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NARRATOR: Martinair
Flight 495 is minutes
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from landing at Faro, Portugal.
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CORTEN HOVE: The left engine
was making rattling sound.
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00:00:11,544 --> 00:00:16,683
All of a sudden, we
heard an enormous bang.
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It was total destruction.
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NARRATOR: 56 people are dead.
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Wow. Look at this.
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NARRATOR: Investigators quickly
find some intriguing evidence
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at the crash site.
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AL DICKINSON: There was
a two inch deep cut down
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the left side of the runway.
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This is very strange.
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NARRATOR: The landing gear
is completely severed.
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JOHN COX: If the
aircraft were overweight
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it could exceed
the design limit,
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causing it to break and shear.
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These guys for 71,000
pounds underweight.
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It wasn't too heavy.
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So what went wrong?
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PILOT (ON RADIO): Mayday!
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Mayday!
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Pull up!
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NARRATOR: Martinair
Flight 495 is nearing
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Portugal's southern coast.
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Approach, Martinair 495.
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Good morning.
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NARRATOR: The captain is
56-year-old H.W. van Staveren.
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74 DME, and out
of 240 for level 70.
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NARRATOR: A, highly
experienced pilot
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and flight instructor he's been
with Martinair for 24 years.
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Descending to level 70.
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NARRATOR: The first officer is
31-year-old R.J. Clemenkowff.
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He's been flying with the
Dutch company for three years.
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The youngest member of the team
is 29-year-old flight engineer
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Gary Glans.
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It was our last flight
before the Christmas holidays.
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Everyone was in a good mood.
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My job as a flight engineer--
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I'm responsible for the
aircraft, in general,
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to make sure that everything
is operating properly,
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and overall trying
to be a third set
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of eyes for the flying pilots.
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NARRATOR: The crew
is flying a DC-10,
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a three engine wide body jet.
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In the '90s, the DC-10 was
one of the type of aircraft most
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used for operators worldwide.
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NARRATOR: They're now less
than half an hour from landing.
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There are 13 crew members
and 327 passengers on board.
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Thank you.
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NARRATOR: Most are residents
of the Netherlands.
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We were heading for a
vacation for a week in the South
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of Portugal, in Algarve,
going to warmer wetter
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than the Netherlands was, and
fleeing the busy year we had.
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NARRATOR: Flight 495 near
the end of a 2 and 1/2
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hour trip from Amsterdam
to Portugal's Faro Airport.
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Eight letter word
for apple sources.
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Hmm.
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-Orchards.
-Oh.
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CORTEN HOVE: I was
traveling with Yvonne, then
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my girlfriend, now my wife.
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I was lucky we could
sit at the front row,
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so I had a lot of leg
space to move around.
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Oh.
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It's raining cats
and dogs over there.
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NARRATOR: As they descend
towards Faro Airport,
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the pilots expect to
encounter some bad weather.
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GARY GLANS: We knew that we
were going to encounter rain
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showers, thunderstorms, or
something that you have to be
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incredibly aware of,
and ensure that they
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don't affect your flight path.
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We do everything to
avoid 'em, because they
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can produce unexpected
wind changes,
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microbursts, wind shears.
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NARRATOR: When a thunderstorm
moves over an active runway,
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the potential for
wind shear can make
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it too dangerous for
an aircraft to land.
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GARY GLANS: It wasn't
something that we felt
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was going to be a major issue.
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It was just
something to monitor.
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NARRATOR: If the
weather worsens,
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they can divert north to Lisbon.
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But right now it
isn't necessary.
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PILOT: Martinair
461, runway visual.
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NARRATOR: Just minutes ahead,
another Martinair flight
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is landing at Faro.
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Clear to land, runway 11.
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NARRATOR: The weather
report indicates the closest
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thunderstorm is
approximately seven miles
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00:05:02,402 --> 00:05:04,937
to the west of the runway.
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Knowing other airplanes
were flying that same approach
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and nobody had reported
any significant issues made
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us feel we were safe
to continue onwards.
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495 is turning inbound.
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NARRATOR: Eight miles
out, Martinair 495
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starts its final
approach to runway 11.
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GARY GLANS: The captain chose
to be the pilot monitoring,
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so he could oversee
the whole approach
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and let the first officer focus
on just flying the aircraft.
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NARRATOR: They descend
into the rain clouds,
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confident the
nearest thunderstorm
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is still miles away.
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You've got to be kidding me.
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CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): 495,
report at minimums or runway
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in sight.
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Runway surface
conditions are flooded.
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Roger, 495.
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NARRATOR: With wet
runway conditions,
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the crew configures
the plane to make what's
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called a positive landing.
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A positive touchdown is
when the main wheels penetrate
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the water layer on the runway
and improve the stopping
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ability of the aircraft.
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Gear down.
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Gear down.
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GARY GLANS: With
a wet runway, you
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do want to touch down
at a positive firm rate
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rather than trying to float
down for a softer touchdown.
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Altimeters?
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Set three times.
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NARRATOR: Four miles from
touchdown, the pilots
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make their final checks.
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Spoilers?
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Fine.
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Flaps, slats.
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5-0, land.
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CORTEN HOVE: The left engine
was making quite a noise
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and a rattling sound every
time it gave full power.
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The plane was pitching
up and pitching down.
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So that was not reassuring.
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00:07:24,844 --> 00:07:28,047
Martinair 495,
clear to land runway 11.
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The wind, 150, 15 knots,
maximum 2-0.
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Cleared to land.
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NARRATOR: Flight 495
is less than a minute
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from touching down when the
weather gets much worse.
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00:07:50,770 --> 00:07:51,971
Windshield anti-ice.
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I can't see anything.
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I'm on it.
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Wipers are on fast.
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00:08:05,952 --> 00:08:08,321
It's OK.
It's OK.
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I was just squeezing her hands
firmer and firmer with Yvonne.
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It was dead quiet, the plane.
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NARRATOR: The plane is now just
a few seconds from landing.
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CORTEN HOVE: All of a sudden
we heard an enormous bang.
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I fell out of the chair, and
then I saw the kitchen splinter
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into pieces.
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I was pretty sure we
were going to be crushed.
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NARRATOR: Flight 495
slides more than 350 feet
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off the runway at Faro Airport.
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00:09:05,912 --> 00:09:09,448
Firefighter and rescue
crews raced to the site.
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00:09:13,386 --> 00:09:15,454
Incredibly, many of the
passengers and the flight crew
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survived.
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There were people screaming,
and crying, and running.
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CORTEN HOVE: I didn't
see my girlfriend.
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My first thought was, oh, I
won't ever see Yvonne again.
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NARRATOR: Those lucky enough to
escape search for loved ones.
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CORTEN HOVE: All of a sudden,
I heard my name.
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Then I saw in the distance,
I saw Yvonne standing there.
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We found each other.
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NARRATOR: The injured are
taken to nearby hospitals.
