All language subtitles for Air Disasters S17E09 Turboprop Terror 1080p PMTP WEB-DL AAC2 0 H 264_track3_[eng]

NARRATOR: On approach to
Raleigh-Durham airport--

Did we just have a flameout?

NARRATOR: --the pilots decide
to abort their landing.

When you have
an engine failure,

you lose 80% of
your performance.

Let's go missed approach.

NARRATOR: But the plan
falls apart.

Lower the nose!

We were going down.

NARRATOR: Only five of the
20 people on board survive.

NTSB investigators are puzzled
by the wreckage of flight 3379.

It appears the engines
are rotating at full power.

So what went wrong?

NARRATOR: Only by
taking a test flight

to the brink of disaster--

Yawing to the left.

NARRATOR: --will an astonishing
sequence of events be revealed.

This airplane had to crash.

Mayday!

Mayday!

Pull up!

NARRATOR: American Eagle flight
3379 approaches Raleigh-Durham

International Airport.

OK.

Can you do the descent
checklist, please?

NARRATOR: In the
cockpit, Captain

Mike Hillis and first
officer Matthew Sailor

prepare for landing.

Altimeter 3031, set,
cross-checked.

3031.

Set.

Cross-checked.

These were young pilots just
starting off in their career.

They were looking to go
work at the major airlines,

where the pay and benefits
were substantially better.

NARRATOR: The pilots
are flying a Jetstream

3201, a twin turboprop airplane
designed for short flights.

It's a workhorse for regional
airlines like American Eagle.

DOUG TAUBER: Turboprop
engines run more

efficiently at lower altitudes.

They're actually
more fuel efficient.

So on these short haul
routes, the Jetstream

pretty much fit that market.

NARRATOR: Flight 3379
took off at 6:00 PM

from Greensboro, North Carolina.

It's a 35-minute flight
to Raleigh-Durham airport.

Well, folks, at this
time, we're about 10.8 miles

from Raleigh-Durham
International Airport,

about 5 minutes out.

We're about to
begin our approach.

Weather tonight's not
very good in Raleigh.

Two-mile visibility because
of rain and fog, and the winds

are out of the North
at 6 miles an hour.

NARRATOR: There are 18
passengers on board tonight.

Among them, college
student Lauren Anderson.

I had been up
the night before.

I had stayed up all night.

Pulled an all-nighter,
wrote a paper,

and slid it under the door of my
English professor that morning.

So I was pretty tired.

It had been a long
week of finals.

I was ready to get home.

Eagle fight 3379, reduce
to 170, then descend

and maintain 3,000.

NARRATOR: 10 miles from
Raleigh-Durham, flight 3379

is cleared to begin its descent.

170 then 3,000.

3379.

NARRATOR: The flight crew
reduces engine power.

In a turboprop plane, the engine
power and the propeller speed

are controlled separately.

The Jetstream 32
had no autopilot,

so you were always hand flying.

It was one of the most
demanding airplanes

on a pilot's flying skills.

NARRATOR: Descending
to 3,000 feet,

the crew keeps a close
eye on the weather.

When you get a chance,
look out your window

and see if you see
any of that ice.

Yeah, I was looking out there.

I don't see anything right now.

Icing can be a major
threat to an aircraft.

It not only increases
the weight of it,

but also spoils the
aerodynamics over the wing.

NARRATOR: Icing isn't the
only hazard facing the pilots.

Eagle flight 3379,
caution wake turbulence.

Your spacing on a 727.

Turn left one niner zero.

NARRATOR: There's a 727
landing ahead of flight 3379,

which creates a potential
hazard for the flight crew.

Heavy aircraft tend
to generate very strong

horizontal tornadoes,
called vortexes,

that come off the wingtips.

If the smaller aircraft has an
encounter with wake turbulence,

it could be so powerful
that it's beyond the control

of the pilot to counteract it.

NARRATOR: Left one
niner zero, 3379.

