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NARRATOR: After losing
their electric generators--
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OK, beacons off.
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NARRATOR: The pilots of
Air Illinois flight 710
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shut down one
system after another
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to conserve their battery power.
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It was probably
the most sickening
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feeling for both of them.
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NARRATOR: But efforts
proved futile.
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All the passengers
and crew are killed.
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NTSB investigators examine the
plane's electrical components
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for clues.
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There was no short circuit.
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What about the batteries?
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No signs of arcing.
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NARRATOR: The cockpit
voice recording
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raises more questions.
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Are you using
these lights here?
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I'll get that one down.
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Well, they're doing
the right thing, turning
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things off to reduce the load.
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So what happened?
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You got a flashlight?
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Yep.
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CREW (ON RADIO): Mayday, mayday.
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NARRATOR: Air
Illinois flight 710
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departs from capital airport
in Springfield, Illinois.
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Gear up.
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NARRATOR: 32-year-old Captain
Lester Smith has been with Air
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Illinois almost five years.
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He's one of its most
experienced pilots.
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Gear is up.
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NARRATOR: First Officer Frank
Tudor has been with the airline
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for three years.
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He's considered one of
its top first officers.
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1,000 feet.
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The pilots are flying
a Hawker Siddeley 748.
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The rugged turboprop is designed
to land on shorter runways.
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DAVE MINTY: These
Hawker Siddeley 748
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was one of a number of aircraft
built to replace the DC3
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00:02:21,174 --> 00:02:25,945
as a commuter slash cargo
slash military-type aircraft
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but primarily used as
a commuter aircraft.
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NARRATOR: It's the ideal
plane for a regional airline
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that connects big cities
to small towns in Illinois.
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Illinois 710,
radar identified.
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Continue to 3,000 feet,
clear to Carbondale.
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TUDOR: Illinois 710, 3,000
feet cleared for Carbondale.
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Thank you and good night.
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Heading 175.
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00:03:00,747 --> 00:03:03,716
NARRATOR: Less than two
minutes after takeoff--
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It's the generator again.
51
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NARRATOR: A generator
warning light comes on.
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00:03:10,657 --> 00:03:13,760
The aircraft is equipped with
two nine-kilowatt generators
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00:03:13,826 --> 00:03:18,865
that supply power to the battery
banks and electrical systems.
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One of the generators
has failed.
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Isolating it now.
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NARRATOR: The first officer
disconnects the right generator
57
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to protect the rest of the
aircraft's electrical system.
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SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: When
something like this
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happens and you have
a generator failure,
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00:03:37,317 --> 00:03:39,185
one of the most
important steps is
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to disconnect that
generator from the system
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as quickly as possible.
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00:03:46,259 --> 00:03:48,962
Jeanene Urban is a
former Air Illinois
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pilot who landed the
pain in Springfield
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three hours earlier.
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JEANENE URBAN: The
generators are each
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00:03:56,569 --> 00:04:01,608
rated to be able to
carry the entire load,
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so if one generator
goes down, you can
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00:04:04,744 --> 00:04:07,246
continue to your destination.
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It is not an emergency.
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NARRATOR: Tonight's
40-minute flight
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is taking seven passengers
146 miles from Springfield
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to Carbondale, Illinois.
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00:04:20,860 --> 00:04:24,597
Springfield, Illinois
710, we've experienced
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00:04:24,664 --> 00:04:26,599
a slight electrical problem.
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00:04:26,666 --> 00:04:28,301
We'll keep you advised.
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00:04:28,368 --> 00:04:31,738
Illinois 710, do you intend
to return to Springfield.
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SMITH: Negative.
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Continuing to
Carbondale, 3,000 feet.
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00:04:36,876 --> 00:04:38,578
NARRATOR: The
captain decides it's
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safe to continue the flight.
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I understand you are
continuing to Carbondale.
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00:04:43,249 --> 00:04:44,083
Roger.
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00:04:47,286 --> 00:04:51,124
NARRATOR: There's dense
cloud cover this evening.
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JEANENE URBAN: The
conditions at Carbondale
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were what is called IFR,
instrument flight rules.
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00:04:57,030 --> 00:04:59,699
They would have been
operating in the clouds,
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00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:04,570
needed their instruments to
be able to fly the airplane.
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00:05:04,637 --> 00:05:07,006
DAVE MINTY: They were flying
into deteriorating weather
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00:05:07,073 --> 00:05:08,274
conditions.
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00:05:08,341 --> 00:05:09,942
It's something that
every airline pilot
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is trained to handle,
but it doesn't
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00:05:12,111 --> 00:05:13,179
give you much room for error.
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00:05:16,783 --> 00:05:19,085
NARRATOR: Four
minutes after takeoff,
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the first officer checks the
status of the generators.
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00:05:23,089 --> 00:05:26,092
Zero voltage in
amps on the left side.
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00:05:26,159 --> 00:05:29,862
NARRATOR: He discovers that
the left generator is dead.
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00:05:29,929 --> 00:05:33,766
TUDOR: The right generator's
putting out 27.5 volts.
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00:05:33,833 --> 00:05:37,303
NARRATOR: The right generator
now appears to be working,
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00:05:37,370 --> 00:05:39,672
but the first officer
is unable to reconnect
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00:05:39,739 --> 00:05:41,074
it to the electrical system.
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00:05:41,140 --> 00:05:43,076
Can't get it to come online.
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00:05:43,142 --> 00:05:47,380
NARRATOR: The right
generator is as good as dead.
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00:05:47,447 --> 00:05:49,649
DAVE MINTY: With
both generators out,
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all the systems are
feeding off the batteries
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00:05:52,051 --> 00:05:54,120
instead of the generators.
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00:05:54,187 --> 00:05:55,388
It's not a good situation.
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00:05:58,191 --> 00:06:02,261
NARRATOR: The aircraft has
four nickel cadmium batteries.
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00:06:02,328 --> 00:06:04,831
With no generators,
the batteries
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00:06:04,897 --> 00:06:07,266
are now powering
lights, instruments,
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00:06:07,333 --> 00:06:09,202
navigational equipment,
and everything
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00:06:09,268 --> 00:06:10,269
in the passenger cabin.
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00:06:15,441 --> 00:06:19,112
How were the bats there?
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00:06:19,178 --> 00:06:21,948
We're down to 22.5 volts.
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00:06:22,014 --> 00:06:24,817
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: So now that
we're operating on only battery
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00:06:24,884 --> 00:06:28,755
power, the primary problem is
that the batteries are only
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00:06:28,821 --> 00:06:32,225
designed to operate
for about 30 minutes
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00:06:32,291 --> 00:06:35,795
under the best case scenario.
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00:06:35,862 --> 00:06:41,367
NARRATOR: Illinois 710 is now
32 minutes from its destination.
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00:06:41,434 --> 00:06:45,171
If they don't reduce the
drain on the batteries,
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00:06:45,238 --> 00:06:48,174
it will be almost impossible
to land without lights,
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00:06:48,241 --> 00:06:51,878
instruments, or a radio.
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00:06:51,944 --> 00:06:54,814
OK, beacons off.
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00:06:54,881 --> 00:06:57,884
OK.
125
00:06:57,950 --> 00:07:00,820
SMITH: Nav lights are off.
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00:07:00,887 --> 00:07:03,089
Are you using these lights here?
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00:07:03,156 --> 00:07:05,024
I'll get that one down.
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00:07:08,060 --> 00:07:12,932
NARRATOR: The pilots quickly
shut down nonessential systems.
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00:07:12,999 --> 00:07:16,068
JEANENE URBAN: The sooner they
start shutting things down,
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00:07:16,135 --> 00:07:19,839
the longer the battery
is going to last.
131
00:07:19,906 --> 00:07:22,008
How are the batteries?
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00:07:22,074 --> 00:07:24,010
Pretty good.
133
00:07:24,076 --> 00:07:26,746
We're at 21.5.
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00:07:26,813 --> 00:07:28,748
NARRATOR: The efforts
to conserve battery
135
00:07:28,815 --> 00:07:31,951
power seem to be paying off.
136
00:07:32,018 --> 00:07:34,720
Should last to Carbondale.