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GARY GLANS: Of the
340 people on board,
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54 passengers and two
cabin crew members
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are dead, making this one
of Portugal's worst aviation
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disasters in more than a decade.
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A detailed
investigation is now
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underway into why this
plane hit the tarmac
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and burst into flames.
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See if we can find
the flight recorders.
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Got it.
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NARRATOR: Investigators from
Portugal's General Directorate
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of Civil Aviation
and from the American
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NTSB arrived to
inspect the wreckage
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of Martinair Flight 495.
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A DC-10 is a big
aircraft and there
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were pieces of it all around.
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The right wing had dislodged
from the rest of the aircraft.
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The wing structure is
the strongest structure
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on whole aircraft, so it had to
have a major amount of stress
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to make that wing depart.
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It's amazing so many survived.
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PEDRO MATOS: The wreckage
showed that the aircraft
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was mostly destroyed by fire.
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80% to 90% of the
people who died,
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died from the post-impact fire.
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AL DICKINSON: We
were very concerned.
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Because if you have
something that's
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suspect on an aircraft that's
being flown all over the world,
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you want to find it.
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That's great.
Nice work.
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Let's hope we get the
data back quickly.
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NARRATOR: Investigators
recover the black boxes
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containing the
flight data recorder
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and cockpit voice recorder.
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PEDRO MATOS: We needed to try
to understand what happened
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in the final moments of the
flight in terms of speeds,
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00:12:01,087 --> 00:12:02,988
in terms of decisions,
and also what
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happened just before touchdown.
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Well, look at this.
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NARRATOR: A quarter of a mile
from the runway threshold,
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investigators discover
the aircraft's
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initial point of impact.
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There was a two inch
deep cut down the left side
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of the runway.
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00:12:27,346 --> 00:12:30,516
So it hit here and
veered off to the right.
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00:12:30,583 --> 00:12:31,617
It's deep.
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00:12:31,684 --> 00:12:33,085
It must have come down hard.
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PEDRO MATOS: The scratches
we saw on the runway revealed
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00:12:38,824 --> 00:12:41,894
to us that the plane
had landed very hard,
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so that's why the
marks were deep.
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00:12:44,096 --> 00:12:46,966
Maybe one of the
engines failed.
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00:12:47,032 --> 00:12:49,668
PEDRO MATOS: Why did
the plane land so hard?
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00:12:49,735 --> 00:12:51,070
Was it a problem
with the landing
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00:12:51,137 --> 00:12:53,639
gear or was it a
problem with speeds
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00:12:53,706 --> 00:12:55,441
or was it a problem
with the engines?
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00:12:55,508 --> 00:12:57,209
So we need to investigate that.
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Is that all of them?
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00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,782
Let's see what we've got.
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AL DICKINSON: You always
look at the engines,
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00:13:05,784 --> 00:13:10,122
and there was
substantial damage.
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00:13:10,189 --> 00:13:13,459
We had to determine
was there some kind
220
00:13:13,526 --> 00:13:17,229
of malfunction in the engine.
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00:13:17,296 --> 00:13:19,798
NARRATOR: Investigators
examine a key component
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00:13:19,865 --> 00:13:21,867
from the engine's
oil block called
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00:13:21,934 --> 00:13:25,371
a magnetic chip detector.
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00:13:25,437 --> 00:13:29,074
A magnetic chip detector is a
small, cylinder shaped device
225
00:13:29,141 --> 00:13:32,344
located inside the
engine's oil filter.
226
00:13:32,411 --> 00:13:36,916
When an engine part wears,
pieces or chips of broken metal
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00:13:36,982 --> 00:13:41,687
adhere to a magnet as they
pass through the oil filter.
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00:13:41,754 --> 00:13:43,389
JOHN COX: It's known
as making metal.
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00:13:43,455 --> 00:13:48,027
Why is there more metal on
this detector than expected?
230
00:13:48,093 --> 00:13:51,030
What part of the
engine is wearing?
231
00:13:51,096 --> 00:13:52,898
The alloys are
slightly different.
232
00:13:52,965 --> 00:13:54,767
They wear at different rates.
233
00:13:54,833 --> 00:13:58,070
So they can tell by
laboratory analysis
234
00:13:58,137 --> 00:14:02,608
what part of the engine is
wearing and how rapidly.
235
00:14:02,675 --> 00:14:04,176
These look clean.
236
00:14:04,243 --> 00:14:06,345
No chips.
237
00:14:06,412 --> 00:14:08,747
NARRATOR: There's no
evidence of metallic debris
238
00:14:08,814 --> 00:14:10,382
inside the oil system.
239
00:14:13,886 --> 00:14:15,821
The engines look fine.
240
00:14:15,888 --> 00:14:18,224
From the tests
conducted on the engines,
241
00:14:18,290 --> 00:14:20,859
it was concluded
that the engines did
242
00:14:20,926 --> 00:14:23,629
not contribute to the accident.
243
00:14:23,696 --> 00:14:25,331
AL DICKINSON: At this
point in the investigation,
244
00:14:25,631 --> 00:14:29,868
we really didn't have a good
idea of what to look for next.
245
00:14:29,935 --> 00:14:32,438
We just had to keep going.
246
00:14:40,946 --> 00:14:43,082
This is very strange.
247
00:14:43,148 --> 00:14:46,352
NARRATOR: They soon realize that
part of the right landing gear
248
00:14:46,418 --> 00:14:48,921
is broken.
249
00:14:48,988 --> 00:14:52,758
The fact that part of the
right landing gear fractured
250
00:14:52,825 --> 00:14:54,159
is very unusual.
251
00:14:54,226 --> 00:14:57,062
It's almost impossible
to make it fail.
252
00:14:57,129 --> 00:15:00,633
The forces necessary to shear
the landing gear like that
253
00:15:00,699 --> 00:15:03,636
is massive.
254
00:15:03,702 --> 00:15:04,903
NARRATOR: Landing
gear is designed
255
00:15:04,970 --> 00:15:06,639
and tested to be
able to withstand
256
00:15:06,705 --> 00:15:09,908
the shock of a 200-ton landing.
257
00:15:09,975 --> 00:15:11,410
It should never fracture.
258
00:15:13,746 --> 00:15:16,782
Well, we had to confirm
whether there was something
259
00:15:16,849 --> 00:15:19,084
wrong with that gear
in the metal used
260
00:15:19,151 --> 00:15:21,353
or maybe the maintenance on it--
261
00:15:21,420 --> 00:15:25,224
anything that could cause
the gear to fail in any way.
262
00:15:25,291 --> 00:15:29,161
And if it was a design
problem, that's a big deal.
263
00:15:29,228 --> 00:15:31,697
NARRATOR: The landing
gear failing on impact
264
00:15:31,764 --> 00:15:34,166
would explain this
tragic accident.
265
00:15:34,233 --> 00:15:36,902
Did we get this piece
of landing gear in yet?
266
00:15:41,607 --> 00:15:42,841
Not yet.
