Original subtitles

Powell: Adolf Hitler caused the deaths of 50 million people.

An entire nation followed him to ruin.

He was hated by those he persecuted

and even by some of his own commanders,

yet, in 25 years, no one managed to kill him.

Winston Churchill had very few bodyguards,

whilst Hitler had thousands.

He needed them.

During his travels across Europe,

there were over 40 attempts on his life.

Now, with access to captured original SS records,

the producers of "Churchill's Bodyguard"

can reveal for the first time, in this new series,

how fate and a small number of hand-picked bodyguards

helped this evil genius to cheat death

on so many occasions.

Why did no one manage to kill Adolf Hitler?

Enough people wanted to, but as this series shows,

it was not as simple as it sounds,

even when the number

of people out to get him was increasing rapidly.

By 1938, Hitler was on the road to war.

His march across Europe would multiply his enemies

and put him in the sights

of foreign powers.

[Crowd cheering ]

It was the greatest challenge for his bodyguards,

and they stocked up on weapons.

As they escorted Hitler's car through foreign crowds,

the Begleitkommando --

Hitler's SS close escort --

carried two pistols each,

had quick access to a dozen submachine guns,

plus 2,500 rounds of ammunition.

[Crowd cheering ]

They were taking no chances.

Their Fuhrer was becoming the most wanted man in Europe.

Hitler's grab for land began in February 1938.

Austria was his homeland, the country he was born in.

And he was keen to absorb it into the Third Reich.

His Nazi party was active there

and cajoled sections of the population

into demonstrating for Anschluss,

union with Germany.

Taking advantage of this,

Hitler summoned the Austrian Chancellor,

Kurt von Schuschnigg,

to his private residence at Obersalzberg.

This stood just over the border from Austria.

In choosing it, Hitler indicated

the low esteem in which he held the foreign chancellor.

This was to be no official visit,

but a session of bullying.

For two hours, Hitler brow-beat the Austrian chancellor.

He insisted he sign a treaty of union with Germany.

He then told Schuschnigg to wait outside his study

under the glare of his black-uniformed SS bodyguards.

General Wilhelm Keitel marched past the Austrian chancellor

to discuss the affair with Hitler.

The threat was clear --

you sign, or your country will be invaded.

Schuschnigg signed,

but then called for a referendum in which the Austrian people

could decide on union or not.

Fearful that they would reject it, Hitler was furious.

He massed his troops on the border.

On the 11th of March,

Schuschnigg was forced to back down

and resigned.

Artur Seyss-Inquart, head of the Austrian Nazi party,

became the new Chancellor of Austria.

The next day, German troops invaded the country.

It was a carefully choreographed operation

and demonstrated the balance of power Hitler wished to maintain

within his own forces.

[Crowd cheering ]

The SS-Leibstandarte was Hitler's regiment of bodyguards.

Each of them was over six feet tall

and chosen for his Aryan looks.

The Leibstandarte looked like soldiers

and were armed like soldiers,

but they were not part of the army.

They belonged to the SS --

the ruthless party security machine

run by Heinrich Himmler.

Almost four years earlier,

during the Night of the Long Knives,

Hitler had used the Leibstandarte

to slaughter the leaders of his brown-shirted SA

to reassure the German army that he put country before party.

But now he wanted to demonstrate

that party and country marched side by side.

Hitler instructed Sepp Dietrich, head of the Leibstandarte,

that his SS bodyguards would take part

in the invasion of Austria.

They were to be placed

under the command of army General Heinz Guderian.

Dietrich had no problem with this

and formed a strong friendship

with Guderian -- a pioneer of tank warfare.

Dietrich had served in a tank unit in 1918.

Guderian had no illusions that, although he was in command

of the Leibstandarte for this mission,

it was Dietrich

who had the ear of the Führer.

To reassure the Austrian population that they came

in peace, Guderian suggested

heading the troop columns with bands.

[Brass band playing]

[Crowd cheering ]

He put this idea to Dietrich, who had it accepted by Hitler.

It was a lesson quickly learned by German generals

that the best way to get to Hitler

was through his trusted chief of bodyguards,

Sepp Dietrich.

As the Leibstandarte

rode across the Austrian border with the regular German army,

it was Hans Rattenhuber -- commander of the RSD,

the Reich Security Service --

who was in charge of Hitler's personal security.

