All language subtitles for Air Disasters S17E01 Holding Pattern 1080p PMTP WEB-DL AAC2 0 H 264_track3_[eng]

No, no no no no no.

NARRATOR: Security footage
of Flydubai Flight 981

captures its final moments.

Oh, it's diving hard.

JOHN NANCE: The level of
violence of the impact

was catastrophic.

NARRATOR: 62 people are
killed in a fatal dive.

Investigators soon
discover the pilots

had aborted two landings.

We're going around.

PHIL DERNER: A go-around
is done just when

conditions are not perfect.

Did they say why they were
going around the second time?

They just said going around.

Check your speed.

CONTROLLER: The next
thing I knew, the plane

was diving towards the runway.

Investigators needed
to find out how the two

go-arounds were different.

One turns to disaster.

Why?

PILOT (ON RADIO): Mayday!

Mayday!

Go up!

NARRATOR: Flydubai
Flight 981 closes

in on Rostov-on-Don
International

Airport in Southwest Russia.

Rostov tower, Skydubao
981, we're at 2,600 feet.

2,300 feet is our
next target altitude.

NARRATOR: 11 miles out, Captain
Aristos Sokratous and First

Officer Alejandro Alava Cruz
prepare the Boeing 737-800

for touchdown.

PHIL DERNER: Both pilots had
a pretty good amount of flying

hours in the 737, specifically.

These were experienced pilots.

CONTROLLER: Flight
981, Rostov Tower.

Wind, 240 degrees.

Gusts, 30 knots.

You're cleared to
land on Runway 22.

NARRATOR: The controller
reports the weather

conditions at the airport.

Thick clouds cover
Rostov-on-Don.

High winds are
battering the runways.

The weather in Rostov at
that time was pretty low

cloud with wind gusts.

It was typical for that
time of year for Rostov.

If you look at the geography,
with the sea and the hills

around it, then yes, you
can expect some challenges.

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981
departed Dubai International

Airport at 10.37 PM.

It's a four hour flight
Northwest to Rostov-on-Don.

It's a bumpy ride for the
55 passengers on board.

The flight is expected
to land in minutes.

150 knots.

NARRATOR: Eight miles out, the
pilots reduce speed as they

begin the final descent.

PHIL DERNER: On approach,
pilots know exactly

what the airplane is doing.

They know the conditions
that they're flying in.

Flaps 30.

Flaps 30.

PHIL DERNER: They're going to
drop the flaps bit by bit, when

to drop their landing gear.

It's a very gradual process.

It should be a bit bumpy and
then later it should be calm.

NARRATOR: The pilots expect
turbulence on approach,

but anticipate a smooth
landing, The runway

is just four miles away,
but there's a threat ahead.

AUTOMATED VOICE: Go around.

Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: The onboard radar
has detected dangerous winds.

AUTOMATED VOICE:
Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: Wind shear is a rapid
change in direction and speed

of wind.

If a pilot experiences a strong
headwind that suddenly changes

to a tailwind, the
aircraft might not

have enough lift to remain
airborne, especially

at low altitude.

The wind shear alert is built
into the aircraft's avionics

to tell you you're
going into wind currents

that could be problematic.

AUTOMATED VOICE:
Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear, go-around.

NARRATOR: Just 1,000
feet above the ground,

landing at Rostov-on-Don
becomes too risky.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ:
Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We are conducting a
go-around due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The pilots
abort their approach.

Every pilot is
prepared to make

a go-around on every approach.

It's something that pilots do
off the top of their heads.

There's no manual involved.

PHIL DERNER: They have no limit
to the amount of approaches

that they can try as long
as they have enough fuel.

So why not go around
and just try it again?

Flight 981, copy.

NARRATOR: Flight
981 is one of four

incoming flights
controllers are managing

as high winds delay landings.

Aeroflot 1166, be advised
Skydubai 981 reports

wind shear on landing.

PHIL DERNER: The air traffic
controller's workload

was definitely increased
in this environment,

and they have to start juggling
all of those cards in the air.

NARRATOR: As Flight 981 climbs--

Aeroflot 1166, you're
cleared to land on runway 22.

NARRATOR: --an Aeroflot
flight prepares to land.

Captain Sokratous
pays close attention

to its communications.