267
00:15:42,908 --> 00:15:44,376
I'll put a rush in.
268
00:15:48,180 --> 00:15:50,849
PEDRO MATOS: The
landing gear collapsed.
269
00:15:50,916 --> 00:15:53,118
That was perhaps the
most important question
270
00:15:53,185 --> 00:15:54,887
that we had to deal with.
271
00:16:01,860 --> 00:16:04,863
NARRATOR: While investigators
wait for the right landing gear
272
00:16:04,930 --> 00:16:09,234
of Flight 495, they
consider what could
273
00:16:09,301 --> 00:16:11,337
have caused it to fracture.
274
00:16:11,403 --> 00:16:14,573
Maybe the plane was too heavy.
275
00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:18,410
If the aircraft were
overweight and made a very firm
276
00:16:18,477 --> 00:16:20,479
touchdown, then
the loads imparted
277
00:16:20,546 --> 00:16:25,050
could exceed the design limit,
causing it to break and shear.
278
00:16:28,354 --> 00:16:29,922
Let's check the load manifest.
279
00:16:36,161 --> 00:16:41,800
The plane and the cargo
were roughly 280,000 pounds.
280
00:16:41,867 --> 00:16:44,503
There was 340 people on board.
281
00:16:44,570 --> 00:16:49,408
Let's call it 53,000 pounds.
282
00:16:49,475 --> 00:16:50,676
The fuel?
283
00:16:50,743 --> 00:16:53,946
Fuel was 20,000 pounds.
284
00:16:59,084 --> 00:17:05,791
So total weight on landing was
353,000 pounds, give or take.
285
00:17:05,858 --> 00:17:10,162
Max weight is 424,000 pounds.
286
00:17:16,168 --> 00:17:23,275
So these guys were
71,000 pounds underweight.
287
00:17:23,342 --> 00:17:25,444
It wasn't too heavy.
288
00:17:25,511 --> 00:17:26,912
NARRATOR: The
weight of the plane
289
00:17:27,212 --> 00:17:32,418
is not what caused the landing
gear to fail on touchdown.
290
00:17:32,484 --> 00:17:35,287
What about weight
distribution?
291
00:17:35,354 --> 00:17:39,758
AL DICKINSON: You have to have
the baggage and the weight
292
00:17:39,825 --> 00:17:43,629
distributed properly,
so the aircraft will fly
293
00:17:43,695 --> 00:17:46,598
the way the pilots want it to.
294
00:17:46,665 --> 00:17:47,900
By the book.
295
00:17:50,436 --> 00:17:52,237
It was properly
loaded, properly
296
00:17:52,304 --> 00:17:53,772
stored, properly locked down.
297
00:17:53,839 --> 00:17:55,908
So it wasn't really an issue.
298
00:17:58,977 --> 00:18:01,547
NARRATOR: With weight
and balance ruled out,
299
00:18:01,613 --> 00:18:03,649
investigators are
finally able to test
300
00:18:03,715 --> 00:18:07,553
the right landing gear itself.
301
00:18:07,619 --> 00:18:10,756
Service records
are up to date.
302
00:18:10,823 --> 00:18:14,827
Let's see if the steel
wasn't strong enough.
303
00:18:14,893 --> 00:18:16,094
PEDRO FERNANDES:
Another thing they
304
00:18:16,428 --> 00:18:20,232
were looking for is any
pre-existing weaknesses
305
00:18:20,299 --> 00:18:21,800
on the steel.
306
00:18:21,867 --> 00:18:24,937
If this occurred in the
manufacturing process,
307
00:18:25,003 --> 00:18:28,240
it could affect the
aircraft in operations
308
00:18:28,307 --> 00:18:29,441
all around the world.
309
00:18:29,775 --> 00:18:30,809
NARRATOR: They
performed something
310
00:18:30,876 --> 00:18:33,812
called a Vickers hardness test.
311
00:18:33,879 --> 00:18:36,315
JOHN COX: The Vickers hardness
test is an industry standard
312
00:18:36,381 --> 00:18:42,187
test to evaluate the strength
of a particular component
313
00:18:42,254 --> 00:18:43,188
or piece of metal.
314
00:18:43,589 --> 00:18:44,923
NARRATOR: A
pyramid-shaped diamond
315
00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:49,828
is pressed into the steel,
leaving an indent, or a dimple.
316
00:18:49,895 --> 00:18:53,832
You can measure the depth
and the diameter of the dimple,
317
00:18:53,899 --> 00:18:56,468
and derive the
metallurgical strength
318
00:18:56,535 --> 00:18:58,237
of what you're testing.
319
00:18:58,303 --> 00:19:04,843
Hardness value is 658, so
the steel was strong enough.
320
00:19:04,910 --> 00:19:06,778
NARRATOR: Investigators
find no weakness
321
00:19:06,845 --> 00:19:10,082
in the metal used to make
the plane's landing gear.
322
00:19:10,148 --> 00:19:12,317
PEDRO FERNANDES: It was
determined there was nothing
323
00:19:12,384 --> 00:19:15,053
wrong with the landing gear.
324
00:19:15,120 --> 00:19:19,291
Whatever went wrong, it
happened before the aircraft
325
00:19:19,358 --> 00:19:20,893
touched the runway.
326
00:19:21,260 --> 00:19:23,695
NARRATOR: There are still no
clues that can help explain
327
00:19:23,762 --> 00:19:26,565
why the landing gear fractured.
328
00:19:26,632 --> 00:19:28,133
The next step in
the investigation
329
00:19:28,433 --> 00:19:33,338
was to look at how the crew was
operating during the last phase
330
00:19:33,405 --> 00:19:35,607
of the landing.
331
00:19:44,883 --> 00:19:46,885
This is interesting.
332
00:19:46,952 --> 00:19:49,021
NARRATOR: Official
statements made by the pilots
333
00:19:49,087 --> 00:19:51,490
may shed some light
on the final moments
334
00:19:51,557 --> 00:19:53,492
of Martinair Flight 495.
335
00:19:53,559 --> 00:19:55,360
After the accident,
the investigators
336
00:19:55,427 --> 00:19:58,764
came to all three of us.
337
00:19:58,830 --> 00:20:00,899
We had closed sessions.
338
00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,871
The captain said
the flight was normal.
339
00:20:05,938 --> 00:20:07,906
The approach was normal.
340
00:20:07,973 --> 00:20:11,310
"At 200 feet, we were
on the center line."
341
00:20:11,376 --> 00:20:12,377
So they should have been OK.
342
00:20:12,444 --> 00:20:14,012
Mm-hmm.
343
00:20:14,079 --> 00:20:17,616
But a few seconds later,
the captain sees lightning.
344
00:20:17,683 --> 00:20:19,651
"I suddenly felt
a high sink rate.
345
00:20:19,718 --> 00:20:20,986
It all happened so fast.
346
00:20:21,353 --> 00:20:24,289
The aircraft actually
fell out of the sky."
