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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:06,583 --> 00:00:07,792 (CROWD CHANTING) 2 00:00:07,875 --> 00:00:09,333 DONALD TRUMP: You know, when I first heard that term, 3 00:00:09,417 --> 00:00:11,208 I said "Ugh, that's so hokey." 4 00:00:11,625 --> 00:00:13,750 The hierarchy of power in Washington D.C. 5 00:00:14,083 --> 00:00:15,667 is who can raise the money. 6 00:00:15,750 --> 00:00:17,875 and the special interest groups control the money. 7 00:00:18,083 --> 00:00:20,583 -The lobbyists. -That's the swamp. 8 00:00:21,250 --> 00:00:23,917 I didn't run to unify Washington. 9 00:00:24,458 --> 00:00:26,000 -PROTESTER: Asshole! -Do something! 10 00:00:26,083 --> 00:00:27,291 MATT GAETZ: I ran to change Washington. 11 00:00:28,709 --> 00:00:31,417 REPORTER: What has President Trump done to drain the swamp? 12 00:00:33,000 --> 00:00:34,583 CROWD: Drain the swamp! 13 00:00:35,083 --> 00:00:36,083 ♪ (MUSIC CONCLUDES) ♪ 14 00:00:52,917 --> 00:00:56,125 ♪ (DRAMATIC MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 15 00:01:01,458 --> 00:01:06,125 REPORTER: (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 16 00:01:11,792 --> 00:01:13,875 -(STATIC CRACKLES) -(SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 17 00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:17,000 -(STATIC CRACKLES) -(SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 18 00:01:22,291 --> 00:01:25,542 -(STATIC CRACKLES) -(SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 19 00:01:29,083 --> 00:01:30,500 Donald Trump. 20 00:01:34,792 --> 00:01:37,291 MARGARITA SIMONYAN: (IN ENGLISH) My husband woke me up 21 00:01:37,375 --> 00:01:39,542 and said, "You're not gonna believe it, 22 00:01:39,625 --> 00:01:41,583 but apparently, Trump is winning." 23 00:01:41,667 --> 00:01:45,792 And I thought, "God, now they're gonna blame us." 24 00:01:45,875 --> 00:01:47,709 (LAUGHS) 25 00:01:47,792 --> 00:01:52,000 And I even posted that I think that Russians should go out 26 00:01:52,083 --> 00:01:55,083 on the streets and carry an American flag. 27 00:01:55,166 --> 00:02:00,583 Because somebody against whom the whole establishment, 28 00:02:00,667 --> 00:02:01,959 and all of the media, 29 00:02:02,041 --> 00:02:04,917 and all of the deep state, almost all of them, were, 30 00:02:05,000 --> 00:02:08,458 and he still won because the people liked him. 31 00:02:08,542 --> 00:02:13,041 As a young person who still believes in the values 32 00:02:13,125 --> 00:02:17,250 that I was taught by Americans, in an American school... 33 00:02:17,333 --> 00:02:21,917 to me, it was very optimistic to see that. 34 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:24,875 That it can actually really happen, still. 35 00:02:26,500 --> 00:02:29,750 That is how democracy is supposed to work. 36 00:02:29,834 --> 00:02:32,875 ♪ ("RHAPSODY IN BLUE" BY GEORGE GERSHWIN PLAYING) ♪ 37 00:02:37,041 --> 00:02:39,375 HILLARY CLINTON: I think we know what we're up against. 38 00:02:40,709 --> 00:02:41,959 We do, don't we? 39 00:02:42,041 --> 00:02:45,625 DONALD TRUMP: She's guilty of a very, very serious crime. 40 00:02:45,709 --> 00:02:47,792 She should not be allowed to run. 41 00:02:48,959 --> 00:02:51,291 Hillary Clinton has some explaining to do. 42 00:02:51,375 --> 00:02:54,542 (REPORTERS CLAMORING) 43 00:02:54,625 --> 00:02:57,667 I'm sick and tired of hearing about your damn emails! 44 00:02:57,750 --> 00:02:58,959 -Thank you. (LAUGHS) -(CROWD CHEERING) 45 00:02:59,041 --> 00:03:00,083 BERNIE SANDERS: You know? 46 00:03:00,166 --> 00:03:01,667 REPORTER: Bernie Sanders leading Hillary Clinton. 47 00:03:01,750 --> 00:03:03,667 CROWD: (CHANTING) Feel the Bern! Feel the Bern! 48 00:03:03,750 --> 00:03:05,125 Bernie Sanders. You know, I told him. 49 00:03:05,208 --> 00:03:06,667 I said, "The election's rigged." 50 00:03:06,750 --> 00:03:07,750 It was rigged! 51 00:03:07,834 --> 00:03:09,583 "Here's another ballot!" Throw it away, throw-- 52 00:03:09,667 --> 00:03:11,333 "Oh, here's one I like. We'll keep that one." 53 00:03:11,417 --> 00:03:14,834 ♪ (MUSIC CONTINUES) ♪ 54 00:03:14,917 --> 00:03:17,542 You could put half of Trump's supporters 55 00:03:17,625 --> 00:03:19,959 into what I call the "basket of deplorables." 56 00:03:20,041 --> 00:03:23,500 TRUMP: Isn't this exciting? Don't you love it? I love it! 57 00:03:23,583 --> 00:03:26,333 What's more fun than a Trump rally, right? 58 00:03:26,417 --> 00:03:28,041 (CROWD CHEERING) 59 00:03:28,125 --> 00:03:29,750 I made speeches to lots of groups. 60 00:03:29,834 --> 00:03:32,417 But did you have to be paid 675,000 dollars? 61 00:03:32,500 --> 00:03:33,750 That's what they offered. 62 00:03:33,834 --> 00:03:35,625 -So, um... -(CROWD LAUGHING) 63 00:03:35,709 --> 00:03:37,000 This is the ultimate reality show. 64 00:03:37,083 --> 00:03:38,959 It's the Presidency of the United States. 65 00:03:39,041 --> 00:03:41,583 ♪ (MUSIC INTENSIFIES) ♪ 66 00:03:41,667 --> 00:03:44,083 (CROWD CLAMORING) 67 00:03:44,166 --> 00:03:46,291 -(YIPS) -(EAGLE SQUAWKS) 68 00:03:46,375 --> 00:03:47,625 ...hacked the hell out of us. 69 00:03:47,709 --> 00:03:49,041 -...the DNC hack... -...hacking the DNC... 70 00:03:49,125 --> 00:03:50,834 -...exposed by WikiLeaks... -...and posted on WikiLeaks... 71 00:03:50,917 --> 00:03:52,834 -Military and civilian... -TRUMP: Our country has no idea. 72 00:03:52,917 --> 00:03:54,709 -...agencies, well... -Yeah, I doubt it. I doubt it. 73 00:03:54,792 --> 00:03:56,125 ...he'd rather believe Vladimir Putin. 74 00:03:56,208 --> 00:03:58,333 Vladimir Putin, he called you a brilliant leader. 75 00:03:58,417 --> 00:04:02,041 Do you wanna be complimented by that former KGB officer? 76 00:04:02,125 --> 00:04:03,500 Well, I think when he calls me brilliant, 77 00:04:03,583 --> 00:04:04,917 I'll take the compliment, okay? 78 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:06,750 And every time Russia's brought up, they say, 79 00:04:06,834 --> 00:04:09,417 "Oh, Trump!" What do I have to do with it? 80 00:04:09,500 --> 00:04:11,458 ALEX GIBNEY: Okay, I'm not gonna make you relive 81 00:04:11,542 --> 00:04:14,291 the entire 2016 election. 82 00:04:14,375 --> 00:04:19,125 It was too chaotic. Too crazy. Too much. 83 00:04:19,208 --> 00:04:21,083 But I am interested in figuring out 84 00:04:21,166 --> 00:04:22,500 this Trump-Russia thing. 85 00:04:23,208 --> 00:04:24,834 What was that all about? 86 00:04:24,917 --> 00:04:27,917 Vladimir Putin's plan to rule the world? 87 00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:30,458 A Democrat witch hunt to take down Trump? 88 00:04:31,125 --> 00:04:33,291 A Cold War spy game? 89 00:04:33,375 --> 00:04:35,875 I've been trying for years to answer those questions, 90 00:04:35,959 --> 00:04:37,125 and every time someone asked me 91 00:04:37,208 --> 00:04:39,417 what this movie was about, I'd say... 92 00:04:39,500 --> 00:04:41,500 "Well, how much time do you have?" 93 00:04:43,083 --> 00:04:46,250 Fear. Money. Corruption. 94 00:04:46,333 --> 00:04:48,291 I can't tell you the one thing that explains 95 00:04:48,375 --> 00:04:51,917 what Russia did to us or what we did to ourselves. 96 00:04:52,041 --> 00:04:54,959 All I can tell you is what happened. 97 00:04:55,041 --> 00:04:56,625 That's hard enough when you're talking about 98 00:04:56,709 --> 00:05:00,000 the most chaotic election of our lifetimes. 99 00:05:00,083 --> 00:05:02,917 And maybe for now, that's one thing I will say. 100 00:05:03,000 --> 00:05:06,125 For some politicians, in Russia and America, 101 00:05:06,208 --> 00:05:08,375 chaos isn't something to fear. 102 00:05:08,917 --> 00:05:10,625 It's a way to get by. 103 00:05:10,709 --> 00:05:14,000 Sometimes, with a little help from your friends. 104 00:05:14,083 --> 00:05:17,000 ♪ (MUSIC CONTINUES) ♪ 105 00:05:18,834 --> 00:05:21,417 ♪ (MUSIC TRANSITIONS INTO ROCK RENDITION) ♪ 106 00:05:31,291 --> 00:05:32,500 Thank you very much. 107 00:05:39,166 --> 00:05:41,542 (CROWD CHEERING) 108 00:05:44,500 --> 00:05:46,125 ♪ (MUSIC CONCLUDES) ♪ 109 00:05:50,375 --> 00:05:52,750 (CAR HONKING IN DISTANCE) 110 00:05:57,000 --> 00:05:58,959 ♪ (MELLOW MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 111 00:06:03,625 --> 00:06:06,166 ALEX: The country spent years telling itself stories 112 00:06:06,250 --> 00:06:08,834 to make sense of 2016. 113 00:06:08,917 --> 00:06:12,417 It started in the final days of the Obama administration 114 00:06:12,500 --> 00:06:15,709 with a report from the US Intelligence Community. 115 00:06:15,792 --> 00:06:17,792 REPORTER: An American intelligence report 116 00:06:17,875 --> 00:06:20,458 finds that Russia used disinformation warfare 117 00:06:20,542 --> 00:06:24,041 to try to interfere with the 2016 presidential election. 118 00:06:24,125 --> 00:06:26,542 One of the weapons in the Kremlin's arsenal 119 00:06:26,625 --> 00:06:30,083 was its state-run news network, RT. 120 00:06:30,166 --> 00:06:31,875 SIMONYAN: I read that report. 121 00:06:31,959 --> 00:06:34,709 Well, I laughed my guts out. 122 00:06:34,792 --> 00:06:38,166 They mentioned my name there 27 times. 123 00:06:38,250 --> 00:06:41,709 It would be laughable if it weren't that scary. 124 00:06:41,792 --> 00:06:44,583 If the Intelligence Community... 125 00:06:44,667 --> 00:06:48,542 of the most powerful country in the world... 126 00:06:48,625 --> 00:06:52,333 is that ignorant, the world is in much trouble. 127 00:06:52,417 --> 00:06:54,792 REPORTER 1: The FBI has an open investigation... 128 00:06:54,875 --> 00:06:56,375 REPORTER 2: The House Intelligence Committee 129 00:06:56,458 --> 00:06:57,667 issued seven subpoenas... 130 00:06:57,750 --> 00:06:59,041 REPORTER 3: ...an active investigation... 131 00:06:59,125 --> 00:07:00,750 REPORTER 2: This is a pretty broad investigation, 132 00:07:00,834 --> 00:07:02,333 they are following the money... 133 00:07:02,417 --> 00:07:04,083 REPORTER 4: What next on the Russian investigation? 134 00:07:04,166 --> 00:07:05,583 REPORTER 2: ...so-called Russian collusion... 135 00:07:05,667 --> 00:07:06,959 REPORTER 4: It'll now be handled by... 136 00:07:07,041 --> 00:07:08,834 ALEX: There were too many investigations to count. 137 00:07:08,917 --> 00:07:12,583 The FBI, the Justice Department, both houses of Congress. 138 00:07:12,667 --> 00:07:15,458 Everyone wanted to know what Russia had done. 139 00:07:15,542 --> 00:07:17,542 But if anyone was gonna get the goods, 140 00:07:17,625 --> 00:07:19,166 it would be the team put together 141 00:07:19,250 --> 00:07:21,500 by the Special Counsel, Robert Mueller. 142 00:07:26,500 --> 00:07:28,250 ANDREW WEISSMANN: After the announcement that 143 00:07:28,333 --> 00:07:32,000 Rod Rosenstein had appointed Bob Mueller, 144 00:07:32,083 --> 00:07:37,583 a friend of mine sent me an email that said: "Bye, bye!" 145 00:07:37,667 --> 00:07:40,542 He knew that I'd worked with Director Mueller twice before, 146 00:07:40,625 --> 00:07:43,959 and he just assumed that I would just go off and work with him. 147 00:07:44,041 --> 00:07:47,208 ♪ (MYSTERIOUS MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 148 00:07:48,458 --> 00:07:50,875 People like to think of the Special Counsel's Office 149 00:07:50,959 --> 00:07:51,959 as a witch hunt, 150 00:07:52,041 --> 00:07:55,709 but this is just not a partisan issue. 151 00:07:57,208 --> 00:08:01,667 Our report has one key finding. 152 00:08:02,834 --> 00:08:05,709 Clear, unequivocal... 153 00:08:07,083 --> 00:08:09,250 efforts by the Russian government 154 00:08:09,333 --> 00:08:10,917 to interfere with our election. 155 00:08:12,709 --> 00:08:19,041 The issue that goes to the core of our democracy is... 156 00:08:19,125 --> 00:08:23,583 are we doing everything we can to make sure 157 00:08:23,667 --> 00:08:28,125 that Americans will decide who is running this country? 158 00:08:30,250 --> 00:08:34,750 Oh, so, the DNC knew of the hack on April 19th. 159 00:08:34,834 --> 00:08:38,125 But it wasn't reported until The Washington Post... 160 00:08:38,208 --> 00:08:39,834 ALEX: I started working on the Russia story 161 00:08:39,917 --> 00:08:41,959 at the suggestion of the legendary reporter 162 00:08:42,041 --> 00:08:44,417 and producer Lowell Bergman. 163 00:08:44,500 --> 00:08:46,667 We formed a team of reporters and collaborators 164 00:08:46,750 --> 00:08:50,041 from the US and Russia to take on different parts of the story. 165 00:08:50,125 --> 00:08:53,208 INTERVIEWER: Uh, did you get hired by a firm that was-- 166 00:08:53,291 --> 00:08:54,875 that had a more political interest? 167 00:08:54,959 --> 00:08:55,959 No, but thank you. 168 00:08:56,041 --> 00:08:59,166 ALEX: But what exactly was the story? 169 00:08:59,250 --> 00:09:02,208 We learned a lot of details about election interference. 170 00:09:02,291 --> 00:09:06,458 The trolling, the hacking, and the alleged collusion. 171 00:09:07,417 --> 00:09:09,041 What I couldn't figure out was, 172 00:09:09,125 --> 00:09:11,709 how did these pieces fit together? 173 00:09:11,792 --> 00:09:13,417 Or even if they did. 174 00:09:15,500 --> 00:09:17,208 The first piece of the puzzle pointed us 175 00:09:17,291 --> 00:09:19,166 toward a cyber trail on the internet, 176 00:09:19,250 --> 00:09:21,250 where a motley band of Russian trolls 177 00:09:21,333 --> 00:09:24,291 had been busy making mischief on social media. 178 00:09:24,375 --> 00:09:26,750 ♪ (DRAMATIC MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 179 00:09:33,417 --> 00:09:37,000 (ELECTRONIC BEEPING) 180 00:09:55,542 --> 00:09:57,959 ALEX: The campaign was riddled with disinformation, 181 00:09:58,041 --> 00:10:00,959 which travels like quicksilver on the internet. 182 00:10:01,041 --> 00:10:03,083 So we sought out Camille François, 183 00:10:03,166 --> 00:10:06,583 who was engaged by the US Senate to study the activities 184 00:10:06,667 --> 00:10:08,834 of the infamous Russian troll factory 185 00:10:08,917 --> 00:10:11,458 known as the Internet Research Agency, 186 00:10:11,834 --> 00:10:13,333 or IRA. 187 00:10:14,500 --> 00:10:17,125 CAMILLE FRANÇOIS: In 2016, people didn't know 188 00:10:17,208 --> 00:10:19,125 what a Russian troll was. 189 00:10:19,834 --> 00:10:21,542 I was quite fascinated 190 00:10:21,625 --> 00:10:25,333 by this new means of controlling narratives. 191 00:10:26,250 --> 00:10:28,583 My background is in human rights, 192 00:10:28,667 --> 00:10:32,750 and I was very concerned with the way digital technology 193 00:10:32,834 --> 00:10:36,375 was actually creating new problems in human rights. 194 00:10:38,208 --> 00:10:40,208 What's really interesting with Russia, 195 00:10:40,291 --> 00:10:43,208 it exemplifies a new trend 196 00:10:43,291 --> 00:10:45,792 in governments using the internet 197 00:10:45,875 --> 00:10:48,041 to control and repress. 198 00:10:49,208 --> 00:10:50,583 Members of the committee, thank you 199 00:10:50,667 --> 00:10:52,500 for having me here today. 200 00:10:52,583 --> 00:10:54,709 We're here to discuss the growing issue 201 00:10:54,792 --> 00:10:57,458 of online imposters and disinformation. 202 00:10:57,542 --> 00:11:00,125 Targeting specific communities at the right time 203 00:11:00,208 --> 00:11:01,542 and with the right tactics 204 00:11:01,625 --> 00:11:04,125 can have a catastrophic impact on society 205 00:11:04,208 --> 00:11:05,458 or on an election. 206 00:11:05,542 --> 00:11:07,417 And I have seen the types of impacts 207 00:11:07,500 --> 00:11:10,250 that those disinformation campaigns can have. 208 00:11:11,166 --> 00:11:15,333 The IRA uses what we call "persona." 209 00:11:15,417 --> 00:11:18,166 A persona is simply an account 210 00:11:18,250 --> 00:11:20,041 that's not who they say they are. 211 00:11:20,125 --> 00:11:23,417 They're really doing three types of personas. 212 00:11:23,500 --> 00:11:27,083 Fake people, like, "Hi, my name is Jenna Abrams. 213 00:11:27,166 --> 00:11:29,000 I am an American conservative." 214 00:11:29,083 --> 00:11:31,208 She doesn't exist. She's a fake person. 215 00:11:31,291 --> 00:11:32,959 That's a fake persona. 216 00:11:33,041 --> 00:11:34,625 Fake organizations. 217 00:11:34,709 --> 00:11:37,500 "Hi, we are BlackMattersUS. 218 00:11:37,583 --> 00:11:41,041 We are an organization dedicated to fighting racism in America." 219 00:11:41,125 --> 00:11:44,166 This organization doesn't exist. It's a fake shop. 220 00:11:44,250 --> 00:11:48,417 And finally, through doing fake local media. 221 00:11:48,500 --> 00:11:51,542 Like a newspaper that's based in Baltimore 222 00:11:51,625 --> 00:11:54,959 that has a title that sounds like it could be real. 223 00:11:55,041 --> 00:11:56,875 But it's not. It's not a real newspaper. 224 00:11:56,959 --> 00:11:58,291 It doesn't have real journalists, 225 00:11:58,375 --> 00:12:00,667 and it has zero office in Baltimore. 226 00:12:00,750 --> 00:12:04,125 They have this army of personas, 227 00:12:04,208 --> 00:12:07,375 and together they're gonna do campaigns. 228 00:12:07,458 --> 00:12:09,208 (INDISTINCT CHATTER) 229 00:12:09,291 --> 00:12:12,291 FRANÇOIS: What does all this social media activity tell us 230 00:12:12,375 --> 00:12:16,291 about what the IRA was doing in the United States? 231 00:12:17,291 --> 00:12:18,625 What is the story? 232 00:12:19,625 --> 00:12:21,875 Initially, the IRA was not focused 233 00:12:21,959 --> 00:12:24,750 on the 2016 election. 234 00:12:24,834 --> 00:12:26,458 The first thing that you see 235 00:12:26,542 --> 00:12:29,959 is the IRA's seeking to control 236 00:12:30,041 --> 00:12:32,583 the Russian domestic conversation. 237 00:12:32,667 --> 00:12:34,625 ♪ (DRAMATIC MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 238 00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:42,709 FRANÇOIS: The first target of the IRA 239 00:12:42,792 --> 00:12:45,333 really is the Russian people themselves. 240 00:12:49,333 --> 00:12:53,000 The IRA starts in 2013, in St. Petersburg. 241 00:12:56,959 --> 00:12:59,417 ALEX: To tell the story of the troll factory, 242 00:12:59,500 --> 00:13:02,542 we compiled hacked and leaked materials 243 00:13:02,625 --> 00:13:05,083 and spoke to former employees and journalists 244 00:13:05,166 --> 00:13:07,250 who had gotten inside. 245 00:13:07,333 --> 00:13:10,375 MAN: (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN OVER PHONE) 246 00:13:27,333 --> 00:13:29,250 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 247 00:13:30,834 --> 00:13:32,542 ANDREI SOSHNIKOV: (IN ENGLISH) The troll farm itself 248 00:13:32,625 --> 00:13:36,959 is like, um, a Disneyland for investigative journalists. 249 00:13:37,041 --> 00:13:39,458 There is always something going on there. 250 00:13:39,542 --> 00:13:41,709 It's a very evil organization, 251 00:13:41,792 --> 00:13:44,709 but it was very fun to investigate. 252 00:13:44,792 --> 00:13:46,500 JAVIER: When was the first time you heard of this, 253 00:13:46,583 --> 00:13:49,709 this thing that we've come to call the troll factory? 254 00:13:49,792 --> 00:13:53,625 In the year 2013, I was the first journalist 255 00:13:53,709 --> 00:13:56,333 to report about the troll farm. 256 00:13:56,417 --> 00:13:58,000 (MOUSE CLICKING) 257 00:13:58,083 --> 00:14:01,333 SOSHNIKOV: I've seen a post on social media. 258 00:14:01,417 --> 00:14:04,291 A woman told about a very strange job, 259 00:14:04,375 --> 00:14:06,834 and I decided that I need to check. 260 00:14:06,917 --> 00:14:11,542 So I went undercover. I bought a new SIM card. 261 00:14:12,583 --> 00:14:15,917 I created a new social media profile. 262 00:14:16,000 --> 00:14:18,542 And I came up with another name. 263 00:14:19,875 --> 00:14:24,625 They rented this big building on Savushkina Street 55. 