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Original subtitles

[gunfire]

[gunfire]

[explosions]

NARRATOR: Thousands of square miles were laid waste.

Billions of dollars were spent.

3 million died

as the Cold War moved to Vietnam.

D ♪

BRANAGH: Dien Bien Phu, 1954.

One of the defining battles of the Cold War.

Despite substantial American backing,

the French finally lost control

of their Vietnamese colony.

They were defeated by the communist-led army

of General Giap.

[speaking Vietnamese]

The Dien Bien Phu campaign was a huge victory.

It was the first time a poor feudal nation

had beaten a great colonial power

that had a modern industry

and a massive army.

The victory meant a lot,

not just to us,

but to people all over the world.

BRANAGH: There was a new regime in Vietnam.

It was nationalist.

But it was also communist.

After Dien Bien Phu,

the French left Vietnam for good.

An International Peace Conference

temporarily divided Vietnam into North and South,

and agreed that countrywide elections

would be held in 1956.

America opposed the elections.

They never took place.

It was felt that the elections

could not be free in the North in particular.

I would say that was part of it.

The other was that

a sense that

even if free elections were held

they probably would be dominated

by the Communists

and the Communists would gain control.

BRANAGH: Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam's leader,

had lived in France and trained in Moscow.

To many Vietnamese he was a national hero,

but Washington saw him as an instrument

of the communist bloc.

The North Vietnamese embarked on radical land reforms.

Landowners and so-called rich peasants

were persecuted pillared, and imprisoned.

The party's cruel policies

helped aggravate a refugee crisis.

By 1955,

close to a million people,

some encouraged by American agents,

had fled south.

In South Vietnam, the United States underwrote

the regime of President Diem,

an anti-communist,

determined to resist Hanoi.

Ruthless and autocratic,

Diem was intolerant of any opposition.

In 1960, to fight Diem

and to unite the country under Hanoi,

the communists created the National Liberation Front,

known to its opponents as the Viet Cong.

Such movements were encouraged by Moscow.

[speaking Russian ]

[ Applause ]

Let every nation know

whether it wishes us well or ill,

that we shall pay any price,

bear any burden,

meet any hardship,

support any friend,

Oppose any foe

to assure the survival

and the success of liberty.

[ Applause ]

BRANAGH: Within a year of his election,

after suffering the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba

and a crisis in Berlin,

President Kennedy set out to show strength in Asia.

MAN: The objective was to prevent the dominoes from falling.

The loss of Vietnam would trigger the loss

of Southeast Asia,

and conceivably even the loss of India,

and would strengthen the Chinese

and the Soviet position across the world.

BRANAGH: Village leaders in the South

who supported Diem,

were being assassinated by the National Liberation Front

or Viet Cong.

In 1961 alone

an estimated 4,000 Diem officials were killed.

To isolate the peasants from Viet Cong control,

Diem's troops burned entire villages to the ground.

The inhabitants were moved

into fortified "Strategic Hamlets,"

built under the supervision of American advisers.

These upheavals were extremely unpopular

and won new recruits for the Viet Cong.

Advisers from the United States

trained the South Vietnamese army

in counter insurgency.

Violence was routine.

The actions of the ruler, President Diem,

have been declared autocratic

and perhaps his personal actions

are to some degree,

but one realizes the chaos he faced,

the complete anarchy that existed there,

it's conceivable that autocratic methods

within a democratic framework were required

to restore order.

The regime of Mr. Diem did create a kind of framework,

a kind of government with all the structures

for governing the country.

Of course, his policy provoked

a lot of discontent

among the intellectuals.

BRANAGH: Summer 1963.

Saigon witnessed horrifying scenes.

Buddhist monks burnt themselves to death

in protest at Diem's religious intolerance.

[ People screaming ]

South Vietnamese protestors organized

a wave of demonstrations.

A group of generals plotted a coup against Diem

and sounded out America's support.

You get cables like that from some part of the country

or the world or the other almost every week

and as a kind of a standard reply,

you say the United States cannot participate

in anything like this.

We cannot aid it,

we cannot do anything to be involved

and we will examine any new government

on its own merits.

