All language subtitles for Flight.Risk.2022.1080p.WEBRip.x264-RARBG

(soft rumbling, growing louder)

♪ ♪

(waves crashing)

ZIPPORAH KURIA: I remember the first time
I ever stepped into the ocean.

My brothers jumped in, my mom jumped in,
and I just stayed away from the waves.

And I remember my dad pretending to drown,
and he was like,

"Who's gonna help me? Who's gonna help me?

Only my little girl can help me."

He had the ability to empower me to think

that my six-year-old body
could lift a whole man.

The world has really lost

the best kind of people...

...on that flight.

(jet engine whirring)

(upbeat electronic music playing)

WOMAN: My colleague with communications,
John Flick,

is with some of the employees
that have come,

and certainly there are a lot here
in Renton, Washington,

but we have employees who've been involved

with this airplane and program
from all over the globe.

-John?
-FLICK: Deborah, certainly it is

a worldwide effort,
and, you know, not the greatest day.

It's rainy, it's cold,
but look at all the excited faces.

-(crowd whooping)
-A lot of these folks from Renton here,

ponchos, smiling,
even though it's raining.

And we talked about
the team effort for this.

WOMAN:
Let's just take a listen

as this airplane gets ready
for its very first takeoff.

(applause)

(jet engine roaring)

(crowd whooping)

♪ ♪

(cameras clicking)

(typewriter clacking)

DENNIS MUILENBURG:
Throughout the past 100 years,

Boeing and its employees
have led with innovation...

...and have taken the world
from seaplanes to space planes.

From walking on the Earth...

...to walking on the Moon.

(satellite beeping)

Few companies have achieved
as much as we have.

Today, we'll celebrate
that legacy together

while imagining what comes next.

NEWSMAN: One Dow stock is skyrocketing,
and it's a familiar one.

NEWSWOMAN: Shares of Boeing stock
is on pace for its best month ever.

(bell clanging)

I'm speaking to you from the Boeing plant
in Everett, Washington,

because at this plant,
they're building the plane of the future.

CROWD (chanting):
U.S.A.! U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

-U.S.A.
-U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

MUILENBURG: We're the leader
in this great global industry,

and we know that lives
literally depend on what we do.

We will continue to lead and succeed
in our second century.

(applause)

DOMINIC GATES:
I believe in the Boeing mission.

I'm awed by their technology
and their prowess.

I love it.

And it's a hugely important company,
and I want it to succeed.

This is the piece that we wrote
that blew open the story

behind the 737 MAX disasters.

I remember somebody called me up and said,
"Why didn't you publish that earlier?

Maybe you could've stopped
the second crash."

♪ ♪

(soft rumbling)

(water burbling)

(helicopter whirring)

(man speaking foreign language)

NEWSWOMAN:
An Indonesia passenger plane

crashing into the sea
minutes after takeoff from Jakarta.

All 189 people on board
are now feared dead.

♪ ♪

Mentioned this was a-a Boeing aircraft.

What m-more do we know about the plane?

NEWSMAN: (stammers)
Boeing, as you said, uh, almost brand-new.

They had taken delivery of it
back in August.

It was a 737 MAX.

That's the updated version of the 737.
They haven't been out that long.

NEWSMAN 2: The stock is down,
but my read is that TheStreet

actually isn't that negative
on where Boeing is going with this issue.

NEWSWOMAN 2: Analysts have
great expectations for their stock.

-(siren wailing)
-The company said the crash had posed

no material risk to the MAX program,

the company has
enough cash flow to cover this,

and that this issue again is overblown.

(people crying)

MUILENBURG: First of all,
I think it's important that we all

express our sympathies for
the-the loss of, uh, Lion Air Flight 610.

Uh, we've been very engaged with
the investigative authorities throughout

in providing all of the information,
uh, necessary

to make sure we do a full assessment
of, uh, of the situation.

And the bottom line here
is the 737 MAX is safe.

(birds squawking)

(helicopter whirring)

NEWSWOMAN: We are following
breaking news out of Ethiopia,

where a plane went down,
killing everyone on board.

NEWSWOMAN 2:
The airline told state media

there were people of more than
30 nationalities among the dead.

NEWSWOMAN 3:
It's unclear what caused the crash,

but the model in question,
a Boeing 737 MAX 8,

it's the same one that was involved in
the Indonesian disaster back in October.

NEWSWOMAN 4:
This has now moved into a criminal probe.

The Justice Department
issuing multiple subpoenas

as part of a wide-ranging investigation
into Boeing's FAA certification.

(thunder rumbling)

NEWSMAN: Facing serious safety questions
and brutal political headwinds,

the Boeing 737 MAX 8
is being grounded around the globe.

(reporters speaking various languages)

DONALD TRUMP:
Any plane currently in the air

will go to its destination
and thereafter be grounded.

NEWSWOMAN 5: Is this expected to send
shock waves through the U.S. economy?

NEWSMAN 2:
It certainly could.

You're talking about tens of thousands
of supply chain workers.

That's in addition to the
12,000 Boeing employees who build the 737.

-(reporters clamoring) -TRUMP:
It was a big-- that was a big decision.

-It's also one of our largest exporters.
-(cameras clicking)

One of the truly great companies
of the world.

They have to figure it out fast.

♪ ♪

GATES: These were
two brand-new airplanes that crashed,

and the weather was perfect.

That just shouldn't happen.

Why did they crash?

Was there a common cause?

Were the pilots somehow at fault?

Or was there something wrong
with the plane?

KURIA:
I'm smart.

OLIVIA:
I'm smart.

KURIA:
I'm intelligent.

(babbles)

I'm kind.

Kind.

I'm funny.

I'm funny. (babbles)

I'm beautiful!

-I'm beautiful.
-Good girl.

(happy babbling)

♪ ♪

KURIA: They say you usually start
your grieving process

when you've buried your loved one.

Then you get news
that they've identified some remains.

And finding out you're getting like 30%

of the man who raised you.

Some families got 70%, 80%.

My brothers, my niece

and the rest of our family,

we only got 30%.

Going through the list of remains,
viewing, like, what's in the casket.

You know, it was hard to digest.

NEWSWOMAN: The families
of some of the 157 people killed

when a Boeing 737 MAX

crashed in Ethiopia last March
have accused

Ethiopian Airlines
of denying them the chance

to attend a service for their loved ones
at the site of the disaster.

NEWSMAN: Yesterday, the final
unidentifiable remains of those who died

were buried at the site.

Two days before the burial,
they send the families an email,

saying, "We're going to be burying
your loved ones in the next 48 hours."

They were just buried like people
who didn't belong to anyone

or weren't loved by anyone.

My dad had a funeral yesterday,
and I missed it.

(wind whistling softly)

♪ ♪

NEWSWOMAN:
Do you believe that Boeing has been

transparent enough in the process so far?

We may actually be in litigation
against Boeing out of this cris--

so I don't want to throw stones at Boeing
until we know more.

(train horn blows in distance)

JUSTIN GREEN:
Boeing's got the best aviation lawyers,

trial lawyers.

They've got unlimited resources.

And the families of the victims

-essentially have us.
-(train horn blows)

(whoops)

I was a pilot in the Marine Corps.

I've been in two aviation crashes.

The first one was in a DC-9.

It broke in half
when it landed in Pensacola.

The second one, the cross-tube broke,
the rotor blades hit the ground

and flipped the helicopter.

The accident I was in,
nothing compared to the two MAX crashes.

Those passengers didn't have a chance.

So, on the 6th, we have Konjit.

ANNE HABIG:
And then Linet.

She has two hours to meet with you.

GREEN: There's two sides of the case,
and they're both equally important.

The first one is the liability case.

She may not come now. She's all worried.

GREEN:
Yeah, I saw the emails.

Basically, we have to prove
that Boeing did something wrong

in order to hold Boeing accountable.

HABIG: She left behind a husband
and two little-- and two minor children.

But they haven't given me a date yet.

