Original subtitles

No, no no no no no.

NARRATOR: Security footage of Flydubai Flight 981

captures its final moments.

Oh, it's diving hard.

JOHN NANCE: The level of violence of the impact

was catastrophic.

NARRATOR: 62 people are killed in a fatal dive.

Investigators soon discover the pilots

had aborted two landings.

We're going around.

PHIL DERNER: A go-around is done just when

conditions are not perfect.

Did they say why they were going around the second time?

They just said going around.

Check your speed.

CONTROLLER: The next thing I knew, the plane

was diving towards the runway.

Investigators needed to find out how the two

go-arounds were different.

One turns to disaster.

Why?

PILOT (ON RADIO): Mayday!

Mayday!

Go up!

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 closes

in on Rostov-on-Don International

Airport in Southwest Russia.

Rostov tower, Skydubao 981, we're at 2,600 feet.

2,300 feet is our next target altitude.

NARRATOR: 11 miles out, Captain Aristos Sokratous and First

Officer Alejandro Alava Cruz prepare the Boeing 737-800

for touchdown.

PHIL DERNER: Both pilots had a pretty good amount of flying

hours in the 737, specifically.

These were experienced pilots.

CONTROLLER: Flight 981, Rostov Tower.

Wind, 240 degrees.

Gusts, 30 knots.

You're cleared to land on Runway 22.

NARRATOR: The controller reports the weather

conditions at the airport.

Thick clouds cover Rostov-on-Don.

High winds are battering the runways.

The weather in Rostov at that time was pretty low

cloud with wind gusts.

It was typical for that time of year for Rostov.

If you look at the geography, with the sea and the hills

around it, then yes, you can expect some challenges.

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 departed Dubai International

Airport at 10.37 PM.

It's a four hour flight Northwest to Rostov-on-Don.

It's a bumpy ride for the 55 passengers on board.

The flight is expected to land in minutes.

150 knots.

NARRATOR: Eight miles out, the pilots reduce speed as they

begin the final descent.

PHIL DERNER: On approach, pilots know exactly

what the airplane is doing.

They know the conditions that they're flying in.

Flaps 30.

Flaps 30.

PHIL DERNER: They're going to drop the flaps bit by bit, when

to drop their landing gear.

It's a very gradual process.

It should be a bit bumpy and then later it should be calm.

NARRATOR: The pilots expect turbulence on approach,

but anticipate a smooth landing, The runway

is just four miles away, but there's a threat ahead.

AUTOMATED VOICE: Go around.

Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: The onboard radar has detected dangerous winds.

AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: Wind shear is a rapid change in direction and speed

of wind.

If a pilot experiences a strong headwind that suddenly changes

to a tailwind, the aircraft might not

have enough lift to remain airborne, especially

at low altitude.

The wind shear alert is built into the aircraft's avionics

to tell you you're going into wind currents

that could be problematic.

AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear, go-around.

NARRATOR: Just 1,000 feet above the ground,

landing at Rostov-on-Don becomes too risky.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We are conducting a go-around due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The pilots abort their approach.

Every pilot is prepared to make

a go-around on every approach.

It's something that pilots do off the top of their heads.

There's no manual involved.

PHIL DERNER: They have no limit to the amount of approaches

that they can try as long as they have enough fuel.

So why not go around and just try it again?

Flight 981, copy.

NARRATOR: Flight 981 is one of four

incoming flights controllers are managing

as high winds delay landings.

Aeroflot 1166, be advised Skydubai 981 reports

wind shear on landing.

PHIL DERNER: The air traffic controller's workload

was definitely increased in this environment,

and they have to start juggling all of those cards in the air.

NARRATOR: As Flight 981 climbs--

Aeroflot 1166, you're cleared to land on runway 22.

NARRATOR: --an Aeroflot flight prepares to land.

Captain Sokratous pays close attention

to its communications.

I want to see what this guy will do.