BRANAGH: But Washington did nothing to stop the coup.

President Kennedy was receiving mixed messages.

Some officials even said

America's Vietnam policy was succeeding.

They expected to withdraw

the force of 16,000 military advisers

by the end of '65,

and that the first unit of withdrawal

would be completed within 9O days,

by the end of December, 1963.

BRANAGH: Events overtook the plan to withdraw.

On November 1, 1963

a group of generals attacked the Presidential Palace,

believing that they had,

or would have American support.

By the next day the government was overthrown.

Diem and his brother were murdered by their own soldiers

after they had earlier taken refuge in a church.

At first, the people of Saigon responded with enthusiasm

to Diem's overthrow.

But it left the country with no clear leader.

Within three weeks of Diem's murder,

President Kennedy was himself assassinated.

As Kennedy was buried in Arlington Cemetery,

America remained committed to South Vietnam.

We are going to build

a great society --

WhEFE HO man Of woman

are the victim of fear,

or poverty or hatred.

Where every man and woman

has a chance for fulfillment,

and prosperity and hope.

BRANAGH: Lyndon Johnson had vast ambitions at home.

But, like Kennedy, he was determined

not to lose Vietnam to the communists.

How do you do?

You know the Vice Premier.

Nice to see you, sir.

BRANAGH: Johnson sent McNamara to re-pledge America

to South Vietnam's cause.

The strategy was unchanged,

the promises more spectacular.

We'll stay for as long as it takes.

We shall provide whatever help is required

to win the battle

against the communist insurgents.

BRANAGH: General William Westmore land,

a veteran of Korea and World War ll,

took charge as President Johnson began

to increase the American war effort.

This was the type of war

that we'd had no experience with before...

and we were on a learning curve

and some of our policies

were kind of trial and error in character.

BRANAGH: In August 1964,

an American destroyer, the USS Maddox,

on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin,

exchanged fire with North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

The President has asked that the destroyer force

be doubled and that an "air cap"

a combat air patrol --

be available at all times on call to it,

and as I think you know, he's issued instructions

that in the event of a further attack

upon our vessels in international waters

we are to respond with the objective

of destroying the attackers.

BRANAGH: Two days later, the ship's captain thought

he was again coming under attack.

One of the pilots was not so sure.

Well, I was over that-- those destroyers

for over an hour and a half,

below a thousand feet, lights off,

watching everything they did.

I could hear 'em chit chatting oh the radio,

the Maddox and the Joy,

they seemed to have some intermittent radar targets.

I took it upon myself to get out there

where they thought the boat was

and try to kill it if they didn't.

But it was it was fruitless.

And I'd go down there and there was nothing.

BRANAGH: Ignoring the conflicting evidence,

the Pentagon insisted there had been a second attack.

In retaliation for this unprovoked attack,

on the high seas,

our forces have struck the bases used

by the North Vietnamese patrol craft.

BRANAGH: Johnson used the incident

to push the Tohkih Gulf resolution through Congress.

It would allow the President to wage war in Vietnam.

In South Vietnam,

the Viet Cong were stepping up operations.

They now had 170,000 men and women in the field.

They could move and operate throughout

most of the country.

They repeatedly launched attacks

in the heart of Saigon.

[ Overlapping conversations ]

[speaking Vietnamese]

INTERPRETER: People were fighting back.

We would establish contacts with them,

and guide them.

The protest movement of students and intellectuals

including Catholics and Buddhists,

was widespread.

When people saw that our methods were effective,

they would join us.

BRANAGH: Saigon was in a constant state of crisis.

Ministers came and went,

with each regime as unpopular and corrupt

as the last.

Johnson was exasperated.

I was sitting with him one day

when he got news that there was

another coup in Vietnam

and another general has ascended to the power platform

and he, frustrated, said, "Hot damn,

I'm getting sick and tired

of this Goddamn coup shit in Vietnam.

It's got to stop."

BRANAGH: Johnson was in the throes

of the 1964 election campaign.

The Great Society he hoped to build

was the central issue.

But Communism and the Cold War were,

as ever, near the top of the agenda.

One,

two,

three,

four,

five,

SEVEN...