I want to see what
this guy will do.

PHIL DERNER: The
crew, at this point,

is hoping that the
crews of other flights

are able to give
them some information

that they might be able to
use to make some decisions

about what to do next.

NARRATOR: That flight can't
land at Rostov-on-Dov either.

PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1156.

We're going around,
due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The Aeroflot
pilots also encounter

wind shear on final approach.

They're forced to abort.

That kind of seals the deal.

Flydubai is going to
have to either wait

or they're going to have to
go to an alternate airport.

NARRATOR: High over
Rostov-on-Don, passengers

on Flight 981 are restless.

The pilots are holding
at 15,000 feet,

circling near the airport,
waiting for a chance to land.

PHIL DERNER: The pilots sit in a
holding pattern, since they had

enough fuel to be able to do so,
to wait for weather conditions

to improve.

NARRATOR: Three other planes
are also in a holding pattern.

The storm pounding
Rostov-on-Don isn't passing.

PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1166.

We're diverting.

CONTROLLER (ON
RADIO): Skydubai 981,

for your information,
previous traffic

went to alternate airports.

NARRATOR: All the other
flights decide to divert

to alternate airports instead.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
The problem with diverting

is that it's expensive and,
yes, it's inconvenient.

The passengers don't end
up at their destination.

They have to be
put up in hotels.

And with a low cost airline,
it's the last thing it wants.

NARRATOR: Captain
Sokratous continues

monitoring the weather radar.

Finally, he spots a clearing.

I think I'd like
to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
It's not unusual for crews

to take advantage
if there happens

to be a break in
the weather pattern

that provides safe conditions
to land the aircraft.

Skydubai 981 request
descent for another approach.

NARRATOR: 15,000 feet over
Rostov-on-Don, the pilots

again prepare to land.

Skydubai 981, Rosoff Tower.

You're cleared to
land on runway 22.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA
CRUZ (ON INTERCOM):

Good evening, your
first officer here.

We will be learning shortly.

Once again, we
apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: 13 miles
from runway 22,

the pilots line up
for a second approach.

CONTROLLER: Be advised,
low altitude head

wind 53 knots, light icing.

NARRATOR: Even though
winds are strong,

controllers aren't reporting
wind shear at the runway.

Flaps 30.

Flaps 30.

NARRATOR: But as they
approach, they soon

realize something's not right.

Check your speed.

OK.

Go-around.

NARRATOR: The pilots
execute another go-around.

Keep it at 15 degrees.

Nose up.

NARRATOR: Just 2,000
feet in the air,

Captain Sokratous kratos is
wrestling with the Boeing 737.

Seconds later--

NARRATOR: --Flight 981 is
diving straight at the runway.

Oh, my god.

NARRATOR: Fire and
emergency crews

rush to the end of Runway 22.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
The aircraft punched

a crater in the runway about
a meter and a half deep,

with wreckage--

wreckage thrown everywhere.

NARRATOR: Firefighters battle
the flames through the night,

but there's no
one to be rescued.

All 62 people on board Flight
981 are killed in the crash.

Grieving families and
the world demand answers.

NARRATOR: Hours
after Flydubai Flight

981 crashes on the
runway at Rostov-on-Don,

investigators from the IAC, the
Interstate Aviation Committee,

arrive on the scene.

The IAC is the lead air
accident investigation agency,

not just for Russia,
but for several

of the former Soviet states.

NARRATOR: The IAC must find the
cause for the horrific tragedy.

OK.

That's great.

That belongs over here.

NARRATOR: Wreckage
from Flight 981

is laid out in a nearby
hangar for closer inspection.

A team from the
United Arab Emirates

assists in the investigation.

So how fast did
the plane hit the ground?

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
The size of the debris

would tell whether it was a
high speed impact, whether it

was a low speed impact.

There are clues in the
pieces of wreckage.

There's
not much left of it.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: It
was all small pieces.

It describes a very high
speed and violent impact

with the ground.

it makes us question
what really happened.

Let's see it.

NARRATOR: Investigators
wonder how

the plane could have
gathered so much speed

during an attempted landing.

Oh, it's diving hard.

NARRATOR: Security footage gives
them a look at the last moments

of Flight 981.