PHIL DERNER: The crew, at this point,

is hoping that the crews of other flights

are able to give them some information

that they might be able to use to make some decisions

about what to do next.

NARRATOR: That flight can't land at Rostov-on-Dov either.

PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1156.

We're going around, due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The Aeroflot pilots also encounter

wind shear on final approach.

They're forced to abort.

That kind of seals the deal.

Flydubai is going to have to either wait

or they're going to have to go to an alternate airport.

NARRATOR: High over Rostov-on-Don, passengers

on Flight 981 are restless.

The pilots are holding at 15,000 feet,

circling near the airport, waiting for a chance to land.

PHIL DERNER: The pilots sit in a holding pattern, since they had

enough fuel to be able to do so, to wait for weather conditions

to improve.

NARRATOR: Three other planes are also in a holding pattern.

The storm pounding Rostov-on-Don isn't passing.

PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1166.

We're diverting.

CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Skydubai 981,

for your information, previous traffic

went to alternate airports.

NARRATOR: All the other flights decide to divert

to alternate airports instead.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The problem with diverting

is that it's expensive and, yes, it's inconvenient.

The passengers don't end up at their destination.

They have to be put up in hotels.

And with a low cost airline, it's the last thing it wants.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous continues

monitoring the weather radar.

Finally, he spots a clearing.

I think I'd like to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's not unusual for crews

to take advantage if there happens

to be a break in the weather pattern

that provides safe conditions to land the aircraft.

Skydubai 981 request descent for another approach.

NARRATOR: 15,000 feet over Rostov-on-Don, the pilots

again prepare to land.

Skydubai 981, Rosoff Tower.

You're cleared to land on runway 22.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ (ON INTERCOM):

Good evening, your first officer here.

We will be learning shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: 13 miles from runway 22,

the pilots line up for a second approach.

CONTROLLER: Be advised, low altitude head

wind 53 knots, light icing.

NARRATOR: Even though winds are strong,

controllers aren't reporting wind shear at the runway.

Flaps 30.

Flaps 30.

NARRATOR: But as they approach, they soon

realize something's not right.

Check your speed.

OK.

Go-around.

NARRATOR: The pilots execute another go-around.

Keep it at 15 degrees.

Nose up.

NARRATOR: Just 2,000 feet in the air,

Captain Sokratous kratos is wrestling with the Boeing 737.

Seconds later--

NARRATOR: --Flight 981 is diving straight at the runway.

Oh, my god.

NARRATOR: Fire and emergency crews

rush to the end of Runway 22.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The aircraft punched

a crater in the runway about a meter and a half deep,

with wreckage--

wreckage thrown everywhere.

NARRATOR: Firefighters battle the flames through the night,

but there's no one to be rescued.

All 62 people on board Flight 981 are killed in the crash.

Grieving families and the world demand answers.

NARRATOR: Hours after Flydubai Flight

981 crashes on the runway at Rostov-on-Don,

investigators from the IAC, the Interstate Aviation Committee,

arrive on the scene.

The IAC is the lead air accident investigation agency,

not just for Russia, but for several

of the former Soviet states.

NARRATOR: The IAC must find the cause for the horrific tragedy.

OK.

That's great.

That belongs over here.

NARRATOR: Wreckage from Flight 981

is laid out in a nearby hangar for closer inspection.

A team from the United Arab Emirates

assists in the investigation.

So how fast did the plane hit the ground?

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The size of the debris

would tell whether it was a high speed impact, whether it

was a low speed impact.

There are clues in the pieces of wreckage.

There's not much left of it.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: It was all small pieces.

It describes a very high speed and violent impact

with the ground.

it makes us question what really happened.

Let's see it.

NARRATOR: Investigators wonder how

the plane could have gathered so much speed

during an attempted landing.

Oh, it's diving hard.

NARRATOR: Security footage gives them a look at the last moments

of Flight 981.