GREEN:
The second thing is compensation.

Even though life is precious and life
can't be measured in terms of money,

that is how the law measures it.

And the compensation
that we seek from Boeing

has to reflect the very serious losses
our clients have suffered.

(indistinct chatter)

Boeing will try to put people
on a spreadsheet.

WOMAN:
Hello.

GREEN:
Have name, age, relatives.

(woman speaking foreign language)

And then they might say,
"Well, that's a single person,

"not survived by a spouse, no kids.

That case isn't worth a lot of money."

So one of the things we do is
we kind of take them off that chart.

"Yeah, that person's not married,

but did you know
the person supported his entire family?"

-(indistinct chatter)
-(woman crying)

KONJIT SHAFI BALEKER:
He completed all the six years training

and then he become Africa key instructor.

GREEN:
In this case, our client's a young man,

who, in the entire country of Ethiopia,

he's the only person who can
actually instruct master technicians

on Toyota vehicles.

BALEKER:
He wins a national contest in 2011,

also in thou-- 2012.

Everything here is
a memorial of Sintayehu.

Everything.

My mother still expect, every night,

to open the door for him.

To say hi to him.

She wakes up early
to prepare a food to him.

It's difficult
to accept the reality still.

GREEN:
You don't let people become numbers.

You make them people again.

So what we have to do is
try to get the essence of the person.

ABABU AMEHA: This is, uh,
when she was graduating from ET.

-Oh.
-Yeah.

As a cabin crew, when she was joined.

This is the wings that they wore?

AMEHA:
This is the wing for the crew members.

Her intention was to run her own business.

-GREEN: Right.
-Yeah.

And she was doing it
in addition to raising kids,

having a full-time
flight attendant position.

AMEHA:
Yeah.

-GREEN: She had a lot of energy, huh?
-Yeah.

-This is her attorney.
-The image I found.

AMEHA: My wife, she used to
drink wine while she had

helping of spaghetti.

So this is her last drink.

This is her last drink.

Nobody has touched it.

We need justice.

We need justice.

GREEN: Um, could you just tell me
what your full name is?

I am John Quindos.

Can I ask you about the crash

and the loss of your wife, uh, your
daughter and-and your three grandchildren?

QUINDOS: It is, uh...
it's a bit difficult to explain.

Every day, you wake up

and you find you have nowhere to go.

It comes to your mind,

"My God, why did you do this?"

GREEN: We make them, you know,
put together photos for us.

We make them
fill out questionnaires for us.

We put the people through pain.

Can you just tell me
what you miss the most about your mom?

♪ ♪

It's emotionally draining.

And, um, making everything much worse,

you could have a case
where someone from the U.S.

gets ten times what someone
from outside the U.S. gets.

And this is something
that we've been fighting for years.

I'm so sorry.

-And, God, thank you for having us.
-Thank you.

One of the families said, "You know what?

"If you bring me a billion dollars
and you say,

"'You can have this billion dollars

or my brother back,'
I'm gonna take my brother."

Um, so getting the money, is that justice?

ELYAB TILAHUN:
I mean, I-I won't even

begin to understand
what they're going through.

One minute, these people,
they were, they were with you,

and then, 20 minutes later,
you're-you're being told that

there was a plane crash
and they've all died.

How do you make peace with that?

(seagulls chirping)

(ship horn blowing)

WOMAN:
Morning. Hi.

-Hello. Good morning.
-(busy chatter)

Yeah, come in.

MAN (over speakers): We're gonna
have some folks coming in late.

We'll just have to find a seat.

Hey, there's Dominic. You made it.

WENDY SOWERS:
Of the 20 largest airlines in the world,

19 of them fly the Triple Seven.

We talked about
ten percent better costs per seat

than our closest competitor
currently in the market today.

We also have
double-digit improvement in efficiency,

so this allows them to reduce their costs.

Happy to take some questions of the room.

-Yes?
-Can we get an interview about the MAX?

SOWERS:
Uh...

We can work with you
on any MAX-related questions.

Wendy's really
the marketing Triple Seven X person.

I don't think
she'd be in a position to answer

any real complicated MAX questions, right?

SOWERS:
Yeah, and I'm not an engineer, so...

-MAN: And she's not an engineer.
-(woman laughs)

Okay, so we're gonna proceed out of here.
Head out of the door.

Head toward-- straight to the buses.

GATES: I always say to Boeing
that it's better if you work with me.

But if you don't
and you try to close me out,

well, I'll write it without you.

♪ ♪

For 17 years now,
I've been covering the story of Boeing.

Joining us now is Dominic Gates, an
aerospace reporter for The Seattle Times.

Behind me here, we've got the 737

fuselage system installation.

This is the most journalistically
competitive story I've ever worked on.

Sorry, everybody. Sorry I'm late.

And so every meeting we were having...

You know that a lot of people
are gonna be reading it or not...

GATES: The editors were saying,
"Whatever you got, get it out there fast."

There are two great centers
of airplane building in the world:

Toulouse in Europe for Airbus

and Seattle for Boeing.

Historically, you did pay a premium
for a Boeing plane.

And that's because it was better built.

I don't think that's true anymore.

I mean, it-it began with
the McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997.

The merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
is now complete.

GATES:
And, in a sense, the MAX crashes

are the end point of that.

All these McDonnell Douglas people
came with this different mentality.

They didn't want to design new planes

and just harvested the money
from these older models.

The new management
sold Wall Street this vision

of Boeing growing exponentially,
and Wall Street bought it.

But they were also under intense
competitive pressure from Airbus.

-Yeah.
-That's right.

Airbus kept building new planes,

and suddenly American Airlines
was about to seal a huge order

for 200 A320neos,

which is the rival of the 737.

NEWSMAN:
Is Boeing in trouble, do you think?

It tells us that the-the company's in some
trouble in its competition with Airbus.

GREEN:
American Airlines was a legacy

Boeing customer who only flew,
uh, Boeing products up to that time.

So the idea that they would lose
market share to, um, Airbus

was a major event.

GATES: So what's Boeing
going to do to answer Airbus?

RAY RIVERA: They were going to design
a whole new airplane,

and then scrapped those plans
and decided to modify

-the 737 in that race.
-Right.

DANIEL ROSE:
And the thinking for that was time,

-money?
-GREEN: Time.

It's a lot easier to get a new version
of a already certified aircraft

certified by the FAA.

But the primary goal was that
Boeing wanted to produce the airplane

so they could sell it to customers
who were already flying the 737

and say, "Look, if an airline is
looking at either buying an Airbus,

"where they'd have to put pilots
through training,

"or buy the 737 MAX, where
they already have the pilots certified,

that's a huge competitive advantage."

MICHELE MATASSA FLORES:
The biggest picture of all is really

the expectations
in a capitalist society, right?

There's shareholders,
who want greater return all the time.

There are flying passengers,
who want lower prices all the time.

That's really what drives all of this.

MARC MOLLER:
Pull the curtain back

and see what's really going on
in this company,

and you'll understand
why this plane crashed.

ED PIERSON: Over here, this was not
supposed to be a big parking lot for 737s,

but that's what it's become right now
where they're grounded.

It's, uh, heartbreaking.

(birds chirping)

The 737 factory, it's a huge facility.

My team worked on the factory floor,

and we started seeing
a lot of quality issues.

And that's when I was expressing
my concerns to the general manager.

♪ ♪

Problems started when senior executives

were really trying to ramp up
production of the MAX.

The plan is to build these planes
in a very organized way

'cause it's a complicated product
and you have to do everything right.

And because of this pressure,
this continued pressure to produce,

because of Airbus,

we're not doing that.

MUILENBURG: We're seeing
a lot of, uh, narrow-body interest,

so of course, uh, this week,
we'll be highlighting the MAX family.

NEWSMAN: Cameras captured a great week
for Boeing in orders and commitments.

MAN:
Singapore Airlines has committed to 30,

-United Airlines to 20.
-(cameras clicking)

GATES:
The MAX was very successful.