Flight 981's angle of
descent leads investigators

to wonder if the pilots
were having problems

controlling their plane.

Maybe it's their
flight controls.

Mm-hmm.

Never I've seen it before.

NARRATOR: Boeing
737 flight controls

have a problematic history.

March 3, 1991--

United Airlines Flight
585 banks hard right

and crashes while attempting
to land, killing all on board.

Three years later,
it happens again.

US Air Flight 427 rolls left
and crashes near Pittsburgh.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
Investigators

were tearing their hair out
trying to figure it out.

NARRATOR: Two years
passed without incident.

Then, while on approach to land,
the pilots of Eastwind Airlines

Flight 517 lose control.

This time, the pilots regain
control of their plane and land

safely in Richmond, Virginia.

The plane is intact.

Investigators get
their best lead yet.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: After
a five year investigation,

the National
Transportation Safety Board

concluded that a power
unit in the rudder

had been responsible for what's
called a rudder hard over.

The rudder had
moved to one side,

and that caused the
aircraft to roll over

and then dive into the ground.

NARRATOR: Movements of rudder
and other control surfaces

occur when pilots push their
rudder pedal or pull the yoke.

Power control units turn those
commands into actual movements

of the control surfaces.

It's similar to the
power steering on a car.

Hey, there.

Did you recover the PCUs?

NARRATOR: Investigators want
to know if any of Flight

981's control units failed.

Yep, they're here.

Great.

We need to test them.

NARRATOR: Much of the
Boeing 737 was destroyed

during high speed impact.

But two of the power
control units have survived.

They could provide
crucial information.

JOHN NANCE: PCUs are the
heart and soul of the flight

controls of the airplane.

And one of the first questions
if you have an airplane that

came screaming out of the sky
they had a 50 degree angle

is did we have a PCU problem
in the flight controls.

NARRATOR:
Investigators carefully

examine the PCUs of Flight 981.

They look for signs
of a malfunction.

Nothing wrong with the PCUs.

JOHN NANCE: They were
extensively examined and found

to have had absolutely no
connection to what brought

this airplane out of the sky.

NARRATOR: With flight
control issues ruled out,

the team turns to the
controller for insight.

Take me through what you saw.

They were on final approach.

CONTROLLER (ON RADIO):
Flight 081, Rostov Tower.

You're clear to
land on runway 22.

Then they aborted their
first attempt to land.

They reported wind shear.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ:
Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We're conducting a
go-around due to wind shear.

Skydubai 981, make holding
pattern at your convenience.

They climbed
and began holding.

How long were they holding?

For a long time.

NARRATOR: Investigators
learn that the pilots

held for almost
two hours waiting

for the weather to improve.

Skydubai 981, request
descent for another approach.

CONTROLLER: Then
they asked to land.

NARRATOR: But something
went wrong when the pilots

made their second approach.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov
Tower, this is Skydubai 981.

We're going around.

Did they say why they were
going around the second time?

No.

They just said going
around, that's all.

The next thing I knew, the plane
was diving towards the runway.

Did they report any
problems with the plane?

No, nothing.

NARRATOR: IAC
investigators still

can't explain why Flight
981 suddenly banked

and then dived into runway 22.

Something had gone wrong
on the second go-around,

but investigators
didn't know what.

Was there a problem
with the airplane?

Did the pilots make a mistake?

There was no knowing it yet.

OK.

Two go-arounds, one
turns to disaster.

Why?

Let's take a look
at the first one.

NARRATOR: Investigators
turn to FDR data

to better understand
why Flydubai Flight

981 performed one
successful go-around

but crashed during the second.

Investigators need to figure
out how the two go-arounds

were different from each other.

Zoom in a bit.

Look.

NARRATOR: They
confirm the pilots

reacted to a wind shear alarm
during the first approach.

And how did they respond?

Thruster jumps up to 102.

So he applied max power.

Mm-hmm.

What about the flaps?

Flaps at 30, and
gear remained down.

Textbook wind shear go-around.

Yeah.

If a pilot
encounters wind shear,

he'll typically perform
a-- what's called

a wind shear escape maneuver.

And that involves increasing
the engine power to a maximum.

You leave the flaps down.

You leave the gear down.

AUTOMATED VOICE:
Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear, go-around.