Flight 981's angle of descent leads investigators

to wonder if the pilots were having problems

controlling their plane.

Maybe it's their flight controls.

Mm-hmm.

Never I've seen it before.

NARRATOR: Boeing 737 flight controls

have a problematic history.

March 3, 1991--

United Airlines Flight 585 banks hard right

and crashes while attempting to land, killing all on board.

Three years later, it happens again.

US Air Flight 427 rolls left and crashes near Pittsburgh.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Investigators

were tearing their hair out trying to figure it out.

NARRATOR: Two years passed without incident.

Then, while on approach to land, the pilots of Eastwind Airlines

Flight 517 lose control.

This time, the pilots regain control of their plane and land

safely in Richmond, Virginia.

The plane is intact.

Investigators get their best lead yet.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: After a five year investigation,

the National Transportation Safety Board

concluded that a power unit in the rudder

had been responsible for what's called a rudder hard over.

The rudder had moved to one side,

and that caused the aircraft to roll over

and then dive into the ground.

NARRATOR: Movements of rudder and other control surfaces

occur when pilots push their rudder pedal or pull the yoke.

Power control units turn those commands into actual movements

of the control surfaces.

It's similar to the power steering on a car.

Hey, there.

Did you recover the PCUs?

NARRATOR: Investigators want to know if any of Flight

981's control units failed.

Yep, they're here.

Great.

We need to test them.

NARRATOR: Much of the Boeing 737 was destroyed

during high speed impact.

But two of the power control units have survived.

They could provide crucial information.

JOHN NANCE: PCUs are the heart and soul of the flight

controls of the airplane.

And one of the first questions if you have an airplane that

came screaming out of the sky they had a 50 degree angle

is did we have a PCU problem in the flight controls.

NARRATOR: Investigators carefully

examine the PCUs of Flight 981.

They look for signs of a malfunction.

Nothing wrong with the PCUs.

JOHN NANCE: They were extensively examined and found

to have had absolutely no connection to what brought

this airplane out of the sky.

NARRATOR: With flight control issues ruled out,

the team turns to the controller for insight.

Take me through what you saw.

They were on final approach.

CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Flight 081, Rostov Tower.

You're clear to land on runway 22.

Then they aborted their first attempt to land.

They reported wind shear.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We're conducting a go-around due to wind shear.

Skydubai 981, make holding pattern at your convenience.

They climbed and began holding.

How long were they holding?

For a long time.

NARRATOR: Investigators learn that the pilots

held for almost two hours waiting

for the weather to improve.

Skydubai 981, request descent for another approach.

CONTROLLER: Then they asked to land.

NARRATOR: But something went wrong when the pilots

made their second approach.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is Skydubai 981.

We're going around.

Did they say why they were going around the second time?

No.

They just said going around, that's all.

The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway.

Did they report any problems with the plane?

No, nothing.

NARRATOR: IAC investigators still

can't explain why Flight 981 suddenly banked

and then dived into runway 22.

Something had gone wrong on the second go-around,

but investigators didn't know what.

Was there a problem with the airplane?

Did the pilots make a mistake?

There was no knowing it yet.

OK.

Two go-arounds, one turns to disaster.

Why?

Let's take a look at the first one.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to FDR data

to better understand why Flydubai Flight

981 performed one successful go-around

but crashed during the second.

Investigators need to figure out how the two go-arounds

were different from each other.

Zoom in a bit.

Look.

NARRATOR: They confirm the pilots

reacted to a wind shear alarm during the first approach.

And how did they respond?

Thruster jumps up to 102.

So he applied max power.

Mm-hmm.

What about the flaps?

Flaps at 30, and gear remained down.

Textbook wind shear go-around.

Yeah.

If a pilot encounters wind shear,

he'll typically perform a-- what's called

a wind shear escape maneuver.

And that involves increasing the engine power to a maximum.

You leave the flaps down.

You leave the gear down.

AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear, go-around.

