All language subtitles for Air Disasters S17E02 Peril Over Portugal 1080p PMTP WEB-DL AAC2 0 H 264_track3_[eng]

ak Akan
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bem Bemba
bh Bihari
bs Bosnian
br Breton
bg Bulgarian
km Cambodian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
chr Cherokee
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian
cs Czech
da Danish
nl Dutch
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
ee Ewe
fo Faroese
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gaa Ga
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
gn Guarani
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ia Interlingua
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
rw Kinyarwanda
rn Kirundi
kg Kongo
ko Korean
kri Krio (Sierra Leone)
ku Kurdish
ckb Kurdish (Soranรฎ)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Laothian
la Latin
lv Latvian
ln Lingala
lt Lithuanian
loz Lozi
lg Luganda
ach Luo
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mfe Mauritian Creole
mo Moldavian
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
sr-ME Montenegrin
ne Nepali
pcm Nigerian Pidgin
nso Northern Sotho
no Norwegian
nn Norwegian (Nynorsk)
oc Occitan
or Oriya
om Oromo
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt-BR Portuguese (Brazil)
pt Portuguese (Portugal)
pa Punjabi
qu Quechua
ro Romanian
rm Romansh
nyn Runyakitara
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
sh Serbo-Croatian
st Sesotho
tn Setswana
crs Seychellois Creole
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhalese
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish
es-419 Spanish (Latin American)
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
tt Tatar
te Telugu
th Thai
ti Tigrinya
to Tonga
lua Tshiluba
tum Tumbuka
tr Turkish
tk Turkmen
tw Twi
ug Uighur
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese
cy Welsh
wo Wolof
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,602 --> 00:00:05,171 NARRATOR: Martinair Flight 495 is minutes 2 00:00:05,238 --> 00:00:07,574 from landing at Faro, Portugal. 3 00:00:07,640 --> 00:00:11,478 CORTEN HOVE: The left engine was making rattling sound. 4 00:00:11,544 --> 00:00:16,683 All of a sudden, we heard an enormous bang. 5 00:00:19,185 --> 00:00:23,390 It was total destruction. 6 00:00:23,456 --> 00:00:27,427 NARRATOR: 56 people are dead. 7 00:00:27,494 --> 00:00:29,796 Wow. Look at this. 8 00:00:29,863 --> 00:00:32,332 NARRATOR: Investigators quickly find some intriguing evidence 9 00:00:32,399 --> 00:00:33,600 at the crash site. 10 00:00:33,933 --> 00:00:36,603 AL DICKINSON: There was a two inch deep cut down 11 00:00:36,669 --> 00:00:39,906 the left side of the runway. 12 00:00:39,973 --> 00:00:41,975 This is very strange. 13 00:00:42,041 --> 00:00:44,844 NARRATOR: The landing gear is completely severed. 14 00:00:44,911 --> 00:00:46,846 JOHN COX: If the aircraft were overweight 15 00:00:46,913 --> 00:00:49,449 it could exceed the design limit, 16 00:00:49,516 --> 00:00:52,419 causing it to break and shear. 17 00:00:52,485 --> 00:00:57,490 These guys for 71,000 pounds underweight. 18 00:00:57,557 --> 00:00:59,058 It wasn't too heavy. 19 00:00:59,125 --> 00:01:00,493 So what went wrong? 20 00:01:00,560 --> 00:01:02,128 PILOT (ON RADIO): Mayday! 21 00:01:02,195 --> 00:01:03,096 Mayday! 22 00:01:06,166 --> 00:01:08,468 Pull up! 23 00:01:23,917 --> 00:01:26,586 NARRATOR: Martinair Flight 495 is nearing 24 00:01:26,653 --> 00:01:28,121 Portugal's southern coast. 25 00:01:30,657 --> 00:01:33,226 Approach, Martinair 495. 26 00:01:33,293 --> 00:01:34,627 Good morning. 27 00:01:34,994 --> 00:01:39,732 NARRATOR: The captain is 56-year-old H.W. van Staveren. 28 00:01:39,799 --> 00:01:44,571 74 DME, and out of 240 for level 70. 29 00:01:44,637 --> 00:01:45,972 NARRATOR: A, highly experienced pilot 30 00:01:46,406 --> 00:01:51,377 and flight instructor he's been with Martinair for 24 years. 31 00:01:51,444 --> 00:01:53,746 Descending to level 70. 32 00:01:53,813 --> 00:01:57,283 NARRATOR: The first officer is 31-year-old R.J. Clemenkowff. 33 00:01:57,350 --> 00:02:00,887 He's been flying with the Dutch company for three years. 34 00:02:03,890 --> 00:02:07,527 The youngest member of the team is 29-year-old flight engineer 35 00:02:07,594 --> 00:02:08,862 Gary Glans. 36 00:02:11,131 --> 00:02:14,300 It was our last flight before the Christmas holidays. 37 00:02:14,367 --> 00:02:17,403 Everyone was in a good mood. 38 00:02:17,470 --> 00:02:18,671 My job as a flight engineer-- 39 00:02:19,005 --> 00:02:20,573 I'm responsible for the aircraft, in general, 40 00:02:20,840 --> 00:02:23,476 to make sure that everything is operating properly, 41 00:02:23,543 --> 00:02:25,512 and overall trying to be a third set 42 00:02:25,578 --> 00:02:29,716 of eyes for the flying pilots. 43 00:02:29,782 --> 00:02:31,784 NARRATOR: The crew is flying a DC-10, 44 00:02:31,851 --> 00:02:35,221 a three engine wide body jet. 45 00:02:35,288 --> 00:02:40,393 In the '90s, the DC-10 was one of the type of aircraft most 46 00:02:40,460 --> 00:02:43,763 used for operators worldwide. 47 00:02:43,830 --> 00:02:46,132 NARRATOR: They're now less than half an hour from landing. 48 00:02:48,234 --> 00:02:53,873 There are 13 crew members and 327 passengers on board. 49 00:02:53,940 --> 00:02:55,008 Thank you. 50 00:02:55,341 --> 00:02:58,211 NARRATOR: Most are residents of the Netherlands. 51 00:02:58,278 --> 00:03:01,714 We were heading for a vacation for a week in the South 52 00:03:01,781 --> 00:03:05,151 of Portugal, in Algarve, going to warmer wetter 53 00:03:05,218 --> 00:03:08,922 than the Netherlands was, and fleeing the busy year we had. 54 00:03:11,958 --> 00:03:14,827 NARRATOR: Flight 495 near the end of a 2 and 1/2 55 00:03:14,894 --> 00:03:18,631 hour trip from Amsterdam to Portugal's Faro Airport. 56 00:03:21,634 --> 00:03:26,039 Eight letter word for apple sources. 57 00:03:26,105 --> 00:03:27,173 Hmm. 58 00:03:27,240 --> 00:03:30,143 -Orchards. -Oh. 59 00:03:30,209 --> 00:03:31,844 CORTEN HOVE: I was traveling with Yvonne, then 60 00:03:31,911 --> 00:03:34,547 my girlfriend, now my wife. 61 00:03:34,614 --> 00:03:36,983 I was lucky we could sit at the front row, 62 00:03:37,050 --> 00:03:39,986 so I had a lot of leg space to move around. 63 00:03:43,289 --> 00:03:45,124 Oh. 64 00:03:45,191 --> 00:03:49,128 It's raining cats and dogs over there. 65 00:03:49,195 --> 00:03:52,131 NARRATOR: As they descend towards Faro Airport, 66 00:03:52,198 --> 00:03:56,102 the pilots expect to encounter some bad weather. 67 00:03:56,169 --> 00:03:58,538 GARY GLANS: We knew that we were going to encounter rain 68 00:03:58,605 --> 00:04:02,542 showers, thunderstorms, or something that you have to be 69 00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:05,445 incredibly aware of, and ensure that they 70 00:04:05,511 --> 00:04:07,347 don't affect your flight path. 71 00:04:08,948 --> 00:04:11,684 We do everything to avoid 'em, because they 72 00:04:11,751 --> 00:04:14,087 can produce unexpected wind changes, 73 00:04:14,153 --> 00:04:16,389 microbursts, wind shears. 