137
00:07:34,787 --> 00:07:35,421
Yeah.
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00:07:38,424 --> 00:07:41,294
NARRATOR: Midway to
their destination,
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00:07:41,360 --> 00:07:43,763
the weather deteriorates.
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00:07:45,364 --> 00:07:48,501
JEANENE URBAN: The weather
that Frank and Les encountered
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00:07:48,568 --> 00:07:50,403
trying to get down
to Carbondale was
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00:07:50,469 --> 00:07:53,139
much stormier than Springfield.
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00:07:53,206 --> 00:07:58,744
There were level two
and three thunderstorms.
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00:07:58,811 --> 00:08:00,980
Want me to tune in
to cabby real quick?
145
00:08:01,047 --> 00:08:02,014
Sure.
146
00:08:02,081 --> 00:08:03,182
Not gonna use that much power.
147
00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:08,888
NARRATOR: 45 miles from
Carbondale, the crew
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00:08:08,955 --> 00:08:11,390
tunes into a signal that will
provide a precise bearing
149
00:08:11,457 --> 00:08:12,291
to the airport.
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00:08:15,995 --> 00:08:18,297
Meanwhile, air traffic
control transfers
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00:08:18,364 --> 00:08:19,966
the flight to the
approach frequency
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00:08:20,032 --> 00:08:23,169
for Southern Illinois.
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00:08:23,236 --> 00:08:26,038
Air Illinois flight
710, contact Kansas
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00:08:26,105 --> 00:08:29,475
City center on frequency 125.3.
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00:08:29,542 --> 00:08:31,277
25.3, Roger.
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00:08:31,344 --> 00:08:35,948
Air Illinois 710.
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00:08:36,015 --> 00:08:38,951
They were getting
close to the airport,
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00:08:39,018 --> 00:08:42,355
and that approach control
facility would have lined them
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up for an instrument approach.
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00:08:46,492 --> 00:08:50,162
NARRATOR: After contacting
approach control,
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00:08:50,229 --> 00:08:53,165
the situation worsens.
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00:08:53,232 --> 00:08:56,402
I don't know if we have
enough juice to get out of this.
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NARRATOR: The radios and
transponder on flight 710
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00:08:59,338 --> 00:09:00,172
have shut down.
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00:09:03,075 --> 00:09:04,977
The pilots are now on their own.
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00:09:08,247 --> 00:09:11,918
Illinois 710, I've
lost radar contact.
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00:09:11,984 --> 00:09:14,320
NARRATOR: Flight 710
has disappeared from air
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00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:16,188
traffic control's radar.
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00:09:16,255 --> 00:09:19,959
Illinois 710, Kansas City.
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00:09:20,026 --> 00:09:26,265
They had no capability
at this point to like help.
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00:09:26,332 --> 00:09:30,002
It was probably
the most sickening
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00:09:30,069 --> 00:09:35,374
feeling for both of them
that you or I could imagine.
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Watch my altitude.
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00:09:37,209 --> 00:09:40,579
Going down to 2,400 feet.
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00:09:40,646 --> 00:09:44,417
NARRATOR: Concerned their
instruments are about to fail,
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00:09:44,483 --> 00:09:49,088
the captain attempts to
get below the clouds.
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00:09:49,155 --> 00:09:50,957
JEANENE URBAN: He
was desperately
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00:09:51,023 --> 00:09:53,559
hoping that he could
see the airport
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00:09:53,626 --> 00:09:58,297
beacon or some runway lights
and land that airplane visually.
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00:09:58,364 --> 00:10:02,435
DAVE MINTY: Just eight
minutes from landing--
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SMITH: You got a flashlight?
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00:10:03,669 --> 00:10:05,104
Yeah.
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00:10:05,171 --> 00:10:07,239
NARRATOR: The batteries
are almost depleted.
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00:10:07,306 --> 00:10:08,274
Here we go.
185
00:10:08,341 --> 00:10:10,009
You want to shine it up here.
186
00:10:10,076 --> 00:10:12,945
Trying to illuminate the
instruments with a flashlight
187
00:10:13,012 --> 00:10:17,216
in a dark cockpit,
that is very abnormal,
188
00:10:17,283 --> 00:10:19,352
and is he pointing it at an
instrument that's functioning
189
00:10:19,418 --> 00:10:21,654
or one that's not?
190
00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:26,058
We're losing everything
down to 13 volts.
191
00:10:26,125 --> 00:10:28,194
Watch my altitude, Frank.
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00:10:28,260 --> 00:10:32,465
JEANENE URBAN: It would have
been a total panic situation
193
00:10:32,531 --> 00:10:36,669
and realizing that they
were out of options.
194
00:10:44,110 --> 00:10:46,912
OK, 2,400.
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00:10:46,979 --> 00:10:49,849
NARRATOR: Rapidly
losing electrical power
196
00:10:49,915 --> 00:10:54,220
and operating in total darkness,
the pilots of Illinois flight
197
00:10:54,286 --> 00:10:58,858
710 desperately try
to land their plane.
198
00:10:58,924 --> 00:11:01,727
DAVE MINTY: The conditions
Carbondale were such
199
00:11:01,794 --> 00:11:03,629
that one mile
visibility in light rain
200
00:11:03,696 --> 00:11:10,236
and fog, his chances of seeing
anything were minimal at best.
201
00:11:10,302 --> 00:11:13,706
Do you have any instruments?
202
00:11:13,773 --> 00:11:14,607
Do you have a horizon?
203
00:11:17,843 --> 00:11:19,812
DAVE MINTY: They're
in a dark cockpit.
204
00:11:19,879 --> 00:11:21,680
Instruments are failing.
205
00:11:21,747 --> 00:11:23,783
They can't see anything outside.
206
00:11:23,849 --> 00:11:26,585
They were now into a
critical emergency.
207
00:11:26,652 --> 00:11:30,656
TUDOR: OK, you're
banking left six degrees.
208
00:11:30,723 --> 00:11:32,892
OK, correcting to the right.
209
00:11:36,929 --> 00:11:37,963
A little more.
210
00:11:57,416 --> 00:12:01,287
Illinois 710, Kansas
City, do you read?
211
00:12:01,353 --> 00:12:03,689
DAVE MINTY: I would be very
surprised that they knew
212
00:12:03,756 --> 00:12:05,191
that they were going to hit.
213
00:12:05,257 --> 00:12:09,295
I would be very surprised
they saw the ground at all.
214
00:12:09,361 --> 00:12:13,766
NARRATOR: Air Illinois flight
710 crashes 25 miles north
215
00:12:13,833 --> 00:12:14,867
of Carbondale airport.
216
00:12:17,903 --> 00:12:20,005
The wreckage is
scattered across farmland
217
00:12:20,072 --> 00:12:23,709
near the town of Pinckneyville.
218
00:12:23,776 --> 00:12:26,645
All seven passengers and
three crew members are dead.
219
00:12:32,451 --> 00:12:35,955
The National Transportation
Safety Board, or NTSB,
220
00:12:36,021 --> 00:12:38,090
begins an investigation
to determine
221
00:12:38,157 --> 00:12:41,260
what happened to flight 710.
222
00:12:41,327 --> 00:12:45,164
Let's see what we got here.
223
00:12:45,231 --> 00:12:47,933
NARRATOR: They begin by
reviewing the debris pattern.
224
00:12:53,205 --> 00:13:02,148
That's a half a mile long
and roughly 200 feet wide.
225
00:13:02,214 --> 00:13:06,852
NARRATOR: Investigators get a
sense of the vast impact area,
226
00:13:06,919 --> 00:13:09,388
which extends across
two small wooded areas,
227
00:13:09,455 --> 00:13:11,724
a field, and a pond.
228
00:13:11,790 --> 00:13:13,859
They came in at
a shallow angle.
229
00:13:13,926 --> 00:13:16,896
RON SCHLEEDE: The wreckage
pattern gave us the idea
230
00:13:16,962 --> 00:13:20,900
that this was a fairly
high speed, low angle
231
00:13:20,966 --> 00:13:23,202
impact to be able to
spread the wreckage
232
00:13:23,269 --> 00:13:26,972
like this over a half a mile.