347
00:20:25,691 --> 00:20:26,959
NARRATOR: According
to the captain,
348
00:20:27,259 --> 00:20:29,795
he saw lightning just
seconds before the aircraft
349
00:20:29,861 --> 00:20:32,464
began to lose altitude rapidly.
350
00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:34,967
AUTOMATED VOICE: Sink rate.
351
00:20:37,135 --> 00:20:39,838
GARY GLANS: The airplane
felt like God took his hands,
352
00:20:39,905 --> 00:20:42,407
rammed it into the ground.
353
00:20:42,474 --> 00:20:43,475
Well, get this.
354
00:20:43,942 --> 00:20:45,844
The first officer stated,
"The weather was bad
355
00:20:45,911 --> 00:20:47,679
and it was raining heavily.
356
00:20:47,746 --> 00:20:50,082
It was gusty and
very turbulent."
357
00:20:50,148 --> 00:20:52,417
NARRATOR: Investigators
wonder if sudden wind
358
00:20:52,484 --> 00:20:57,255
changes could have contributed
to the crash of Flight 495.
359
00:20:57,322 --> 00:21:00,359
The flight crew indicated
to the investigators
360
00:21:00,425 --> 00:21:05,230
that they were in an area
with a lot of wind shear,
361
00:21:05,297 --> 00:21:07,833
a very dynamic
weather condition.
362
00:21:07,899 --> 00:21:09,701
They were in turbulence.
363
00:21:09,768 --> 00:21:12,838
Things were changing
very rapidly.
364
00:21:12,904 --> 00:21:14,840
NARRATOR: Did the pilot
encounter wind shear
365
00:21:14,906 --> 00:21:16,208
on final approach?
366
00:21:18,877 --> 00:21:21,113
The team interviews the
air traffic controller
367
00:21:21,179 --> 00:21:22,881
to better understand
the conditions
368
00:21:22,948 --> 00:21:25,851
the pilots were experiencing.
369
00:21:25,917 --> 00:21:28,887
Can you tell me what
happened with Flight 495?
370
00:21:28,954 --> 00:21:31,890
Everything seemed
perfectly normal.
371
00:21:31,957 --> 00:21:33,825
They were on their
final approach
372
00:21:33,892 --> 00:21:37,496
and confirmed they had
the runway in sight.
373
00:21:37,562 --> 00:21:39,031
Then I cleared them to land.
374
00:21:41,099 --> 00:21:45,270
CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Martinair
495, clear to land runway 11.
375
00:21:45,337 --> 00:21:50,142
The wind, 150, 15 knots,
maximum 20.
376
00:21:50,208 --> 00:21:52,778
The controllers were
quite confident that they
377
00:21:52,844 --> 00:21:54,780
performed well at the tasks.
378
00:21:54,846 --> 00:21:57,716
So they didn't find that
they did anything wrong,
379
00:21:57,783 --> 00:22:00,052
and they gave the
correct information.
380
00:22:00,118 --> 00:22:04,623
Did they report any
issues with the plane?
381
00:22:04,690 --> 00:22:06,692
No, not at all.
382
00:22:06,758 --> 00:22:08,026
What about the weather?
383
00:22:11,430 --> 00:22:12,664
There was rain.
384
00:22:13,131 --> 00:22:17,869
But other planes were taking off
and landing without difficulty.
385
00:22:17,936 --> 00:22:21,707
PILOT (ON RADIO): Martinair
461, runway visual.
386
00:22:21,773 --> 00:22:24,576
NARRATOR: Just minutes before
the crash, the controller
387
00:22:24,643 --> 00:22:27,179
was in contact with an
aircraft that took off
388
00:22:27,245 --> 00:22:30,949
and another that landed
on the same runway.
389
00:22:31,016 --> 00:22:33,885
Clear to land runway 11.
390
00:22:33,952 --> 00:22:35,721
NARRATOR: Neither flight
reported extreme weather
391
00:22:35,787 --> 00:22:36,888
over the runway.
392
00:22:39,591 --> 00:22:41,293
What about wind shear?
393
00:22:41,359 --> 00:22:43,762
Did the runway sensors
pick up anything?
394
00:22:46,498 --> 00:22:49,267
NARRATOR: Faro Airport is
equipped with two anemometers
395
00:22:49,334 --> 00:22:52,771
that measure both wind
speed and direction, located
396
00:22:52,838 --> 00:22:56,775
on runway 29 and runway 11.
397
00:22:56,842 --> 00:23:00,112
If the anemometers detect a
sudden change in wind speed
398
00:23:00,178 --> 00:23:03,148
of 15 knots or greater,
a wind shear warning
399
00:23:03,215 --> 00:23:04,683
is automatically triggered.
400
00:23:13,291 --> 00:23:16,461
Yes, there were
wind shear warnings.
401
00:23:16,528 --> 00:23:19,231
But they happened after the
aircraft had already crashed.
402
00:23:26,271 --> 00:23:30,208
NARRATOR: If Flight 495 was
hit by an extreme gust of wind
403
00:23:30,275 --> 00:23:32,978
before it crashed to
the runway, the system
404
00:23:33,044 --> 00:23:35,447
would have detected it.
405
00:23:35,514 --> 00:23:37,249
It didn't.
406
00:23:37,315 --> 00:23:39,284
PEDRO MATOS: There was a
conflicting information
407
00:23:39,351 --> 00:23:42,120
between what the crew
said and what the air
408
00:23:42,187 --> 00:23:44,723
traffic controller reports.
409
00:23:44,790 --> 00:23:46,158
NARRATOR: The crew's
statements don't
410
00:23:46,458 --> 00:23:50,562
match with the controller's
account of the weather.
411
00:23:50,629 --> 00:23:52,297
Thank you.
412
00:23:54,599 --> 00:23:57,669
AL DICKINSON: The best thing
to substantially what went on
413
00:23:57,736 --> 00:24:01,740
was to take a really deep look
at what the pilots were saying
414
00:24:01,807 --> 00:24:03,308
to each other in the cockpit.
415
00:24:12,918 --> 00:24:14,853
NARRATOR: A week after
the crash of Flight
416
00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:18,456
495, data from the
cockpit voice recorder
417
00:24:18,523 --> 00:24:20,725
is ready to be reviewed.
418
00:24:20,792 --> 00:24:23,061
FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF:
Plenty approach with 50 flaps.
419
00:24:23,128 --> 00:24:26,298
You call approaching
minimums in field in sight.
420
00:24:26,364 --> 00:24:28,300
You look outside.
421
00:24:28,366 --> 00:24:30,468
Wet runway.
422
00:24:30,535 --> 00:24:32,404
Here are the wipers.
423
00:24:32,470 --> 00:24:33,839
Roger.
424
00:24:34,206 --> 00:24:36,007
NARRATOR: As the crew
prepares for the approach,
425
00:24:36,074 --> 00:24:41,012
they become aware of weather
conditions at Faro Airport.