74 00:04:16,456 --> 00:04:19,892 NARRATOR: When a thunderstorm moves over an active runway, 75 00:04:19,959 --> 00:04:21,828 the potential for wind shear can make 76 00:04:21,894 --> 00:04:25,164 it too dangerous for an aircraft to land. 77 00:04:25,231 --> 00:04:26,966 GARY GLANS: It wasn't something that we felt 78 00:04:27,033 --> 00:04:28,501 was going to be a major issue. 79 00:04:28,568 --> 00:04:30,103 It was just something to monitor. 80 00:04:34,774 --> 00:04:36,643 NARRATOR: If the weather worsens, 81 00:04:36,709 --> 00:04:38,745 they can divert north to Lisbon. 82 00:04:38,811 --> 00:04:42,048 But right now it isn't necessary. 83 00:04:42,115 --> 00:04:46,185 PILOT: Martinair 461, runway visual. 84 00:04:46,252 --> 00:04:49,389 NARRATOR: Just minutes ahead, another Martinair flight 85 00:04:49,455 --> 00:04:52,692 is landing at Faro. 86 00:04:52,759 --> 00:04:54,627 Clear to land, runway 11. 87 00:04:57,897 --> 00:04:59,832 NARRATOR: The weather report indicates the closest 88 00:04:59,899 --> 00:05:02,335 thunderstorm is approximately seven miles 89 00:05:02,402 --> 00:05:04,937 to the west of the runway. 90 00:05:05,004 --> 00:05:07,874 Knowing other airplanes were flying that same approach 91 00:05:07,940 --> 00:05:11,711 and nobody had reported any significant issues made 92 00:05:11,778 --> 00:05:14,747 us feel we were safe to continue onwards. 93 00:05:14,814 --> 00:05:18,685 495 is turning inbound. 94 00:05:18,751 --> 00:05:20,853 NARRATOR: Eight miles out, Martinair 495 95 00:05:20,920 --> 00:05:26,159 starts its final approach to runway 11. 96 00:05:26,225 --> 00:05:28,194 GARY GLANS: The captain chose to be the pilot monitoring, 97 00:05:28,261 --> 00:05:31,130 so he could oversee the whole approach 98 00:05:31,197 --> 00:05:35,301 and let the first officer focus on just flying the aircraft. 99 00:05:39,038 --> 00:05:40,873 NARRATOR: They descend into the rain clouds, 100 00:05:40,940 --> 00:05:42,709 confident the nearest thunderstorm 101 00:05:42,775 --> 00:05:44,343 is still miles away. 102 00:05:51,784 --> 00:05:54,353 You've got to be kidding me. 103 00:06:02,261 --> 00:06:05,398 CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): 495, report at minimums or runway 104 00:06:05,465 --> 00:06:06,332 in sight. 105 00:06:06,866 --> 00:06:09,535 Runway surface conditions are flooded. 106 00:06:09,602 --> 00:06:11,637 Roger, 495. 107 00:06:11,704 --> 00:06:13,206 NARRATOR: With wet runway conditions, 108 00:06:13,272 --> 00:06:15,541 the crew configures the plane to make what's 109 00:06:15,608 --> 00:06:17,944 called a positive landing. 110 00:06:18,010 --> 00:06:21,380 A positive touchdown is when the main wheels penetrate 111 00:06:21,447 --> 00:06:25,184 the water layer on the runway and improve the stopping 112 00:06:25,251 --> 00:06:26,719 ability of the aircraft. 113 00:06:26,786 --> 00:06:28,020 Gear down. 114 00:06:30,523 --> 00:06:32,992 Gear down. 115 00:06:33,059 --> 00:06:34,761 GARY GLANS: With a wet runway, you 116 00:06:34,827 --> 00:06:37,396 do want to touch down at a positive firm rate 117 00:06:37,463 --> 00:06:41,734 rather than trying to float down for a softer touchdown. 118 00:06:41,801 --> 00:06:44,604 Altimeters? 119 00:06:44,670 --> 00:06:46,305 Set three times. 120 00:06:46,372 --> 00:06:48,975 NARRATOR: Four miles from touchdown, the pilots 121 00:06:49,041 --> 00:06:50,710 make their final checks. 122 00:06:50,777 --> 00:06:52,044 Spoilers? 123 00:06:55,381 --> 00:06:56,482 Fine. 124 00:06:56,549 --> 00:06:57,784 Flaps, slats. 125 00:07:00,319 --> 00:07:01,420 5-0, land. 126 00:07:05,992 --> 00:07:10,029 CORTEN HOVE: The left engine was making quite a noise 127 00:07:10,096 --> 00:07:15,201 and a rattling sound every time it gave full power. 128 00:07:15,268 --> 00:07:18,371 The plane was pitching up and pitching down. 129 00:07:21,574 --> 00:07:24,777 So that was not reassuring. 130 00:07:24,844 --> 00:07:28,047 Martinair 495, clear to land runway 11. 131 00:07:28,114 --> 00:07:32,318 The wind, 150, 15 knots, maximum 2-0. 132 00:07:39,192 --> 00:07:41,194 Cleared to land. 133 00:07:41,260 --> 00:07:43,462 NARRATOR: Flight 495 is less than a minute 134 00:07:43,529 --> 00:07:50,703 from touching down when the weather gets much worse. 135 00:07:50,770 --> 00:07:51,971 Windshield anti-ice. 136 00:07:52,038 --> 00:07:53,339 I can't see anything. 137 00:07:53,406 --> 00:07:54,640 I'm on it. 138 00:07:54,707 --> 00:07:56,475 Wipers are on fast. 139 00:08:05,952 --> 00:08:08,321 It's OK. It's OK. 140 00:08:08,387 --> 00:08:12,325 I was just squeezing her hands firmer and firmer with Yvonne. 141 00:08:14,727 --> 00:08:17,897 It was dead quiet, the plane. 142 00:08:24,837 --> 00:08:28,507 NARRATOR: The plane is now just a few seconds from landing. 143 00:08:32,645 --> 00:08:35,448 CORTEN HOVE: All of a sudden we heard an enormous bang. 144 00:08:40,720 --> 00:08:45,691 I fell out of the chair, and then I saw the kitchen splinter 145 00:08:45,758 --> 00:08:46,826 into pieces. 146 00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:56,602 I was pretty sure we were going to be crushed. 147 00:08:58,304 --> 00:09:01,974 NARRATOR: Flight 495 slides more than 350 feet 148 00:09:02,041 --> 00:09:05,845 off the runway at Faro Airport. 149 00:09:05,912 --> 00:09:09,448 Firefighter and rescue crews raced to the site. 150 00:09:13,386 --> 00:09:15,454 Incredibly, many of the passengers and the flight crew 151 00:09:15,521 --> 00:09:16,422 survived. 152 00:09:18,424 --> 00:09:22,428 There were people screaming, and crying, and running. 153 00:09:28,200 --> 00:09:31,103 CORTEN HOVE: I didn't see my girlfriend. 154 00:09:31,170 --> 00:09:35,708 My first thought was, oh, I won't ever see Yvonne again. 155 00:09:35,775 --> 00:09:39,312 NARRATOR: Those lucky enough to escape search for loved ones. 156 00:09:41,981 --> 00:09:45,284 CORTEN HOVE: All of a sudden, I heard my name. 157 00:09:47,386 --> 00:09:52,725 Then I saw in the distance, I saw Yvonne standing there. 158 00:09:52,792 --> 00:09:55,461 We found each other. 159 00:09:55,528 --> 00:10:00,533 NARRATOR: The injured are taken to nearby hospitals. 160 00:10:05,404 --> 00:10:07,907 GARY GLANS: Of the 340 people on board, 161 00:10:07,974 --> 00:10:10,509 54 passengers and two cabin crew members 162 00:10:10,576 --> 00:10:17,116 are dead, making this one of Portugal's worst aviation 163 00:10:17,183 --> 00:10:21,220 disasters in more than a decade. 164 00:10:21,287 --> 00:10:22,989 A detailed investigation is now 165 00:10:23,055 --> 00:10:25,725 underway into why this plane hit the tarmac 166 00:10:25,791 --> 00:10:27,259 and burst into flames. 167 00:10:40,639 --> 00:10:43,442 See if we can find the flight recorders. 