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[Airplane Roaring]
2
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[Narrator] On an early
morning takeoff in Kentucky.
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Hundred knots.
4
00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:07,311
[James] Checks.
5
00:00:07,355 --> 00:00:08,834
[Narrator] Two experienced
pilots struggled to get
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00:00:08,878 --> 00:00:11,402
their regional jet off the ground.
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00:00:11,446 --> 00:00:12,751
V-1.
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Rotate.
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00:00:13,839 --> 00:00:15,102
Whoa!
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00:00:15,189 --> 00:00:18,235
[Airplane Roaring]
11
00:00:20,107 --> 00:00:22,892
[Narrator] And crash into a nearby field.
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This was a catastrophic accident.
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00:00:25,199 --> 00:00:27,070
[Narrator] Investigators try
to piece together
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00:00:27,114 --> 00:00:28,463
what went wrong.
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Get those to Washington.
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[Narrator] And end up with
more questions than answers.
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Why the heck would they stop there?
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[Narrator] Only by retracing
the taxi route.
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All the cues are right
there in plain sight.
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00:00:41,476 --> 00:00:43,869
[Narrator] And listening
to the cockpit discussions.
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-That is weird with no lights.
-Yeah.
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[Narrator] Do investigators
discover the grim truth.
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They finally realize something's wrong,
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but it's already too late.
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[Dramatic Music]
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[Attendant] Ladies and gentlemen,
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we are starting our approach.
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[Pilot] We lost both engines.
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[Attendant] Put the mask over your nose.
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Emergency detect.
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[Attendant] Brace for impact!
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[Dramatic Music]
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[Man] It's gonna crash!
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[Dramatic Music]
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[Narrator] It's almost six in the morning
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in Lexington, Kentucky.
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The pilots of Comair flight 5191
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prepare for their pre-flight briefing.
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In command is Captain Jeff Clay,
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and experienced pilot with
more than 4,700 flying hours.
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[Jeff Chuckling]
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Man, I always feel like
I could eat a little more
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when I get a seatbelt
like this. [Chuckling]
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[Narrator] First Officer James Polehinke
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is also a seasoned pilot,
with more than 6,500 hours.
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You up for flying this leg?
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Yeah, I'll take us to Atlanta.
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Both the captain and the first officer
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were very highly regarded.
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They had an outstanding
professional reputation,
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and individuals that had
flown with them had nothing
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but high marks and very favorable comments
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as far as their qualities.
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[Narrator] The crew is flying
a Bombardier CRJ-100,
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00:02:24,100 --> 00:02:27,495
a small twin-engine jet designed
for short commuter flights.
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Shawn Pruchnicki flew that aircraft
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for Comair for ten years.
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[Shawn] The CRJ is an aircraftthat's built for
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00:02:39,855 --> 00:02:41,335
short haul flights.
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For example, the Lexington to Atlanta,
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less than an hour-type
flight is really what
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these airplanes are designed to do.
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Ladies and gentlemen,
we'd like to take this time
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to welcome you on board
Comair flight 5191,
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direct to Atlanta.
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We'll try to keep it as quiet possible.
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Hopefully you can catch
a nap on the way there.
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It's our pleasure having
you on board today.
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[Narrator] There are 47 passengers
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and one flight attendant
on today's flight.
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The pilots begin their briefing.
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Right flex takeoff procedures off of?
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He said what runway? 2-4?
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It's 2-2.
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[Shawn] Something that we doprior to takeoff is
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00:03:27,729 --> 00:03:30,732
we do a flight briefing
between the two crew members.
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And the primary reason
we do this is to make sure
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that everyone has the
same amount of information
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and knowledge to safely
depart the airport.
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Huh, on 2-2 the ILS is out.
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Came in the other night,
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the runway identifier lights
were out all over the place.
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All right.
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2-2's your short taxi. Any questions?
85
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No questions before starting.
Your leisure.
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[Narrator] In the cabin,
passengers prepare for takeoff.
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Seatbelt, please.
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[Narrator] Today they are
bound for Atlanta, Georgia,
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just a 67-minute flight straight south
90
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from Lexington's Blue Grass Airport.
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Comair 1-91 is ready to taxi.
92
00:04:26,091 --> 00:04:29,225
Comair 1-91, taxi to runway 2-2.
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00:04:29,269 --> 00:04:32,272
Altimeter 3-0-0-0.
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00:04:33,534 --> 00:04:36,580
Winds are 2-0-0 at eight.
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00:04:36,667 --> 00:04:38,930
[James] Three triple zero and taxi 2-2.
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Comair 1-91.
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[Narrator] Lexington's
air traffic controller
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clears flight 5191 to the runway,
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00:04:45,807 --> 00:04:48,331
and then turns his
attention to another plane.
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Eagle flight runway 2-2,
cleared for takeoff.
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[Narrator] With few planes
at this small airport
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in near perfect weather,
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this flight is far from challenging
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for these seasoned pilots.
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00:05:06,610 --> 00:05:08,569
[Shawn] During the taxi out,
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the captain is responsible
primarily for navigating
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00:05:10,571 --> 00:05:12,921
the aircraft on the airport surface.
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00:05:12,964 --> 00:05:15,097
[Airplane Humming]
109
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The first officer is
running numerous checklists
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00:05:21,669 --> 00:05:24,367
and verifying that the
aircraft is safe for departure.
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00:05:26,804 --> 00:05:28,502
[James] Folks, we're gonnabe underway momentarily.
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So sit back, relax and enjoy the flight.
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We're all ready in the cabin, sir.
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00:05:36,074 --> 00:05:37,075
Thank you.
115
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Cabin reports received.
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Before takeoff checks complete.
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Ready.
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All set.
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00:05:48,130 --> 00:05:49,914
At your leisure, Comair 1-21,
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ready to go.
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Comair 1-91, Lexington tower.
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Fly runway heading.
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Cleared for takeoff.
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[James] Ugh.
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00:06:00,098 --> 00:06:02,449
Runway heading, cleared for takeoff, 1-91.
126
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[Airplane Humming]
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00:06:23,208 --> 00:06:26,560
Anti-ice off, lights set,
takeoff config's okay,
128
00:06:26,603 --> 00:06:27,735
lineup checks completed.
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All yours, Jim.
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[Narrator] Captain Clay
hands control of the aircraft
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to First Officer Polehinke for takeoff.
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My brakes, my controls.
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[Airplane Whirring]
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00:06:51,715 --> 00:06:52,586
Set thrust, please.
135
00:06:55,153 --> 00:06:56,067
[Jeff] Thrust set.
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00:06:58,679 --> 00:07:00,594
[Airplane Roaring]
137
00:07:02,422 --> 00:07:04,641
[Dramatic Music]
138
00:07:09,341 --> 00:07:10,821
That is weird with no lights.
139
00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:13,084
Yeah.
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[Airplane Roaring]
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00:07:17,872 --> 00:07:19,830
[Dramatic Music]
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100 knots.
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[James] Checks.
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[Narrator] Something's not right.
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V-1.
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Rotate.
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[Narrator] As 5191 prepares to lift off.
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-[Airplane Rattling]
-Whoa.
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-[Dramatic Music]
-[Airplane Roaring]
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[James] Dammit!
151
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[Airplane Roaring]
152
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[Passengers Screaming]
153
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[Airplane Roaring]
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[Passengers Screaming]
155
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[Narrator] Comair flight
5191 hurtles into a field
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less than half a mile from the runway.
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This is Lexington.
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Alert three.
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West side of the runway
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with a Comair regional jet taking off.
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[Suspenseful Music]
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[Pete Maupin] We knew something was wrong.
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We never get an alert three.
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We never get one.
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[Dramatic Music]
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[Narrator] Public Safety
Officer Pete Maupin
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rushes to the scene.
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It's hot. I mean, it's very hot.
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[Dramatic Music]
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There were explosions.
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-[Saw Buzzing]
-[Sirens Wailing]
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Can we save anybody?
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That's what I was thinking
when I saw this ball of fire.
