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NARRATOR: An emergency above
the French Alps strikes
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Trans-Air Cargo Flight 671.
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00:00:11,244 --> 00:00:13,346
There was an enormous bang.
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00:00:13,413 --> 00:00:16,983
And the aircraft
almost inverted.
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00:00:17,050 --> 00:00:19,719
Mayday, mayday, mayday.
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00:00:19,786 --> 00:00:23,556
NARRATOR: The crew needs to
land but are flying blind.
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Kabo 671, we have
no radar contact.
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They stood a very real
chance of hitting a mountain.
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00:00:29,896 --> 00:00:36,603
NARRATOR: Then they discover
something even more horrifying.
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I saw nothing in the
number four engine position.
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The wing was clean.
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00:00:42,375 --> 00:00:45,011
NARRATOR: Assuming the worst,
the first officer leaves
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a clue for investigators.
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MARTIN EMERY: I took the
photograph because I wasn't
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sure what would happen next.
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If somebody might find the
camera, they'll see the truth.
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MAN: Mayday mayday
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Pull up!
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NARRATOR: Trans-Air Flight
671 is preparing for takeoff
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at Luxembourg Airport.
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Forecast says we'll get
some weather in an hour.
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As we cross over
the Alps, typical.
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NARRATOR: Captain
Ingemar Berglund
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is a highly experienced
Swedish pilot
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who has been flying Boeing 707
aircraft for over a decade.
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MARTIN EMERY: The captain
had been a military pilot.
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And he'd been on
air transport flying
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for most of his working life.
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His experience was pretty
vast in Africa and in Europe.
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He knew the routes.
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And he was a very good pilot.
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(OVER RADIO):
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Kabo 671, you are cleared
for takeoff, runway 24.
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671 clear for takeoff, roger.
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NARRATOR: First
officer Martin Emery
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is an accomplished British pilot
who has worked as an instructor
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and an air traffic controller.
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Ready to go.
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BOB GRIMSTEAD:
The first officer had
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about 10,000 hours, about half
of which was on the Boeing 707.
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So he was very experienced too.
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V1, 170, rotate.
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NARRATOR: The Boeing 707 is a
long-range aircraft powered by
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four Pratt & Whitney engines.
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00:02:53,873 --> 00:02:59,379
It was a very basic airplane,
very strong, very reliable,
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00:02:59,445 --> 00:03:02,215
and could carry 40 or 50
tons of freight.
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00:03:04,951 --> 00:03:08,721
NARRATOR: Assisting the pilots
is flight engineer Terry Boone.
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BOB GRIMSTEAD: The Boeing 707
didn't have much in the way
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00:03:14,260 --> 00:03:15,662
of automated systems.
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00:03:15,862 --> 00:03:19,899
But this meant that there
was a whole panel sideways
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in the flight deck in which the
flight engineer had to operate
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00:03:24,137 --> 00:03:26,973
every system manually.
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He was probably one of the
most experienced Boeing 707
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flight engineers in the world.
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NARRATOR: Today's flight is
a seven hour journey from
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Luxembourg to Kano, Nigeria.
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Feels a little heavy today.
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Well, did you see what's
loaded back there?
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It's all oil well equipment.
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Yeah, and not the light kind.
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NARRATOR: Flight 671 is operated
by the newly formed Nigerian
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company Trans-Air Limited.
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Their client-- Kabo Air Cargo.
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Trans-Air had only
been formed a few
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weeks before this incident.
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It was purely for
the oil industry
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to transport a lot of
equipment down to Nigeria
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for the oil works.
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This was an extra special
flight in that it was carrying
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equipment that would have helped
Nigeria in their modernizing.
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NARRATOR: Kabo 671 levels off
at 29,000 feet.
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MARTIN EMERY: The flight plan
indicated, with the weight
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of the aircraft, we should
stay at a slightly lower
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than normal flight level for
the first part of the flight
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until we burned off fuel.
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And then we could gain
a higher flight level.
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How are the guys in the back?
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Good, they made us coffee.
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NARRATOR: Also on board
are a cargo supervisor
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and a maintenance engineer.
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Like them more every day.
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BOB GRIMSTEAD: So
the five of them
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were knowledgeable
about the 707.
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They were knowledgeable
about this sort of ad hoc air
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cargo work.
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And although they hadn't met
until a fortnight previously,
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I think they worked
well together as a team.
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NARRATOR: Over the Alps,
the weather deteriorates.
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Pretty much ground level up to
about 33,000 feet was in cloud.
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00:05:29,662 --> 00:05:32,899
And the cloud was rough
and turbulent.
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I'm going to buckle up
until we're above it.
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Good idea.
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We engaged our
five-point seat harness,
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00:05:44,377 --> 00:05:47,714
rather than just the four-point
harnesses that we normally keep
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on to a top of climb
and then moved our seats
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forward to be really
guarding the controls
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in this turbulent air.
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It was getting quite rough.
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Ask if we can go to 33.
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Kabo 671, request
flight level 330.
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00:06:05,531 --> 00:06:06,733
671, roger.
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00:06:06,799 --> 00:06:09,869
Climb to flight level 330.
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Climb 330, 671.
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The requested climb was
to go up another 4,000.
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00:06:28,955 --> 00:06:30,690
NARRATOR: One hour
into the flight,
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00:06:30,757 --> 00:06:34,393
just as the plane
reaches 33,000 feet--
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MARTIN EMERY: There was an
enormous bang followed almost
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immediately by another one.
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And the aircraft absolutely
rolled to the right.
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NARRATOR: The captain
uses all his strength
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to level the plane.
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00:07:06,192 --> 00:07:07,994
MARTIN EMERY: Had the captain
not reacted as quickly
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as he did, the
aircraft could have
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rolled over, in fact, inverted.
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Engine fire.
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NARRATOR: Engines three and four
show signs of fire.
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While the flight engineer
deals with the engine alarms,
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00:07:28,915 --> 00:07:31,350
the first officer
checks on the engines.
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00:07:33,820 --> 00:07:36,489
MARTIN EMERY: I saw
nothing in the number
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four engine position.
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00:07:38,758 --> 00:07:41,294
Number four engine
has left the wing.
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00:07:45,765 --> 00:07:49,702
Mayday, mayday,
mayday, Kabo 671.
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00:07:49,769 --> 00:07:51,070
NARRATOR: With
reduced engine power
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and an unbalanced configuration,
the flight drops out of the sky
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00:07:55,775 --> 00:07:57,877
in an uncontrolled descent.
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00:07:57,944 --> 00:07:59,912
The descent rate was horrific.
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00:07:59,979 --> 00:08:04,984
I think I saw 8,000 or
9,000 feet per minute.
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00:08:05,051 --> 00:08:07,687
NARRATOR: It's diving quickly
towards the French Alps
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00:08:07,753 --> 00:08:10,189
through heavy clouds.
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00:08:11,824 --> 00:08:13,659
They need to get
out of the mountains.
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00:08:13,726 --> 00:08:18,998
And they can't see outside
because of the thick cloud.
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00:08:19,065 --> 00:08:21,534
They need the air traffic
controller to give them
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00:08:21,601 --> 00:08:25,404
a direction in which to head
for a safe haven,
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00:08:25,471 --> 00:08:26,873
for a safe airport.
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00:08:28,774 --> 00:08:30,009
Mayday, mayday, mayday.
136
00:08:30,076 --> 00:08:33,913
Request descent
for radar landing.
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00:08:33,980 --> 00:08:35,748
The ground service
can follow your track
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00:08:35,815 --> 00:08:38,517
over the ground you're heading,
your height and speed,
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00:08:38,584 --> 00:08:41,254
from our transponder.
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00:08:41,320 --> 00:08:44,991
And they can point you to
the nearest available runway.
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00:08:45,057 --> 00:08:47,894
NARRATOR: But air traffic
control has bad news.