It's the fastest-selling Boeing jet ever.

MUILENBURG:
We got about 4,000

737s in backlog.

We're oversold.

PIERSON: We were going from
building 47 planes in a month to 52.

That's a lot of airplanes.

MUILENBURG:
Every one and a half seconds,

a 737 takes off

-somewhere in the world.
-MAN 2: Right, and...

-So, there goes another one.
-All right. -(laughter)

So we would try to meet schedule,
and-and it started slipping.

NEWSMAN 2: AerCap announced
an order for 100 737 MAX 8s.

MAN 3: Well, it's looking pretty good.
Looks like, uh, another record year.

PIERSON: Now we're having
to do work out of sequence,

which adds risk.

NEWSMAN 3:
Take a look at shares of Boeing.

MUILENBURG:
Over the next 20 years,

we see a need for about
41,000 new airplanes.

MAN 4:
I'm about ready to move again.

So I just move my pad,
and I have to keep pace, keep up.

PIERSON: I've never seen
that kind of pressure put on people.

And they started getting grilled,
you know, "How--

"I thought you gave me your word you were
gonna be done yesterday, and your team--

How come you're not off the plane?"
And somebody would make this mistake,

and then the same mistake
would be made a day or two later.

Y-You don't want people thinking like that
when they're building airplanes.

I wrote a letter to the CEO saying,
"We could still do the right thing,

but we need to stop
and give our people a chance to catch up."

I wrote to the board of directors,
and I requested their assistance.

"Yeah, we'll get in touch with you."
"We'll get back to you."

Nothing, nothing.

We'll meet this demand,
always raising the bar

when it comes to safety,
quality and integrity.

(sighs)

(crickets chirping)

PIERSON: I do know that,
you know, there might be people

that will try to discredit me
or maybe challenge what I say, you know,

and my response back is,
"Look, I have to do it."

♪ ♪

I need to explain that even a wonderful,
great company like Boeing

can have problems.

ERIC HAVIAN: There are many unfortunate
circumstances involving whistleblowers.

Edward Snowden, he now lives in-in Russia.

Chelsea Manning ended up in prison.

Been a long road to get here, huh?

HAVIAN:
Yeah, too long. (chuckles)

Those are the names that you hear about,

but there are many other whistleblowers
trying to speak out to make a difference.

Doing okay, honey?

I'm doing okay.

HAVIAN:
Ed's going up against Boeing,

one of the biggest employers
in Seattle area,

and there are
some very well documented examples

where Boeing has retaliated against people
who have gone against the company.

-Thank you, sir.
-Thank you.

(elevator bell dings)

Going down here. Down here?

-CYNTHIA McFADDEN: Hi.
-Hi. How are you, Cynthia?

Thank you for coming and doing this.

Thanks for inviting me. Appreciate it.

Very good. So let's, um, let's ask
the documentary team to go.

So, the name's out.

The Wall Street Journal
is the one who got the leak.

Right.

HAVIAN:
Someone leaked Ed's identity,

and now the press are calling Boeing,
and Boeing is preparing to say something.

I can't answer questions like that ever
on behalf of the client,

whether the answer is yes or no.

People want to protect Boeing's flank.

They think it's in their interest
to have Boeing get out there first

before Ed's story is told.

But of course,
I know you don't want to do that.

In order for that not to happen, um,

looks like the stories will go today
rather than tomorrow.

(whispers):
I'm trying.

Never a dull moment.

McFADDEN: After 30 years in the military,
much of it spent in an airplane,

Ed Pierson has a strong sense of duty.

Bottom line is you're worried about
people dying in Boeing planes.

Yeah, absolutely.

McFADDEN:
But in late 2017,

Ed Pierson says he started to see things
that alarmed him.

(elevator bell dings)

What words would you use
to describe that factory at that point?

PIERSON:
Dangerous.

Um, unnecessary.

Taking unnecessary risks.

Chaotic. Uh, um, disarray.

McFADDEN:
Four months later, a Lion Air 737 MAX

(over TV):
crashed, killing all 189 people on board.

What do you say to Americans
who are planning to fly on a 737?

I would demand that the FAA,
in their role as regulators,

go in, thoroughly investigate
that factory.

LESTER HOLT: So, Cynthia,
what is Boeing saying about all this?

McFADDEN: Well, Lester,
while the 737 MAX fleet are all grounded,

there are more than 6,800
other 737s flying.

Now, Boeing is
pushing back strongly tonight,

saying that the 737 is one of the safest
planes flying, and they say, quote,

"...the suggestion by Mr. Pierson
of a link between his concerns

and the recent MAX accidents
is completely unfounded."

And they say, so far,
no investigators have found, quote,

"...production conditions in the factory
contributed to the accidents."

Lester.

-(indistinct chatter)
-(birds chirping)

PETER DeFAZIO: After the first crash,
Boeing told us it was a one-off.

The initial reports on the second crash

sounded identical
to what happened in the first crash.

And that just set off alarm bells with me,
saying, "No, wait a minute.

Uh, there's something we don't know here."

And that was when we began
the investigation.

Almost like a court proceeding,
we-- first you go into discovery.

You need the documents.

And then, once you get the documents,

you identify, uh, key players
who need to be interviewed.

-(cameras clicking)
-Morning.

MUILENBURG: Good morning.
Good to be here with you this morning.

Uh, thank you.

Looking forward to, uh, today's hearing.

REPORTER: They're gonna ask you,
apparently, about a manager

who sought to halt the production
of the 737 MAX today.

Did you know about anything like that?

And what would your response be
to that now?

Aware of that, and we've, uh,
taken on those concerns

and address-- have addressed those.

-(reporters clamoring)
-Thank you. Thank you.

DeFAZIO:
I want to return to the market pressures,

the fact that you had to design a plane
that was more economical

and couldn't require pilot training.

I was taking on
a very powerful corporation.

Mr. Chairman,
we'll follow up with that information.

DeFAZIO:
They were resistant.

Is anybody at Boeing taking a cut

or working for free
to try to rectify this problem?

My, uh, board will conduct
a comprehensive review that's...

So you're saying you're not giving up
any compensation at all?

You're continuing to work
and make $30 million a year?

DeFAZIO: But we're gonna
see through with the investigation.

We think the system is gonna work.

NEWSMAN: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
testified before a Senate committee.

Boeing came to my office
shortly after these crashes

and said they were the result
of pilot error.

Those pilots never had a chance.

MUILENBURG:
When we design a system,

understand that these airplanes
are flown in the hands of pilots,

and in some cases,
our system safety analysis includes

not only the engineering design but also

the actions that, uh, pilots would take
as part of, uh, a failure scenario.

GATES:
Blame the dead pilots.

I-I'm continually astonished
that Boeing won't move from that.

Especially once I started
digging up information about

the MAX's new flight control system,
which is called the MCAS--

the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System.

Hey, it's Dominic.

Uh, you got a minute?

The name of it is an awful acronym
that tells you nothing.

I find it astonishing
that you don't know about it.

All we knew early on was that
MCAS was new flight control software

that had been added to the MAX

and that some flaw in it
had caused the crash.

(jet engine whirring)

GREEN: There's a big question about
how this airplane was designed.

The history of this is freaking crazy.

So the whole thing goes way back
to, like, the '60s.

MALE ANNOUNCER: Newest arrival
in the Boeing family of airliners,

the 737 attracts a crowd.

GREEN:
They want a short jet.

They want a jet that people can get
onto and off of on a stairway,

so they build the 737 low to the ground.

So then, fast-forward to 2011...

...they tacked on two new engines.

The size of the engines meant
they're gonna be dragging on the ground,

so they put them forward and up.

The new engines are so big
that the air gets underneath

and gives it an extra bit of lift,
so software automatically counters that.

A sensor feeds
the flight control computer,

and MCAS swivels the tail,

pushing the jet's nose down.

But the system was just too strong.