Over 30 SS-Begleitkommando and RSD agents were selected

for the task of protecting Hitler

as he returned in triumph to his homeland.

They rode in a convoy of a dozen Mercedes-Benz cars.

Hitler chose to ride in a massive six-wheeled

rough-terrain Mercedes G-4

painted in field gray to underline

his closeness to the army.

The crowds might be cheering

the Fuhrer's entry into their country,

but among them could be angry Communists,

Jews, or anyone who felt threatened by the Nazis,

now they were in charge.

Hitler’s first stop was Braunau, the little Austrian town

close to the border where he had been born

in this house 49 years earlier.

Being an Austrian had always made him

feel an outsider in German politics,

but now he had made Austria part of the Third Reich.

It was a significant moment, and he felt totally at ease

among the welcoming crowds, allowing them

to get close to his car, photograph him,

and hand him flowers and gifts.

But it was a nightmare for his bodyguards.

Hitler's number-one SS bodyguard, Bruno Gesche,

was in charge of the Begleitkommando contingent

in and around his car.

He kept a sharp eye out for any threats,

but even he was borne along by a wave of exuberance

and relaxed his guard.

Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's close friend

and personal photographer, traveled with them,

taking snaps of the celebrations along the way.

The Nazi convoy drove on to Lambach, Wels, and Linz.

They spent the night at Linz and then traveled onto Vienna.

As they got closer to the Austrian capital,

the crowds got thicker, and the convoy slowed

to just 10 miles an hour.

At one point, along the road from Linz to Vienna,

a Briton stopped his car to watch the parade go past.

The Briton was Colonel Noel Mason-MacFarlane,

the British military attaché to Berlin.

Many years later, he revealed how impressed he was

by the genuinely enthusiastic welcome for Hitler...

but he also noted the cars

filled with bodyguards brandishing weapons.

The scene set his mind racing.

This Fuhrer of Germany and now Austria

was going to be a threat to his own country.

Maybe it would be a good idea to get rid of him,

sooner, rather than later.

Mason-MacFarlane began to think of assassination,

but where to do it?

He had to get round Hitler's impressive ring of bodyguards.

He would also have to okay it

with his superiors back in London.

The idea stuck with the British attaché

as he returned to Berlin.

Hitler concluded his tour of Austria

with a grand parade in Vienna

of German and Austrian troops --

including his SS-Leibstandarte.

The Austrian troops took the oath of allegiance

to their new Führer.

It was a glorious reward for his daring.

He had blustered and bullied his way into the country.

Now he considered doing the same thing

in neighboring Czechoslovakia.

But would the welcome be so friendly?

It was an act verging on foreign conquest,

and even his proud generals might draw the line at that.

Hitler celebrated his easy annexation of Austria

with a trip to Italy.

He wanted to thank the Italian Fascist leader,

Benito Mussolini, for staying out of the action.

Il Duce might have turned awkward --

the Third Reich now shared a border with Italy.

Knowing that Hitler's theft of Austria

had set alarm bells ringing all over Europe,

his bodyguard needed to take special care

over the arrangements for the journey.

On their side of the border, it all ran smoothly.

To wrong-foot any assassins,

three official Condor airliners flew to Rome.

Hitler preferred to fly when traveling long distances,

but the Condors were empty of the Fuhrer and his entourage.

They traveled instead by train --

the Fuhrersonderzug

or Fuhrer Special -- a luxury express

designed with armored carriages

for his staff and bodyguards.

The train crossed the Italian border at the Brenner Pass

and arrived early evening in Rome.

As soon as Hitler stepped off the train,

his security services ceased to have

tight control over his protection.

Mussolini and his Black Shirts greeted Hitler

with a hearty Fascist salute --

their raised fists clenching drawn daggers.

It was a nervous moment for Bruno Gesche

and the SS-Begleitkommando.

But from then on, matters only got worse.

Hitler rode through Rome

in an open-topped horse-drawn carriage,

exposed completely to the foreign crowd

and accompanied only by

King Victor Emmanuel and his coachmen.

The Fuhrer was also not happy about the way

his friend Mussolini had to play second fiddle

to the King of Italy.

He considered the Fascist leader

the true head of state of his country,

not the diminutive king.