NARRATOR: For safety, the
pilots make a minor adjustment

to their course.

Eagle flight 3379,
Raleigh, clear to land.

Wind 010 at 8.

Traffic, 3 and 1/2
mile final, a 727.

Cleared to land 5 left, 3379.

NARRATOR: Once the
Boeing 727 touches down,

flight 3379 will
be cleared to land.

We didn't
anticipate any issues.

It was the same old,
same old, I'd say.

I probably had taken that flight
three times already that year.

And gear down.

Gear down.

NARRATOR: The pilots configure
the pain for landing.

Flaps 20.

Flaps 20.

NARRATOR: Just minutes
before touchdown--

Why is that ignition light on?

Did we just have a flame out?

NARRATOR: The engine
ignition light illuminates.

DOUG TAUBER: Seeing the ignition
light come on during approach

would typically raise a concern.

If combustion is
interrupted for any reason,

it's what pilots call a
flameout or an engine failure.

I'm not sure what's
going on with it.

NARRATOR: If there
is an engine failure,

the pilots need to
reconsider landing.

The pilot would have
to make the decision

whether to continue the
approach, or abort the approach

and see what the problem is.

What you want me to do?

Are you going to continue?

OK, yeah.

I'm going to continue.

Just back me up.

NARRATOR: Captain
Hillis decides to land.

All right.

Let's go missed approach.

NARRATOR: But then he
reverses his decision.

DOUG TAUBER: A go-around
or a missed approach

would have given the
pilot more time to run

an engine failure checklist.

When you're on final,
you really don't have

that much time to complete it.

Set max power.

NARRATOR: Now, at 1,500
feet, captain Hillis

aborts the landing.

When you have
an engine failure,

you not only lost
half your power, you

lose 80% of your performance.

NARRATOR: Flight
3379 isn't climbing,

and it's losing speed.

Lower the nose.

Lower the nose!

NARRATOR: At 1,400 feet,
the plane is stalling.

You got it?

Yeah.

They're unable to climb.

They're starting to
lose directional control

of the aircraft.

NARRATOR: Flight 3379 is
turning steadily to the left,

veering further off course.

Lower the nose!

Things are getting
bad real fast,

and they're running out of time.

Here!

NARRATOR: Plunging
rapidly toward the ground,

the pilots fight to
recover their plane.

There's no flight
attendant on the plane.

There was a lot of commotion.

You could hear some
kind of warning siren.

I was scared.

People were scared.

We knew we were crashing.

I knew we were going down.

I just braced myself,
literally putting my hand

and my foot on the
seat in front of me.

I had a moment that,
OK, I need to survive.

I need to live through this.

When we crashed, I just remember
hitting ground very, very fast,

very hard.

NARRATOR: Flight 3379 has just
plowed through the dense woods

of North Carolina.

It's now a pile of
burning wreckage.

The pain split literally in
between my seat and the seat

in front of me.

I can remember taking my seat
belt off, and hearing people

moaning, and people screaming.

I couldn't see anything.

I don't know if I
lost my contacts,

or I just had fuel in my eyes.

I couldn't walk, but my
adrenaline was pumping.

I was in fight-or-flight mode.

My intuition was up.

I had-- I had to survive.

And somehow I got
away from the fire.

NARRATOR: Morrisville
firefighter, David Farrell,

is one of the first
responders on site.

And your heart's racing.

I mean-- you know,
you're probably

fixing to encounter one
of the worst things you've

ever been in in your life.

And you could see the fire.

Your heart was in your throat.

You know, your adrenaline's
pumping, you're scared.

As I got closer to the scene,
something called my eye.

And I looked down.

I saw a female pulling
herself away from the fire,

and she couldn't move her legs.

He had asked my name.

And I told him I needed
to find my suitcase,

and that I needed to get home.

I said, you-- you're
going to make it.

You're not going
to die on my watch.

You're through
the worst of this,

and we're going to
get you out of here.

