All language subtitles for Air Disasters S18E11 Cutting Corners 1080p PMTP WEB-DL DDP5 1 H 264-maldini_track3_[eng]

WOMAN: Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.

MAN: We lost both engines.

WOMAN: Put the mask
over your nose.

Emergency descend.
MAN: Mayday!

Mayday!

WOMAN: Brace for impact!

Think I lost one.

Investigation started in June.

It's gonna crash!

FRED MILLER: No family
wants to lose a loved one--

daughter, son.

None of us think it's going
to happen to our family.

We read about these
horrible crashes,

and we think, thank
God, you know?

And chances are it
won't happen to us.

The odds are in our favor.

You got it?

Ah!

What are you doing?

It just
got worse, OK?

NARRATOR: In January
2000, an Air Alaska jet

with 88 passengers and crew
suffered a catastrophic failure

that tore it from the sky.

A shocking chain of negligence
and error led to disaster.

When a whistleblower
mechanic from the airline

tried to sound the alarm about
faulty maintenance procedures,

he was suspended from his job.

The investigation exposed
deeply worrying shortcomings

in maintenance and
regulation that

afflict the airline industry.

It showed how a series
of devastating errors

combined to produce
a tragic accident,

one that could happen again.

We're stalled!

Gotta release it.

NARRATOR: Puerto Vallarta
is a popular holiday resort

on the Mexican
Pacific Coast, one

of several Mexican destinations
served by Alaskan Airlines.

Colleen Worley went there to
celebrate a family birthday.

The 34-year-old
was a keen traveler

who spoke Spanish well and
had visited Mexico many times.

MAN: Yes!

NARRATOR: Colleen and the
other holiday makers returning

from Puerto Vallarta
settle in for the four-hour

flight to San Francisco.

In the warm afterglow
of their holidays,

they're looking to the future.

Colleen and her
fiance Monte Donaldson

are planning to start a
family later that year.

MAN (ON RADIO): Be
ready for taxi at 5.

NARRATOR: The pilots on Flight
261 are very experienced.

Both Captain Ted
Thompson and First

Officer Bill Tansky
have thousands

of hours flying MD-80s.

They know the plane well.

The MD83 is one of a successful
group of rear-engine, low wing

planes.

Originally launched
in 1980, over 1,100

were delivered worldwide.

Flaps?

Check, confirm.

Spoilers.

Check, armed.

NARRATOR: But on the
31st of January, 2000,

as they prepared Flight
261, Thompson and Tansky

had no idea that deep
in the plane's tail

lay a critical weakness.

Colleen Worley and her
fiance Monty Donaldson

were planning their
forthcoming wedding.

They had announced their
engagement at Christmastime,

and so it was a
time for everybody

to sort of congratulate them.

And so we decided we'd have
a party for the family.

NARRATOR: Abby Miller
Busche had visited Mexico

with her husband Ryan
and their friends

to celebrate her new
job at Microsoft.

It's hard to describe
how joyful a girl she was.

She was well known for that care
that she had in her, a trait

that you can't put a value on.

SUSAN DA SILVA: Dean and I
had been there a lot together,

and it was the first time
that he went without me.

Dean taught me how to play.

He was always up.

He told jokes a lot.

People described him
kind of as a puppy dog.

NARRATOR: Alaska Airlines
was a successful carrier,

with routes up and down
the west coast of America

and into Mexico.

Flight 261 left Puerto
Vallarta as a routine flight

with no hint of
the danger to come.

The devastating failure that
would bring catastrophe to 261

did not come out of the blue.

In fact, it was the culmination
of a chain of mistakes

that began years earlier.

Maintenance procedures
at the company

had come under scrutiny
two years earlier,

when a whistleblower set off
an investigation by the Federal

Aviation Administration.

But the day Flight 261
left Puerto Vallarta,

the investigation
was still underway,

and the whistleblower
suspended from his job.

Shortly after takeoff,
Captain Thompson

and First Officer Tansky get
the first sign of trouble.

The horizontal stabilizer on the
tail of the plane won't move.

The pilots carry out a standard
checklist to try and free it.

Stabilizer, trim switch.

Normal.

Circuit breakers--
reset if tripped.

D9, D10, D11 OK.

NARRATOR: The
stabilizer on the MD-83

the 40-foot wide
horizontal surface

of the front of the tail.