When they traveled on to Naples to review the Italian Navy,

there were no significant security measures in sight.

Hitler's bodyguards were livid.

Mussolini's Fascists reassured the Germans

that they had arrested 10,000 Jews

and other suspects before the visit.

But this sounded like mere bombast.

Rattenhuber and his RSD agents

were not impressed, but they had little choice

but to accept the foreign arrangements.

The trip continued with a visit

to Civitavecchia air base, north of Rome, to inspect

Mussolini's air force.

And then on to Florence, where the two dictators enjoyed

a brief cultural interlude.

After four days, the Fuhrer got safely back to Berlin.

Never again did he go abroad -- except to countries

he was in the process of subjugating.

Hitler may have survived the Italian state visit,

but now he was hungry for more foreign policy success.

Nestled beneath southern Germany and Austria,

some three million German-speaking people

lived in the northwestern half of Czechoslovakia.

The region was called the Sudetenland.

Inside its borders,

the Nazi party agitated for it to become part of Germany.

Hitler had a secret meeting

with the leader of the Sudeten Germans,

Konrad Henlein.

They discussed ways

of provoking a crisis with Czechoslovakia.

One of these ideas was to have a German minister assassinated

in Prague -- and blame the Czechs.

It was an astonishingly criminal idea,

but Hitler had also considered this

before his annexation of Austria.

For Hitler, political assassination

was an acceptable weapon in Nazi foreign policy.

As a result, he knew that he too was vulnerable --

and his bodyguards were put on special alert

during this critical period.

In April 1938, Hitler discussed the military dimension

to a Sudetenland takeover with General Wilhelm Keitel,

his newly appointed

senior commander of the Wehrmacht.

They called it Operation Green.

Not all German generals were happy with Hitler's

aggressive plans for Czechoslovakia.

Unlike Austria, this would not be a popular move

and would be opposed

by the Czech President, Edvard Benes.

The Czechs had signed alliances with France

and the Soviet Union, and could expect

some international help.

They had a well-trained and equipped army

and had also spent much effort building border fortifications,

designed by the French

and based on their formidable Maginot Line.

The Czechs were likely to resist,

and war might easily break out in the center of Europe.

Many German generals felt they weren't ready

for a major conflict -- they were still

rebuilding their strength from the small force permitted

by the Versailles Treaty.

The army chief of staff, 58-year-old General Ludwig Beck,

was the most senior commander to oppose Hitler's plans.

He was concerned not only by the unreadiness of his forces,

but by political developments.

Two senior generals had been forced out

in a purge of the army at the beginning of 1938.

General Werner von Blomberg,

commander in chief of all armed forces,

had recently remarried.

Gestapo files revealed his new wife had been a prostitute

and posed for pornographic pictures.

He was forced to resign.

Just a couple of months after this,

General Werner von Fritsch,

commander in chief of the German army,

was put on trial for his part

in a homosexual blackmail scandal.

The charges were dropped,

but the damage had been done, and he was dismissed.

Beck could see what was happening around him.

Hitler was clearing out any of the old-style Prussian generals

who might oppose his march towards war.

With Hitler loyalists like Keitel rising to senior command,

the German armed forces were becoming

a branch of the Nazi party.

The removal of the independent- minded von Fritsch

was a blow for those who opposed Hitler.

It forced Beck to take command

of the ring of generals and key civilian figures

who were becoming unhappy with the Nazi drive to war.

As early as February 1938, General Erwin von Witzleben,

commander of the Berlin military district,

had a secret meeting with

Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg,

deputy head of the Berlin police.

They knew that the greatest obstacle to dealing with Hitler

was his Praetorian guard -- the SS-Leibstandarte --

based in Berlin.

This regiment of bodyguards could

stamp on any move against the Führer.

Von Witzleben was asked whether the army possessed

the muscle and the will to intervene

against the Leibstandarte.

He spoke to the commander

of the regiment stationed near Berlin,

who agreed to bring out his regular troops

to fight the SS bodyguards.

The absence of the Leibstandarte from Berlin

during the Austrian Anschluss in March

encouraged these plotters to think the unthinkable.

Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch

was chosen by Hitler to succeed Fritsch as head of the army.