BRANAGH: Johnson played up Cold War fears

in his election commercials,

painting his Republican adversary

as a trigger-happy warmonger.

MAN ON PA: Ten, nine

eight, seven

six, five

four, three

two, one

zero!

JOHNSON: These are the stakes.

To make a world in which

all of God's children can live.

Or to go into the dark.

We must either love each other,

or we must die.

BRANAGH: Johnson won by a landslide.

North Vietnam was a peasant society

with virtually no industry.

Ho Chi Minh sought aid from China

and the Soviet Union.

[ Cheering ]

In February 1965,

Hanoi gave Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin

a warm welcome.

He agreed to increase military aid

to the North Vietnamese.

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: We used to say,

"When Vietnam is reunited,

it will be a wonderful example

for the other nations of South East Asia."

It was all in the context of an ideological struggle --

the Cold War.

The argument was about which system would last,

which one was progressive.

"Here was a good example," people said.

"Look at Vietnam."

BRANAGH: While Soviet Premier Kosygin was still in Hanoi,

the Viet Cong launched an attack on Pleiku airbase.

Eight Americans were killed.

A hundred more were wounded.

Johnson responded with air power.

He launched Rolling Thunder,

a campaign of bombing against the North.

He hoped it would boost Southern morale

and get Ho Chi Minh to the negotiating table.

The North did not respond.

It became more and more clear

that President Johnson was going to have to choose

between losing South Vietnam,

or trying to save it

by introducing US military force

and taking over a major part of the combat mission.

BRANAGH: The first American ground troops landed

at Da Nang in March, 1965.

MAN: I can remember one of my squad leaders

when we were leaving Okinawa

and he said, "Hot damn, Vietnam!"

We were all kind of hot to go,

hot to get into something,

do something that was other than

a training drill

and there was a kind of a feeling --

I don't know if anybody ever said this --

a sort of feeling that being US Marines,

OUF mere PFESEHCE

in Vietnam

was going to terrify the enemy

into quitting.

BRANAGH: The United States had embarked on what would be

the longest military war in its history.

BRANAGH: Three weeks after the marines landed,

the Viet Cong bombed the American Embassy in Saigon.

We need a stretcher over here.

Stretcher!

Stretcher is right over here!

Johnson believed communist China

lay behind such attacks.

Their target is not merely South Vietnam --

it is Asia.

Their objective is not the fulfillment

of Vietnamese nationalism,

it is to erode and to discredit

America's ability to help prevent Chinese domination

over all of Asia.

BRANAGH: In fact China was now supplying less aid

than the Soviet Union.

Although they got few aircraft,

North Vietnamese pilots were being trained

in the Soviet Union.

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: Our position was clear --

Vietnam was defending its independence.

It was fighting against the Americans,

so we had to help them.

And I must say that in the Soviet Union,

this point of view was fully supported.

BRANAGH: The situation in South Vietnam worsened

as Viet Cong attacks continued.

In June,

a military outpost at Dong Suay was destroyed.

An elite South Vietnamese regiment was decimated,

and there were many civilian casualties.

McNamara returned to Vietnam to reassess the war.

He looked for the statistics

that would help him manage the conflict.

DIEM: But somehow Mr. McNamara came

and he never let the Vietnamese general

ask him the question one way or the other

and he came out like a machine gun

asking a lot of statistics like that

and with his yellow pad,

he put down all the indications

and as soon as the answers were given,

he took up and left.

He was not interested that much

about the opinion of the Vietnamese at all.

BRANAGH: President Johnson was now convinced

that without the support of a massive American army,

South Vietnam was doomed.

I have today ordered to Vietnam

the Air Mobile Division,

and certain other forces

which will raise our fighting strength

from 75,000 to 125,000 men

almost immediately.

Additional forces will be needed later,

and they will be sent as requested.

BRANAGH: Vietnam was a television war.

MAN: Come on, let's move in with those other guys.

This is what the war in Vietnam is all about.

[speaking Vietnamese]

The old and the very young.

The marines have burned

this old couple's cottage

because fire was coming from here.

150 homes were leveled

in retaliation for a burst of gunfire.