Before the first crash,
the pilot began a fight

against this system
that he didn't know about,

pulling the nose up,
and he did it 26 times.

And the plane was going
in a roller-coaster ride.

(jet engine roaring)

WOMAN (over P.A.):
Flight 892 is...

GATES:
I actually talked to pilots,

and they had a totally different story.

Before the second crash,
Boeing sent a senior vice president

down to American Airlines

to brief the pilot union.

And that turned into
a pretty rough meeting.

DAN CAREY:
I wasn't going to stay in the meeting.

It was the first time
Boeing visited APA headquarters.

When we saw the list
of the Boeing personnel coming,

the one thing
that really jumped off the page

was they were bringing their lawyer, so...

I mean, who brings a lawyer
to a safety meeting?

I just sensed that they were not
being direct or forthright.

So, anyway, I just thought it would be
beneficial to record the meeting.

MAN (recorded): So I-I guess what
I'll start with, then, is the control law

that is referred to in the press right now
called MCAS.

So it's just a little bit of software
in the flight control system.

Obviously, in the accident
a couple of weeks ago,

it's been reported that
the system misbehaved.

I keep hearing those words,
"little," "little bit," "misbehave."

It was like they were
describing it as a child.

MAN (recorded): You know, a million miles
you're going to fly this airplane,

and maybe once
you're going to see this ever.

So we try not to overload the crews
with information that's unnecessary.

And I don't know that
understanding this system

would have changed the outcome of this.

They didn't come in and go, "Look,

"you've only got a handful of seconds
to get this right.

"Okay, we didn't tell you about it.
We're very sorry.

"But we want you to know going forward
that if you react quickly and get on this,

that it's manageable."

They didn't. They were like,
"Look, you know what to do."

NEWSWOMAN: Just minutes from now,
lawmakers on Capitol Hill will hear from

pilots who have criticized Boeing
in the wake of these two deadly crashes.

NEWSMAN: I know Sully will be
the movie star in the room,

but really look for Dan Carey.

He's the head
of the Allied Pilots Association.

As pilots know, improvements in aviation
are often-- too often--

written in the blood of the unfortunate
victims of these airplane accidents.

I got a subpoena from Congress,
so I released the tape.

I knew there would be
some pretty heavy consequences.

NEWSMAN 2: This audio recording,
more than anything else,

has raised the specter of doubt
about the company and this aircraft.

This is the first unscripted moment
we have heard from Boeing.

CAREY: It was important for me
to get that tape out,

and then I immediately turned it over
to Chairman DeFazio.

DeFAZIO: There were
many false warnings simultaneously?

SULLY SULLENBERGER:
Yes.

A single fault, a single failure

can now have cascading effects
rapidly through multiple systems.

THOMAS MASSIE:
Do you think that better trained pilots

should've been able
to handle the malfunctions?

You have to remember, uh, sir,
and members of the panel,

this is a sudden, violent
and terrifying event.

This airplane's pitching up and down,
rapidly and violently.

There's bells, uh, warnings
and clackers, uh, sounding.

Again, the failure was that they didn't
ever tell us the system existed,

so therefore we did not have
robust training.

WOMAN: I'd like first,
the family members who are on,

that they could unmute themselves
and introduce themselves

so that the media knows
who is, uh, who's on.

Suzanne Camp.
I'm the mother of Micah Messent.

I'm, uh, Matthieu Willm. I lost my sister.

Tom Kabau. We lost our younger brother.

My name is Paul Njoroge.

I lost my wife and my three children

and my mom-in-law
in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines.

MAN:
He was traveling to Kenya.

Nairobi would have been,
uh, just a, just a little stop,

and she never arrived.

My name is Zipporah Kuria,

and I lost my dad.

(gearshift clicks)

(elevator beeping)

KURIA:
Go up. Go.

Stop right there.

Yeah, if we, if we can edit this.

If it-- if we just put,
"For the first six minutes,

"the pilot struggled to control
the 737 MAX 8

before it then crashed."

I'm a bit younger than
most of the family members,

so we're all just kind of
streamlining our different skill.

I kind of know how to work social media
and for the website.

-My favorite feature
is the "Our Stories" page. -Mm.

KURIA:
We are family.

Like, we're the ET302 family
whether we want to be part of it or not.

In a way, it's like they shared...
shared blood.

-(blows)
-(laughs)

(laughter)

DARCY BELANGER:
Hi. Good morning, everyone.

It is an early start today.

I am in Washington, D.C., on a layover.

I'm heading to the United Nations
Environment Assembly.

Uh, so, uh, I'll check in again.

We don't know where I'll be--
maybe Ethiopia,

maybe my final destination, Kenya--

but I'll keep you posted on the journey.

Have a great day.

KURIA: You can see the stories of,
like, my dad, Joseph Kuria Waithaka,

age 55, and you can see
a little bit about him and who he was.

Hi, guys.

This is me and Olivia's diary of
"Don't take your family to your gym."

Dad, how many calories have you burnt now?

-WAITHAKA: 31.
-31 only?

And how long have you been doing it for?

(whispers):
He doesn't like it.

How long have you been doing it for?

♪ ♪

I remember dreaming about
my dad screaming for me,

being sat next to him on the plane,
but his section falling

and me trying to reach out and grab him.

I wonder how the people who were behind
making the decisions go to sleep at night.

(voice breaking):
I can count how many nights I go to sleep

and just have clean sleep

without imagining what was happening

in those last six minutes
of my dad's life.

Like seeing the ground
coming toward you so close.

(jet engine rumbling, fading)

♪ ♪

NEWSMAN: Tonight, a rare
and stark admission of fault

from the world's biggest airplane maker.

MUILENBURG:
We at Boeing are sorry

for the lives lost
in the recent 737 MAX accidents.

The Boeing argument was,

"We've informed everybody
how to handle it,

and we're working on a software fix
which we will have very soon."

NEWSMAN 2: Boeing says MAX pilots can
learn the new system in just 30 minutes.

That's-that's just ridiculous.

We're taking a comprehensive,
disciplined approach

and taking the time
to get the software update right.

We're nearing completion and anticipate
its certification and implementation

on the 737 MAX fleet worldwide
in the weeks ahead.

We remain confident
in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.

(birds chirping)

PIERSON: People think
that the problem was only software,

but Boeing is controlling the narrative:
"Look here. Don't look here."

It's easier for them
to talk about pilot training,

'cause they can blame it
on human mistakes,

and the software,
'cause we'll just make a software patch

and we'll send it out, you know,

but there's other issues,

unanswered questions
that are not being addressed.

Why did the plane crash?

It crashed 'cause the pilots lost control.

Why did the pilots lose control?

'Cause MCAS software was
pitching the plane down repeatedly.

Why was that happening?

'Cause the angle of attack sensor failed.

But why'd the sensor fail?

People think it's software,
but it's actually hardware.

It's a three-pound physical part

that's been installed on hundreds
if not thousands of planes.

GATES:
The angle of attack is the angle

basically between the wing
and the incoming airflow,

and the angle of attack sensor
was giving a wrong signal.

In fact, it was giving
an impossible signal.

GREEN:
74.5 degrees nose up.

ROSE:
Isn't 74 degrees, like,

beyond the pale of any normal...

GREEN: You're right.
An airplane can't fly at 74.5 de--

You'd have to be a rocket ship.

ROSE:
So even though the plane was flying

at a safe angle of attack,
because of this bad sensor,

the MCAS system thought
it was higher up like that

and was programming the nose to go down.

If this was truly the-the angle of attack,
they've got...

-Bigger problems. (chuckles)
-They got way bigger problems.

PIERSON: The MAX was not
the only plane being built at the factory.

Makes you wonder: Are there other sensors
out there that have the same defect?

And so, if that's all they're gonna do--
fix the software and the pilot training--

then I think the flying public
needs to ask why.

GATES: Whistleblowers from
inside Boeing stepping forward

has always been
my best source of information.

Over the years, that's how I've learned

what's really going wrong
inside the company.