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-[Dramatic Music]
-[Flames Crackling]
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[Sirens Wailing]
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[Helicopter Whirring]
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[Narrator] 49 people are dead
after the tragic takeoff
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of Comair flight 5191.
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First Officer Polehinke
is the only survivor.
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[Shawn] The first responders'quick actions were the reason
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00:09:28,916 --> 00:09:32,093
that First Officer Polehinke
survived this accident.
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He was so traumatically injured
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that they recognized that
time was of the essence
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and transported him to the hospital
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rather than waiting for an ambulance.
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[Pete] And he thanked mefor saving his life.
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I told him that was my job,
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but I was glad that I was
there to do what I did,
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and I told him that.
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[Narrator] The question NTSB investigators
191
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now need to answer is
why Comair flight 5191
192
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couldn't get off the ground.
193
00:10:03,341 --> 00:10:04,821
[Helicopters Whirring]
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As soon as the fires are put
out and the crash site is safe,
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NTSB investigators begin looking for clues
196
00:10:17,094 --> 00:10:21,142
to discover why Comair flight 5191 crashed
197
00:10:21,229 --> 00:10:24,275
less than half a mile from
Lexington's Blue Grass Airport.
198
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Ensure every scrap is documented.
199
00:10:28,715 --> 00:10:29,933
We need a clear picture of the path
200
00:10:30,020 --> 00:10:31,761
this plane took before impact.
201
00:10:34,677 --> 00:10:36,461
[Narrator] Lead investigator Joe Sedor
202
00:10:36,505 --> 00:10:39,073
is among the first to arrive
at the crash site.
203
00:10:39,116 --> 00:10:41,815
In this case it was
quite interesting because
204
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initially we didn't have much.
205
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An airplane had crashed.
206
00:10:46,994 --> 00:10:48,778
We didn't know if it was on
the airport, off the airport.
207
00:10:51,172 --> 00:10:53,522
We actually started at
the final resting place
208
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for the wreckage,
209
00:10:55,045 --> 00:10:56,786
and then we walked back
towards the airport.
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First impact point is there.
211
00:11:02,923 --> 00:11:05,665
[Airplane Roaring]
212
00:11:12,628 --> 00:11:14,282
And the plane hit those trees over there.
213
00:11:15,413 --> 00:11:17,764
[Airplane Roaring]
214
00:11:23,552 --> 00:11:25,859
Those impact marks are more
than 20 feet up those trunks.
215
00:11:29,210 --> 00:11:32,953
[Evan Byrne] We were looking atthe trajectory of the airplane.
216
00:11:32,996 --> 00:11:35,172
Clearly looked like it took off just about
217
00:11:35,216 --> 00:11:36,826
the end of the runway,
218
00:11:36,870 --> 00:11:39,568
and immediately started contacting trees
219
00:11:39,611 --> 00:11:40,874
into the wreckage site.
220
00:11:43,093 --> 00:11:45,139
[Soft Dramatic Music]
221
00:11:50,100 --> 00:11:52,102
[Narrator] The wreckage
path tells investigators
222
00:11:52,189 --> 00:11:55,018
that the plane was struggling
to get off the ground.
223
00:11:55,105 --> 00:11:57,978
Was it engine trouble or something else?
224
00:11:58,021 --> 00:12:00,110
It looks like they took
off from runway 26.
225
00:12:05,550 --> 00:12:06,769
Hang on.
226
00:12:10,599 --> 00:12:12,035
26 wasn't in use last night.
227
00:12:16,997 --> 00:12:19,260
[Narrator] Lexington airport
has two runways:
228
00:12:19,347 --> 00:12:22,263
runway 2-6, then runway 2-2.
229
00:12:25,135 --> 00:12:26,658
According to the flight plan,
230
00:12:26,702 --> 00:12:28,312
they were supposed to
take off from runway 22.
231
00:12:30,924 --> 00:12:32,752
So how the heck did they end up over here?
232
00:12:35,363 --> 00:12:37,452
[Narrator] Investigators
are surprised to discover
233
00:12:37,495 --> 00:12:41,673
that flight 5191 took off
from the wrong runway.
234
00:12:41,717 --> 00:12:43,153
[Joe] Well, at that point intime because we knew
235
00:12:43,197 --> 00:12:45,068
that it was a wrong runway takeoff,
236
00:12:45,155 --> 00:12:46,983
the question is, is why, right?
237
00:12:47,027 --> 00:12:49,333
And that's, and it's one
that doesn't make sense.
238
00:12:51,292 --> 00:12:53,860
[Narrator] Did they
misunderstand their instructions
239
00:12:53,903 --> 00:12:56,253
or deliberately change
their plans to take off
240
00:12:56,297 --> 00:12:58,342
from a different runway?
241
00:12:58,386 --> 00:13:00,301
There's gotta be something
on that CVR about why
242
00:13:00,388 --> 00:13:01,998
they were on runway 26.
243
00:13:03,826 --> 00:13:06,524
Get those to Washington.
244
00:13:06,611 --> 00:13:09,658
[Joe] The flight recorder andthe cockpit voice recorder
245
00:13:09,701 --> 00:13:12,356
were retrieved and flown
back here to Washington D.C.
246
00:13:13,401 --> 00:13:15,011
[Airplane Roaring]
247
00:13:15,055 --> 00:13:16,752
[Narrator] But being on the wrong runway
248
00:13:16,839 --> 00:13:19,581
doesn't explain why the plane
barely made it off the ground.
249
00:13:19,624 --> 00:13:21,322
[Airplane Roaring]
250
00:13:24,978 --> 00:13:27,023
Let's take a closer look at those engines.
251
00:13:29,069 --> 00:13:30,766
[Joe] When the engines are examined,
252
00:13:30,853 --> 00:13:33,769
what the investigator
is looking for is damage.
253
00:13:35,945 --> 00:13:38,208
The more damage that there is
and the type of damage
254
00:13:38,295 --> 00:13:40,515
tells us that if it
was turning at high speed
255
00:13:40,558 --> 00:13:41,821
or turning at a lower speed.
256
00:13:45,476 --> 00:13:47,783
Yeah, they were spinning, all right.
257
00:13:47,870 --> 00:13:49,567
[Narrator] Evidence of deformed blades
258
00:13:49,654 --> 00:13:52,353
suggests the engines
were running on impact.
259
00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:55,312
[Joe] All the indicationswere that both engines
260
00:13:55,356 --> 00:13:57,010
were operating at high power
261
00:13:57,097 --> 00:13:58,315
when the breakup sequence started.
262
00:13:58,359 --> 00:14:00,840
There was no problem with the engines.
263
00:14:00,883 --> 00:14:02,493
[Engine Roaring]
264
00:14:08,195 --> 00:14:10,197
Something else must have kept
them from getting airborne.
265
00:14:13,156 --> 00:14:16,116
Maybe they were too heavy?
266
00:14:16,159 --> 00:14:18,031
[Narrator] With engine failure ruled out,
267
00:14:18,074 --> 00:14:20,250
the team wonders if the plane was loaded
268
00:14:20,294 --> 00:14:23,819
with too much weight to take off.
269
00:14:23,906 --> 00:14:25,690
[Joe] There's a certain maximumweight that the aircraft
270
00:14:25,734 --> 00:14:27,736
can take off safely with.
271
00:14:27,779 --> 00:14:29,912
So what we do is we calculate the load
272
00:14:29,956 --> 00:14:31,871
that's on the aircraft at
the time of the accident.
273
00:14:36,919 --> 00:14:38,616
Hmm.
274
00:14:38,660 --> 00:14:40,357
Ah, here it is.
275
00:14:40,401 --> 00:14:42,316
CRJ's max takeoff weight
276
00:14:42,359 --> 00:14:44,753
is 50,178 pounds.
277
00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,060
[Suspenseful Music]
278
00:14:53,066 --> 00:14:54,981
And the load manifest
said the plane weighed
279
00:14:55,068 --> 00:14:58,941
49,087 pounds on that day.