426
00:24:41,079 --> 00:24:43,415
You have to make
a positive landing.
427
00:24:43,481 --> 00:24:46,351
Yes.
428
00:24:46,418 --> 00:24:47,786
OK.
429
00:24:48,119 --> 00:24:51,523
So, obviously, they're worried
about the runway conditions.
430
00:24:54,659 --> 00:24:56,661
NARRATOR: In a positive
landing, the aircraft
431
00:24:56,728 --> 00:24:59,598
touches down firmly enough
to penetrate the water,
432
00:24:59,664 --> 00:25:03,235
allowing the wheels to grip the
tarmac and slow the airplane.
433
00:25:05,203 --> 00:25:08,206
They want to put it down
hard to avoid hydroplaning
434
00:25:08,273 --> 00:25:10,108
and running out of runway.
435
00:25:10,175 --> 00:25:11,910
So what went wrong?
436
00:25:11,977 --> 00:25:14,713
NARRATOR: Did the pilots
somehow botch their plan
437
00:25:14,779 --> 00:25:16,615
as they approached the runway?
438
00:25:21,052 --> 00:25:22,621
CAPTAIN STAVEREN
(ON RECORDING): 500.
439
00:25:22,687 --> 00:25:24,055
FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF
(ON RECORDING): Cleared.
440
00:25:24,356 --> 00:25:27,058
CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON
RECORDING): Speed a bit low?
441
00:25:27,125 --> 00:25:30,195
Speed is low.
442
00:25:30,262 --> 00:25:31,463
Low.
443
00:25:31,529 --> 00:25:33,765
OK.
444
00:25:33,832 --> 00:25:36,868
Now speed is an issue.
445
00:25:36,935 --> 00:25:38,737
JOHN COX: Going
onto a wet runway,
446
00:25:38,803 --> 00:25:41,206
the air speed control
is very, very important,
447
00:25:41,273 --> 00:25:44,476
so that you don't have too
much and the airplane floats,
448
00:25:44,542 --> 00:25:45,977
but that you don't
have too little
449
00:25:46,044 --> 00:25:48,914
and you end up impacting
the runway quite hard.
450
00:25:48,980 --> 00:25:51,983
All right.
Let's hear more.
451
00:25:52,050 --> 00:25:53,685
CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON
RECORDING): Speed is OK.
452
00:25:53,752 --> 00:25:56,321
Windshield anti-ice!
I can't see anything.
453
00:25:56,388 --> 00:25:57,522
I'm on it.
454
00:25:57,589 --> 00:25:59,691
Wipers are on fast.
455
00:25:59,758 --> 00:26:01,860
NARRATOR: As the plane
gets closer to the ground,
456
00:26:01,927 --> 00:26:05,997
the crew contends with
stormy conditions.
457
00:26:06,064 --> 00:26:08,400
CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON
RECORDING): A bit low.
458
00:26:08,466 --> 00:26:09,801
Low!
459
00:26:10,135 --> 00:26:11,536
FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF
(ON RECORDING): Yes.
460
00:26:14,072 --> 00:26:15,407
Throttles!
461
00:26:23,848 --> 00:26:26,284
Why does the captain
yell, "Throttles?"
462
00:26:28,753 --> 00:26:31,589
For the captain to
say this at this moment,
463
00:26:31,656 --> 00:26:32,958
it raises a question.
464
00:26:33,325 --> 00:26:36,695
Did they have an issue in
the final phase of landing?
465
00:26:36,761 --> 00:26:37,796
All right.
466
00:26:38,129 --> 00:26:39,931
Let's look at the
descent profile.
467
00:26:39,998 --> 00:26:43,535
NARRATOR: If Flight 495 flew
in on the right trajectory,
468
00:26:43,601 --> 00:26:45,470
the FDR will confirm it.
469
00:26:45,537 --> 00:26:46,938
Here you go.
470
00:26:47,005 --> 00:26:48,606
JOHN COX: The
flight data recorder
471
00:26:48,673 --> 00:26:51,643
gives objective,
clear data on what
472
00:26:51,710 --> 00:26:54,746
the airplane
was actually doing.
473
00:26:54,813 --> 00:26:58,216
Was the airplane being
flown at the proper speed?
474
00:26:58,283 --> 00:27:01,853
The changes in the airspeed--
were they indicative
475
00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:04,089
of a severe weather condition?
476
00:27:04,155 --> 00:27:09,761
And how were the pilots
responding to those changes?
477
00:27:09,828 --> 00:27:11,162
Autopilot is on.
478
00:27:11,229 --> 00:27:12,063
OK.
479
00:27:12,564 --> 00:27:15,500
So they're descending
at the standard angle,
480
00:27:15,567 --> 00:27:20,538
and they dip here and recover.
481
00:27:20,605 --> 00:27:22,774
Looks fine.
482
00:27:24,175 --> 00:27:27,812
At 200 feet, which is about
20 seconds from landing,
483
00:27:27,879 --> 00:27:31,983
they were on a
normal glide path.
484
00:27:32,050 --> 00:27:37,889
Something happened between
that and touchdown.
485
00:27:37,956 --> 00:27:39,891
Let's look at
the airspeed data.
486
00:27:42,427 --> 00:27:48,533
So it looks like they're flying
steady at 145 knots until here.
487
00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:51,403
Then airspeed jumps
488
00:27:51,469 --> 00:27:56,074
and then drops all the way
to 139 knots.
489
00:27:56,141 --> 00:27:58,176
NARRATOR: Investigators
spot evidence
490
00:27:58,243 --> 00:28:03,014
of airspeed fluctuations during
the last minute of the flight.
491
00:28:03,081 --> 00:28:05,316
AL DICKINSON: These
fluctuations in airspeed
492
00:28:05,383 --> 00:28:10,488
can be caused by wind gusts
as they got closer to landing.
493
00:28:17,562 --> 00:28:20,765
Speed is a bit low.
494
00:28:20,832 --> 00:28:22,067
Speed is low.
495
00:28:29,441 --> 00:28:31,076
Speed is OK.
496
00:28:31,142 --> 00:28:32,911
NARRATOR: Was the
captain concerned
497
00:28:32,977 --> 00:28:35,547
their speed wasn't fast
enough to compensate
498
00:28:35,613 --> 00:28:37,015
for the strong headwind?
499
00:28:41,119 --> 00:28:42,787
These fluctuations
seem too extreme
500
00:28:42,854 --> 00:28:44,722
to be caused by
the 20-knot winds
501
00:28:44,789 --> 00:28:46,724
reported by the controller.
502
00:28:46,791 --> 00:28:48,660
We need a full
analysis of the weather
503
00:28:48,726 --> 00:28:50,261
conditions on final approach.
504
00:28:54,165 --> 00:28:56,501
NARRATOR: Investigators asked
the Netherlands Aerospace
505
00:28:56,568 --> 00:28:59,270
Laboratory to perform an
in-depth weather study
506
00:28:59,337 --> 00:29:02,440
to determine if the winds
were stronger than what
507
00:29:02,507 --> 00:29:05,009
was reported to Flight 495.