233
00:13:27,039 --> 00:13:31,310
First point of impact
is right here with ground
234
00:13:31,377 --> 00:13:36,081
scars and debris heading north.
235
00:13:36,148 --> 00:13:40,386
Carbondale airport is
25 miles to the south.
236
00:13:40,452 --> 00:13:42,221
NARRATOR: Investigators
determined
237
00:13:42,288 --> 00:13:44,390
that at the time of
the crash, flight
238
00:13:44,456 --> 00:13:49,061
710 was flying in the opposite
direction to its destination.
239
00:13:49,128 --> 00:13:52,231
ROBERT WATSON: With the aircraft
traveling the way it was
240
00:13:52,298 --> 00:13:55,701
at that speed and in
a wrong direction,
241
00:13:55,768 --> 00:13:58,370
it made us wonder was
the aircraft actually
242
00:13:58,437 --> 00:13:59,905
under control.
243
00:13:59,972 --> 00:14:03,442
So first ground scar
here followed by a few
244
00:14:03,509 --> 00:14:11,850
more and then 200 feet in front
of that, the right wing tip.
245
00:14:11,917 --> 00:14:14,119
NARRATOR: Near the
first impact marks,
246
00:14:14,186 --> 00:14:17,423
investigators discover
fragments of a green navigation
247
00:14:17,489 --> 00:14:20,326
light from the plane's
right wing tip.
248
00:14:20,392 --> 00:14:24,063
It was banked to the right
when it hit the ground.
249
00:14:24,129 --> 00:14:26,098
RON SCHLEEDE: We had
the right wing tip.
250
00:14:26,165 --> 00:14:28,767
We knew that was the first
thing to hit the ground,
251
00:14:28,834 --> 00:14:32,104
and we could measure
approximately 30 degree right
252
00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:34,173
bank.
253
00:14:34,240 --> 00:14:37,476
Did the crew report any
issues to air traffic control?
254
00:14:37,543 --> 00:14:39,111
Yeah, they did.
255
00:14:42,248 --> 00:14:46,085
Springfield, Illinois
710, we have experienced
256
00:14:46,151 --> 00:14:48,254
a slight electrical problem.
257
00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:50,856
We'll keep you advised.
258
00:14:50,923 --> 00:14:54,393
NARRATOR: Investigators learned
that 90 seconds after taking
259
00:14:54,460 --> 00:14:59,465
off from Springfield, the crew
reported an electrical problem.
260
00:14:59,531 --> 00:15:01,367
Anything else?
261
00:15:01,433 --> 00:15:06,839
That's it, just the
electrical problem.
262
00:15:06,905 --> 00:15:08,807
We'll need to take
a good look at all
263
00:15:08,874 --> 00:15:10,776
the electrical components.
264
00:15:10,843 --> 00:15:14,813
RON SCHLEEDE: The pilot reported
a slight electrical problem,
265
00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:18,817
and it was up to us to figure
out what his problem was
266
00:15:18,884 --> 00:15:20,085
and why they crashed.
267
00:15:26,191 --> 00:15:28,327
Is this everything?
268
00:15:28,394 --> 00:15:31,363
NARRATOR: Investigators
examine electrical components
269
00:15:31,430 --> 00:15:35,567
for evidence of malfunctions.
270
00:15:35,634 --> 00:15:37,436
The wires are clean.
271
00:15:37,503 --> 00:15:38,470
There's no short circuit.
272
00:15:45,044 --> 00:15:47,012
This inverter's in bad shape.
273
00:15:49,581 --> 00:15:52,017
Hard to tell if they
were working or not.
274
00:15:54,520 --> 00:15:56,322
What about the batteries?
275
00:15:59,191 --> 00:16:03,996
NARRATOR: Four NiCad batteries
are powered by two generators.
276
00:16:04,063 --> 00:16:08,967
Each battery contains 18
individual battery cells.
277
00:16:09,034 --> 00:16:14,073
No signs of arcing or short
circuit as a result of impact.
278
00:16:14,139 --> 00:16:17,042
ROBERT WATSON: We were able
to recover a total of 10 cells
279
00:16:17,109 --> 00:16:20,379
from the batteries, and they
were all in decent shape.
280
00:16:20,446 --> 00:16:24,216
Well, let's see if
they can hold a charge.
281
00:16:24,283 --> 00:16:26,018
NARRATOR: Under
normal conditions,
282
00:16:26,085 --> 00:16:27,586
the battery should
be fully charged.
283
00:16:30,522 --> 00:16:34,426
Wow, they're dead.
284
00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:36,929
ROBERT WATSON: The batters
are able to hold a charge,
285
00:16:36,995 --> 00:16:41,633
but for some reason,
they were run down.
286
00:16:41,700 --> 00:16:44,103
NARRATOR: Did the
generators malfunction
287
00:16:44,169 --> 00:16:48,073
and fail to charge
the batteries?
288
00:16:48,140 --> 00:16:51,910
Now the left generator.
289
00:16:51,977 --> 00:16:54,346
NARRATOR: Aircraft
engines power a generator
290
00:16:54,413 --> 00:16:59,184
shaft to rotate a metal
core wrapped in copper coil.
291
00:16:59,251 --> 00:17:02,221
This is known as an armature.
292
00:17:02,287 --> 00:17:05,391
The armature spins rapidly
between the poles of a magnet
293
00:17:05,457 --> 00:17:07,159
to generate electricity.
294
00:17:10,662 --> 00:17:13,332
Banding wire's come off.
295
00:17:13,399 --> 00:17:15,534
NARRATOR: Banding
wire is used to hold
296
00:17:15,601 --> 00:17:20,139
the armature together as it
spins inside the assembly.
297
00:17:20,205 --> 00:17:23,375
If the banding wire comes
loose, the armature could jam.
298
00:17:30,449 --> 00:17:34,586
The soldering is melted.
299
00:17:34,653 --> 00:17:37,990
The motor must have overheated.
300
00:17:38,056 --> 00:17:40,225
NARRATOR: Investigators
discover evidence
301
00:17:40,292 --> 00:17:43,395
that the left generator failed.
302
00:17:43,462 --> 00:17:47,332
This happened
before the crash.
303
00:17:47,399 --> 00:17:49,034
ROBERT WATSON: We
know that there was
304
00:17:49,101 --> 00:17:53,272
no fire on the aircraft, so
we believe that the solder
305
00:17:53,338 --> 00:17:55,107
melted due to internal heating.
306
00:17:55,174 --> 00:17:57,976
But we don't know why.
307
00:17:58,043 --> 00:18:01,413
NARRATOR: They then inspect
the right generator.
308
00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:05,451
Well, the banding
wire's intact on this one.
309
00:18:05,517 --> 00:18:07,686
Looks fine.
310
00:18:07,753 --> 00:18:10,022
ROBERT WATSON: We did a
resistance test, checked
311
00:18:10,088 --> 00:18:12,724
the brushes, and we looked at
all the mechanical workings
312
00:18:12,791 --> 00:18:14,493
of the generator.
313
00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:17,162
We were not able to find any
reason why the right generator
314
00:18:17,229 --> 00:18:19,398
would not charge the batteries.
315
00:18:19,465 --> 00:18:23,001
How did they crash with
four working batteries
316
00:18:23,068 --> 00:18:25,337
and one working generator?
317
00:18:25,404 --> 00:18:28,173
RON SCHLEEDE: From
examination of the wreckage,
318
00:18:28,240 --> 00:18:33,178
we were not able to find
any reason for the accident.
319
00:18:33,245 --> 00:18:36,548
We were hoping that the voice
recorder would give us clues
320
00:18:36,615 --> 00:18:38,050
as to what really happened.
321
00:18:45,824 --> 00:18:48,961
The recording starts around
four minutes after takeoff.
322
00:18:51,663 --> 00:18:55,000
NARRATOR: Investigators turn
to flight 710's cockpit voice
323
00:18:55,067 --> 00:18:57,202
recorder to determine
how an aircraft
324
00:18:57,269 --> 00:19:00,072
with one functioning
generator crashed
325
00:19:00,138 --> 00:19:01,840
short of its destination.