NARRATOR: Lauren Anderson is
one of only five survivors.

15 others are killed.

I did break bones in
my hand, my clavicle.

Broke my ribs,
punctured my lungs.

I had broken and
dislocated my back.

Tibia, fibula break in my
left leg, bones in my ankle.

NARRATOR: Captain Mike Hillis
and first officer Matthew

Sailor are among the dead.

National Transportation
Safety Board investigators

are on site by morning.

Anyone finding
the data recorders?

Team is still looking.

Weather wasn't great last night.

Well, I'm going to need
the pilot's record of icing

and the weather data.

In this particular
accident, icing was very

paramount because 3379 was--

was a second accident
for American Eagle.

Just a few weeks past
we'd had another Jetstream

involved with icing conditions.

NARRATOR: Was icing
the reason flight

3379 failed to make it to the
airport just four miles away?

The landing gear's down.

Do we know how
the flaps are set?

I'll check with that
guy in the cockpit.

Strauch, here.

What can you tell us
about the flap selector?

The cockpit section
was particularly damaged.

A lot of controls a
lot of the instruments

were unable to document.

MAN (OVER THE WALKIE-TALKIE):
The flaps selector is

fused in a 20 degree position.

Copy that.

The flap extension was
also very interesting,

because it was in the
landing configuration.

Thanks very much.

The plane was iced up
as they were landing.

I mean, that's trouble.

We had to start making major
inquiries into the possibility

of an icing involvement.

These are pilot reports
from five other planes

flying into Raleigh.

We do have pilots
reporting light icing,

but just trace icing
at high altitudes.

NARRATOR: Investigators learned
that the other pilots flying

near Raleigh-Durham
weren't reporting any

significant issues with icing.

The icing, although it
was present in the area,

was absolutely no factor in
the accident investigation.

They were all set to land.

So what went wrong?

I mean, they had
engine trouble.

The investigators
had a major challenge

trying to figure out
if one of the engines

had malfunctioned in some way.

Hey, can you bring that
blade over here, please?

Thank you.

Thank you, sir.

Now, is this blade from
the left propeller?

Yes.

This is from the
right propeller.

NARRATOR: The team examines the
propellers for an indication

that they were rotating.

Yeah, it was bent.

And look at the
damage where it hit.

NARRATOR: The way the blade
is damaged provides a clue.

If you've got turning
propellers on your airplane,

they tend to grab into things
and bend forward as they hit

the debris of trees, and so on.

It appears the engines
are rotating at full power.

So he's four miles
from the airport.

He's configured to land.

What happened?

As we spent more time on
site with the 3379 wreckage,

the questions just kept coming.

It made it very clear
that this accident

was going to be a real puzzler.

Were the pilots reporting any
problems during their approach?

Let me have a look.

NARRATOR: NTSB investigators
hope the pilot's conversations

with air traffic controllers
can shed some light

on why flight 3379
crashed before reaching

Raleigh-Durham airport.

They're the last people
to talk to the crew,

and we want to know
if there was anything

unusual in their conversations.

No, there wasn't anything
out of the ordinary.

Eagle fight 3379, reduce
to 170, then descend

and maintain 3,000.

NARRATOR: The controller tells
investigators that flight

3379's approach seemed routine.

170 then 3,000.

3379.

Was there any conflicting
traffic as they were coming in?

Well, yes.

There was a 727 landing
right ahead of them.

I warned them about
wake turbulence.

Eagle Flight 3379,
caution wake turbulence.

You're spacing on a 727.

Turn left one niner zero.

The wake turbulence issue
is particularly critical.

This would be a
factor that we were

going to have to deal with.

Thank you very much.

Sure.

How fast does a
wake vortex descend?

300 feet per minute.

NARRATOR: Investigators compare
the flight path of flight 3379

with the estimated path
of the wake vortex.

All right, let's
see what we got.

NARRATOR: They use
recorded radar returns

for both planes and
factor in the weather

at the time of the accident.