508
00:29:05,076 --> 00:29:07,812
What about auto throttle data?
509
00:29:07,879 --> 00:29:09,147
Let's take a look.
510
00:29:13,651 --> 00:29:14,953
Hmm.
511
00:29:15,286 --> 00:29:20,492
Yeah, the fluctuations in
auto throttles correspond
512
00:29:20,558 --> 00:29:23,128
to the airspeed fluctuations.
513
00:29:26,164 --> 00:29:30,101
If there is an increase in air
speed, the auto throttle system
514
00:29:30,168 --> 00:29:33,238
will decrease the power
that is being commanded--
515
00:29:33,304 --> 00:29:37,308
the amount of thrust that
the engines are producing.
516
00:29:37,375 --> 00:29:41,179
If the airspeed falls low,
the auto throttle system
517
00:29:41,246 --> 00:29:45,783
will command increase thrust
to bring the airplane up
518
00:29:45,850 --> 00:29:48,887
to the commanded airspeed.
519
00:29:48,953 --> 00:29:50,221
NARRATOR: The auto
throttles were
520
00:29:50,588 --> 00:29:54,025
indeed adjusting for the
dramatic changes in airspeed.
521
00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:58,096
Wow. Look at that, 102% power.
522
00:29:58,163 --> 00:29:59,998
NARRATOR: Investigators
discover a very
523
00:30:00,064 --> 00:30:03,501
high surge in engine
power 3/4 of a mile
524
00:30:03,568 --> 00:30:05,170
from the runway threshold.
525
00:30:05,236 --> 00:30:08,640
The 102% command by
the auto throttle system
526
00:30:08,706 --> 00:30:10,175
is a massive amount of power.
527
00:30:10,241 --> 00:30:12,810
It would be similar
to the amount of power
528
00:30:12,877 --> 00:30:14,946
that you would use for takeoff--
529
00:30:15,013 --> 00:30:18,216
too much power to
try to land with.
530
00:30:18,283 --> 00:30:22,820
And then here
power drops to 40%.
531
00:30:22,887 --> 00:30:24,389
NARRATOR: The team
discovers that the power
532
00:30:24,722 --> 00:30:29,861
dropped to a minimum, or engine
idle, shortly thereafter.
533
00:30:29,928 --> 00:30:31,963
That's way too fast for
the auto throttle system
534
00:30:32,030 --> 00:30:33,865
to perform on its own.
535
00:30:37,268 --> 00:30:41,105
For the engines to decelerate
as quickly as they did means
536
00:30:41,172 --> 00:30:44,042
that the levers were
moved faster than the auto
537
00:30:44,108 --> 00:30:47,278
throttle clutches can
physically move them.
538
00:30:47,345 --> 00:30:50,481
The only way the throttles
would move that quick
539
00:30:50,548 --> 00:30:53,017
would be if the
pilot was manually
540
00:30:53,084 --> 00:30:55,119
adjusting them down to 40%.
541
00:30:57,055 --> 00:30:58,223
GARY GLANS: The
auto throttle system
542
00:30:58,289 --> 00:31:00,058
could make large corrections.
543
00:31:00,391 --> 00:31:02,594
And you have to make manual
adjustments if the throttles
544
00:31:02,660 --> 00:31:03,761
aren't keeping up.
545
00:31:10,401 --> 00:31:12,403
JOHN COX: The first officer,
who was the flying pilot,
546
00:31:12,470 --> 00:31:16,140
made the decision to override
the auto throttle system
547
00:31:16,207 --> 00:31:18,543
and to pull the power way back.
548
00:31:21,412 --> 00:31:25,116
And, in fact, he pulled it all
the way back to flight idol.
549
00:31:25,183 --> 00:31:29,254
With so little power they
would have dropped like a rock.
550
00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:31,222
According to the data,
they were
551
00:31:31,289 --> 00:31:34,626
dropping 1,000 feet per minute.
552
00:31:34,692 --> 00:31:38,129
AL DICKINSON: 1,000 feet is well
beyond the operational limit
553
00:31:38,196 --> 00:31:41,532
of 600 feet per
minute for the DC-10.
554
00:31:41,599 --> 00:31:44,135
NARRATOR: As a consequence
of the reduced power,
555
00:31:44,202 --> 00:31:46,638
the plane hit the
runway with enough force
556
00:31:46,704 --> 00:31:48,473
to crack the landing gear.
557
00:31:51,276 --> 00:31:54,879
I've never experienced
a landing as hard as that.
558
00:31:54,946 --> 00:31:59,150
I crushed my teeth in my mouth.
559
00:31:59,217 --> 00:32:01,586
It was hard beyond compare.
560
00:32:01,653 --> 00:32:06,024
NARRATOR: Investigators are
left with a key question.
561
00:32:06,090 --> 00:32:09,093
Why would the crew
reduce power by so much,
562
00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:12,163
so far from the
runway threshold?
563
00:32:26,544 --> 00:32:28,112
This is the Dutch
weather report.
564
00:32:28,446 --> 00:32:31,649
NARRATOR: Investigators turned
to a weather analysis prepared
565
00:32:31,716 --> 00:32:33,918
by the Netherlands
aerospace laboratory
566
00:32:33,985 --> 00:32:37,355
to determine if the weather
affected the crew's actions
567
00:32:37,422 --> 00:32:39,057
during their final approach.
568
00:32:39,123 --> 00:32:42,193
Looks like the weather
was worse than we thought.
569
00:32:42,260 --> 00:32:43,594
Really?
570
00:32:43,961 --> 00:32:46,731
They hit no less than
three separate micro bursts
571
00:32:46,798 --> 00:32:49,000
in the last minute of flight.
572
00:32:49,067 --> 00:32:50,868
Wow. OK.
573
00:32:52,737 --> 00:32:54,672
NARRATOR: A microburst
is a column of air
574
00:32:54,739 --> 00:32:58,242
that descends from rain
clouds, hits the ground,
575
00:32:58,309 --> 00:33:00,678
and fans out horizontally.
576
00:33:00,745 --> 00:33:03,214
It leads to significant
fluctuations
577
00:33:03,281 --> 00:33:04,515
in a plane's airspeed.
578
00:33:09,687 --> 00:33:11,022
When exactly?
579
00:33:14,459 --> 00:33:17,061
The first one was at 700 feet.
580
00:33:19,130 --> 00:33:23,301
The second was between
600 and 300 feet.
581
00:33:26,237 --> 00:33:31,075
And the last one was
between 200 and 110 feet.
582
00:33:36,948 --> 00:33:40,118
Now, this last one
was the worst.
583
00:33:40,184 --> 00:33:46,090
The wind speed jumped from the
reported 20 knots to 40 knots.
584
00:33:46,157 --> 00:33:47,191
Wow.