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Kabo 671, we have
no radar contact.
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00:08:56,335 --> 00:08:58,204
Say your position please, sir.
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00:08:58,271 --> 00:09:04,076
NARRATOR: They can no longer
see Flight 671 on the radar.
145
00:09:04,143 --> 00:09:07,313
With nobody able to give
them a direction to steer,
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00:09:07,380 --> 00:09:12,051
they stood a very real chance
of hitting a mountain.
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00:09:12,118 --> 00:09:15,521
NARRATOR: The plane's radar
transponder has failed.
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00:09:22,295 --> 00:09:24,931
I was considering
which direction we could
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00:09:24,997 --> 00:09:28,067
go to avoid the mountains.
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00:09:28,134 --> 00:09:29,435
It was very scary.
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00:09:37,276 --> 00:09:40,613
NARRATOR: The situation is dire
enough that the first officer
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00:09:40,680 --> 00:09:42,848
records the damage to the wing.
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00:09:45,117 --> 00:09:48,788
MARTIN EMERY: I wasn't sure
what would happen next.
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00:09:48,854 --> 00:09:51,924
I believe that if
anything ended,
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00:09:51,991 --> 00:09:53,759
like the flight
before we were ready,
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somebody might find the camera.
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00:09:55,828 --> 00:09:58,197
And they'd have seen the truth.
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NARRATOR: Flight 671 is
in an uncontrolled descent
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over the French Alps.
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00:10:10,810 --> 00:10:12,945
With thick clouds
and no transponder
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00:10:13,012 --> 00:10:18,084
for the controller to guide
them, the crew is flying blind.
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00:10:18,150 --> 00:10:19,385
Mayday, mayday, mayday.
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00:10:19,452 --> 00:10:20,987
Request descent
for radar landing.
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00:10:24,924 --> 00:10:26,859
NARRATOR: The flight
engineer attempts to get
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the transponder working again.
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00:10:28,728 --> 00:10:32,565
He suspects there
is a power issue.
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00:10:32,631 --> 00:10:34,700
The reason the air
traffic control lost
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00:10:34,767 --> 00:10:37,837
the radar initially was
probably because the electrics
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00:10:37,903 --> 00:10:41,440
powering the radar
failed when the engine
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00:10:41,507 --> 00:10:43,576
number four fell off.
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00:10:46,145 --> 00:10:48,080
NARRATOR: The flight
engineer redirects
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00:10:48,147 --> 00:10:50,983
the power to engine one.
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00:10:51,050 --> 00:10:53,552
BOB GRIMSTEAD: He selected
the essential power selector
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to engine number
one which had an
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operative electrical generator.
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NARRATOR: It works.
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00:11:02,661 --> 00:11:04,063
MARTIN EMERY: Request
descent radar landing.
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00:11:04,130 --> 00:11:05,664
Roger.
179
00:11:05,731 --> 00:11:08,234
Turn left, heading
south to Marseilles.
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00:11:08,300 --> 00:11:10,603
NARRATOR: The controller
directs Flight 671
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00:11:10,669 --> 00:11:15,408
to Marseilles Airport,
75 miles away.
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00:11:15,474 --> 00:11:17,910
You turn left, 180.
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00:11:17,977 --> 00:11:18,944
OK.
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00:11:24,150 --> 00:11:25,584
BOB GRIMSTEAD: There
was immense relief
185
00:11:25,651 --> 00:11:27,820
as they descended
out of the cloud
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00:11:27,887 --> 00:11:31,524
and finally could see the
mountains around them.
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00:11:31,590 --> 00:11:32,858
NARRATOR: But relief
is short lived
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00:11:33,059 --> 00:11:35,428
after the first officer
gives the right wing
189
00:11:35,494 --> 00:11:36,896
a further inspection.
190
00:11:41,667 --> 00:11:44,003
We've lost both engines
on the right wing.
191
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What?
192
00:11:46,672 --> 00:11:48,274
MARTIN EMERY: With a
five-point harness,
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00:11:48,340 --> 00:11:49,708
you are slightly restricted.
194
00:11:49,909 --> 00:11:52,611
But I did manage to look
right over my right shoulder.
195
00:11:52,678 --> 00:11:54,847
And both the engines
were off the wing.
196
00:11:54,914 --> 00:11:59,452
The wing was clean, which
was a really big shock.
197
00:11:59,518 --> 00:12:01,053
We've lost both engines.
198
00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:03,689
Both engines?
199
00:12:03,756 --> 00:12:05,057
BOB GRIMSTEAD: Just
about the worst thing
200
00:12:05,357 --> 00:12:08,260
that can happen in an
airliner is to have an engine
201
00:12:08,327 --> 00:12:10,529
depart from the aircraft.
202
00:12:10,596 --> 00:12:13,933
The only thing worse than that
would be to have two engines
203
00:12:13,999 --> 00:12:16,102
depart from your aircraft.
204
00:12:16,168 --> 00:12:19,171
NARRATOR: With only the two
left engines functioning,
205
00:12:19,238 --> 00:12:23,642
control of the plane
is compromised.
206
00:12:23,709 --> 00:12:25,211
BOB GRIMSTEAD: When
you've lost both engines
207
00:12:25,277 --> 00:12:28,547
from the right wing and
still have a lot of thrust
208
00:12:28,614 --> 00:12:31,984
from the engines on the left
wing, it upsets that balance
209
00:12:32,051 --> 00:12:35,654
and causes the airplane
to turn and to roll
210
00:12:35,721 --> 00:12:39,125
very powerfully to the right.
211
00:12:39,191 --> 00:12:40,860
Getting the airplane
to turn left
212
00:12:40,926 --> 00:12:46,232
is a huge ask under
these circumstances.
213
00:12:46,298 --> 00:12:47,533
Can you turn 180?
214
00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:51,904
Yeah, I'm trying.
215
00:12:54,039 --> 00:12:55,641
NARRATOR: Flying the
disabled plane is
216
00:12:55,708 --> 00:12:58,344
testing the captain's strength.
217
00:13:01,547 --> 00:13:04,517
The Boeing 707 has all
manual flying controls.
218
00:13:04,583 --> 00:13:08,721
It's very heavy to fly when
everything's working well.
219
00:13:08,787 --> 00:13:10,823
When you've lost two engines
on one side,
220
00:13:10,890 --> 00:13:15,127
it's virtually at the limit
of physical capability
221
00:13:15,194 --> 00:13:16,862
for the captain.
222
00:13:20,766 --> 00:13:22,201
You want to dump fuel?
223
00:13:22,268 --> 00:13:24,770
Yes, dump fuel.
224
00:13:24,837 --> 00:13:27,173
NARRATOR: To keep
Flight 671 in the air,
225
00:13:27,239 --> 00:13:30,543
the crew decides
to reduce its load.
226
00:13:30,609 --> 00:13:34,013
This aircraft was carrying
a very heavy fuel load.
227
00:13:34,079 --> 00:13:37,750
And it was imperative to
reduce that fuel load.
228
00:13:37,816 --> 00:13:40,052
NARRATOR: But it requires
a precise calculation.
229
00:13:40,119 --> 00:13:43,355
They need to leave themselves
enough fuel to reach
230
00:13:43,422 --> 00:13:46,058
Marseilles and land safely.
231
00:13:46,125 --> 00:13:49,395
BOB GRIMSTEAD: 112 tons
is the maximum safe weight
232
00:13:49,461 --> 00:13:51,130
at which they can land.
233
00:13:51,197 --> 00:13:53,199
If they're any heavier than
that and hit the ground hard,
234
00:13:53,265 --> 00:13:55,768
then they would be sliding
along the runway on their belly,
235
00:13:55,834 --> 00:13:58,370
shedding fuel and burning.
236
00:13:58,437 --> 00:14:00,706
This is not a position
you want to be in.