I'm for the little guy.

I'm not for-- obviously,
for the large, powerful corporation.

So-- That I know
has severe problems internally.

GATES:
Gerry Eastman approached me in 2003,

years before the MAX crashes,

angry about how management
was running the company into the ground

and about safety issues.

My boss had this meeting with me
and told me not to do my job,

to just stamp the paperwork off.

Of course, I knew that was bogus.

GATES:
He had access to documents

he wasn't supposed to have access to,
but he did.

I mean, you're talking about

the second biggest defense contractor
in the United States

with big cyber capabilities. (chuckles)

And this machinist

was logging in to the presentations
of the CEO

and giving them to me. (laughs)

I repeatedly told Gerry,
"Look, be careful."

He just completely ignored me.

NEWSWOMAN:
Eastman worked for Boeing for 18 years.

He was arrested at his desk.

He's been charged with
computer trespassing,

and, if convicted,
he faces up to four years in prison.

GATES: Anybody who worked at Boeing
who talked to me privately

is breaking the company rules

and is in serious trouble.

NEWSMAN: Gerald Eastman
was in King County court today

for his arraignment,
where he pleaded not guilty.

He says Boeing was not taking
his safety concerns seriously

and that is why he went public
with what he found.

You know, I got together,
you know, and said to my wife, I said...

(sighs heavily)

"I have to go public, you know, so--
regardless of the threat to me."

GATES: After he was arrested,
he settled with Boeing

and he never worked in aerospace again.

I didn't hear from him in a long time,

and I wondered, "What's going on?"

I was worried.

Later, I learned from a friend of his

that he had taken his own life.

NEWSWOMAN 2:
Do you ever look back and say,

"I wish I would've just
kept my mouth shut"?

(sighs) No.

There's-there's thousands of people like--
at Boeing that do that every day,

and some of us have to step forward.

(vehicle alarm chirps)

(engine starts)

♪ ♪

MICHELLE PIERSON:
I'm anxious.

We have friends and family that work
or have worked at Boeing,

and-and my dad worked at Boeing
after he retired from the Navy as well,

and we felt proud to be part of that.

And so this is hard
'cause you feel like you're squealing.

And I know it's not. He's not.

He's just trying to shed light
on something

that can be made better and safer.

But I'm hoping that people understand

the reasons behind why he's doing this.

KURIA: It would be different if you knew
this was a one-off, this is it,

this is the last time this would happen.

But there's the angst and anticipation
for another crash to happen.

This first six minutes of every flight
are extremely difficult.

Not just for me but for all the families.

Every time there's turbulence,
the first thought is,

"Is this the end?

"Like...

am I gonna die?"

But my dad would go anywhere for me.

That's why I have to go.

To make sure that the world knows

planes are not as safe
as we think they are.

(electronic bell chimes)

♪ ♪

(electronic bell chimes)

PILOT (over P.A.): Folks, we'd like
to welcome all of you to Washington, D.C.

(indistinct chatter)

So glad you're here.

-Good to see you.
-Yeah.

-We made it, guys.
-Yeah. -Yeah.

We made it.

I've met so many families
from 35 different countries.

We see the same pain in each other's eyes.

PAUL NJOROGE:
While all your lives moved on,

for the last six months, our lives,

the lives of the families of the victims

has not moved an inch.

KURIA: Grief, loss and pain are a
universal language that everybody speaks.

JOAN VINCENT:
Grief has been, uh, profound,

and, uh, I feel best when I'm outdoors.

My daughter was a... a conservationist.

(sobs softly)

(voice breaking): And I know
that was her, um, happy place.

KURIA: And I think that the way
that we can fight for their legacy...

...is to make sure that no other family
is in the same position as we are.

DeFAZIO:
The families, they're critical,

putting a face on these crashes.

Since the plane was built here,

since the plane was certified here,

they knew that they had to focus
on the United States government

and on Boeing to fix this problem.

CHRIS MOORE: It was quite evident
that things were rushed.

In fact, they were continuing to make
the airplanes after the second crash.

That's the biggest slap in the face
to every single family.

KURIA:
My mission out of this is

to make sure that,
when people get on a flight,

that they get off on the other side.

PIERSON: There's a lot of, lot of,
lot of things swirling around in my head.

It's...

It has been a-- I have-- it's been--

I've been obsessed by it,
and I-I didn't really intend to be.

I'm not-- I don't consider myself...

MICHELLE: That's the first time
I've heard you say that.

Well, I know I've been obsessed with
kind of-- 'cause I want to, you know...

...make sure it never happens again.

So...

♪ ♪

I still have nightmares, but fighting back
has been a powerful motivator.

-I mean, I'm finally getting it, but...
-MICHELLE: Just one more step.

Yeah. I know.

I'd like to think that the families know
that there's people out there

that are still trying to get to the truth.

NEWSMAN: Today, appearing before
the House Transportation Committee

is a Boeing whistleblower, Edward Pierson.

Pierson says he thinks that production
problems contributed to the MAX crashes.

KURIA:
We need answers,

we need accountability, and we need
someone to take responsibility.

HAVIAN:
The reporters will try to question you.

They'll shout questions at you
that'll be provocative.

Don't respond to it.

-(busy chatter)
-(cameras clicking)

MICHELLE:
You're gonna do this right now?

HAVIAN: Guys, if you could give him
some space, that would be great.

Can we just have a moment?

Yeah.

-Why did the FAA not...
-(busy chatter continues)

-You're gonna have to ask them...
-MICHELLE: We're coming in.

PIERSON:
My name is Ed Pierson.

I would first like to provide
my heartfelt condolences

for all the families and friends
who lost loved ones

on Lion Air Flight 610
and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.

Your loss and grief
are truly unimaginable.

I believe production problems
at the Renton factory

may have contributed
to these two tragic crashes.

I formally warned Boeing leadership
in writing on multiple occasions,

specifically once before
the Lion Air crash

and again before
the Ethiopian Airlines crash,

about potential airplane risk.

Those warnings were ignored.

On June 9, 2018, while the Lion Air
airplane was being produced,

four months before it crashed,

I wrote an email
to the 737 general manager

advising him to shut down
the production line.

When I mentioned that I've seen
operations in the military

shut down for lesser safety concerns,

I will never forget his response,
which was,

"The military isn't
a profit-making organization."

(quiet murmuring, gasping)

Less than a month later,
on March 10, 2019,

Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed,
killing 157 people.

The U.S. regulators' investigation
of these crashes

has been as disappointing
as Boeing's insistence

that it had no systemic quality
or safety issues.

Thank you again
for providing me this opportunity.

I'm ready to answer your questions.

Okay. I recognize, uh,
Representative Norton.

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON:
Would you favor the FAA going farther

and doing an investigation
of U.S. Boeing factories?

PIERSON:
I fully support that.

I was there for three years,
and-and honestly I never saw--

I never met an FAA employee
in my three years.

And I never actually remember
any of my employees

saying they talked to an FAA employee.

Now, they may have been there, but they
certainly weren't visible and present.

And I-I really think that's necessary.

Uh, I'm gonna suggest that, uh, as, uh--
following this hearing.

It is gonna be on us
if we do not take the steps

to systematically look at Boeing factories
across the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

♪ ♪

(cameras clicking)

DeFAZIO:
The Federal Aviation Administration,

they are tasked with the job
of keeping the public safe

and, uh, making sure
that things that we certify to fly

are gonna fly and not crash.

WOMAN:
Administrator Dickson, you're our hope.

You are our hope.

STEVE DICKSON: Aviation's hard lessons and
the hard work in response to those lessons

have paved the way
to creating a global aviation system

with an enviable safety record.

But we recognize that

safety is a journey, not a destination,

and we must build on the lessons learned,

and we must never allow ourselves
to become complacent.

Thank you, and I'm happy
to take your questions.

Mr. Dickson, um, do you know
who Ed Pierson is?