Looks like flight
3379 missed it.

By more than 600 feet.

The jet stream did not fly
through any of those vortexes.

Wake turbulence did
not affect the flight

path of the accident aircraft.

NARRATOR: But the radar
data reveals that something

happened along the flight path.

Why does he veers off
course after missing

the weight vortices?

He's off to the left.

Why?

Why is this aircraft
over here to the left

of the final approach path,
configured to land?

PILOT (ON RECORDER): OK.

Can you do the descent
checklist, please?

NARRATOR: The team turns to
the cockpit voice recorder,

hoping they might
find an explanation

for the unusual left turn.

We were going to
really have to look

at what was going on
on the flight deck

with the cockpit crew.

What were they saying?

What were their intentions?

CO-PILOT (ON RECORDER):
Altimeter 3031, set,

cross-checked.

Pressurization, set and checked.

Ice protection is on.

NARRATOR: Investigators here
the captain and first officer

planning the approach
with precision.

PILOT (ON RECORDER):
OK, reviewed.

So far so good.

NARRATOR: The flight crew seems
to be working in perfect tandem

as flight 3379
approaches the airport.

Why is that ignition light on?

PILOT (ON RECORDER): Did
we just have a flame out?

Did he just say flame out?

Play that again.

PILOT (ON RECORDER): Did
we just have a flame out?

When the captain talks about
the ignition light, that--

all this-- that
came out of nowhere.

We had a flame out.

We lost the left one?

Yeah.

NARRATOR: They discover that
the ignition light illuminated

moments before the crash.

This ignition light introduced
the thought of a lost engine.

Considering the physical
evidence that we'd seen,

this idea was very strange.

You would expect
during that period

that there would be some
sort of confirmation.

Nothing happened other
than absolute quiet.

We needed to try and figure
out what was going on.

These are the engine
sound waves from when

the ignition light went on.

NARRATOR: Another way for
investigators to determine

if the engines were operating
is to analyze their sound

on the cockpit voice recording.

This study is attempting
to home in on blade passing

frequencies, blade passing
meaning all these revolutions

of the propeller.

Call up the comparison.

NARRATOR: They compare the
engine sounds from flight 3379

to other engines
operating at 100%.

We're looking at the acoustics
of the engine performance,

and it's relatively
easy to match

that against the acoustics
of a working engine.

They're almost identical.

NARRATOR: Investigators hear
evidence that both engines

were running at full speed.

The sound analysis told us the
sounds generated by the engines

on this aircraft were
consistent with two

engines generating power.

The ignition light
must have misled

the pilots into believing
the left engine flamed out.

But really it hadn't.

This sound analysis put
the idea of an engine failure

to bed.

It just wasn't a
factor in the accident.

NARRATOR: This discovery
leaves investigators puzzled.

Why was that ignition
light on if there was

nothing wrong with the engine?

Why's that ignition light on?

Did we just have a flame out?

NARRATOR: Investigators examined
Jetstream manuals to determine

why an ignition light would
come on even though the plane's

engines were fully operational.

So what activates it?

It's wired to a
negative torque system.

NARRATOR: Negative torque
occurs when the air loads

on the propellers
cause them to drive

the engines instead of the
engines driving the propellers.

It can be a sign of a flameout.

This is the same scenario
you would have as when you put

your car in low gear
going down a hill,

and use the
transmission to drag.

It says the
ignition light will

activate if they advance the
propeller speed too quickly.

There was a situation when you
would be at a low power setting

on your torque, and as you
go speeds high in preparation

for landing, if you move those
speed levers up too quickly,

that could trigger
the negative torque

to cause that light to come on.

PILOT (ON RECORDER): Go ahead.

Flaps 10.

NARRATOR: Investigators
returned to the CVR

to learn if the pilots mentioned
increasing the propeller speed.

Let's go ahead
and go speeds high.

NARRATOR: They hear captain
Hillis advancing the propellers

to 100% for landing.