168 00:10:43,509 --> 00:10:45,077 Got it. 169 00:10:45,444 --> 00:10:47,847 NARRATOR: Investigators from Portugal's General Directorate 170 00:10:47,913 --> 00:10:50,483 of Civil Aviation and from the American 171 00:10:50,549 --> 00:10:53,552 NTSB arrived to inspect the wreckage 172 00:10:53,619 --> 00:10:56,489 of Martinair Flight 495. 173 00:10:56,555 --> 00:10:58,891 A DC-10 is a big aircraft and there 174 00:10:58,958 --> 00:11:02,261 were pieces of it all around. 175 00:11:02,328 --> 00:11:07,366 The right wing had dislodged from the rest of the aircraft. 176 00:11:07,433 --> 00:11:10,002 The wing structure is the strongest structure 177 00:11:10,069 --> 00:11:14,540 on whole aircraft, so it had to have a major amount of stress 178 00:11:14,607 --> 00:11:17,343 to make that wing depart. 179 00:11:17,410 --> 00:11:20,679 It's amazing so many survived. 180 00:11:20,746 --> 00:11:22,448 PEDRO MATOS: The wreckage showed that the aircraft 181 00:11:22,515 --> 00:11:25,851 was mostly destroyed by fire. 182 00:11:25,918 --> 00:11:27,953 80% to 90% of the people who died, 183 00:11:28,020 --> 00:11:31,690 died from the post-impact fire. 184 00:11:31,757 --> 00:11:33,459 AL DICKINSON: We were very concerned. 185 00:11:33,526 --> 00:11:35,294 Because if you have something that's 186 00:11:35,361 --> 00:11:39,298 suspect on an aircraft that's being flown all over the world, 187 00:11:39,365 --> 00:11:40,766 you want to find it. 188 00:11:40,833 --> 00:11:42,902 That's great. Nice work. 189 00:11:46,238 --> 00:11:49,041 Let's hope we get the data back quickly. 190 00:11:49,108 --> 00:11:51,510 NARRATOR: Investigators recover the black boxes 191 00:11:51,577 --> 00:11:52,978 containing the flight data recorder 192 00:11:53,045 --> 00:11:56,182 and cockpit voice recorder. 193 00:11:56,248 --> 00:11:58,217 PEDRO MATOS: We needed to try to understand what happened 194 00:11:58,284 --> 00:12:01,020 in the final moments of the flight in terms of speeds, 195 00:12:01,087 --> 00:12:02,988 in terms of decisions, and also what 196 00:12:03,055 --> 00:12:05,624 happened just before touchdown. 197 00:12:12,264 --> 00:12:13,833 Well, look at this. 198 00:12:14,166 --> 00:12:16,602 NARRATOR: A quarter of a mile from the runway threshold, 199 00:12:16,669 --> 00:12:18,637 investigators discover the aircraft's 200 00:12:18,704 --> 00:12:20,940 initial point of impact. 201 00:12:21,006 --> 00:12:25,778 There was a two inch deep cut down the left side 202 00:12:25,845 --> 00:12:27,012 of the runway. 203 00:12:27,346 --> 00:12:30,516 So it hit here and veered off to the right. 204 00:12:30,583 --> 00:12:31,617 It's deep. 205 00:12:31,684 --> 00:12:33,085 It must have come down hard. 206 00:12:36,388 --> 00:12:38,757 PEDRO MATOS: The scratches we saw on the runway revealed 207 00:12:38,824 --> 00:12:41,894 to us that the plane had landed very hard, 208 00:12:41,961 --> 00:12:44,029 so that's why the marks were deep. 209 00:12:44,096 --> 00:12:46,966 Maybe one of the engines failed. 210 00:12:47,032 --> 00:12:49,668 PEDRO MATOS: Why did the plane land so hard? 211 00:12:49,735 --> 00:12:51,070 Was it a problem with the landing 212 00:12:51,137 --> 00:12:53,639 gear or was it a problem with speeds 213 00:12:53,706 --> 00:12:55,441 or was it a problem with the engines? 214 00:12:55,508 --> 00:12:57,209 So we need to investigate that. 215 00:12:59,879 --> 00:13:01,547 Is that all of them? 216 00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,782 Let's see what we've got. 217 00:13:03,849 --> 00:13:05,718 AL DICKINSON: You always look at the engines, 218 00:13:05,784 --> 00:13:10,122 and there was substantial damage. 219 00:13:10,189 --> 00:13:13,459 We had to determine was there some kind 220 00:13:13,526 --> 00:13:17,229 of malfunction in the engine. 221 00:13:17,296 --> 00:13:19,798 NARRATOR: Investigators examine a key component 222 00:13:19,865 --> 00:13:21,867 from the engine's oil block called 223 00:13:21,934 --> 00:13:25,371 a magnetic chip detector. 224 00:13:25,437 --> 00:13:29,074 A magnetic chip detector is a small, cylinder shaped device 225 00:13:29,141 --> 00:13:32,344 located inside the engine's oil filter. 226 00:13:32,411 --> 00:13:36,916 When an engine part wears, pieces or chips of broken metal 227 00:13:36,982 --> 00:13:41,687 adhere to a magnet as they pass through the oil filter. 228 00:13:41,754 --> 00:13:43,389 JOHN COX: It's known as making metal. 229 00:13:43,455 --> 00:13:48,027 Why is there more metal on this detector than expected? 230 00:13:48,093 --> 00:13:51,030 What part of the engine is wearing? 231 00:13:51,096 --> 00:13:52,898 The alloys are slightly different. 232 00:13:52,965 --> 00:13:54,767 They wear at different rates. 233 00:13:54,833 --> 00:13:58,070 So they can tell by laboratory analysis 234 00:13:58,137 --> 00:14:02,608 what part of the engine is wearing and how rapidly. 235 00:14:02,675 --> 00:14:04,176 These look clean. 236 00:14:04,243 --> 00:14:06,345 No chips. 237 00:14:06,412 --> 00:14:08,747 NARRATOR: There's no evidence of metallic debris 238 00:14:08,814 --> 00:14:10,382 inside the oil system. 239 00:14:13,886 --> 00:14:15,821 The engines look fine. 240 00:14:15,888 --> 00:14:18,224 From the tests conducted on the engines, 241 00:14:18,290 --> 00:14:20,859 it was concluded that the engines did 242 00:14:20,926 --> 00:14:23,629 not contribute to the accident. 243 00:14:23,696 --> 00:14:25,331 AL DICKINSON: At this point in the investigation, 244 00:14:25,631 --> 00:14:29,868 we really didn't have a good idea of what to look for next. 245 00:14:29,935 --> 00:14:32,438 We just had to keep going. 246 00:14:40,946 --> 00:14:43,082 This is very strange. 247 00:14:43,148 --> 00:14:46,352 NARRATOR: They soon realize that part of the right landing gear 248 00:14:46,418 --> 00:14:48,921 is broken. 249 00:14:48,988 --> 00:14:52,758 The fact that part of the right landing gear fractured 250 00:14:52,825 --> 00:14:54,159 is very unusual. 251 00:14:54,226 --> 00:14:57,062 It's almost impossible to make it fail. 252 00:14:57,129 --> 00:15:00,633 The forces necessary to shear the landing gear like that 253 00:15:00,699 --> 00:15:03,636 is massive. 254 00:15:03,702 --> 00:15:04,903 NARRATOR: Landing gear is designed 255 00:15:04,970 --> 00:15:06,639 and tested to be able to withstand 256 00:15:06,705 --> 00:15:09,908 the shock of a 200-ton landing. 257 00:15:09,975 --> 00:15:11,410 It should never fracture. 258 00:15:13,746 --> 00:15:16,782 Well, we had to confirm whether there was something 259 00:15:16,849 --> 00:15:19,084 wrong with that gear in the metal used 260 00:15:19,151 --> 00:15:21,353 or maybe the maintenance on it-- 261 00:15:21,420 --> 00:15:25,224 anything that could cause the gear to fail in any way. 262 00:15:25,291 --> 00:15:29,161 And if it was a design problem, that's a big deal. 263 00:15:29,228 --> 00:15:31,697 NARRATOR: The landing gear failing on impact 264 00:15:31,764 --> 00:15:34,166 would explain this tragic accident. 265 00:15:34,233 --> 00:15:36,902 Did we get this piece of landing gear in yet? 266 00:15:41,607 --> 00:15:42,841 Not yet. 267 00:15:42,908 --> 00:15:44,376 I'll put a rush in. 268 00:15:48,180 --> 00:15:50,849 PEDRO MATOS: The landing gear collapsed. 