237
00:14:00,773 --> 00:14:03,876
NARRATOR: The process
is time consuming.
238
00:14:12,184 --> 00:14:16,989
As Flight 671 completes its
left turn toward Marseilles,
239
00:14:17,056 --> 00:14:20,926
Captain Berglund reduces
power in the two left engines.
240
00:14:20,993 --> 00:14:22,761
BOB GRIMSTEAD:
They had to reduce the power
241
00:14:22,828 --> 00:14:25,097
on the left engines
to give themselves
242
00:14:25,164 --> 00:14:28,400
a chance of staying upright
and going in the direction they
243
00:14:28,467 --> 00:14:30,970
wanted to go in.
244
00:14:31,036 --> 00:14:33,405
NARRATOR: Reducing air
speed means an increase
245
00:14:33,472 --> 00:14:35,407
in the angle of descent.
246
00:14:38,010 --> 00:14:39,445
MARTIN EMERY: Unfortunately,
this of course
247
00:14:39,511 --> 00:14:42,448
meant they then
descended more rapidly.
248
00:14:42,514 --> 00:14:43,916
They have to land soon.
249
00:14:43,983 --> 00:14:47,486
And they have to land
somewhere very nearby.
250
00:14:47,553 --> 00:14:50,623
NARRATOR: Airspeed isn't
the crew's only concern.
251
00:14:50,689 --> 00:14:52,825
Request the weather.
252
00:14:52,891 --> 00:14:55,828
Give me the weather
for Marseilles, 671.
253
00:14:55,894 --> 00:14:57,963
I really needed the
weather at Marseilles
254
00:14:58,030 --> 00:14:59,965
to make a plan for
an approach to land
255
00:15:00,032 --> 00:15:04,103
either direct or a circuit,
or whatever we could do.
256
00:15:04,169 --> 00:15:08,307
NARRATOR: But air traffic
control isn't responding.
257
00:15:08,374 --> 00:15:10,009
Request weather.
258
00:15:10,075 --> 00:15:14,780
Mayday, mayday, mayday,
671 request weather.
259
00:15:19,218 --> 00:15:21,220
MARTIN EMERY: It was quite
a tough call to actually get
260
00:15:21,287 --> 00:15:25,658
the instant weather, at that
moment, at Marseilles airport,
261
00:15:25,724 --> 00:15:27,893
that we needed right now.
262
00:15:30,062 --> 00:15:31,964
NARRATOR: Making
matters worse, the fuel
263
00:15:32,031 --> 00:15:36,135
dump is not going as expected.
264
00:15:36,201 --> 00:15:39,438
Fuel tank number one
isn't discharging.
265
00:15:43,742 --> 00:15:46,011
BOB GRIMSTEAD: It became
evident to the flight engineer
266
00:15:46,078 --> 00:15:49,114
that the number one fuel
tank wasn't emptying.
267
00:15:49,181 --> 00:15:52,184
This would cause a lateral
imbalance across the airplane,
268
00:15:52,251 --> 00:15:53,819
which is not a good thing.
269
00:15:53,886 --> 00:15:55,421
I've got limited maneuvering.
270
00:15:59,958 --> 00:16:02,294
You dumping?
271
00:16:02,361 --> 00:16:03,295
Yeah.
272
00:16:08,300 --> 00:16:10,569
NARRATOR: The flight engineer
discovers that a circuit
273
00:16:10,636 --> 00:16:12,404
breaker has popped.
274
00:16:16,208 --> 00:16:18,043
BOB GRIMSTEAD: By pushing
the circuit breaker back in,
275
00:16:18,110 --> 00:16:22,081
he was able to reactivate
the number one fuel pump
276
00:16:22,147 --> 00:16:26,418
and get the fuel jettisoning
from all four tanks
277
00:16:26,485 --> 00:16:30,556
simultaneously.
278
00:16:30,622 --> 00:16:36,428
NARRATOR: Flight 671 is 30 miles
from the runway in Marseilles.
279
00:16:36,495 --> 00:16:37,529
Mayday, mayday, mayday.
280
00:16:39,031 --> 00:16:39,832
MARTIN EMERY: 671
requests weather.
281
00:16:43,035 --> 00:16:46,605
It's raining on the airfield.
282
00:16:46,672 --> 00:16:49,074
Two , 500 feet.
283
00:16:49,141 --> 00:16:52,444
Three , 1,600 feet.
284
00:16:52,511 --> 00:16:54,980
Three ,
2,000 feet.
285
00:16:55,047 --> 00:16:57,383
No. No, no.
286
00:16:57,449 --> 00:16:59,918
NARRATOR: Thunder clouds
and the risk of turbulence
287
00:16:59,985 --> 00:17:03,055
will make a difficult
landing harder.
288
00:17:03,122 --> 00:17:04,623
MARTIN EMERY: We were
pushed to even get there
289
00:17:04,690 --> 00:17:06,225
with the height available.
290
00:17:06,291 --> 00:17:09,294
With thunderstorm activity,
it was really a no go.
291
00:17:09,361 --> 00:17:13,065
Kabo 671, what is our
distance to the runway?
292
00:17:14,299 --> 00:17:15,768
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(OVER RADIO):
293
00:17:15,834 --> 00:17:18,971
22 miles for landing, sir.
294
00:17:19,037 --> 00:17:21,774
MARTIN EMERY: We had no
plan B. At that point,
295
00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,009
that was a nasty moment.
296
00:17:24,076 --> 00:17:25,611
What we wanted was a runway.
297
00:17:25,677 --> 00:17:27,312
And we wanted it quickly.
298
00:17:36,989 --> 00:17:40,626
Hey, you see the airfield?
299
00:17:40,692 --> 00:17:42,094
I don't see it.
300
00:17:42,161 --> 00:17:45,130
NARRATOR: Flight 671
is in a rapid descent
301
00:17:45,197 --> 00:17:48,500
with limited maneuverability
less than 9,000
302
00:17:48,567 --> 00:17:54,807
feet above Southern France when
the crew finally gets a break.
303
00:17:54,873 --> 00:17:57,643
MARTIN EMERY: I looked through
just cloud underneath us,
304
00:17:57,709 --> 00:18:01,613
and I glimpsed some
ribbon black tarmac.
305
00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:03,549
It was a runway.
306
00:18:06,552 --> 00:18:08,821
Kabo 671, we have
an airfield ahead.
307
00:18:08,887 --> 00:18:11,457
What is our airfield?
308
00:18:11,523 --> 00:18:17,596
It's a military airfield at
your 12 o'clock for six miles.
309
00:18:17,663 --> 00:18:18,530
Can we land there?
310
00:18:18,597 --> 00:18:19,465
No, it's too short.
311
00:18:19,531 --> 00:18:21,066
Too short.
312
00:18:21,133 --> 00:18:24,102
How long is the runway
on this military airfield?
313
00:18:24,169 --> 00:18:26,371
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(OVER RADIO): 13,000 feet.
314
00:18:26,438 --> 00:18:29,208
Oh, yeah, OK.
315
00:18:29,274 --> 00:18:31,009
BOB GRIMSTEAD: The
runway at Istres is long.
316
00:18:31,076 --> 00:18:33,846
It is France's
flight test center.
317
00:18:33,912 --> 00:18:37,182
And it was also a space shuttle
alternate learning ground.
318
00:18:37,249 --> 00:18:40,686
It's probably the biggest
airport in Europe.
319
00:18:40,752 --> 00:18:44,022
Military airfield,
mayday, traffic 671.
320
00:18:44,089 --> 00:18:47,025
NARRATOR: The first officer
makes contact with air traffic
321
00:18:47,092 --> 00:18:49,695
control at Istres Airport.
322
00:18:49,761 --> 00:18:51,330
671, this is Istres.
323
00:18:51,396 --> 00:18:56,635
You are cleared for arrival,
runway 33.