264 00:14:25,417 --> 00:14:27,083 I went to the interview, 265 00:14:27,166 --> 00:14:29,834 and I was asked just two simple questions: 266 00:14:29,917 --> 00:14:32,250 "What's your attitude towards Kremlin?" 267 00:14:32,333 --> 00:14:36,041 And "What's your attitude towards Russian opposition?" 268 00:14:36,125 --> 00:14:37,291 That's how it worked. 269 00:14:38,375 --> 00:14:39,333 (BEEPS) 270 00:14:39,417 --> 00:14:40,625 WOMAN: (IN RUSSIAN) 271 00:14:42,625 --> 00:14:43,625 (DOOR CLOSES) 272 00:14:45,208 --> 00:14:48,250 SOSHNIKOV: I met another investigative journalist there. 273 00:14:48,333 --> 00:14:49,875 We know each other since childhood, 274 00:14:49,959 --> 00:14:53,000 and it was very difficult to hide our laughs. 275 00:14:53,083 --> 00:14:55,959 She said, "Oh, hi, Andrei. Good to see you here. 276 00:14:56,041 --> 00:14:57,792 You also looking for a job?" 277 00:14:57,875 --> 00:15:01,208 "Yeah! I will write stuff on the internet about Kremlin 278 00:15:01,291 --> 00:15:03,709 and praise Putin and stuff like this." 279 00:15:03,792 --> 00:15:06,959 And she said, "Wow, I will do the same thing." 280 00:15:07,458 --> 00:15:10,041 (MACHINE BEEPS) 281 00:15:10,125 --> 00:15:12,542 SOSHNIKOV: It shows how unprofessional they were 282 00:15:12,625 --> 00:15:13,709 on their first days 283 00:15:13,792 --> 00:15:16,458 because they had two investigative journalists... 284 00:15:17,125 --> 00:15:19,542 in the building. Same time. 285 00:15:20,917 --> 00:15:22,625 They had several levels. 286 00:15:26,750 --> 00:15:30,208 Some doors has just a hashtag. 287 00:15:30,291 --> 00:15:34,542 A special department creating hashtags, maybe. 288 00:15:35,166 --> 00:15:36,959 (WOMAN HUMMING) 289 00:15:38,500 --> 00:15:40,750 They had two types of people, 290 00:15:40,834 --> 00:15:42,750 -simple trolls and analytics. -(BEEPS) 291 00:15:42,834 --> 00:15:46,083 SOSHNIKOV: The job of analytics is to create the agenda 292 00:15:46,166 --> 00:15:47,583 for the troll. 293 00:15:47,667 --> 00:15:51,166 You have to use these words and these phrases 294 00:15:51,250 --> 00:15:53,667 to promote our opinion. 295 00:15:53,750 --> 00:15:57,792 A very short task, we called them technical assignments. 296 00:15:59,333 --> 00:16:01,125 SOSHNIKOV: They were really interested 297 00:16:01,208 --> 00:16:04,333 in the comments sections of media websites. 298 00:16:07,667 --> 00:16:08,959 WOMAN: (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 299 00:16:09,041 --> 00:16:13,458 TRANSLATOR: "Putin is good. Putin is the best president. 300 00:16:13,542 --> 00:16:16,208 If someone had doubts that Putin is the best president, 301 00:16:16,291 --> 00:16:17,583 then after the..." 302 00:16:17,667 --> 00:16:23,125 SOSHNIKOV: And they had to send their bosses pages of forums 303 00:16:23,208 --> 00:16:26,041 with examples of their posts. 304 00:16:28,959 --> 00:16:31,041 (WOMAN LAUGHING) 305 00:16:31,125 --> 00:16:33,083 SOSHNIKOV: I spent one day there. 306 00:16:35,250 --> 00:16:39,291 I literally wrote the story, uh, in the evening, 307 00:16:39,375 --> 00:16:41,875 and the next morning, it was online. 308 00:16:43,959 --> 00:16:45,375 A very short story. 309 00:16:51,583 --> 00:16:53,125 (INDISTINCT CHATTER) 310 00:16:53,208 --> 00:16:56,125 SOSHNIKOV: I thought they are amateurs. 311 00:16:56,208 --> 00:17:00,291 And how people who were hired from the streets... 312 00:17:01,041 --> 00:17:02,458 could establish 313 00:17:02,542 --> 00:17:06,417 such a sophisticated disinformational campaign 314 00:17:06,500 --> 00:17:09,250 against a strong Western democracy? 315 00:17:10,083 --> 00:17:11,750 Um, absurd. 316 00:17:13,792 --> 00:17:15,750 ALEX: It seemed absurd back then. 317 00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,417 The trolls' skills just didn't match their ambition 318 00:17:18,500 --> 00:17:21,083 to move fast and break things. 319 00:17:21,166 --> 00:17:24,542 So the people in charge tried to scale up. 320 00:17:24,625 --> 00:17:27,208 They boosted pay to attract better employees 321 00:17:27,291 --> 00:17:30,583 and brought in various outside consultants to train them. 322 00:17:32,041 --> 00:17:35,834 OLEG MATVEYCHEV: (IN RUSSIAN) 323 00:18:26,542 --> 00:18:28,792 ♪ (TENSE MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 324 00:19:50,500 --> 00:19:51,959 ALEX: The trolls were building a machine 325 00:19:52,041 --> 00:19:54,792 for influencing conversations on the web. 326 00:19:54,875 --> 00:19:57,667 So what? Every PR firm in the world 327 00:19:57,750 --> 00:20:00,500 was doing the same thing in 2013. 328 00:20:00,583 --> 00:20:04,500 But the trolls wanted to do more than monetize social media. 329 00:20:04,583 --> 00:20:07,000 They used their network to help the Russian government 330 00:20:07,083 --> 00:20:09,917 in a war against another country. 331 00:20:10,041 --> 00:20:13,208 What they really did, they did with Ukraine, 332 00:20:13,291 --> 00:20:15,542 and Ukraine is the main victim. 333 00:20:15,625 --> 00:20:19,166 ♪ (MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 334 00:20:23,917 --> 00:20:25,333 Ukraine is fascinating 335 00:20:25,417 --> 00:20:29,792 because it is caught between the West and Russia, 336 00:20:30,458 --> 00:20:32,625 both politically and physically. 337 00:20:33,917 --> 00:20:36,792 There's the eastern part, which is more Russian, 338 00:20:36,875 --> 00:20:39,208 and it's also the wealthier part. 339 00:20:39,291 --> 00:20:42,291 Russia has enormous control there 340 00:20:42,375 --> 00:20:45,375 because of oil and gas, which Ukraine needs. 341 00:20:45,458 --> 00:20:48,500 And so, there's this tug of war about Ukraine 342 00:20:48,583 --> 00:20:49,875 and whether it's gonna be 343 00:20:49,959 --> 00:20:51,792 a Russian sphere of influence or not. 344 00:20:56,667 --> 00:21:00,875 FRANÇOIS: Before the IRA did a major operation in the US, 345 00:21:00,959 --> 00:21:04,417 Ukraine became, frankly, the lab 346 00:21:04,500 --> 00:21:07,083 for all the latest and greatest 347 00:21:07,166 --> 00:21:10,333 from Russia's information operations. 348 00:21:15,792 --> 00:21:18,834 ♪ ("STATE ANTHEM OF UKRAINE" PLAYING) ♪ 349 00:21:19,792 --> 00:21:21,333 (INDISTINCT VOICE OVER LOUDSPEAKER) 350 00:21:24,250 --> 00:21:30,083 Yanukovych was the pro-Russian, pro-Putin president. 351 00:21:30,166 --> 00:21:32,166 (SCATTERED APPLAUSE) 352 00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:37,083 WEISSMANN: But he was going to sign legislation 353 00:21:37,166 --> 00:21:38,291 that would put Ukraine 354 00:21:38,375 --> 00:21:41,208 further in the sphere of Western influence. 355 00:21:43,041 --> 00:21:45,750 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 356 00:21:45,834 --> 00:21:47,417 TRANSLATOR: "I believe that we should push on 357 00:21:47,500 --> 00:21:49,875 with our partnership with the European Union. 358 00:21:50,750 --> 00:21:52,500 It's an imperative." 359 00:21:52,583 --> 00:21:54,375 Originally, Yanukovych became president 360 00:21:54,458 --> 00:21:57,375 with the promise of signing an EU Association Agreement. 361 00:21:57,458 --> 00:21:58,875 There was a lot of political support 362 00:21:58,959 --> 00:22:01,375 'cause it was gonna be good for Ukrainian business. 363 00:22:02,959 --> 00:22:05,125 It would have given them freedom of movement 364 00:22:05,208 --> 00:22:06,458 for their citizens, visa-free. 365 00:22:06,542 --> 00:22:10,375 It would have given them, uh, complete trade preferences. 366 00:22:10,458 --> 00:22:14,625 It would have been a free, prosperous, 367 00:22:14,709 --> 00:22:18,041 increasingly European Ukraine. 368 00:22:18,875 --> 00:22:23,834 Putin wakes up in October of 2013 369 00:22:23,917 --> 00:22:28,458 and decides that he has to move very quickly to end that. 370 00:22:28,542 --> 00:22:29,667 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 371 00:22:29,750 --> 00:22:32,417 TRANSLATOR: "Ukraine is not our closest neighbor. 372 00:22:34,875 --> 00:22:37,250 It's our fraternal nation." 373 00:22:38,583 --> 00:22:42,625 So he offers Yanukovych these big loans... 374 00:22:42,709 --> 00:22:44,166 and Yanukovych tells his citizens, 375 00:22:44,250 --> 00:22:46,125 "We're gonna put this on the back burner." 376 00:22:46,834 --> 00:22:49,125 This is Ukraine's moment 377 00:22:49,208 --> 00:22:51,709 to meet the aspirations of its people 378 00:22:52,291 --> 00:22:54,041 or to disappoint them 379 00:22:54,125 --> 00:22:58,333 and risk descending into chaos and violence. 380 00:22:59,542 --> 00:23:01,542 It was political for Putin. 381 00:23:01,625 --> 00:23:04,709 He was afraid he was losing Ukraine to Europe 382 00:23:04,792 --> 00:23:05,959 and the next step would be 383 00:23:06,041 --> 00:23:08,291 that his own citizens would want that, too. 384 00:23:11,375 --> 00:23:13,041 ALEX: Putin needed to show Russians 385 00:23:13,125 --> 00:23:16,375 that Ukraine's turn toward Europe was bad news, 386 00:23:16,458 --> 00:23:19,291 a perfect opportunity for the troll factory. 387 00:23:24,792 --> 00:23:27,208 While the trolls tried to sway public opinion, 388 00:23:27,291 --> 00:23:29,375 Putin invited Yanukovych to the Kremlin 389 00:23:29,458 --> 00:23:30,834 for a friendly chat. 390 00:23:32,667 --> 00:23:34,875 WEISSMANN: Rumors are that Yanukovych was paid 391 00:23:34,959 --> 00:23:36,667 a bloody fortune under the table. 392 00:23:36,750 --> 00:23:39,542 I mean, he lived this incredibly opulent life 393 00:23:39,625 --> 00:23:42,917 that you couldn't possibly live on a government salary. 394 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:46,458 When he reneged on the European deal, 395 00:23:46,542 --> 00:23:49,000 there was this huge popular uprising. 396 00:23:50,834 --> 00:23:52,792 (SHOUTING IN UKRAINIAN) 397 00:23:53,500 --> 00:23:55,792 (PROTESTERS CHEER) 398 00:23:55,875 --> 00:24:00,166 PROTESTER: (SPEAKING IN UKRAINIAN) 399 00:24:10,500 --> 00:24:15,083 It started as peaceful protests in December of 2013. 400 00:24:15,166 --> 00:24:18,500 Those protests turned violent in January of 2014. 401 00:24:19,417 --> 00:24:21,834 (GUNSHOTS) 402 00:24:22,875 --> 00:24:24,458 (PEOPLE SHOUTING IN UKRAINIAN) 403 00:24:24,542 --> 00:24:28,250 Putin was encouraging Yanukovych throughout this period to do 404 00:24:28,333 --> 00:24:32,417 what he himself would have done and has done in Russia, 405 00:24:32,500 --> 00:24:34,875 which is to be very heavy-handed on the street 406 00:24:34,959 --> 00:24:38,000 against protesters, locking up mass numbers of people. 407 00:24:38,083 --> 00:24:40,709 (SHOUTING IN UKRAINIAN) 408 00:24:40,792 --> 00:24:42,041 PROTESTER: 409 00:24:42,125 --> 00:24:43,375 CROWD: 410 00:24:44,458 --> 00:24:46,333 And he thought that Yanukovych was a chump 411 00:24:46,417 --> 00:24:48,375 to allow it to go on as long as he did. 412 00:24:49,834 --> 00:24:52,583 CELESTE WALLANDER: Ukrainian security services, 413 00:24:52,667 --> 00:24:54,709 possibly with some outside help, 414 00:24:54,792 --> 00:24:57,458 began to shoot at the protesters. 415 00:24:57,542 --> 00:24:58,917 (GUNSHOT) 416 00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:01,667 (PEOPLE YELLING IN UKRAINIAN) 417 00:25:06,750 --> 00:25:08,375 (INDISTINCT CLAMORING) 418 00:25:10,375 --> 00:25:12,583 WALLANDER: You've probably seen the films of the bloodbaths 419 00:25:12,667 --> 00:25:14,125 in-- in January of 2014. 420 00:25:15,208 --> 00:25:17,917 ♪ (SOMBER MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 421 00:25:21,250 --> 00:25:24,458 TIMOTHY SNYDER: In Ukraine, in 2013 and 2014, 422 00:25:24,542 --> 00:25:29,417 people mobilized for a very simple thing. 423 00:25:29,500 --> 00:25:32,750 People, especially young people, wanted to look forward 424 00:25:32,834 --> 00:25:34,625 to a future with predictability 425 00:25:34,709 --> 00:25:37,250 and the rule of law and Europe in it. 426 00:25:37,959 --> 00:25:39,500 That mattered to them enough 427 00:25:39,583 --> 00:25:42,333 to go out on the street and take risks. 428 00:25:42,417 --> 00:25:45,458 And in the end, some of them paid with their lives. 429 00:25:45,542 --> 00:25:47,166 That's the story of the revolution in Ukraine 430 00:25:47,250 --> 00:25:49,000 which is thought of as the Maidan. 431 00:25:49,083 --> 00:25:51,625 VICTORIA NULAND: The whole world is watching. 432 00:25:51,709 --> 00:25:54,041 There is a way out for Ukraine. 433 00:25:54,125 --> 00:25:57,000 It is still possible to save 434 00:25:57,083 --> 00:25:59,583 Ukraine's European future. 435 00:25:59,667 --> 00:26:04,125 EU finally managed to broker a de-escalation agreement 436 00:26:04,208 --> 00:26:06,208 that would constrain 437 00:26:06,291 --> 00:26:09,375 Yanukovych's authoritarian trends and power. 438 00:26:09,458 --> 00:26:11,125 But he was gonna stay in as president. 439 00:26:11,959 --> 00:26:14,166 I have no doubt after our meeting 440 00:26:14,250 --> 00:26:18,417 that President Yanukovych knows what he needs to do. 441 00:26:21,917 --> 00:26:24,375 There was actually a plan for Vice President Biden 442 00:26:24,458 --> 00:26:26,291 to speak to Yanukovych. 443 00:26:26,375 --> 00:26:28,125 I was supposed to be in on that phone call, 444 00:26:28,208 --> 00:26:29,750 taking notes. 445 00:26:29,834 --> 00:26:32,625 And they said, "We can't find President Yanukovych." 446 00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:36,291 We all were like, "Well, that's kind of strange." 447 00:26:36,375 --> 00:26:38,208 We woke up the next morning to find out 448 00:26:38,291 --> 00:26:41,709 that Yanukovych had actually fled to Russia. 449 00:26:45,333 --> 00:26:47,375 And then, the Ukrainians had a vote 450 00:26:47,458 --> 00:26:49,333 to create an interim government. 451 00:26:49,417 --> 00:26:51,458 The Russians were not happy about this. 452 00:26:53,917 --> 00:26:57,291 On the next day, I got a call from the Situation Room 453 00:26:57,375 --> 00:26:59,583 saying, "You need to come in and see something," 454 00:26:59,667 --> 00:27:01,917 and it was the first movement of Russian forces 455 00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:03,250 invading Crimea, 456 00:27:03,333 --> 00:27:06,875 which is a strategic part of Ukraine for Russia. 457 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:10,417 Within 24 hours of Yanukovych having run away. 458 00:27:14,583 --> 00:27:17,375 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 459 00:27:24,417 --> 00:27:26,166 WALLANDER: And they managed to cut off Crimea 460 00:27:26,250 --> 00:27:28,709 from the mainland within a couple days. 461 00:27:28,792 --> 00:27:30,083 -(GUNSHOT) -(DOG BARKING) 462 00:27:30,166 --> 00:27:32,542 WALLANDER: The whole invasion was done within a week. 463 00:27:35,542 --> 00:27:38,792 ALEX: The invasion became a war for Eastern Ukraine 464 00:27:38,875 --> 00:27:42,500 with pro-Russian separatists receiving support from Moscow. 465 00:27:42,583 --> 00:27:45,458 From the start, the trolls had a key role to play. 466 00:27:45,542 --> 00:27:47,417 They created fake news websites, 467 00:27:47,500 --> 00:27:49,834 which they used to drive a wedge into Ukraine 468 00:27:49,917 --> 00:27:53,625 and push the two halves of the country apart. 469 00:27:53,709 --> 00:27:56,417 Targeting Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine, 470 00:27:56,500 --> 00:27:58,709 they portrayed the protestors in the capital 471 00:27:58,792 --> 00:28:02,917 as neo-Nazis trying to seize power by coup d'état. 472 00:28:04,583 --> 00:28:07,417 If you were an American or a European 473 00:28:07,500 --> 00:28:09,583 following the war in Ukraine, 474 00:28:09,667 --> 00:28:11,166 and you were looking at Facebook, 475 00:28:11,250 --> 00:28:13,667 if you were on the left, the Russians would be 476 00:28:13,750 --> 00:28:18,166 telling you that Ukraine was a fascist or a Nazi regime. 477 00:28:18,250 --> 00:28:19,875 With the lack of peace and stability 478 00:28:19,959 --> 00:28:21,834 and the rise of neo-Nazi hardliners, 479 00:28:21,917 --> 00:28:25,291 many Jews are considering fleeing the country. 480 00:28:27,333 --> 00:28:28,750 SNYDER: If you were on the far right, 481 00:28:28,834 --> 00:28:30,083 the Russians would be telling you 482 00:28:30,166 --> 00:28:31,709 that this whole Ukrainian thing 483 00:28:31,792 --> 00:28:34,166 was a part of a Jewish international conspiracy 484 00:28:34,250 --> 00:28:36,208 and the Ukrainian state was just propped up 485 00:28:36,291 --> 00:28:38,250 by Jewish oligarchs. 486 00:28:38,333 --> 00:28:41,000 And of course, those two stories don't go very well together, 487 00:28:41,083 --> 00:28:42,125 but it doesn't matter. 488 00:28:42,208 --> 00:28:43,542 People on the left and people on the far right 489 00:28:43,625 --> 00:28:45,125 are in their own internet bubbles. 490 00:28:45,208 --> 00:28:47,500 So, they learned that you can do that. 491 00:28:47,583 --> 00:28:49,375 And you can motivate and de-motivate 492 00:28:49,458 --> 00:28:51,291 by telling contradictory falsehoods 493 00:28:51,375 --> 00:28:53,583 that are targeted to different audiences, 494 00:28:54,458 --> 00:28:55,375 and by doing that, 495 00:28:55,458 --> 00:28:57,667 get the overall result that you want. 496 00:29:00,250 --> 00:29:03,000 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 497 00:29:58,208 --> 00:29:59,709 SOSHNIKOV: They were preparing 498 00:29:59,792 --> 00:30:03,125 the informational background of these operations. 499 00:30:03,208 --> 00:30:05,792 They created so many fake news and videos, 500 00:30:05,875 --> 00:30:07,417 like to say that, uh, 501 00:30:07,500 --> 00:30:11,417 Ukrainian soldiers torture people who speaks Russian, 502 00:30:11,500 --> 00:30:15,041 to cover what was really going on there. 503 00:30:17,333 --> 00:30:19,041 (IN RUSSIAN) 504 00:31:26,792 --> 00:31:29,166 FIGHTER: (IN RUSSIAN) 505 00:31:34,792 --> 00:31:36,333 WALLANDER: I would watch these videos 506 00:31:36,417 --> 00:31:39,375 about, you know, fascists in Ukraine, and Nazis, 507 00:31:39,458 --> 00:31:41,458 and all this sort of insane stuff, 508 00:31:41,542 --> 00:31:44,417 and be like... (SCOFFS) "No one could believe that." 509 00:31:44,500 --> 00:31:45,750 And I was wrong. 510 00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:54,125 I was insufficiently attuned to how those Russian operations 511 00:31:54,208 --> 00:31:57,542 could be persuasive in the context of social media 512 00:31:57,625 --> 00:31:59,458 if they were properly targeted. 513 00:32:01,667 --> 00:32:04,542 People who worked on the troll farm, 514 00:32:04,625 --> 00:32:06,375 they changed history. 515 00:32:06,458 --> 00:32:09,667 They really influenced the situation. 516 00:32:12,250 --> 00:32:14,750 ALEX: When the troll factory manufactured its campaign 517 00:32:14,834 --> 00:32:16,083 on the US election, 518 00:32:16,166 --> 00:32:18,709 it used tools developed in Ukraine. 519 00:32:18,792 --> 00:32:20,625 A motive developed there, too. 520 00:32:20,709 --> 00:32:22,250 Before Yanukovych fled, 521 00:32:22,333 --> 00:32:24,709 the Russian government was furious about the role 522 00:32:24,792 --> 00:32:28,250 played by Americans on the ground in Kyiv. 523 00:32:28,333 --> 00:32:31,583 NULAND: We had a stream of Americans 524 00:32:31,667 --> 00:32:33,083 going out to Ukraine 525 00:32:33,166 --> 00:32:37,458 to mediate between Yanukovych and the protesters. 526 00:32:37,542 --> 00:32:39,750 And the US ambassador on the ground called me. 527 00:32:39,834 --> 00:32:40,917 It was an open line. 528 00:32:41,041 --> 00:32:42,542 I knew the Russians were listening. 529 00:32:43,875 --> 00:32:45,667 (OVER PHONE) 530 00:32:58,208 --> 00:33:00,625 And at that point, I used this barnyard epithet, 531 00:33:00,709 --> 00:33:05,291 never thinking that the Russians would put this out publicly. 