In May 1938, Beck sent him two memos

stressing that the German army was unprepared

for a war over Czechoslovakia, which might well also involve

fighting France and Britain.

Brauchitsch showed them to Hitler,

who rejected both out of hand.

It was too late.

On that same day, Hitler told his High Command

that his proposed invasion of Czechoslovakia

would take place in September 1938.

He wanted his generals to stop dragging their feet

and get on with planning victory.

Beck tried openly to rally support

within the German army for his reasons not to go to war,

but neither Brauchitsch nor Hitler would be swayed.

In August, Beck resigned.

It was a significant moment.

From this point on, Beck would have to work in secret

with those who opposed Hitler.

And among these would be his successor

as army chief of staff, General Franz Halder.

[Crowd cheering ]

Their views hardened.

If Hitler would not listen

to their reasoned arguments,

then he would have to be removed.

And if he resisted,

then he would have to be killed.

While General Beck was organizing

opposition against Hitler within the German army,

General Hans Oster was fomenting dissent

within the Abwehr --

the military intelligence service.

The 50-year-old Oster was deputy controller.

He managed a formidable group of agents gathering information

on all foreign enemies of the Third Reich.

The Abwehr should have been one of Hitler's main agencies

for defending his regime.

But Oster and his like-minded colleagues

believed their country was more important than the Nazi party

and did not like the journey their Fuhrer was taking them on.

There were also leading German civilians

who opposed Hitler's march to war.

Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the former President of the Reichsbank,

was Hitler's first Minister of Economics.

He was the man who kept the money flowing

for Nazi rearmament,

but even he had expressed his doubts about Hitler

to General Beck.

[Speaking German]

Schacht resigned in November 1937

and went back to the Reichsbank.

He was soon drawn into a plot to overthrow Hitler,

being planned by Oster

and Dr. Hans Gisevius, a senior civil servant

in the Ministry of the Interior.

On September 4, 1938,

the various plots began to come together

as Gisevius and Schacht met

the new army chief of staff, General Halder,

to sound out whether the army would support a coup.

He agreed that it would, but only when Hitler

had given the order for an invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Halder left the detailed planning

to Gisevius, who now agreed with General von Witzleben,

the commander of the Berlin military district,

to reactivate the plan to use the army to defeat the SS,

which he had discussed in March with Berlin police chief,

Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg.

The army's 1st Light Division under General Erich Hoeppner

was designated to take on the SS-Leibstandarte

and the plan was now refined to include a hit squad

of young army and Abwehr officers,

led by Major Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz,

which would storm the new Reichschancellery

and arrest Hitler.

[Speaking German]

In a plot within the plot, Oster and Heinz agreed

that none of the senior conspirators would be told

that during the assault,

the Fuhrer would actually be shot.

This would avoid any need for a public trial

in which Hitler might display his talent

for persuasive speech-making.

On September 9th, von Brauchitsch

and General Franz Halder, the new army chief of staff,

had a meeting with Hitler to discuss Operation Green.

The two generals voiced yet again the army's resistance

to any invasion of Czechoslovakia,

and Hitler flew into a rage.

He told them to be bold and carry on with his plans.

As the clock in Berlin ticked towards Hitler's annihilation,

the determination of the German plotters

depended on just one major outside factor --

the belief that Britain would join with France

to declare war on Germany.

This threat had to be real and strong...

and it looked as though it would be,

as France mobilized its reserves

and President Edouard Daladier

contacted the British Prime Minister,

Neville Chamberlain.

The French leader proposed

a united and determined stand

against Hitler's aggressive foreign policy.

Once a public declaration had been made --

and defied by Hitler --

the German plotters would be free to go into action.

The German army and the conspirators would be seen

to be acting not only in the peaceful interests

of Germany, but also for the rest of Europe.

It seemed so simple.

But one obstacle stood in their way...

the English premier, Neville Chamberlain.

His political naivety and misjudgment

would jeopardize the one

great opportunity Europe had

to get rid of Hitler before the start of World War II.

[Crowd cheering ]

As September 1938 began,

Adolf Hitler was just days away from ordering

a German invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Neither he nor his security apparatus were aware

that this would be the signal

for a serious coup against him.

All that General Ludwig Beck and his group

of dissident officers and key civilian figures needed

was for Britain and France to stand firm

against Hitler's aggressive foreign policy.