326
00:19:07,913 --> 00:19:10,048
Zero voltage and
amps on the left side.
327
00:19:14,820 --> 00:19:17,823
Just like we suspected.
328
00:19:17,890 --> 00:19:20,359
NARRATOR: The CVR
recording confirms
329
00:19:20,425 --> 00:19:25,163
that the left generator
failed shortly after takeoff.
330
00:19:25,230 --> 00:19:29,234
The right generator's
putting out 27.5 volts,
331
00:19:29,301 --> 00:19:32,738
but I can't get
it to come online.
332
00:19:32,804 --> 00:19:34,907
NARRATOR: Investigators
can't understand
333
00:19:34,973 --> 00:19:37,109
why the right generator
was disconnected
334
00:19:37,175 --> 00:19:41,346
from the electrical system
if it was operational.
335
00:19:41,413 --> 00:19:43,649
Then they hear an
astonishing statement
336
00:19:43,715 --> 00:19:46,652
from the first officer
to the captain.
337
00:19:46,718 --> 00:19:48,153
TUDOR: When we
lost the left one,
338
00:19:48,220 --> 00:19:50,155
I reached up and shut
off the right generator
339
00:19:50,222 --> 00:19:53,725
because I assumed the
problem was the right side.
340
00:19:53,792 --> 00:19:55,193
Isolating it now.
341
00:19:57,829 --> 00:20:01,733
NARRATOR: There are two shutoff
switches for the generators,
342
00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:05,771
one for the left generator
and one for the right.
343
00:20:05,837 --> 00:20:08,006
The first officer
disconnects the right one
344
00:20:08,073 --> 00:20:13,111
to protect the rest of the
aircraft's electrical system,
345
00:20:13,178 --> 00:20:15,914
but he soon realizes that
it's the left one that
346
00:20:15,981 --> 00:20:20,118
has the issue, not the right.
347
00:20:20,185 --> 00:20:23,722
Why doesn't he
just reconnect it?
348
00:20:23,789 --> 00:20:26,725
He tries, but it doesn't work.
349
00:20:26,792 --> 00:20:28,260
ROBERT WATSON: The
right generator
350
00:20:28,327 --> 00:20:30,929
was not charging the battery
so that we know all they had
351
00:20:30,996 --> 00:20:34,299
to power the aircraft was the
charge remaining on the battery
352
00:20:34,366 --> 00:20:36,735
shortly after takeoff.
353
00:20:36,802 --> 00:20:40,005
Maybe there was a problem
with the switching unit?
354
00:20:40,072 --> 00:20:42,941
ROBERT WATSON: If the generator
switching unit is not working,
355
00:20:43,008 --> 00:20:44,910
then the generator will
not come back online.
356
00:20:44,977 --> 00:20:46,345
So we were quite
interested in learning what
357
00:20:46,411 --> 00:20:47,913
we could about this component.
358
00:20:52,050 --> 00:20:54,386
It's in pretty rough shape.
359
00:20:54,453 --> 00:20:57,022
NARRATOR: Looking for
signs of a malfunction,
360
00:20:57,089 --> 00:21:00,392
investigators examine the
right generator control switch.
361
00:21:04,429 --> 00:21:07,466
I can't tell 100%.
362
00:21:07,532 --> 00:21:11,203
It's possible it failed
before the crash.
363
00:21:11,269 --> 00:21:12,471
ROBERT WATSON: The
switching unit was
364
00:21:12,537 --> 00:21:14,272
heavily damaged from the crash.
365
00:21:14,339 --> 00:21:17,409
We were not able to determine
if that's even why the generator
366
00:21:17,476 --> 00:21:18,343
would not come online.
367
00:21:21,413 --> 00:21:24,950
Even if the switch
was broken, it doesn't
368
00:21:25,017 --> 00:21:26,351
explain the pilot's actions.
369
00:21:29,354 --> 00:21:32,858
The first officer says
I assumed the problem
370
00:21:32,924 --> 00:21:35,060
was with the right side.
371
00:21:35,127 --> 00:21:37,062
Why would he assume
something like that?
372
00:21:37,129 --> 00:21:38,397
ROBERT WATSON: Made
us wonder if there
373
00:21:38,463 --> 00:21:42,434
was a problem with that
generator in the past.
374
00:21:42,501 --> 00:21:45,103
Take a look at these
maintenance reports.
375
00:21:45,170 --> 00:21:47,072
NARRATOR: The team
reviews the maintenance
376
00:21:47,139 --> 00:21:49,975
records for the Hawker
Siddeley's generators.
377
00:21:50,042 --> 00:21:51,510
Check it out.
378
00:21:51,576 --> 00:21:53,912
No less than eight separate
pilot complaints and repairs
379
00:21:53,979 --> 00:21:57,315
on the right generator.
380
00:21:57,382 --> 00:22:01,153
There were voltage
fluctuations and recurring
381
00:22:01,219 --> 00:22:02,954
problems at the regulator.
382
00:22:03,021 --> 00:22:05,157
Causing the right
generator shut down.
383
00:22:08,060 --> 00:22:10,328
NARRATOR: Two weeks
before the crash,
384
00:22:10,395 --> 00:22:14,533
there were issues with a right
generator almost every day.
385
00:22:14,599 --> 00:22:16,234
RON SCHLEEDE: They
were doing maintenance,
386
00:22:16,301 --> 00:22:19,237
they were troubleshooting
it, they were changing parts,
387
00:22:19,304 --> 00:22:21,306
and they couldn't fix it.
388
00:22:21,373 --> 00:22:24,376
Air Illinois had one
Hawker Siddeley and three
389
00:22:24,443 --> 00:22:27,946
flight crews flying that plane.
390
00:22:28,013 --> 00:22:29,548
ROBERT WATSON: I'm
sure that they all
391
00:22:29,614 --> 00:22:32,417
knew that the right generator
had had problems in the past,
392
00:22:32,484 --> 00:22:33,518
and they probably
all experienced
393
00:22:33,585 --> 00:22:36,021
it at one time or another.
394
00:22:36,088 --> 00:22:38,323
JEANENE URBAN: The
first officer had
395
00:22:38,390 --> 00:22:41,326
been on some of those flights
where the right generator
396
00:22:41,393 --> 00:22:44,329
had actually disconnected.
397
00:22:44,396 --> 00:22:46,498
Thank goodness I was not.
398
00:22:46,565 --> 00:22:50,268
The most I ever saw it do
was flicker a time or two.
399
00:22:50,335 --> 00:22:53,071
That would explain
why the first officer
400
00:22:53,138 --> 00:22:56,108
disconnected the right generator
instead of the left one.
401
00:22:58,643 --> 00:23:00,612
NARRATOR: Investigators
suspect that
402
00:23:00,679 --> 00:23:02,481
on the night of the crash--
403
00:23:02,547 --> 00:23:04,950
It's the generator again.
404
00:23:05,016 --> 00:23:07,419
NARRATOR: The first officer
made the immediate assumption
405
00:23:07,486 --> 00:23:11,890
that the right generator
had malfunctioned.
406
00:23:11,957 --> 00:23:14,359
ROBERT WATSON: The reaction
that the first officer had
407
00:23:14,426 --> 00:23:16,394
about taking the right
generator offline
408
00:23:16,461 --> 00:23:20,632
probably falls into a phenomenon
that's called expectation bias.
409
00:23:20,699 --> 00:23:23,535
He has experienced
this in the past
410
00:23:23,602 --> 00:23:27,005
and assumed that that was
going to be the problem
411
00:23:27,072 --> 00:23:29,141
without really looking
at the indications
412
00:23:29,207 --> 00:23:30,976
they had available to him.
413
00:23:31,042 --> 00:23:34,112
Still doesn't
explain the crash.
414
00:23:34,179 --> 00:23:37,415
NARRATOR: Even though both
generators were offline,
415
00:23:37,482 --> 00:23:40,051
investigators know the
aircraft's batteries
416
00:23:40,118 --> 00:23:42,254
were in working order.
417
00:23:42,320 --> 00:23:44,389
How are the batteries?
418
00:23:44,456 --> 00:23:46,424
Pretty good.