It's like another wing.

Together with the elevators
at the rear of the tail,

the stabilizer is used
to adjust the angle

of the plane in flight.

The stabilizer was jammed.

Thompson and Tansky
assumed there

was a fault in the
electric motors

that move it up and down.

They believed they
could fix the problem.

They had no idea they
were in great danger.

JOHN NANCE: What they
dealt with was something

that really snuck up on them.

It was not supposed
to be a big deal.

If it had been, they
would have turned

around and gone back in to the
Mexican airfield they came out

of.

But they were led down this
road of accepting this problem

as a small problem,
so it's perfectly

all right to troubleshoot it.

NARRATOR: The pilots
repeatedly try the two switches

that operate the stabilizer.

The primary motor is
activated by both the switch

on the control stick,
known as the pickle switch,

and the sliding suitcase
handles on the central console.

Either system operative.

No.

Both systems inoperative.

Consider stab jammed.

Do not use autopilot.

Check.

NARRATOR: The jammed stabilizer
is pushing the aircraft down

towards the ground.

At 28,500 feet, the pilots
switch off the autopilot

and fly the plane manually.

PILOT: Full systems inoperative.

NARRATOR: They have to pull
back hard on the control column

to lift the nose
of the plane up.

This requires
considerable effort.

The plane climbs for
the next 7 minutes

to its cruising
altitude of 32,000 feet.

As they fly up the
coast, the pilots

contact Alaska
Airlines' maintenance

department for assistance.

PILOT: Maintenance, we
need to know of any faults

like this got reported
recently for this aircraft

and whether there are
any switches that we

might not be aware of that could
get those motors turning again.

Roger 261.

I have verified no
history on your aircraft

in the past 30 days.

Yeah, we didn't see
anything in the logbook.

Why don't you move
your seat forward.

I'll check this
pedestal back there.

Beyond that, I
don't think there's

anything we haven't checked.

I use the example
of the average layman,

I think, can understand.

If you try to start your
car and it doesn't crank,

you try jiggling the key in the
socket and then try it again.

And I think that the crew was
probably understandably going

through a lot of these-- well,
maybe it'll work now, or let's

try this, let's try that.

NARRATOR: The pilots want
to divert to Los Angeles,

but Alaska Airlines dispatch
coordinating the movements

of the company's
planes is worried it

will upset the busy schedule.

261 dispatch, if you
want to land at LA,

of course for safety
reasons we will do that.

I'll tell you, though,
if we land in LA,

we're looking at probably
an hour, an hour and a half.

We've got a major flow
program going right now.

Well, boy.

You really put me
in a spot up here.

I don't want to hear that
the flow is the reason you're

calling, because I'm
concerned about overflying

suitable airports.

Well, we want
to do what's safe,

so if that's what
you feel is safe,

just want to make sure
you have all the info.

We might ask if
they have a ground

school instructor available, and
we could discuss it with him--

and a simulator instructor.

Dispatch 261, we're wondering
if we can get some support out

of the instructors up there.

NARRATOR: Thompson
and Tansky now

ask for a pilot instructor
who might know the solution

to their unusual problem.

Stand by.

NARRATOR: As they
wait for a reply,

their frustration
begins to show.

It just drives
me nuts, you know?

Not that I want to go on about
it, but it just blows me away.

They think we're going to land.

They're going to fix it.

Now they're worried
about the flow.

Well, I'm sorry, just--

They're putting
pressure on you.

I don't know.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: The pilots need to
think about what will happen

when they descend for landing.

How will the plane behave?

Will they be able to control it?

But several minutes
after requesting help

from the ground, they're
getting no advice.

As Flight 261 approached
Los Angeles off the coast,

the problems on board were
about to get far worse.

The pilots on the crippled
Air Alaska Flight 261

are flying manually at
32,000 feet in a plane that

has a jammed
stabilizer, which is

forcing the plane's nose down.

The pilots have
another go at freeing

up the jammed stabilizer.

They switch on both of the
motors that control it.

This will click it off.

Holy sh--

Shit, you got it?

Ah!

What are you doing?

Damn, it kicked off.

NARRATOR: At 31,000
feet, Flight 261 plunges

downwards for over a minute.

The crew battles for control.

It just got worse, OK?