In Vietnam, like everywhere else in Asia,

property, a home, is everything.

A man lives with his family on ancestral land.

His parents are buried nearby.

Their spirit is part of his holding.

If there were Viet Cong in the hamlets,

they were long gone.

The women and the old men who remained

will never forget that August afternoon.

BRANAGH: The Viet Cong kept fighting.

In response to the American troop build-up,

Hanoi was preparing to send thousands of North Vietnamese

to join the fighters in the South.

Westmore land feared that South Vietnam

would be out in two.

In the la Drang valley in the Central Highlands,

the armies would meet head-on

in the first major battle of the war.

[speaking Vietnamese]

The battle at la Drang

was our first big victory.

We concluded that we could fight the Americans

and win.

The key thing was to force the Americans to fight

the way we wanted --

that is, hand to hand.

BRANAGH: Although the Americans defeated the North Vietnamese

at la Drang,

casualties were heavy.

2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed.

300 elite American infantry died in the battle.

The attitude of the enemy was, uh,

was not comparable

to what our attitude would have been

under the circumstances.

He was ready, willing and able

to pay a far greater price

than I would say we Caucasians would.

My casualties in my company

were relatively light, and I say relatively light.

I lost 17 killed and about 43 wounded

so the unit was almost combat ineffective

with those kind of casualties,

but fortunately we were able to weather

that particular piece of the battle.

BRANAGH: The Gls had gone to South Vietnam

to fight communism.

But often they met hostility from those

they thought they were helping.

American troops found it impossible to tell

which Vietnamese were friends and which were foes.

CAPUTO: How do you distinguish a civilian

from a Viet Cong?

Well, of course, he shoots at you

or he's armed.

But how about --

what happens after a fire fight

and you find bodies out there,

but no weapons?

And we were told, "Well, if it's dead

and it's Vietnamese, it's VC."

That was the exact words.

You would go out, you would secure a piece of terrain

during the daylight hours

and you'd surrender that --

and I mean literally surrender,

not be forced off,

well maybe surrenders probably not a good word,

but you'd give it up because you --

the helicopters would come in and pick you up at night

and fly you back

to the security of your base camp.

BRANAGH: Instead of trying to hold territory,

the Americans used their superior mobility

to launch search and destroy missions.

[ explosion ]

The attempt to save South Vietnam

was destroying it.

Viet Cong operations continued.

[speaking Vietnamese]

INTERPRETER: At 8:00 in the morning of March 23rd,

we hit them.

Our artillery destroyed aircraft.

We killed not only some guards,

but also the American Quartermaster.

Our commando unit also attacked

the police training school.

We killed many trainee police officers

whilst they were watching a movie.

BRANAGH: In another attempt to encourage

the North Vietnamese to negotiate,

Johnson stopped Rolling Thunder.

Then started it again.

The tactic failed.

The Communists' vital supply route

was the Ho Chi Minh trail.

It was a network of tracks

linking the North with the South

via the jungles of Central Vietnam,

Laos, and Cambodia.

[ Man speaking Vietnamese]

INTERPRETER: The enemies assumed we dared not

drive during the day.

In fact we drove both day and night.

We had to keep changing our tactics

to keep ahead of the enemy.

Their plan of attacking the trail

was very malicious and changed all the time.

But we out-maneuvered them.

[speaking Vietnamese]

One night we counted 14 cannons firing,

reddening and lightening the whole sky

with explosions.

It was like fireworks night in Hanoi.

We were constantly driving through bullets and smoke.

BRANAGH: The trail wove through theoretically neutral

Laos and Cambodia.

Both suffered heavy American bombing.

Over the years, Cambodia --

the border area of Cambodia and Laos

were used freely by the enemy,

but by virtue

of the policy of my government

we could not fight the overt war

or deploy troops overtly,

military troops,

into those countries.

On one or two occasions, the chiefs recommended

US military intervention

in North Vietnam,

and stated that they recognized this might

lead to Chinese

and/or Soviet military response,

in which case they said,

"We might have to consider the use of nuclear weapons."

The President was worried about China and Russia.

He didn't know.

In Korea nobody thought the Chinese were

going to cross the Yalu with a million men

and we were caught by surprise.