PHIL DERNER: The first go round was pretty routine.

They responded appropriately.

They did exactly what they should have done.

This is the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Investigators analyze the second attempt

at landing, focusing in on the last moments before the crash.

Now, did they get another wind shear warning the second time?

No, nothing.

Look.

There's a leap in air speed, from 153 to 176 in seconds.

NARRATOR: 10 seconds before the pilots

abort, a sudden increase in the plane's airspeed was recorded.

Investigators saw the airspeed fluctuating for more than 20

knots within a few seconds.

It's a pretty strong gust of wind.

Now, they can see that on the flight data recorder.

NARRATOR: Investigators determined that a strong gust

of wind struck the plane.

JOHN NANCE: You can feel the wind increase

on the nose of the airplane.

It's probably also moving the airplane a little bit

left to right.

It's not a pleasant position to be in.

How did the pilots respond this time?

Let me see.

They added max power.

OK.

Go around.

And what about the flaps and landing gear?

Hmm.

Flaps are retracted.

Gear, retracted.

NARRATOR: The data reveals that on the second go-around

the pilots performed a different procedure.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: They didn't

fly the wind shear escape maneuver

during the second go-around.

Well, it looks like they were doing a standard go-around.

NARRATOR: On a standard go-around,

the flaps and landing gear are retracted.

Except they did it at max power.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Given how streamlined the aircraft is

with the landing gear up and the flaps largely retracted,

the use of maximum power is very much overkill.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that on the second attempt

the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures.

They used the power of a wind shear escape maneuver

with the gear and flap settings of a traditional go-around.

So what would that do to the plane?

We need to take a look at all the factors at play.

They were holding on for nearly two hours.

That's four tons of fuel they burned.

NARRATOR: The weight of the Boeing 737

is a critical factor in the plane's performance.

Adding the weight of the plane--

total weight, that's 54 tons.

That's a light plane.

Yeah.

At this weight, you know, the crew would

feel a faster acceleration.

Max power, no drag from flaps or landing gear, low weight.

This plane could have been accelerating dangerously fast.

This is really an accelerated situation.

This is a very powerful airplane doing

something that feels like you just went into afterburner.

How much quicker did this plane pick up

speed on the second go-around?

We need to do modeling on this.

It was really incumbent upon the investigators

to look further into the question of the acceleration.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to computer modeling

to answer a crucial question.

Here's all the data for the first and second go-around.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: How did the rate of acceleration

differ at the start of the two attempts?

First go-around, speed increased by 17 knots.

And the second?

Second go-around, 25 knot increase.

That's a difference of 8 knots between the two go-arounds.

Mm-hmm.

Yeah.

JOHN NANCE: It was a key part of the findings when they realized

that over 40% difference existed between the acceleration

from the first go-around to the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Could the increase in acceleration have

affected the pilots themselves?

They calculate the impact of the second go-around.

Wow.

Look at the backward force experienced by the pilot.

That faster acceleration on the second go-around would have

pushed him back into the seat.

NARRATOR: The team also examines the impact

of vertical acceleration.

The g-force would have lifted the pilots upwards.

BRADEN MCGRATH: The pilot would have felt a slight unwaging.

He would come up out of the seat.

So sudden acceleration like this,

both horizontal and vertical--

that'll play tricks on your mind.

NARRATOR: Were Captain Sokratous's senses

his worst enemy?

Maybe he experienced a somatogravic illusion.

Check your speed.

OK.

Go around.

NARRATOR: A somatogravic illusion is a dangerous form

of spatial disorientation.

When a plane accelerates quickly with no visual reference

of the horizon, the gravitational forces

cause a pitch up illusion in the inner ear.

The little hairs in the inner ear bend backwards,

tricking the brain into thinking the head is tilting up.

Well, you might be going level.

But if you cannot see outside, that

sensation on your vestibular system is overwhelming.