419
00:23:46,491 --> 00:23:49,394
They're at 21.5.
420
00:23:49,461 --> 00:23:51,463
Should last to Carbondale.
421
00:23:51,530 --> 00:23:52,998
Yeah.
422
00:23:53,064 --> 00:23:54,299
ROBERT WATSON: It was
really important to know
423
00:23:54,366 --> 00:23:56,134
did the batteries
have enough endurance
424
00:23:56,201 --> 00:23:57,169
to get to the airport.
425
00:24:04,142 --> 00:24:07,212
Let's see how they
manage their battery power.
426
00:24:07,279 --> 00:24:10,649
NARRATOR: Investigators return
to the cockpit voice recorder
427
00:24:10,715 --> 00:24:14,252
to determine why flight 710
ran out of battery power
428
00:24:14,319 --> 00:24:18,089
before reaching Carbondale.
429
00:24:18,156 --> 00:24:21,893
SMITH: How are the bats there?
430
00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:24,963
We're down to 22.5 volts.
431
00:24:25,030 --> 00:24:27,799
OK, beacons off.
432
00:24:27,866 --> 00:24:30,802
OK.
433
00:24:30,869 --> 00:24:33,605
SMITH: Nav lights are off.
434
00:24:33,672 --> 00:24:36,708
NARRATOR: Just minutes after
discovering both generators
435
00:24:36,775 --> 00:24:40,145
are down, the pilots turn
off nonessential systems
436
00:24:40,212 --> 00:24:41,713
to save their batteries.
437
00:24:44,349 --> 00:24:47,085
They were doing the
right thing turning
438
00:24:47,152 --> 00:24:49,254
things off to reduce the load.
439
00:24:49,321 --> 00:24:50,722
But is it enough?
440
00:24:54,159 --> 00:24:56,795
According to the manufacturer,
they needed to reduce
441
00:24:56,862 --> 00:24:59,598
their load to 70 amps.
442
00:24:59,664 --> 00:25:01,333
NARRATOR: Amps
measure the strength
443
00:25:01,399 --> 00:25:03,001
of an electrical current.
444
00:25:03,068 --> 00:25:04,870
The more amps
drawn on a battery,
445
00:25:04,936 --> 00:25:08,940
the faster the battery
will discharge.
446
00:25:09,007 --> 00:25:11,610
ROBERT WATSON: If the crew would
have reduced the load to 70
447
00:25:11,676 --> 00:25:13,211
amps, that would have
given them a minimum
448
00:25:13,278 --> 00:25:15,180
of 30 minutes of endurance.
449
00:25:15,247 --> 00:25:17,215
That might have been
enough time to get
450
00:25:17,282 --> 00:25:19,184
them to the Carbondale airport.
451
00:25:19,251 --> 00:25:23,889
Let's see if they got
their load down to 70 amps.
452
00:25:23,955 --> 00:25:28,960
Well, we know they
turned off the beacons,
453
00:25:29,027 --> 00:25:30,795
navigation lights--
454
00:25:30,862 --> 00:25:34,065
NARRATOR: Investigators make
an inventory of the instruments
455
00:25:34,132 --> 00:25:36,001
the crew turned
off and what they
456
00:25:36,067 --> 00:25:41,273
left on in order to calculate
the load on the batteries.
457
00:25:41,339 --> 00:25:44,743
What else?
458
00:25:44,809 --> 00:25:47,178
SMITH: Are you using
these lights here?
459
00:25:47,245 --> 00:25:49,648
TUDOR: I'll get that one down.
460
00:25:49,714 --> 00:25:52,017
RON SCHLEEDE: We were
not able to determine
461
00:25:52,083 --> 00:25:56,688
what was powered up or on or off
based on the flight recorder.
462
00:25:56,755 --> 00:25:58,156
TUDOR: Should last
the Carbondale.
463
00:25:58,223 --> 00:26:00,859
RON SCHLEEDE: So we had to
rely on the conversations
464
00:26:00,926 --> 00:26:05,363
between the two pilots what to
leave on and what to turn off.
465
00:26:05,430 --> 00:26:07,799
Want me to tune
into cabby real quick?
466
00:26:07,866 --> 00:26:08,833
Sure.
467
00:26:08,900 --> 00:26:10,035
Not gonna use that much power.
468
00:26:13,338 --> 00:26:21,813
The DME instruments, weather
radar, main cabin lights, one
469
00:26:21,880 --> 00:26:28,286
of the main radios, cooling
fan, and the transponder.
470
00:26:28,353 --> 00:26:31,022
RON SCHLEEDE: The weather
radar and the radios
471
00:26:31,089 --> 00:26:34,092
draw a lot of power, and
so shedding those if you
472
00:26:34,159 --> 00:26:37,028
can is a prudent thing to do.
473
00:26:37,095 --> 00:26:39,197
Looks like they kept the rest
of the flight instruments on
474
00:26:39,264 --> 00:26:40,799
and that's it.
475
00:26:46,304 --> 00:26:48,907
They used 110 amps.
476
00:26:48,974 --> 00:26:51,142
NARRATOR: Investigators
discover the crew
477
00:26:51,209 --> 00:26:55,880
did not properly reduce the
draw on their batteries.
478
00:26:55,947 --> 00:26:58,817
No wonder they didn't
make it to Carbondale.
479
00:26:58,883 --> 00:27:01,152
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: This
importance with load shedding
480
00:27:01,219 --> 00:27:05,690
and getting down to 70 amps
seems to be lost on the crew
481
00:27:05,757 --> 00:27:08,360
as there seems to be no
discussion whatsoever
482
00:27:08,426 --> 00:27:11,463
about amperage to
determine if their changes
483
00:27:11,529 --> 00:27:13,431
in the electrical
system were actually
484
00:27:13,498 --> 00:27:18,336
making a difference in the
longevity of the batteries.
485
00:27:18,403 --> 00:27:21,840
NARRATOR: So why did the pilots
believe they had enough power
486
00:27:21,906 --> 00:27:25,410
to reach their destination?
487
00:27:25,477 --> 00:27:28,279
The team checks to see
how the pilots monitored
488
00:27:28,346 --> 00:27:30,415
the state of their batteries.
489
00:27:30,482 --> 00:27:35,086
It says here fully charged,
the batteries are 24 volts.
490
00:27:35,153 --> 00:27:36,421
Let's see how they did.
491
00:27:40,859 --> 00:27:42,360
SMITH: How are the bats there?
492
00:27:45,063 --> 00:27:49,734
We're down to 22.5 volts.
493
00:27:49,801 --> 00:27:53,405
Eight minutes into the
flight, they used up 1.5 volts.
494
00:27:57,275 --> 00:27:59,744
Seven minutes later--
495
00:27:59,811 --> 00:28:02,247
SMITH: How are the batteries?
496
00:28:02,313 --> 00:28:04,249
Pretty good.
497
00:28:04,315 --> 00:28:06,151
We're at 21.5.
498
00:28:06,217 --> 00:28:14,492
The battery charge drops
another volt to 21.5.
499
00:28:14,559 --> 00:28:16,895
The first officer
says the battery
500
00:28:16,961 --> 00:28:20,131
should last to Carbondale.
501
00:28:20,198 --> 00:28:23,101
They're halfway through the
flight, he's feeling good.
502
00:28:23,168 --> 00:28:26,204
And then nine minutes
later, he checks again.
503
00:28:26,271 --> 00:28:27,138
It's 20 volts.
504
00:28:33,878 --> 00:28:36,381
So they think they're
doing all right.
505
00:28:36,448 --> 00:28:39,017
And then minutes later,
the radios go dead.
506
00:28:43,354 --> 00:28:47,092
We're losing everything
down to 13 volts.
507
00:28:47,158 --> 00:28:50,361
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: They're
talking about having 20 volts,
508
00:28:50,428 --> 00:28:53,998
and then they all of a
sudden, they have 13 volts.
509
00:28:54,065 --> 00:28:56,167
So they're
monitoring the volts,
510
00:28:56,234 --> 00:28:59,204
but it's as if the sudden
drop caught them by surprise.