324
00:18:56,702 --> 00:18:57,603
We're just overhead.
325
00:18:57,669 --> 00:18:59,037
What's the wind?
326
00:18:59,104 --> 00:19:00,272
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(OVER RADIO):
327
00:19:00,572 --> 00:19:06,778
Wind it is 330 10 knots,
gusting 1 to 4 knots.
328
00:19:06,845 --> 00:19:09,414
We'll make a left-hand
pattern from the west.
329
00:19:09,481 --> 00:19:11,049
Yeah.
330
00:19:11,116 --> 00:19:12,885
MARTIN EMERY: The French
military air traffic
331
00:19:12,951 --> 00:19:14,720
controller was one of my gang.
332
00:19:14,786 --> 00:19:16,288
I thought he was great.
333
00:19:16,355 --> 00:19:17,656
We turn left to land.
334
00:19:17,723 --> 00:19:19,224
Yes.
335
00:19:19,291 --> 00:19:20,893
NARRATOR: As they
start their turn,
336
00:19:20,959 --> 00:19:22,761
the crew lowers
the plane's flaps
337
00:19:22,828 --> 00:19:24,763
in preparation for landing.
338
00:19:26,999 --> 00:19:28,400
The wheels were
down and locked.
339
00:19:28,467 --> 00:19:30,435
And the flaps were coming
down, so Captain Berglund
340
00:19:30,502 --> 00:19:32,170
could have more roll control.
341
00:19:32,237 --> 00:19:34,673
NARRATOR: But when the
flaps are extended--
342
00:19:36,108 --> 00:19:37,309
--disaster strikes.
343
00:19:41,046 --> 00:19:43,115
MARTIN EMERY: There was
another big explosion which
344
00:19:43,181 --> 00:19:46,385
tried to roll us right again.
345
00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:50,722
Turn left.
346
00:19:50,789 --> 00:19:53,725
Turn left to land.
347
00:19:53,792 --> 00:19:54,726
Turn left.
348
00:19:54,793 --> 00:19:56,962
I'm trying.
349
00:19:57,029 --> 00:19:58,530
Turn left to land.
Left turn.
350
00:19:58,597 --> 00:19:59,665
Yeah.
351
00:20:04,403 --> 00:20:05,437
We missed the runway.
352
00:20:05,504 --> 00:20:08,140
Oh, god.
353
00:20:08,206 --> 00:20:10,175
NARRATOR: They're unable
to line up for landing.
354
00:20:19,184 --> 00:20:21,119
671, we have fire on board.
355
00:20:21,186 --> 00:20:24,756
I confirm, fire on board.
356
00:20:24,823 --> 00:20:25,991
I could hear the fire.
357
00:20:26,058 --> 00:20:28,961
But I didn't say anything.
358
00:20:29,027 --> 00:20:31,396
We need another runway.
359
00:20:31,463 --> 00:20:33,198
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): Take runway 14.
360
00:20:33,265 --> 00:20:39,538
Wind is 320, 10 knots,
clear, direct.
361
00:20:39,605 --> 00:20:42,341
NARRATOR: After failing to
make a hard left for a landing
362
00:20:42,407 --> 00:20:46,678
on runway 33, the crew attempts
to circle back and land
363
00:20:46,745 --> 00:20:51,183
on the runway's opposite
end, known as 15.
364
00:20:51,249 --> 00:20:53,151
The captain doesn't
have the strength
365
00:20:53,218 --> 00:20:55,120
to make the turn on his own.
366
00:20:55,187 --> 00:20:57,489
But the first officer
has an idea.
367
00:20:57,556 --> 00:21:00,225
MARTIN EMERY: I said,
"I'll take the power."
368
00:21:00,292 --> 00:21:02,928
Then, Captain Berglund
said to me, "Be careful."
369
00:21:02,995 --> 00:21:03,795
I said, "I will.
370
00:21:03,862 --> 00:21:05,497
I promise."
371
00:21:05,564 --> 00:21:08,033
NARRATOR: The first officer
adjusts the throttles to help
372
00:21:08,100 --> 00:21:10,502
steer the plane to the runway.
373
00:21:10,569 --> 00:21:13,205
I'm bringing back number
one, advancing number two.
374
00:21:13,271 --> 00:21:14,640
It actually turned
the airplane left.
375
00:21:14,706 --> 00:21:16,742
And he could fly it
going towards the runway,
376
00:21:16,808 --> 00:21:18,577
which was a miracle.
377
00:21:18,644 --> 00:21:20,646
Truly was.
378
00:21:20,712 --> 00:21:22,648
NARRATOR: It's a
race against time
379
00:21:22,714 --> 00:21:25,250
to get the plane on the ground
before the wing is incinerated.
380
00:21:31,023 --> 00:21:31,857
Good descent.
381
00:21:31,923 --> 00:21:34,860
You are on axis.
382
00:21:34,926 --> 00:21:37,929
NARRATOR: Flight 671 is
flying 50 knots faster
383
00:21:37,996 --> 00:21:39,898
than normal landing speed.
384
00:21:46,672 --> 00:21:48,707
MARTIN EMERY: Captain
did a perfect landing,
385
00:21:48,774 --> 00:21:50,509
kept it just left
of the center line.
386
00:21:50,575 --> 00:21:53,045
And we were safely on the
ground at a great speed,
387
00:21:53,111 --> 00:21:55,681
but we were on the ground.
388
00:21:55,747 --> 00:21:57,282
NARRATOR: If they
don't brake soon,
389
00:21:57,349 --> 00:22:00,552
they will overshoot the runway.
390
00:22:00,619 --> 00:22:03,889
Without hydraulics, they have
only the plane's emergency
391
00:22:03,955 --> 00:22:06,258
brake to reduce speed.
392
00:22:06,324 --> 00:22:07,793
BOB GRIMSTEAD: There was
no anti-skid protection.
393
00:22:07,993 --> 00:22:10,262
That would have meant that
the tires would start scuffing
394
00:22:10,328 --> 00:22:12,931
and bursting, which
would then reduce
395
00:22:12,998 --> 00:22:17,536
their ability to slow down.
396
00:22:17,602 --> 00:22:20,238
Stopping was the only
thing that mattered.
397
00:22:20,305 --> 00:22:21,973
You want both thrust reverses?
398
00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:25,410
The flight engineer wanted to
use reverse thrust on the two
399
00:22:25,477 --> 00:22:27,879
left engines, because
that was the only way
400
00:22:27,946 --> 00:22:29,147
he could see of slowing down.
401
00:22:29,214 --> 00:22:30,949
No, cut the engines.
402
00:22:31,016 --> 00:22:33,118
The first officer didn't
want him to do that,
403
00:22:33,185 --> 00:22:34,586
because that would
pull the airplane
404
00:22:34,653 --> 00:22:36,321
off to the left of the runway.
405
00:22:36,388 --> 00:22:39,257
I've just lost engine two.
406
00:22:42,160 --> 00:22:43,895
As a compromise,
they used reverse thrust
407
00:22:43,962 --> 00:22:47,399
on the inboard left engine,
the number two engine, which
408
00:22:47,466 --> 00:22:49,701
did help reduce their
galloping speed,
409
00:22:49,768 --> 00:22:52,637
but pulled the airplane
off the runway to the left.
410
00:22:58,376 --> 00:23:02,781
The aircraft did come
to a halt in the mud.
411
00:23:06,051 --> 00:23:07,552
We're on fire.
Evacuate.
412
00:23:07,619 --> 00:23:08,653
Evacuate.
413
00:23:08,920 --> 00:23:10,489
MARTIN EMERY: I realized
that we were on fire.
414
00:23:10,555 --> 00:23:12,624
And it was burning and
belching smoke and flame.
415
00:23:12,691 --> 00:23:15,694
We needed to get down,
get out, and get away.