And I remember time after time,

when the military would suggest mining Haiphong,

or sending in warplanes to bomb Haiphong,

he said, "Hell no."

He said, "Some damn aviator will drop a bomb

down a Russian smoke stack

and then I've got World War Ill on my hands."

BRANAGH: The scale of Soviet aid to North Vietnam

was affected by growing tensions

between the Soviet Union and China.

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: The Chinese demanded that we hand over

all military equipment for Vietnam

on the Soviet Chinese border

and that China in its turn

would pass it on to the Vietnamese.

We discovered later that the Chinese weren't

handing everything oven

Some of the equipment they unloaded for themselves.

[speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: What surprised me was that we could send

the newest anti-aircraft missiles to Egypt,

a capitalist country,

but not to Vietnam.

Our commanders used to say that it was

because there was a danger they would fall

into the hands of the Chinese.

BRANAGH: Moscow sent missiles to North Vietnam.

And more than a thousand Soviet advisers

worked on air defenses against the Americans.

[Yershov speaking Russian ]

INTERPRETER: When they entered our target zone,

we saw six planes on our screen.

With the first missile we shot a plane.

We fired a second ahead of the plane

and the plane flew into the missile.

None of the pilots survived.

BRANAGH: Each year the American casualty rate increased.

VALENTI: I would go in the President's bedroom,

at 7:00 in the morning.

Every morning, he'd be on the phone,

with a 12-hour time difference,

checking the casualties of the day before.

"Mr. President, uh, we lost 18 men yesterday.

Mr. President, we lost 160 men.

We had 400 casualties."

Morning after morning after morning.

BRANAGH: At the beginning of 1967,

the Americans used 852s to bomb communist bases

near the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon.

They were trying to clear the area

of Viet Cong.

The savagery and apparent futility of the war

aroused increasing dissent back home.

This confused war

has played havoc

with our domestic destinies.

Despite feeble protestations to the contrary,

the promises of the great society

have been shot down

on the battlefield of Vietnam.

The pursuit of this widened war

has narrowed the promised dimensions

of the domestic welfare programs,

making the poor, white and negro,

bear the heaviest burdens both at the front

and at home.

BRANAGH: Desperate to put more pressure on Hanoi,

in August Johnson extended the bombing of the North

to within 10 miles of the Chinese border.

First I would like to make it clear that

these air strikes are not intended

as any threat to communist China,

and they do not, in fact,

pose any threat to that country.

We believe that Peking knows that the United States

does not seek to widen the war in Vietnam.

[ Chanting ]

BRANAGH: Johnson was weakened by the growth

of the anti-war movement in America.

I“ [ Country Joe McDonald sings ] I“

I“ Come on mothers throughout the land I“

I“ Pack your boys off to Vietnam I“

I“ Come on, fathers, don't hesitate I“

I“ Send your sons off before it's too late I“

I“ Be the first one on your block I“

I“ To have your boy come home in a box I“

PAndit's1,2,3 ♪

I“ what are we fighting for I“

I“ Don't ask me I don't give a damn I“

I“ Next stop is Vietnam I“

J“ And it's 5, 6, 7 open up the Pearly Gates I“

I“ Yeah, there ain't no time to wonder why I“

I“ Whoopee! We're all gonna die I“

FORREST: When you turned on AFN

and you saw riots in the streets and whatever,

and guys were saying, "Wait a minute.

Why am I fighting here

when these guys at home are saying

this is the wrong thing to do?

BRANAGH: In public Johnson staged a show of optimism and support

for General Westmore land and his troops.

The enemy is not beaten,

but he knows that he has met his master in the field.

He is trying to buy time,

hoping that our nation's will

does not match his will.

J*[ woman singing in Vietnamese 1P

BRANAGHI In 1968,

in the fields and on the rivers,

massive preparations were being made by the communists

for concerted attacks throughout South Vietnam.

I“ [singing continues 1P

Weapons, ammunition and supplies were

moved to the South for an offensive planned

for the Vietnamese New Year, Tet.

The communists hoped to spark a general uprising

across the country.