269 00:15:50,916 --> 00:15:53,118 That was perhaps the most important question 270 00:15:53,185 --> 00:15:54,887 that we had to deal with. 271 00:16:01,860 --> 00:16:04,863 NARRATOR: While investigators wait for the right landing gear 272 00:16:04,930 --> 00:16:09,234 of Flight 495, they consider what could 273 00:16:09,301 --> 00:16:11,337 have caused it to fracture. 274 00:16:11,403 --> 00:16:14,573 Maybe the plane was too heavy. 275 00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:18,410 If the aircraft were overweight and made a very firm 276 00:16:18,477 --> 00:16:20,479 touchdown, then the loads imparted 277 00:16:20,546 --> 00:16:25,050 could exceed the design limit, causing it to break and shear. 278 00:16:28,354 --> 00:16:29,922 Let's check the load manifest. 279 00:16:36,161 --> 00:16:41,800 The plane and the cargo were roughly 280,000 pounds. 280 00:16:41,867 --> 00:16:44,503 There was 340 people on board. 281 00:16:44,570 --> 00:16:49,408 Let's call it 53,000 pounds. 282 00:16:49,475 --> 00:16:50,676 The fuel? 283 00:16:50,743 --> 00:16:53,946 Fuel was 20,000 pounds. 284 00:16:59,084 --> 00:17:05,791 So total weight on landing was 353,000 pounds, give or take. 285 00:17:05,858 --> 00:17:10,162 Max weight is 424,000 pounds. 286 00:17:16,168 --> 00:17:23,275 So these guys were 71,000 pounds underweight. 287 00:17:23,342 --> 00:17:25,444 It wasn't too heavy. 288 00:17:25,511 --> 00:17:26,912 NARRATOR: The weight of the plane 289 00:17:27,212 --> 00:17:32,418 is not what caused the landing gear to fail on touchdown. 290 00:17:32,484 --> 00:17:35,287 What about weight distribution? 291 00:17:35,354 --> 00:17:39,758 AL DICKINSON: You have to have the baggage and the weight 292 00:17:39,825 --> 00:17:43,629 distributed properly, so the aircraft will fly 293 00:17:43,695 --> 00:17:46,598 the way the pilots want it to. 294 00:17:46,665 --> 00:17:47,900 By the book. 295 00:17:50,436 --> 00:17:52,237 It was properly loaded, properly 296 00:17:52,304 --> 00:17:53,772 stored, properly locked down. 297 00:17:53,839 --> 00:17:55,908 So it wasn't really an issue. 298 00:17:58,977 --> 00:18:01,547 NARRATOR: With weight and balance ruled out, 299 00:18:01,613 --> 00:18:03,649 investigators are finally able to test 300 00:18:03,715 --> 00:18:07,553 the right landing gear itself. 301 00:18:07,619 --> 00:18:10,756 Service records are up to date. 302 00:18:10,823 --> 00:18:14,827 Let's see if the steel wasn't strong enough. 303 00:18:14,893 --> 00:18:16,094 PEDRO FERNANDES: Another thing they 304 00:18:16,428 --> 00:18:20,232 were looking for is any pre-existing weaknesses 305 00:18:20,299 --> 00:18:21,800 on the steel. 306 00:18:21,867 --> 00:18:24,937 If this occurred in the manufacturing process, 307 00:18:25,003 --> 00:18:28,240 it could affect the aircraft in operations 308 00:18:28,307 --> 00:18:29,441 all around the world. 309 00:18:29,775 --> 00:18:30,809 NARRATOR: They performed something 310 00:18:30,876 --> 00:18:33,812 called a Vickers hardness test. 311 00:18:33,879 --> 00:18:36,315 JOHN COX: The Vickers hardness test is an industry standard 312 00:18:36,381 --> 00:18:42,187 test to evaluate the strength of a particular component 313 00:18:42,254 --> 00:18:43,188 or piece of metal. 314 00:18:43,589 --> 00:18:44,923 NARRATOR: A pyramid-shaped diamond 315 00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:49,828 is pressed into the steel, leaving an indent, or a dimple. 316 00:18:49,895 --> 00:18:53,832 You can measure the depth and the diameter of the dimple, 317 00:18:53,899 --> 00:18:56,468 and derive the metallurgical strength 318 00:18:56,535 --> 00:18:58,237 of what you're testing. 319 00:18:58,303 --> 00:19:04,843 Hardness value is 658, so the steel was strong enough. 320 00:19:04,910 --> 00:19:06,778 NARRATOR: Investigators find no weakness 321 00:19:06,845 --> 00:19:10,082 in the metal used to make the plane's landing gear. 322 00:19:10,148 --> 00:19:12,317 PEDRO FERNANDES: It was determined there was nothing 323 00:19:12,384 --> 00:19:15,053 wrong with the landing gear. 324 00:19:15,120 --> 00:19:19,291 Whatever went wrong, it happened before the aircraft 325 00:19:19,358 --> 00:19:20,893 touched the runway. 326 00:19:21,260 --> 00:19:23,695 NARRATOR: There are still no clues that can help explain 327 00:19:23,762 --> 00:19:26,565 why the landing gear fractured. 328 00:19:26,632 --> 00:19:28,133 The next step in the investigation 329 00:19:28,433 --> 00:19:33,338 was to look at how the crew was operating during the last phase 330 00:19:33,405 --> 00:19:35,607 of the landing. 331 00:19:44,883 --> 00:19:46,885 This is interesting. 332 00:19:46,952 --> 00:19:49,021 NARRATOR: Official statements made by the pilots 333 00:19:49,087 --> 00:19:51,490 may shed some light on the final moments 334 00:19:51,557 --> 00:19:53,492 of Martinair Flight 495. 335 00:19:53,559 --> 00:19:55,360 After the accident, the investigators 336 00:19:55,427 --> 00:19:58,764 came to all three of us. 337 00:19:58,830 --> 00:20:00,899 We had closed sessions. 338 00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,871 The captain said the flight was normal. 339 00:20:05,938 --> 00:20:07,906 The approach was normal. 340 00:20:07,973 --> 00:20:11,310 "At 200 feet, we were on the center line." 341 00:20:11,376 --> 00:20:12,377 So they should have been OK. 342 00:20:12,444 --> 00:20:14,012 Mm-hmm. 343 00:20:14,079 --> 00:20:17,616 But a few seconds later, the captain sees lightning. 344 00:20:17,683 --> 00:20:19,651 "I suddenly felt a high sink rate. 345 00:20:19,718 --> 00:20:20,986 It all happened so fast. 346 00:20:21,353 --> 00:20:24,289 The aircraft actually fell out of the sky." 347 00:20:25,691 --> 00:20:26,959 NARRATOR: According to the captain, 348 00:20:27,259 --> 00:20:29,795 he saw lightning just seconds before the aircraft 349 00:20:29,861 --> 00:20:32,464 began to lose altitude rapidly. 350 00:20:33,665 --> 00:20:34,967 AUTOMATED VOICE: Sink rate. 351 00:20:37,135 --> 00:20:39,838 GARY GLANS: The airplane felt like God took his hands, 352 00:20:39,905 --> 00:20:42,407 rammed it into the ground. 353 00:20:42,474 --> 00:20:43,475 Well, get this. 354 00:20:43,942 --> 00:20:45,844 The first officer stated, "The weather was bad 355 00:20:45,911 --> 00:20:47,679 and it was raining heavily. 356 00:20:47,746 --> 00:20:50,082 It was gusty and very turbulent." 357 00:20:50,148 --> 00:20:52,417 NARRATOR: Investigators wonder if sudden wind 358 00:20:52,484 --> 00:20:57,255 changes could have contributed to the crash of Flight 495. 359 00:20:57,322 --> 00:21:00,359 The flight crew indicated to the investigators 360 00:21:00,425 --> 00:21:05,230 that they were in an area with a lot of wind shear, 361 00:21:05,297 --> 00:21:07,833 a very dynamic weather condition. 362 00:21:07,899 --> 00:21:09,701 They were in turbulence. 363 00:21:09,768 --> 00:21:12,838 Things were changing very rapidly. 