511
00:28:59,270 --> 00:29:01,372
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: The reason
this is significant is
512
00:29:01,439 --> 00:29:04,375
because NiCad
batteries will maintain
513
00:29:04,442 --> 00:29:07,378
their voltage almost
right until the end
514
00:29:07,445 --> 00:29:09,247
that the batteries are dead.
515
00:29:09,314 --> 00:29:11,883
Much different
than lead acid type
516
00:29:11,950 --> 00:29:13,551
batteries, which
is where you see
517
00:29:13,618 --> 00:29:18,089
a gradual decline in voltage.
518
00:29:18,156 --> 00:29:21,092
NARRATOR: That characteristic
of NiCad batteries
519
00:29:21,159 --> 00:29:23,528
may explain why there
was such a sudden drop
520
00:29:23,595 --> 00:29:26,498
in the battery voltage.
521
00:29:26,564 --> 00:29:30,001
I don't know if we have
enough juice to get out of this.
522
00:29:30,068 --> 00:29:32,504
ROBERT WATSON: If they would
have known the characteristic
523
00:29:32,570 --> 00:29:35,373
of a NiCad battery, it might
have sent them a message
524
00:29:35,440 --> 00:29:37,008
saying we better
get on this right
525
00:29:37,075 --> 00:29:40,011
away and get this load reduced.
526
00:29:40,078 --> 00:29:42,313
NARRATOR: Investigators
find another reason why
527
00:29:42,380 --> 00:29:44,883
the crew may have missed how
fast their batteries were
528
00:29:44,949 --> 00:29:46,885
discharging.
529
00:29:46,951 --> 00:29:50,588
They never
mentioned their amps.
530
00:29:50,655 --> 00:29:54,492
Looks like the only thing
they monitored were the volts.
531
00:29:54,559 --> 00:29:57,929
NARRATOR: Volts measure the
potential output of a battery,
532
00:29:57,996 --> 00:30:00,198
not how long it will last.
533
00:30:00,265 --> 00:30:04,035
Amps tell you how much
electricity is being drawn.
534
00:30:04,102 --> 00:30:06,037
ROBERT WATSON: It was very
surprising that they weren't
535
00:30:06,104 --> 00:30:07,605
monitoring the
amperage because that
536
00:30:07,672 --> 00:30:09,874
was going to tell them
how much longer they
537
00:30:09,941 --> 00:30:12,010
had on the batteries.
538
00:30:12,076 --> 00:30:15,180
NARRATOR: Did the crew have
the proper training to monitor
539
00:30:15,246 --> 00:30:17,115
the endurance of the batteries?
540
00:30:22,554 --> 00:30:25,890
Investigators interview
other Air Illinois pilots--
541
00:30:25,957 --> 00:30:27,192
So what'd you find out.
542
00:30:27,258 --> 00:30:28,960
NARRATOR: To determine
their ability
543
00:30:29,027 --> 00:30:34,098
to monitor and calculate
battery endurance.
544
00:30:34,165 --> 00:30:37,902
Well, we know that they're all
trained on battery management
545
00:30:37,969 --> 00:30:39,904
for a dual generator problem.
546
00:30:39,971 --> 00:30:43,942
But when I asked them how long
they thought the batteries
547
00:30:44,008 --> 00:30:48,479
would have lasted on the flight,
some calculated 30 minutes,
548
00:30:48,546 --> 00:30:51,983
others less than an hour.
549
00:30:52,050 --> 00:30:55,053
Five pilots gave us
five different answers,
550
00:30:55,119 --> 00:30:57,922
and they were not all correct.
551
00:30:57,989 --> 00:30:59,390
ROBERT WATSON: It
became obvious to us
552
00:30:59,457 --> 00:31:02,260
there was definitely a
training issue involved here.
553
00:31:02,327 --> 00:31:05,296
Are you using
these lights here?
554
00:31:05,363 --> 00:31:07,632
I'll get that one down.
555
00:31:07,699 --> 00:31:11,269
NARRATOR: The lack of training
explains why the pilots thought
556
00:31:11,336 --> 00:31:14,973
they had enough power
to reach Carbondale,
557
00:31:15,039 --> 00:31:17,108
but that doesn't solve
a bigger mystery.
558
00:31:20,445 --> 00:31:21,946
This is their flight path.
559
00:31:22,013 --> 00:31:24,515
NARRATOR: Why didn't
the pilots land the pain
560
00:31:24,582 --> 00:31:26,551
at another airport
before completely
561
00:31:26,618 --> 00:31:28,519
running out of battery power?
562
00:31:28,586 --> 00:31:34,692
1, 2, 3, 4, 5
different airports.
563
00:31:34,759 --> 00:31:37,195
They were only five minutes
away from Springfield,
564
00:31:37,262 --> 00:31:40,431
yet they elected to go
40 minutes to Carbondale.
565
00:31:40,498 --> 00:31:44,035
And there were several airports
in between that they missed.
566
00:31:44,102 --> 00:31:46,704
They could have landed
any time along the way.
567
00:31:46,771 --> 00:31:49,140
NARRATOR: Their
decision not to land
568
00:31:49,207 --> 00:31:53,144
calls the pilots'
judgment into question.
569
00:31:53,211 --> 00:31:55,480
It's time to look
into their backgrounds.
570
00:32:04,355 --> 00:32:06,858
Here's the captain's file.
571
00:32:06,924 --> 00:32:10,561
NARRATOR: Investigators dig into
the backgrounds of flight 710's
572
00:32:10,628 --> 00:32:13,731
pilots for clues that explain
their unusual reaction
573
00:32:13,798 --> 00:32:14,932
to an electrical failure.
574
00:32:18,303 --> 00:32:21,739
The captain was
perfectly qualified.
575
00:32:21,806 --> 00:32:25,243
Same with the FO.
576
00:32:25,310 --> 00:32:26,978
Gear up.
577
00:32:27,045 --> 00:32:29,614
NARRATOR: The two pilots were
among the most experienced
578
00:32:29,681 --> 00:32:31,182
flight crew in the roster--
579
00:32:31,249 --> 00:32:32,917
Gear is up.
580
00:32:32,984 --> 00:32:35,720
NARRATOR: With a combined
5,000 flying hours between them
581
00:32:35,787 --> 00:32:36,688
on the Hawker Siddeley.
582
00:32:39,424 --> 00:32:41,859
Here's something.
583
00:32:41,926 --> 00:32:44,996
The captain lived in Carbondale.
584
00:32:45,063 --> 00:32:47,598
Maybe he wanted to get home.
585
00:32:47,665 --> 00:32:49,367
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI:
In aviation, what we
586
00:32:49,434 --> 00:32:53,871
describe as get home itis
is when we try to make it
587
00:32:53,938 --> 00:32:58,042
to the destination because of
our strong desire to do so,
588
00:32:58,109 --> 00:33:02,747
and it plays a significant
role in our decision making.
589
00:33:02,814 --> 00:33:05,149
NARRATOR: Investigators
talk to other pilots
590
00:33:05,216 --> 00:33:09,687
at the company including
first officer Jeanene Urban.
591
00:33:09,754 --> 00:33:13,057
How well did you
know the pilots?
592
00:33:13,124 --> 00:33:15,760
I flew with the captain,
and I was good friends
593
00:33:15,827 --> 00:33:16,728
with the first officer.
594
00:33:19,163 --> 00:33:21,799
JEANENE URBAN: I
thought very highly
595
00:33:21,866 --> 00:33:24,402
of the first officer Frank.
596
00:33:24,469 --> 00:33:30,241
I knew the flight attendant
Barbie and liked her a lot.
597
00:33:30,308 --> 00:33:34,645
It was a very emotional thing
to hear that both of them
598
00:33:34,712 --> 00:33:37,115
had been killed.
599
00:33:37,181 --> 00:33:40,718
What sort of pilot
was the captain?
600
00:33:40,785 --> 00:33:43,855
I'd say average.
601
00:33:43,921 --> 00:33:46,224
ROBERT WATSON: In the aviation
community, when someone is
602
00:33:46,290 --> 00:33:48,192
characterized as
an average pilot,
603
00:33:48,259 --> 00:33:51,295
that usually means
he's not too good.
604
00:33:51,362 --> 00:33:53,364
Why is that?