585
00:33:47,492 --> 00:33:49,794
That would have triggered
a wind shear alert if one
586
00:33:49,861 --> 00:33:52,096
was installed on the plane.
587
00:33:52,163 --> 00:33:55,266
Then the wind shifts from
a headwind to a tailwind.
588
00:33:59,203 --> 00:34:02,039
GARY GLANS: So a wind shear
from headwind to a tailwind
589
00:34:02,106 --> 00:34:05,810
is the worst type of wind shear,
because a headwind improves
590
00:34:05,877 --> 00:34:09,147
your angle of attack to
ensure that the aircraft has
591
00:34:09,213 --> 00:34:10,815
good lift.
592
00:34:10,882 --> 00:34:13,918
When the wind switches
around to a tailwind,
593
00:34:13,985 --> 00:34:17,955
you lose that
aerodynamic performance.
594
00:34:18,022 --> 00:34:21,559
If you don't have the thrust
to compensate for it right away
595
00:34:21,626 --> 00:34:23,261
the aircraft will drop.
596
00:34:25,263 --> 00:34:29,000
Let's compare this to
the auto throttle data.
597
00:34:38,509 --> 00:34:39,444
They line up.
598
00:34:39,510 --> 00:34:40,978
Mm-hmm.
599
00:34:41,045 --> 00:34:43,114
NARRATOR: For every
microburst there's
600
00:34:43,181 --> 00:34:45,416
a corresponding increase
in engine power,
601
00:34:45,483 --> 00:34:49,854
as the auto throttles try to
maintain the plane's speed.
602
00:34:49,921 --> 00:34:52,890
The auto throttle
was going up and down.
603
00:34:52,957 --> 00:34:55,359
It was struggling
very hard to fight
604
00:34:55,426 --> 00:34:58,896
against those heavy down bursts.
605
00:34:58,963 --> 00:35:00,898
The down burst
causes a decrease
606
00:35:00,965 --> 00:35:05,470
in stability, which
means turbulence induced
607
00:35:05,536 --> 00:35:07,638
roll and pitch oscillations.
608
00:35:11,609 --> 00:35:13,211
Would have been a bumpy ride.
609
00:35:13,277 --> 00:35:14,579
Yeah.
610
00:35:14,946 --> 00:35:17,682
NARRATOR: As they pass
through each microburst,
611
00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,484
the auto throttles
were adjusting
612
00:35:19,550 --> 00:35:22,587
to the shifts in wind gusts.
613
00:35:34,866 --> 00:35:36,133
PEDRO MATOS: In
the final moments,
614
00:35:36,467 --> 00:35:40,004
the approach was under
extreme weather conditions.
615
00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:42,173
There were a lot of
oscillations in speed,
616
00:35:42,240 --> 00:35:44,909
and that created a lot
of stress for the pilot
617
00:35:44,976 --> 00:35:47,745
flying at that time.
618
00:35:47,812 --> 00:35:50,214
The first officer
likely would have
619
00:35:50,281 --> 00:35:53,417
been overwhelmed by
the unexpected change
620
00:35:53,484 --> 00:35:54,485
in the weather.
621
00:35:59,123 --> 00:36:00,725
And knowing that he needed
to make a positive landing
622
00:36:00,791 --> 00:36:06,631
at the runway threshold, he
sees the power spike to 102%
623
00:36:06,697 --> 00:36:08,733
and takes corrective action.
624
00:36:08,799 --> 00:36:11,168
NARRATOR: In order to get
the plane on the ground,
625
00:36:11,235 --> 00:36:14,038
the first officer
overrides the auto throttle
626
00:36:14,105 --> 00:36:18,109
and reduces the power to idle.
627
00:36:18,175 --> 00:36:23,915
Investigators now see just how
unfortunate his timing was.
628
00:36:23,981 --> 00:36:26,684
He cut the power at
the exact same time
629
00:36:26,751 --> 00:36:29,387
that last down burst hit them.
630
00:36:34,458 --> 00:36:35,993
Throttles!
631
00:36:36,060 --> 00:36:37,962
NARRATOR: The
captain tries to stop
632
00:36:38,029 --> 00:36:40,164
the plane's
uncontrolled descent...
633
00:36:42,533 --> 00:36:45,403
...but he's too late.
634
00:36:50,908 --> 00:36:53,377
The captain should
have stepped in sooner.
635
00:36:55,780 --> 00:36:56,914
AL DICKINSON: He
should have recognized
636
00:36:56,981 --> 00:37:00,151
something was not right.
637
00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:03,287
The captain really should have
taken over and landed himself.
638
00:37:05,623 --> 00:37:08,993
NARRATOR: Investigators suspect
the sudden change in weather,
639
00:37:09,060 --> 00:37:11,662
combined with the pilot's
decision to cut power too
640
00:37:11,729 --> 00:37:15,600
early, caused the aircraft
to land with more force
641
00:37:15,666 --> 00:37:17,868
than it was built to withstand.
642
00:37:17,935 --> 00:37:21,872
But one question
remains unanswered.
643
00:37:21,939 --> 00:37:26,010
If the winds were gusting
at 40 knots a half mile
644
00:37:26,077 --> 00:37:30,815
from the runway, wouldn't
the winds at the runway
645
00:37:30,881 --> 00:37:33,017
be gusting stronger
than the 20 knots
646
00:37:33,084 --> 00:37:35,553
reported by the controller?
647
00:37:44,962 --> 00:37:47,198
NARRATOR: The team returns
with their findings
648
00:37:47,264 --> 00:37:49,066
to the air traffic
controller who
649
00:37:49,133 --> 00:37:52,870
oversaw Martinair Flight 495.
650
00:37:52,937 --> 00:37:57,041
You reported that
the winds on runway 11
651
00:37:57,108 --> 00:38:00,411
were gusting up to 20 knots.
652
00:38:00,478 --> 00:38:01,746
That's correct.
653
00:38:01,812 --> 00:38:03,748
But that doesn't seem right.
654
00:38:03,814 --> 00:38:06,584
The Dutch weather study
confirmed that there were three
655
00:38:06,651 --> 00:38:09,020
microbursts in the
last minute of flight
656
00:38:09,086 --> 00:38:11,288
with gusts much
higher than that.
657
00:38:14,992 --> 00:38:18,329
Can you show me the
actual data for runway 11?
658
00:38:33,978 --> 00:38:37,181
According to the raw data,
the winds were
659
00:38:37,248 --> 00:38:41,852
actually gusting at 35 knots.
660
00:38:41,919 --> 00:38:44,955
Well, that sounds
more like it.
661
00:38:45,022 --> 00:38:48,426
But how could you
have underreported
662
00:38:48,492 --> 00:38:50,695
the wind conditions?
663
00:38:59,603 --> 00:39:04,508
We receive wind data every
30 seconds from this device.
664
00:39:10,414 --> 00:39:13,017
It must have been switched
to runway 29...