We're stalled.

NARRATOR: At first, they pull
back on the control columns

to fight the dive.

Then the pilots push the
nose down into the dive

to regain control.

It's a risky maneuver,
pushing the plane's speed

to up to 350 miles per hour.

You gotta release it.

You gotta release it.

NARRATOR: The pilots slowly
bring the plane out of its dive

and back under control.

Let's get speed brakes.

Give me high pressure pumps.

OK.

Help me back.

Help me back.

OK.

Center, Alaska 261.

We're in a dive here.

I've lost control,
vertical pitch.

Alaska 261, say again, sir.

Yeah, we're out
of 26,000 feet.

We are in a vertical dive.

Not a dive yet, but we
have lost vertical control

of our airplane.

Just help me.

Once we get the speed
slope, maybe we'll be OK.

NARRATOR: Maintaining
level flight is difficult.

The jammed stabilizer keeps
pushing the nose of the plane

down.

We're at 23-7.

Request-- yeah, we got
it under control here.

PILOT: No, we don't.

OK.

PILOT: OK.

NARRATOR: To counteract
the downward force

of the stabilizer, the
pilots use the elevators,

movable panels at the back
of the tail linked by cables

to the control column.

The pilots pull with
all their might.

The fate of the plane hangs
on the strength of their arms.

In the cabin, frightened
passengers try to recover

from the terrifying plunge.

They have no idea
what will happen next.

In the cockpit, the pilots
struggle to control the plane's

speed so they can land.

JOHN NANCE: They've got
a handful of airplane.

They get her stabilized, and
they're now in a situation

where they make the
decision properly

to go in on an emergency landing
to Los Angeles International.

And they have to be able
to slow the airplane up,

so you've got to
experiment a little bit.

Let's take the
speed brakes off.

No, no leave them there.

It seems to be helping.

Damn, OK, it really
wants to pitch down.

OK.

Don't mess with that.

I agree with you.

NARRATOR: With the plane
under temporary control,

the crew makes the
fateful decision

to do more troubleshooting.

They need a block of clear space
around the aircraft in case

they lose control again.

They contact air
traffic control.

Alaska 261, say
your conditions.

261, we are at 24,000
feet, kind of stabilized.

We're slowing down
here, and we're going

to do a little troubleshooting.

Can you give me a block
altitude between 20 and 25?

Alaska 261, maintain
block altitude flight level

200 through flight level 250.

NARRATOR: The pilots know
they now have clear airspace

above and below the plane.

They try to figure
out their next move.

You've got the airplane.

Let me just try it.

OK.

How hard is it?

I don't know.

My adrenaline's going.

It was really rough
back there for a while.

Yeah, it is.

Whatever we did is no good.

Let's not do that again.

Yeah, it went to
down-- to full nose down.

It's worse than it was before.

Yeah, we're in
much worse shape now.

NARRATOR: The crew knows this
is no mere electrical problem.

From what they've
experienced, they assume

the stabilizer is now jammed.

I think it's at the stop--

full stop.

And I'm thinking can
it get any worse?

But it probably can.

But let's slow it.

Let's get down to 200
knots and see what happens.

NARRATOR: The crisis
is worse than ever.

Uncertain about how the plane
will react if they try to slow

it down, the pilots must
still pull on the elevators

to maintain level flight.

Maintenance, 261.

Are you on?

Yeah, 261.

This is maintenance.

OK, we did both
the pickle switch

and the suitcase
handles, and it ran away.

It ran away full nose trim down.

MAN: Oh, it ran away trim down?

Hoke-- and now we're in a
damn pinch, and we're holding.

We're worse than we were before.

You're getting
full nose trim down,

but you don't get
no nose trim up.

Is that correct?

That's affirm.

We went to full
nose down, and I'm

afraid to try it again
to see if it would

go in the other direction.

OK, well, your discretion.

If you want to try
it, that's OK with me.

If not, that's fine.

We'll see you at the gate.

NARRATOR: Maintenance
clearly does not

appreciate the significance
of the situation.

This is the last the
crew will hear from them.

No one can help the pilots
now as they struggle with

the plane's jammed stabilizer.

Ever professional,
however, they try

to put the passengers at ease.

(WHISPERING) Is everything OK?

We're going to be OK.

We're just redirecting.