PHIL DERNER: The first go
round was pretty routine.

They responded appropriately.

They did exactly what
they should have done.

This is the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Investigators
analyze the second attempt

at landing, focusing in on the
last moments before the crash.

Now, did they get another wind
shear warning the second time?

No, nothing.

Look.

There's a leap in air speed,
from 153 to 176 in seconds.

NARRATOR: 10 seconds
before the pilots

abort, a sudden increase in the
plane's airspeed was recorded.

Investigators saw the airspeed
fluctuating for more than 20

knots within a few seconds.

It's a pretty
strong gust of wind.

Now, they can see that on
the flight data recorder.

NARRATOR: Investigators
determined that a strong gust

of wind struck the plane.

JOHN NANCE: You can
feel the wind increase

on the nose of the airplane.

It's probably also moving
the airplane a little bit

left to right.

It's not a pleasant
position to be in.

How did the pilots
respond this time?

Let me see.

They added max power.

OK.

Go around.

And what about the
flaps and landing gear?

Hmm.

Flaps are retracted.

Gear, retracted.

NARRATOR: The data reveals
that on the second go-around

the pilots performed
a different procedure.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
They didn't

fly the wind shear
escape maneuver

during the second go-around.

Well, it looks like they were
doing a standard go-around.

NARRATOR: On a
standard go-around,

the flaps and landing
gear are retracted.

Except they did
it at max power.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Given
how streamlined the aircraft is

with the landing gear up and
the flaps largely retracted,

the use of maximum power
is very much overkill.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude
that on the second attempt

the crew flew a hybrid
of two procedures.

They used the power of a
wind shear escape maneuver

with the gear and flap settings
of a traditional go-around.

So what would that
do to the plane?

We need to take a look
at all the factors at play.

They were holding on
for nearly two hours.

That's four tons of
fuel they burned.

NARRATOR: The weight
of the Boeing 737

is a critical factor in
the plane's performance.

Adding the weight
of the plane--

total weight, that's 54 tons.

That's a light plane.

Yeah.

At this weight, you
know, the crew would

feel a faster acceleration.

Max power, no drag from flaps
or landing gear, low weight.

This plane could have been
accelerating dangerously fast.

This is really an
accelerated situation.

This is a very
powerful airplane doing

something that feels like you
just went into afterburner.

How much quicker
did this plane pick up

speed on the second go-around?

We need to do
modeling on this.

It was really incumbent
upon the investigators

to look further into the
question of the acceleration.

NARRATOR: Investigators
turn to computer modeling

to answer a crucial question.

Here's all the data for the
first and second go-around.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: How did the
rate of acceleration

differ at the start
of the two attempts?

First go-around, speed
increased by 17 knots.

And the second?

Second go-around,
25 knot increase.

That's a difference of 8 knots
between the two go-arounds.

Mm-hmm.

Yeah.

JOHN NANCE: It was a key part of
the findings when they realized

that over 40% difference
existed between the acceleration

from the first go-around
to the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Could the increase
in acceleration have

affected the pilots themselves?

They calculate the impact
of the second go-around.

Wow.

Look at the backward force
experienced by the pilot.

That faster acceleration on
the second go-around would have

pushed him back into the seat.

NARRATOR: The team also
examines the impact

of vertical acceleration.

The g-force would have
lifted the pilots upwards.

BRADEN MCGRATH: The pilot would
have felt a slight unwaging.

He would come up
out of the seat.

So sudden
acceleration like this,

both horizontal and vertical--

that'll play tricks
on your mind.

NARRATOR: Were Captain
Sokratous's senses

his worst enemy?

Maybe he experienced
a somatogravic illusion.

Check your speed.

OK.

Go around.

NARRATOR: A somatogravic
illusion is a dangerous form

of spatial disorientation.

When a plane accelerates
quickly with no visual reference

of the horizon, the
gravitational forces

cause a pitch up illusion
in the inner ear.

The little hairs in the
inner ear bend backwards,

tricking the brain into
thinking the head is tilting up.

Well, you might
be going level.

But if you cannot
see outside, that

sensation on your vestibular
system is overwhelming.

And, you know, you would really
feel that you're climbing up.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: A
somatogravic graphic illusion

is one of the most
lethal traps in aviation.