280
00:15:01,509 --> 00:15:04,338
It's close, but it's within their limit.
281
00:15:04,381 --> 00:15:08,733
[Narrator] The aircraft
wasn't too heavy to take off.
282
00:15:08,777 --> 00:15:11,519
In that aircraft on
that day with that weight,
283
00:15:11,562 --> 00:15:13,347
how much runway would be
needed to take off safely?
284
00:15:15,262 --> 00:15:17,525
[Narrator] Using the actual
weight of the aircraft
285
00:15:17,568 --> 00:15:20,528
and the CRJ-100 specifications,
286
00:15:20,571 --> 00:15:23,009
investigators calculate
how much runway the plane
287
00:15:23,096 --> 00:15:25,881
needed to lift off.
288
00:15:25,968 --> 00:15:28,014
A weight of the aircraft affects how fast
289
00:15:28,057 --> 00:15:30,016
they have to be going
to be able to lift off,
290
00:15:30,059 --> 00:15:32,975
and that is directly correlated
to how much runway
291
00:15:33,019 --> 00:15:34,934
it takes to be able to achieve that speed.
292
00:15:37,023 --> 00:15:39,721
3,744 feet.
293
00:15:40,896 --> 00:15:43,725
3,744 feet.
294
00:15:43,768 --> 00:15:45,988
And runway 2-6 is?
295
00:15:47,903 --> 00:15:49,949
3,501 feet.
296
00:15:53,604 --> 00:15:56,477
[Narrator] Investigators reach
an astonishing conclusion.
297
00:15:58,044 --> 00:16:01,003
Runway 2-6 is 243 feet too short.
298
00:16:02,787 --> 00:16:04,224
They ran out of runway.
299
00:16:06,400 --> 00:16:07,879
[Narrator] They now understand
300
00:16:07,923 --> 00:16:09,403
why the plane couldn't get airborne,
301
00:16:10,970 --> 00:16:12,884
but they're still mystified.
302
00:16:12,928 --> 00:16:16,105
Why didn't flight 5191 take off
from the longer runway?
303
00:16:17,411 --> 00:16:20,196
[Airplane Roaring]
304
00:16:25,941 --> 00:16:28,813
Hate to say this, but
you're not gonna get any answers
305
00:16:28,857 --> 00:16:30,946
from the first officer, either.
306
00:16:30,990 --> 00:16:32,817
His injuries are very severe.
307
00:16:35,472 --> 00:16:37,387
[Narrator] The first
officer is medically unfit
308
00:16:37,431 --> 00:16:39,041
to be interviewed.
309
00:16:39,085 --> 00:16:41,739
It's a big loss to the investigation.
310
00:16:41,783 --> 00:16:43,828
[Evan Sighing]
311
00:16:43,872 --> 00:16:45,700
[Evan] It can be frustratingwhen you're not able
312
00:16:45,743 --> 00:16:47,745
to speak with people that
you'd like to speak with,
313
00:16:47,832 --> 00:16:51,053
but as investigators we need to work with
314
00:16:51,097 --> 00:16:52,185
the data that we have.
315
00:16:54,317 --> 00:16:56,189
[Narrator] Investigators
look for other clues
316
00:16:56,276 --> 00:17:00,106
that might reveal why
flight 5191 ended up on a runway
317
00:17:00,193 --> 00:17:02,238
they were not cleared to use.
318
00:17:04,066 --> 00:17:07,722
All right, they left the gate here.
319
00:17:07,765 --> 00:17:09,419
They taxi along here.
320
00:17:11,465 --> 00:17:15,121
They're supposed to leave
from runway 2-2 here,
321
00:17:18,428 --> 00:17:20,343
but they end up here.
322
00:17:22,215 --> 00:17:24,869
The question is why?
323
00:17:24,956 --> 00:17:27,002
[Joe] So when we were lookinginto trying to understand why
324
00:17:27,089 --> 00:17:29,091
this flight crew thought
they are on runway 2-2,
325
00:17:29,135 --> 00:17:31,441
we looked at anything that was different,
326
00:17:31,485 --> 00:17:34,314
anything that the flight
crew may have misunderstood
327
00:17:34,357 --> 00:17:38,492
with regard to both
the airport and the charts
328
00:17:38,535 --> 00:17:39,841
or any of their training.
329
00:17:40,885 --> 00:17:42,322
Hey, look at this.
330
00:17:42,365 --> 00:17:44,019
Our guys got some shots of the runway.
331
00:17:53,159 --> 00:17:54,334
Hey, check this out.
332
00:17:58,555 --> 00:18:03,691
Taxi way to runway 2-2 was
blocked off by construction.
333
00:18:03,778 --> 00:18:05,388
[Shawn] There were numerousconstruction projects
334
00:18:05,432 --> 00:18:06,911
that were in place at
the Lexington airport
335
00:18:06,955 --> 00:18:08,435
the day of the accident.
336
00:18:09,697 --> 00:18:10,959
Okay? Sure.
337
00:18:11,046 --> 00:18:12,352
But wasn't that in their chart?
338
00:18:13,831 --> 00:18:16,225
[Narrator] Normally,
when a taxiway is closed,
339
00:18:16,269 --> 00:18:18,532
pilots receive an interim airport chart
340
00:18:18,575 --> 00:18:19,924
with an alternate route.
341
00:18:21,970 --> 00:18:23,711
Nope, nothing on the chart.
342
00:18:27,280 --> 00:18:29,151
[Narrator] Investigators
are amazed to learn
343
00:18:29,195 --> 00:18:32,285
that the crew's airport chart
only showed the taxi route
344
00:18:32,328 --> 00:18:33,938
before construction,
345
00:18:35,157 --> 00:18:37,072
not the updated taxi route.
346
00:18:41,032 --> 00:18:44,166
[Joe] It is a surprise to seethat the airport construction
347
00:18:44,210 --> 00:18:45,950
had not been updated in the charts
348
00:18:45,994 --> 00:18:47,300
that the flight crew had.
349
00:18:50,041 --> 00:18:52,087
[Narrator] It's a disturbing find.
350
00:18:52,174 --> 00:18:55,612
Could out-of-date taxi charts
have misled the pilots
351
00:18:55,656 --> 00:18:57,875
into taking off from
a runway that was too short
352
00:18:57,919 --> 00:18:59,225
for their plane?
353
00:19:05,187 --> 00:19:06,101
So they get out there and they find
354
00:19:06,145 --> 00:19:07,798
their taxi ways blocked.
355
00:19:07,842 --> 00:19:09,017
And they don't have anything to tell them
356
00:19:09,060 --> 00:19:10,410
how to get to runway 2-2.
357
00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:14,283
That could trip you up.
358
00:19:16,024 --> 00:19:17,939
[Narrator] But something doesn't add up.
359
00:19:19,810 --> 00:19:23,031
Comair flight 5191 wasn't the only plane
360
00:19:23,074 --> 00:19:24,511
departing Lexington that morning.
361
00:19:25,773 --> 00:19:27,340
Other planes left before them
362
00:19:27,427 --> 00:19:29,342
and none of them ended up on runway 2-6.
363
00:19:32,301 --> 00:19:35,783
Eagle flight runway 2-2,
cleared for takeoff.
364
00:19:39,439 --> 00:19:42,616
[Joe] The other two flightstook off prior to 5191.
365
00:19:42,659 --> 00:19:45,227
Received the same information
that the flight crew
366
00:19:45,271 --> 00:19:47,186
from 5191 received,
367
00:19:47,229 --> 00:19:48,926
and did not have any difficulties
368
00:19:49,013 --> 00:19:51,059
in navigating to the runway.
369
00:19:51,102 --> 00:19:54,018
[Evan] The fact the two otheraircraft were able to
370
00:19:54,062 --> 00:19:56,282
depart successfully that morning
371
00:19:56,369 --> 00:19:58,284
caused us to look deeper.
372
00:19:58,327 --> 00:20:00,373
-[Airplane Roaring]
-[Dramatic Music]
373
00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,338
Maybe there's something
on the security footage.