And, you know, you would really feel that you're climbing up.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: A somatogravic graphic illusion

is one of the most lethal traps in aviation.

Keep the nose up 15 degrees.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's an extremely convincing illusion.

What was the actual pitch of the plane after it accelerated

during the second go-around?

Almost 20 seconds after the actual pitch

was 8.8 degrees nose up.

NARRATOR: Investigators look for evidence

that the pilots of Flight 981 became severely

disoriented in the dark.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: If you imagine

that this glass of water represents

the fluid in your ear--

if you accelerated this along a smooth surface,

the water would be pushed up against the back of the glass

very much like this.

In other words, it's the same effect as if you'd

simply tilted the glass.

If you take visual information away, what tends to happen

is that the pilot forgets about the acceleration

and assumes that everything is feeling is due to the pitch.

And what was the pilot's perceived pitch?

BRADEN MCGRATH: Combining the horizontal and vertical

acceleration experienced by the pilot,

we can calculate the pH that is perceived by the pilot.

This is called the illusionary pitch.

Pilot's perceived pitch was 21.6 degrees.

NARRATOR: They compare the plane's actual pitch

to the pilot's illusionary pitch during the second go-around.

10 seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.

And the pilot perceived it to be 26.7 degrees, nose up.

Wow.

That's a huge difference.

This puts the captain into a situation

that he potentially will be experiencing

as a somatogravic illusion.

The captain is feeling one thing,

but the aircraft is doing something else.

Get this.

Near the end of the flight, the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees,

and the perceived pitch becomes, well over 40.

NARRATOR: Investigators discover three instances where there was

a dramatic difference between the plane's actual and

the pilot's perceived pitch.

Keep it at 16 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: It's evidence that the pilots may have

experienced a somatogravic illusion

during the second go-around.

Could the feeling of the rapid acceleration

have affected how the pilots flew the plane?

They dig deeper into the flight data.

When the captain push forward on the yoke--

He was trying to pitch the plane downward.

That's what his senses were telling him to do.

JOHN NANCE: The captain, responding more to his feelings

than to what he was seeing on any instrumentation

in front of him-- he decides that he needs

to push the airplane forward and counteract

this massive pitch up.

He's trying to save them by pitching down.

Wow.

Check this out.

He pushed the stabilizer trim down.

NARRATOR: From the data, investigators see the captain

didn't just push the yoke.

Be careful!

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Captain applies the stabilized

trim because he's pushing--

trying to push the nose of the aircraft down.

But for how long?

Yeah.

He held the trim switch for 12 seconds.

PHIL DERNER: Holding the switch for 12 seconds is unheard of.

That should never be held for that amount of time.

NARRATOR: The team discovers that instead of pitching

the plane up to climb, the captain is pitching

the plane towards the ground--

No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

NARRATOR: --eventually putting the plane into a fatal dive.

The sudden change in direction is jarring.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: At that time you

feel like you're in a roller coaster, you know,

when you're coming up to the peak

as you were diving at speed.

It's similar to that sensation.

NARRATOR: The pitch down has another disorienting

effect on the pilot's senses.

Pitching down of the aircraft would have caused both

the captain and the first officer

to experience a dramatic change in the g-forces.

Oh, my god!

That would increase the confusion in the cockpit

as to what's going on.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the various g-forces

on Captain Sokratous caused his complete

spatial disorientation.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: The captain pushing and pulling

on the yoke, stomping on the rudder, in the dive, you know,

that shows confusion.

He's probably disorientated.

Oh, my god!

GERRY SOEJATMAN: You know, he's trying

desperately to get out of that sensation that he's feeling.

NARRATOR: But there's one question that

still troubles investigators.

Was the first officer feeling the illusion, as well?

BRADEN MCGRATH: Even though the accelerations experienced

by both pilots was the same, the perception of what is happening

can differ.

And that can be due to many different factors--

expectation, what are they looking at,

their age, their experience.

Start it at the second go-around, please.

NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder

could tell investigators if the first officer

was also under the influence of the somatogravic illusion.

ARISTOS SOKRATOUS: OK.

Go around.

Careful!

No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

Don't-- don't do that!

He sees something wrong.

No.

Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

He's telling him to pull back the yoke.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Pull it!

If he's feeling the same illusion as the captain,

it sure doesn't seem like he was affected by it.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first officer knew how much trouble

the aircraft was in, knew the captain wasn't

responding the way he should.

Oh, my god!

NARRATOR: Investigators are left wondering why the first officer

didn't intervene.

You look at this first office you're trying his best

and wonder why didn't you just take control

and say, I've got the airplane.

He's been flying the 737-800 for nearly two years.

He's fully certified.

NARRATOR: Investigators look into the first officer's

background to understand why he didn't take

control of Flight 981 when he the captain

was making grave mistakes.

Look.

His trainer wrote notes on his assessment,

and this one is telling.

NARRATOR: They find notes left by one of his flight

instructors that alarm them.

One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft

was discovered in a note that was left

behind by a flight instructor.

He needs to be a bit more assertive in what

is needed from the captain.

And it continues.

Tell him what you want done, and do not

wait for the captain to inquire with you

or direct you in this regard.

He's not the type to take control.

No. Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: A first officer

could see that the captain was experiencing

enormous problems trying to control the go-around.

He really should have taken some decisive action and intervened.

Oh, my god!

I still don't understand something.

Why did they try to land the plane in the first place?

The big mystery was why was this crew so determined to land

at Rostov-onDon when every other flight had already diverted.

NARRATOR: A storm was pummeling Rostov-on-Don Airport,

as Flight 981 circled above.

Why didn't the pilots divert to another airport?

Investigators look for answers in the cockpit voice recording.

CONTROLLER (ON RECORDING): Skydubai 981,

for your information, previous traffic

went to alternate airports.

Two other flights diverted?

There's no need.

I'm gonna keep flying.

Investigators just couldn't understand

why they wanted to fly in circles for almost two hours.

ARISTOS SOKRATOUS (ON RECORDING):

I'm gonna try this approach.

And if I can't make it, we'll have a go-around.

And I will head to Mineralyne Vody.

OK?

DISPATCHER (ON RECORDING): OK, Captain.

Understood.

Who is he talking to?

The dispatcher in Dubai.

NARRATOR: Investigators finally get

an indication of the captain's rationale

for attempting another landing.

As the captain decides whether to divert,

he contacts Flydubai's flight dispatcher

in the United Arab Emirates.

DISPATCHER (ON RADIO): We would like to recommend

you hold max as possible.

Dispatchers manage the entire fleet's operation

for a specific airline.

JOHN NANCE: The dispatcher and the captain

are co-equally responsible for the safety of the flight.

There is a very delicate dance that

goes on between and among the dispatchers and the captains.

The captain follows with the dispatchers recommendation.

NARRATOR: Minutes turn to hours as the pilots

wait for a chance to land.

I don't know, man.

If we divert, we're gonna exceed our flying hours.

So what are you looking at?

Maximum duty hours.

He's calculating his duty hours.

NARRATOR: Regulations limit how many hours pilots

can fly during a duty period.

Been in the air for 5 and 1/2 hours now.

NARRATOR: The team learns that the pilots were concerned they

might exceed their duty hours.

Stop.

Roll the map.

They've been flying for at least five hours.

It'll take another hour to reach their alternate airport,

wait out the storm.

Then they still have to get back to Rostov-on-Don

before returning to Dubai.

Diverting would put them over their duty hours for the day.

Right.

Look.

I think it'll be clear by the time we do this approach now.

And even if we start now, I think we'll be good.

We'll be good.

OK.

Is he landing because it's clear or because he

wants to get on the ground?

PHIL DERNER: The conversation in the flight deck

before the second approach clearly showed that they

weren't really thinking so much about the safety

of the landing, just the fact that they wanted to land.