Keep the nose up 15 degrees.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's an
extremely convincing illusion.

What was the actual pitch of
the plane after it accelerated

during the second go-around?

Almost 20 seconds
after the actual pitch

was 8.8 degrees nose up.

NARRATOR: Investigators
look for evidence

that the pilots of Flight
981 became severely

disoriented in the dark.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
If you imagine

that this glass of
water represents

the fluid in your ear--

if you accelerated this
along a smooth surface,

the water would be pushed up
against the back of the glass

very much like this.

In other words, it's the
same effect as if you'd

simply tilted the glass.

If you take visual information
away, what tends to happen

is that the pilot forgets
about the acceleration

and assumes that everything is
feeling is due to the pitch.

And what was the
pilot's perceived pitch?

BRADEN MCGRATH: Combining
the horizontal and vertical

acceleration experienced
by the pilot,

we can calculate the pH that
is perceived by the pilot.

This is called the
illusionary pitch.

Pilot's perceived
pitch was 21.6 degrees.

NARRATOR: They compare
the plane's actual pitch

to the pilot's illusionary pitch
during the second go-around.

10 seconds later, the plane
is pitched up 3.9 degrees.

And the pilot perceived it
to be 26.7 degrees, nose up.

Wow.

That's a huge difference.

This puts the captain
into a situation

that he potentially
will be experiencing

as a somatogravic illusion.

The captain is
feeling one thing,

but the aircraft is
doing something else.

Get this.

Near the end of the flight, the
actual pitch is 7.6 degrees,

and the perceived pitch
becomes, well over 40.

NARRATOR: Investigators discover
three instances where there was

a dramatic difference between
the plane's actual and

the pilot's perceived pitch.

Keep it at 16
degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: It's evidence
that the pilots may have

experienced a
somatogravic illusion

during the second go-around.

Could the feeling of
the rapid acceleration

have affected how the
pilots flew the plane?

They dig deeper into
the flight data.

When the captain push
forward on the yoke--

He was trying to pitch
the plane downward.

That's what his senses
were telling him to do.

JOHN NANCE: The captain,
responding more to his feelings

than to what he was seeing
on any instrumentation

in front of him-- he
decides that he needs

to push the airplane
forward and counteract

this massive pitch up.

He's trying to save
them by pitching down.

Wow.

Check this out.

He pushed the
stabilizer trim down.

NARRATOR: From the data,
investigators see the captain

didn't just push the yoke.

Be careful!

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
Captain applies the stabilized

trim because he's pushing--

trying to push the nose
of the aircraft down.

But for how long?

Yeah.

He held the trim
switch for 12 seconds.

PHIL DERNER: Holding the switch
for 12 seconds is unheard of.

That should never be held
for that amount of time.

NARRATOR: The team discovers
that instead of pitching

the plane up to climb,
the captain is pitching

the plane towards the ground--

No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

NARRATOR: --eventually putting
the plane into a fatal dive.

The sudden change in
direction is jarring.

GERRY SOEJATMAN:
At that time you

feel like you're in a
roller coaster, you know,

when you're coming
up to the peak

as you were diving at speed.

It's similar to that sensation.

NARRATOR: The pitch down
has another disorienting

effect on the pilot's senses.

Pitching down of the
aircraft would have caused both

the captain and
the first officer

to experience a dramatic
change in the g-forces.

Oh, my god!

That would increase the
confusion in the cockpit

as to what's going on.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude
that the various g-forces

on Captain Sokratous
caused his complete

spatial disorientation.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: The
captain pushing and pulling

on the yoke, stomping on the
rudder, in the dive, you know,

that shows confusion.

He's probably disorientated.

Oh, my god!

GERRY SOEJATMAN: You
know, he's trying

desperately to get out of that
sensation that he's feeling.

NARRATOR: But there's
one question that

still troubles investigators.

Was the first officer
feeling the illusion, as well?

BRADEN MCGRATH: Even though
the accelerations experienced

by both pilots was the same, the
perception of what is happening

can differ.

And that can be due to
many different factors--

expectation, what
are they looking at,

their age, their experience.

Start it at the second
go-around, please.