364 00:21:12,904 --> 00:21:14,840 NARRATOR: Did the pilot encounter wind shear 365 00:21:14,906 --> 00:21:16,208 on final approach? 366 00:21:18,877 --> 00:21:21,113 The team interviews the air traffic controller 367 00:21:21,179 --> 00:21:22,881 to better understand the conditions 368 00:21:22,948 --> 00:21:25,851 the pilots were experiencing. 369 00:21:25,917 --> 00:21:28,887 Can you tell me what happened with Flight 495? 370 00:21:28,954 --> 00:21:31,890 Everything seemed perfectly normal. 371 00:21:31,957 --> 00:21:33,825 They were on their final approach 372 00:21:33,892 --> 00:21:37,496 and confirmed they had the runway in sight. 373 00:21:37,562 --> 00:21:39,031 Then I cleared them to land. 374 00:21:41,099 --> 00:21:45,270 CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Martinair 495, clear to land runway 11. 375 00:21:45,337 --> 00:21:50,142 The wind, 150, 15 knots, maximum 20. 376 00:21:50,208 --> 00:21:52,778 The controllers were quite confident that they 377 00:21:52,844 --> 00:21:54,780 performed well at the tasks. 378 00:21:54,846 --> 00:21:57,716 So they didn't find that they did anything wrong, 379 00:21:57,783 --> 00:22:00,052 and they gave the correct information. 380 00:22:00,118 --> 00:22:04,623 Did they report any issues with the plane? 381 00:22:04,690 --> 00:22:06,692 No, not at all. 382 00:22:06,758 --> 00:22:08,026 What about the weather? 383 00:22:11,430 --> 00:22:12,664 There was rain. 384 00:22:13,131 --> 00:22:17,869 But other planes were taking off and landing without difficulty. 385 00:22:17,936 --> 00:22:21,707 PILOT (ON RADIO): Martinair 461, runway visual. 386 00:22:21,773 --> 00:22:24,576 NARRATOR: Just minutes before the crash, the controller 387 00:22:24,643 --> 00:22:27,179 was in contact with an aircraft that took off 388 00:22:27,245 --> 00:22:30,949 and another that landed on the same runway. 389 00:22:31,016 --> 00:22:33,885 Clear to land runway 11. 390 00:22:33,952 --> 00:22:35,721 NARRATOR: Neither flight reported extreme weather 391 00:22:35,787 --> 00:22:36,888 over the runway. 392 00:22:39,591 --> 00:22:41,293 What about wind shear? 393 00:22:41,359 --> 00:22:43,762 Did the runway sensors pick up anything? 394 00:22:46,498 --> 00:22:49,267 NARRATOR: Faro Airport is equipped with two anemometers 395 00:22:49,334 --> 00:22:52,771 that measure both wind speed and direction, located 396 00:22:52,838 --> 00:22:56,775 on runway 29 and runway 11. 397 00:22:56,842 --> 00:23:00,112 If the anemometers detect a sudden change in wind speed 398 00:23:00,178 --> 00:23:03,148 of 15 knots or greater, a wind shear warning 399 00:23:03,215 --> 00:23:04,683 is automatically triggered. 400 00:23:13,291 --> 00:23:16,461 Yes, there were wind shear warnings. 401 00:23:16,528 --> 00:23:19,231 But they happened after the aircraft had already crashed. 402 00:23:26,271 --> 00:23:30,208 NARRATOR: If Flight 495 was hit by an extreme gust of wind 403 00:23:30,275 --> 00:23:32,978 before it crashed to the runway, the system 404 00:23:33,044 --> 00:23:35,447 would have detected it. 405 00:23:35,514 --> 00:23:37,249 It didn't. 406 00:23:37,315 --> 00:23:39,284 PEDRO MATOS: There was a conflicting information 407 00:23:39,351 --> 00:23:42,120 between what the crew said and what the air 408 00:23:42,187 --> 00:23:44,723 traffic controller reports. 409 00:23:44,790 --> 00:23:46,158 NARRATOR: The crew's statements don't 410 00:23:46,458 --> 00:23:50,562 match with the controller's account of the weather. 411 00:23:50,629 --> 00:23:52,297 Thank you. 412 00:23:54,599 --> 00:23:57,669 AL DICKINSON: The best thing to substantially what went on 413 00:23:57,736 --> 00:24:01,740 was to take a really deep look at what the pilots were saying 414 00:24:01,807 --> 00:24:03,308 to each other in the cockpit. 415 00:24:12,918 --> 00:24:14,853 NARRATOR: A week after the crash of Flight 416 00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:18,456 495, data from the cockpit voice recorder 417 00:24:18,523 --> 00:24:20,725 is ready to be reviewed. 418 00:24:20,792 --> 00:24:23,061 FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF: Plenty approach with 50 flaps. 419 00:24:23,128 --> 00:24:26,298 You call approaching minimums in field in sight. 420 00:24:26,364 --> 00:24:28,300 You look outside. 421 00:24:28,366 --> 00:24:30,468 Wet runway. 422 00:24:30,535 --> 00:24:32,404 Here are the wipers. 423 00:24:32,470 --> 00:24:33,839 Roger. 424 00:24:34,206 --> 00:24:36,007 NARRATOR: As the crew prepares for the approach, 425 00:24:36,074 --> 00:24:41,012 they become aware of weather conditions at Faro Airport. 426 00:24:41,079 --> 00:24:43,415 You have to make a positive landing. 427 00:24:43,481 --> 00:24:46,351 Yes. 428 00:24:46,418 --> 00:24:47,786 OK. 429 00:24:48,119 --> 00:24:51,523 So, obviously, they're worried about the runway conditions. 430 00:24:54,659 --> 00:24:56,661 NARRATOR: In a positive landing, the aircraft 431 00:24:56,728 --> 00:24:59,598 touches down firmly enough to penetrate the water, 432 00:24:59,664 --> 00:25:03,235 allowing the wheels to grip the tarmac and slow the airplane. 433 00:25:05,203 --> 00:25:08,206 They want to put it down hard to avoid hydroplaning 434 00:25:08,273 --> 00:25:10,108 and running out of runway. 435 00:25:10,175 --> 00:25:11,910 So what went wrong? 436 00:25:11,977 --> 00:25:14,713 NARRATOR: Did the pilots somehow botch their plan 437 00:25:14,779 --> 00:25:16,615 as they approached the runway? 438 00:25:21,052 --> 00:25:22,621 CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON RECORDING): 500. 439 00:25:22,687 --> 00:25:24,055 FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF (ON RECORDING): Cleared. 440 00:25:24,356 --> 00:25:27,058 CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON RECORDING): Speed a bit low? 441 00:25:27,125 --> 00:25:30,195 Speed is low. 442 00:25:30,262 --> 00:25:31,463 Low. 443 00:25:31,529 --> 00:25:33,765 OK. 444 00:25:33,832 --> 00:25:36,868 Now speed is an issue. 445 00:25:36,935 --> 00:25:38,737 JOHN COX: Going onto a wet runway, 446 00:25:38,803 --> 00:25:41,206 the air speed control is very, very important, 447 00:25:41,273 --> 00:25:44,476 so that you don't have too much and the airplane floats, 448 00:25:44,542 --> 00:25:45,977 but that you don't have too little 449 00:25:46,044 --> 00:25:48,914 and you end up impacting the runway quite hard. 450 00:25:48,980 --> 00:25:51,983 All right. Let's hear more. 451 00:25:52,050 --> 00:25:53,685 CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON RECORDING): Speed is OK. 452 00:25:53,752 --> 00:25:56,321 Windshield anti-ice! I can't see anything. 453 00:25:56,388 --> 00:25:57,522 I'm on it. 454 00:25:57,589 --> 00:25:59,691 Wipers are on fast. 455 00:25:59,758 --> 00:26:01,860 NARRATOR: As the plane gets closer to the ground, 456 00:26:01,927 --> 00:26:05,997 the crew contends with stormy conditions. 