665
00:39:18,222 --> 00:39:20,324
...instead of runway 11.
666
00:39:23,561 --> 00:39:26,897
NARRATOR: Investigators discover
that air traffic controllers
667
00:39:26,964 --> 00:39:30,935
at Faro Airport had mistakenly
selected the wind reading on
668
00:39:31,001 --> 00:39:34,371
runway 2 instead of runway 11.
669
00:39:37,041 --> 00:39:38,476
JOHN COX: Airports
are large places.
670
00:39:38,843 --> 00:39:41,846
So when you have anemometers on
opposite ends of the airport,
671
00:39:41,912 --> 00:39:43,280
you would expect
that frequently there
672
00:39:43,347 --> 00:39:45,950
would be a difference
in direction
673
00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,120
in velocity of a reported wind.
674
00:39:49,186 --> 00:39:52,723
CONTROLLER: Martinair 495,
clear to land runway 11.
675
00:39:52,790 --> 00:39:55,726
The wind 150, 15 knots.
676
00:39:55,793 --> 00:39:57,628
Maximum 20.
677
00:40:02,833 --> 00:40:04,268
Clear to land.
678
00:40:04,635 --> 00:40:08,038
The controller's information
that they provided to the crew
679
00:40:08,105 --> 00:40:10,775
was not representative
of what was actually
680
00:40:10,841 --> 00:40:12,343
occurring on the runway.
681
00:40:19,650 --> 00:40:22,319
PEDRO MATOS: Wet
runway, crosswinds--
682
00:40:22,386 --> 00:40:24,889
that's a completely
different picture.
683
00:40:24,955 --> 00:40:30,327
If the pilots were aware,
they would have gone around.
684
00:40:30,394 --> 00:40:31,962
NARRATOR: Investigators
have figured out
685
00:40:32,029 --> 00:40:35,099
what brought down Flight 495.
686
00:40:41,172 --> 00:40:45,976
495 is turning inbound.
687
00:40:46,043 --> 00:40:47,144
CONTROLLER: 495, copy.
688
00:40:47,444 --> 00:40:50,114
Report at minimums
or runway in sight.
689
00:40:50,181 --> 00:40:53,117
Runway surface
conditions are flooded.
690
00:40:53,184 --> 00:40:55,853
Roger, 495.
691
00:41:00,891 --> 00:41:02,293
Gear down.
692
00:41:04,094 --> 00:41:05,362
Gear down.
693
00:41:05,729 --> 00:41:07,998
NARRATOR: With the runway
at Faro underwater,
694
00:41:08,065 --> 00:41:10,100
the crew plans a
positive touchdown
695
00:41:10,167 --> 00:41:12,303
at the runway threshold.
696
00:41:12,369 --> 00:41:14,338
CONTROLLER: Clear
to land, runway 11.
697
00:41:14,405 --> 00:41:20,311
The wind, 150, 15 knots,
maximum 20.
698
00:41:20,377 --> 00:41:22,213
NARRATOR: But they're
unaware of the severity
699
00:41:22,279 --> 00:41:24,481
of the weather conditions.
700
00:41:24,548 --> 00:41:26,550
-I can't see anything.
-I'm on it.
701
00:41:28,986 --> 00:41:30,221
NARRATOR:
They're hit by a series
702
00:41:30,588 --> 00:41:33,824
of unexpected microbursts,
causing the engine power
703
00:41:33,891 --> 00:41:35,226
to shoot up automatically.
704
00:41:40,264 --> 00:41:42,066
Concerned that the
excess power is
705
00:41:42,132 --> 00:41:44,301
too great for a
positive landing,
706
00:41:44,368 --> 00:41:47,872
the first officer reduces
the power to idle just
707
00:41:47,938 --> 00:41:50,174
as the last microburst occurs.
708
00:41:50,241 --> 00:41:53,177
That makes them vulnerable
to strong winds,
709
00:41:53,244 --> 00:41:57,781
and the aircraft dropped
from 150 feet.
710
00:42:04,121 --> 00:42:06,824
NARRATOR: Flight 495
slams to the ground
711
00:42:06,891 --> 00:42:10,594
at 1,000 feet per minute.
712
00:42:15,466 --> 00:42:20,304
The danger of being slow
and encountering a downdraft
713
00:42:20,371 --> 00:42:24,341
is you may not be able
to recover in time.
714
00:42:24,408 --> 00:42:26,443
And that can be disastrous.
715
00:42:28,612 --> 00:42:31,282
PEDRO FERNANDES: They could
have come with a higher speed.
716
00:42:31,348 --> 00:42:33,984
They could have performed
a missed approach.
717
00:42:34,051 --> 00:42:38,322
But the truth is, the flight
crew tried their best.
718
00:42:38,389 --> 00:42:41,025
This wasn't an accident
where we can
719
00:42:41,091 --> 00:42:43,861
see negligence or gross error.
720
00:42:46,664 --> 00:42:49,333
NARRATOR: In the aftermath of
their report into the crash
721
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:52,970
of Martinair Flight 495,
investigators make
722
00:42:53,037 --> 00:42:56,240
a series of recommendations.
723
00:42:56,307 --> 00:43:00,244
This accident was going
to be yet another example
724
00:43:00,311 --> 00:43:04,882
of inappropriate wind shear
recovery being
725
00:43:04,949 --> 00:43:06,550
applied in a timely fashion.
726
00:43:06,617 --> 00:43:10,020
So this says additional
pilot training.
727
00:43:10,087 --> 00:43:14,959
This says wind shear detection
systems on airplanes.
728
00:43:15,025 --> 00:43:19,063
This says a more aggressive
approach to go-arounds
729
00:43:19,129 --> 00:43:21,498
in unstable conditions.
730
00:43:21,565 --> 00:43:23,334
NARRATOR: Shortly
after the crash,
731
00:43:23,400 --> 00:43:25,569
Faro Airport
modernized their wind
732
00:43:25,636 --> 00:43:31,241
sensors and displays to comply
with international regulations.
733
00:43:31,308 --> 00:43:33,143
JOHN COX:
The critical information
734
00:43:33,210 --> 00:43:37,781
that controllers provide to
pilots needs to be accurate.
735
00:43:37,848 --> 00:43:40,751
So these are some of the
lessons that the industry
736
00:43:40,818 --> 00:43:44,855
learned and implemented
following this accident.
737
00:43:48,425 --> 00:43:49,593
GARY GLANS: You know,
one of the things
738
00:43:49,893 --> 00:43:51,061
I was told when I was
becoming a pilot is
739
00:43:51,128 --> 00:43:52,329
never let your guard down.
740
00:43:52,663 --> 00:43:55,632
You can be having a
beautiful, wonderful flight.
741
00:43:55,699 --> 00:44:00,170
And in the blink of an eye,
things can change.
742
00:44:00,237 --> 00:44:03,173
It's just ingrained
in my mind, always
743
00:44:03,240 --> 00:44:06,410
be ready for the unexpected.
57427
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