But as Frank Roberts, a senior British diplomat,

later described, there was a fundamental difference

between the two groups.

Man: From then on, of course,

Beck and that group of the generals --

but they didn't represent all of the generals,

by any manner of means -- kept in touch with us

by underground means.

They used to come through me,

and it was a sort of a thing of,

"if only you and the French will stand up to Hitler,

then we'll do something about him,"

and we rather saying, "Well, hadn't you better start

doing something about him, and then perhaps we can help you."

Powell: Also, firmness in London was in short supply.

There was a distinct lack of interest

among ministers in the British government

to bring a quick end to Hitler's regime.

This had already

been indicated by a minor incident earlier that summer.

Colonel Noel Mason-MacFarlane,

the British military attache in Berlin who witnessed

Hitler's triumphant entry into Austria in March,

had followed up his idea of getting rid

of the man he saw as a dangerous warmonger.

Mason-MacFarlane lived at the western end

of the east-west axis of Berlin --

the main parade route.

His house at No. 1 Sophienstrasse

had a good view of the reviewing stand in the Berlinerstrasse

frequently used by Hitler.

This extraordinary luck

gave Mason-MacFarlane an idea, which he discussed

with Times correspondent Ewan Butler --

Man: "All that was necessary was a good shot

"and a high-velocity rifle with telescopic sight and silencer.

"It could have been fired though my bathroom window

"from a spot on the landing some 30 feet back

from the window."

Powell: As a diplomat,

Mason-MacFarlane's house was within

the security zone put around Hitler

by his SS bodyguards,

and the noise of marching men and cheering

would have disguised any noise from his rifle.

He was quite prepared to pull the trigger himself.

Ewan Butler himself had been unimpressed

by Hitler's personal security and got within

just 20 feet of the Fuhrer

outside the Anhalter station in Berlin.

Man: "In my case, the Gestapo security arrangements

"had collapsed.

"I was not searched, although I had

"no right to be where I was

"and might have had several Mills bombs in my pocket.

"In that case, I could have disposed not only of the Fuhrer

"but of most of his accomplices.

"I told Mason-Mac about this,

"and he reproached me bitterly for having missed

such an excellent opportunity."

Powell: Mason-MacFarlane reported his golden opportunity

to his masters in London, but was told not to proceed.

It would be unsportsmanlike to assassinate the dictator.

Mason-MacFarlane does not say exactly when

he put his idea to London, but he was

in the reviewing stand among the other

military attachés for Hitler's four-hour 50th Birthday Review

on April 20, 1939.

One wonders whether he was reflecting on the loss

of an excellent opportunity to rid the world of a major threat.

A lack of appetite for violent action

was characterized above all by the 69-year-old

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

Like many of his generation, Chamberlain was appalled

by the way in which an entire generation of Europe's young men

had been sacrificed in the trenches of World War I.

Man: "When I think of the 7 million young men

"who were cut off in their prime,

"the 13 million maimed and mutilated,

"in war there are no winners,

but all are losers."

Powell: He was determined

to avoid a war in Europe at any cost --

even if it meant giving Hitler exactly what he wanted.

In stark contrast

was British MP Winston Churchill.

He voiced great concern

over Hitler's hunger for foreign expansion

and could see that it was better to stop him earlier

rather than later.

But, at the time, Churchill was out of favor,

and his warnings were ignored by the Prime Minister.

Chamberlain had a highly elevated view

of his talents as a diplomat and believed

that his personal intervention could avoid war.

It has been suggested

that news of the planned coup against Hitler

was picked up by British intelligence agents

in Berlin.

It is more than likely that it was deliberately leaked to them

by Hans Oster's department in the Abwehr.

This news was then passed on to Chamberlain.

But rather than giving strength to the plotters

by threatening war

against Hitler if he invaded Czechoslovakia,

Chamberlain did the exact opposite.

He flew out to Munich to talk peace --

face to face with Hitler.

It was an extraordinary thing to do.

He had never flown before.

It has also been suggested that he chose to fly

because he wanted to get to Hitler quickly,

before the army plotters did.

They met on September 15th

at Hitler's private residence at the Berghof.

As they talked, it has also been suggested

that Chamberlain might even have covertly warned Hitler

of a plot against him so as to give himself

a diplomatic bargaining chip.