I think I'd like to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

Stop the recording.

So they decide to circle for two hours

after a four hour flight in the middle of the night.

NARRATOR: Did the long flight affect the pilot's ability

to land the plane safely?

Two hours of hold, six hours total time--

aren't we seeing a decline in the decision making

capabilities because of fatigue?

You tired?

No.

NARRATOR: As investigators break down Flight 981's journey

from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don, they

identify a glaring problem.

They were actually in the air for more than six hours.

It's almost 5:00 AM their time when they're landing.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The circadian rhythm

is the body's natural alignment with the day and night cycle.

A quiet period is roughly for a four

hour between 2:00 in the morning and 6:00 in the morning.

That's the point at which your mental ability

is pretty much at its lowest.

I think I'd like to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

NARRATOR: Investigators determined the crew was

suffering from operational fatigue

as they launched their second approach.

Good evening, your first officer here.

We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: The decision to make a second attempt

to land at Rostov-on-Don triggers a chain of events

that ends in catastrophe.

Check your speed.

As the aircraft is hit by this sudden wind,

the crew is forced into executing another go-around.

OK, go around.

And this time it was all going to go wrong.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous executes

a wind shear go-around, pushing the throttle to maximum power.

The first officer performs a standard go-around,

retracting the flaps and raising the landing gear.

Both pilots were essentially flying two

different airplanes from there.

This blunder factors heavily into the catastrophe

that followed.

NARRATOR: Flight 981 climbs from Rostov-on-Don at high speed.

When you're light on fuel and you put the maximum thrust,

you will accelerate.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's what happened

in the last few seconds that doomed Flight 981.

Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: At this moment, Captain Sokratous

fights an inner battle.

Acceleration of the aircraft makes the captain feel as

though the aircraft is pitching up a lot more

than it actually is.

NARRATOR: His spatial orientation

deteriorates rapidly.

JOHN NANCE: Your vestibular senses and your middle ear

are all telling you the wrong thing.

NARRATOR: The captain counters the pitch up

feeling of a somatogravic illusion

by pushing the yoke forward.

The captain has lost touch with the reality of what's

happening to the airplane.

NARRATOR: Then, the final blow.

The captain holds that stabilizer trim button

down for about 12 seconds.

With the sudden forcing of the aircraft's nose down

and stabilizer trim, the aircraft

transitions from a climb very suddenly into a dive.

BRADEN MCGRATH: The aircraft is now

in a very dangerous situation which the captain

is unable to overcome.

My god!

JOHN NANCE: They're accelerating rapidly,

and the first officer finally gets on the yoke

and tries to pull.

But the controls on the left side

govern where the airplane is.

And you get to a certain point, and there's no recovery.

NARRATOR: Nose diving at full throttle

towards the runway, Captain Sokratous

is completely disoriented.

When he adds rudder at the last moment,

he's lost all awareness of how the plane is flying.

The pilots in this case were conducting

the flight very well right up until those last few moments.

And then it all really just fell apart.

NARRATOR: The IAC investigation into the crash of Flight 981

is a landmark case of how spatial disorientation

can end in disaster.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: This accident is a wake up

call for the industry.

This is one of the accidents that

pave the way into increased training

in spatial disorientation.

NARRATOR: In their final report, investigators

blame the captain's string of errors on his

diminished psychological state.

The IAC recommends that Flydubai provide better training

on the manual operation of stabilizer trim,

so their pilots don't make the same mistake again.

Research into human factors, including situations like this

where disorientation likely occurred,

is at the forefront of aviation safety research.

We are training our pilots on simulators to experience

these illusions before they experience them in the air,

so they can recognize those situations.

I think the Flydubai accident shows how quickly

your senses can overtake you.

And one of the key lessons is for pilots

to trust in their instruments, to take a step back from what

they may think they're experiencing,

to actually understand what the airplane is doing.

You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.