457 00:26:06,064 --> 00:26:08,400 CAPTAIN STAVEREN (ON RECORDING): A bit low. 458 00:26:08,466 --> 00:26:09,801 Low! 459 00:26:10,135 --> 00:26:11,536 FIRST OFFICER CLEMENKOWFF (ON RECORDING): Yes. 460 00:26:14,072 --> 00:26:15,407 Throttles! 461 00:26:23,848 --> 00:26:26,284 Why does the captain yell, "Throttles?" 462 00:26:28,753 --> 00:26:31,589 For the captain to say this at this moment, 463 00:26:31,656 --> 00:26:32,958 it raises a question. 464 00:26:33,325 --> 00:26:36,695 Did they have an issue in the final phase of landing? 465 00:26:36,761 --> 00:26:37,796 All right. 466 00:26:38,129 --> 00:26:39,931 Let's look at the descent profile. 467 00:26:39,998 --> 00:26:43,535 NARRATOR: If Flight 495 flew in on the right trajectory, 468 00:26:43,601 --> 00:26:45,470 the FDR will confirm it. 469 00:26:45,537 --> 00:26:46,938 Here you go. 470 00:26:47,005 --> 00:26:48,606 JOHN COX: The flight data recorder 471 00:26:48,673 --> 00:26:51,643 gives objective, clear data on what 472 00:26:51,710 --> 00:26:54,746 the airplane was actually doing. 473 00:26:54,813 --> 00:26:58,216 Was the airplane being flown at the proper speed? 474 00:26:58,283 --> 00:27:01,853 The changes in the airspeed-- were they indicative 475 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:04,089 of a severe weather condition? 476 00:27:04,155 --> 00:27:09,761 And how were the pilots responding to those changes? 477 00:27:09,828 --> 00:27:11,162 Autopilot is on. 478 00:27:11,229 --> 00:27:12,063 OK. 479 00:27:12,564 --> 00:27:15,500 So they're descending at the standard angle, 480 00:27:15,567 --> 00:27:20,538 and they dip here and recover. 481 00:27:20,605 --> 00:27:22,774 Looks fine. 482 00:27:24,175 --> 00:27:27,812 At 200 feet, which is about 20 seconds from landing, 483 00:27:27,879 --> 00:27:31,983 they were on a normal glide path. 484 00:27:32,050 --> 00:27:37,889 Something happened between that and touchdown. 485 00:27:37,956 --> 00:27:39,891 Let's look at the airspeed data. 486 00:27:42,427 --> 00:27:48,533 So it looks like they're flying steady at 145 knots until here. 487 00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:51,403 Then airspeed jumps 488 00:27:51,469 --> 00:27:56,074 and then drops all the way to 139 knots. 489 00:27:56,141 --> 00:27:58,176 NARRATOR: Investigators spot evidence 490 00:27:58,243 --> 00:28:03,014 of airspeed fluctuations during the last minute of the flight. 491 00:28:03,081 --> 00:28:05,316 AL DICKINSON: These fluctuations in airspeed 492 00:28:05,383 --> 00:28:10,488 can be caused by wind gusts as they got closer to landing. 493 00:28:17,562 --> 00:28:20,765 Speed is a bit low. 494 00:28:20,832 --> 00:28:22,067 Speed is low. 495 00:28:29,441 --> 00:28:31,076 Speed is OK. 496 00:28:31,142 --> 00:28:32,911 NARRATOR: Was the captain concerned 497 00:28:32,977 --> 00:28:35,547 their speed wasn't fast enough to compensate 498 00:28:35,613 --> 00:28:37,015 for the strong headwind? 499 00:28:41,119 --> 00:28:42,787 These fluctuations seem too extreme 500 00:28:42,854 --> 00:28:44,722 to be caused by the 20-knot winds 501 00:28:44,789 --> 00:28:46,724 reported by the controller. 502 00:28:46,791 --> 00:28:48,660 We need a full analysis of the weather 503 00:28:48,726 --> 00:28:50,261 conditions on final approach. 504 00:28:54,165 --> 00:28:56,501 NARRATOR: Investigators asked the Netherlands Aerospace 505 00:28:56,568 --> 00:28:59,270 Laboratory to perform an in-depth weather study 506 00:28:59,337 --> 00:29:02,440 to determine if the winds were stronger than what 507 00:29:02,507 --> 00:29:05,009 was reported to Flight 495. 508 00:29:05,076 --> 00:29:07,812 What about auto throttle data? 509 00:29:07,879 --> 00:29:09,147 Let's take a look. 510 00:29:13,651 --> 00:29:14,953 Hmm. 511 00:29:15,286 --> 00:29:20,492 Yeah, the fluctuations in auto throttles correspond 512 00:29:20,558 --> 00:29:23,128 to the airspeed fluctuations. 513 00:29:26,164 --> 00:29:30,101 If there is an increase in air speed, the auto throttle system 514 00:29:30,168 --> 00:29:33,238 will decrease the power that is being commanded-- 515 00:29:33,304 --> 00:29:37,308 the amount of thrust that the engines are producing. 516 00:29:37,375 --> 00:29:41,179 If the airspeed falls low, the auto throttle system 517 00:29:41,246 --> 00:29:45,783 will command increase thrust to bring the airplane up 518 00:29:45,850 --> 00:29:48,887 to the commanded airspeed. 519 00:29:48,953 --> 00:29:50,221 NARRATOR: The auto throttles were 520 00:29:50,588 --> 00:29:54,025 indeed adjusting for the dramatic changes in airspeed. 521 00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:58,096 Wow. Look at that, 102% power. 522 00:29:58,163 --> 00:29:59,998 NARRATOR: Investigators discover a very 523 00:30:00,064 --> 00:30:03,501 high surge in engine power 3/4 of a mile 524 00:30:03,568 --> 00:30:05,170 from the runway threshold. 525 00:30:05,236 --> 00:30:08,640 The 102% command by the auto throttle system 526 00:30:08,706 --> 00:30:10,175 is a massive amount of power. 527 00:30:10,241 --> 00:30:12,810 It would be similar to the amount of power 528 00:30:12,877 --> 00:30:14,946 that you would use for takeoff-- 529 00:30:15,013 --> 00:30:18,216 too much power to try to land with. 530 00:30:18,283 --> 00:30:22,820 And then here power drops to 40%. 531 00:30:22,887 --> 00:30:24,389 NARRATOR: The team discovers that the power 532 00:30:24,722 --> 00:30:29,861 dropped to a minimum, or engine idle, shortly thereafter. 533 00:30:29,928 --> 00:30:31,963 That's way too fast for the auto throttle system 534 00:30:32,030 --> 00:30:33,865 to perform on its own. 535 00:30:37,268 --> 00:30:41,105 For the engines to decelerate as quickly as they did means 536 00:30:41,172 --> 00:30:44,042 that the levers were moved faster than the auto 537 00:30:44,108 --> 00:30:47,278 throttle clutches can physically move them. 538 00:30:47,345 --> 00:30:50,481 The only way the throttles would move that quick 539 00:30:50,548 --> 00:30:53,017 would be if the pilot was manually 540 00:30:53,084 --> 00:30:55,119 adjusting them down to 40%. 541 00:30:57,055 --> 00:30:58,223 GARY GLANS: The auto throttle system 542 00:30:58,289 --> 00:31:00,058 could make large corrections. 543 00:31:00,391 --> 00:31:02,594 And you have to make manual adjustments if the throttles 544 00:31:02,660 --> 00:31:03,761 aren't keeping up. 545 00:31:10,401 --> 00:31:12,403 JOHN COX: The first officer, who was the flying pilot, 546 00:31:12,470 --> 00:31:16,140 made the decision to override the auto throttle system 547 00:31:16,207 --> 00:31:18,543 and to pull the power way back. 548 00:31:21,412 --> 00:31:25,116 And, in fact, he pulled it all the way back to flight idol. 549 00:31:25,183 --> 00:31:29,254 With so little power they would have dropped like a rock. 550 00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:31,222 According to the data, they were 551 00:31:31,289 --> 00:31:34,626 dropping 1,000 feet per minute. 552 00:31:34,692 --> 00:31:38,129 AL DICKINSON: 1,000 feet is well beyond the operational limit 553 00:31:38,196 --> 00:31:41,532 of 600 feet per minute for the DC-10. 