605
00:33:53,431 --> 00:33:55,266
The captain really
prided himself
606
00:33:55,333 --> 00:33:57,268
on getting there on time.
607
00:33:57,335 --> 00:34:02,039
JEANENE URBAN: It was not
uncommon for him to take risks.
608
00:34:04,742 --> 00:34:06,344
Looks like we've
got some weather.
609
00:34:06,411 --> 00:34:08,446
Shall I call for deviation?
610
00:34:08,513 --> 00:34:11,249
SMITH: Doesn't look too bad.
611
00:34:11,315 --> 00:34:12,150
We'll be fine.
612
00:34:14,852 --> 00:34:17,221
NARRATOR: According to
Air Illinois pilots,
613
00:34:17,288 --> 00:34:19,791
the captain would
often fly too close
614
00:34:19,857 --> 00:34:22,794
or through dangerous
storms to save flight time.
615
00:34:25,763 --> 00:34:31,969
JEANENE URBAN: If I made
any comments or suggestions
616
00:34:32,036 --> 00:34:35,773
about a safety issue like the
thunderstorms or anything else,
617
00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:40,211
he would do something
spiteful just to prove
618
00:34:40,278 --> 00:34:42,713
that he was the captain.
619
00:34:42,780 --> 00:34:46,050
In order to keep schedule,
he'd also speed up, which would
620
00:34:46,117 --> 00:34:48,986
set off the overspeed alarm.
621
00:34:51,355 --> 00:34:53,458
Pull the circuit
breaker, would you?
622
00:34:53,524 --> 00:34:55,193
What?
623
00:34:55,259 --> 00:34:57,128
Really?
624
00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,896
NARRATOR: Pilots
said he would order
625
00:34:58,963 --> 00:35:01,232
them to disable the
overspeed warning
626
00:35:01,299 --> 00:35:04,836
so that they could fly faster.
627
00:35:04,902 --> 00:35:09,774
It was always about
getting there faster.
628
00:35:09,841 --> 00:35:14,445
NARRATOR: The captain's
behavior is troublesome.
629
00:35:14,512 --> 00:35:18,082
RON SCHLEEDE: We wanted to know
if the company, the airline,
630
00:35:18,149 --> 00:35:20,751
was putting undue
pressure on the pilots
631
00:35:20,818 --> 00:35:22,420
to make the schedule.
632
00:35:22,487 --> 00:35:26,757
This pressure to get there on
time, was it from management?
633
00:35:26,824 --> 00:35:28,025
No.
634
00:35:28,092 --> 00:35:29,927
It was all the captain.
635
00:35:29,994 --> 00:35:31,496
The interviews
with the other pilots
636
00:35:31,562 --> 00:35:34,198
indicated that there
was no undue pressure
637
00:35:34,265 --> 00:35:36,067
to skirt the rules.
638
00:35:36,133 --> 00:35:39,537
In the case of the captain,
that pressure was self imposed.
639
00:35:39,604 --> 00:35:42,773
NARRATOR: Investigators
conclude that Captain Smith
640
00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:44,842
often stretched the rules.
641
00:35:44,909 --> 00:35:46,310
And what about
the first officer?
642
00:35:50,181 --> 00:35:54,252
Frank was the best.
643
00:35:54,318 --> 00:35:58,189
And he knew the plane and
its systems really well.
644
00:35:58,256 --> 00:36:00,291
NARRATOR: So why didn't
the first officer
645
00:36:00,358 --> 00:36:04,795
speak up when Captain Smith
made the decision to carry on.
646
00:36:04,862 --> 00:36:06,831
DISPATCH: Air Illinois
710, do you intend
647
00:36:06,898 --> 00:36:08,299
to return to Springfield?
648
00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:13,271
Negative continuing to
Carbondale, 3,000 feet.
649
00:36:13,337 --> 00:36:14,972
ROBERT WATSON:
And at no time did
650
00:36:15,039 --> 00:36:16,908
we hear the first
officer challenge
651
00:36:16,974 --> 00:36:18,843
the captain's decision
to go on to Carbondale.
652
00:36:18,910 --> 00:36:20,411
We found this very perplexing.
653
00:36:20,478 --> 00:36:22,547
I asked how he could
fly with the captain
654
00:36:22,613 --> 00:36:25,082
because he took
so many chances--
655
00:36:25,149 --> 00:36:29,020
JEANENE URBAN: And
he said, oh, I just
656
00:36:29,086 --> 00:36:31,322
try to keep an eye
on the situation
657
00:36:31,389 --> 00:36:33,291
and not let him get
us into anything
658
00:36:33,357 --> 00:36:35,359
that I can't get us out of.
659
00:36:35,426 --> 00:36:38,262
We're losing everything
down to 13 volts.
660
00:36:38,329 --> 00:36:40,932
Watch my altitude, Frank.
661
00:36:40,998 --> 00:36:44,335
JEANENE URBAN: Boy, that didn't
work out very well at all.
662
00:36:44,402 --> 00:36:46,437
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI: The captain
should have made the decision
663
00:36:46,504 --> 00:36:50,341
to return to the Springfield
airport, and if so none of this
664
00:36:50,408 --> 00:36:51,275
would have happened.
665
00:36:54,211 --> 00:36:56,280
Thank you.
666
00:36:56,347 --> 00:37:00,051
NARRATOR: Investigators conclude
that the risk-taking captain
667
00:37:00,117 --> 00:37:05,590
and an unassertive first officer
was a dangerous combination.
668
00:37:05,656 --> 00:37:07,992
Let's pick it
up from where they
669
00:37:08,059 --> 00:37:11,228
realize they don't have enough
power to make it to Carbondale.
670
00:37:11,295 --> 00:37:15,466
NARRATOR: The team returns to
the cockpit voice recording
671
00:37:15,533 --> 00:37:18,069
to see if they can
uncover why the plain
672
00:37:18,135 --> 00:37:21,372
ended up so far off course.
673
00:37:21,439 --> 00:37:23,140
SMITH (ON RECORDING):
Watch my altitude.
674
00:37:23,207 --> 00:37:25,977
Going down to 2,400 feet.
675
00:37:26,043 --> 00:37:28,913
OK.
676
00:37:28,980 --> 00:37:31,482
Stop the tape.
677
00:37:31,549 --> 00:37:38,889
Why would the captain decide
to drop down to 2,400 feet?
678
00:37:38,956 --> 00:37:41,392
The cloud ceiling
near Carbondale
679
00:37:41,459 --> 00:37:44,395
was almost 2,000
feet, so maybe he
680
00:37:44,462 --> 00:37:46,063
was popping in and
out of the clouds
681
00:37:46,130 --> 00:37:49,266
to see something on the ground.
682
00:37:49,333 --> 00:37:50,167
Play on.
683
00:37:53,971 --> 00:37:55,272
SMITH (ON RECORDING):
You got a flashlight?
684
00:37:55,339 --> 00:37:58,342
Yeah.
685
00:37:58,409 --> 00:37:59,377
Here we go.
686
00:37:59,443 --> 00:38:01,345
You want to shine it up here.
687
00:38:01,412 --> 00:38:05,082
NARRATOR: Just as the captain
tries to see the ground,
688
00:38:05,149 --> 00:38:08,152
the cockpit lights
go out and plunge
689
00:38:08,219 --> 00:38:10,221
them into total darkness.
690
00:38:10,287 --> 00:38:12,556
We're losing everything
down to 13 volts.
691
00:38:15,192 --> 00:38:16,594
Watch my altitude, Frank.
692
00:38:19,697 --> 00:38:25,102
OK, 2,400.
693
00:38:25,169 --> 00:38:28,139
They make it to 2,400 feet.
694
00:38:28,205 --> 00:38:31,575
The captain plans to level
off, spot the runway,
695
00:38:31,642 --> 00:38:34,679
and continue his descent.
696
00:38:34,745 --> 00:38:37,148
But that's not what happens.
697
00:38:37,214 --> 00:38:41,419
OK, you're banking
left, six degrees.
698
00:38:41,485 --> 00:38:43,721
OK, correcting to the right.