416
00:23:22,768 --> 00:23:25,470
NARRATOR: With two missing
engines, a wing on fire,
417
00:23:25,537 --> 00:23:31,343
and no brakes, Flight 671
has landed in Istres, France
418
00:23:31,409 --> 00:23:34,346
with its cargo and crew safe.
419
00:23:34,412 --> 00:23:38,416
To actually have two of the
four engines fall off the wing,
420
00:23:38,483 --> 00:23:41,987
virtually unheard of in
the history of aviation.
421
00:23:42,053 --> 00:23:43,488
NARRATOR: The heroic
escape from death
422
00:23:43,555 --> 00:23:46,024
makes headlines
around the world.
423
00:23:46,091 --> 00:23:48,960
As French investigators
arrive, they're faced
424
00:23:49,027 --> 00:23:51,163
with an important question.
425
00:23:51,229 --> 00:23:55,300
What caused two engines
to fall off a plane?
426
00:23:55,367 --> 00:23:58,203
BOB GRIMSTEAD: Losing two
engines is a huge thing,
427
00:23:58,270 --> 00:24:03,108
so the investigators had quite
a big task to establish what had
428
00:24:03,175 --> 00:24:05,710
happened, and more
importantly, why and how
429
00:24:05,777 --> 00:24:08,046
to prevent it happening again.
430
00:24:15,120 --> 00:24:17,322
NARRATOR: The damaged 707
is moved to a hangar
431
00:24:17,389 --> 00:24:20,725
to be examined by
the BEA, France's
432
00:24:20,792 --> 00:24:22,594
air investigation authority.
433
00:24:22,661 --> 00:24:24,930
The level of damage
on this aircraft
434
00:24:24,996 --> 00:24:31,536
was very close to looking like
a total structural failure.
435
00:24:39,344 --> 00:24:40,812
I've got something.
436
00:24:41,112 --> 00:24:43,682
NARRATOR: Investigators make an
early discovery about the fire
437
00:24:43,748 --> 00:24:46,218
on board the plane.
438
00:24:46,284 --> 00:24:49,221
These wires from the cable
loom short circuited.
439
00:24:49,287 --> 00:24:51,756
That, plus a fuel leak
from near the engine
440
00:24:51,823 --> 00:24:53,692
three area caused the fire.
441
00:24:53,758 --> 00:24:55,293
Good work.
442
00:24:55,360 --> 00:25:00,565
When the engines came
away from the wing,
443
00:25:00,632 --> 00:25:04,436
they tore with them
electrical wiring.
444
00:25:04,502 --> 00:25:09,374
Some of that wiring still
had power available.
445
00:25:09,441 --> 00:25:12,244
NARRATOR: When the flaps
were extended, leaking fuel
446
00:25:12,310 --> 00:25:15,347
made contact with live
wires and ignited.
447
00:25:17,649 --> 00:25:20,919
Let's get this cleaned up,
get a better look at what tore
448
00:25:20,986 --> 00:25:22,153
the engine loose from the wing.
449
00:25:27,092 --> 00:25:28,193
NARRATOR: Investigators
are counting
450
00:25:28,393 --> 00:25:29,928
on the plane's
flight data recorder
451
00:25:29,995 --> 00:25:34,132
to provide more information.
452
00:25:34,199 --> 00:25:36,801
OK, let's see
what it can tell us.
453
00:25:46,645 --> 00:25:48,813
Looks like engines
three and four
454
00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:54,152
were producing thrust
right up until here.
455
00:25:54,219 --> 00:25:58,556
9:10:50 AM, one hour
into the flight.
456
00:25:58,623 --> 00:26:01,760
NARRATOR: The FDR data reveals
that both engines stopped
457
00:26:01,826 --> 00:26:04,596
working almost concurrently.
458
00:26:04,663 --> 00:26:07,999
The flight data
recorder basically
459
00:26:08,066 --> 00:26:11,870
show the engines
operating as normal
460
00:26:11,937 --> 00:26:14,539
when they left the aircraft.
461
00:26:19,778 --> 00:26:21,446
NARRATOR: To you understand
why two perfectly functioning
462
00:26:21,513 --> 00:26:24,549
engines detached
from the 707's wings,
463
00:26:24,616 --> 00:26:27,786
investigators need to
find the missing engines.
464
00:26:27,852 --> 00:26:29,854
Here's the flight path.
465
00:26:34,426 --> 00:26:37,796
This is where they
probably fell off.
466
00:26:41,433 --> 00:26:43,702
I'll send a search and
recovery team out there.
467
00:26:49,708 --> 00:26:53,345
NARRATOR: 24 hours into the
investigation, the engines
468
00:26:53,411 --> 00:26:56,514
of Flight 671 are
located on a mountainside
469
00:26:56,581 --> 00:27:00,518
near Séderon, France,
55 miles northeast
470
00:27:00,585 --> 00:27:01,786
of where the plane landed.
471
00:27:04,456 --> 00:27:10,829
Investigators found the engines
about 800 meters apart.
472
00:27:10,895 --> 00:27:12,597
That's very close.
473
00:27:12,664 --> 00:27:15,900
NARRATOR: Their locations also
suggest the engines detached
474
00:27:15,967 --> 00:27:18,670
at almost the same time.
475
00:27:18,737 --> 00:27:21,539
While the team waits for
the engines to be recovered,
476
00:27:21,606 --> 00:27:26,144
they turn to the crew
for further insight.
477
00:27:26,211 --> 00:27:28,079
We were climbing
to 33,000 feet
478
00:27:28,146 --> 00:27:31,349
to avoid some pretty
bad turbulence.
479
00:27:31,416 --> 00:27:33,451
Suddenly, there
were loud sounds.
480
00:27:42,927 --> 00:27:45,864
I saw engine four was missing.
481
00:27:47,599 --> 00:27:51,436
You reported the engines
missing at two different times.
482
00:27:51,503 --> 00:27:54,072
Is it possible
you were mistaken?
483
00:27:54,139 --> 00:27:55,607
It's possible.
484
00:27:55,840 --> 00:27:57,842
The harness I was wearing kept
me from getting a good look
485
00:27:57,909 --> 00:27:59,477
out the window at first.
486
00:27:59,544 --> 00:28:01,746
You said you were climbing
to avoid turbulence.
487
00:28:01,813 --> 00:28:02,847
How bad was it?
488
00:28:02,914 --> 00:28:04,349
It was severe.
489
00:28:04,416 --> 00:28:07,485
I wouldn't want to go
through that again.
490
00:28:07,552 --> 00:28:11,256
They'd flown through extremely
heavy turbulence of a level
491
00:28:11,322 --> 00:28:13,324
not normally encountered.
492
00:28:16,494 --> 00:28:21,733
So there were two cumulonimbus
clouds here and here.
493
00:28:21,800 --> 00:28:26,438
And they went up
past 33,000 feet.
494
00:28:26,504 --> 00:28:29,007
NARRATOR: Investigators
examine the weather conditions
495
00:28:29,074 --> 00:28:31,276
at the time of the incident.
496
00:28:31,342 --> 00:28:35,413
Looks like there was also a
90-knot jet stream over here.
497
00:28:42,387 --> 00:28:44,355
NARRATOR: They discover
that Flight 671
498
00:28:44,422 --> 00:28:46,424
flew through two
weather conditions
499
00:28:46,491 --> 00:28:50,728
when they reached 33,000 feet.
500
00:28:50,795 --> 00:28:51,996
Those two
conditions would have
501
00:28:52,063 --> 00:28:54,499
generated severe turbulence.
502
00:28:54,566 --> 00:28:57,502
But you'd think it could
withstand the turbulence.
503
00:28:57,569 --> 00:28:59,704
NARRATOR: Did two colliding
weather conditions
504
00:28:59,771 --> 00:29:02,474
tear the engines off the 707?
505
00:29:02,540 --> 00:29:04,642
Well, let's see what
the engines can tell us.