PILOT (ON RECORDER): Why's
that ignition light on?

There it is.

He advanced the propeller
speed, and boom,

the ignition light illuminates.

NARRATOR: The team
discovers that the pilots

created negative torque.

Negative torque
doesn't necessarily mean

there was an engine failure.

You would get a transient
situation for a second or two.

That could trigger
that light to come on.

We had a flame out.

He misdiagnoses the situation.

Well, surely he
checks his engines RPMs?

CO-PILOT (ON RECORDER):
What you want me to do?

Are you going to continue?

OK, yeah.

I'm going to continue.

Just back me up.

He's not even checking
to see if there's

an actual engine failure.

Look at your instruments.

Determine whether or not the--

both engines are
generating power.

It's not that hard.

They're trained for that.

If he had, he would have
seen the engine power is where

he put it, 100% full power.

If you don't know if you
have an engine failure,

but you're responding to a
potential engine failure,

that's not very
good, and that could

very easily cause an accident.

Let's go missed approach.

NARRATOR: So what actions
did the pilots take

during the missed approach?

OK, so how did they
configure their plane

for the missed approach?

They set engine power to max.

Set max power.

As they should.

What else?

There's no mention of
reducing the flaps to 10

or retracting landing gear.

A go around would be done
by informing the other pilot.

Then, apply max power, retract
the gear, retract the flaps.

NARRATOR: But the pilot's
failure to raise the gear

or retract the flaps doesn't
explain the accident.

Hard to believe that
configuration caused the pain

to veer to the left and crash.

Well, there's only
one way to find out.

There was a necessity to
conduct some flight tests,

because we really wanted to
figure out what the crew had

introduced in
the configuration that

would make the aircraft deviate
from this intended flight path.

OK, let's go max power.

NARRATOR: Investigators turned
to test pilots for help.

They'll take a Jetstream
3201 to its limits,

to try to solve the mystery.

Sometimes you
have to put yourself

in an uncomfortable position,
and you know what's going

to happen if you go too far.

Max power.

Flaps to 20.

NARRATOR: They
start by duplicating

the configuration the pilots
had set for the missed approach.

Flaps 20.

Gear down.

OK.

Gear down.

OK, it's a bit slower than
a regular missed approach,

but it's still doable.

NARRATOR: So why did flight
3379 turn to the left and crash?

Let's do the
same configuration,

but put max power on the
right engine but not the left.

Roger that.

NARRATOR: They try a different
configuration in the hope of

recreating the pilot's actions.

Max power, right engine.

Yawing to the left.

I can't climb like this.

NARRATOR: Investigators finally
understand how Captain Hillis

executed the missed approach.

Set max power.

NARRATOR: Believing his
left engine has failed,

the captain increases power
only to the right engine.

Lower the nose.

Lower the nose!

NARRATOR: The imbalance
in engine power

robs the plane of
the airspeed it

needs to climb out with the gear
down and the flaps extended.

The flight test told
us that an airplane

with that configuration could
not have been flown safely.

It had to crash.

He had that plane
configured all wrong.

NARRATOR: Investigators
conclude that the captain

didn't configure
his plane correctly

for a missed approach.

If the captain thought
one of his engines failed,

they should have performed a
single-engine missed approach.

Didn't do that either.

So he set himself up for
a nearly unflyable airplane.

You got it?

Yeah.

NTSB investigators
focus squarely

on the captain of flight 3379,
29-year-old Michael Hillis.

To come across an accident
where a response was botched

as poorly as this one,
it begs the question,

how did he get there?

He's got 2,294
hours of turboprops,

3,499 total flying hours.

He's young, but
he's no rookie.

NARRATOR: NTSB
investigators scrutinize

the personnel records of
the pilots of flight 3379.

We want to find out the
background of the pilots.

Is there anything in
their performance that

can reveal something
about their performance

on the night of the accident?

NARRATOR: From
American Eagle's files,

the team learns that Michael
Hillis was licensed to fly

multiple turboprop airplanes.