Folks, we have had a flight
control problem up front here.

We're working it.

That's Los Angeles off
to the right there,

and that's where
we're intending to go.

We're pretty busy up here
working this situation.

I don't anticipate any big
problems once we get a couple

of subsystems on the line.

But we will be going
into LAX, and I

anticipate us parking there
in about 20 to 30 minutes.

NARRATOR: In fact, they will
never make it to Los Angeles.

A full-blown disaster
is about to unfold.

After the terrifying 8,000
foot plunge downward,

Alaska Airlines Flight
261 has now leveled out.

LA, Alaska 261,
we're with you.

We're at 225.

We have a jammed stabilizer,
and we're maintaining

altitude with difficulty.

But we can maintain
altitude we think,

and our intention is
to land at Los Angeles.

NARRATOR: The pilots
request to be routed

out over the Pacific Ocean.

Center, Alaska 261.

I need to get down
about 10, change

my configurations to make
sure I can control the jet.

And I'd like to do that
over the bay here if I may.

NARRATOR: If the worst
happens, the pilots

don't want to kill people on the
ground as well as on the plane.

There are a lot of lives saved
that people maybe don't realize

by the fact that this air
crew said let's stay out

over the water until
we've got this thing

completely under control.

NARRATOR: The crew tries to slow
the aircraft down to landing

speed without losing control,
but every move they make

could have fatal consequences.

OK, bring the flaps and
the slats back up for me.

Slats, too?

Yep.

NARRATOR: Treading a
knife edge of control,

the pilots are still trying
to free up the stabilizer.

What we want to do
is get the nose up

and then let the nose
fall through and see if we

can stab it when it's unloaded.

NARRATOR: The only
hope for the passengers

is that the pilots'
skill and experience

will get the plane to Los
Angeles International Airport.

It's on the stop now.

It's on the stop.

Not according
to this it's not.

NARRATOR: As one effort
after another fails,

the crew wonders if the
stabilizer is damaged.

The trim might be, and then
it might be if something's

popped back there.

Yeah.

It might be
mechanical damage, too.

I think it was controllable.

We ought to just
try and land it.

Think so?

OK, let's head for LA.

NARRATOR: But just as they
prepare to land in Los Angeles,

something in the
tail suddenly breaks.

Did you feel that?

Yup.

OK, give me slats.

This is a bitch.

Is it?

Yeah.

NARRATOR: The plane dives
straight down from 18,000 feet.

To avoid collisions,
LA control has warned

the pilots of nearby
planes that Alaska

Flight 261 is in difficulty.

These pilots have now
reported back to the tower.

Yep.

The plane was being
knocked from side to side.

It turned upside down.

It was spinning.

Persons were being thrown
against the walls of the plane,

falling out of their
seats, on the cockpit

voice recorder screaming--

unbelievable, horrible last
few minutes of their lives.

Uh, here we go.

NARRATOR: After a
terrifying 60-second dive,

Flight 261 hits
the Pacific Ocean

and over 250 miles an hour.

Rescue helicopters were
soon at the crash site,

but there were no survivors.

The plane had
broken up on impact.

88 passengers and crew,
including three young children,

died instantly.

The investigation into
Alaska Airlines Flight 261

began, but the wreckage
lay 700 feet down.

So National Transportation
Safety Board officials

called on Navy submersibles
to retrieve the debris

from the ocean floor.

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: We set
up a base of operations,

and we had a remote
operating vehicle

with the side-scanning
sonar which they used

to map the debris field
and get an idea of how

widely spread the wreckage was.

NARRATOR: At the National
Transportation Safety Board

headquarters in Washington,
the investigators'

immediate concern
was to find out what

had brought the plane down.

The first clues came from
the cockpit voice recordings.

LA, Alaska 261.

We're with you.

We're at 225.

We have a jammed stabilizer,
and we're maintaining

altitude with difficulty.

We immediately
suspected some problem

in the tail of the
airplane, which

is where the controls are.

Just something was
wrong back there,

and that was the key piece
of wreckage to look for.

NARRATOR: The MD-83
that crashed was

a revised version of the Douglas
Corporation's popular DC-9.

Over 2,000 were delivered
to airlines worldwide.

The engines were at
the rear of the plane,

and the distinctive T-shaped
tail was an essential element

of the design.