If that is true, it is a shocking indictment

of the lengths to which Chamberlain would go

to project himself as a peace-winning politician.

Chamberlain's negotiations with Hitler

completely threw the Berlin plotters.

This was unexpected

and deflated their preparations for a coup.

The Czechs were also appalled.

Decisions were being made

about the future of their country

without their involvement.

Their leaders asked whether France would still stand by them

if Germany invaded.

The answer was no --

Czechoslovakia would be on its own.

Chamberlain flew for a second meeting with Hitler

at Bad Godesberg, near Bonn, on September 22nd.

But now Hitler pushed his luck too far --

he rejected a compromise proposed by Chamberlain

in which a plebiscite would be held in the Sudetenland,

allowing the German-speakers

to vote for union with Nazi Germany.

Hitler said he would send his troops

into the whole of Czechoslovakia by the end of the month,

unless the Sudetenland was handed over to him.

To underscore this threat, as with the Anschluss,

Hitler had already dispatched

his bodyguard regiment, the SS-Leibstandarte,

to the border area to undertake combat training.

Its absence from Berlin encouraged the plotters

but they were still confused

by the mixed messages coming from Chamberlain's behavior.

I hope that this journey...

At Bad Godesberg, the British Prime Minister

was shocked by Hitler's aggression

and could find no room for compromise.

Even his own government refused any more concessions,

and at the last moment, Britain finally mobilized its forces

in preparation for war.

France also called up her troops.

The Berlin coup was back on.

Even Army Commander in Chief von Brauchitsch,

hitherto enthusiastic about Operation Green,

was nervous when he heard of Britain's mobilization.

He told Halder that he now supported the removal of Hitler.

Halder replied that as soon as he gave the order,

the coup would swing into action.

Sympathetic officers inside the Reich Chancellery

were ready to leave doors unlocked so that the plotters

could immediately arrest the Führer.

But just when all was ready,

the Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini

announced on September 28th that he was intervening

to arrange a conference in response

to a phone call from Chamberlain asking for help

in brokering a peace.

From this point, the coup collapsed completely.

Brauchitsch backed away as Hitler won a stunning

diplomatic victory in Munich

under the eyes of his good friend, Mussolini.

It was a tragedy.

The thoroughness of the planning

and the depth of the support for the coup

by senior civilian and military figures

made it the most dangerous threat to Hitler

and his regime before World War II.

On September 30th, the Munich Agreement was signed.

Hitler promised that once he had received the Sudetenland,

he would make no more territorial demands in Europe.

But to get this, Britain and France had given in

to Hitler on virtually all counts.

Germany was allowed to take over the entire Sudetenland --

11,000 square miles and over 3 million people --

just so long as she did not proceed any further

into the rest of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler had annexed yet another chunk of Europe

without a shot being fired.

This bloodless victory

pulled the rug out from under the generals' plot.

Their fears were shown to be groundless

and Hitler's boldness vindicated.

He was the supreme foreign policy poker player.

He had won his prize and saved his own life, too.

The plot was finished.

Chamberlain returned to Britain waving his piece of paper --

a hollow promise of peace.

Whatever the truth of the allegations

that he had revealed the generals' plot to Hitler,

he had undoubtedly saved the German dictator

from almost certain arrest and assassination.

Chamberlain had proved to be Hitler's best bodyguard of all.

[Cheers and applause ]

On October 3, 1938,

a triumphant Hitler

entered his new acquisition in Czechoslovakia.

He had taken the Fuhrer Special train from Berlin to Hof

the previous day.

His SS-Begleitkommando bodyguards traveled with him

under the watchful gaze of Bruno Gesche, their commander.

But the mood of Hitler and his close comrades was celebratory.

He had won a tremendous bloodless victory

at the Munich conference, and their guard was down.

Besides, they had the army to protect them.

The French-designed concrete gun emplacements,

built at great expense on the Czech border with Germany,

were simply bypassed.

The well-equipped Czech army could have made its stand here

with the British and French threatening Germany's

other flank.

Such resistance

would have encouraged the coup against Hitler.

But any thought of that was long gone.

Pro-Hitler euphoria spread

through the army at the ease of its occupation.