He starts off training on
the Jetstream in March 1991.

We've got single-engine
missed approaches today.

Are you ready for that?

Yes, sir.

NARRATOR: Investigators
dig deeper into Captain

Hillis' pilot records.

All right.

I am cutting your left engine.

We like to see an
airman with airmanship,

so we had to look back at
the training information.

Look at this.

Trainer's evaluation.

OK, you're losing airspeed
that you're going to need.

How do you get it back?

Not sure.

Now, this is telling.

He's messing up single-engine
missed approaches.

It was very obvious
that this captain

was having serious troubles
with his airmanship development.

Single-engine missed
approaches, engine failures.

When is this?

April 1992.

That was two years
before the accident.

He had more than
enough time to improve.

Well, he must have dug in.

He makes captain a
few months later.

By the time pilots
become airline pilots,

they're pretty good.

The-- the selection
process is so rigorous

that you don't get to be
an airline pilot unless you

had considerable capabilities.

That's all I have here.

Will any American Eagle pilots
that will talk to us about him?

Let's find out.

NARRATOR: The NTSB wants to
know more about Hillis' career.

Usually in the
pilot file, there'll

be some little notes
about the issues that

have been encountered
by other persons

in flying with the captain.

What can you tell
me about Mike Hillis?

Well, We're pretty
broken up about this.

NARRATOR: Investigators
track down American Eagle's

Raleigh-Durham base manager.

Unfortunately, we had a lot
of complaints about his flying.

I was really surprised
to hear him say that.

Complaints?

From whom?

Several first officers that
flew with him out of Raleigh.

Co-pilots were whispering
to their colleagues.

It was something not normal.

Well, we had co-pilots that
were afraid to fly with him,

and they'd keep a close
eye on what he was doing.

Really?

If pilots are afraid to
fly with this guy, which

is essentially what the
base manager told us,

that's very revealing
about the accident.

I hate to say it, but this
is a really questionable pilot.

We got a picture of a
pilot who could fly OK,

but when he was faced
with something unexpected,

his performance would
start deteriorating.

How did this guy end up
on American Eagle, huh?

Where'd they find him?

His application
should be on file.

We tried to get
as much information

as we can for a complete
pilot's history.

His previous job
was with ComAir.

NARRATOR: Captain
Hillis applied to work

for American Eagle
in October 1990,

while he was flying
for another airline.

Find out if they did a
background check on this guy.

NARRATOR: When investigators
ask American Eagle

about background
checks on Mike Hillis,

they're shocked by
what they learn.

They did not go back and
check with previous employers.

NARRATOR: The NTSB does what
American Eagle never did,

they requisition Mike
Hillis' file from ComAir.

When we compared his records
with ComAir with his records

at American Eagle,
they were consistent.

"Moody, unpredictable,
gets distracted.

Concerns about tunnel vision
in an emergency situation."

Huh.

And he was potentially
a dangerous pilot.

"Tunnel vision in an
emergency situation."

ComAir could see it.

This guy wanted him fired.

It just keeps getting worse.

I've never encountered
before or since a pilot who

was recommended to be
terminated because he

was potentially unsafe.

ComAir recommended
for dismissal.

Well, did they fire him?

He resigns from ComAir
before they can fire him.

That Captain should not
have been flying passengers.

Under any circumstances.

Did American Eagle know about
this guy's performance history?

It doesn't look
like they asked.

There's no record of ComAir
providing it to American Eagle.

NARRATOR: But the
picture is crystal clear.

Michael Hillis' flying
career was blemished

by failed certification tests,
bad evaluations from trainers,

and complaints from
colleagues that were never

passed on to American Eagle.

One would have
to ask themselves,

if you really knew the
background of this pilot,

would you put your wife or
your child in that aircraft?

And the answer would be no.

NARRATOR: But there
were two pilots

in the cockpit of flight 3379.

Lower the nose.

Lower the nose!