532 00:33:05,375 --> 00:33:09,458 In fact, they hadn't dumped a phone call on the street 533 00:33:09,542 --> 00:33:10,959 in 25 years. 534 00:33:11,041 --> 00:33:15,291 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 535 00:33:15,375 --> 00:33:17,083 NULAND (OVER PHONE): You know... (BLEEP) ...the EU. 536 00:33:17,166 --> 00:33:19,542 -REPORTER: (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) -(BLEEP) 537 00:33:19,625 --> 00:33:22,125 NULAND: I did a great apologia tour, 538 00:33:22,208 --> 00:33:23,291 called everybody. 539 00:33:23,375 --> 00:33:25,875 It was pretty impressive tradecraft. 540 00:33:25,959 --> 00:33:28,625 The audio was, uh, extremely clear. 541 00:33:29,417 --> 00:33:30,709 (OVER PHONE) So, uh... 542 00:33:34,750 --> 00:33:36,917 It sounds like they're playing a game of chess, 543 00:33:37,000 --> 00:33:38,792 uh, with the opposition leaders 544 00:33:38,875 --> 00:33:41,333 as-- as the pieces on that chess board. 545 00:33:43,875 --> 00:33:48,083 (SPEAKING IN UKRAINIAN) 546 00:33:49,750 --> 00:33:52,000 ALEX: The hack and release of the Nuland phone call 547 00:33:52,083 --> 00:33:54,000 was a new kind of cyberattack 548 00:33:54,083 --> 00:33:56,166 pointed at the US State Department 549 00:33:56,250 --> 00:33:58,417 and, by extension, its former secretary, 550 00:33:58,500 --> 00:33:59,667 Hillary Clinton. 551 00:33:59,750 --> 00:34:03,166 Only a few years before, Clinton had wondered out loud 552 00:34:03,250 --> 00:34:06,041 whether Russia's 2012 election would be rigged 553 00:34:06,125 --> 00:34:08,166 in favor of Vladimir Putin. 554 00:34:09,375 --> 00:34:12,291 Mr. Putin, like all tyrants, 555 00:34:12,375 --> 00:34:16,500 faces a very challenging kind of politics every day. 556 00:34:16,583 --> 00:34:19,667 It's not that, you know, democracy is-- is hard 557 00:34:19,750 --> 00:34:22,458 and tyranny is easy, or the other way around. 558 00:34:22,542 --> 00:34:23,625 They're-- they're both hard. 559 00:34:23,709 --> 00:34:25,750 They just have different kinds of challenges. 560 00:34:26,500 --> 00:34:29,041 In 2011 and 2012 in Russia, 561 00:34:29,125 --> 00:34:31,625 there were parliamentary elections in December, 562 00:34:31,709 --> 00:34:33,542 and then there were presidential elections 563 00:34:33,625 --> 00:34:34,834 in the spring. 564 00:34:34,917 --> 00:34:37,875 And the parliamentary elections brought Putin's party 565 00:34:37,959 --> 00:34:39,542 a majority in the parliament, 566 00:34:39,625 --> 00:34:43,041 and the presidential elections brought Putin back to power. 567 00:34:43,125 --> 00:34:47,250 But in fact, his party only won about 26 percent of the votes 568 00:34:47,333 --> 00:34:51,166 and, in fact, Mr. Putin himself didn't win enough votes 569 00:34:51,250 --> 00:34:53,750 in the first round to actually clear and be president 570 00:34:53,834 --> 00:34:57,166 after one round of voting. So everything was faked. 571 00:34:57,250 --> 00:35:00,583 And everybody knew it. And people did protest. 572 00:35:00,667 --> 00:35:03,667 (PROTESTERS CHANTING IN RUSSIAN) 573 00:35:04,625 --> 00:35:06,834 (INDISTINCT SHOUTING) 574 00:35:07,458 --> 00:35:09,041 (PROTESTERS CLAMORING) 575 00:35:09,125 --> 00:35:13,542 SNYDER: There were protests in 99 Russian cities. 576 00:35:13,625 --> 00:35:15,417 There were hundreds of thousands of people 577 00:35:15,500 --> 00:35:17,125 simultaneously on the street, 578 00:35:17,208 --> 00:35:19,208 and the message was a very simple one: 579 00:35:19,291 --> 00:35:21,125 for free elections. 580 00:35:21,208 --> 00:35:23,625 (CHANTING IN RUSSIAN) 581 00:35:24,750 --> 00:35:27,000 (CHANTING) 582 00:35:29,500 --> 00:35:32,000 (SHOUTING) 583 00:35:34,041 --> 00:35:37,458 (CHANTING) 584 00:35:37,542 --> 00:35:40,750 That was a crucial moment, because it was the last moment 585 00:35:40,834 --> 00:35:44,750 where, if you were Russian, you could maybe still believe 586 00:35:44,834 --> 00:35:47,542 that voting might make a difference. 587 00:35:51,041 --> 00:35:52,625 (INDISTINCT CHATTER) 588 00:35:52,709 --> 00:35:56,333 VOTER: (IN RUSSIAN) 589 00:35:57,208 --> 00:36:01,750 VOTERS: (OVERLAPPING) 590 00:36:01,834 --> 00:36:04,208 ELECTION STAFF: (IN RUSSIAN) 591 00:36:05,500 --> 00:36:08,083 -VOTER: -STAFF: 592 00:36:08,834 --> 00:36:11,041 VOTER: 593 00:36:11,125 --> 00:36:12,417 STAFF: 594 00:36:12,500 --> 00:36:14,000 -VOTER: -STAFF: 595 00:36:14,083 --> 00:36:16,250 VOTER: 596 00:36:16,792 --> 00:36:19,208 (IN RUSSIAN) 597 00:36:25,041 --> 00:36:27,709 (PROTESTERS CHANTING IN RUSSIAN) 598 00:36:27,792 --> 00:36:31,500 There are plenty of Russians who care about democracy. 599 00:36:31,583 --> 00:36:32,917 There are plenty of Russians 600 00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:34,834 who'd like to have their votes counted. 601 00:36:34,917 --> 00:36:37,500 There are plenty of Russians who would like to have the rule of law, 602 00:36:37,583 --> 00:36:39,917 who would like to have a free press. 603 00:36:41,792 --> 00:36:43,458 Putin could have said, 604 00:36:43,542 --> 00:36:44,959 "Yes, let's have free elections." 605 00:36:45,041 --> 00:36:48,917 But his reaction instead was 180 degrees the opposite. 606 00:36:49,000 --> 00:36:55,000 -(SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) -(PROTESTERS CLAMORING) 607 00:37:01,583 --> 00:37:04,125 (IN RUSSIAN) 608 00:37:05,291 --> 00:37:06,792 SNYDER: Putin's reaction was to say, 609 00:37:06,875 --> 00:37:09,834 "All of these protesters are foreign agents. 610 00:37:09,917 --> 00:37:11,417 They've all been inspired by 611 00:37:11,500 --> 00:37:14,125 the American Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton." 612 00:37:16,750 --> 00:37:18,250 (HILLARY CLEARS THROAT) 613 00:37:18,333 --> 00:37:19,792 We do have serious concerns 614 00:37:19,875 --> 00:37:21,834 about the conduct of the elections. 615 00:37:21,917 --> 00:37:26,125 (IN RUSSIAN) 616 00:37:30,583 --> 00:37:32,625 NULAND: Putin was furious, 617 00:37:32,709 --> 00:37:36,208 because he believed that it couldn't possibly be the case 618 00:37:36,291 --> 00:37:37,208 that the Russian people 619 00:37:37,291 --> 00:37:38,291 didn't like what he was offering. 620 00:37:38,375 --> 00:37:41,208 It had to be inspired from the outside. 621 00:37:41,291 --> 00:37:43,500 (IN RUSSIAN) 622 00:37:54,417 --> 00:37:58,417 WALLANDER: He blamed her publicly for the protests... 623 00:37:58,500 --> 00:38:04,166 and also, her foreign policy was very tough on Russia. 624 00:38:05,667 --> 00:38:07,583 The Russian foreign policy elite understood 625 00:38:07,667 --> 00:38:10,417 that if she were elected president of the United States, 626 00:38:10,500 --> 00:38:12,750 it would be possibly even tougher, 627 00:38:12,834 --> 00:38:14,166 and they didn't want that. 628 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:19,041 (IN RUSSIAN) 629 00:38:37,375 --> 00:38:40,834 TRUMP (OVER PHONE): Look, Putin is a smart, calculating guy, 630 00:38:40,917 --> 00:38:42,917 you know, just, uh-- he's-- 631 00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:45,125 we're talking about a different league of-- 632 00:38:45,208 --> 00:38:46,583 I don't know if it's street smarts 633 00:38:46,667 --> 00:38:48,583 or intelligence or whatever... 634 00:38:49,375 --> 00:38:51,041 ALEX: Even before 2016, 635 00:38:51,125 --> 00:38:54,291 Putin had a big fan in Donald Trump. 636 00:38:54,375 --> 00:38:57,208 In Ukraine, Putin had done the unthinkable. 637 00:38:57,291 --> 00:38:59,417 He had annexed the territory of another country, 638 00:38:59,500 --> 00:39:02,959 something that hadn't been done in Europe since World War II. 639 00:39:03,041 --> 00:39:06,083 But for Trump, Putin's moves were a sign of strength. 640 00:39:06,166 --> 00:39:07,542 TRUMP (OVER PHONE): Ukraine, you know, 641 00:39:07,625 --> 00:39:10,125 it's not our backyard. And it is his backyard. 642 00:39:10,208 --> 00:39:11,834 Just look at the way he did Syria. 643 00:39:11,917 --> 00:39:13,333 Look at what's going on with Iran, 644 00:39:13,417 --> 00:39:16,375 where Russia's backing Iran, and big-league backing Iran. 645 00:39:16,458 --> 00:39:20,792 I mean, it is absolutely insane what's happened to this country 646 00:39:20,875 --> 00:39:23,291 over the last four or five years. 647 00:39:23,375 --> 00:39:24,834 ALEX: Small wonder that, in Russia, 648 00:39:24,917 --> 00:39:27,333 Trump's announcement that he was running for president 649 00:39:27,417 --> 00:39:28,625 got rave reviews. 650 00:39:29,875 --> 00:39:33,625 REPORTER: (IN RUSSIAN) 651 00:39:40,959 --> 00:39:42,417 I was over in Moscow two years ago... 652 00:39:42,500 --> 00:39:45,458 TRANSLATOR: (TRANSLATING IN RUSSIAN) 653 00:39:47,959 --> 00:39:50,125 I would be willing to bet I would have 654 00:39:50,208 --> 00:39:52,625 a great relationship with Putin. It's about leadership. 655 00:39:52,709 --> 00:39:55,000 Based on what? You're two macho guys? I mean... 656 00:39:55,083 --> 00:39:56,542 ALEX: Trump's attitude towards Putin 657 00:39:56,625 --> 00:39:58,667 was part of a different kind of game. 658 00:39:58,750 --> 00:40:01,000 From the beginning, the only consistent principle 659 00:40:01,083 --> 00:40:02,834 of Trump's presidential campaign 660 00:40:02,917 --> 00:40:03,917 was that you never knew 661 00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:05,375 what would come out of his mouth next. 662 00:40:05,458 --> 00:40:06,333 (CROWD CHEERS) 663 00:40:06,417 --> 00:40:08,000 No, it's so great. This Twitter-- 664 00:40:08,083 --> 00:40:10,041 This Twitter, Facebook, is so great 665 00:40:10,125 --> 00:40:12,458 because when they lie on television, 666 00:40:12,542 --> 00:40:14,750 I type out, you know, ding, ding, ding--- 667 00:40:14,834 --> 00:40:15,875 I'll do it myself. 668 00:40:15,959 --> 00:40:18,500 Ding, ding, dong, doong, ding. Press. 669 00:40:18,583 --> 00:40:20,583 And they go, like 12 seconds later, 670 00:40:20,667 --> 00:40:22,542 "We have breaking news from Donald Trump. 671 00:40:22,625 --> 00:40:24,417 Here's the story--" It's the craziest thing. 672 00:40:24,500 --> 00:40:28,375 ALEX: Being an agent of chaos was part of Trump's brand. 673 00:40:28,458 --> 00:40:30,041 The more chaos, the better. 674 00:40:30,125 --> 00:40:32,291 And I said, "Somebody should run against John McCain." 675 00:40:32,375 --> 00:40:34,083 -FRANK LUNTZ: He's a war hero. -He is a war hero-- 676 00:40:34,166 --> 00:40:35,709 LUNTZ: Five and a half years in a POW camp. 677 00:40:35,792 --> 00:40:37,291 He's a war hero 'cause he was captured. 678 00:40:37,375 --> 00:40:38,834 I like people that weren't captured, okay? 679 00:40:38,917 --> 00:40:40,208 -I hate to tell you. -(AUDIENCE LAUGHING) 680 00:40:40,291 --> 00:40:41,875 JOHN PODESTA: He made the disparaging comments 681 00:40:41,959 --> 00:40:43,458 about John McCain. 682 00:40:43,542 --> 00:40:45,750 For virtually anybody else, 683 00:40:45,834 --> 00:40:47,917 that would have been a total career ender. 684 00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:51,125 And yet, he seemed to both be able to absorb that, 685 00:40:51,208 --> 00:40:52,750 bounce off it, uh, 686 00:40:52,834 --> 00:40:55,583 and actually, to some extent, strengthen from it. 687 00:40:55,667 --> 00:40:57,750 If I didn't have a big speaker system 688 00:40:57,834 --> 00:40:59,709 in terms of my mouth, 689 00:40:59,792 --> 00:41:01,500 but the people that listened to it, 690 00:41:01,583 --> 00:41:04,333 and Twitter, at realDonaldTrump, by the way, but-- 691 00:41:04,417 --> 00:41:06,166 (CROWD CHEERING) 692 00:41:08,375 --> 00:41:11,458 FRANÇOIS: You know, people ask, "Was the IRA pro-Trump?" 693 00:41:11,542 --> 00:41:13,000 I think that's a tricky question. 694 00:41:13,083 --> 00:41:15,250 The IRA was anti-America. 695 00:41:15,333 --> 00:41:16,834 In general, they were interested 696 00:41:16,917 --> 00:41:19,125 in any message that weakens 697 00:41:19,208 --> 00:41:21,875 the democratic institutions of the US. 698 00:41:23,542 --> 00:41:26,583 "Create chaos" was the primary goal. 699 00:41:26,667 --> 00:41:31,500 Weakening Hillary's messages and position and identity 700 00:41:31,583 --> 00:41:34,625 and amplifying Donald Trump's campaign 701 00:41:34,709 --> 00:41:37,750 is a good means to create this chaos. 702 00:41:39,834 --> 00:41:41,583 I think the target is trust. 703 00:41:43,583 --> 00:41:45,250 ALEX: Trust is a funny thing. 704 00:41:45,333 --> 00:41:48,458 So hard to earn, so easy to lose. 705 00:41:48,542 --> 00:41:50,500 If the US system depends on trust 706 00:41:50,583 --> 00:41:52,500 in democratic institutions, 707 00:41:52,583 --> 00:41:55,583 who benefits if Americans lose that trust? 708 00:41:58,208 --> 00:41:59,959 TROLL ACTOR: Is it Vladimir Putin? 709 00:42:01,417 --> 00:42:03,625 Oh, my gosh, I-- I can't believe it. 710 00:42:06,166 --> 00:42:08,417 ALEX: In Russia, Putin has built a political system 711 00:42:08,500 --> 00:42:11,333 that depends on personal loyalty. 712 00:42:11,417 --> 00:42:13,917 Putin can claim that the trolls didn't work for him. 713 00:42:14,000 --> 00:42:15,291 That's true. 714 00:42:15,375 --> 00:42:16,625 But they do his bidding 715 00:42:16,709 --> 00:42:19,375 because they work for someone he trusts to serve him. 716 00:42:19,458 --> 00:42:20,917 Literally. 717 00:42:21,000 --> 00:42:24,667 He is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot dog salesman 718 00:42:24,750 --> 00:42:26,875 who worked his way up the Kremlin food chain 719 00:42:26,959 --> 00:42:29,166 and earned the nickname "Putin's Chef." 720 00:42:32,125 --> 00:42:35,375 WALLANDER: It didn't surprise me that Prigozhin had been 721 00:42:35,458 --> 00:42:38,083 the source of funding for the Internet Research Agency, 722 00:42:38,166 --> 00:42:39,959 given that he had been involved in 723 00:42:40,041 --> 00:42:42,875 some other favored Putin operations. 724 00:42:42,959 --> 00:42:45,041 He was a go-to guy. 725 00:42:45,125 --> 00:42:47,542 REPORTER: This is a very powerful Russian businessman 726 00:42:47,625 --> 00:42:49,792 who allegedly is very close to Vladimir Putin. 727 00:42:49,875 --> 00:42:53,083 Behind a troll factory operating out of St. Petersburg. 728 00:42:53,166 --> 00:42:55,041 (RUSSIAN NEWSCASTERS OVERLAPPING) 729 00:42:55,125 --> 00:42:56,959 ALEX: Prigozhin is well-known in Russia 730 00:42:57,041 --> 00:42:58,667 for his close ties to Putin. 731 00:42:58,750 --> 00:43:01,041 But his hidden web of business relationships 732 00:43:01,125 --> 00:43:02,291 is hard to penetrate. 733 00:43:02,375 --> 00:43:05,333 He wouldn't speak to us and refuses most interviews. 734 00:43:05,417 --> 00:43:08,291 When he does talk, he denies any wrongdoing. 735 00:43:09,500 --> 00:43:11,542 To solve the mystery surrounding the man, 736 00:43:11,625 --> 00:43:14,000 we sought out the former cop turned journalist 737 00:43:14,083 --> 00:43:16,667 who's been tracking Prigozhin for years. 738 00:43:17,500 --> 00:43:19,834 (INDISTINCT CHATTER OVER RADIO) 739 00:43:21,375 --> 00:43:25,667 DENIS KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 740 00:44:23,458 --> 00:44:25,375 ♪ (UPBEAT MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 741 00:44:42,041 --> 00:44:43,709 JAVIER: Have you ever eaten at BlinDonald's? 742 00:44:47,417 --> 00:44:48,458 (CHUCKLES) 743 00:44:48,542 --> 00:44:50,917 You should try it. It's very tasty. 744 00:44:52,417 --> 00:44:54,458 He also had this famous restaurant 745 00:44:54,542 --> 00:44:56,834 called Russkiy Kitsch. 746 00:44:56,917 --> 00:44:59,709 All the Russian stereotypes were gathered in one place. 747 00:44:59,792 --> 00:45:02,417 It was just a museum of Russian stereotypes. 748 00:45:02,500 --> 00:45:05,417 And also he had some luxury restaurants. 749 00:45:06,250 --> 00:45:09,250 ANDREY ZAKHAROV: (IN ENGLISH) 750 00:45:17,625 --> 00:45:20,709 SOSHNIKOV: Many Western leaders visited St. Petersburg. 751 00:45:20,792 --> 00:45:23,125 There is one famous picture, for example, 752 00:45:23,208 --> 00:45:25,458 of Yevgeny Prigozhin and George Bush. 753 00:45:27,000 --> 00:45:30,291 KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 754 00:45:42,542 --> 00:45:44,959 JAVIER: Have you ever met Yevgeny Prigozhin? 755 00:45:45,041 --> 00:45:46,959 Yeah. I met him several times. 756 00:45:47,041 --> 00:45:50,125 During dinners with Putin because he usually serves them. 757 00:45:50,959 --> 00:45:51,959 (CAMERA CLICKS) 758 00:45:52,041 --> 00:45:53,291 JAVIER: What is he like, out of curiosity? 759 00:45:53,375 --> 00:45:54,291 SIMONYAN: I don't know. 760 00:45:54,375 --> 00:45:57,125 He's the man who serves nice food, 761 00:45:57,208 --> 00:45:59,417 and you can ask him, "What is this made of?" 762 00:45:59,500 --> 00:46:01,500 And he says, "It's veal." 763 00:46:01,583 --> 00:46:02,750 JAVIER: Is the food good? 764 00:46:02,834 --> 00:46:05,458 Yeah. The food is good. The food is good. 765 00:46:06,500 --> 00:46:10,000 ZAKHAROV: (IN ENGLISH) 766 00:46:15,166 --> 00:46:17,542 (IN RUSSIAN) 767 00:46:19,750 --> 00:46:22,166 REPORTER: 768 00:46:29,625 --> 00:46:32,083 ALEX: Prigozhin kept failing up. 769 00:46:32,166 --> 00:46:34,458 After delivering subpar school lunches, 770 00:46:34,542 --> 00:46:36,250 he was mysteriously awarded 771 00:46:36,333 --> 00:46:38,333 bigger and bigger government contracts 772 00:46:38,417 --> 00:46:40,375 for services including construction, 773 00:46:40,458 --> 00:46:42,792 sanitation, and utilities. 774 00:46:42,875 --> 00:46:44,667 Investigators discovered his ties 775 00:46:44,750 --> 00:46:47,166 to a web of hundreds of enterprises, 776 00:46:47,250 --> 00:46:49,458 loosely connected to a holding company 777 00:46:49,542 --> 00:46:53,625 owned by Prigozhin and his mother, called Concord. 778 00:46:53,709 --> 00:46:56,458 Concord eventually got lucrative catering contracts 779 00:46:56,542 --> 00:46:58,083 for the Russian armed forces. 780 00:46:59,375 --> 00:47:01,834 (LAUGHTER) 781 00:47:01,917 --> 00:47:06,583 Concord is very sophisticated and big networks of companies 782 00:47:06,667 --> 00:47:08,542 under control of Yevgeny Prigozhin. 783 00:47:10,250 --> 00:47:13,375 He receives lots of money from public procurement 784 00:47:13,458 --> 00:47:17,834 and then he can invest this money wherever he wants. 785 00:47:17,917 --> 00:47:21,834 He wants to establish a troll farm? Okay. 786 00:47:21,917 --> 00:47:25,250 He wants to establish a private military company? 787 00:47:25,333 --> 00:47:27,750 Okay. There's always money for that. 788 00:47:28,750 --> 00:47:33,125 (IN RUSSIAN) 789 00:47:44,583 --> 00:47:46,792 WALLANDER: Prigozhin rose with Putin. 790 00:47:46,875 --> 00:47:50,917 Owes his position, his wealth, his protection, 791 00:47:51,000 --> 00:47:52,458 to his relationship with Putin. 792 00:47:52,542 --> 00:47:56,041 And those are the people who matter in Putin's Russia. 793 00:47:58,375 --> 00:48:01,583 Someone who really needs to deliver, 794 00:48:01,667 --> 00:48:04,208 because if you don't deliver, all that wealth 795 00:48:04,291 --> 00:48:05,375 and all that power 796 00:48:05,458 --> 00:48:07,083 and all that protection goes away. 797 00:48:08,125 --> 00:48:09,208 It makes perfect sense 798 00:48:09,291 --> 00:48:11,875 in terms of mitigating vulnerability 799 00:48:11,959 --> 00:48:14,417 and keeping control of an operation. 800 00:48:15,625 --> 00:48:20,291 NULAND: Putin will use folks over whom he has influence. 801 00:48:20,375 --> 00:48:22,291 (IN RUSSIAN ACCENT) You do a little bit of this for me, 802 00:48:22,375 --> 00:48:25,750 and we will do a little bit of that for you. 803 00:48:25,834 --> 00:48:27,458 (IN NORMAL VOICE) And particularly, if they're not 804 00:48:27,542 --> 00:48:31,583 part of the formal intelligence apparat, 805 00:48:31,667 --> 00:48:35,542 then he has deniability when things go wrong. 