DICKSON: Uh, I have not met him
personally, but I know, I know of him.

-He's sitting right over there.
-Yeah.

SEAN MALONEY: I mean, are you aware
that four months before the first crash,

he brought these problems
to Boeing's attention?

Are you aware of that, gentlemen?

-Four months before the first crash.
-I know that there were, uh, con--

yes, that, uh, that concerns
were raised, yes.

MALONEY:
That's right. And you know what they did?

They sat on it until a second plane crash.

That's what happened.

A bunch more people lost their lives.

So my question to you is:

Will you investigate the production
problems at the Renton facility?

Uh, I know that there's ongoing activity
through our-our, uh, our oversight.

MALONEY: Sir, sir, I'm sorry,
that's not good enough.

Are we gonna interview the production
workers at the Renton facility?

Is it gonna be a real thing?

DICKSON: You have my commitment
that we are looking into those problems

and we will continue to do so.

Will you commit, as we sit here today,
that you will interview Mr. Pierson?

Absolutely.

MALONEY:
Will you, will you investigate

-the production problems
at the Renton facility? -Yes.

The committee stands adjourned.

(indistinct chatter)

(camera clicking)

Thank you so much. That took courage.

You're doing the right thing
by making sure it gets fixed

and no other family has to
go through this. Thank you.

Thank you.

-Thank you very much, sir.
-Yeah.

Thank you.

-(indistinct chatter)
-(cameras clicking)

HAVIAN: If you could give him some space,
that would be great.

Happy to-- if you have any questions,
I'm happy to answer them for you,

but I think that's all for today.

Well, nobody wants to fly on those planes.

That was really amazing.

PIERSON: The FAA just got directed
to go and-and investigate the factory.

And, yeah, this was a big win.

NEWSWOMAN:
The story we are following tonight:

Boeing has fired its CEO,
Dennis Muilenburg.

NEWSMAN: Muilenburg had presided over one
of the worst years in Boeing's history.

REPORTER: 346 people died.
Can you answer a few questions?

NEWSWOMAN 2:
How much did he walk away with?

(over computer):
$62.2 million.

That may sound like a lot,
but he's not taking his 2019 bonus.

But the new guy, the new CEO,
David Calhoun,

he will be making 1.4 million

with the added benefit
of making millions more in bonuses,

including seven million--
just seven million alone--

if he gets the MAX back in the air.

And since we're talking about...

KURIA:
There is no remorse in this for Boeing.

Just financial targets.

And I think for me,

thinking about Muilenburg and my dad,

knowing they were two men
born the same year,

one is living a lavish lifestyle
with millions of dollars,

and the other paid for it with his blood.

♪ ♪

GREEN: So the FAA is under fire,
and I think rightfully so,

but it's crazy because the--
Boeing's main defense

is that it can't be liable because
the airplane is certified by the FAA.

ROSE: Every plane that's ever crashed
has been certified.

-Right.
-So that kind of answers the question,

uh, no, certification is not safety.

GREEN:
The FAA's position

is that the certification standard should
provide immunity to-to the manufacturer,

but the FAA's position
also is that manufacturers,

their responsibility extends beyond
just meeting the certification standards.

MEGAN BENETT:
If the only pressure

on your profit margin is legal liability,

and if you remove the risk of legal
liability, because once it's certified,

you're no longer
going to be able to be sued

by people who are killed
or injured by your aircraft,

there's no longer any motivation
for the aircraft companies,

for the designers, the manufacturers,
to design anything safely.

The only motivation is
to design something that's certifiable.

It doesn't really make sense.

Then there is no--
there's no safety for the flying public.

(jet engine roaring in distance)

-HAVIAN: We got to go.
-PIERSON: Yeah, we got to go.

-MICHELLE: Okay.
-All right, babe.

-Okay.
-I will call you when we can,

-and we'll-- Okay.
-Good luck.

Love you.

(sighs)

MICHELLE: Naively,
I thought that he would do his bit

at the hearing and then it would be over,

and so not the case.

And it-- I mean, it literally dawned on me
that moment like,

"Oh, my God, this is not the end of it.

We're just, we're just...
This is the tip of the iceberg."

And that's exactly what it was.

♪ ♪

PIERSON:
Finally got the interview with the FAA.

Now I'm going to tell them
what was going on in the factory.

I think that's it,
that giant facility down there.

-HAVIAN: Yeah.
-I believe.

(phone chimes)

(phone clicking)

(message swooshes)

♪ ♪

(phone chimes)

That's my source.

(phone clicking)

(message swooshes)

I'll see you later.

This source approached me in 2007.

At the time, I actually met with
half a dozen FAA safety engineers.

You know, I'm not taking my usual car

because some sources
that I've worked with have been followed.

(engine revving)

I give them a number of a burner phone
that I bought with cash

so that the phone's untraceable.

Nobody here yet.

(gearshift clicks)

PIERSON:
The thing that really jumps out for me

is, during the interview,
I was always giving them examples

of production problems
that I was seeing in the factory,

one of the gentlemen would
lit-literally finish my-my thoughts.

And as I said, you know,
"And-and then this led to,"

and he would, he would
actually finish my statement.

So either the FAA did know
and they didn't do anything about it

or they didn't know and it's inexcusable
how they could not know.

PIERSON: And-and I-- the part
I can't get past my brain is, you know,

you have 45,000 FAA employees,

you have 1,600 of them
in that building that we were at,

and they can only assign five people

15 minutes away down the street
at the busiest factory in the world?

I mean, give me a break.

I just hope that they do
what they say they're gonna do

and go back and do
a deeper investigation and...

It's-it's gonna require someone
to force them to do it, I-I worry.

♪ ♪

(horn honks)

(vehicle door opens)

(vehicle door closes)

GATES:
Thanks for coming.

MAN (voice garbled):
Yeah.

GATES:
In terms of change at the FAA,

is there a culture shift as a result
of what happened on the MAX?

Have people's attitudes changed?

One of our engineers
turned in a safety report,

and the manager was upset.

Because now you've got a delay
in the program,

and it's all going to impact
the program's schedule,

and managers retaliate.

And so the people that I talk to said
that they have not seen

any change.

There's some real problems
with the organization.

In all fairness, we went through ten years

of just absolutely amazing safety level.

But then there was a lot of complacency,
both in industry and at the agency.

And Boeing has huge influence politically.

A lot of money put into lobbying Congress.

And it just shows the acceptance
of the Boeing...

the Boeing position on things,

because the agency and Congress,

they are focused on enabling industry,

and I think the belief system is
that is safe enough.

♪ ♪

GREEN: The wall between the FAA
and the industry is a very low wall.

There's-there's a lot
of back-and-forth movement.

It really often is a revolving door.

People who work for Boeing, who then

go into the FAA.

You also see people at the FAA
looking to go into Boeing.

And what ends up happening

is the FAA really becomes
part of the Boeing team.

DeFAZIO:
I was very frustrated by the FAA.

They were way less cooperative
than Boeing.

They refer to

the regulated entities as their customers.

No, they're not your customers.

They are a private interest
that sometimes will cut corners

to get a competitive edge.

And sometimes
those corners they cut kill people.

During this investigation,

we found out something
which I think changed everything.

After the first crash was a report

that the FAA had produced
about the MCAS system.

That report said that,
unless the MCAS was modified,

15 of these planes will crash
during the life of the fleet.

We've never allowed anything like that
into the air before in history.

You don't do that.

Who saw that report?
How was it circulated?

Why didn't they then act
to ground the planes,

as opposed to waiting until, uh,
another plane full of people crash?

(quiet chatter)

KURIA:
After the first crash, they estimated

15 crashes in the lifespan of the plane.

FAA leadership, Boeing leadership,

(voice breaking):
they knew this before this plane was made,

before it was put together,

and they did nothing.

That's what makes it so heartbreaking.

When you realize, like,
how preventable it was.