NARRATOR: The cockpit
voice recorder

could tell investigators
if the first officer

was also under the influence
of the somatogravic illusion.

ARISTOS SOKRATOUS: OK.

Go around.

Careful!

No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

Don't-- don't do that!

He sees something wrong.

No.

Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

He's telling him to
pull back the yoke.

ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Pull it!

If he's feeling the same
illusion as the captain,

it sure doesn't seem like
he was affected by it.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first
officer knew how much trouble

the aircraft was in,
knew the captain wasn't

responding the way he should.

Oh, my god!

NARRATOR: Investigators are left
wondering why the first officer

didn't intervene.

You look at this first
office you're trying his best

and wonder why didn't
you just take control

and say, I've got the airplane.

He's been flying the
737-800 for nearly two years.

He's fully certified.

NARRATOR: Investigators look
into the first officer's

background to understand
why he didn't take

control of Flight 981
when he the captain

was making grave mistakes.

Look.

His trainer wrote notes
on his assessment,

and this one is telling.

NARRATOR: They find notes
left by one of his flight

instructors that alarm them.

One thing that could have
possibly saved this aircraft

was discovered in a
note that was left

behind by a flight instructor.

He needs to be a bit
more assertive in what

is needed from the captain.

And it continues.

Tell him what you
want done, and do not

wait for the captain
to inquire with you

or direct you in this regard.

He's not the type
to take control.

No.
Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

Pull it!

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
A first officer

could see that the
captain was experiencing

enormous problems trying
to control the go-around.

He really should have taken some
decisive action and intervened.

Oh, my god!

I still don't
understand something.

Why did they try to land the
plane in the first place?

The big mystery was why was
this crew so determined to land

at Rostov-onDon when every other
flight had already diverted.

NARRATOR: A storm was pummeling
Rostov-on-Don Airport,

as Flight 981 circled above.

Why didn't the pilots
divert to another airport?

Investigators look for answers
in the cockpit voice recording.

CONTROLLER (ON
RECORDING): Skydubai 981,

for your information,
previous traffic

went to alternate airports.

Two other flights diverted?

There's no need.

I'm gonna keep flying.

Investigators just
couldn't understand

why they wanted to fly in
circles for almost two hours.

ARISTOS SOKRATOUS
(ON RECORDING):

I'm gonna try this approach.

And if I can't make it,
we'll have a go-around.

And I will head to
Mineralyne Vody.

OK?

DISPATCHER (ON
RECORDING): OK, Captain.

Understood.

Who is he talking to?

The dispatcher in Dubai.

NARRATOR: Investigators
finally get

an indication of the
captain's rationale

for attempting another landing.

As the captain decides
whether to divert,

he contacts Flydubai's
flight dispatcher

in the United Arab Emirates.

DISPATCHER (ON RADIO): We
would like to recommend

you hold max as possible.

Dispatchers manage the
entire fleet's operation

for a specific airline.

JOHN NANCE: The
dispatcher and the captain

are co-equally responsible
for the safety of the flight.

There is a very
delicate dance that

goes on between and among the
dispatchers and the captains.

The captain follows with the
dispatchers recommendation.

NARRATOR: Minutes turn
to hours as the pilots

wait for a chance to land.

I don't know, man.

If we divert, we're gonna
exceed our flying hours.

So what are you looking at?

Maximum duty hours.

He's calculating
his duty hours.

NARRATOR: Regulations
limit how many hours pilots

can fly during a duty period.

Been in the air for
5 and 1/2 hours now.

NARRATOR: The team learns that
the pilots were concerned they

might exceed their duty hours.

Stop.

Roll the map.

They've been flying for
at least five hours.

It'll take another hour to
reach their alternate airport,

wait out the storm.

Then they still have to
get back to Rostov-on-Don

before returning to Dubai.

Diverting would put them over
their duty hours for the day.

Right.

Look.

I think it'll be clear by the
time we do this approach now.

And even if we start now,
I think we'll be good.

We'll be good.

OK.

Is he landing because
it's clear or because he

wants to get on the ground?

PHIL DERNER: The conversation
in the flight deck

before the second approach
clearly showed that they

weren't really thinking
so much about the safety

of the landing, just the fact
that they wanted to land.

I think I'd like
to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

Stop the recording.