806 00:48:35,625 --> 00:48:38,208 Putin has developed what I would call 807 00:48:38,291 --> 00:48:41,375 -the franchise model. -(SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 808 00:48:41,458 --> 00:48:44,917 That also gives you a thousand flowers blooming. 809 00:48:45,000 --> 00:48:47,458 You can try lots of different things, 810 00:48:47,542 --> 00:48:49,125 throw lots of spaghetti on the wall, 811 00:48:49,208 --> 00:48:50,500 and see what's effective. 812 00:48:52,375 --> 00:48:54,041 -(LAUGHTER) -ALEX: Some projects, 813 00:48:54,125 --> 00:48:57,000 like the troll factory, generate political support. 814 00:48:58,208 --> 00:49:00,375 Others take a more physical approach 815 00:49:00,458 --> 00:49:02,375 to doing the Kremlin's dirty work. 816 00:49:03,417 --> 00:49:05,333 (INDISTINCT RADIO CHATTER) 817 00:49:07,375 --> 00:49:13,125 KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 818 00:49:53,667 --> 00:49:55,583 (IN RUSSIAN) 819 00:49:56,417 --> 00:49:57,834 (CAMERAMAN CHUCKLING) 820 00:49:58,875 --> 00:50:01,834 KOROTKOV: 821 00:50:12,792 --> 00:50:14,875 SOLDIER: (IN RUSSIAN) 822 00:50:17,750 --> 00:50:19,041 (CHUCKLES) 823 00:50:29,375 --> 00:50:32,375 ZAKHAROV: (IN ENGLISH) 824 00:50:42,959 --> 00:50:45,959 KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 825 00:51:21,667 --> 00:51:24,917 ALEX: It's easy to see why Prigozhin was so angry. 826 00:51:25,000 --> 00:51:27,458 Korotkov's reporting exposed how Prigozhin 827 00:51:27,542 --> 00:51:30,208 used disinformation from the troll factory 828 00:51:30,291 --> 00:51:33,083 to soften the ground for military operations 829 00:51:33,166 --> 00:51:36,041 carried out by his Wagner forces in Ukraine. 830 00:51:37,166 --> 00:51:41,667 KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 831 00:52:03,500 --> 00:52:06,125 WOMAN: (IN RUSSIAN) 832 00:52:06,208 --> 00:52:07,500 (MAN SPEAKING INDISTINCTLY) 833 00:52:14,417 --> 00:52:16,792 FRANÇOIS: The St. Petersburg trolls say, 834 00:52:16,875 --> 00:52:19,750 "What we're really doing here is geopolitical marketing. 835 00:52:19,834 --> 00:52:22,625 Russia's a brand, and we need to defend our brand." 836 00:52:22,709 --> 00:52:25,750 So, the fact that the IRA is focused 837 00:52:25,834 --> 00:52:27,709 on the rest of the world, 838 00:52:27,792 --> 00:52:31,208 and not just Russia, comes in quite quickly. 839 00:52:32,375 --> 00:52:35,375 VITALY BESPALOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 840 00:52:41,500 --> 00:52:42,875 FRANÇOIS: Some of the specialists 841 00:52:42,959 --> 00:52:44,458 were pretty funny. 842 00:52:44,542 --> 00:52:47,834 And they were using pop culture references a lot 843 00:52:47,917 --> 00:52:50,875 to build an audience and to gather followers. 844 00:52:51,667 --> 00:52:52,834 There were definitely things 845 00:52:52,917 --> 00:52:54,291 that they would steal and rebrand, 846 00:52:54,375 --> 00:52:56,792 and there's stuff that's original IRA creation. 847 00:52:56,875 --> 00:52:57,667 (CHUCKLES) 848 00:52:57,750 --> 00:53:00,125 ♪ (DRAMATIC MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 849 00:53:08,583 --> 00:53:10,458 (SPEAKING RUSSIAN) 850 00:53:16,625 --> 00:53:17,750 Obama chmo. 851 00:53:19,250 --> 00:53:20,458 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 852 00:53:21,041 --> 00:53:23,583 BESPALOV: 853 00:53:24,750 --> 00:53:26,875 It's not all overtly political. 854 00:53:26,959 --> 00:53:29,917 Some of it starts as wacky and fun. 855 00:53:30,000 --> 00:53:34,458 ♪ ("SPIDERMAN" BY ALEX WASTEN PLAYING IN RUSSIAN) ♪ 856 00:53:36,125 --> 00:53:38,000 SOSHNIKOV: The guy in the Spiderman costume, 857 00:53:38,083 --> 00:53:40,208 running around the streets of St. Petersburg 858 00:53:40,291 --> 00:53:41,667 and harassing people, 859 00:53:41,750 --> 00:53:43,959 saying rude things to people. 860 00:53:44,041 --> 00:53:47,083 And in the end, it appears he's Barack Obama. 861 00:53:48,250 --> 00:53:51,000 (SPEAKING RUSSIAN) 862 00:53:51,083 --> 00:53:52,792 (PUNCHING SOUND EFFECTS) 863 00:53:55,583 --> 00:53:57,792 ♪ (SONG CONCLUDES) ♪ 864 00:53:59,000 --> 00:54:02,208 Some people who worked for the IRA were thinking, 865 00:54:02,291 --> 00:54:03,500 "I signed up for a job 866 00:54:03,583 --> 00:54:06,625 in which I was just basically doing digital content. 867 00:54:06,709 --> 00:54:11,000 And I woke up in some James Bond espionage shit." 868 00:54:13,291 --> 00:54:15,625 BESPALOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 869 00:54:22,000 --> 00:54:23,041 (COMPUTER BEEPS) 870 00:54:25,917 --> 00:54:28,375 BESPALOV: 871 00:54:32,500 --> 00:54:34,583 FRANÇOIS: They start Project Translator, 872 00:54:34,667 --> 00:54:36,458 which is the IRA's department 873 00:54:36,542 --> 00:54:38,208 that's focused on the US. 874 00:54:38,291 --> 00:54:41,417 It's trying to figure out what types of narratives work 875 00:54:41,500 --> 00:54:43,417 in the US. 876 00:54:43,500 --> 00:54:47,000 ♪ ("AMERICA" BY SIMON & GARFUNKEL PLAYING) ♪ 877 00:54:47,083 --> 00:54:51,083 FRANÇOIS: The entire strategy is to influence 878 00:54:51,166 --> 00:54:53,792 by pretending to be American. 879 00:54:53,875 --> 00:54:59,834 ♪ "Kathy," I said as we boarded A Greyhound in Pittsburgh... ♪ 880 00:55:01,542 --> 00:55:04,959 And the program coordinators took trips 881 00:55:05,041 --> 00:55:08,083 to the US and to very specific cities. 882 00:55:08,166 --> 00:55:12,208 ♪ It took me four days To hitchhike from Saginaw ♪ 883 00:55:12,291 --> 00:55:18,750 ♪ I've gone To look for America ♪ 884 00:55:20,166 --> 00:55:25,917 ♪ Laughing on the bus Playing games with the faces ♪ 885 00:55:27,041 --> 00:55:30,583 ♪ She said the man In the gabardine suit ♪ 886 00:55:30,667 --> 00:55:32,667 ♪ Was a spy ♪ 887 00:55:35,166 --> 00:55:41,125 ♪ I said, "Be careful His bowtie is really a camera" ♪ 888 00:55:41,208 --> 00:55:42,792 FRANÇOIS: They're not Russian spies, 889 00:55:42,875 --> 00:55:46,583 but they do intelligence-gathering missions 890 00:55:46,667 --> 00:55:51,083 in order to better tailor their influence campaign. 891 00:55:51,166 --> 00:55:53,291 Because the IRA starts with a focus 892 00:55:53,375 --> 00:55:56,166 on controlling the Russian domestic conversation, 893 00:55:56,250 --> 00:55:58,959 it's really good at VKontakte. 894 00:55:59,041 --> 00:56:00,625 It's kind of the Facebook of Russia. 895 00:56:00,709 --> 00:56:02,834 They quickly... (CHUCKLES) ...realize that, 896 00:56:02,917 --> 00:56:05,083 if we're going to bring this into America, 897 00:56:05,166 --> 00:56:07,583 we're not gonna go very far with VKontakte. 898 00:56:07,667 --> 00:56:09,000 (BEEPING) 899 00:56:09,083 --> 00:56:11,583 FRANÇOIS: Regarding Facebook, we know that the IRA had pages, 900 00:56:11,667 --> 00:56:13,083 it had profiles. 901 00:56:13,166 --> 00:56:16,375 We know a lot of what the IRA did on Twitter. 902 00:56:16,458 --> 00:56:18,500 We know they liked YouTube. 903 00:56:18,583 --> 00:56:21,875 We also know that the IRA came to love Instagram. 904 00:56:21,959 --> 00:56:23,542 We know that they used Reddit. 905 00:56:23,625 --> 00:56:25,375 We know that they used Pinterest. 906 00:56:25,458 --> 00:56:30,125 They really were constantly testing new platforms 907 00:56:30,208 --> 00:56:32,750 and adjusting their strategies. 908 00:56:37,166 --> 00:56:38,375 This is Jenna Abrams. 909 00:56:38,458 --> 00:56:42,417 On the face of it, she is a woman in her mid-30s 910 00:56:42,500 --> 00:56:46,000 and she claims she lives on Main Street, USA. 911 00:56:46,083 --> 00:56:48,166 But of course, she's not a real person. 912 00:56:48,250 --> 00:56:49,375 When Jenna tweets, 913 00:56:49,458 --> 00:56:53,291 it's actually a team of specialists in St. Petersburg 914 00:56:53,375 --> 00:56:57,250 who are crafting this persona and thinking, 915 00:56:57,333 --> 00:56:59,125 "What should Jenna be saying today? 916 00:56:59,208 --> 00:57:00,875 Is it-- Is it a racist tweet, 917 00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:03,375 or is it, like, a Kim Kardashian joke?" 918 00:57:03,458 --> 00:57:07,083 And they create this sort of mix of pop culture references 919 00:57:07,166 --> 00:57:10,500 and damaging political commentary. 920 00:57:10,583 --> 00:57:14,458 She was mostly designed to speak to conservative audiences. 921 00:57:14,542 --> 00:57:17,542 And she has quite a lot of followers online. 922 00:57:17,625 --> 00:57:20,959 She has about 70,000 followers on her Twitter. 923 00:57:21,041 --> 00:57:22,917 So she is in a position 924 00:57:23,000 --> 00:57:25,583 to actually shape the political discourse 925 00:57:25,667 --> 00:57:28,834 because of how well she has embedded herself 926 00:57:28,917 --> 00:57:33,000 within the fabric of American political discussions. 927 00:57:33,083 --> 00:57:35,083 That is also how she managed 928 00:57:35,166 --> 00:57:38,375 to get into actual mainstream media. 929 00:57:38,458 --> 00:57:40,417 People would say, "Yes," like, you know, 930 00:57:40,500 --> 00:57:43,583 "Political activist Jenna Abrams said on the internet..." 931 00:57:43,667 --> 00:57:45,041 Of course, they had no idea 932 00:57:45,125 --> 00:57:47,709 that there was no such person as Jenna Abrams 933 00:57:47,792 --> 00:57:51,583 and this was not a real conservative American activist 934 00:57:51,667 --> 00:57:53,583 from Main Street, USA. 935 00:57:56,917 --> 00:58:00,500 They used social media to talk to people directly 936 00:58:00,583 --> 00:58:02,125 in private messages. 937 00:58:02,208 --> 00:58:05,250 They used social media to contact campaign officials 938 00:58:05,333 --> 00:58:08,000 that they were having conversations with. 939 00:58:08,083 --> 00:58:11,583 They also used social media to talk to activists. 940 00:58:11,667 --> 00:58:13,667 We have this idea that all the content 941 00:58:13,750 --> 00:58:18,583 that the troll put out was fake or wrong or bad, 942 00:58:18,667 --> 00:58:22,000 but, you know, the trolls also amplified content 943 00:58:22,083 --> 00:58:23,625 that they've stolen from elsewhere, 944 00:58:23,709 --> 00:58:26,000 which is things that people actually believed in 945 00:58:26,083 --> 00:58:27,542 and resonated with. 946 00:58:29,250 --> 00:58:30,500 Before the election, 947 00:58:30,583 --> 00:58:33,458 they were focused on specific issues. 948 00:58:33,542 --> 00:58:35,041 And they realized that, 949 00:58:35,125 --> 00:58:38,667 if you wanted to make those issues divisive 950 00:58:38,750 --> 00:58:40,875 and hurtful for America, 951 00:58:40,959 --> 00:58:44,625 you needed to have a hand in both sides of the issue. 952 00:58:50,291 --> 00:58:52,166 They're designing conflict 953 00:58:52,250 --> 00:58:56,542 between polarized groups in America online, 954 00:58:56,625 --> 00:58:57,834 but also offline. 955 00:58:57,917 --> 00:59:00,959 And so, they conduct protests in the US. 956 00:59:02,458 --> 00:59:04,750 (PROTESTERS CLAMORING) 957 00:59:04,834 --> 00:59:06,917 FRANÇOIS: When they organize a protest, 958 00:59:07,000 --> 00:59:09,375 they reach out to one group, 959 00:59:09,458 --> 00:59:11,667 and make sure that on the other side of the street, 960 00:59:11,750 --> 00:59:12,750 there's another group 961 00:59:12,834 --> 00:59:15,583 who's gonna do the exact opposite position. 962 00:59:15,667 --> 00:59:19,083 All these things are instruments of white supremacy. 963 00:59:19,166 --> 00:59:22,709 FRANÇOIS: Online, when they talk about immigration, for instance, 964 00:59:22,792 --> 00:59:23,875 they encourage messages 965 00:59:23,959 --> 00:59:27,875 that are inflammatory against immigration. 966 00:59:27,959 --> 00:59:31,875 But they also encourage, in the same stroke, 967 00:59:31,959 --> 00:59:35,875 pro-immigration messages and campaigns. 968 00:59:35,959 --> 00:59:39,500 And then, they have an anti-immigration group 969 00:59:39,583 --> 00:59:41,375 do a demonstration, 970 00:59:41,458 --> 00:59:43,542 and a pro-immigration group 971 00:59:43,625 --> 00:59:47,083 do a demonstration on the very same street, 972 00:59:47,166 --> 00:59:48,875 on the same day. 973 00:59:48,959 --> 00:59:50,917 REPORTER: The anti-Muslim protesters were responding 974 00:59:51,000 --> 00:59:53,834 to an event called "Stop Islamization of Texas." 975 00:59:53,917 --> 00:59:55,625 It was organized by a Facebook group 976 00:59:55,709 --> 00:59:58,792 named Heart of Texas, generated by Russia. 977 00:59:58,875 --> 01:00:01,375 Posts on the Facebook event page threatened to, quote, 978 01:00:01,458 --> 01:00:03,917 "Blow this place up." 979 01:00:04,000 --> 01:00:06,208 FRANÇOIS: They're designing for violence. 980 01:00:06,291 --> 01:00:08,041 They've done their research, 981 01:00:08,125 --> 01:00:11,875 and so the content they curate and how they behave online 982 01:00:11,959 --> 01:00:17,625 is unfortunately a reflection of how polarized 983 01:00:17,709 --> 01:00:21,625 the actual online political conversation was at that time. 984 01:00:21,709 --> 01:00:24,083 Of course they picked the most egregious parts 985 01:00:24,166 --> 01:00:26,208 of the content and the most divisive ones, 986 01:00:26,291 --> 01:00:30,417 but they're not injecting in that bloodstream 987 01:00:30,500 --> 01:00:33,542 anything that wasn't already there. 988 01:00:33,625 --> 01:00:37,500 They're really holding a mirror to our face. 989 01:00:37,583 --> 01:00:39,542 ALEX: It's hard to look in the mirror. 990 01:00:39,625 --> 01:00:42,250 It's even harder when you don't like what you see. 991 01:00:43,375 --> 01:00:44,750 White power! 992 01:00:45,709 --> 01:00:47,041 ALEX: The trolls had spent years 993 01:00:47,125 --> 01:00:49,875 tracking the divisions in American society. 994 01:00:49,959 --> 01:00:51,792 They knew that immigration and race 995 01:00:51,875 --> 01:00:53,625 were two of our deepest wounds. 996 01:00:53,709 --> 01:00:55,208 PROTESTERS: 997 01:00:55,291 --> 01:00:58,959 Hands up! Don't shoot! Hands up! Don't shoot! 998 01:00:59,041 --> 01:01:01,959 ALEX: Their fake personas exploited the very real horror 999 01:01:02,041 --> 01:01:04,625 of police violence against African Americans. 1000 01:01:04,709 --> 01:01:06,208 -ERIC GARNER: Don't touch me, please. -(BLEEP) 1001 01:01:06,291 --> 01:01:08,375 -Don't touch me. -(BLEEP) 1002 01:01:11,417 --> 01:01:13,500 ALEX: On the anniversary of the brutal killing 1003 01:01:13,583 --> 01:01:16,083 of Eric Garner by the New York City Police, 1004 01:01:16,166 --> 01:01:18,542 the trolls tried to exploit Garner's memory 1005 01:01:18,625 --> 01:01:22,000 to call on Americans not to vote to reform the system 1006 01:01:22,083 --> 01:01:24,333 but to tear it down. 1007 01:01:24,417 --> 01:01:27,083 FRANÇOIS: If you take a group like BlackMattersUS, 1008 01:01:27,166 --> 01:01:28,959 it had a page on Facebook, 1009 01:01:29,041 --> 01:01:31,542 but also a Twitter account. It had a website. 1010 01:01:31,625 --> 01:01:35,875 They were slowly gaining influence and traction. 1011 01:01:35,959 --> 01:01:38,834 And they became key assets 1012 01:01:38,917 --> 01:01:42,583 used to manipulate American audiences. 1013 01:01:44,291 --> 01:01:48,125 When they target the Black community in the US, 1014 01:01:48,208 --> 01:01:51,542 they craft messages saying, "Hey, we shouldn't vote." 1015 01:01:54,542 --> 01:01:56,542 ALEX: There's nothing more undemocratic 1016 01:01:56,625 --> 01:01:58,750 than convincing people not to vote. 1017 01:01:58,834 --> 01:02:00,583 But for the trolls, voter suppression 1018 01:02:00,667 --> 01:02:03,959 was a pragmatic strategy intended to hurt Clinton. 1019 01:02:04,750 --> 01:02:06,000 And it may have worked. 1020 01:02:06,625 --> 01:02:07,667 In Detroit, Michigan, 1021 01:02:07,750 --> 01:02:10,375 a city dominated by black Democratic voters, 1022 01:02:10,458 --> 01:02:16,875 75,000 people who had turned out for Obama, stayed home in 2016. 1023 01:02:16,959 --> 01:02:19,000 Clinton lost that key swing state 1024 01:02:19,083 --> 01:02:20,792 by only 10,000 votes. 1025 01:02:23,375 --> 01:02:26,458 (BEEPING) 1026 01:02:32,458 --> 01:02:35,959 JAVIER: In terms of trolling, was it effective? 1027 01:02:36,041 --> 01:02:38,166 You're asking me a question. "Whether there is life-- 1028 01:02:38,250 --> 01:02:42,583 If there is life on Mars, do you think they have babies 1029 01:02:42,667 --> 01:02:44,625 after nine months of pregnancy or 12?" 1030 01:02:44,709 --> 01:02:46,041 I don't know if there's life on Mars. 1031 01:02:46,125 --> 01:02:48,250 How can I possibly think of how they give birth? (CHUCKLES) 1032 01:02:48,333 --> 01:02:51,667 I don't know what these kids thought or didn't think, 1033 01:02:51,750 --> 01:02:52,709 or why they worked there, 1034 01:02:52,792 --> 01:02:54,667 because I don't know if they ever did. 1035 01:02:55,333 --> 01:02:57,709 (IN RUSSIAN) 1036 01:03:19,709 --> 01:03:22,542 BESPALOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 1037 01:03:51,166 --> 01:03:53,792 REPORTER: (IN RUSSIAN) 1038 01:03:53,875 --> 01:03:56,291 (AUDIENCE APPLAUDS) 1039 01:03:56,375 --> 01:03:59,417 (IN RUSSIAN) 1040 01:04:03,250 --> 01:04:05,250 (AUDIENCE APPLAUDS) 1041 01:04:05,333 --> 01:04:08,417 (IN ENGLISH) I don't know whether it was done or wasn't. 1042 01:04:09,208 --> 01:04:10,333 But, uh, apparently, 1043 01:04:10,417 --> 01:04:12,667 even the people who think it was done 1044 01:04:12,750 --> 01:04:16,291 see it as a hugely ineffective operation. 1045 01:04:18,125 --> 01:04:21,834 FRANÇOIS: It's not a simple answer to just assess the impact 1046 01:04:21,917 --> 01:04:24,166 on the result of the vote. 1047 01:04:24,250 --> 01:04:26,375 It's not something you can just compute. 1048 01:04:27,583 --> 01:04:29,667 We know the IRA was pleased with themselves, 1049 01:04:29,750 --> 01:04:32,625 but we also know that they had all the incentives 1050 01:04:32,709 --> 01:04:35,166 to celebrate this as a victory. 1051 01:04:35,250 --> 01:04:38,709 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) ...Donald Trump. 1052 01:04:38,792 --> 01:04:40,875 FRANÇOIS: We know from the Senate report 1053 01:04:40,959 --> 01:04:43,875 that when election night came through, 1054 01:04:43,959 --> 01:04:47,041 they uncorked champagne, and toasted, 1055 01:04:47,125 --> 01:04:49,458 saying that they had "made America great." 1056 01:04:51,000 --> 01:04:52,208 How do you evaluate 1057 01:04:52,291 --> 01:04:54,709 whether the IRA was a success or not? 1058 01:04:54,792 --> 01:04:56,709 If you ask that, you have to ask yourself, like, 1059 01:04:56,792 --> 01:04:58,792 "Who's the audience of the IRA?" 1060 01:04:59,959 --> 01:05:02,583 They also had internal stakeholders. 1061 01:05:03,417 --> 01:05:06,041 The moral panic that unfolded 1062 01:05:06,125 --> 01:05:08,458 around Russian trolling in America 1063 01:05:08,542 --> 01:05:12,792 in itself is a strategic win for the organization. 1064 01:05:14,792 --> 01:05:18,041 ALEX: After the election, a source provided us with chats 1065 01:05:18,125 --> 01:05:20,542 from inside Pregozhin's organization 1066 01:05:20,625 --> 01:05:23,125 in which key executives discussed the best way 1067 01:05:23,208 --> 01:05:27,083 to promote the accomplishments of the trolls' work in the US. 1068 01:05:27,166 --> 01:05:30,500 The reports boasted their numbers state by state. 1069 01:05:32,000 --> 01:05:35,291 (REPORTER SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 1070 01:05:35,375 --> 01:05:36,917 TRANSLATOR: "The Heart of Texas Group, 1071 01:05:37,000 --> 01:05:40,834 the largest internet resource on the theme of secession. 1072 01:05:40,917 --> 01:05:43,750 It had an audience of about 300,000 people. 