(man singing somber song
in foreign language over speakers)

-(singing continues)
-(quiet sobbing)

(woman singing somber song
in foreign language)

(singing continues)

-(woman singing and sobbing)
-(people sobbing)

(crowd singing)

(crowd continues singing and sobbing)

♪ ♪

PIERSON: This is gonna be
a really interesting hearing.

And this got to go here.

...of the crash of
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.

There we go.

The aircraft involved in both accidents

was the Boeing 737 MAX.

It is hard not to conclude

your team at the FAA
has attempted to keep us in the dark.

Administrator Dickson,
I hold you responsible for this.

I expect to receive an explanation today
at this hearing for the failure to comply

-with the committee's request.
-Yeah, just make some excuses.

DICKSON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I-I always appreciate
the opportunity for dialogue.

I will not sign off on this aircraft until
all FAA technical reviews are complete.

I also intend to pilot the aircraft myself

before the FAA makes
any ungrounding decision.

-There we go.
-(laughs)

Just bravado.

You got pi-- you have test pilots.

You don't have to fly it yourself.

Talk about j-just tone-deaf.

ROGER WICKER:
Senator Markey.

EDWARD MARKEY:
Boeing is now arguing in court

that the FAA's certification of the
737 MAX should shield it from liability.

Do you support Boeing's position,

or should the victims' families
be able to hold Boeing accountable?

Uh, Senator, I'm not in a position
to comment on that.

Uh, but I would certainly be willing
to-to follow up with you

-on-on that, uh, question.
-WICKER: Senator Cruz.

TED CRUZ:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Did Boeing lie to the FAA?

DICKSON:
I can't say.

I-I can't say.

I mean, I-- definitely there was
incomplete, uh, information

and fragmented information
that was provided.

-That's bullshit.
-CRUZ: Did the FAA screw up

in certifying the 737 MAX?

I have concerns, I would say,
that there were mistakes made, yes.

Come on, Senator.

In Washington, the passive voice

is a great way of avoiding responsibility.

Who made the mistakes and why?

The-the, uh, the manufacturer
made mistakes,

and the FAA made mistakes in its,
in its oversight of the manufacturer.

And what were the mistakes
and why were they made?

DICKSON:
The full implications

of the, uh, flight control system
were not understood, uh,

-as design changes were made.
-Come on.

CRUZ:
Has anyone at FAA been fired?

Uh, no one has been fired
over this particular matter,

um, up to this point, but...

CRUZ: Has anyone been disciplined
over this matter?

No, not specifically.

So, unknown somebodies
made unspecified mistakes

for which there have been
no repercussions?

-Zero accountability.
-You understand, sir,

you do not work for Boeing,
you work for the American people.

WICKER:
With that,

this hearing is now adjourned.

(gavel knocks)

Who got fired?

Nobody. Who got demoted? Nobody.

This is our government, our government.

This is our government in action.

Just ridiculous.

Come on, Jordan. Let's go for a walk.

Come on. At least
you don't work for the government.

♪ ♪

It's bullshit.

(door opens)

MICHELLE: I think he sort of owns it
and feels very, very guilty,

maybe responsible a little bit
for the deaths of these people,

and it's very difficult to watch him,
'cause he's not.

I thought he was doing a time line

mostly of just the things
that he had done.

But this is everything.

PIERSON:
I am beyond pissed.

It should not be that hard
to get the FAA to do their damn job.

But you still have the Department
of Justice investigation going on,

so it's not over yet.

♪ ♪

GATES: As part of
the Department of Justice investigation,

Boeing was forced to release
some documents.

Instant messages and emails
between a couple of pilots at Boeing

that's completely off script,

and they're saying things Boeing would
never have wanted to see the light of day.

And we're reading them,
and you're realizing as a journalist,

"Oh, my God,
readers are gonna be outraged."

Boeing's chief technical pilot,
Mark Forkner,

saw it as his job to dissuade airlines
and regulators all over the world

from wanting extra training
for the pilots.

GREEN: This guy Forkner, he is doing it
because, higher up at the company,

they decided that a major program goal

was not to require pilot training.

This was a business competitive advantage
and was very important to Boeing.

GATES:
Boeing had promised

pilots who flew the old model 737
could transition to

this MAX model with minimal training--

two hours on an iPad.

Seriously, an iPad.

Boeing had written into the contract
with Southwest a guarantee:

"You will not have to train your pilots
on the simulator,

"and if you do, we'll pay you
a million dollars per airplane.

That's how seriously we're taking this."

And there was a-a chilling moment
when I got in the middle of the document

and I saw this exchange and I realized

that Forkner was telling his deputy,
Patrick Gustavsson,

that he had, that day,
managed to dissuade Lion Air...

...not to have simulator training
for its pilots.

Lion Air did actually ask
for more training,

and Boeing went out of its way
to stop them from getting it.

Mark Forkner tells his deputy,

"I just Jedi mind tricked these fools."

What we also learned
was that MCAS was changed

in a way that was gonna be a real problem,

and if the FAA knew about it, they were
gonna change the training requirements.

So these two guys at that moment,
under pressure from senior managers,

caved and-and decided not to tell the FAA.

"The airplane," meaning the MAX,

"The airplane is designed by clowns,
who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

This is bad engineering.

It's bad safety.

It's devastating consequences.

And after the MAX wrapped,

these guys were given an award by Boeing

because they delivered exactly

what their bosses had wanted.

What's Boeing going to do
to answer this mess?

We don't know,
but I would expect criminal charges.

NEWSWOMAN:
The U.S. now has its first confirmed case

of the deadly new coronavirus.

HOLT:
The Dow dropping more than 2,300 points.

NEWSMAN:
Airports and airlines devastated.

This airport is empty.
The parking lot is empty.

WOMAN (over P.A.):
...at all times until they are checked.

(jackhammers rattling in distance)

GATES:
Because of the COVID-19 crisis,

what we have is a company
that's in terrible shape business-wise.

NEWSMAN 2:
Boeing, the number one component

in the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
in a freefall at this moment.

GATES: So they really depend
on the 737 MAX getting back

to get cash flow coming again.

TRUMP: We have to help Boeing.
We have to help the airline industry.

It wasn't their fault.
This wasn't their fault.

GATES:
It has to work

or Boeing can't keep going.

(typing)

♪ ♪

(ringtone plays)

Yeah.

-(stammers) Um, what about the...
-(dog barks)

-Are you sure?
-(dog barks)

(fire crackling)

(sighs softly)

♪ ♪

PIERSON: Today, we're gonna watch
the FAA administrator fly the MAX

on a test flight.

This is one of the last steps apparently
before the plane gets recertified.

Why is he touching

the plane like...

literally just a clown in a suit?

PIERSON: Well, he made a big deal,
saying, you know,

"I'm not gonna approve this plane
unless I-I fly it myself."

Sitting up there, you know,
what is he really gonna test? Uh, come on.

GATES:
So wh-where is the plane right now?

Is-is that it right there?

(jet engine whirring)

There she goes.

♪ ♪

(jet engine roaring)

♪ ♪

You seeing anything yet?

(cameras clicking)

(indistinct radio chatter)

-Well, that's him. -MAN: Yeah.
-(camera clicking)

DICKSON: Good morning,
and thank you for joining us today.

We're in the homestretch,

but that doesn't mean that we're gonna
take shortcuts to get it done...

GREEN:
Boeing stock's up three dollars right now.

MAN: Which is twice before
the Dickson press conference started.

DICKSON: ...the plane
for return to passenger service.

GATES: Steve, uh, I'd like to ask you
a question that actually comes from

one of the families of the victims
in an email this morning,

and it's something that
the-the families have been repeating.

They say today's flight is a
public relations stunt, a gift to Boeing.

DICKSON:
This is not a publicity stunt.

This is simply, uh, the fulfillment of
a commitment, a promise that I made,

uh, within my first few weeks at the FAA.

The 737 aircraft--

and statistically it may be the safest
airplane that's ever been built.

You know, as I've said many times,
safety's a journey,

and it is something
that we need to continue...