374
00:20:09,382 --> 00:20:10,905
[Narrator] Investigators
turn their attention
375
00:20:10,948 --> 00:20:14,735
to CCTV footage in the hopes
that it will explain
376
00:20:14,778 --> 00:20:17,781
why Comair flight 5191
took off from the wrong runway.
377
00:20:18,913 --> 00:20:20,044
[Airplane Roaring]
378
00:20:20,088 --> 00:20:21,437
[Passengers Screaming]
379
00:20:27,965 --> 00:20:29,880
[Suspenseful Music]
380
00:20:33,101 --> 00:20:36,191
We were able to retrieve
security footage from cameras
381
00:20:36,278 --> 00:20:38,280
on the parking garage
that showed our aircraft
382
00:20:38,324 --> 00:20:39,890
taxiing out that morning.
383
00:20:41,762 --> 00:20:45,374
All right, let's see what
they were actually up to.
384
00:20:45,418 --> 00:20:46,897
[Narrator] Investigators quickly confirm
385
00:20:46,941 --> 00:20:49,248
how straightforward the taxi route was.
386
00:20:50,945 --> 00:20:53,513
Taxi is short and there's
no other aircraft in sight.
387
00:20:55,906 --> 00:20:57,952
[Evan] Our assessment based on examination
388
00:20:57,995 --> 00:21:01,129
of surveillance video showed
that it was a nominal taxi.
389
00:21:04,741 --> 00:21:09,964
The taxi route from the ramp to runway 2-2
390
00:21:10,007 --> 00:21:12,009
was straightforward and only required
391
00:21:12,096 --> 00:21:14,447
one runway crossing, 2-6.
392
00:21:16,231 --> 00:21:17,580
Wait, stop it right there.
393
00:21:19,147 --> 00:21:20,366
[Suspenseful Music]
394
00:21:23,107 --> 00:21:26,285
It looks like they've stopped
at the hold short line
395
00:21:26,328 --> 00:21:27,895
for runway 26.
396
00:21:32,073 --> 00:21:33,553
[Narrator] Before takeoff,
397
00:21:33,596 --> 00:21:36,556
planes stop or hold short the runway
398
00:21:36,599 --> 00:21:39,515
until they're cleared to
proceed by air traffic control.
399
00:21:39,559 --> 00:21:41,387
No, they were on their way to runway 22.
400
00:21:41,430 --> 00:21:44,825
Why the heck would they stop there?
401
00:21:44,868 --> 00:21:48,785
[Narrator] Investigators are
startled by the discovery.
402
00:21:48,829 --> 00:21:51,527
[Joe] We noticed at that timethat the aircraft had stopped
403
00:21:51,571 --> 00:21:56,358
prior to runway 2-6 for over 50 seconds.
404
00:21:56,402 --> 00:21:58,926
This is unusual because
there was no real reason
405
00:21:58,969 --> 00:22:00,406
for them to stop there.
406
00:22:00,493 --> 00:22:01,581
[Joe Sighing]
407
00:22:01,624 --> 00:22:03,104
We need to see the taxi route.
408
00:22:03,974 --> 00:22:05,759
All right.
409
00:22:05,802 --> 00:22:07,717
[Narrator] Were there clues
telling the pilots
410
00:22:07,761 --> 00:22:09,850
they were in the wrong place?
411
00:22:09,937 --> 00:22:12,287
[Evan] One of our mainquestions when we realized
412
00:22:12,374 --> 00:22:14,942
that they stopped for 50 seconds
at the hold short line
413
00:22:14,985 --> 00:22:18,075
for runway 2-6 was what could
they have been seeing?
414
00:22:20,295 --> 00:22:22,123
[Narrator] To better
understand why the pilots
415
00:22:22,166 --> 00:22:24,952
of Comair flight 5191
416
00:22:25,039 --> 00:22:27,650
stopped at the hold short line
for the wrong runway.
417
00:22:27,737 --> 00:22:30,305
All right, now let's get started.
418
00:22:30,392 --> 00:22:32,960
[Narrator] Investigators
retrace their taxi route.
419
00:22:33,003 --> 00:22:34,222
[Evan Sighing]
420
00:22:38,748 --> 00:22:41,229
We want to understand what
the flight crew was seeing.
421
00:22:41,272 --> 00:22:45,625
In order to do that, we had
to do a taxi demonstration
422
00:22:45,668 --> 00:22:49,063
to identify all the signage, the markings,
423
00:22:49,106 --> 00:22:50,978
and the cues available to the flight crew.
424
00:22:52,240 --> 00:22:54,155
[Suspenseful Music]
425
00:22:58,333 --> 00:23:01,597
There on the left there's
a sign for runway 26.
426
00:23:07,037 --> 00:23:08,648
Straight ahead,
427
00:23:08,691 --> 00:23:10,780
I can see the hold
short line for runway 26.
428
00:23:10,824 --> 00:23:12,347
I mean, it's clear as day.
429
00:23:15,219 --> 00:23:17,918
[Evan] Things that we're lookingfor during that taxi demo
430
00:23:18,005 --> 00:23:21,965
were things like
the quality of the markings
431
00:23:22,009 --> 00:23:23,837
on the taxi way,
432
00:23:23,880 --> 00:23:26,796
the signage, whether it
was illuminated or not.
433
00:23:26,840 --> 00:23:29,669
The taxi line splits three ways.
434
00:23:29,712 --> 00:23:32,062
[Narrator] Investigators
can see what the pilots
435
00:23:32,106 --> 00:23:35,326
would have seen from the
hold short line for runway 2-6.
436
00:23:35,370 --> 00:23:37,981
The line on the left goes to runway 2-6.
437
00:23:42,377 --> 00:23:45,249
The line in the middle is
the route to runway 2-2.
438
00:23:48,949 --> 00:23:52,082
The line on the right
is runway 2-2's old taxi route,
439
00:23:54,215 --> 00:23:56,086
blocked by barricades.
440
00:23:57,740 --> 00:23:59,873
I can clearly see the signs telling us
441
00:23:59,916 --> 00:24:03,180
that we're at the hold
short line for runway 26.
442
00:24:03,267 --> 00:24:04,660
I mean, it's hard to miss that.
443
00:24:08,142 --> 00:24:09,839
[Narrator] Investigators
discovered that the crew
444
00:24:09,883 --> 00:24:13,060
had clear cues that they
were at the hold short line
445
00:24:13,103 --> 00:24:17,630
for runway 2-6, not 2-2.
446
00:24:17,717 --> 00:24:20,633
The question remains,
how did they miss those cues?
447
00:24:22,504 --> 00:24:24,158
[Evan Sighing]
448
00:24:24,201 --> 00:24:26,203
Okay, let's go to 26.
449
00:24:29,511 --> 00:24:31,165
[Narrator] The test plane follows the line
450
00:24:31,208 --> 00:24:33,472
on the left to runway 2-6.
451
00:24:34,124 --> 00:24:35,996
Okay. See?
452
00:24:36,083 --> 00:24:37,867
That's where they should
have taken the taxi route
453
00:24:37,911 --> 00:24:40,566
and stopped, the hold
short line for runway 22.
454
00:24:43,830 --> 00:24:45,745
[Narrator] Investigators
are surprised to learn
455
00:24:45,788 --> 00:24:50,663
that even as flight 5191
was turning onto runway 2-6,
456
00:24:50,706 --> 00:24:53,013
the crew had a clear view of the sign
457
00:24:53,100 --> 00:24:56,756
pointing to the runway
they were meant to be on.
458
00:24:56,799 --> 00:24:59,672
There were no features in the environment
459
00:24:59,715 --> 00:25:02,892
in terms of the signs, marking or lighting
460
00:25:02,936 --> 00:25:06,374
that show they were on runway 2-2.
461
00:25:09,769 --> 00:25:13,033
All the cues are right
there in plain sight.
462
00:25:15,209 --> 00:25:16,993
[Narrator] Joe Sedor then uncovers
463
00:25:17,037 --> 00:25:19,126
one more disturbing fact.