1073 01:05:43,834 --> 01:05:46,208 -(REPORTER SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) -TRANSLATOR: Atlanta. 1074 01:05:46,291 --> 01:05:50,709 African Americans make up 54 percent of its population. 1075 01:05:50,792 --> 01:05:55,709 Our Williams and Kalvin resource had 123,000 subscribers." 1076 01:05:55,792 --> 01:05:58,959 (REPORTER SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 1077 01:05:59,041 --> 01:06:01,208 TRANSLATOR: "BlackMattersUS dot com 1078 01:06:01,291 --> 01:06:03,709 had more than 500,000 subscribers." 1079 01:06:03,792 --> 01:06:05,375 (REPORTER SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN) 1080 01:06:05,458 --> 01:06:07,458 TRANSLATOR: "Company work influenced the opinions 1081 01:06:07,542 --> 01:06:09,917 of citizens in swing states. 1082 01:06:10,000 --> 01:06:12,583 Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. 1083 01:06:12,667 --> 01:06:15,709 Trump received 59 electoral votes." 1084 01:06:17,375 --> 01:06:22,417 ZAKHAROV: (IN ENGLISH) 1085 01:06:48,083 --> 01:06:50,041 KOROTKOV: (IN RUSSIAN) 1086 01:08:07,500 --> 01:08:11,709 ♪ ("SUMMER" BY MIKE NAUMENKO PLAYING) ♪ 1087 01:08:19,166 --> 01:08:22,417 FRANÇOIS: In 2016, you still see that the IRA 1088 01:08:22,500 --> 01:08:26,750 is a strategic blind spot in America's understanding 1089 01:08:26,834 --> 01:08:29,208 of what really happened with the election. 1090 01:08:31,917 --> 01:08:34,917 We want to think about it in terms of volume, right? 1091 01:08:35,000 --> 01:08:37,625 Like, "How much did they troll?" 1092 01:08:37,709 --> 01:08:39,792 The thing that's more fascinating 1093 01:08:39,875 --> 01:08:42,417 is to see them experiment 1094 01:08:42,500 --> 01:08:45,166 with different techniques of trolling. 1095 01:08:45,250 --> 01:08:49,291 How does it look like to do this trolling on different platforms? 1096 01:08:49,375 --> 01:08:52,291 How does it look like to do this trolling hand-in-hand 1097 01:08:52,375 --> 01:08:53,792 with hacking information 1098 01:08:53,875 --> 01:08:57,166 and more serious cyber operations? 1099 01:08:57,250 --> 01:09:00,875 There's no evidence to suggest that the IRA 1100 01:09:00,959 --> 01:09:05,291 ever did the hacking themselves, or, frankly, was able to do so. 1101 01:09:05,375 --> 01:09:07,750 So it bears the question, who's doing the hacking 1102 01:09:07,834 --> 01:09:10,291 and how closely does the IRA coordinate 1103 01:09:10,375 --> 01:09:12,333 with the hackers on the other side? 1104 01:09:17,083 --> 01:09:19,417 ALEX: The troll operation was ambitious. 1105 01:09:19,500 --> 01:09:22,709 It lasted for years and had clear goals. 1106 01:09:22,792 --> 01:09:23,875 But during the campaign, 1107 01:09:23,959 --> 01:09:25,959 the trolling operation was almost invisible 1108 01:09:26,041 --> 01:09:27,667 to those Americans who were tasked 1109 01:09:27,750 --> 01:09:29,959 with protecting the country. 1110 01:09:30,041 --> 01:09:33,000 The national security experts inside the White House 1111 01:09:33,083 --> 01:09:35,583 were focused on a different kind of internet threat. 1112 01:09:36,500 --> 01:09:38,333 But instead of being written in memes, 1113 01:09:38,417 --> 01:09:39,750 it was written in code. 1114 01:09:42,375 --> 01:09:43,417 (BEEP) 1115 01:09:47,208 --> 01:09:50,375 REPORTER 1: The hacking of Democratic National Committee emails, 1116 01:09:50,458 --> 01:09:52,417 experts say, by the Russian government... 1117 01:09:52,500 --> 01:09:54,709 REPORTER 2: As you know, somebody hacked into the DNC computer... 1118 01:09:54,792 --> 01:09:55,959 REPORTER 3: The latest stolen email... 1119 01:09:56,041 --> 01:09:57,417 REPORTER 4: Another batch of stolen emails, 1120 01:09:57,500 --> 01:09:59,125 -published today... -REPORTER 5: Hacked emails 1121 01:09:59,208 --> 01:10:00,125 and other information. 1122 01:10:00,208 --> 01:10:01,458 REPORTER 6: ...the avalanche of emails 1123 01:10:01,542 --> 01:10:02,834 that continue to come out. 1124 01:10:02,917 --> 01:10:04,166 REPORTER 7: We have new details now 1125 01:10:04,250 --> 01:10:05,834 on that email hack at the DNC. 1126 01:10:05,917 --> 01:10:07,375 REPORTER 8: ...inside look at the machinations 1127 01:10:07,458 --> 01:10:10,834 of the Democratic Party machine are all online 1128 01:10:10,917 --> 01:10:12,083 for the world to see. 1129 01:10:14,083 --> 01:10:15,125 (BEEPING) 1130 01:10:16,875 --> 01:10:20,625 ALEX: Would you walk me through the hack into the DNC in 2016? 1131 01:10:20,709 --> 01:10:21,917 MICHAEL DANIEL: Sure. 1132 01:10:22,000 --> 01:10:25,041 Imagine that you are Russian intelligence services 1133 01:10:25,125 --> 01:10:28,542 trying to get access to the DNC network. 1134 01:10:28,625 --> 01:10:31,250 The first thing you might try to do is get someone to the DNC 1135 01:10:31,333 --> 01:10:33,625 to give you their username and password, 1136 01:10:33,709 --> 01:10:37,875 so you can log into the network using those stolen credentials. 1137 01:10:37,959 --> 01:10:40,166 (BEEPING) 1138 01:10:40,250 --> 01:10:41,875 DANIEL: And then, what you're going to do 1139 01:10:41,959 --> 01:10:43,917 is reconnaissance. 1140 01:10:44,000 --> 01:10:45,500 What does this network look like? 1141 01:10:45,583 --> 01:10:48,041 What kind of security software is it running? 1142 01:10:48,125 --> 01:10:51,792 And, based on that, you will customize malware 1143 01:10:51,875 --> 01:10:54,041 that you will install on that system. 1144 01:10:54,125 --> 01:10:57,417 They had a-- a particular malware product 1145 01:10:57,500 --> 01:10:59,625 we knew as X-Agent. 1146 01:10:59,709 --> 01:11:03,041 They could do screenshots of what you were doing. 1147 01:11:03,125 --> 01:11:05,250 They could do keystroking. 1148 01:11:05,333 --> 01:11:08,709 You're sitting there, typing on your computer, 1149 01:11:08,792 --> 01:11:11,208 and someone's literally seeing it. 1150 01:11:11,291 --> 01:11:12,417 It's coming up on their screen 1151 01:11:12,500 --> 01:11:15,291 as if it's coming up on your screen. 1152 01:11:15,375 --> 01:11:17,750 DANIEL: You're gonna begin moving through the network 1153 01:11:17,834 --> 01:11:21,750 to other machines and servers, looking for information. 1154 01:11:21,834 --> 01:11:24,500 And then you will extract that from the network 1155 01:11:24,583 --> 01:11:26,917 without being detected. 1156 01:11:27,000 --> 01:11:29,333 Maybe a network that you're trying to get into 1157 01:11:29,417 --> 01:11:31,750 has a rule on its firewall that says, 1158 01:11:31,834 --> 01:11:36,166 "Yeah, if it's an IP address from Russia, maybe not." 1159 01:11:37,542 --> 01:11:39,959 So then what you might try to do is connect to... 1160 01:11:40,041 --> 01:11:41,792 probably to something here in the United States. 1161 01:11:41,875 --> 01:11:44,083 And then use that to connect to another server 1162 01:11:44,166 --> 01:11:45,917 and maybe to another server, and from there, 1163 01:11:46,000 --> 01:11:47,166 you're gonna move it back 1164 01:11:47,250 --> 01:11:50,709 to wherever you are conducting your operations from. 1165 01:11:50,792 --> 01:11:53,250 Most of the advanced actors out there, 1166 01:11:53,333 --> 01:11:56,333 they use a combination of off-the-shelf 1167 01:11:56,417 --> 01:11:59,709 commercial tools that you can buy from other criminal groups 1168 01:11:59,792 --> 01:12:03,375 and custom malware that they write themselves. 1169 01:12:03,458 --> 01:12:06,625 Sometimes these tools, if they're highly customized, 1170 01:12:06,709 --> 01:12:10,083 that's almost like a fingerprint for, you know, malicious actors, 1171 01:12:10,166 --> 01:12:11,875 and it's very hard to fake that. 1172 01:12:11,959 --> 01:12:13,041 And in this case, 1173 01:12:13,125 --> 01:12:15,166 when we assembled all of that information up 1174 01:12:15,250 --> 01:12:18,667 and you looked at the potential alternatives and other things... 1175 01:12:18,750 --> 01:12:21,500 the most likely result was that it was in fact the Russians 1176 01:12:21,583 --> 01:12:23,291 carrying out those operations. 1177 01:12:29,917 --> 01:12:32,917 ALEX: Using warrants and open source tools, 1178 01:12:33,000 --> 01:12:35,208 an FBI cyber unit identified 1179 01:12:35,291 --> 01:12:37,583 the fingerprints of Russian servers 1180 01:12:37,667 --> 01:12:40,667 and tracked Russian operators, in real time, 1181 01:12:40,750 --> 01:12:43,875 on their networks and through social media. 1182 01:12:43,959 --> 01:12:48,333 Emails with fake links were sent by Aleksey Lukashev. 1183 01:12:48,417 --> 01:12:51,667 Nikolay Kozachek, callsign "Cossack," 1184 01:12:51,750 --> 01:12:54,792 rented servers in Illinois and Arizona. 1185 01:12:54,875 --> 01:12:59,000 Artem Malyshev installed an updated version of X-Agent. 1186 01:12:59,083 --> 01:13:03,041 Ivan Yermakov burrowed into the flimsy security systems 1187 01:13:03,125 --> 01:13:04,875 of the Democratic Party networks, 1188 01:13:04,959 --> 01:13:09,208 then built digital tunnels to exfiltrate troves of data. 1189 01:13:09,291 --> 01:13:10,625 All told, they harvested 1190 01:13:10,709 --> 01:13:12,542 hundreds of thousands of documents, 1191 01:13:12,625 --> 01:13:15,750 including fundraising records and opposition research. 1192 01:13:16,792 --> 01:13:19,250 But stealing secrets was nothing new. 1193 01:13:21,291 --> 01:13:23,875 DANIEL: Espionage is part of international relations. 1194 01:13:23,959 --> 01:13:27,125 It always has been, and it always will be. 1195 01:13:27,208 --> 01:13:30,208 We conduct espionage as well, across the world. 1196 01:13:30,291 --> 01:13:33,041 We are looking for and collecting information 1197 01:13:33,125 --> 01:13:34,458 and bringing that back. 1198 01:13:35,583 --> 01:13:37,583 And so as a government, 1199 01:13:37,667 --> 01:13:40,542 you try to prevent as much espionage from happening, 1200 01:13:40,625 --> 01:13:42,333 but you don't really get your nose out of joint 1201 01:13:42,417 --> 01:13:45,667 when-- when it occurs, because that's the part 1202 01:13:45,750 --> 01:13:48,041 of the normal international relations process. 1203 01:13:48,125 --> 01:13:49,542 ♪ (SUSPENSEFUL MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 1204 01:13:49,625 --> 01:13:50,667 MAN 1: (IN RUSSIAN) 1205 01:13:50,750 --> 01:13:52,333 MAN 2: (IN RUSSIAN) 1206 01:13:53,041 --> 01:13:54,417 MAN 1: 1207 01:13:54,500 --> 01:13:57,166 ALEX: For years, countries have silently spied on each other. 1208 01:13:58,000 --> 01:13:59,583 Sometimes things got violent, 1209 01:13:59,667 --> 01:14:01,208 but that was mostly in the movies. 1210 01:14:01,291 --> 01:14:02,709 (IN RUSSIAN) 1211 01:14:04,208 --> 01:14:05,542 ALEX: When the internet came along, 1212 01:14:05,625 --> 01:14:08,041 spy agencies got into the hacking business, 1213 01:14:08,125 --> 01:14:10,208 but the old rules mostly still applied. 1214 01:14:10,959 --> 01:14:12,917 Armed forces fought wars, 1215 01:14:13,000 --> 01:14:16,125 while intelligence services just stole secrets. 1216 01:14:18,000 --> 01:14:22,250 DAVID HICKTON: Those of us who are my age remember the KGB. 1217 01:14:22,333 --> 01:14:24,166 Or, if they watch television, 1218 01:14:24,250 --> 01:14:25,917 they remember the parodies of it. 1219 01:14:26,000 --> 01:14:28,125 In Maxwell Smart, it was called KAOS, 1220 01:14:28,208 --> 01:14:30,834 and in James Bond, it was called Spectre. 1221 01:14:30,917 --> 01:14:32,291 (ALARM BLARING) 1222 01:14:32,375 --> 01:14:35,083 But it's important to talk about two spy agencies 1223 01:14:35,166 --> 01:14:36,625 in Russia today. 1224 01:14:36,709 --> 01:14:38,041 ♪ (MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 1225 01:14:38,125 --> 01:14:39,709 DANIEL: There's the GRU, 1226 01:14:39,792 --> 01:14:41,583 which is the intelligence service 1227 01:14:41,667 --> 01:14:43,709 that works for the Russian military. 1228 01:14:44,375 --> 01:14:45,917 And then there's the SVR. 1229 01:14:46,000 --> 01:14:47,917 Typically, the SVR is focused more 1230 01:14:48,000 --> 01:14:50,125 on what we would consider traditional espionage. 1231 01:14:50,208 --> 01:14:51,709 INTERVIEWER: More like the CIA? 1232 01:14:51,792 --> 01:14:53,542 More like the CIA, correct. 1233 01:14:54,667 --> 01:14:56,458 WALLANDER: The SVR is much more 1234 01:14:56,542 --> 01:14:59,834 of a traditional foreign intelligence service. 1235 01:14:59,917 --> 01:15:04,250 It runs its own agents that serve abroad, undercover, 1236 01:15:04,333 --> 01:15:07,291 whether at embassies or as private citizens. 1237 01:15:07,375 --> 01:15:09,792 And it's an intelligence collection operation. 1238 01:15:09,875 --> 01:15:14,458 Its job is more to watch and collect. Not to act. 1239 01:15:15,834 --> 01:15:18,417 The GRU is military intelligence. 1240 01:15:18,500 --> 01:15:19,917 So, to the extent it collects, 1241 01:15:20,000 --> 01:15:23,583 it collects more on American defense capabilities, 1242 01:15:23,667 --> 01:15:25,417 on conflicts. 1243 01:15:25,500 --> 01:15:28,792 The GRU had been sent in early in Syria. 1244 01:15:28,875 --> 01:15:31,083 The GRU had been one of the lead agencies 1245 01:15:31,166 --> 01:15:33,542 in the intervention in Ukraine. 1246 01:15:33,625 --> 01:15:36,291 I was told that the GRU is a little sloppier 1247 01:15:36,375 --> 01:15:39,583 than some of the other Russian intelligence services. 1248 01:15:39,667 --> 01:15:41,041 (SHOUTS IN RUSSIAN) 1249 01:15:41,125 --> 01:15:43,208 (CHANTING IN RUSSIAN) 1250 01:15:45,583 --> 01:15:46,750 DANIEL: Prior to 2014, 1251 01:15:46,834 --> 01:15:49,709 if you discovered the Russians in a network, 1252 01:15:49,792 --> 01:15:52,792 uh, they tended to vanish like ghosts. 1253 01:15:52,875 --> 01:15:55,166 They're very quiet, they're very stealthy. 1254 01:15:55,250 --> 01:15:56,834 They have excellent tradecraft. 1255 01:15:56,917 --> 01:15:58,417 Uh, but starting in 2014, 1256 01:15:58,500 --> 01:16:00,959 they actually became much more aggressive. 1257 01:16:01,041 --> 01:16:04,583 I think it was a broader shift in Russian strategic thinking 1258 01:16:04,667 --> 01:16:08,041 about how aggressive they wanted to be with the West, 1259 01:16:08,125 --> 01:16:10,291 and the United States in particular. 1260 01:16:10,375 --> 01:16:12,875 And the GRU is a reflection of that. 1261 01:16:12,959 --> 01:16:14,667 And it's the GRU that carries out 1262 01:16:14,750 --> 01:16:16,834 more of the activities that actually generate 1263 01:16:16,917 --> 01:16:19,458 an effect in the physical world. 1264 01:16:22,166 --> 01:16:27,458 The GRU used the Ukraine invasion in 2014 1265 01:16:27,542 --> 01:16:30,333 as a cyber playground... 1266 01:16:30,417 --> 01:16:34,500 including a power grid attack in December 2015. 1267 01:16:35,500 --> 01:16:36,917 ALEX: Two days before Christmas, 1268 01:16:37,000 --> 01:16:39,000 the lights went out in Western Ukraine. 1269 01:16:44,000 --> 01:16:45,917 In a display of Russian cyber power, 1270 01:16:46,000 --> 01:16:48,291 the GRU hacked into the control systems 1271 01:16:48,375 --> 01:16:50,875 of the Ukrainian power grid and commanded 1272 01:16:50,959 --> 01:16:53,917 distribution centers to shut themselves down... 1273 01:16:54,000 --> 01:16:55,250 CONTROL WORKER 1: (IN RUSSIAN) 1274 01:16:55,333 --> 01:16:57,041 CONTROL WORKER 2: (IN RUSSIAN) 1275 01:16:57,125 --> 01:16:59,291 ALEX: ...leaving more than 200,000 people 1276 01:16:59,375 --> 01:17:00,709 without electricity. 1277 01:17:00,792 --> 01:17:04,208 UKRAINIAN CITIZEN: (IN RUSSIAN) 1278 01:17:10,375 --> 01:17:13,959 DANIEL: The GRU obviously felt like they had a greater 1279 01:17:14,041 --> 01:17:19,000 degree of freedom operating in Ukraine than in other places. 1280 01:17:19,083 --> 01:17:21,583 ALEX: Nothing was off limits for the GRU. 1281 01:17:21,667 --> 01:17:24,458 A year earlier, it had caused chaos by hacking 1282 01:17:24,542 --> 01:17:27,291 into voting computer systems during the election 1283 01:17:27,375 --> 01:17:29,792 to replace President Yanukovych. 1284 01:17:29,875 --> 01:17:33,458 The Russians actually hacked into the main server 1285 01:17:33,542 --> 01:17:37,625 and, uh, created an outcome in which a very minor 1286 01:17:37,709 --> 01:17:41,375 nationalist candidate was portrayed as the winner. 1287 01:17:41,458 --> 01:17:44,417 And they actually broadcast it on their evening news. 1288 01:17:44,500 --> 01:17:48,041 (IN RUSSIAN) 1289 01:17:55,208 --> 01:17:56,834 SNYDER: Fortunately, the Ukrainian state 1290 01:17:56,917 --> 01:17:58,208 caught up with that. 1291 01:17:58,291 --> 01:18:01,500 They manually counted, they got the right result out. 1292 01:18:01,583 --> 01:18:03,333 But imagine if that had worked. 1293 01:18:03,417 --> 01:18:04,667 (EXPLOSION) 1294 01:18:04,750 --> 01:18:07,333 SNYDER: Russia was telling the West over and over again, 1295 01:18:07,417 --> 01:18:09,166 "Ukraine is a bunch of fascists. 1296 01:18:09,250 --> 01:18:10,834 We have to intervene to defend civilization 1297 01:18:10,917 --> 01:18:12,875 against all of these Nazis in Ukraine." 1298 01:18:12,959 --> 01:18:15,166 And then you pick out a fascist, and you claim 1299 01:18:15,250 --> 01:18:16,959 that he's won the presidential election? 1300 01:18:17,041 --> 01:18:19,583 I mean, even if that had only worked for a few days, 1301 01:18:19,667 --> 01:18:21,417 imagine how that would have affected 1302 01:18:21,500 --> 01:18:23,959 our impression of Ukraine. 1303 01:18:24,041 --> 01:18:25,792 ALEX: The cyberattack that caught the eye 1304 01:18:25,875 --> 01:18:27,917 of US authorities was an intrusion 1305 01:18:28,000 --> 01:18:30,125 into a nuclear reactor in Ukraine 1306 01:18:30,208 --> 01:18:33,375 owned by a Pennsylvania company, Westinghouse. 1307 01:18:33,458 --> 01:18:35,750 Marked by the digital fingerprints of the GRU 1308 01:18:35,834 --> 01:18:39,000 and the potential dangers posed by a nuclear hack, 1309 01:18:39,083 --> 01:18:40,542 the strike attracted the attention 1310 01:18:40,625 --> 01:18:43,083 of federal prosecutor David Hickton. 1311 01:18:44,125 --> 01:18:45,250 Westinghouse... 1312 01:18:46,166 --> 01:18:48,166 is the designer of about 50 percent 1313 01:18:48,250 --> 01:18:50,291 of the nuclear reactors in the world. 1314 01:18:50,959 --> 01:18:53,125 So, our larger concern 1315 01:18:53,208 --> 01:18:56,083 is how many Chernobyls do you want to have? 1316 01:18:56,166 --> 01:18:58,375 Because someone is stealing the technology 1317 01:18:58,458 --> 01:19:02,250 and building the nuclear reactor backwards. 1318 01:19:02,333 --> 01:19:04,542 ALEX: Along with the FBI, he started watching 1319 01:19:04,625 --> 01:19:07,458 the GRU's activities very closely. 1320 01:19:09,250 --> 01:19:13,291 We opened up a criminal case in December 2014, 1321 01:19:13,375 --> 01:19:16,750 which ultimately became "Fancy Bear." 1322 01:19:16,834 --> 01:19:19,250 -ALEX: Sorry, I-- I'm gonna interrupt you for a second. -Sure. 1323 01:19:19,333 --> 01:19:21,583 ALEX: From a straightforward point of view, 1324 01:19:21,667 --> 01:19:23,291 who is Fancy Bear? 1325 01:19:26,000 --> 01:19:29,000 -(LAPTOP BEEPING) -(MOUSE CLICKING) 1326 01:19:35,125 --> 01:19:37,834 DANIEL: Fancy Bear is a Russian hacker group. 1327 01:19:37,917 --> 01:19:41,041 You know, the dudes from that intelligence organization. 1328 01:19:41,125 --> 01:19:45,166 Cybersecurity experts will attach a adjective 1329 01:19:45,250 --> 01:19:46,417 to the word "Bear" 1330 01:19:46,500 --> 01:19:49,959 for any group associated with the Russian government. 1331 01:19:50,041 --> 01:19:54,125 And it's "Kitten" for any group connected to Iran. 1332 01:19:54,208 --> 01:19:58,125 ALEX: Fancy Bear was the name for hackers from the GRU. 1333 01:19:58,208 --> 01:20:02,417 Fancy Bear liked to show off. It didn't hide its tracks. 1334 01:20:02,500 --> 01:20:05,709 Not surprising for a spy group whose logo is a bat 1335 01:20:05,792 --> 01:20:08,166 with its wings across the world. 