[ Duong speaking Vietnamese]

Taxis carried chrysanthemums into Saigon

for the Tet market.

Hidden underneath them were AK47s.

The people supported the revolution.

They helped us.

We were able to penetrate the security in the city.

We changed our clothes,

and carried fake identity documents.

The people of Saigon hid us in their houses.

I didn't want the enemy to know

that I knew what was going to happen.

I did know.

I made a mistake in not making that known

to the American public,

because they were caught by surprise.

BRANAGH: The strength of the Tet offensive

came as a shock to Westmore land

and the American public.

On television they saw their South Vietnamese allies

fighting the Viet Cong in the streets of Saigon itself.

Worse still, they saw the American Embassy

penetrated by Viet Cong commandos.

Now CIA men and MPs have gone into the Embassy

and are trying to get the snipers out

by themselves.

BRANAGH: With the Tet offensive at its height,

leading American politicians

were turning on the President.

It is said the Viet Cong will not be able

to hold the cities, and that is probably true.

But they have demonstrated that despite

all of our reports of progress,

of government strength, and of enemy weakness,

that half a million American soldiers,

with 700,000 Vietnamese allies,

with total command of the air,

total command of the sea,

backed by the huge resources and the most modern weapons

that we are unable to secure

even a single city from the attacks

of an enemy whose total strength

is about 250,000.

[gunfire]

BRANAGH: The fiercest battle was to recapture

the ancient city of Hue.

How long do you think it's going to take you

to get through this city?

We'll be here another few weeks anyway,

cleaning it out.

It'll take a little while to get out of here.

You lost any friends? - Quite a few.

We lost one the other day -- good buddy of mine.

The whole thing stinks really.

BRANAGH: When Hue was eventually retaken,

the Americans found that thousands of civilians

had been murdered by the communists.

Tet was a major defeat for the Viet Cong.

Their main objective --

to inspire a nationwide uprising --

had failed.

But Johnson had been stunned

by the scale of the Tet offensive.

Disillusioned,

Secretary of Defense McNamara was leaving office.

Johnson replaced him with Clark Clifford.

I'd ask questions like,

"when is the war going to end?"

"Well, we don't know."

"How many more men do you think we're going to lose?"

"Well, we really don't know."

Then I finally got down to it and said,

"What is our plan

to win the war in Vietnam?"

Turned out there wasn't any.

The plan was just to stay with it

and ultimately hoping

that the enemy would finally give up.

BRANAGH: Johnson was persuaded that the war could not

be won on the battlefield,

and that he must negotiate.

I renew the offer I made last August,

to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam.

We ask that talks begin promptly,

that they be serious talks

on the substance of peace.

BRANAGH: What he said next surprised the World.

JOHNSON: I shall not seek,

and I will not accept,

the nomination of my party

for another term as your President.

BRANAGH: In May 1968,

peace negotiations began in Paris.

They were soon deadlocked.

The communists were determined

to rule a united Vietnam.

But the United States was not prepared

to abandon the South.

As the difficult negotiations continued,

the Republicans were campaigning for the presidency.

We want Nixon!

We want Nixon!

We want Nixon!

We want Nixon!

BRANAGH: In public, Richard Nixon supported

Johnson's peace efforts.

I have pointed out time and again,

that at the time the President of the United States

has the responsibility

and is trying to negotiate in Paris

for an honorable end to the war,

that we should give him every chance

to bring that war to a conclusion

before this election and before his term ends,

and that certainly no candidate for President,

and certainly I will not make any statement

that might pull the rug out from under him,

and that might destroy the chance

to bring the war to a conclusion.

[ Applause ]

BRANAGH: In fact, Nixon's campaign team

was having secret talks

with the South Vietnamese government.

I was in touch with the Republicans,

with the entourage of Mr. Nixon

and the Republican urge us to stand firm.

The worst point was --

at least for Lyndon Johnson was,

when he realized

that negotiations were stalled,

and I do know this,

that he heard

close to the election time in '68,

that Nixon

or one of Nixon's emissaries

was telling the South Vietnamese,

"Don't make a deal.

You'll get a better deal under Nixon."

BRANAGH: America's war in Vietnam

was to last another four years.

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