464
00:25:19,169 --> 00:25:22,042
When we taxied from the taxi way
465
00:25:22,129 --> 00:25:24,348
and turned onto runway 2-6,
466
00:25:24,392 --> 00:25:27,395
all of the lights on runway 2-6 were out
467
00:25:27,438 --> 00:25:29,484
and there was no lights in the distance.
468
00:25:31,965 --> 00:25:35,446
As an experienced pilot,
I look at that and say,
469
00:25:35,490 --> 00:25:37,927
"Why did this flight crew
take off from this runway?"
470
00:25:40,190 --> 00:25:42,192
We need to know what was
going on in that cockpit.
471
00:25:43,237 --> 00:25:45,108
[Dramatic Music]
472
00:25:48,155 --> 00:25:49,548
That is weird with no lights.
473
00:25:51,027 --> 00:25:51,985
Yeah.
474
00:25:56,424 --> 00:25:58,208
[Narrator] The cockpit voice recorder
475
00:25:58,252 --> 00:26:01,429
from Comair flight 5191
is finally ready to be reviewed.
476
00:26:03,257 --> 00:26:04,780
Okay, let's hear what we've got.
477
00:26:07,609 --> 00:26:09,829
[Narrator] It may be the
only hope of explaining
478
00:26:09,872 --> 00:26:12,875
why the crew ended up on
an out of service runway
479
00:26:12,962 --> 00:26:16,183
instead of the one they
were cleared to use.
480
00:26:16,226 --> 00:26:18,620
In this type of human factors accident,
481
00:26:18,664 --> 00:26:20,970
it's very difficult because we have to try
482
00:26:21,014 --> 00:26:25,192
to determine what
the pilots were thinking.
483
00:26:25,235 --> 00:26:27,890
The main tool that we use
in order to determine that
484
00:26:27,977 --> 00:26:30,414
is the cockpit voice recorder.
485
00:26:30,458 --> 00:26:32,721
The CVR was very
important in understanding
486
00:26:32,765 --> 00:26:34,854
what the flight crew was talking about
487
00:26:34,897 --> 00:26:37,813
and what they were doing during
the taxi and the takeoff.
488
00:26:40,337 --> 00:26:41,643
[Jeff] Are you up for flying this leg?
489
00:26:41,687 --> 00:26:43,253
[James] I'll take us to Atlanta.
490
00:26:43,297 --> 00:26:45,560
Okay, so the first officer's gonna fly.
491
00:26:45,604 --> 00:26:46,692
That's standard stuff.
492
00:26:49,303 --> 00:26:50,826
The flight crew were conducting themselves
493
00:26:50,870 --> 00:26:53,916
in a professional manner.
494
00:26:53,960 --> 00:26:55,526
[Jeff] For our own briefing,Comair standard.
495
00:26:55,570 --> 00:26:57,050
Run the checklist, your leisure.
496
00:26:57,093 --> 00:26:58,225
Keep me out of trouble.
497
00:26:58,268 --> 00:26:59,705
I'll do the same for you.
498
00:26:59,792 --> 00:27:01,097
I'll do the same.
499
00:27:01,141 --> 00:27:02,229
Whenever you're ready.
500
00:27:04,057 --> 00:27:07,277
Okay, here comes the taxi brief.
501
00:27:07,321 --> 00:27:10,367
[James] Right seat flextakeoff procedures off of?
502
00:27:10,454 --> 00:27:11,673
He said what runway? 2-4?
503
00:27:11,717 --> 00:27:12,979
That's 2-2.
504
00:27:13,022 --> 00:27:14,545
2-2.
505
00:27:14,589 --> 00:27:15,634
The ILS is out on 2-2.
506
00:27:16,635 --> 00:27:18,680
Came in the other night,
507
00:27:18,724 --> 00:27:20,073
the runway identifier lights
were out all over the place.
508
00:27:20,116 --> 00:27:21,814
[Jeff] All right.
509
00:27:21,857 --> 00:27:23,903
2-2's your short taxi. Any questions?
510
00:27:23,946 --> 00:27:25,469
[James] No questions before starting.
511
00:27:25,513 --> 00:27:26,906
At your leisure.
512
00:27:26,949 --> 00:27:28,037
[Narrator] Something in the briefing
513
00:27:28,081 --> 00:27:30,300
surprises investigators.
514
00:27:30,344 --> 00:27:31,693
Wait, stop it right there.
515
00:27:33,129 --> 00:27:34,957
Is that not a short brief to you?
516
00:27:39,048 --> 00:27:40,789
[Narrator] They discover
that the crew used
517
00:27:40,833 --> 00:27:43,183
an abbreviated version of the taxi brief
518
00:27:43,270 --> 00:27:44,880
called Comair standard.
519
00:27:46,882 --> 00:27:48,841
Pull up the Comair standard taxi brief.
520
00:27:50,494 --> 00:27:52,714
[Suspenseful Music]
521
00:27:58,894 --> 00:28:01,984
There's no mention of crossing runways
522
00:28:02,028 --> 00:28:05,640
or stopping to call ATC if
they're unsure where they are.
523
00:28:05,727 --> 00:28:07,860
[Narrator] Investigators
are baffled to discover
524
00:28:07,947 --> 00:28:09,775
that even the shortened taxi brief
525
00:28:09,862 --> 00:28:11,733
with eight checklist items,
526
00:28:11,777 --> 00:28:14,040
including a very crucial one,
wasn't followed.
527
00:28:15,737 --> 00:28:16,956
Yeah, they never briefed on the runway
528
00:28:16,999 --> 00:28:20,176
they had to cross to get to runway 22.
529
00:28:20,220 --> 00:28:22,048
[Evan] The crew's abbreviatedbriefing that morning
530
00:28:22,091 --> 00:28:24,485
was a deviation from
standard operating procedures
531
00:28:24,528 --> 00:28:25,921
that we identified.
532
00:28:27,749 --> 00:28:30,447
[Narrator] Had the crew
done a full taxi briefing,
533
00:28:30,534 --> 00:28:33,537
they would have discussed
the need to cross runway 2-6
534
00:28:33,581 --> 00:28:35,322
on the way to 2-2.
535
00:28:35,365 --> 00:28:39,630
They missed an opportunity
to review the airport diagram
536
00:28:39,674 --> 00:28:42,546
and determined that they
needed to cross runway 2-6,
537
00:28:42,590 --> 00:28:45,811
and intervening runway, before
they reached runway 2-2.
538
00:28:48,596 --> 00:28:50,598
Okay, let's hear their taxi checklist.
539
00:28:52,426 --> 00:28:53,949
[James] Flight controls.
540
00:28:53,993 --> 00:28:55,168
[Jeff] Check left.
541
00:28:55,211 --> 00:28:56,952
[James] On the right, trims.
542
00:28:57,605 --> 00:28:59,128
Engage 07.2.
543
00:29:00,477 --> 00:29:02,131
Radar terrain displaced.
544
00:29:02,175 --> 00:29:04,133
All taxi checks complete.
545
00:29:04,220 --> 00:29:05,004
[Jeff] Finish up theBefore Takeoff checklist,
546
00:29:05,047 --> 00:29:06,919
your leisure.
547
00:29:06,962 --> 00:29:09,051
[Joe] One other thing on the CVR we heard
548
00:29:09,138 --> 00:29:12,663
was the captain using
the term "at your leisure."
549
00:29:12,707 --> 00:29:15,014
It was used so many times in the CVR.
550
00:29:15,057 --> 00:29:17,712
What this told us is that
this flight crew was relaxed.
551
00:29:17,799 --> 00:29:20,280
Maybe they were a little bit too relaxed.
552
00:29:20,367 --> 00:29:22,499
[James] Ah, yeah, I knowthree guys at Kennedy.
553
00:29:22,543 --> 00:29:24,197
Actually two guys.
554
00:29:24,240 --> 00:29:25,938
One went, but he did get through the Sims.
555
00:29:25,981 --> 00:29:27,461
Oh, really?