699
00:38:43,788 --> 00:38:45,289
ROBERT WATSON:
Just minutes later
700
00:38:45,356 --> 00:38:47,124
they ended up
crashing in completely
701
00:38:47,191 --> 00:38:48,059
the opposite direction.
702
00:38:48,125 --> 00:38:49,727
A little more.
703
00:38:49,794 --> 00:38:53,631
So the question
is what happened.
704
00:38:59,670 --> 00:39:01,539
How do you go
from leveling off
705
00:39:01,605 --> 00:39:04,375
at 2,400 feet to then
hitting the ground
706
00:39:04,442 --> 00:39:07,011
in the opposite direction?
707
00:39:07,078 --> 00:39:11,649
NARRATOR: Investigators examine
the final moments of flight 710
708
00:39:11,716 --> 00:39:15,252
to determine what ultimately
brought the plane down.
709
00:39:15,319 --> 00:39:16,721
How does the recording end?
710
00:39:25,629 --> 00:39:28,265
NARRATOR: The recording
eerily slows down.
711
00:39:32,636 --> 00:39:36,407
And then silence.
712
00:39:36,474 --> 00:39:37,775
Their batteries just died.
713
00:39:43,114 --> 00:39:45,783
NARRATOR: The captain is
asking for a horizon reading
714
00:39:45,850 --> 00:39:48,686
on the attitude directional
indicator or ADI.
715
00:39:51,522 --> 00:39:54,725
The ADI uses an
electrically-powered gyroscope
716
00:39:54,792 --> 00:39:58,162
to indicate the aircraft's
pitch and roll relative
717
00:39:58,229 --> 00:40:01,065
to the Earth's horizon.
718
00:40:01,132 --> 00:40:02,666
SHAWN PRUCHNICKI:
It's nighttime,
719
00:40:02,733 --> 00:40:06,470
no discernible horizon,
low visibility.
720
00:40:06,537 --> 00:40:10,207
Your ADI is everything that
you need to be able to keep
721
00:40:10,274 --> 00:40:12,643
the airplane wings level.
722
00:40:12,710 --> 00:40:17,047
They've lost the lights
on their instruments.
723
00:40:17,114 --> 00:40:21,418
Some of them are
starting to fail.
724
00:40:21,485 --> 00:40:25,322
He asked the first officer to
shine a light on their ADI.
725
00:40:28,292 --> 00:40:32,163
TUDOR: OK, you're banking
left, six degrees.
726
00:40:32,229 --> 00:40:35,199
OK, correcting to the right.
727
00:40:35,266 --> 00:40:39,303
NARRATOR: Investigators can
only surmise what happened next.
728
00:40:39,370 --> 00:40:41,639
Even if all the
instruments had failed,
729
00:40:41,705 --> 00:40:46,143
the ADI would still
look like it's working.
730
00:40:46,210 --> 00:40:51,749
NARRATOR: The ADI gyroscope
spins at about 15,000 RPM.
731
00:40:51,816 --> 00:40:54,652
Even after the power shuts
down, it will continue
732
00:40:54,718 --> 00:40:57,421
rotating for several minutes.
733
00:40:57,488 --> 00:41:01,292
So it looks like it's
working, but it really is not.
734
00:41:01,358 --> 00:41:06,697
NARRATOR: As the ADI winds down,
it slowly tilts to one side.
735
00:41:06,764 --> 00:41:13,771
Imagine that ADI starts
slowly falling to the left.
736
00:41:13,838 --> 00:41:16,340
They correct by
rolling to the right.
737
00:41:18,809 --> 00:41:23,147
OK, you're banking
left six degrees.
738
00:41:23,214 --> 00:41:24,815
OK, correcting to the right.
739
00:41:27,751 --> 00:41:30,487
A little more.
740
00:41:30,554 --> 00:41:32,590
ROBERT WATSON: It may have
appeared to them that the ADI
741
00:41:32,656 --> 00:41:34,358
was working
correctly, but they're
742
00:41:34,425 --> 00:41:38,195
really banking to the
right and losing altitude.
743
00:41:38,262 --> 00:41:40,364
They probably
followed that failing
744
00:41:40,431 --> 00:41:43,567
ADI right into the ground.
745
00:41:46,237 --> 00:41:47,638
RON SCHLEEDE: They couldn't
see where they were,
746
00:41:47,705 --> 00:41:50,140
they couldn't see
any lights, and it
747
00:41:50,207 --> 00:41:51,242
would be over in an instant.
748
00:42:05,689 --> 00:42:08,559
NARRATOR: In their final
report, investigators
749
00:42:08,626 --> 00:42:11,495
conclude that the fatal
accident was a consequence
750
00:42:11,562 --> 00:42:14,198
of a captain's decision
to continue the flight
751
00:42:14,265 --> 00:42:16,767
toward Carbondale
instead of returning
752
00:42:16,834 --> 00:42:20,804
to the nearby departure airport
after the loss of power.
753
00:42:20,871 --> 00:42:22,539
RON SCHLEEDE: The
cause of this accident
754
00:42:22,606 --> 00:42:25,809
was not a catastrophic
failure that suddenly
755
00:42:25,876 --> 00:42:27,811
caused the airplane to crash.
756
00:42:27,878 --> 00:42:30,314
It was the decision
by the captain
757
00:42:30,381 --> 00:42:33,217
to continue flight
on battery power
758
00:42:33,284 --> 00:42:35,920
after they lost the generators.
759
00:42:35,986 --> 00:42:37,888
NARRATOR: Also
adding to the problem
760
00:42:37,955 --> 00:42:42,660
was a lack of crew
resource management or CRM.
761
00:42:42,726 --> 00:42:46,964
RON SCHLEEDE: Now part of crew
resource management training
762
00:42:47,031 --> 00:42:51,335
is that crews are
trained to act as a team,
763
00:42:51,402 --> 00:42:54,638
and first officers are
taught and encouraged
764
00:42:54,705 --> 00:42:58,309
to question the captain's
decision making and actions
765
00:42:58,375 --> 00:43:00,511
if they do not agree.
766
00:43:00,577 --> 00:43:01,845
JEANENE URBAN: Speak up.
767
00:43:01,912 --> 00:43:04,782
Don't worry about if it
upsets somebody's ego.
768
00:43:04,848 --> 00:43:07,618
It's not worth dying over.
769
00:43:07,685 --> 00:43:10,287
NARRATOR: Investigators
cite inadequate crew
770
00:43:10,354 --> 00:43:12,489
training to assess
battery endurance
771
00:43:12,556 --> 00:43:15,559
as another contributing factor.
772
00:43:15,626 --> 00:43:16,627
RON SCHLEEDE: It
should have been
773
00:43:16,694 --> 00:43:18,429
discussed in their training.
774
00:43:18,495 --> 00:43:20,864
It should have been in
their training materials
775
00:43:20,931 --> 00:43:23,000
and in the flight manual.
776
00:43:23,067 --> 00:43:25,436
NARRATOR: As a result
of this accident,
777
00:43:25,502 --> 00:43:29,673
the NTSB also recommends
independently powered ADIs
778
00:43:29,740 --> 00:43:32,242
on all transport airplanes.
779
00:43:32,309 --> 00:43:34,378
ROBERT WATSON: So that
if all power was lost,
780
00:43:34,445 --> 00:43:36,714
they still had the ability to
keep the airplane straight and
781
00:43:36,780 --> 00:43:39,283
level for at least 30 minutes.
782
00:43:39,350 --> 00:43:46,323
NARRATOR: This recommendation
was implemented in 1997.
783
00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:48,759
Flight 710 brought
national attention
784
00:43:48,826 --> 00:43:53,864
and increased scrutiny of
small commuter airlines.
785
00:43:53,931 --> 00:43:56,834
Six months after the
accident, Air Illinois
786
00:43:56,900 --> 00:43:59,837
filed for bankruptcy
and ceased operations.
787
00:43:59,903 --> 00:44:04,008
DAVE MINTY: It's something
where we learn by our mistakes.
788
00:44:04,074 --> 00:44:07,845
The first priority is the safety
of the passengers is got to be
789
00:44:07,911 --> 00:44:10,547
the most important factor.
61827
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