506
00:29:15,920 --> 00:29:19,357
Hey, boss.
507
00:29:19,424 --> 00:29:21,059
NARRATOR: Close
examination of the engines
508
00:29:21,126 --> 00:29:24,295
gives investigators
an important new clue.
509
00:29:26,531 --> 00:29:29,000
See this dent on engine four?
510
00:29:29,067 --> 00:29:32,904
Shape and diameter match
a dent on engine three.
511
00:29:32,971 --> 00:29:35,673
So does this white paint.
512
00:29:35,740 --> 00:29:38,710
You could tell from
the shape of the damage,
513
00:29:38,776 --> 00:29:43,481
and from transfer of white
paint from one engine
514
00:29:43,548 --> 00:29:45,750
to the other engine,
that the number
515
00:29:45,817 --> 00:29:51,823
three had struck the number
four engine and separated it.
516
00:29:51,890 --> 00:29:54,726
NARRATOR: Investigators
now need to find out what
517
00:29:54,792 --> 00:29:56,928
caused engine three to detach.
518
00:30:02,433 --> 00:30:06,437
Looks like a clean break
of all four fittings.
519
00:30:06,504 --> 00:30:08,873
NARRATOR: Each engine
is attached to a pylon.
520
00:30:08,940 --> 00:30:13,845
The pylon is then bolted to the
wing using four large fittings.
521
00:30:13,912 --> 00:30:18,950
During flight 671, all four
fittings broke on engine three.
522
00:30:22,754 --> 00:30:25,557
Now three of the four
fittings broke like this one.
523
00:30:25,623 --> 00:30:27,992
You can see from the surface,
they broke from stress.
524
00:30:31,462 --> 00:30:35,800
This mid spar fitting
is different.
525
00:30:35,867 --> 00:30:37,702
There's some distortion here.
526
00:30:37,769 --> 00:30:40,038
It likely broke from
a fatigue fracture.
527
00:30:42,473 --> 00:30:46,511
JOE EPPERSON: You could see some
characteristics surface-wise,
528
00:30:46,578 --> 00:30:50,782
coloration-wise, that were
consistent with a fatigue
529
00:30:50,848 --> 00:30:52,550
cracking.
530
00:30:54,519 --> 00:30:57,121
NARRATOR: Over time, the
inboard mid spar fitting
531
00:30:57,188 --> 00:30:59,958
on engine three was
weakened because of a crack
532
00:31:00,024 --> 00:31:03,161
caused by metal fatigue.
533
00:31:03,228 --> 00:31:05,763
When it snapped off
in severe turbulence,
534
00:31:05,830 --> 00:31:08,933
the other fittings broke too.
535
00:31:09,000 --> 00:31:10,568
As a metallurgist,
I want to take
536
00:31:10,635 --> 00:31:13,404
a closer look at these things.
537
00:31:22,213 --> 00:31:24,782
OK, let's see what we got.
538
00:31:24,849 --> 00:31:26,918
NARRATOR: To establish a
detailed history of Flight
539
00:31:26,985 --> 00:31:32,323
671's broken mid spar fitting,
investigators use an electron
540
00:31:32,390 --> 00:31:35,293
microscope to examine it.
541
00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:37,795
I can see multiple
arrest lines.
542
00:31:37,862 --> 00:31:42,133
With each takeoff and landing,
the crack grows a little bit.
543
00:31:42,200 --> 00:31:44,636
And it leaves a mark.
544
00:31:44,702 --> 00:31:48,473
And each little
stress cycle makes
545
00:31:48,539 --> 00:31:51,342
the crack a little bigger.
546
00:31:51,409 --> 00:31:52,577
These are likely
from the flights
547
00:31:52,844 --> 00:31:54,245
the plane flew since
Trans-Air put it back
548
00:31:54,312 --> 00:31:57,148
in service a few weeks ago.
549
00:31:57,215 --> 00:31:59,651
But what about before that?
550
00:31:59,717 --> 00:32:01,886
NARRATOR: As the team
continues examining
551
00:32:01,953 --> 00:32:07,025
the cracked mid spar fitting,
they make an unusual finding.
552
00:32:07,091 --> 00:32:08,593
It looks like corrosion.
553
00:32:10,295 --> 00:32:12,196
The plane had to have
been exposed to moisture
554
00:32:12,263 --> 00:32:13,665
over a long period of time.
555
00:32:13,731 --> 00:32:19,470
All right, well, it looks
like the previous owner
556
00:32:19,537 --> 00:32:26,010
had the plane in storage for 13
months prior to the incident.
557
00:32:26,077 --> 00:32:27,345
Where was it stored?
558
00:32:27,412 --> 00:32:33,685
Um, in a field in England.
559
00:32:36,054 --> 00:32:37,889
REX PARKINSON:
Steel will corrode
560
00:32:37,955 --> 00:32:43,561
if it's in a salty atmosphere
or a very moist atmosphere.
561
00:32:43,628 --> 00:32:47,165
This particular aircraft
was stored at airfields
562
00:32:47,231 --> 00:32:50,168
which weren't far from the sea.
563
00:32:50,234 --> 00:32:52,537
That explains the corrosion.
564
00:32:55,606 --> 00:32:59,544
How about those--
those little marks?
565
00:32:59,610 --> 00:33:01,446
NARRATOR: Near the
bottom of the fitting,
566
00:33:01,512 --> 00:33:05,316
they discover several
telltale marks.
567
00:33:05,383 --> 00:33:08,720
Those are corrosion pit marks.
568
00:33:08,786 --> 00:33:12,724
Corrosion pits are tiny holes
that appear in metal
569
00:33:12,790 --> 00:33:16,728
after water has gained
access to that metal
570
00:33:16,794 --> 00:33:19,630
and caused corrosion
to take place.
571
00:33:19,697 --> 00:33:23,234
And the pit can be the start
of a long crack.
572
00:33:23,301 --> 00:33:26,604
JOE EPPERSON: And in this case,
there were corrosion pits that
573
00:33:26,671 --> 00:33:30,308
grew into one crack
and eventually
574
00:33:30,375 --> 00:33:32,610
fractured the mid spar fitting.
575
00:33:32,677 --> 00:33:34,612
So when did these pit
marks start to develop?
576
00:33:34,679 --> 00:33:36,814
Well, it's hard
to pinpoint exactly.
577
00:33:36,881 --> 00:33:38,983
Given their distance
from the arrest lines,
578
00:33:39,050 --> 00:33:41,486
it suggests that the pitting
started even before the plane
579
00:33:41,552 --> 00:33:43,388
went into storage.
580
00:33:43,454 --> 00:33:47,225
JOE EPPERSON: The crack
doesn't occur in storage.
581
00:33:47,291 --> 00:33:48,926
The oxidation does.
582
00:33:48,993 --> 00:33:55,233
So that tells us the cracking
occurred before storage, or
583
00:33:55,299 --> 00:34:01,005
probably years before storage.
584
00:34:01,072 --> 00:34:04,242
These fittings were a
time bomb waiting to blow.
585
00:34:04,308 --> 00:34:07,678
So how did the
maintenance team miss it?
586
00:34:12,083 --> 00:34:14,886
This just arrived from
Trans-Air, maintenance records.
587
00:34:14,952 --> 00:34:17,655
Oh, let's have a look.
588
00:34:17,722 --> 00:34:19,590
NARRATOR: Investigators
want to know
589
00:34:19,657 --> 00:34:25,163
if poor maintenance on Flight
671 contributed to the crash.
590
00:34:25,229 --> 00:34:27,899
REX PARKINSON: You start to
look at the age of the parts
591
00:34:27,965 --> 00:34:30,334
that failed, and what
was the maintenance
592
00:34:30,401 --> 00:34:34,272
requirements for those
parts, and did they
593
00:34:34,338 --> 00:34:38,376
play a role in the accident.