In this case, the ability
of the first officer

to recognize that the captain's
skills were deficient,

it took a long time.

Did the first officer
know who he was flying with?

NARRATOR: Here
investigators wonder

if First Officer Sailor
knew he was teamed

with an unreliable pilot.

First officer Matthew
Ian Sailor, 25 years old.

Worked for American Eagle
for a year before the crash.

NARRATOR: The NTSB
looks into the work

schedules of First Officer
Sailor and Captain Hillis.

Had he flown
with Hillis before?

No.

Not once.

NARRATOR: They discover
the first officer was

new to this particular route.

So was he based
out of Raleigh?

No.

He worked out of Miami.

I think it was
critical to this accident

that the first officer
was from a different base

than the captain.

First officers
in Raleigh Durham

knew to keep a close eye on
him, but he's out of Miami.

This guy had no idea
who he was flying with.

Let's go ahead
and go speeds high.

NARRATOR: When First Officer
Sailor joins Captain Hillis

in the cockpit on
December 13, 1994,

he has no idea what type
of pilot he's teamed with.

This pilot should
never been a pilot

in command of that aircraft.

NARRATOR: As flight 3379
is on final approach

for Raleigh-Durham, Captain
Hillis is caught by surprise.

He misinterprets the elimination
of an ignition light.

Why is that ignition light on?

Did we just have a flame out?

I'm not sure what's
going on with it.

We had a flame out.

NARRATOR: Captain Hillis doesn't
realize that by increasing

the propeller speed
too quickly, he

has created a momentary
negative torque condition.

He misdiagnosed it
as an engine failure

and responded improperly.

I'm going to continue.

NARRATOR: Instead
of landing, Hillis

decides to do a go-round.

Let's go missed approach.

Starting with the captain's
misdiagnosis of an engine

failure, and his decision to
go around, it pretty much was

self-induced engine failure.

NARRATOR: The pilots now
face a severe emergency.

The gear was down.

He was trying to climb.

Set max power.

It was impossible
in that configuration.

They're basically about to
go off the edge of the cliff.

Lower the nose.

NARRATOR: It falls
to the first officer

to rectify the
captain's mistakes.

Here!

I think he could have saved
the airplane, but by the time

he recognized that,
it was too late.

NARRATOR: 15 people are killed
because of Hillis' errors.

Made every mistake in the
book in the last two minutes

of the flight.

I had anger,
sure, at that time,

for the pilot and the co-pilot,
for the errors that they made.

Ultimately, there
was more pointing

fingers to the airline.

Had American Eagle accessed
documents about Hillis' past

before they hired him, he might
not have been in that cockpit

on December 13, 1994.

The final take
away from 3379 is

that we've got to identify
those airmen that don't

display airmanship qualities.

NARRATOR: The crash
of Flight 3379

reveals deep flaws in
the standard hiring

practices of US airlines.

Background information
on pilots is almost

never shared between airlines.

If I was to apply
for a job somewhere,

they would check my references.

This is a pilot!

Isn't it important that
we find out if this person

is competent enough?

We asked for it in '88, '90--

NARRATOR: Tragically,
the case of flight 3379

is not unprecedented.

--and again in '93.

NARRATOR: In three
previous accidents,

the NTSB recommended that
records from previous employers

be made available to a
pilot's current employers.

Fourth time's the charm.

NARRATOR: Now, for
the fourth time,

the NTSB recommends
that US airlines

conduct better background
checks on prospective pilots.

But still, no changes are
made to federal regulations.

I felt like I had
to do something.

I had to speak for these 15
people that couldn't speak.

And I went and spoke
in front of Congress.

NARRATOR: In 1996,
two years after the crash,

Congress passes the
Pilot's Record Information

Act to ensure airlines have
access to previous companies'

pilot records.

The chances of a pilot
falling through the cracks,

as this captain did,
have been reduced

because of that legislation.

It's unfortunate
for that to happen,

but that's what it took.