554 00:31:41,599 --> 00:31:44,135 NARRATOR: As a consequence of the reduced power, 555 00:31:44,202 --> 00:31:46,638 the plane hit the runway with enough force 556 00:31:46,704 --> 00:31:48,473 to crack the landing gear. 557 00:31:51,276 --> 00:31:54,879 I've never experienced a landing as hard as that. 558 00:31:54,946 --> 00:31:59,150 I crushed my teeth in my mouth. 559 00:31:59,217 --> 00:32:01,586 It was hard beyond compare. 560 00:32:01,653 --> 00:32:06,024 NARRATOR: Investigators are left with a key question. 561 00:32:06,090 --> 00:32:09,093 Why would the crew reduce power by so much, 562 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:12,163 so far from the runway threshold? 563 00:32:26,544 --> 00:32:28,112 This is the Dutch weather report. 564 00:32:28,446 --> 00:32:31,649 NARRATOR: Investigators turned to a weather analysis prepared 565 00:32:31,716 --> 00:32:33,918 by the Netherlands aerospace laboratory 566 00:32:33,985 --> 00:32:37,355 to determine if the weather affected the crew's actions 567 00:32:37,422 --> 00:32:39,057 during their final approach. 568 00:32:39,123 --> 00:32:42,193 Looks like the weather was worse than we thought. 569 00:32:42,260 --> 00:32:43,594 Really? 570 00:32:43,961 --> 00:32:46,731 They hit no less than three separate micro bursts 571 00:32:46,798 --> 00:32:49,000 in the last minute of flight. 572 00:32:49,067 --> 00:32:50,868 Wow. OK. 573 00:32:52,737 --> 00:32:54,672 NARRATOR: A microburst is a column of air 574 00:32:54,739 --> 00:32:58,242 that descends from rain clouds, hits the ground, 575 00:32:58,309 --> 00:33:00,678 and fans out horizontally. 576 00:33:00,745 --> 00:33:03,214 It leads to significant fluctuations 577 00:33:03,281 --> 00:33:04,515 in a plane's airspeed. 578 00:33:09,687 --> 00:33:11,022 When exactly? 579 00:33:14,459 --> 00:33:17,061 The first one was at 700 feet. 580 00:33:19,130 --> 00:33:23,301 The second was between 600 and 300 feet. 581 00:33:26,237 --> 00:33:31,075 And the last one was between 200 and 110 feet. 582 00:33:36,948 --> 00:33:40,118 Now, this last one was the worst. 583 00:33:40,184 --> 00:33:46,090 The wind speed jumped from the reported 20 knots to 40 knots. 584 00:33:46,157 --> 00:33:47,191 Wow. 585 00:33:47,492 --> 00:33:49,794 That would have triggered a wind shear alert if one 586 00:33:49,861 --> 00:33:52,096 was installed on the plane. 587 00:33:52,163 --> 00:33:55,266 Then the wind shifts from a headwind to a tailwind. 588 00:33:59,203 --> 00:34:02,039 GARY GLANS: So a wind shear from headwind to a tailwind 589 00:34:02,106 --> 00:34:05,810 is the worst type of wind shear, because a headwind improves 590 00:34:05,877 --> 00:34:09,147 your angle of attack to ensure that the aircraft has 591 00:34:09,213 --> 00:34:10,815 good lift. 592 00:34:10,882 --> 00:34:13,918 When the wind switches around to a tailwind, 593 00:34:13,985 --> 00:34:17,955 you lose that aerodynamic performance. 594 00:34:18,022 --> 00:34:21,559 If you don't have the thrust to compensate for it right away 595 00:34:21,626 --> 00:34:23,261 the aircraft will drop. 596 00:34:25,263 --> 00:34:29,000 Let's compare this to the auto throttle data. 597 00:34:38,509 --> 00:34:39,444 They line up. 598 00:34:39,510 --> 00:34:40,978 Mm-hmm. 599 00:34:41,045 --> 00:34:43,114 NARRATOR: For every microburst there's 600 00:34:43,181 --> 00:34:45,416 a corresponding increase in engine power, 601 00:34:45,483 --> 00:34:49,854 as the auto throttles try to maintain the plane's speed. 602 00:34:49,921 --> 00:34:52,890 The auto throttle was going up and down. 603 00:34:52,957 --> 00:34:55,359 It was struggling very hard to fight 604 00:34:55,426 --> 00:34:58,896 against those heavy down bursts. 605 00:34:58,963 --> 00:35:00,898 The down burst causes a decrease 606 00:35:00,965 --> 00:35:05,470 in stability, which means turbulence induced 607 00:35:05,536 --> 00:35:07,638 roll and pitch oscillations. 608 00:35:11,609 --> 00:35:13,211 Would have been a bumpy ride. 609 00:35:13,277 --> 00:35:14,579 Yeah. 610 00:35:14,946 --> 00:35:17,682 NARRATOR: As they pass through each microburst, 611 00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,484 the auto throttles were adjusting 612 00:35:19,550 --> 00:35:22,587 to the shifts in wind gusts. 613 00:35:34,866 --> 00:35:36,133 PEDRO MATOS: In the final moments, 614 00:35:36,467 --> 00:35:40,004 the approach was under extreme weather conditions. 615 00:35:40,071 --> 00:35:42,173 There were a lot of oscillations in speed, 616 00:35:42,240 --> 00:35:44,909 and that created a lot of stress for the pilot 617 00:35:44,976 --> 00:35:47,745 flying at that time. 618 00:35:47,812 --> 00:35:50,214 The first officer likely would have 619 00:35:50,281 --> 00:35:53,417 been overwhelmed by the unexpected change 620 00:35:53,484 --> 00:35:54,485 in the weather. 621 00:35:59,123 --> 00:36:00,725 And knowing that he needed to make a positive landing 622 00:36:00,791 --> 00:36:06,631 at the runway threshold, he sees the power spike to 102% 623 00:36:06,697 --> 00:36:08,733 and takes corrective action. 624 00:36:08,799 --> 00:36:11,168 NARRATOR: In order to get the plane on the ground, 625 00:36:11,235 --> 00:36:14,038 the first officer overrides the auto throttle 626 00:36:14,105 --> 00:36:18,109 and reduces the power to idle. 627 00:36:18,175 --> 00:36:23,915 Investigators now see just how unfortunate his timing was. 628 00:36:23,981 --> 00:36:26,684 He cut the power at the exact same time 629 00:36:26,751 --> 00:36:29,387 that last down burst hit them. 630 00:36:34,458 --> 00:36:35,993 Throttles! 631 00:36:36,060 --> 00:36:37,962 NARRATOR: The captain tries to stop 632 00:36:38,029 --> 00:36:40,164 the plane's uncontrolled descent... 633 00:36:42,533 --> 00:36:45,403 ...but he's too late. 634 00:36:50,908 --> 00:36:53,377 The captain should have stepped in sooner. 635 00:36:55,780 --> 00:36:56,914 AL DICKINSON: He should have recognized 636 00:36:56,981 --> 00:37:00,151 something was not right. 637 00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:03,287 The captain really should have taken over and landed himself. 638 00:37:05,623 --> 00:37:08,993 NARRATOR: Investigators suspect the sudden change in weather, 639 00:37:09,060 --> 00:37:11,662 combined with the pilot's decision to cut power too 640 00:37:11,729 --> 00:37:15,600 early, caused the aircraft to land with more force 641 00:37:15,666 --> 00:37:17,868 than it was built to withstand. 642 00:37:17,935 --> 00:37:21,872 But one question remains unanswered. 643 00:37:21,939 --> 00:37:26,010 If the winds were gusting at 40 knots a half mile 644 00:37:26,077 --> 00:37:30,815 from the runway, wouldn't the winds at the runway 645 00:37:30,881 --> 00:37:33,017 be gusting stronger than the 20 knots 646 00:37:33,084 --> 00:37:35,553 reported by the controller? 647 00:37:44,962 --> 00:37:47,198 NARRATOR: The team returns with their findings 648 00:37:47,264 --> 00:37:49,066 to the air traffic controller who 649 00:37:49,133 --> 00:37:52,870 oversaw Martinair Flight 495. 