In a big turbojet aircraft,
one of the rather brilliant

elements of the design is
that since you are going

to be loading
passengers and cargo,

you want to be able to have that
aircraft load it a little nose

heavy or a little tail heavy.

Well, in order to do that,
you actually had to have

that entire stabilizer moving.

But the ones that are the
most difficult to engineer

are the T-tailed
airplanes, where

you have the vertical stabilizer
and the horizontal sitting

on top.

And we call that
stabilizer trim,

and that is an essential
element of what

makes these aircraft so usable.

NARRATOR: In the MD-83, a
motorized jackscrew on the tail

moves the horizontal
stabilizer up and down.

As the stabilizer moves up,
the nose of the airplane

moves down.

As the stabilizer moves
down, the nose moves up.

But what role have the
two-foot jackscrew played

in the loss of Flight 261?

The investigators were anxious
to inspect it as soon as it was

recovered from the ocean floor.

The jackscrew wasn't
mated with the nut

that it screws into.

It was just by itself.

And the nut was found in
another piece of structure

a few feet away from
where the jackscrew was.

To have a screw separate
itself from a nut with very

thick threads surprised us.

Secondly, we noticed that there
was a curled piece of brass

around the jackscrew,
and all of the threads

that you can see here,
these ridges, were gone.

They had been stripped out,
and the remnants of those

were found coiled
on the jackscrew.

NARRATOR: Once the thread had
been stripped off the nut,

the jackscrew could
no longer turn.

The pilots could not have known
the real nature of the problem.

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: The crew
was confronted with a situation

that had never occurred before.

There is no failed
jackscrew procedure

in the quick reference handbooks
that they have available.

There is no training for it.

NARRATOR: When the
jackscrew jammed,

the crew was unable to
adjust the stabilizer.

JEFF GUZZETTI: We felt
that it was due to the fact

that these nut
threads had worn away,

and it was just too
hard for that jackscrew

under the power of the
electric motor to turn.

That gave the flight
crew an indication

that there was a problem.

NARRATOR: The crew
knew they had a problem

in the tail of the plane,
but they had no idea what.

Two motors controlled
the jackscrew,

and they tried each
of them in turn.

But the pilots' attempts
to free the jammed

stabilizer inadvertently
made the situation worse.

We're at 23-7.

Request-- yeah, we got
it under control here.

No, we don't.

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ:
Where they went wrong

was that they wanted to try both
the alternate and the primary

trim motors at the same time.

NARRATOR: When the
pilot switched both

the electric motors on,
the jackscrew moved,

but the threads had given way,
and the jackscrew was now held

only by a single retaining nut.

From here on, the
plane was doomed.

That end nut
was never designed

to hold the loads
generated aerodynamically

by the airplane.

Let's get speed brakes.

Give me high pressure pumps.

OK.

JOHN NANCE: Now we know-- in
the glaring light of hindsight,

now when we turn the situation
around in time and look back,

we can see that this
air crew and no air crew

should have ever been
fooling with the trim

and trying to run
it back and forth.

NARRATOR: The retaining
nut grew weaker and weaker.

JEFF GUZZETTI: Then finally,
through the loads beating down

on that nut, the
nut finally failed.

Feel that?

Yup.

OK, give me slats.

JEFF GUZZETTI: The jackscrew
slid completely out

of the acme nut, allowing
the horizontal stabilizer

to move well beyond
its aerodynamic limits.

This is a bitch.

Is it?

Yeah.

NARRATOR: The stabilizer
forced the plane down,

and now completely
out of control,

it rolled over into
its final dive.

It was clear to
the investigators

that the failure of
the jackscrew screw

was the only explanation for
the plane's erratic flight

path and final dive.

But why had this happened?

Why have the jackscrew failed?

The investigators
began looking deeper

into the condition of
the faulty jackscrew

on Alaska Airlines Flight 261.

What had caused it to fail?

There was no lubrication or
visible grease on the working

area of the screw.

That was surprising and strange.

NARRATOR: The discovery of
no grease on the jackscrew

alarmed the investigators.

They alerted the Federal
Aviation Administration,

who ordered an immediate check
on all the MD-80s in the USA.

This led to a
shocking discovery.

At Alaska Airlines, in 6
of its fleet of 34 planes,

the jackscrew assembly
needed to be replaced

after failing new inspections.