Halder, Beck, Oster,

and the other rebel generals kept their heads down.

But this did not mean their resistance to Hitler was over.

But it now took

a very secret path that would only be resurrected

when Hitler faced other military crises --

and that would not be for some time.

Hitler's party crossed the border

at Wildenau near Asch

in a six-wheel cross-country Mercedes.

He was driven onto Eger,

Wildstein,

Schonbach, then back to Hof.

Driving around in the open-topped Mercedes

appalled the Fuhrer's bodyguard.

He was mobbed by enthusiastic crowds,

and this proved a constant danger.

Often his Begleitkommando escort

had to get out of their cars and, three on each side,

walk or run alongside the Fuhrer's

to keep some distance between the conquering hero

and his new subjects.

The formidable Czech border defenses,

which had been betrayed without a shot being fired,

were gloated over.

The following March, Hitler broke

his supposed deal with Chamberlain.

The German army invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia --

and there was little the international community

could do.

Even then, faced by more hostile crowds,

Hitler still visited his conquests,

traveling in his armored open-topped Mercedes.

The countdown to war in Europe had started.

It would be only six months away.

Britain and France hastily re-armed,

but they had already blown their best opportunities

to rid themselves of Hitler.

Not only had they had failed to support a serious German plot,

but they had ignored the urging of their own willing agents,

such as the British attaché Mason-MacFarlane.

If no organized plot could kill Hitler before the war,

there was still the danger of a lone assassin.

This was what he always feared most --

and what almost succeeded

where the military plotters had failed.

In the autumn of 1938,

Maurice Bavaud, a 22-year-old Swiss theology student,

pretended to be a great admirer of Hitler.

He tried to get to meet him at Berlin

and then at the Berghof,

Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden

in the Bavarian Alps.

But the Fuhrer's itinerary

was always too busy for Bavaud to make contact.

But the anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich

was a date he knew Hitler would keep.

On November 9, 1938, Bavaud bought a ticket

for one of the viewing stands on the route

that Hitler and his Nazi veterans would march along

as part of the anniversary celebrations.

As Hitler, surrounded by SS and RSD bodyguards,

approached the stand, Bavaud fingered

the pistol he had bought in Basel.

He was very close to the procession,

but there were just too many bodies

around Hitler for Bavaud to get a good shot.

On this occasion, Hitler's tight security had worked,

and his bodyguards shielded him from assassination.

Bavaud was not easily put off.

He traveled to the Berghof again, but Hitler was away.

Eventually, Bavaud was arrested while traveling on a train

without a valid ticket.

His gun was found,

and Gestapo interrogation revealed

the whole complicated itinerary of his attempts to kill Hitler.

For Bavaud's plot to have been discovered by luck

rather than meticulous security by the RSD or SS

was an embarrassment for both organizations.

An inquiry later criticized in particular

the sale of grandstand tickets in Munich to a foreigner.

The RSD was responsible for checking out

special locations attended regularly by Hitler,

and they should have spotted this.

Such lapses in basic elements of security

would reoccur with alarming regularity.

The whole affair reinforced the wisdom

of Hitler's chaotic approach to his own safety.

Man: "The confessions of the Swiss man interested me.

"They confirmed my conviction that no one can avoid

"an assassin who is determined

"to risk his own life in the execution of his mission.

"The only preventive measure one can take

"is to live life unpredictably --

"to walk, to drive, and to travel

at irregular times and unexpectedly."

Bavaud was put on trial on December 18, 1938.

The Swiss government tried to intervene but failed.

He was beheaded at Berlin-Plötzensee prison.

Bavaud said his reason for killing Hitler

was that he posed a danger to his own country,

to the Catholic faith in Germany,

and to humanity in general.

He was not wrong.

Hitler posed a deadly threat to humanity.

And in September of 1939, that danger was realized.

Hitler's generals forgot their opposition to his warmongering

and led their troops into Poland.

In response, Britain and France declared war on Germany,

and World War II began.

Within a few months, Neville Chamberlain --

the failed appeaser -- had been replaced

as premier by the more pugnacious Winston Churchill.

With open conflict in Europe, the stakes could not

have been higher, and Hitler soon faced

more attempts on his life --

one getting to within just minutes of blowing him apart.

Subtitling made possible by Acorn Media