594
00:34:38,443 --> 00:34:41,345
NARRATOR: In the 1990s,
Nigerian airlines,
595
00:34:41,412 --> 00:34:43,881
like Trans-Air,
gained a reputation
596
00:34:43,948 --> 00:34:47,485
for poor maintenance.
597
00:34:47,552 --> 00:34:50,555
For a while, Nigerian
airways were, in fact, banned
598
00:34:50,621 --> 00:34:53,157
from United Kingdom airspace.
599
00:34:54,926 --> 00:34:56,561
According to this,
Trans-Air didn't do
600
00:34:56,627 --> 00:35:00,264
mid spar maintenance check.
601
00:35:00,331 --> 00:35:03,901
Trans-Air had only owned
that airplane for a very
602
00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:05,236
small amount of time.
603
00:35:05,303 --> 00:35:07,738
So it's unlikely that
they've performed
604
00:35:07,805 --> 00:35:08,739
any maintenance on it.
605
00:35:09,073 --> 00:35:11,909
So maybe Trans-Air
inherited the problem
606
00:35:11,976 --> 00:35:13,945
before it was owned by them.
607
00:35:16,581 --> 00:35:19,317
Looks like the previous owner
did two maintenance checks--
608
00:35:19,383 --> 00:35:22,487
one on October 10, 1991,
when the plane was
609
00:35:22,553 --> 00:35:26,591
in storage, and the
other in May 1990,
610
00:35:26,657 --> 00:35:29,327
before it went into storage.
611
00:35:29,393 --> 00:35:31,429
NARRATOR: The team learns
that the plane passed
612
00:35:31,496 --> 00:35:33,931
two maintenance checks
in a two year period
613
00:35:33,998 --> 00:35:37,068
prior to the incident.
614
00:35:37,134 --> 00:35:39,670
If the metal fatigue
started before the storage,
615
00:35:39,737 --> 00:35:43,474
the maintenance check should
have caught the problem.
616
00:35:43,541 --> 00:35:45,409
GUY HIRST: There were certain
cracks that should have
617
00:35:45,476 --> 00:35:48,579
been picked up, which weren't.
618
00:35:48,646 --> 00:35:51,349
NARRATOR: Then, one month
into the investigation,
619
00:35:51,415 --> 00:35:55,553
another 707 loses an engine.
620
00:35:55,620 --> 00:35:59,490
The incident is similar to
what happened to Flight 671.
621
00:35:59,557 --> 00:36:03,461
During takeoff from Miami
International Airport,
622
00:36:03,528 --> 00:36:06,063
the number three engine
is torn off the wing
623
00:36:06,130 --> 00:36:09,333
and then hits engine four.
624
00:36:09,400 --> 00:36:10,935
REX PARKINSON: With
the Miami accident,
625
00:36:11,002 --> 00:36:13,170
the pilots managed
to land the aircraft
626
00:36:13,237 --> 00:36:17,408
safely, with no one
being hurt.
627
00:36:17,475 --> 00:36:19,644
NARRATOR: The NTSB investigates
and discovers
628
00:36:19,710 --> 00:36:23,548
that a broken mid spar fitting
also caused the engine
629
00:36:23,614 --> 00:36:25,550
to fall off the wing.
630
00:36:25,616 --> 00:36:30,187
This was, perhaps,
history repeating itself.
631
00:36:33,124 --> 00:36:34,825
Is that from the NTSB?
632
00:36:34,892 --> 00:36:36,427
Yep.
633
00:36:36,494 --> 00:36:38,329
NARRATOR: French investigators
review the NTSB's
634
00:36:38,396 --> 00:36:41,299
preliminary report,
curious about the Miami
635
00:36:41,365 --> 00:36:43,467
plane's maintenance history.
636
00:36:43,534 --> 00:36:45,369
Maintenance on
the 707 in Miami
637
00:36:45,436 --> 00:36:48,539
was performed 328 flights
before the accident.
638
00:36:48,606 --> 00:36:50,841
Which is well within the
600 flight recommendation
639
00:36:50,908 --> 00:36:53,644
by the FAA.
640
00:36:53,711 --> 00:36:56,581
NARRATOR: They discovered
that the plane had also passed
641
00:36:56,647 --> 00:36:59,951
maintenance checks and reported
no fatigue cracking
642
00:37:00,017 --> 00:37:02,553
or corrosion.
643
00:37:02,620 --> 00:37:07,692
In both the Miami accident
and the French accident,
644
00:37:07,758 --> 00:37:12,730
the mid spar fitting had failed
in a very similar way
645
00:37:12,797 --> 00:37:18,336
and had also been maintained
as specified by the FAA
646
00:37:18,402 --> 00:37:21,372
and Boeing Aircraft Company.
647
00:37:21,439 --> 00:37:25,376
Perhaps they weren't
maintaining properly.
648
00:37:25,443 --> 00:37:28,012
At the time,
the mid spar fittings
649
00:37:28,079 --> 00:37:35,052
were required to be inspected
in a close, visual examination.
650
00:37:35,119 --> 00:37:39,590
Basically, you gain
access to the fitting,
651
00:37:39,657 --> 00:37:45,262
you wipe it off the best you
can, and what you can see
652
00:37:45,329 --> 00:37:48,399
is what you examine.
653
00:37:48,466 --> 00:37:52,436
NARRATOR: Was there a problem
with the inspection process?
654
00:37:52,503 --> 00:37:54,338
Investigators
interview a maintenance
655
00:37:54,405 --> 00:37:56,374
supervisor about
how engine fittings
656
00:37:56,440 --> 00:37:59,443
are approved for flight.
657
00:37:59,510 --> 00:38:01,379
So how do you inspect
the fitting?
658
00:38:01,445 --> 00:38:02,847
Well, you're
supposed to carry out
659
00:38:02,913 --> 00:38:06,083
a close visual inspection
for cracks on the exposed
660
00:38:06,150 --> 00:38:07,051
surfaces of the fitting.
661
00:38:07,118 --> 00:38:08,085
And--
662
00:38:08,152 --> 00:38:09,620
And?
663
00:38:09,687 --> 00:38:12,323
Well, cracks can start on
the inside of the fitting.
664
00:38:12,390 --> 00:38:13,791
So why is that a problem?
665
00:38:13,858 --> 00:38:15,593
Well, it's a problem
because you can't see
666
00:38:15,660 --> 00:38:17,962
inside unless you remove
the engine and the pylon
667
00:38:18,029 --> 00:38:20,431
from the wing.
668
00:38:20,498 --> 00:38:23,634
NARRATOR: It's a
troubling discovery.
669
00:38:23,701 --> 00:38:26,337
The mid spar fitting is
normally inspected by removing
670
00:38:26,404 --> 00:38:28,806
a panel on the pylon.
671
00:38:28,873 --> 00:38:32,943
But the entire fitting cannot
be seen from the access panel.
672
00:38:33,010 --> 00:38:37,314
The engine and pylon need to
be removed to check for cracks
673
00:38:37,381 --> 00:38:40,618
on the inside of the fitting.
674
00:38:40,685 --> 00:38:44,288
Boeing did not
require disassembly
675
00:38:44,355 --> 00:38:48,492
of the mid spar fitting.
676
00:38:48,559 --> 00:38:51,328
Their risk assessment
basically said, it's not
677
00:38:51,395 --> 00:38:55,366
worth it on this old airframe.
678
00:38:55,433 --> 00:38:56,734
So there could
be 707s out there
679
00:38:57,001 --> 00:38:59,036
with cracks in this fitting
that no one could see?
680
00:38:59,103 --> 00:39:00,404
Yeah.
681
00:39:02,573 --> 00:39:04,875
As an investigator,
you always have
682
00:39:04,942 --> 00:39:10,147
to wonder how many more engines
are going to fall off of 707s.
683
00:39:20,758 --> 00:39:22,093
Listen to this.