1336 01:20:08,250 --> 01:20:12,208 For the GRU, it's like, how much effort do you put 1337 01:20:12,291 --> 01:20:14,792 into obscuring what you're doing? 1338 01:20:14,875 --> 01:20:16,792 How good is the disguise kit? 1339 01:20:16,875 --> 01:20:19,458 Is it just kind of glasses with the funny nose? 1340 01:20:19,542 --> 01:20:21,458 Is it just a bandanna across the face? 1341 01:20:21,542 --> 01:20:23,291 Or is it actually, like, the full, you know, 1342 01:20:23,375 --> 01:20:24,750 Mission Impossible mask? 1343 01:20:26,166 --> 01:20:27,625 At the end, I concluded 1344 01:20:27,709 --> 01:20:29,959 they were sort of an in-your-face group 1345 01:20:30,041 --> 01:20:33,125 because they had created their own website 1346 01:20:33,208 --> 01:20:35,458 in the name we had used for them. (CHUCKLES) 1347 01:20:35,542 --> 01:20:37,041 FancyBear dot org. 1348 01:20:38,458 --> 01:20:41,250 ALEX: Fancy wasn't the only Bear. 1349 01:20:41,333 --> 01:20:45,291 There was also "Cozy Bear." Cozy was quiet. 1350 01:20:45,375 --> 01:20:47,750 Snug as a bug in a rug. 1351 01:20:47,834 --> 01:20:49,959 It haunted networks like a ghost. 1352 01:20:50,041 --> 01:20:52,500 It belonged to the traditional spy group, 1353 01:20:52,583 --> 01:20:53,583 the SVR. 1354 01:20:56,458 --> 01:21:01,500 ALEX: In 2015, Cozy Bear hacked into the Pentagon email system. 1355 01:21:01,583 --> 01:21:04,917 Then Cozy sneaked into the Democratic National Committee 1356 01:21:05,000 --> 01:21:07,583 and quietly set about stealing information. 1357 01:21:08,917 --> 01:21:12,333 Gigabyte by gigabyte, the FBI watched the data flow 1358 01:21:12,417 --> 01:21:15,333 -while they tried to contact the Democrats. -(PHONE BUZZING) 1359 01:21:15,417 --> 01:21:17,500 ANDREW MCCABE: That was kind of the first interactions 1360 01:21:17,583 --> 01:21:18,834 we had with the DNC, 1361 01:21:18,917 --> 01:21:21,000 which is basically the same sort of outreach 1362 01:21:21,083 --> 01:21:24,208 that we give to private corporations 1363 01:21:24,291 --> 01:21:26,000 and academic institutions. 1364 01:21:26,083 --> 01:21:29,041 Our cyber folks will call and say, 1365 01:21:29,125 --> 01:21:31,625 "Hey, we've seen some probing activity 1366 01:21:31,709 --> 01:21:34,000 coming from a particular location. 1367 01:21:34,083 --> 01:21:37,500 You should go onto your systems and look through your logs. 1368 01:21:37,583 --> 01:21:39,583 If you are seeing any of these things, 1369 01:21:39,667 --> 01:21:41,125 come back and let us know." 1370 01:21:42,125 --> 01:21:43,125 ALEX: For six months, 1371 01:21:43,208 --> 01:21:45,625 as spies roamed through the DNC files, 1372 01:21:45,709 --> 01:21:47,750 no one seemed too alarmed. 1373 01:21:47,834 --> 01:21:50,750 DNC tech support didn't return calls from the FBI, 1374 01:21:50,834 --> 01:21:54,375 and the FBI never bothered to contact senior officials. 1375 01:21:54,458 --> 01:21:58,667 Then, Fancy Bear, the group of Russian military hackers, 1376 01:21:58,750 --> 01:22:02,041 decided to find their own way into the DNC 1377 01:22:02,125 --> 01:22:04,667 by sneaking through another door. 1378 01:22:04,750 --> 01:22:06,709 The two groups may not have even known 1379 01:22:06,792 --> 01:22:09,000 that they were attacking the same network. 1380 01:22:10,166 --> 01:22:12,625 You will often find multiple Russian agencies 1381 01:22:12,709 --> 01:22:14,709 targeting a similar target 1382 01:22:14,792 --> 01:22:17,583 to actively encourage bureaucratic competition. 1383 01:22:17,667 --> 01:22:20,083 Probably both of them had been given the DNC 1384 01:22:20,166 --> 01:22:21,333 as a high priority. 1385 01:22:23,166 --> 01:22:27,959 In March of 2016, we learned that Fancy Bear, 1386 01:22:28,041 --> 01:22:31,208 which we had an active criminal investigation into, 1387 01:22:32,000 --> 01:22:33,542 had hacked the DNC. 1388 01:22:34,834 --> 01:22:40,083 And so, then my next reaction to that is, "Well, who else?" 1389 01:22:40,166 --> 01:22:43,792 I fully expected that we would learn that they were hacking 1390 01:22:43,875 --> 01:22:46,458 the RNC and the Trump campaign, too. 1391 01:22:46,542 --> 01:22:51,291 I later became surprised to learn that they were not. 1392 01:22:51,375 --> 01:22:54,250 And then, it was the very next day... 1393 01:22:54,333 --> 01:22:55,709 and it's John Podesta. 1394 01:22:58,500 --> 01:22:59,834 PODESTA: There's what looks like a prompt 1395 01:22:59,917 --> 01:23:01,542 from Google to change your password, 1396 01:23:01,625 --> 01:23:03,709 saying "your account's being attacked." 1397 01:23:05,041 --> 01:23:07,834 We asked one of our cybersecurity people, 1398 01:23:07,917 --> 01:23:10,792 "Should we change? Is this real?" 1399 01:23:10,875 --> 01:23:13,166 Later, he claimed that it was a typo, 1400 01:23:13,250 --> 01:23:16,625 but email went back saying "yes." 1401 01:23:16,709 --> 01:23:20,417 My assistant clicked on it, changed the password. 1402 01:23:20,500 --> 01:23:21,709 The rest is history. 1403 01:23:24,375 --> 01:23:25,834 ALEX: Shortly after the initial theft 1404 01:23:25,917 --> 01:23:28,000 of documents from the DNC, 1405 01:23:28,083 --> 01:23:31,417 Fancy Bear tried and failed to register a website 1406 01:23:31,500 --> 01:23:33,583 called ElectionLeaks dot com. 1407 01:23:34,583 --> 01:23:37,625 They settled for "DCLeaks" and waited. 1408 01:23:39,000 --> 01:23:40,834 -(MOUSE CLICKS) -ALEX: A month later, 1409 01:23:40,917 --> 01:23:42,834 Hillary Clinton sealed her victory 1410 01:23:42,917 --> 01:23:45,375 in the Democratic primaries. 1411 01:23:45,458 --> 01:23:48,208 We are on the brink of a historic... 1412 01:23:48,291 --> 01:23:49,583 (CROWD CHEERS) 1413 01:23:49,667 --> 01:23:53,250 ...historic, unprecedented moment. 1414 01:23:55,667 --> 01:23:57,875 ALEX: The next day, DCLeaks went live 1415 01:23:57,959 --> 01:23:59,000 with its first dump 1416 01:23:59,083 --> 01:24:01,709 of the Democrats' documents and emails. 1417 01:24:04,083 --> 01:24:06,750 HICKTON: I first thought, "Wow, now it's being weaponized, 1418 01:24:06,834 --> 01:24:08,041 and it might have an impact." 1419 01:24:08,125 --> 01:24:10,208 But I discounted that because I thought, 1420 01:24:10,291 --> 01:24:11,750 "The only people who are gonna read this 1421 01:24:11,834 --> 01:24:14,166 are the people who read Politico." 1422 01:24:14,250 --> 01:24:17,333 ALEX: The first dump was small and not widely publicized. 1423 01:24:17,417 --> 01:24:19,500 But when it came to the subject of emails, 1424 01:24:19,583 --> 01:24:22,792 Hillary Clinton was particularly vulnerable. 1425 01:24:22,875 --> 01:24:24,709 REPORTER 1: Hillary Clinton is under fire. 1426 01:24:24,792 --> 01:24:26,542 This morning's New York Times reports 1427 01:24:26,625 --> 01:24:28,667 that the former Secretary of State 1428 01:24:28,750 --> 01:24:30,709 may have violated federal laws. 1429 01:24:30,792 --> 01:24:32,417 REPORTER 2: Clinton used personal email 1430 01:24:32,500 --> 01:24:34,709 to conduct official business for the State Department 1431 01:24:34,792 --> 01:24:36,500 during her time as the nation's top diplomat. 1432 01:24:36,583 --> 01:24:38,417 REPORTER 3: Hillary Clinton's email controversy 1433 01:24:38,500 --> 01:24:40,208 growing by the day. 1434 01:24:40,291 --> 01:24:42,208 You could say her inbox is full. 1435 01:24:42,291 --> 01:24:43,917 You could. 1436 01:24:44,000 --> 01:24:47,041 PODESTA: There was a backdrop to the email story, obviously, 1437 01:24:47,125 --> 01:24:50,583 which was the investigation of her private use of emails 1438 01:24:50,667 --> 01:24:52,542 when she was Secretary of State. 1439 01:24:53,291 --> 01:24:55,000 But the hacks and leaking 1440 01:24:55,083 --> 01:24:57,000 kind of brought the topic of emails... 1441 01:24:57,083 --> 01:24:59,625 (CHUCKLES) ...back to the campaign. 1442 01:25:01,375 --> 01:25:04,917 ALEX: The Clinton campaign knew Russia was behind DCLeaks. 1443 01:25:05,000 --> 01:25:07,959 Their cybersecurity firm, CrowdStrike, had reached 1444 01:25:08,041 --> 01:25:10,417 the same conclusion as US intelligence. 1445 01:25:10,500 --> 01:25:12,375 But despite compelling evidence, 1446 01:25:12,458 --> 01:25:16,000 the US government refused to blame the hack on Russia. 1447 01:25:16,083 --> 01:25:18,375 So the campaign took steps of its own. 1448 01:25:21,166 --> 01:25:23,333 JAKE SULLIVAN: What we knew in the summer of 2016 1449 01:25:23,417 --> 01:25:28,583 was that the Russian government was hacking the DNC, 1450 01:25:28,667 --> 01:25:32,583 and now making efforts to hack the Clinton campaign 1451 01:25:32,667 --> 01:25:34,709 and Clinton campaign officials as well. 1452 01:25:35,667 --> 01:25:36,625 We were under attack. 1453 01:25:36,709 --> 01:25:38,166 And that was a hostile foreign power 1454 01:25:38,250 --> 01:25:40,000 who was undertaking this operation. 1455 01:25:40,083 --> 01:25:43,959 We tried, as best we could, in the days that followed 1456 01:25:44,041 --> 01:25:46,125 those initial releases of information, 1457 01:25:46,208 --> 01:25:50,917 to raise the alarm, to make the American press see, 1458 01:25:51,000 --> 01:25:53,625 uh, just how dramatic this was. 1459 01:25:53,709 --> 01:25:55,291 And so, we went public 1460 01:25:55,375 --> 01:25:58,208 in a Washington Post piece in early June. 1461 01:25:59,250 --> 01:26:01,375 ♪ (TENSE MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 1462 01:26:04,208 --> 01:26:08,000 ALEX: The GRU moved quickly to try to discredit the story. 1463 01:26:08,083 --> 01:26:11,417 Eight hours after the Washington Post article went online, 1464 01:26:11,500 --> 01:26:15,417 hackers were hard at work trying to hide the Russian hand. 1465 01:26:16,959 --> 01:26:18,500 To distract onlookers, 1466 01:26:18,583 --> 01:26:21,458 Fancy Bear had a special card up its sleeve, 1467 01:26:21,542 --> 01:26:24,166 a joker named Guccifer 2.0. 1468 01:26:24,250 --> 01:26:28,083 ♪ ("ON THE ROAD TO NEPAL" BY MASHINA VREMENI PLAYING) ♪ 1469 01:26:34,834 --> 01:26:36,083 ALEX: Guccifer bragged about 1470 01:26:36,166 --> 01:26:38,625 outsmarting the US Intelligence Community, 1471 01:26:38,709 --> 01:26:40,750 and even had a Twitter handle. 1472 01:26:44,792 --> 01:26:47,875 DANIEL: This persona, Guccifer 2.0, says, "No, no, no, 1473 01:26:47,959 --> 01:26:50,000 the DNC intrusion was done by me, 1474 01:26:50,083 --> 01:26:52,625 I'm a lone hacker in Romania." 1475 01:26:52,709 --> 01:26:54,750 ♪ (SONG CONTINUES) ♪ 1476 01:27:03,208 --> 01:27:07,000 This persona had appeared right out of seemingly nowhere. 1477 01:27:07,083 --> 01:27:09,208 You know, when you're in this kind of environment, 1478 01:27:09,291 --> 01:27:10,291 you're like, "Really? 1479 01:27:10,375 --> 01:27:11,959 That seems like an interesting coincidence." 1480 01:27:20,458 --> 01:27:22,667 WALLANDER: There probably was a Romanian platform 1481 01:27:22,750 --> 01:27:25,166 involved in the operation, 1482 01:27:25,250 --> 01:27:30,125 but it was eventually attributed back to, uh, Russian origin. 1483 01:27:31,583 --> 01:27:33,458 DANIEL: Inside the National Security Council, 1484 01:27:33,542 --> 01:27:35,333 the conclusion came back pretty quickly 1485 01:27:35,417 --> 01:27:40,208 that this was not a lone Romanian, uh, hacker, 1486 01:27:40,291 --> 01:27:44,041 that in fact this was a front for the GRU. 1487 01:27:44,125 --> 01:27:46,750 ALEX: They based their creation on the original Guccifer, 1488 01:27:46,834 --> 01:27:50,291 a Romanian who had hacked US politicians like Colin Powell 1489 01:27:50,375 --> 01:27:52,208 and George W. Bush. 1490 01:27:52,291 --> 01:27:54,834 Guccifer offered just enough deniability 1491 01:27:54,917 --> 01:27:56,792 about the origins of the hack. 1492 01:27:56,875 --> 01:27:59,625 GLENN GREENWALD: (OVER PHONE) The claim that 1493 01:27:59,709 --> 01:28:02,166 the Russian intelligence agencies were involved 1494 01:28:02,250 --> 01:28:03,834 in the procurement of these documents, 1495 01:28:03,917 --> 01:28:07,458 thus far there's been very little evidence presented. 1496 01:28:07,542 --> 01:28:10,583 REPORTER: Russian officials are calling Americans paranoid. 1497 01:28:10,667 --> 01:28:13,750 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov dismissed the allegations 1498 01:28:13,834 --> 01:28:15,500 when he was asked about them today. 1499 01:28:19,458 --> 01:28:22,834 ALEX: The public was still at sea for some time 1500 01:28:22,917 --> 01:28:24,959 in terms of Guccifer 2.0. 1501 01:28:25,041 --> 01:28:28,625 We had decided that we would not, uh... 1502 01:28:28,709 --> 01:28:30,875 that we would certainly not support the idea 1503 01:28:30,959 --> 01:28:32,166 that it was a lone hacker, 1504 01:28:32,250 --> 01:28:34,792 but that we weren't going to aggressively sort of try 1505 01:28:34,875 --> 01:28:38,166 to debunk that from the US government. 1506 01:28:38,250 --> 01:28:40,291 ALEX: Guccifer was a flimsy disguise, 1507 01:28:40,375 --> 01:28:41,583 but it worked. 1508 01:28:41,667 --> 01:28:44,667 The identity of the hackers became a sideshow. 1509 01:28:44,750 --> 01:28:47,542 The story wasn't that Russia had hacked the Democrats, 1510 01:28:47,625 --> 01:28:50,375 but that the Democrats were falling apart. 1511 01:28:50,875 --> 01:28:52,417 (CROWD CHEERING) 1512 01:28:52,500 --> 01:28:54,625 REPORTER 1: On the eve of the Democratic Convention, 1513 01:28:54,709 --> 01:28:55,792 a bombshell. 1514 01:28:55,875 --> 01:28:57,166 WikiLeaks released thousands 1515 01:28:57,250 --> 01:29:00,250 of internal Democratic National Committee emails... 1516 01:29:00,333 --> 01:29:02,250 REPORTER 2: Just when Hillary Clinton was hoping 1517 01:29:02,333 --> 01:29:05,375 to put the whole notion of an email controversy behind her, 1518 01:29:05,458 --> 01:29:08,125 here comes an entirely different email controversy, 1519 01:29:08,208 --> 01:29:09,667 and one that threatens the unity 1520 01:29:09,750 --> 01:29:11,333 the Democrats are hoping to show. 1521 01:29:11,417 --> 01:29:12,583 (MESSAGE ALERT PINGS) 1522 01:29:12,667 --> 01:29:14,834 REPORTER 3: Seventeen hundred new stolen emails. 1523 01:29:14,917 --> 01:29:15,792 (MESSAGE ALERT) 1524 01:29:15,875 --> 01:29:17,291 REPORTER 4: Thousands of leaked emails 1525 01:29:17,375 --> 01:29:19,375 show Democratic party officials 1526 01:29:19,458 --> 01:29:22,000 possibly plotting against Bernie Sanders 1527 01:29:22,083 --> 01:29:23,792 in his race against Hillary Clinton. 1528 01:29:23,875 --> 01:29:25,834 REPORTER 5: In one, a top official wonders, 1529 01:29:25,917 --> 01:29:28,041 "Can we get someone to ask his belief? 1530 01:29:28,125 --> 01:29:31,500 Does he believe in a God?" The response, an "Amen." 1531 01:29:31,583 --> 01:29:33,208 (CROWD CHANTING) 1532 01:29:33,291 --> 01:29:36,041 REPORTER 6: The idea that we have heard, of course, from the Sanders campaign 1533 01:29:36,125 --> 01:29:38,458 is that the DNC had a finger on the scale 1534 01:29:38,542 --> 01:29:40,917 to try to help Secretary Clinton, 1535 01:29:41,041 --> 01:29:42,542 and now you see these emails. 1536 01:29:42,625 --> 01:29:45,375 Does this not give credence to their argument? 1537 01:29:45,458 --> 01:29:47,625 Does this not validate their concerns? 1538 01:29:47,709 --> 01:29:50,709 REPORTER 7: It has been a tumultuous 24 hours here, 1539 01:29:50,792 --> 01:29:53,458 at the opening of the Democratic National Convention. 1540 01:29:53,542 --> 01:29:55,542 REPORTER 8: This is exactly the kind of tension 1541 01:29:55,625 --> 01:29:57,750 that the party was hoping to avoid here. 1542 01:29:57,834 --> 01:29:59,125 (CROWD CLAMORING) 1543 01:29:59,208 --> 01:30:01,458 REPORTER 9: Tonight, Sanders's supporters are furious. 1544 01:30:01,542 --> 01:30:03,875 (CHANTING) Walk out! Walk out! Walk out! 1545 01:30:03,959 --> 01:30:05,250 (PROTESTORS CLAMORING) 1546 01:30:05,333 --> 01:30:06,625 MALE PROTESTOR: 1547 01:30:12,125 --> 01:30:13,291 The chair of the DNC, 1548 01:30:13,375 --> 01:30:15,333 Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz, 1549 01:30:15,417 --> 01:30:16,917 has announced her resignation. 1550 01:30:17,000 --> 01:30:18,750 REPORTER 10: (OVER PHONE) She was booed off the stage. 1551 01:30:18,834 --> 01:30:20,041 I've never seen anything like this. 1552 01:30:20,125 --> 01:30:22,125 REPORTER 11: Could you talk about the controversy 1553 01:30:22,208 --> 01:30:25,917 around the emails that came out and then how it suggested 1554 01:30:26,000 --> 01:30:29,959 that the DNC was clearly on the side of Hillary Clinton? 1555 01:30:30,041 --> 01:30:32,250 The Democratic Party does not care about you. 1556 01:30:32,333 --> 01:30:34,583 The Democratic Party does not care about America. 1557 01:30:34,667 --> 01:30:37,083 And so we are gonna show the Democratic Party 1558 01:30:37,166 --> 01:30:38,417 that if they will not have us 1559 01:30:38,500 --> 01:30:40,041 and they will not welcome us into their party, 1560 01:30:40,125 --> 01:30:42,125 then we will leave, and they will lose to Trump. 1561 01:30:42,208 --> 01:30:45,125 And it will not be our fault. It will be their fault. 1562 01:30:45,208 --> 01:30:48,083 ALEX: I found the content of the emails pretty damning. 1563 01:30:48,166 --> 01:30:51,458 The Democratic Party was clearly putting its finger on the scale, 1564 01:30:51,542 --> 01:30:54,750 favoring Clinton over Bernie Sanders. 1565 01:30:54,834 --> 01:30:57,917 The emails were evidence that the system was corrupt 1566 01:30:58,000 --> 01:31:00,750 and even Sanders couldn't put a good face on it. 1567 01:31:00,834 --> 01:31:05,041 We have got to defeat Donald Trump! 1568 01:31:05,125 --> 01:31:06,709 (CROWD CHEERING) 1569 01:31:06,792 --> 01:31:11,875 And we have got to elect Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine! 1570 01:31:11,959 --> 01:31:15,208 (CROWD BOOING) 1571 01:31:20,667 --> 01:31:22,709 ANCHOR: What's your reaction to these emails? 1572 01:31:22,792 --> 01:31:25,375 Outrage, disappointed. And it doesn't matter 1573 01:31:25,458 --> 01:31:27,083 necessarily that it was the Russians. 1574 01:31:27,166 --> 01:31:29,250 It could have been the men from Mars. 1575 01:31:29,333 --> 01:31:31,250 ALEX: But it didn't come from Mars. 1576 01:31:31,333 --> 01:31:34,542 It came from Russia, and not with love. 1577 01:31:34,625 --> 01:31:36,792 That should have been an important part of the story. 1578 01:31:36,875 --> 01:31:39,041 You always want to know the source. 1579 01:31:39,125 --> 01:31:42,291 But the Russian hand was hidden by the volume of the data 1580 01:31:42,375 --> 01:31:44,291 and the chaos it caused. 1581 01:31:44,375 --> 01:31:46,750 That chaos and confusion was fed 1582 01:31:46,834 --> 01:31:49,834 by a controversial figure I knew well. 1583 01:31:49,917 --> 01:31:52,250 I had already made one movie about him. 1584 01:31:54,250 --> 01:31:57,500 You were the one who released these 20,000 emails, 1585 01:31:57,583 --> 01:31:59,000 Julian Assange. 1586 01:31:59,083 --> 01:32:00,166 Where did you get them? 1587 01:32:00,250 --> 01:32:01,875 REPORTER: Can we address the question at hand, 1588 01:32:01,959 --> 01:32:05,291 and that is whether or not you can say definitively 1589 01:32:05,375 --> 01:32:07,458 that Russia had no part in this hack? 1590 01:32:07,542 --> 01:32:08,834 What sort of question is that? 1591 01:32:08,917 --> 01:32:11,917 Uh, I am a journalist. We don't reveal our sources. 1592 01:32:12,000 --> 01:32:14,667 I don't like leaked emails, but in this one case, 1593 01:32:14,750 --> 01:32:17,125 God bless you, WikiLeaks, for proving what we suspected. 1594 01:32:17,208 --> 01:32:18,583 -Okay. -Thank you, WikiLeaks! 1595 01:32:18,667 --> 01:32:22,083 Uh, told us that, um, she doesn't even like Americans. 