No grease is the culprit.

No grease, or inadequate
grease, is the only thing that

can give you that wear rate.

NARRATOR: A simple
lack of grease

led to the failure
of the jackscrew

and the loss of 88 lives.

But why did this happen
at Alaska Airlines?

The investigators' attention
now switched to the company's

maintenance program.

What emerged was
deeply worrying.

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ:
We interviewed

all the mechanics who had
worked on these airplanes.

We knew that they had been
falsifying records or not doing

the work they had indicated.

NARRATOR: The mechanics
at Alaska Airlines

complained that they were
pressured to keep the planes

in the air, or that
their recommendations

were overruled by supervisors.

Some allege that records
were altered to show

work done that was not done.

Alaska Airlines has long
been one of America's most

successful airlines,
but in the early 1990s,

the economic downturn
hit the company hard.

Its response was to costs
to revive its fortunes.

Pilots, maintenance workers,
management, and others

had to make sacrifices.

Jobs were lost.

Pay was cut.

And every hour aircraft spent
on the ground was seen as waste.

Two years of
aggressive axe wielding

saw costs come down
by $80 million.

Profits leaped.

It was a corporate triumph.

In Alaska's case in the early
'90s, this airline had to do

an incredible job of reforming
itself from a fairly high-cost

carrier to a lower
cost carrier that

could compete head
on with Southwest

Airlines and with others.

And they did it.

They did it brilliantly.

Nobody really believed
that it could happen.

NARRATOR: Alaska
Airlines began flying

the planes more intensively.

It doubled the average
daily use of its fleet.

Keeping the planes in
the air earning money

put maintenance
schedules under pressure.

John Liotine was a former lead
mechanic at Alaska Airlines'

Oakland maintenance
facility, where

he worked for eight years.

Liotine felt that the new
pressures on maintenance

put passengers' lives at risk.

He was to pay dearly for
expressing those concerns.

We have used an actor to
portray his experiences,

based on his sworn
testimony to the NTSB.

Liotine claimed that
planes were being pushed

back into service too quickly.

Sometimes rather than wait for
a replacement part or repair,

supervisors passed
planes fit for service,

free to carry passengers
up into the air.

In October 1998, over 15
months before the crash,

John Liotine became so worried
that he did something that

would change his life forever.

He reported Alaska Airlines
to the US Department

of Transportation,
alleging violations

in maintenance procedures.

There were very few
voices at Alaska who had

concerns about the maintenance.

There should have been
more, and there should

have been people listening.

John Liotine is a
hero in my book.

NARRATOR: In December 1999,
over a year before the crash,

the Federal Aviation
Administration

and Department of
Transportation officials

moved on Alaska Airlines.

The case was referred
to federal prosecutors,

and the FBI raided Alaska's
maintenance facilities

and seized thousands of records.

The raid was the opening
shot in a federal grand jury

investigation that
would last three years.

No criminal charges were
brought against the airline.

Alaska's officials denied
that any unsafe planes

were put into service
or that passengers'

lives were ever at risk.

But the investigation revealed
hundreds of violations

of federal regulations.

Alaska Airlines was fined.

The FAA insisted on changes
to the company's maintenance

and safety procedures.

The FAA also suspended
two supervisors

for falsifying records.

Like other whistleblowers,
John Liotine would pay heavily

for his efforts to save lives.

Alaska Airlines put him on
paid leave from his job,

costing him thousands of dollars
in regular overtime earnings.

Then, in January
2000, Liotine saw

his worst nightmare come true.

The kind of accident he
had tried to prevent now

took place just off
the California coast.

After the loss of Flight 261,
mechanic John Liotine went

back to his own work records.

Incredibly, he found
that he had a direct link

to the crashed airliner.

Two years before, at the
plane's last overhaul,

he had ordered that the
jackscrew on this very airplane

be replaced.

He then went off shift.

When investigators
examined the record,

they found that Liotine's
recommendation had been

overruled by the next
shift and the plane put

back into service.

It would be two years
before the next overhaul,

but time ran out.

Four months before the overhaul
was due, Flight 261 crashed.

Alaska Airlines labeled
Liotine a disruptive influence.

He sued the company for libel.

Alaska settled, but
Liotine could no longer

work in the industry he loved.