684
00:39:22,159 --> 00:39:24,428
NARRATOR: Investigators
of Flight 671
685
00:39:24,495 --> 00:39:28,399
do a deep dive into the history
of the Boeing 707's mid spar
686
00:39:28,466 --> 00:39:30,401
fitting.
687
00:39:30,468 --> 00:39:33,270
There have been reports of
more than 35 cracked mid spar
688
00:39:33,337 --> 00:39:35,372
fittings on the 797.
689
00:39:35,439 --> 00:39:38,309
These planes are at the
end of their life cycle.
690
00:39:38,375 --> 00:39:41,879
797 in Miami had flown
over 50,000 hours.
691
00:39:41,946 --> 00:39:46,450
The Trans-Air 707 had
flown more than 60,000 hours.
692
00:39:46,517 --> 00:39:49,120
This was an old fitting, on
an old airplane, that had been
693
00:39:49,186 --> 00:39:52,323
designed a very long time ago.
694
00:39:52,389 --> 00:39:55,292
When they didn't know how
these materials would age,
695
00:39:55,359 --> 00:39:57,528
the consequence of this
and perhaps not the best
696
00:39:57,595 --> 00:40:00,798
maintenance or inspection
meant that eventually
697
00:40:00,865 --> 00:40:03,300
this fitting just gave up.
698
00:40:03,367 --> 00:40:07,104
NARRATOR: By 1992,
most 707s were considered
699
00:40:07,171 --> 00:40:09,740
too old to fly
passengers and were
700
00:40:09,807 --> 00:40:11,575
converted to freight transport.
701
00:40:14,612 --> 00:40:18,315
We need to make sure
this doesn't happen again.
702
00:40:18,382 --> 00:40:21,118
NARRATOR: Investigators
conclude that a hidden fracture
703
00:40:21,185 --> 00:40:24,789
in the mid spar fitting almost
took the lives of the five men
704
00:40:24,855 --> 00:40:27,324
on Trans-Air Flight 671.
705
00:40:34,365 --> 00:40:36,500
The fate of the plane
is sealed when
706
00:40:36,567 --> 00:40:41,839
a maintenance inspection fails
to catch the fatigue crack.
707
00:40:41,906 --> 00:40:44,175
Ask if we can go to 33.
708
00:40:46,043 --> 00:40:49,013
NARRATOR: The 707 is pushed
to its breaking point
709
00:40:49,079 --> 00:40:50,848
when two weather events collide.
710
00:40:53,417 --> 00:40:55,486
JOE EPPERSON:
The in-flight turbulence
711
00:40:55,553 --> 00:41:02,059
was the last little bit that
was necessary to cause fracture.
712
00:41:02,126 --> 00:41:08,432
Basically, it was the last straw
that held this pylon together.
713
00:41:08,499 --> 00:41:11,802
NARRATOR: The weakened mid
spar fitting finally breaks
714
00:41:11,869 --> 00:41:14,104
and both engines are lost.
715
00:41:18,375 --> 00:41:20,845
If not for the
heroics of the crew,
716
00:41:20,911 --> 00:41:24,682
the plane would have crashed.
717
00:41:24,748 --> 00:41:27,051
The 707 is not an
easy airplane to fly
718
00:41:27,117 --> 00:41:28,853
when everything is going well.
719
00:41:28,919 --> 00:41:30,921
It's a very difficult
airplane to fly
720
00:41:30,988 --> 00:41:33,023
when things are going wrong.
721
00:41:33,090 --> 00:41:36,026
I've got limited maneuvering.
722
00:41:36,093 --> 00:41:38,696
You dumping?
723
00:41:38,762 --> 00:41:39,797
Yeah.
724
00:41:40,064 --> 00:41:41,866
NARRATOR: Captain
Berglund's skill and stamina
725
00:41:41,932 --> 00:41:44,568
prove remarkable as
he physically keeps
726
00:41:44,635 --> 00:41:48,439
the plane stable until landing.
727
00:41:48,505 --> 00:41:51,075
From the beginning of
the incident to when they
728
00:41:51,141 --> 00:41:52,576
finally landed on the runway--
729
00:41:52,643 --> 00:41:54,078
24 minutes.
730
00:41:54,144 --> 00:41:57,481
24 minutes that
most pilots wouldn't
731
00:41:57,548 --> 00:42:00,851
have had all those things happen
to them in his entire career.
732
00:42:00,918 --> 00:42:03,854
He was just one fantastic pilot.
733
00:42:07,524 --> 00:42:10,127
Kabo 671, we have
no radar contact.
734
00:42:10,194 --> 00:42:12,596
Say your position, please, sir.
735
00:42:12,663 --> 00:42:14,632
NARRATOR: Throughout
the harrowing flight,
736
00:42:14,698 --> 00:42:17,701
Flight Engineer Boone
troubleshoots and fixes
737
00:42:17,768 --> 00:42:20,337
key systems.
738
00:42:20,404 --> 00:42:22,740
GUY HIRST: The flight
engineer looked at his panel
739
00:42:22,806 --> 00:42:25,743
and came up with the
solution as to why
740
00:42:25,809 --> 00:42:27,478
the radar wasn't working.
741
00:42:27,544 --> 00:42:30,748
You turn left, 180.
742
00:42:30,814 --> 00:42:32,316
OK
743
00:42:37,321 --> 00:42:39,490
Hey, you see the airfield?
744
00:42:39,556 --> 00:42:41,859
NARRATOR: And First Officer
Emery's quick thinking
745
00:42:41,926 --> 00:42:44,128
and intuition proved vital.
746
00:42:44,194 --> 00:42:46,463
Kabo 671, we have
an airfield ahead.
747
00:42:46,530 --> 00:42:48,399
What is that airfield?
748
00:42:48,465 --> 00:42:50,467
It was an absolute
genius decision
749
00:42:50,534 --> 00:42:52,670
to land at a military base
with a long runway.
750
00:42:58,008 --> 00:43:03,280
It shows an awful lot about that
spirit of pilots and survival,
751
00:43:03,347 --> 00:43:05,482
that they somehow
coalesce together.
752
00:43:05,549 --> 00:43:08,352
And they all use their
own individual skills.
753
00:43:13,390 --> 00:43:15,626
NARRATOR: The BEA recommends
that inspections
754
00:43:15,693 --> 00:43:18,963
of the current mid spar fittings
be modified to enable
755
00:43:19,029 --> 00:43:21,966
the detection of hidden
cracks or be replaced
756
00:43:22,032 --> 00:43:23,867
by reinforced fittings.
757
00:43:27,204 --> 00:43:31,675
JOE EPPERSON: The FAA decided
to mandate replacement
758
00:43:31,742 --> 00:43:35,679
of the mid spar fittings with
a new and improved mid spar
759
00:43:35,746 --> 00:43:41,185
fitting, which did not
require inspections that were
760
00:43:41,251 --> 00:43:44,555
ineffective in the first place.
761
00:43:44,621 --> 00:43:48,225
NARRATOR: In 1992, the
crew of Trans-Air Cargo 671
762
00:43:48,292 --> 00:43:51,028
received the Hugh
Gordon-Burge Award
763
00:43:51,095 --> 00:43:53,764
for Outstanding Airmanship.
764
00:43:53,831 --> 00:43:55,766
BOB GRIMSTEAD: This flight
was a heroic achievement
765
00:43:55,833 --> 00:43:59,570
where the crew have recovered
from a virtually
766
00:43:59,636 --> 00:44:01,205
impossible situation.
767
00:44:01,271 --> 00:44:04,541
And they deserve
the awards they got.
768
00:44:04,608 --> 00:44:07,544
MARTIN EMERY: So a lot of
luck, and a bit of teamwork,
769
00:44:07,611 --> 00:44:11,415
and a bit of shouting, and a bit
of action, but a happy landing.
60035
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