650 00:37:52,937 --> 00:37:57,041 You reported that the winds on runway 11 651 00:37:57,108 --> 00:38:00,411 were gusting up to 20 knots. 652 00:38:00,478 --> 00:38:01,746 That's correct. 653 00:38:01,812 --> 00:38:03,748 But that doesn't seem right. 654 00:38:03,814 --> 00:38:06,584 The Dutch weather study confirmed that there were three 655 00:38:06,651 --> 00:38:09,020 microbursts in the last minute of flight 656 00:38:09,086 --> 00:38:11,288 with gusts much higher than that. 657 00:38:14,992 --> 00:38:18,329 Can you show me the actual data for runway 11? 658 00:38:33,978 --> 00:38:37,181 According to the raw data, the winds were 659 00:38:37,248 --> 00:38:41,852 actually gusting at 35 knots. 660 00:38:41,919 --> 00:38:44,955 Well, that sounds more like it. 661 00:38:45,022 --> 00:38:48,426 But how could you have underreported 662 00:38:48,492 --> 00:38:50,695 the wind conditions? 663 00:38:59,603 --> 00:39:04,508 We receive wind data every 30 seconds from this device. 664 00:39:10,414 --> 00:39:13,017 It must have been switched to runway 29... 665 00:39:18,222 --> 00:39:20,324 ...instead of runway 11. 666 00:39:23,561 --> 00:39:26,897 NARRATOR: Investigators discover that air traffic controllers 667 00:39:26,964 --> 00:39:30,935 at Faro Airport had mistakenly selected the wind reading on 668 00:39:31,001 --> 00:39:34,371 runway 2 instead of runway 11. 669 00:39:37,041 --> 00:39:38,476 JOHN COX: Airports are large places. 670 00:39:38,843 --> 00:39:41,846 So when you have anemometers on opposite ends of the airport, 671 00:39:41,912 --> 00:39:43,280 you would expect that frequently there 672 00:39:43,347 --> 00:39:45,950 would be a difference in direction 673 00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,120 in velocity of a reported wind. 674 00:39:49,186 --> 00:39:52,723 CONTROLLER: Martinair 495, clear to land runway 11. 675 00:39:52,790 --> 00:39:55,726 The wind 150, 15 knots. 676 00:39:55,793 --> 00:39:57,628 Maximum 20. 677 00:40:02,833 --> 00:40:04,268 Clear to land. 678 00:40:04,635 --> 00:40:08,038 The controller's information that they provided to the crew 679 00:40:08,105 --> 00:40:10,775 was not representative of what was actually 680 00:40:10,841 --> 00:40:12,343 occurring on the runway. 681 00:40:19,650 --> 00:40:22,319 PEDRO MATOS: Wet runway, crosswinds-- 682 00:40:22,386 --> 00:40:24,889 that's a completely different picture. 683 00:40:24,955 --> 00:40:30,327 If the pilots were aware, they would have gone around. 684 00:40:30,394 --> 00:40:31,962 NARRATOR: Investigators have figured out 685 00:40:32,029 --> 00:40:35,099 what brought down Flight 495. 686 00:40:41,172 --> 00:40:45,976 495 is turning inbound. 687 00:40:46,043 --> 00:40:47,144 CONTROLLER: 495, copy. 688 00:40:47,444 --> 00:40:50,114 Report at minimums or runway in sight. 689 00:40:50,181 --> 00:40:53,117 Runway surface conditions are flooded. 690 00:40:53,184 --> 00:40:55,853 Roger, 495. 691 00:41:00,891 --> 00:41:02,293 Gear down. 692 00:41:04,094 --> 00:41:05,362 Gear down. 693 00:41:05,729 --> 00:41:07,998 NARRATOR: With the runway at Faro underwater, 694 00:41:08,065 --> 00:41:10,100 the crew plans a positive touchdown 695 00:41:10,167 --> 00:41:12,303 at the runway threshold. 696 00:41:12,369 --> 00:41:14,338 CONTROLLER: Clear to land, runway 11. 697 00:41:14,405 --> 00:41:20,311 The wind, 150, 15 knots, maximum 20. 698 00:41:20,377 --> 00:41:22,213 NARRATOR: But they're unaware of the severity 699 00:41:22,279 --> 00:41:24,481 of the weather conditions. 700 00:41:24,548 --> 00:41:26,550 -I can't see anything. -I'm on it. 701 00:41:28,986 --> 00:41:30,221 NARRATOR: They're hit by a series 702 00:41:30,588 --> 00:41:33,824 of unexpected microbursts, causing the engine power 703 00:41:33,891 --> 00:41:35,226 to shoot up automatically. 704 00:41:40,264 --> 00:41:42,066 Concerned that the excess power is 705 00:41:42,132 --> 00:41:44,301 too great for a positive landing, 706 00:41:44,368 --> 00:41:47,872 the first officer reduces the power to idle just 707 00:41:47,938 --> 00:41:50,174 as the last microburst occurs. 708 00:41:50,241 --> 00:41:53,177 That makes them vulnerable to strong winds, 709 00:41:53,244 --> 00:41:57,781 and the aircraft dropped from 150 feet. 710 00:42:04,121 --> 00:42:06,824 NARRATOR: Flight 495 slams to the ground 711 00:42:06,891 --> 00:42:10,594 at 1,000 feet per minute. 712 00:42:15,466 --> 00:42:20,304 The danger of being slow and encountering a downdraft 713 00:42:20,371 --> 00:42:24,341 is you may not be able to recover in time. 714 00:42:24,408 --> 00:42:26,443 And that can be disastrous. 715 00:42:28,612 --> 00:42:31,282 PEDRO FERNANDES: They could have come with a higher speed. 716 00:42:31,348 --> 00:42:33,984 They could have performed a missed approach. 717 00:42:34,051 --> 00:42:38,322 But the truth is, the flight crew tried their best. 718 00:42:38,389 --> 00:42:41,025 This wasn't an accident where we can 719 00:42:41,091 --> 00:42:43,861 see negligence or gross error. 720 00:42:46,664 --> 00:42:49,333 NARRATOR: In the aftermath of their report into the crash 721 00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:52,970 of Martinair Flight 495, investigators make 722 00:42:53,037 --> 00:42:56,240 a series of recommendations. 723 00:42:56,307 --> 00:43:00,244 This accident was going to be yet another example 724 00:43:00,311 --> 00:43:04,882 of inappropriate wind shear recovery being 725 00:43:04,949 --> 00:43:06,550 applied in a timely fashion. 726 00:43:06,617 --> 00:43:10,020 So this says additional pilot training. 727 00:43:10,087 --> 00:43:14,959 This says wind shear detection systems on airplanes. 728 00:43:15,025 --> 00:43:19,063 This says a more aggressive approach to go-arounds 729 00:43:19,129 --> 00:43:21,498 in unstable conditions. 730 00:43:21,565 --> 00:43:23,334 NARRATOR: Shortly after the crash, 731 00:43:23,400 --> 00:43:25,569 Faro Airport modernized their wind 732 00:43:25,636 --> 00:43:31,241 sensors and displays to comply with international regulations. 733 00:43:31,308 --> 00:43:33,143 JOHN COX: The critical information 734 00:43:33,210 --> 00:43:37,781 that controllers provide to pilots needs to be accurate. 735 00:43:37,848 --> 00:43:40,751 So these are some of the lessons that the industry 736 00:43:40,818 --> 00:43:44,855 learned and implemented following this accident. 737 00:43:48,425 --> 00:43:49,593 GARY GLANS: You know, one of the things 738 00:43:49,893 --> 00:43:51,061 I was told when I was becoming a pilot is 739 00:43:51,128 --> 00:43:52,329 never let your guard down. 740 00:43:52,663 --> 00:43:55,632 You can be having a beautiful, wonderful flight. 741 00:43:55,699 --> 00:44:00,170 And in the blink of an eye, things can change. 742 00:44:00,237 --> 00:44:03,173 It's just ingrained in my mind, always 743 00:44:03,240 --> 00:44:06,410 be ready for the unexpected. 57427

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.