1596 01:32:22,166 --> 01:32:23,166 She hates Americans. 1597 01:32:23,250 --> 01:32:25,166 You know, I find WikiLeaks very refreshing. 1598 01:32:25,250 --> 01:32:27,667 This is the Hillary Clinton I always knew existed. 1599 01:32:27,750 --> 01:32:29,667 I just never had proof of it. (CHUCKLES) 1600 01:32:29,750 --> 01:32:32,792 PROTESTERS: Hillary cheats! Thank you, WikiLeaks! 1601 01:32:32,875 --> 01:32:35,750 Hillary cheats! Thank you, WikiLeaks! 1602 01:32:35,834 --> 01:32:38,917 (OVER MEGAPHONE) Hillary cheats! Thank you, WikiLeaks! 1603 01:32:39,000 --> 01:32:42,417 Hillary cheats! Thank you, WikiLeaks! 1604 01:32:42,500 --> 01:32:44,500 WALLANDER: There was a lot of support for WikiLeaks 1605 01:32:44,583 --> 01:32:45,667 in the United States as sort of 1606 01:32:45,750 --> 01:32:48,458 this freedom of information operation... 1607 01:32:48,542 --> 01:32:50,375 which I never really understood. 1608 01:32:50,458 --> 01:32:52,917 But some people thought that, so it had that credibility. 1609 01:32:53,000 --> 01:32:56,667 That sort of, you know, heroic credibility. 1610 01:32:56,750 --> 01:32:59,458 They were one step ahead of us by using a platform 1611 01:32:59,542 --> 01:33:01,792 that had that kind of aura of legitimacy. 1612 01:33:04,333 --> 01:33:06,000 PUNDIT: I mean, right now, we have 1613 01:33:06,083 --> 01:33:08,041 -a serious, serious allegation! -ANCHOR: Let-- let's talk about WikiLeaks. 1614 01:33:08,125 --> 01:33:09,417 -Let's talk about WikiLeaks. -Mm-hmm. 1615 01:33:09,500 --> 01:33:11,375 Well, look, we wouldn't have this information right now, 1616 01:33:11,458 --> 01:33:14,083 the American people would not have this information 1617 01:33:14,166 --> 01:33:16,917 if not for this. I certainly do not condone 1618 01:33:17,000 --> 01:33:19,417 cy-- you know, cybersecurity and hacking, 1619 01:33:19,500 --> 01:33:21,542 but this all plays into the same thing. 1620 01:33:21,625 --> 01:33:23,792 Look at what Hillary Clinton did. 1621 01:33:23,875 --> 01:33:25,917 She put an unsecured server in her home, 1622 01:33:26,000 --> 01:33:28,458 -jeopardizing millions-- -Wait, wait. But WikiLeaks-- That's not WikiLeaks. 1623 01:33:28,542 --> 01:33:30,417 -That's not WikiLeaks. What's in WikiLeaks-- -And-- No. No. 1624 01:33:30,500 --> 01:33:33,417 A lot of this was, in terms of the public's mind, 1625 01:33:33,500 --> 01:33:35,583 confusing, confused... 1626 01:33:35,667 --> 01:33:36,667 It's almost impossible for you 1627 01:33:36,750 --> 01:33:38,417 to keep track of all these emails. 1628 01:33:38,500 --> 01:33:42,000 SULLIVAN: We didn't fully appreciate just how insidious 1629 01:33:42,083 --> 01:33:44,083 the releases of these emails were. 1630 01:33:44,166 --> 01:33:48,333 The words "Hillary" and "email" and "revelation." 1631 01:33:48,417 --> 01:33:51,333 It was coming out day after day after day. 1632 01:33:52,208 --> 01:33:54,583 YOCHAI BENKLER: There's a Gallup poll 1633 01:33:54,667 --> 01:33:58,625 that visualized what word was most associated 1634 01:33:58,709 --> 01:34:00,500 in people's minds. 1635 01:34:00,583 --> 01:34:03,125 For Clinton, "email" is this big, 1636 01:34:03,208 --> 01:34:04,667 much bigger than anything else. 1637 01:34:05,542 --> 01:34:06,750 In people's minds, 1638 01:34:06,834 --> 01:34:09,291 there are secret documents that are authentic and real 1639 01:34:09,375 --> 01:34:10,583 'cause they are real emails 1640 01:34:10,667 --> 01:34:12,208 that show that somehow she's bad. 1641 01:34:12,291 --> 01:34:13,291 "And I've never read them, 1642 01:34:13,375 --> 01:34:14,750 and I don't really know anything about them. 1643 01:34:14,834 --> 01:34:18,208 I just have a gut feeling that there is concrete evidence 1644 01:34:18,291 --> 01:34:19,750 that she's bad." 1645 01:34:19,834 --> 01:34:23,291 She is framed by email the entire campaign. 1646 01:34:23,375 --> 01:34:26,709 That makes that particular vector of attack... 1647 01:34:27,542 --> 01:34:28,667 so powerful. 1648 01:34:29,375 --> 01:34:33,083 (MACHINERY WHIRRING) 1649 01:34:34,709 --> 01:34:36,500 BENKLER: It was such an intelligent 1650 01:34:36,583 --> 01:34:39,917 propaganda operation by the Russians 1651 01:34:40,000 --> 01:34:42,250 to hack the emails and dump them. 1652 01:34:44,000 --> 01:34:45,625 Email is bait. 1653 01:34:46,583 --> 01:34:48,834 The professional reporter comes to them 1654 01:34:48,917 --> 01:34:51,583 as a trove of occult knowledge. 1655 01:34:53,458 --> 01:34:55,000 REPORTER: Another batch of stolen emails 1656 01:34:55,083 --> 01:34:57,166 published today by WikiLeaks, 1657 01:34:57,250 --> 01:34:58,542 offering an even deeper look 1658 01:34:58,625 --> 01:35:01,083 at the calibrations of the Clinton campaign. 1659 01:35:01,166 --> 01:35:03,166 It's a drip drip drip of distraction, 1660 01:35:03,250 --> 01:35:04,959 being released on a daily schedule 1661 01:35:05,041 --> 01:35:06,417 by Julian Assange. 1662 01:35:09,041 --> 01:35:12,291 BENKLER: Throughout this time, the journalists make this effort 1663 01:35:12,375 --> 01:35:15,333 to be objective by being negative equally 1664 01:35:15,417 --> 01:35:17,083 about both candidates. 1665 01:35:18,125 --> 01:35:20,875 For Trump, it's a focus on his issues, 1666 01:35:20,959 --> 01:35:24,417 because they draw people to them in the same way that things 1667 01:35:24,500 --> 01:35:27,625 that are on the verge of obscene draw people. 1668 01:35:27,709 --> 01:35:29,291 With respect to the Muslims, 1669 01:35:29,375 --> 01:35:31,542 hey, Maria, there's something going on. 1670 01:35:31,625 --> 01:35:33,917 Go to Brussels. Go to Paris. 1671 01:35:34,000 --> 01:35:36,500 It's like living in a hellhole right now. 1672 01:35:36,583 --> 01:35:38,333 BENKLER: It's political clickbait. 1673 01:35:39,583 --> 01:35:43,291 Clinton's policy agenda is so much more in line 1674 01:35:43,375 --> 01:35:44,709 with the mainstream. 1675 01:35:44,792 --> 01:35:47,542 She's basically a centrist candidate. 1676 01:35:47,625 --> 01:35:51,875 The focus to be negative on her was the implication of scandal. 1677 01:35:51,959 --> 01:35:55,709 The private server, followed by Benghazi. 1678 01:35:55,792 --> 01:35:58,000 Nothing about her substantive agenda. 1679 01:35:59,792 --> 01:36:03,291 That's a profound form of failure of these media 1680 01:36:03,375 --> 01:36:05,583 that the majority of Americans rely on. 1681 01:36:05,667 --> 01:36:07,834 (INDISTINCT CHATTER) 1682 01:36:07,917 --> 01:36:10,291 As these materials were being leaked 1683 01:36:10,375 --> 01:36:12,834 and washed through the press, I went out to each 1684 01:36:12,917 --> 01:36:15,583 of the major networks to make a presentation 1685 01:36:15,667 --> 01:36:17,875 about what we understood had happened. 1686 01:36:19,166 --> 01:36:20,458 Russian military intelligence 1687 01:36:20,542 --> 01:36:23,792 were penetrating various American campaign organs... 1688 01:36:25,250 --> 01:36:28,709 turning that information over to WikiLeaks, 1689 01:36:28,792 --> 01:36:30,250 who would do their bidding. 1690 01:36:30,333 --> 01:36:32,250 PROTESTERS: (CHANTING) Thank you, WikiLeaks! Hillary cheats! 1691 01:36:32,333 --> 01:36:34,500 SULLIVAN: And then WikiLeaks put it out in the public 1692 01:36:34,583 --> 01:36:38,000 for the express purpose of trying to undermine 1693 01:36:38,083 --> 01:36:40,166 Hillary Clinton's campaign for president. 1694 01:36:41,500 --> 01:36:43,291 Their initial reaction was, 1695 01:36:43,375 --> 01:36:45,959 "Some of this is pretty far-fetched, 1696 01:36:46,041 --> 01:36:47,375 doesn't seem like it could happen 1697 01:36:47,458 --> 01:36:49,166 here in the United States. 1698 01:36:49,250 --> 01:36:51,041 And, by the way, 1699 01:36:51,125 --> 01:36:52,458 you also have a political interest 1700 01:36:52,542 --> 01:36:55,208 in pushing this narrative." 1701 01:36:55,291 --> 01:36:56,875 Robby Mook, the campaign manager, 1702 01:36:56,959 --> 01:36:58,834 went out on television and said, 1703 01:36:58,917 --> 01:37:00,625 "We believe this is the Russians." 1704 01:37:00,709 --> 01:37:02,250 And the pushback from the press, 1705 01:37:02,333 --> 01:37:04,083 when Robby did that, was pretty fierce. 1706 01:37:04,166 --> 01:37:05,834 That's a very, very strong charge 1707 01:37:05,917 --> 01:37:07,375 that you're leveling here. (CLEARS THROAT) 1708 01:37:07,458 --> 01:37:09,166 You're basically suggesting 1709 01:37:09,250 --> 01:37:11,500 that Russians hacked into the DNC 1710 01:37:11,583 --> 01:37:14,000 and now are releasing these files through WikiLeaks 1711 01:37:14,083 --> 01:37:15,458 to help elect Donald Trump. 1712 01:37:15,542 --> 01:37:16,959 Well, this isn't my assertion. 1713 01:37:17,041 --> 01:37:19,041 There are a number of experts that are asserting this. 1714 01:37:19,125 --> 01:37:21,125 I think we need to get to the bottom of these facts. 1715 01:37:21,208 --> 01:37:23,000 But that-- that is what experts are telling us. 1716 01:37:23,083 --> 01:37:24,959 Experts have said that it is the Russians 1717 01:37:25,041 --> 01:37:27,625 that in fact went in and took these emails and-- 1718 01:37:27,709 --> 01:37:28,792 and then, if-- if-- 1719 01:37:28,875 --> 01:37:30,083 if they are the ones who took them, 1720 01:37:30,166 --> 01:37:31,834 we have to infer that they are the ones then-- 1721 01:37:31,917 --> 01:37:33,083 then releasing them. 1722 01:37:38,083 --> 01:37:39,333 REPORTER: From Moscow today, 1723 01:37:39,417 --> 01:37:40,917 an epic shocker. 1724 01:37:41,000 --> 01:37:42,542 Russian president Vladimir Putin 1725 01:37:42,625 --> 01:37:45,291 denied that his government was behind the hacking 1726 01:37:45,375 --> 01:37:47,583 of the Democratic Party's emails. 1727 01:37:47,667 --> 01:37:50,250 PUTIN: (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN, CHUCKLES) 1728 01:38:06,166 --> 01:38:09,125 ALEX: Putin was playing three-dimensional chess. 1729 01:38:09,208 --> 01:38:12,083 He was right, the content did matter. 1730 01:38:12,166 --> 01:38:14,792 But it also mattered that a foreign power 1731 01:38:14,875 --> 01:38:18,041 was stealing and leaking data from one campaign 1732 01:38:18,125 --> 01:38:20,959 while leaving the other candidate alone. 1733 01:38:21,041 --> 01:38:23,625 (SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN, CLEARS THROAT) 1734 01:38:58,834 --> 01:39:00,250 WALLANDER: It was very clear 1735 01:39:00,333 --> 01:39:02,792 that the purpose of this operation 1736 01:39:02,875 --> 01:39:05,208 was to harm the Clinton campaign... 1737 01:39:05,959 --> 01:39:07,667 and it was coming from Russia. 1738 01:39:07,750 --> 01:39:10,500 At that point, it was still not clear 1739 01:39:10,583 --> 01:39:12,792 at what level it had been ordered. 1740 01:39:12,875 --> 01:39:16,083 Um, but my own... take 1741 01:39:16,166 --> 01:39:18,166 and my own advice at the time was, 1742 01:39:18,250 --> 01:39:20,959 the Russian military doesn't operate rogue. 1743 01:39:22,500 --> 01:39:24,208 ALEX: They take orders from the commander-in-chief. 1744 01:39:24,291 --> 01:39:27,417 They absolutely take orders from the commander-in-chief. 1745 01:39:27,500 --> 01:39:29,875 (CHUCKLES) 1746 01:39:32,500 --> 01:39:36,041 SNYDER: The way that oligarchies work... 1747 01:39:36,125 --> 01:39:40,625 is that they substitute a spectacular foreign policy 1748 01:39:40,709 --> 01:39:45,000 for the, really, absent domestic policy. 1749 01:39:46,375 --> 01:39:49,291 If you're Russia, you can't really have domestic policy. 1750 01:39:49,375 --> 01:39:51,625 Because a few men have all the money 1751 01:39:51,709 --> 01:39:54,542 and everything is blocked up by corruption. 1752 01:39:54,625 --> 01:39:55,959 How do you get people to think 1753 01:39:56,041 --> 01:39:58,291 that the government in some way is on their side? 1754 01:39:58,375 --> 01:40:00,417 You have to generate a foreign policy 1755 01:40:00,500 --> 01:40:01,917 with clear enemies. 1756 01:40:02,000 --> 01:40:04,333 (APPLAUSE) 1757 01:40:04,417 --> 01:40:06,291 SNYDER: Since Putin came back to power, 1758 01:40:06,375 --> 01:40:09,500 foreign policy for Russia has been all about 1759 01:40:09,583 --> 01:40:12,000 creating these spectacular enemies. 1760 01:40:12,083 --> 01:40:14,959 The big enemy is the United States. 1761 01:40:15,041 --> 01:40:17,417 The United States is a great enemy to have 1762 01:40:17,500 --> 01:40:19,792 for Russia because of prestige. 1763 01:40:19,875 --> 01:40:22,792 The Russians think of themselves as a superpower. 1764 01:40:22,875 --> 01:40:24,500 An average Russian might say, 1765 01:40:24,583 --> 01:40:26,625 "Well, yes, my plumbing doesn't work... 1766 01:40:26,709 --> 01:40:28,667 you know, and no one ever clears the snow, 1767 01:40:28,750 --> 01:40:30,333 but we're a superpower." 1768 01:40:30,417 --> 01:40:32,208 And having America as an enemy, 1769 01:40:32,291 --> 01:40:34,583 as it were, proves that you're a superpower. 1770 01:40:36,375 --> 01:40:38,834 So Putin has tried to persuade his people 1771 01:40:38,917 --> 01:40:42,291 that there was a kind of great American-Russian conflict going on. 1772 01:40:43,250 --> 01:40:46,083 (IN RUSSIAN) 1773 01:40:59,250 --> 01:41:01,917 (APPLAUSE) 1774 01:41:06,417 --> 01:41:09,625 ALEX: The question that haunted the 2016 election 1775 01:41:09,709 --> 01:41:12,125 was why the White House refused to reveal 1776 01:41:12,208 --> 01:41:14,458 what it knew about Russian interference. 1777 01:41:21,875 --> 01:41:24,166 WALLANDER: The United States is a really powerful country, 1778 01:41:24,250 --> 01:41:27,041 and it's unlikely that we can be defeated abroad 1779 01:41:27,125 --> 01:41:29,166 in a military conflict, 1780 01:41:29,250 --> 01:41:31,375 but in the last couple years, we've seen 1781 01:41:31,458 --> 01:41:33,667 that we're actually pretty vulnerable at home. 1782 01:41:36,750 --> 01:41:40,333 It's a privilege to serve in the government, 1783 01:41:40,417 --> 01:41:41,458 but it's also a responsibility, 1784 01:41:41,542 --> 01:41:43,875 and you have to take responsibility. 1785 01:41:43,959 --> 01:41:46,083 The American citizens were counting on us, 1786 01:41:46,166 --> 01:41:48,792 and I think you can say we didn't live up 1787 01:41:48,875 --> 01:41:51,792 to the highest standards of protecting the country. 1788 01:41:54,166 --> 01:41:57,583 2016 was-- was pretty awful. (CHUCKLES) 1789 01:41:57,667 --> 01:42:01,083 We were dealing with the growing horror of Syria 1790 01:42:01,166 --> 01:42:04,834 and the helplessness of our attempts 1791 01:42:04,917 --> 01:42:08,917 to get the Russians to help end the conflict in Syria. 1792 01:42:09,000 --> 01:42:12,792 And trying to get the Russians to end the conflict in Ukraine. 1793 01:42:12,875 --> 01:42:17,041 The key to success in government is being able to distinguish 1794 01:42:17,125 --> 01:42:19,583 between the urgent and the important. 1795 01:42:19,667 --> 01:42:22,166 And I think we failed in 2016, 1796 01:42:22,250 --> 01:42:25,917 and we allowed ourselves to be distracted by the urgent. 1797 01:42:26,000 --> 01:42:30,500 It prevented us from really grasping what was important. 1798 01:42:31,542 --> 01:42:34,417 The real challenge in 2016 wasn't Syria... 1799 01:42:35,917 --> 01:42:37,917 important though that was. 1800 01:42:38,000 --> 01:42:41,375 I regret to say this. It wasn't Ukraine, 1801 01:42:41,458 --> 01:42:45,583 compared to Russian interference in the election. 1802 01:42:46,875 --> 01:42:49,458 But it's not like one day, you think, "Oh my God, 1803 01:42:49,542 --> 01:42:51,333 the Russians are interfering in our election," 1804 01:42:51,417 --> 01:42:53,583 and the next day you go to the president's desk 1805 01:42:53,667 --> 01:42:55,583 and say, "This is what we need to do." 1806 01:42:58,417 --> 01:43:00,166 NULAND: Patterns that you've seen elsewhere 1807 01:43:00,250 --> 01:43:01,709 and that you have experience with 1808 01:43:01,792 --> 01:43:04,000 are clearer at that level of government 1809 01:43:04,083 --> 01:43:05,959 than they might be at higher levels. 1810 01:43:07,417 --> 01:43:08,917 WALLANDER: I was working with Victoria Nuland. 1811 01:43:09,000 --> 01:43:12,000 We would kind of put our heads together on what was going on. 1812 01:43:12,083 --> 01:43:13,333 She pushed a lot. 1813 01:43:13,417 --> 01:43:16,875 She sometimes was impatient with our pace, which was fair. 1814 01:43:16,959 --> 01:43:18,625 What I felt at the time was 1815 01:43:18,709 --> 01:43:22,333 our Intelligence Community was too slow to validate 1816 01:43:22,417 --> 01:43:24,792 what our experience told us was happening. 1817 01:43:24,875 --> 01:43:26,000 They ultimately did, 1818 01:43:26,083 --> 01:43:28,208 but it would have been far more useful to the president 1819 01:43:28,291 --> 01:43:30,458 if they had been able to validate more quickly. 1820 01:43:31,583 --> 01:43:34,166 What we were seeing bore the hallmarks 1821 01:43:34,250 --> 01:43:36,875 of Russian tradecraft in Ukraine. 1822 01:43:36,959 --> 01:43:38,667 And what we were asking for then 1823 01:43:38,750 --> 01:43:42,083 was more US intelligence resources 1824 01:43:42,166 --> 01:43:43,875 so that we could give 1825 01:43:43,959 --> 01:43:45,792 better information to leadership. 1826 01:43:45,875 --> 01:43:48,875 But it was too early for the Intelligence Community 1827 01:43:48,959 --> 01:43:52,041 to validate with the kind of certainty a president wants. 1828 01:43:52,125 --> 01:43:54,542 The standards have to be impeccable, 1829 01:43:54,625 --> 01:43:58,375 with all strands of the US Intelligence Community in agreement 1830 01:43:58,458 --> 01:43:59,875 before you can say to the president, 1831 01:43:59,959 --> 01:44:02,041 "We're confident." 1832 01:44:02,125 --> 01:44:04,834 JOHN BRENNAN: If I'm going to talk to the president of the United States, 1833 01:44:04,917 --> 01:44:08,166 I wanted to make sure that I was intimately familiar 1834 01:44:08,250 --> 01:44:10,834 with every detail. 1835 01:44:10,917 --> 01:44:14,041 In the summer of 2016, 1836 01:44:14,125 --> 01:44:17,583 I became exceptionally, uh... 1837 01:44:17,667 --> 01:44:19,125 knowledgeable, put it that way, 1838 01:44:19,208 --> 01:44:22,709 of all the information that we had access to 1839 01:44:22,792 --> 01:44:27,500 and all of the analytic work that we had done. 1840 01:44:27,583 --> 01:44:29,041 ALEX: No one in the US government 1841 01:44:29,125 --> 01:44:31,750 had complete knowledge of the Russian operation, 1842 01:44:31,834 --> 01:44:35,750 but CIA director John Brennan probably knew more than most. 1843 01:44:35,834 --> 01:44:38,709 By mid-summer, Obama's national security team 1844 01:44:38,792 --> 01:44:41,875 decided it was time to send Russia a warning. 1845 01:44:41,959 --> 01:44:43,250 Brennan was tapped to reach out 1846 01:44:43,333 --> 01:44:45,083 to one of his Russian counterparts, 1847 01:44:45,166 --> 01:44:49,000 an intelligence official named Alexander Bortnikov. 1848 01:44:49,083 --> 01:44:51,917 BRENNAN: Bortnikov had direct and immediate access 1849 01:44:52,000 --> 01:44:53,125 to Mr. Putin. 1850 01:44:53,208 --> 01:44:55,000 I think I was the first senior US official 1851 01:44:55,083 --> 01:44:57,041 to confront them directly. 1852 01:44:57,125 --> 01:44:59,792 I must say, Mr. Bortnikov is a very smooth 1853 01:44:59,875 --> 01:45:01,667 and slick individual. 1854 01:45:02,375 --> 01:45:03,500 He said, "Oh, no, 1855 01:45:03,583 --> 01:45:06,041 we would never do something like that, Mr. Director. 1856 01:45:06,125 --> 01:45:07,500 We are ready to work with 1857 01:45:07,583 --> 01:45:09,083 whomever is going to be elected." 1858 01:45:09,166 --> 01:45:12,333 He, uh, lies with the best of them. 1859 01:45:12,417 --> 01:45:14,959 WALLANDER: Brennan calling Bortnikov on this 1860 01:45:15,041 --> 01:45:17,041 was a pretty extraordinary signal 1861 01:45:17,125 --> 01:45:19,375 of how important this was viewed. 