So they decide to
circle for two hours

after a four hour flight
in the middle of the night.

NARRATOR: Did the long flight
affect the pilot's ability

to land the plane safely?

Two hours of hold,
six hours total time--

aren't we seeing a decline
in the decision making

capabilities because of fatigue?

You tired?

No.

NARRATOR: As investigators
break down Flight 981's journey

from Dubai to
Rostov-on-Don, they

identify a glaring problem.

They were actually in the
air for more than six hours.

It's almost 5:00 AM their
time when they're landing.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
The circadian rhythm

is the body's natural alignment
with the day and night cycle.

A quiet period is
roughly for a four

hour between 2:00 in the
morning and 6:00 in the morning.

That's the point at
which your mental ability

is pretty much at its lowest.

I think I'd like
to give it a try.

I agree.

Let's try.

NARRATOR: Investigators
determined the crew was

suffering from
operational fatigue

as they launched
their second approach.

Good evening, your
first officer here.

We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we
apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: The decision
to make a second attempt

to land at Rostov-on-Don
triggers a chain of events

that ends in catastrophe.

Check your speed.

As the aircraft is
hit by this sudden wind,

the crew is forced into
executing another go-around.

OK, go around.

And this time it was
all going to go wrong.

NARRATOR: Captain
Sokratous executes

a wind shear go-around, pushing
the throttle to maximum power.

The first officer performs
a standard go-around,

retracting the flaps and
raising the landing gear.

Both pilots were
essentially flying two

different airplanes from there.

This blunder factors
heavily into the catastrophe

that followed.

NARRATOR: Flight 981 climbs from
Rostov-on-Don at high speed.

When you're light on fuel
and you put the maximum thrust,

you will accelerate.

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW:
It's what happened

in the last few seconds
that doomed Flight 981.

Keep it at 15
degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: At this
moment, Captain Sokratous

fights an inner battle.

Acceleration of the aircraft
makes the captain feel as

though the aircraft is
pitching up a lot more

than it actually is.

NARRATOR: His
spatial orientation

deteriorates rapidly.

JOHN NANCE: Your vestibular
senses and your middle ear

are all telling you
the wrong thing.

NARRATOR: The captain
counters the pitch up

feeling of a
somatogravic illusion

by pushing the yoke forward.

The captain has lost touch
with the reality of what's

happening to the airplane.

NARRATOR: Then, the final blow.

The captain holds that
stabilizer trim button

down for about 12 seconds.

With the sudden forcing of
the aircraft's nose down

and stabilizer
trim, the aircraft

transitions from a climb
very suddenly into a dive.

BRADEN MCGRATH:
The aircraft is now

in a very dangerous
situation which the captain

is unable to overcome.

My god!

JOHN NANCE: They're
accelerating rapidly,

and the first officer
finally gets on the yoke

and tries to pull.

But the controls
on the left side

govern where the airplane is.

And you get to a certain
point, and there's no recovery.

NARRATOR: Nose diving
at full throttle

towards the runway,
Captain Sokratous

is completely disoriented.

When he adds rudder
at the last moment,

he's lost all awareness of
how the plane is flying.

The pilots in this
case were conducting

the flight very well right up
until those last few moments.

And then it all really
just fell apart.

NARRATOR: The IAC investigation
into the crash of Flight 981

is a landmark case of how
spatial disorientation

can end in disaster.

GERRY SOEJATMAN: This
accident is a wake up

call for the industry.

This is one of
the accidents that

pave the way into
increased training

in spatial disorientation.

NARRATOR: In their final
report, investigators

blame the captain's
string of errors on his

diminished psychological state.

The IAC recommends that
Flydubai provide better training

on the manual operation
of stabilizer trim,

so their pilots don't make
the same mistake again.

Research into human factors,
including situations like this

where disorientation
likely occurred,

is at the forefront of
aviation safety research.

We are training our pilots
on simulators to experience

these illusions before they
experience them in the air,

so they can recognize
those situations.

I think the Flydubai
accident shows how quickly

your senses can overtake you.

And one of the key
lessons is for pilots

to trust in their instruments,
to take a step back from what

they may think
they're experiencing,

to actually understand
what the airplane is doing.

You've got to keep
the aeroplane flying.