556
00:29:27,504 --> 00:29:29,506
[James] Then a firstofficer from Cincinnati,
557
00:29:29,550 --> 00:29:31,378
he got through the second part
and that's as far as he got.
558
00:29:31,421 --> 00:29:33,249
Stop it right there.
559
00:29:33,293 --> 00:29:34,990
[Narrator] Investigators cannot believe
560
00:29:35,034 --> 00:29:36,035
what they're hearing.
561
00:29:36,078 --> 00:29:38,428
What the heck is he talking about?
562
00:29:38,472 --> 00:29:40,866
[Narrator] Instead of focusing
on their checklists,
563
00:29:40,909 --> 00:29:44,521
the crew of 5191 was having
a casual conversation
564
00:29:44,565 --> 00:29:45,914
during a critical moment.
565
00:29:47,829 --> 00:29:49,526
It's a major breach of what's called
566
00:29:49,613 --> 00:29:51,702
the sterile cockpit rule.
567
00:29:51,746 --> 00:29:54,836
The sterile cockpit rule
requires that pilots refrain
568
00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:58,622
from non-operational conversation
569
00:29:58,666 --> 00:30:00,711
during significant portions of flight.
570
00:30:00,755 --> 00:30:03,192
One of the key reasons for
the sterile cockpit rule
571
00:30:03,279 --> 00:30:05,760
is that non-pertinent
conversation can be distracting.
572
00:30:08,067 --> 00:30:09,938
[James] And that's as far as it got,
573
00:30:09,982 --> 00:30:11,853
and then he actually got
offered the position.
574
00:30:11,897 --> 00:30:12,898
Did he take it or?
575
00:30:12,985 --> 00:30:14,682
Yeah, he took it.
576
00:30:14,769 --> 00:30:16,727
[Jeff] Oh, okay.
577
00:30:16,771 --> 00:30:18,120
The captain should be shutting
this conversation down,
578
00:30:18,207 --> 00:30:20,557
not encouraging it.
579
00:30:20,644 --> 00:30:22,255
[Evan] Although the first officer
580
00:30:22,298 --> 00:30:24,039
started the conversation,
581
00:30:24,083 --> 00:30:26,999
the captain is responsible for ensuring
582
00:30:27,086 --> 00:30:29,218
that sterile cockpit rule's enforced
583
00:30:29,262 --> 00:30:31,438
and distractions do not enter the cockpit
584
00:30:31,481 --> 00:30:33,701
that could affect the safety of flight.
585
00:30:35,224 --> 00:30:38,967
[Narrator] After 40 seconds
of casual conversation.
586
00:30:39,011 --> 00:30:40,099
[James] Second engine started.
587
00:30:40,142 --> 00:30:42,449
Anti-ice probes. Windshield low.
588
00:30:44,712 --> 00:30:46,322
[Narrator] Investigators
hear the pilots turn
589
00:30:46,366 --> 00:30:48,107
to their takeoff checklist.
590
00:30:51,023 --> 00:30:53,242
Now they finally get back to their jobs.
591
00:30:53,286 --> 00:30:55,157
[Joe] We were surprised by that.
592
00:30:55,201 --> 00:30:58,291
That non-pertinent conversation
was in a critical area
593
00:30:58,334 --> 00:31:01,250
when the flight crew was
making their taxi out
594
00:31:01,294 --> 00:31:05,037
to the runway where the
flight crew needs to be
595
00:31:05,080 --> 00:31:07,082
100% flying the aircraft.
596
00:31:08,301 --> 00:31:09,693
[Dramatic Music]
597
00:31:11,347 --> 00:31:13,480
[Narrator] Could that
period of inattention
598
00:31:13,523 --> 00:31:15,612
hold the key to this tragic accident?
599
00:31:15,699 --> 00:31:16,962
[Airplane Roaring]
600
00:31:21,009 --> 00:31:22,445
Okay, let's see what we've got so far.
601
00:31:24,491 --> 00:31:27,450
[Narrator] Investigators wonder
if a casual conversation
602
00:31:27,494 --> 00:31:30,627
is at the heart of the crash
of Comair flight 5191.
603
00:31:32,412 --> 00:31:34,718
They skipped out of their briefing.
604
00:31:34,762 --> 00:31:37,025
It would have told them
they needed to cross 26
605
00:31:38,157 --> 00:31:39,114
to get to 22.
606
00:31:42,944 --> 00:31:45,077
Then for almost a minute
607
00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:47,122
they violate the sterile cockpit rule.
608
00:31:50,734 --> 00:31:52,040
Let's see what happens when they get here.
609
00:31:55,304 --> 00:31:57,263
[Narrator] Investigators hope
the crew will give
610
00:31:57,306 --> 00:32:00,353
some indication why they stopped
at the hold short line
611
00:32:00,396 --> 00:32:02,094
for runway 2-6.
612
00:32:03,225 --> 00:32:05,401
Thrust reversers are armed.
613
00:32:05,445 --> 00:32:07,447
Autocross flow is manual.
614
00:32:08,448 --> 00:32:11,320
Ignition is off.
615
00:32:11,407 --> 00:32:14,454
Altimeters are three triple
zero across the board.
616
00:32:15,585 --> 00:32:16,891
[James] Crosschecked.
617
00:32:16,935 --> 00:32:18,284
I'll check in with the cabin.
618
00:32:20,025 --> 00:32:22,027
That's it?
619
00:32:22,070 --> 00:32:25,465
It was surprising to us that
there was no conversation
620
00:32:25,552 --> 00:32:28,598
about their location on the airfield
621
00:32:28,685 --> 00:32:30,600
or confusion about it
622
00:32:30,644 --> 00:32:33,081
while they were holding
short on runway 2-6.
623
00:32:36,650 --> 00:32:38,347
We know they were distracted,
624
00:32:39,914 --> 00:32:41,785
but when they stopped their chit-chat
625
00:32:41,829 --> 00:32:44,701
they don't seem to recognize,
know, or check where they are.
626
00:32:47,878 --> 00:32:51,230
We got no information
based on the conversation
627
00:32:51,273 --> 00:32:52,796
of the flight crew while
they were holding short
628
00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:54,842
that they were disoriented.
629
00:32:54,929 --> 00:32:57,497
No indications at all.
630
00:32:57,584 --> 00:32:58,846
[Narrator] Investigators are amazed
631
00:32:58,933 --> 00:33:00,891
by what they hear next.
632
00:33:00,935 --> 00:33:01,936
[James] At your leisure,
633
00:33:01,980 --> 00:33:04,460
Comair 1-21 ready to go.
634
00:33:04,504 --> 00:33:07,289
[Controller] Comair 1-91, Lexington tower.
635
00:33:10,510 --> 00:33:12,860
Fly runaway heading. Cleared for takeoff.
636
00:33:12,947 --> 00:33:14,818
Ugh.
637
00:33:14,862 --> 00:33:17,038
Hold there.
638
00:33:17,082 --> 00:33:21,303
So they're completely relaxed
when they ask for clearance.
639
00:33:21,390 --> 00:33:23,305
They're so relaxed or distracted
640
00:33:23,349 --> 00:33:26,700
that the first officer uses
the wrong flight number.
641
00:33:26,743 --> 00:33:30,051
[Narrator] Investigators
realize the grim truth.
642
00:33:30,095 --> 00:33:33,098
These guys actually
thought they were lined up
643
00:33:33,185 --> 00:33:35,317
for runway 22.
644
00:33:35,361 --> 00:33:38,233
[Evan] The fact that they
stopped at runway 2-6
645
00:33:38,277 --> 00:33:41,062
and subsequently called for takeoff
646
00:33:41,106 --> 00:33:44,152
indicates that they lost awareness
647
00:33:44,196 --> 00:33:46,589
that they had not crossed runway 2-6.
648
00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:50,898
They turn onto runway 26.
649
00:33:50,985 --> 00:33:52,465
Then what?
650
00:33:52,508 --> 00:33:54,032
Keep going.
651
00:33:54,075 --> 00:33:55,903
[James] Lineup checks completed.