1862 01:45:19,458 --> 01:45:23,291 But there wasn't a lot of credible threats you could make. 1863 01:45:23,375 --> 01:45:25,291 Other than, you know... 1864 01:45:25,375 --> 01:45:27,041 "Relations between the United States and Russia 1865 01:45:27,125 --> 01:45:28,458 are gonna be really, really bad." 1866 01:45:28,542 --> 01:45:30,333 Well, relations between the United States and Russia 1867 01:45:30,417 --> 01:45:32,250 already are really, really bad! 1868 01:45:33,375 --> 01:45:35,125 And there was an increasing trend 1869 01:45:35,208 --> 01:45:39,083 of Russian intelligence agents to harass American diplomats, 1870 01:45:39,166 --> 01:45:42,417 including a physical assault outside the American embassy. 1871 01:45:42,500 --> 01:45:43,834 He was trying to walk into the embassy 1872 01:45:43,917 --> 01:45:46,291 and he was assaulted by a Russian security officer, 1873 01:45:46,375 --> 01:45:48,417 which was outrageous. 1874 01:45:48,500 --> 01:45:50,333 ALEX: She called the American a diplomat, 1875 01:45:50,417 --> 01:45:52,333 but he was actually a CIA officer 1876 01:45:52,417 --> 01:45:54,000 with diplomatic cover. 1877 01:45:54,083 --> 01:45:56,000 Even so, the extraordinary assault 1878 01:45:56,083 --> 01:45:57,917 became an international incident. 1879 01:46:00,625 --> 01:46:02,500 BRENNAN: I said to Mr. Bortnikov, 1880 01:46:02,583 --> 01:46:03,875 in no uncertain terms, 1881 01:46:03,959 --> 01:46:09,166 that some of the tactics that the FSB, uh, thugs were using 1882 01:46:09,250 --> 01:46:12,583 against US diplomats in Moscow was intolerable 1883 01:46:12,667 --> 01:46:14,291 and that there are limits 1884 01:46:14,375 --> 01:46:17,125 to the espionage and intelligence profession. 1885 01:46:18,250 --> 01:46:20,500 ALEX: Those limits are often flexible. 1886 01:46:20,583 --> 01:46:23,959 But between spies, there is a rough equilibrium, 1887 01:46:24,041 --> 01:46:27,625 and when the tacit rules are broken, spies wonder why. 1888 01:46:27,709 --> 01:46:29,500 (SIREN WAILING) 1889 01:46:29,583 --> 01:46:33,208 ALEX: In 2016, Russia was breaking the rules of the game 1890 01:46:33,291 --> 01:46:36,834 and stability was giving way to a kind of chaos. 1891 01:46:37,834 --> 01:46:39,166 SNYDER: You have to think about this 1892 01:46:39,250 --> 01:46:40,542 the way that they think about this. 1893 01:46:40,625 --> 01:46:44,333 This is not a legalistic process or a bureaucratic process. 1894 01:46:44,417 --> 01:46:47,333 This is not a diplomatic process. 1895 01:46:47,417 --> 01:46:49,375 This is making a play. (CHUCKLES) 1896 01:46:49,458 --> 01:46:51,000 You make a play, and sometimes it works 1897 01:46:51,083 --> 01:46:52,208 and sometimes it doesn't work, 1898 01:46:52,291 --> 01:46:54,291 and then sometimes it works better than you think. 1899 01:46:56,458 --> 01:46:59,875 WALLANDER: We needed an effective threat. 1900 01:46:59,959 --> 01:47:02,625 You deter actions by raising the costs, 1901 01:47:02,709 --> 01:47:05,417 and one of the most effective ways to raise costs 1902 01:47:05,500 --> 01:47:10,375 is to threaten reciprocal and more costly retaliation. 1903 01:47:11,750 --> 01:47:14,834 That's one of the reasons why I developed options 1904 01:47:14,917 --> 01:47:18,500 for steps that could be taken or things that could be signaled 1905 01:47:18,583 --> 01:47:20,709 that could make it a more effective threat. 1906 01:47:21,709 --> 01:47:25,792 One of the steps one sensibly might consider 1907 01:47:25,875 --> 01:47:28,542 would be to release embarrassing information 1908 01:47:28,625 --> 01:47:29,834 about Russian officials. 1909 01:47:29,917 --> 01:47:32,667 ALEX: But was it something that was under consideration? 1910 01:47:35,041 --> 01:47:36,542 Those options were explored. 1911 01:47:39,333 --> 01:47:42,166 DANIEL: We put together particularly aggressive options 1912 01:47:42,250 --> 01:47:44,583 that we could use to counter the Russians. 1913 01:47:44,667 --> 01:47:47,041 Things like sanctions on individuals. 1914 01:47:47,125 --> 01:47:48,792 Could we identify Russian operatives 1915 01:47:48,875 --> 01:47:51,000 in the United States and kick them out? 1916 01:47:52,208 --> 01:47:54,458 Are there Justice Department options? 1917 01:47:54,542 --> 01:47:58,125 You know, actors that we could bring legal charges against? 1918 01:47:58,208 --> 01:48:00,583 ALEX: The Justice Department was already investigating 1919 01:48:00,667 --> 01:48:04,792 one crime they could charge, the hacking of the DNC. 1920 01:48:04,875 --> 01:48:07,834 In Pittsburgh, David Hickton wanted to target Fancy Bear 1921 01:48:07,917 --> 01:48:09,625 for a federal indictment. 1922 01:48:09,709 --> 01:48:12,792 He'd gone after foreign actors like this before. 1923 01:48:12,875 --> 01:48:14,875 Years earlier, his unit had named 1924 01:48:14,959 --> 01:48:17,041 and charged Chinese government hackers 1925 01:48:17,125 --> 01:48:19,291 for stealing industrial secrets. 1926 01:48:19,375 --> 01:48:22,125 The hackers never saw the inside of a courtroom, 1927 01:48:22,208 --> 01:48:26,375 but the indictment itself did curb China's hacking for a time. 1928 01:48:27,542 --> 01:48:30,542 I really wanted to bring a case. 1929 01:48:30,625 --> 01:48:33,792 But the historical position of the Department of Justice is, 1930 01:48:33,875 --> 01:48:39,500 "You do not get involved in election litigation." 1931 01:48:39,583 --> 01:48:42,667 We weren't even allowed to appear with candidates... 1932 01:48:42,750 --> 01:48:44,875 sixty days before they were elected. 1933 01:48:44,959 --> 01:48:48,333 So, if a case was not brought two months 1934 01:48:48,417 --> 01:48:50,667 before the November election, 1935 01:48:50,750 --> 01:48:54,041 it was not gonna be brought in any form or fashion 1936 01:48:54,125 --> 01:48:55,667 till after the election. 1937 01:48:55,750 --> 01:48:59,417 But, in simple terms, the case was not gonna be ready 1938 01:48:59,500 --> 01:49:02,333 unless we did something Herculean to do it. 1939 01:49:02,417 --> 01:49:04,208 (KEYBOARD CLACKING) 1940 01:49:04,291 --> 01:49:06,291 WALLANDER: After I had written up that options paper, 1941 01:49:06,375 --> 01:49:08,542 Susan Rice, the National Security Advisor, 1942 01:49:08,625 --> 01:49:10,625 discussed it with some of the principals. 1943 01:49:10,709 --> 01:49:13,291 And their reaction was, 1944 01:49:13,375 --> 01:49:14,792 "Too risky." Uh... 1945 01:49:14,875 --> 01:49:17,917 "Too edgy." (CHUCKLES) "Too aggressive." 1946 01:49:18,000 --> 01:49:20,709 There were options in terms of what we could do 1947 01:49:20,792 --> 01:49:22,333 even in the cybersphere. 1948 01:49:22,417 --> 01:49:24,333 Rattle the Russians' cyber cages. 1949 01:49:25,291 --> 01:49:27,583 Very uncertain as to what the Russians 1950 01:49:27,667 --> 01:49:30,333 then might have decided to do in response. 1951 01:49:30,417 --> 01:49:34,041 Would we have then engaged in some type of escalatory war 1952 01:49:34,125 --> 01:49:36,041 with the Russians in the cyber realm? 1953 01:49:36,125 --> 01:49:37,875 There were things that they could have done 1954 01:49:37,959 --> 01:49:41,333 that would have been even more serious 1955 01:49:41,417 --> 01:49:43,667 and potentially more impactful. 1956 01:49:43,750 --> 01:49:45,959 And so we didn't wanna make it a self-fulfilling prophecy 1957 01:49:46,041 --> 01:49:48,291 about what the Russians were trying to achieve. 1958 01:49:48,375 --> 01:49:52,667 By escalating, that could be cathartic on our part, 1959 01:49:52,750 --> 01:49:57,166 but really would have, again, further undermined the election. 1960 01:49:57,250 --> 01:50:00,375 There was a-- a reluctance... 1961 01:50:01,834 --> 01:50:03,333 to take steps 1962 01:50:03,417 --> 01:50:06,375 that would undermine the Syria negotiations, 1963 01:50:07,000 --> 01:50:08,166 supposedly... (CHUCKLES) 1964 01:50:08,250 --> 01:50:09,875 ...which were not going well anyway, 1965 01:50:09,959 --> 01:50:13,291 uh, undermine the chance to rescue arms control, 1966 01:50:13,834 --> 01:50:16,166 um, or... 1967 01:50:16,250 --> 01:50:21,250 take actions that might not deter Russian interference 1968 01:50:21,333 --> 01:50:24,750 but actually escalate Russian interference. 1969 01:50:24,834 --> 01:50:26,625 And those arguments won the day. 1970 01:50:30,792 --> 01:50:32,625 HICKTON: It became pretty clear to me 1971 01:50:32,709 --> 01:50:34,875 the election case was gonna be deferred. 1972 01:50:35,875 --> 01:50:38,291 I thought that if we had said, 1973 01:50:38,375 --> 01:50:40,375 "Pittsburgh's gonna do the case," 1974 01:50:40,458 --> 01:50:43,500 surged resources into Pittsburgh... 1975 01:50:43,583 --> 01:50:46,667 we would have been able to identify 1976 01:50:46,750 --> 01:50:48,709 and indict the people. 1977 01:50:49,500 --> 01:50:51,291 But what would that have done? 1978 01:50:51,375 --> 01:50:53,375 Would that have changed anything? 1979 01:50:53,458 --> 01:50:56,417 (CROWD CHEERING) 1980 01:50:56,500 --> 01:50:58,333 HICKTON: The Democratic nominee for president 1981 01:50:58,417 --> 01:51:01,041 was President Obama's Secretary of State. 1982 01:51:02,458 --> 01:51:04,792 It would look like the president was putting his hand 1983 01:51:04,875 --> 01:51:08,959 on the scale of the election, if he was more active 1984 01:51:09,041 --> 01:51:12,834 than precedent had dictated about this. 1985 01:51:12,917 --> 01:51:15,417 The better weight of wisdom would be 1986 01:51:15,500 --> 01:51:17,041 to wait till after the election. 1987 01:51:17,125 --> 01:51:19,625 It's not for me to evaluate his decisions. 1988 01:51:19,709 --> 01:51:21,417 He was the president. (CHUCKLES) 1989 01:51:26,041 --> 01:51:28,291 SNYDER: Traditionally, war is a way 1990 01:51:28,375 --> 01:51:29,917 of one sovereign state 1991 01:51:30,000 --> 01:51:33,250 making another sovereign state do what it wants. 1992 01:51:35,875 --> 01:51:37,500 War doesn't have to be carried out 1993 01:51:37,583 --> 01:51:39,291 by way of traditional military force. 1994 01:51:39,375 --> 01:51:40,333 I can break your will, 1995 01:51:40,417 --> 01:51:42,166 my nation can break your nation's will, 1996 01:51:42,250 --> 01:51:43,166 in other ways. 1997 01:51:43,250 --> 01:51:45,000 I try to figure out what makes you tick. 1998 01:51:45,083 --> 01:51:46,500 I try to figure out your strengths, 1999 01:51:46,583 --> 01:51:48,291 and above all, your weaknesses. 2000 01:51:48,375 --> 01:51:49,875 And then I appeal to those weaknesses 2001 01:51:49,959 --> 01:51:51,500 to try to get you to do something 2002 01:51:51,583 --> 01:51:54,583 that's not really in your interest to do. 2003 01:51:56,208 --> 01:51:58,875 What Russia did in 2016 was understand 2004 01:51:58,959 --> 01:52:02,000 and take advantage of a new technical environment 2005 01:52:02,083 --> 01:52:03,792 faster than anyone else. 2006 01:52:05,291 --> 01:52:07,792 They used an instrument that allowed them to get inside 2007 01:52:07,875 --> 01:52:10,208 the will of a country that they understood 2008 01:52:10,291 --> 01:52:12,500 as their enemy. And they succeeded. 2009 01:52:12,583 --> 01:52:13,917 They were also very lucky. 2010 01:52:14,000 --> 01:52:16,375 I mean, they were lucky to have Mr. Trump. 2011 01:52:16,458 --> 01:52:18,208 He does things for them in public 2012 01:52:18,291 --> 01:52:19,667 which they can't do themselves. 2013 01:52:19,750 --> 01:52:21,834 You know, they can pretend to be Americans on the internet, 2014 01:52:21,917 --> 01:52:24,709 but they can't pretend to be Americans in real life. 2015 01:52:24,792 --> 01:52:25,834 He's got the accent. 2016 01:52:25,917 --> 01:52:28,333 He's a white guy. He can wear a tie. 2017 01:52:28,417 --> 01:52:30,625 He gives a good off-the-cuff speech. 2018 01:52:30,709 --> 01:52:32,375 He knows how to work an audience. 2019 01:52:32,458 --> 01:52:35,667 It's pretty clear that cooperation is taking place. 2020 01:52:38,792 --> 01:52:41,959 ALEX: At what point did you become concerned 2021 01:52:42,041 --> 01:52:43,375 or conclude that-- 2022 01:52:43,458 --> 01:52:45,709 that the Russians had also reached out 2023 01:52:45,792 --> 01:52:47,792 to the Trump campaign? 2024 01:52:47,875 --> 01:52:51,583 During the summer of 2016, we were seeing reports 2025 01:52:51,667 --> 01:52:56,083 of Russian officials claiming contacts 2026 01:52:56,166 --> 01:52:58,834 with individuals in the Trump campaign. 2027 01:52:59,583 --> 01:53:02,000 And I was explicitly told 2028 01:53:02,083 --> 01:53:06,875 that the White House cannot be involved in tracking 2029 01:53:06,959 --> 01:53:08,583 what Americans are doing, 2030 01:53:08,667 --> 01:53:11,917 that it is illegal, it is not constitutional. 2031 01:53:12,000 --> 01:53:14,583 I was told by my leadership to stand down, 2032 01:53:14,667 --> 01:53:17,250 and I took that seriously and I stopped. 2033 01:53:17,333 --> 01:53:19,500 I also remember, um... 2034 01:53:20,458 --> 01:53:22,667 walking back to my office thinking... 2035 01:53:23,250 --> 01:53:24,542 feeling helpless. 2036 01:53:25,792 --> 01:53:27,041 They did make clear to me 2037 01:53:27,125 --> 01:53:30,709 that the proper authorities were looking into it. 2038 01:53:32,792 --> 01:53:36,417 We started immediately identifying direct connections 2039 01:53:36,500 --> 01:53:39,792 between campaign people and Russians. 2040 01:53:39,875 --> 01:53:43,291 Paul Manafort was an obvious target. 2041 01:53:43,375 --> 01:53:45,583 General Michael Flynn, Carter Page, 2042 01:53:45,667 --> 01:53:47,125 George Papadopoulos. 2043 01:53:47,208 --> 01:53:50,959 A lot of questions about their behavior, connections, 2044 01:53:51,041 --> 01:53:52,792 network of friends and associates. 2045 01:53:52,875 --> 01:53:56,500 The combination of those things brought to a head this idea 2046 01:53:56,583 --> 01:53:59,875 that we needed to now investigate potential collusion 2047 01:53:59,959 --> 01:54:02,542 between the Trump campaign and the Russians. 2048 01:54:02,625 --> 01:54:06,333 It was just like stepping off the roller coaster 2049 01:54:06,417 --> 01:54:08,166 into the rocket ship. 2050 01:54:08,250 --> 01:54:10,500 Is there somebody disturbing us up here? 2051 01:54:10,583 --> 01:54:12,125 -(CROWD CHEERS) -Where? 2052 01:54:12,208 --> 01:54:14,500 ALEX: Once inside the Trump rocket ship, 2053 01:54:14,583 --> 01:54:16,333 it was hard to miss the crazy way 2054 01:54:16,417 --> 01:54:17,959 he seemed to be steering a course 2055 01:54:18,041 --> 01:54:19,417 guided by the Kremlin. 2056 01:54:20,500 --> 01:54:22,375 Those who suspected collusion 2057 01:54:22,458 --> 01:54:26,667 played one particular clip from 2016 over and over. 2058 01:54:26,750 --> 01:54:28,959 -(MOUSE CLICKS) -What do I have to get involved with Putin for? 2059 01:54:29,041 --> 01:54:31,041 I have nothing to do with Putin. I've never spoken to him. 2060 01:54:31,125 --> 01:54:34,125 I don't know anything about him other than he will respect me. 2061 01:54:34,208 --> 01:54:37,542 ALEX: See? He starts by saying he doesn't know Putin. 2062 01:54:37,625 --> 01:54:39,333 Trump loves saying this, 2063 01:54:39,417 --> 01:54:41,166 almost as much as he loves saying the opposite. 2064 01:54:41,250 --> 01:54:43,500 DAVID LETTERMAN: Well, there's Vladimir Putin. Have you ever met the guy? 2065 01:54:43,583 --> 01:54:44,834 He's a tough guy. I met him once. 2066 01:54:44,917 --> 01:54:45,875 LETTERMAN: He's -- he stole-- 2067 01:54:45,959 --> 01:54:47,125 As an example, I own the Miss Universe. 2068 01:54:47,208 --> 01:54:49,834 I was in Russia, I was in Moscow, recently. 2069 01:54:49,917 --> 01:54:52,458 And I spoke indirectly and directly 2070 01:54:52,542 --> 01:54:55,375 with President Putin, who could not have been nicer. 2071 01:54:55,458 --> 01:54:57,875 If it is Russia, which it's probably not, 2072 01:54:57,959 --> 01:54:59,250 nobody knows who it is. 2073 01:54:59,333 --> 01:55:01,917 ALEX: He's talking now about the hacking of the Democrats. 2074 01:55:02,000 --> 01:55:03,041 And he's right. 2075 01:55:03,125 --> 01:55:04,542 The US government, at this point, 2076 01:55:04,625 --> 01:55:08,041 hadn't publicly attributed the hacks to Russia. 2077 01:55:08,125 --> 01:55:10,208 But this is where it gets really good. 2078 01:55:10,291 --> 01:55:12,834 Now that he's denied Russia hacked the Democrats, 2079 01:55:12,917 --> 01:55:14,166 Trump spins like a top 2080 01:55:14,250 --> 01:55:18,125 and openly asks Russia to hack Hillary Clinton herself. 2081 01:55:18,208 --> 01:55:22,375 Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find 2082 01:55:22,458 --> 01:55:26,667 the 30,000 emails that are missing. 2083 01:55:26,750 --> 01:55:29,041 ALEX: Trump said that this was just a joke. 2084 01:55:29,959 --> 01:55:31,750 But less than five hours later, 2085 01:55:31,834 --> 01:55:35,917 Russian military intelligence, a.k.a. Fancy Bear, 2086 01:55:36,000 --> 01:55:39,125 was looking for honey in Clinton's email accounts. 2087 01:55:40,667 --> 01:55:44,083 So, was this just cartoon collusion? 2088 01:55:44,166 --> 01:55:48,125 Or a real back and forth hiding in plain sight? 2089 01:55:48,208 --> 01:55:49,834 It's the hottest thing out there, 2090 01:55:49,917 --> 01:55:51,250 this hat, you can't get 'em! 2091 01:55:51,333 --> 01:55:54,583 ALEX: That's the crazy beauty about the politics of chaos. 2092 01:55:54,667 --> 01:55:57,291 It's hard to tell a joke from a crime. 2093 01:55:57,375 --> 01:56:00,750 Getting help from the Russians? Just part of the game. 2094 01:56:00,834 --> 01:56:04,041 It doesn't matter how you play, or who you play with. 2095 01:56:04,959 --> 01:56:06,750 As long as you wind up on top, 2096 01:56:06,834 --> 01:56:09,417 who cares if the whole motherfucking system 2097 01:56:09,500 --> 01:56:11,125 burns to the ground? 2098 01:56:11,208 --> 01:56:13,875 ♪ (ROCK MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 2099 01:57:07,834 --> 01:57:12,083 ♪ (SOMBER MUSIC PLAYING) ♪ 2100 01:58:13,917 --> 01:58:16,417 MAN: In 2016, we faced an attack of a new kind 2101 01:58:16,500 --> 01:58:17,709 in our democracy. 2102 01:58:19,709 --> 01:58:23,083 We now know what the Russians were actually doing 2103 01:58:23,166 --> 01:58:24,166 during the campaign. 2104 01:58:25,166 --> 01:58:27,750 Russian interference only worked because America 2105 01:58:27,834 --> 01:58:29,041 was a vulnerable target. 2106 01:58:29,125 --> 01:58:32,125 MAN 2: This was not just a standard set of espionage. 2107 01:58:32,917 --> 01:58:34,667 Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, 2108 01:58:34,959 --> 01:58:38,166 and Don Jr. all there to see what Russia could give them. 2109 01:58:38,250 --> 01:58:40,041 You don't give something for nothing. 2110 01:58:41,291 --> 01:58:43,875 Any customer whose check clears is a good customer. 2111 01:58:44,875 --> 01:58:47,959 The Russians have offered to assist the campaign 2112 01:58:48,166 --> 01:58:52,041 by dumping negative material on Hillary Clinton. 2113 01:58:52,458 --> 01:58:54,166 Of course Russians prefer Trump, 2114 01:58:54,250 --> 01:58:56,166 because Trump said that he preferred Russians. 2115 01:58:56,542 --> 01:59:00,083 Trump was adopting Putin's foreign policy. 2116 01:59:01,000 --> 01:59:03,917 These allegations are absolutely preposterous. 2117 01:59:04,542 --> 01:59:07,625 We began to see the intrusions in the electoral system. 2118 01:59:08,291 --> 01:59:10,583 If I didn't tell some people this story, 2119 01:59:10,667 --> 01:59:13,875 and something did happen to me, it would never get out. 2120 01:59:14,625 --> 01:59:16,875 It was all bullshit. 2121 01:59:17,166 --> 01:59:19,333 ♪ (DRAMATIC OUTRO PLAYS) ♪ 182889

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