The FAA is supposed to be our watchdog,
our guardian and our protector.

It doesn't make sense.
It doesn't make sense.

Doesn't make sense to me.

At all.

(sighs heavily)

♪ ♪

(printer beeps, whirs)

GATES: This is a settlement as a result
of the DOJ's grand jury investigation.

MONIQUE MING LAVEN:
Boeing avoided criminal prosecution

for criminal misconduct today

for giving the FAA false information
about the 737 MAX.

NEWSMAN: As part of this agreement,
which is, by the way,

what many people on Wall Street expected,

Boeing has agreed to pay
more than $2.5 billion.

NEWSMAN 2:
That fine's only a slap on the wrist

when you consider
the severity of the charges.

GREEN:
Boeing had a problem.

They dealt with the problem
working with the government.

They together crafted this announcement
that basically said,

"Look, we're responsible...

"...but only because
we had some bad apples,

"and the bad apples
didn't have senior management.

It was these guys."

These two guys were guilty,

pilots from the internal Boeing emails,

Mark Forkner
and his deputy Patrick Gustavsson.

They've been thrown to the wolves here.

Forkner does what he's told,

and now he's basically being left
as a scapegoat for what Boeing did.

And the DOJ actually went
out of their way--

and this is not normal--

they explicitly say

that senior management didn't do anything.

All of the senior management at Boeing
are off scot-free,

and not only scot-free but, you know,

with their huge million-dollar salaries
all intact and no threat to them at all.

(line rings)

ROSE (over speakerphone):
Hey. I'm on a call. Can I call you back?

GREEN:
Yeah. Just come by when you're done.

ROSE:
All right.

GREEN: It's really annoying
that Boeing is able to pay money

to avoid criminal responsibility,

but honestly it's great for the case
'cause we make the same allegations

that the government
now has settled with Boeing,

and that is essentially
Boeing defrauded the FAA.

These guys, um, Forkner and Gustavsson,
are the two technical pilots.

They do what they're doing
because they're under orders from above,

but the guys above, the executives
who gave the order, they got away with it.

And that frankly goes back
to this whistleblower

that we've been talking about, Ed Pierson.

(ship horn blowing in distance)

PIERSON:
After the first crash, I wrote to the CEO.

"You need to know we got to stop
and do the job properly."

Right after that,
I wrote to the board of directors.

And it was a certified letter

'cause I wanted to make sure
that it was documented.

I was pleading with them to act.

And then, a couple weeks later,
the Ethiopian Airline crashes.

Pierson comes along and he says,
"That's not just those two guys.

"I went to Muilenburg and said there are
real problems on the assembly line,

manufacturing process."

So you begin to develop a larger picture
of a corporate attitude

to put money and, uh, profit above safety.

Everybody in the Boeing organization says,

"Safety first, safety first,
safety first."

Is that true?

Is that true or is that a canard?
Is that baloney?

Right now, I like the idea of, uh,
getting Pierson, uh, on paper.

GREEN:
Yeah. Put it this way:

Boeing doesn't want him to testify,
so we should... (laughs)

we should react to that
by getting him to testify.

♪ ♪

(siren wailing in distance)

GATES:
Oh, hold on. Boeing's calling me.

Hi-- Hi, Bernard. How are you doing?

No-- No problem.

So, what'd you--
what did you want to tell me?

No, but wh-wh... (groans)

(page turns)

I understand.

Mm-hmm.

♪ ♪

All right, Bernard, well, thanks
for the call, and I'll talk to you later.

Bye.

(sighs)

Well, we-we have the heads-up basically.

The FAA's gonna clear the MAX
to fly again on Wednesday.

It's good news for Boeing

at a very, very low moment.

(line ringing)

-PIERSON: Hello.
-MICHELLE (over phone): Hey.

PIERSON:
Uh, did you see the news?

MICHELLE: I-I was in Costco, honey.
I haven't seen the news.

The FAA just cleared
the Boeing MAX to fly.

(Michelle groans)

Well, you knew it was gonna happen.

GREEN:
American has these airplanes,

so American as a company
is gonna want to fly them.

Okay, that's an Airbus, 737.

Here you go.

MAX 8, 2:30 p.m.

Look at the cost.

You can go at 1:40 for five-fif--
516 on an Embraer.

I can go at 2:30 for 181 on a MAX.

People looking for deals to go to Miami
are gonna end up in a MAX

if they're not careful.

That's crazy.

I can... just tell our PR guy about this.

I don't know. It's-- I got to tell you,
I think it's gonna be real when

people are at an airport lining up and
being the first ones to-to get on a MAX.

WOMAN (over P.A.):
Ladies and gentlemen, at this time...

(woman continues speaking indistinctly
over P.A.)

♪ ♪

(electronic bells chime)

WOMAN 2 (over P.A.):
Good morning, passengers.

This is the pre-boarding announcement

for American Airlines Flight 718 to Miami,
leaving on time.

Boarding begins in 20 minutes. Thank you.

♪ ♪

KURIA: Birthdays and anniversaries
tend to be really hard,

so just making sure that,
instead of just being sad,

to celebrate Dad, celebrate his laugh,

celebrate his life.

And, um...

-Hey.
-Yeah, and I think it's needed

because the 737 MAX
is going back up in the air,

and that hurts a lot,

so to feel some form of, like, victory.

Thank you so much.

MAN:
That's a beautiful cake.

(electronic bells chime)

WOMAN 2 (over P.A.): This is
the final boarding call for passengers

on American Airlines Flight 718 to Miami.

GATES: I've talked
to high-level people inside Boeing

who feel a sense of guilt

but they don't believe
they did anything deliberately wrong.

The sin wasn't anything deliberate.

It was going along
with the system that was there

and not questioning it enough.

This is a very American story because
it's the American corporate culture

at the root of what's gone wrong.

What happened within the FAA

in withdrawing further and further
from its direct oversight role,

that was just a political move.

Boeing lobbied and paid politicians

and convinced them that they needed
to get out of the way of industry.

Boeing said,
"We want regulation out of the way.

We'll control it 'cause we're efficient
and we can do it ourselves."

PILOT (over P.A.):
Flight attendants, prepare for takeoff.

DeFAZIO:
Predatory capitalism will kill itself.

And it'll kill people.

This is a sickness that kills

many good American corporations.

The impact of Wall Street on the real
economy of the United States of America.

40% of our economy is financed.

They used to be 20%.

They used to lend money to people
to make things.

Now they are predating
on successful companies

and turning them into
a shell of their former selves.

I want to see Boeing go back to being
what it was and they could be again:

the greatest engineering company
in the world.

(jet engine roaring)

(Kuria singing)

♪ But we're here today ♪

(guitar playing softly)

♪ Didn't see the end
through all the pain ♪

♪ But we made it through the storm ♪

♪ Made it through the storm ♪

♪ Grateful for the battles that we won ♪

-(chuckles)
-(group humming)

♪ And the ones that we lost, too ♪

-(laughs)
-(woman singing softly)

(group vocalizing)

♪ Safe to shore. ♪

♪ ♪

NEWSMAN:
Ed Pierson told lawmakers

pressure to produce new planes as fast
as possible was undermining safety.

PIERSON:
Boeing wasn't listening or the FAA.

The only people that were doing
any listening it seemed was Congress.

DANA CANEDY (over computer):
The prize is awarded to Dominic Gates,

-(screams)
-Steve Miletich, Mike Baker and Lewis Kamb

of The Seattle Times.

(woman speaking indistinctly over P.A.)

NEWSWOMAN:
Boeing has finally accepted sole liability

for the fatal crash in Ethiopia.

NEWSWOMAN 2: ...an agreement that
also paves way for compensation claims

to be made under U.S. law, which provides
for higher levels of compensation.

♪ ♪

KURIA: My dad always used to say
you have to live full and die empty.

I'm not there yet.

I'm just starting my journey,

but that's the direction that I'm heading.

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

(music fades)