652
00:33:57,252 --> 00:33:58,688
[Jeff] All yours, Jim.
653
00:33:58,732 --> 00:34:01,082
First officer takes the controls.
654
00:34:01,126 --> 00:34:03,041
So he's looking ahead
655
00:34:03,084 --> 00:34:05,043
probably for the first time.
656
00:34:07,306 --> 00:34:10,265
[Joe] At this time the captaintaxied the aircraft
657
00:34:10,309 --> 00:34:12,137
out onto the runway
658
00:34:12,180 --> 00:34:13,834
and then transferred controls
659
00:34:13,877 --> 00:34:15,662
to the first officer.
660
00:34:15,705 --> 00:34:17,446
So before this time,
661
00:34:17,490 --> 00:34:20,058
the first officer was
heads down in the cockpit.
662
00:34:21,276 --> 00:34:23,887
My brakes, my controls.
663
00:34:23,931 --> 00:34:27,326
[Evan] When the first officerlooked out, he saw a runway.
664
00:34:27,369 --> 00:34:31,330
He may not have perceived
that it was a narrower runway
665
00:34:31,373 --> 00:34:33,332
than runway 2-2.
666
00:34:34,681 --> 00:34:37,118
They're looking down runway 26.
667
00:34:39,164 --> 00:34:41,601
Why don't they see the sign
for 22 off to the right?
668
00:34:45,257 --> 00:34:47,520
[Evan] Neither pilotcrosschecked their location
669
00:34:47,563 --> 00:34:49,391
at the time that they took the runway.
670
00:34:51,393 --> 00:34:54,092
[Airplane Whirring]
671
00:34:55,919 --> 00:34:57,356
Set thrust, please.
672
00:34:59,619 --> 00:35:01,360
Thrust set.
673
00:35:01,403 --> 00:35:04,145
-[Airplane Roaring]
-[Dramatic Music]
674
00:35:12,197 --> 00:35:13,850
That is weird with no lights.
675
00:35:14,851 --> 00:35:16,070
Yeah.
676
00:35:19,508 --> 00:35:20,422
Hold on.
677
00:35:22,381 --> 00:35:24,992
Runway 26 is not in use, so it's not lit.
678
00:35:27,212 --> 00:35:29,475
They see the lights for
22 until they cross it.
679
00:35:35,829 --> 00:35:37,961
They're looking down a pitch dark runway,
680
00:35:39,137 --> 00:35:41,574
and it doesn't phase them.
681
00:35:41,617 --> 00:35:43,880
[Narrator] Investigators
wonder if the pilots
682
00:35:43,924 --> 00:35:47,841
were confused about what the
runway should have looked like.
683
00:35:47,884 --> 00:35:51,236
[Evan] When they began thetakeoff roll on runway 2-6,
684
00:35:51,323 --> 00:35:53,325
they had no center line lights
685
00:35:53,368 --> 00:35:55,457
or edge lights on this runway.
686
00:35:55,501 --> 00:35:58,591
However, based on the first
officer's previous experience
687
00:35:58,634 --> 00:36:00,070
the night before,
688
00:36:00,114 --> 00:36:02,116
he did not expect to see lights.
689
00:36:04,249 --> 00:36:06,903
The ILS is out on 2-2.
Came in the other night,
690
00:36:06,947 --> 00:36:09,297
the runway identifier lights
were out all over the place.
691
00:36:09,341 --> 00:36:11,125
And so it would not necessarily have been
692
00:36:11,169 --> 00:36:12,822
an unusual sight picture.
693
00:36:14,346 --> 00:36:16,130
[Narrator] Such decision-making based on
694
00:36:16,217 --> 00:36:19,046
a person's mistaken assessment
is called confirmation bias.
695
00:36:21,135 --> 00:36:23,006
Confirmation bias is where the flight crew
696
00:36:23,050 --> 00:36:25,531
expects something to be there
697
00:36:25,574 --> 00:36:27,185
even though it might
not actually be there.
698
00:36:30,492 --> 00:36:33,713
He noticed there was
no lights on the runway,
699
00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:35,193
but he just accepted the fact.
700
00:36:36,890 --> 00:36:37,804
What happens next?
701
00:36:38,979 --> 00:36:40,633
[Dramatic Music]
702
00:36:45,377 --> 00:36:47,074
-[Jeff] 100 knots.
-[James] Checks.
703
00:36:49,076 --> 00:36:51,426
[Narrator] Pilots now see
they're almost out of runway.
704
00:36:51,470 --> 00:36:53,254
[Jeff] V-1. Rotate.
705
00:36:54,821 --> 00:36:56,257
[Narrator] And don't
have the required speed
706
00:36:56,301 --> 00:36:57,084
to get airborne.
707
00:36:57,171 --> 00:36:58,216
Whoa.
708
00:36:59,173 --> 00:37:00,435
[Airplane Roaring]
709
00:37:00,479 --> 00:37:01,349
[James] Dammit!
710
00:37:02,263 --> 00:37:03,960
[Airplane Roaring]
711
00:37:05,092 --> 00:37:06,398
[Transmission Static Crackling]
712
00:37:07,834 --> 00:37:09,401
That's it.
713
00:37:09,488 --> 00:37:11,490
They finally realize something's wrong
714
00:37:11,533 --> 00:37:12,882
and it's too late.
715
00:37:15,189 --> 00:37:16,408
[Evan] Based on our calculations,
716
00:37:16,451 --> 00:37:18,323
the crew needed to recognize
717
00:37:18,366 --> 00:37:20,194
that they were on the wrong runway
718
00:37:20,281 --> 00:37:23,893
and successfully reject
the takeoff about 20 seconds
719
00:37:23,937 --> 00:37:25,721
into the takeoff roll.
720
00:37:25,765 --> 00:37:29,899
However, their recognition
did not occur until much later
721
00:37:29,943 --> 00:37:33,338
when the captain called
rotate at a lower speed
722
00:37:35,078 --> 00:37:37,298
than what was required.
723
00:37:37,342 --> 00:37:39,039
[Airplane Roaring]
724
00:37:44,218 --> 00:37:46,525
[Narrator] Investigators have
unraveled the mystery
725
00:37:46,568 --> 00:37:50,137
of what happened inside
the cockpit of flight 5191.
726
00:37:51,094 --> 00:37:53,445
[Suspenseful Music]
727
00:37:57,362 --> 00:38:00,974
They started by skipping
the full briefing.
728
00:38:01,017 --> 00:38:02,758
And then after a long
discussion about the airline,
729
00:38:02,802 --> 00:38:05,544
they lose sight of where they are.
730
00:38:05,587 --> 00:38:08,416
They stop at the wrong place
and they completely miss
731
00:38:08,460 --> 00:38:11,245
all the signage that
they're at the wrong runway.
732
00:38:11,332 --> 00:38:13,552
By the time they figure out
the mistake, it's too late.
733
00:38:15,728 --> 00:38:18,034
These guys were going through the motions
734
00:38:18,121 --> 00:38:19,819
when they should have
been at full attention.
735
00:38:21,864 --> 00:38:24,040
[Narrator] The crew's
failure to use available cues
736
00:38:24,127 --> 00:38:27,392
and aids to identify
and check the plane's location
737
00:38:29,132 --> 00:38:32,135
led to the tragedy of Comair flight 5191.
738
00:38:34,703 --> 00:38:35,922
[Explosion Booming]
739
00:38:35,965 --> 00:38:37,489
[Flames Crackling]
740
00:38:40,709 --> 00:38:42,842
But the team still has one
unanswered question.
741
00:38:44,278 --> 00:38:45,975
Why didn't the controller tell them
742
00:38:46,019 --> 00:38:47,325
they were at the wrong runway?
743
00:38:48,717 --> 00:38:50,502
[Dramatic Music]
744
00:38:57,639 --> 00:38:59,598
[Narrator] Investigators wonder
745
00:38:59,641 --> 00:39:02,992
if the air traffic controller
of Comair flight 5191
746
00:39:03,036 --> 00:39:05,299
could have picked up the crew's error
747
00:39:05,386 --> 00:39:06,518
and prevented the accident.