I get calls almost every
week of somebody saying,

should I blow the whistle?

And I always tell
them, you need to know.

You need to be prepared to
find another line of work,

because you will not
work in the industry,

and you will not work
in the government.

In most cases, it's
almost impossible

to be a whistleblower
and survive your career.

NARRATOR: As the investigators
continued their work

into Flight 261, they made
another disturbing discovery

about the drive to cut
costs at Alaska Airlines.

To keep planes flying
more intensively,

Alaska had dramatically extended
the intervals between service.

This was significant, because
when a plane is designed,

every part has a
schedule listing

when it is to be serviced
and when it must be replaced.

You're supposed to go in and
inspect every so many hours,

and that's different on
parts all over the planes.

Some things you have to
look at after every flight.

Other things have
to be inspected

every two or three days.

NARRATOR: In 1996,
Alaska Airlines

extended the intervals between
MD-80 jackscrew inspections

by 400%.

Before 1996, jackscrews
were inspected

every 600 flight hours.

Now there was over 2,500
between each service.

If you had 600 hours between
inspection points and greasing

points, we have no chance of
ever having a metal-to-metal

contact situation.

But if you put that out to
2,000 hours or 2,500 hours,

now what you do is eat into
some of these protective stages,

these barriers that we have
towards catastrophic failure.

Investigations division--

NARRATOR: In its final report
into the crash of Flight 261,

the NTSB concluded that Alaska
Airlines' extended service

intervals to the
jackscrews on its MD-80s

were a significant
contributor to the crash.

Nor with any of
your supervisors

up the chain in the
engineering area.

JAY MALONEY: I
don't recall any--

With carriers doing anything
to save a dime, maintenance,

safety took a back seat.

And one of the shocking
things about Alaska

is that they were allowed to
increase inspection intervals.

And it was very
shocking, because that

is the only way we have safety.

NARRATOR: The extended
maintenance intervals

meant that lack of grease in
the jackscrew went undiscovered.

But now, investigators also
wondered if the failure

of the jackscrew assembly
revealed a basic floor

in the plane's design.

They found that the MD-80 broke
one of the fundamental rules

of aircraft design.

It was not fail safe.

JOHN NANCE: The
design philosophy

that has made aviation so safe
is that we should never, ever

have a situation in which
one catastrophic failure

of some component
of the airplane

causes us to lose the airplane.

These backups to the backup
backing up the backups

is why we can get on an airplane
with almost 100% assurance

that we're going to get
where we want to go safely.

NARRATOR: There was no backup
to the jackscrew and its nut.

Engineers never envisioned
a situation on the MD-80

where the jackscrew might fail.

With inspections every 600
flight hours and replacements

every 2,000 hours,
the designers did not

add an additional
redundant backup system.

It was utterly
laughable that they

said it was a redundant system.

There's one screw,
and there's one nut.

That's all there is.

It's not redundant.

--investigations division.

NARRATOR: In its final report,
the National Transportation

Safety Board concluded that
the crash of Flight 261

was due to the lack of
adequate greasing and the

stretched service intervals.

When coupled with the
design of the jackscrew,

these failures led to a
completely avoidable accident

and the loss of 88 lives.

Three years after the
crash of Flight 261,

the relatives and
friends of the dead

dedicated a permanent
memorial at Port Hueneme close

to the crash site.

Janice Stokes.

JOHN NANCE: I think
the best thing

and the only thing in our
infinite inadequacy of making

up for the loss from this life
is to say something that we've

been able to say in a
lot of other accidents

to other grieving families.

And that is those deaths
will not be in vain.

We will not let them be in vain.

Every one of those
lives will be made

to count in terms of making
sure that 3, 4, 5 or 10

other people do not die.

MAN: Miss Carol Karlsson.

Colleen was different.

She was adventurous, and there's
nobody like that in our family.

And I don't know what we can
do except to remember Colleen

and to live our lives now a
little bit better for her.

MAN: Ryan Busche.

None of us are
the same anymore.

It's like walking into
a giant storm, wave

after wave forming up, coming
in, because it never stops.

Grief over the loss
of a child is not

something I wish on anybody.

This plane went down
because of neglect.

It seems like such an
unholy type of loss.

What a hard way to die so
an airline can, you know,

make more money.