748
00:39:08,346 --> 00:39:10,522
Happy to answer any questions.
749
00:39:10,565 --> 00:39:12,306
[Evan] With the air traffic controller,
750
00:39:12,393 --> 00:39:14,830
we were trying to understand
did the controller
751
00:39:14,874 --> 00:39:16,658
have an opportunity to see this airplane
752
00:39:16,745 --> 00:39:19,357
take the wrong runway
and prevent the accident?
753
00:39:21,402 --> 00:39:24,579
At 6:05 they asked for takeoff clearance.
754
00:39:24,623 --> 00:39:26,668
Runway 2-2 was free,
755
00:39:26,755 --> 00:39:29,541
so I gave Comair clearance for takeoff.
756
00:39:32,282 --> 00:39:35,329
[James] At your leisure,Comair 1-21, ready to go.
757
00:39:35,373 --> 00:39:37,810
Comair 1-91, Lexington tower.
758
00:39:38,898 --> 00:39:39,899
Fly runway heading.
759
00:39:39,986 --> 00:39:42,075
Cleared for takeoff.
760
00:39:42,118 --> 00:39:43,990
[James] Runway heading.Cleared for takeoff, 1-91.
761
00:39:47,385 --> 00:39:48,777
And what did you do next?
762
00:39:50,431 --> 00:39:52,912
I saw the plane proceed
towards runway 2-6,
763
00:39:52,999 --> 00:39:55,001
and then scanned runway 2-2
764
00:39:55,044 --> 00:39:56,481
to make sure there were no vehicles on it.
765
00:39:57,656 --> 00:39:59,701
Did you watch the flight take off?
766
00:39:59,788 --> 00:40:02,574
Not if I have other jobs to do.
767
00:40:02,661 --> 00:40:05,228
[Narrator] Investigators
make one final discovery.
768
00:40:07,579 --> 00:40:09,711
And then I turned over here
to count my flight strips.
769
00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:13,933
And why would you start counting
your flight strips then?
770
00:40:13,976 --> 00:40:15,587
I wasn't busy.
771
00:40:17,327 --> 00:40:18,546
It only takes a few minutes
772
00:40:21,375 --> 00:40:22,376
and there was no reason to think
773
00:40:22,420 --> 00:40:24,247
that they'd have any problems.
774
00:40:24,291 --> 00:40:27,294
In 17 years I've never
seen a plane that size
775
00:40:27,337 --> 00:40:28,948
try to take off from runway 2-6.
776
00:40:31,907 --> 00:40:35,171
[Joe] The controller was notwatching the airplane
777
00:40:35,258 --> 00:40:38,044
and assumed that the airplane
was going to take off
778
00:40:38,131 --> 00:40:41,047
on the correct runway because
this is such a simple airport
779
00:40:41,090 --> 00:40:43,266
and because there was no other traffic
780
00:40:43,310 --> 00:40:45,443
on the airport at
the time of the accident.
781
00:40:47,183 --> 00:40:49,272
And if you hadn't turned away,
782
00:40:49,316 --> 00:40:51,231
would you have noticed that
they were in the wrong place?
783
00:40:56,323 --> 00:40:57,629
I might've.
784
00:40:59,848 --> 00:41:02,764
[Narrator] FAA regulations
do not require controllers
785
00:41:02,851 --> 00:41:04,940
to monitor every takeoff,
786
00:41:04,984 --> 00:41:07,726
but if the controller
had been watching the runway
787
00:41:07,769 --> 00:41:09,684
instead of counting flight strips,
788
00:41:09,728 --> 00:41:12,208
he might've noticed by 5191's mistake.
789
00:41:13,906 --> 00:41:15,647
[Shawn] He was not actually required,
790
00:41:15,734 --> 00:41:18,084
nor are any controllers required,
791
00:41:18,171 --> 00:41:21,566
to actually watch an aircraft
during its takeoff roll.
792
00:41:21,609 --> 00:41:23,568
Had they been required to do that,
793
00:41:23,611 --> 00:41:25,570
this would have given an opportunity
794
00:41:25,657 --> 00:41:27,006
to have the takeoff aborted.
795
00:41:28,877 --> 00:41:31,793
[Narrator] The NTSB concludes
that several factors
796
00:41:31,837 --> 00:41:34,013
led the pilots to lose
track of their position
797
00:41:34,100 --> 00:41:35,667
on their way to the runway.
798
00:41:37,843 --> 00:41:42,108
Contributing to that was
the flight crews' failure
799
00:41:42,151 --> 00:41:44,240
to maintain sterile cockpit
800
00:41:44,284 --> 00:41:47,809
and to have a non-pertinent
conversation prior to takeoff.
801
00:41:47,896 --> 00:41:49,332
[Evan] This crashed happened
802
00:41:49,376 --> 00:41:53,467
because of a period of distraction
803
00:41:53,554 --> 00:41:56,731
during what was perceived
as a relatively simple taxi.
804
00:41:58,690 --> 00:42:00,605
And it illustrates
805
00:42:00,692 --> 00:42:02,607
the perils of distraction
806
00:42:02,694 --> 00:42:05,261
in that it can take you off task.
807
00:42:05,348 --> 00:42:07,829
It can cause you to lose awareness.
808
00:42:07,873 --> 00:42:12,138
And in this case, both
crew members lost awareness
809
00:42:12,181 --> 00:42:15,010
of where they were on
that airport surface,
810
00:42:15,054 --> 00:42:17,926
and made a mistake that was
extremely consequential.
811
00:42:21,974 --> 00:42:24,498
[Narrator] Among the NTSB recommendations
812
00:42:24,585 --> 00:42:27,414
is a basic technological
change to prevent pilots
813
00:42:27,501 --> 00:42:30,025
from getting lost.
814
00:42:30,069 --> 00:42:34,900
The CRJ-100 at the time
had sophisticated avionics,
815
00:42:34,943 --> 00:42:37,424
but it lacked a simple
GPS system available
816
00:42:37,511 --> 00:42:39,078
in cars of the same era.
817
00:42:41,950 --> 00:42:46,564
Install moving map GPS displays
in CRJ-100 cockpits.
818
00:42:48,478 --> 00:42:51,003
[Narrator] The NTSB also
makes recommendations
819
00:42:51,046 --> 00:42:52,744
for flight crews.
820
00:42:52,831 --> 00:42:54,659
Require pilots to check that they are
821
00:42:54,746 --> 00:42:56,008
at their assigned runway
822
00:42:58,184 --> 00:43:00,229
before crossing the hold short line.
823
00:43:06,758 --> 00:43:08,324
[Narrator] First Officer James Polehinke,
824
00:43:08,411 --> 00:43:12,024
the lone survivor of Comair flight 5191,
825
00:43:12,067 --> 00:43:13,503
suffered severe injuries,
826
00:43:13,547 --> 00:43:15,201
including the loss of his left leg.
827
00:43:18,204 --> 00:43:20,206
He never returned to commercial aviation.
828
00:43:23,426 --> 00:43:25,559
This was a catastrophic accident.
829
00:43:26,821 --> 00:43:30,999
It affected scores and scores of lives,
830
00:43:31,043 --> 00:43:33,349
but the legacy of this accident
831
00:43:33,436 --> 00:43:36,135
are the safety changes
832
00:43:36,222 --> 00:43:38,703
that have been made to
prevent this type of accident
833
00:43:38,746 --> 00:43:39,834
from happening in the future.
834
00:43:42,532 --> 00:43:46,145
[Joe] This accident showsthat there are threats
835
00:43:46,232 --> 00:43:47,842
in any environment,
836
00:43:47,886 --> 00:43:50,584
no matter how docile they seem,
837
00:43:50,671 --> 00:43:53,239
and that flight crews have to be aware
838
00:43:53,326 --> 00:43:55,981
and have to be looking for all
the threats at all the time.
839
00:43:58,070 --> 00:43:59,985
[Airplane Roaring]
64534
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