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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:01,479 --> 00:00:02,915 [Airplane Roaring] 2 00:00:02,959 --> 00:00:04,482 [Narrator] On an early morning takeoff in Kentucky. 3 00:00:04,526 --> 00:00:05,396 Hundred knots. 4 00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:07,311 [James] Checks. 5 00:00:07,355 --> 00:00:08,834 [Narrator] Two experienced pilots struggled to get 6 00:00:08,878 --> 00:00:11,402 their regional jet off the ground. 7 00:00:11,446 --> 00:00:12,751 V-1. 8 00:00:12,795 --> 00:00:13,796 Rotate. 9 00:00:13,839 --> 00:00:15,102 Whoa! 10 00:00:15,189 --> 00:00:18,235 [Airplane Roaring] 11 00:00:20,107 --> 00:00:22,892 [Narrator] And crash into a nearby field. 12 00:00:22,935 --> 00:00:25,155 This was a catastrophic accident. 13 00:00:25,199 --> 00:00:27,070 [Narrator] Investigators try to piece together 14 00:00:27,114 --> 00:00:28,463 what went wrong. 15 00:00:28,506 --> 00:00:30,160 Get those to Washington. 16 00:00:30,204 --> 00:00:32,728 [Narrator] And end up with more questions than answers. 17 00:00:32,771 --> 00:00:35,948 Why the heck would they stop there? 18 00:00:35,992 --> 00:00:38,299 [Narrator] Only by retracing the taxi route. 19 00:00:38,342 --> 00:00:41,432 All the cues are right there in plain sight. 20 00:00:41,476 --> 00:00:43,869 [Narrator] And listening to the cockpit discussions. 21 00:00:43,913 --> 00:00:46,568 -That is weird with no lights. -Yeah. 22 00:00:46,655 --> 00:00:49,179 [Narrator] Do investigators discover the grim truth. 23 00:00:51,355 --> 00:00:53,314 They finally realize something's wrong, 24 00:00:54,271 --> 00:00:55,925 but it's already too late. 25 00:00:56,012 --> 00:00:58,710 [Dramatic Music] 26 00:00:58,754 --> 00:00:59,972 [Attendant] Ladies and gentlemen, 27 00:01:00,016 --> 00:01:01,148 we are starting our approach. 28 00:01:01,235 --> 00:01:03,019 [Pilot] We lost both engines. 29 00:01:03,106 --> 00:01:03,672 [Attendant] Put the mask over your nose. 30 00:01:03,715 --> 00:01:05,326 Emergency detect. 31 00:01:05,369 --> 00:01:07,545 [Attendant] Brace for impact! 32 00:01:07,589 --> 00:01:08,807 [Dramatic Music] 33 00:01:11,680 --> 00:01:13,638 [Man] It's gonna crash! 34 00:01:13,682 --> 00:01:15,684 [Dramatic Music] 35 00:01:22,995 --> 00:01:24,562 [Narrator] It's almost six in the morning 36 00:01:24,606 --> 00:01:25,955 in Lexington, Kentucky. 37 00:01:30,351 --> 00:01:32,918 The pilots of Comair flight 5191 38 00:01:32,962 --> 00:01:34,833 prepare for their pre-flight briefing. 39 00:01:37,619 --> 00:01:39,795 In command is Captain Jeff Clay, 40 00:01:39,838 --> 00:01:43,190 and experienced pilot with more than 4,700 flying hours. 41 00:01:44,713 --> 00:01:47,063 [Jeff Chuckling] 42 00:01:47,150 --> 00:01:48,630 Man, I always feel like I could eat a little more 43 00:01:48,717 --> 00:01:50,980 when I get a seatbelt like this. [Chuckling] 44 00:01:53,200 --> 00:01:54,853 [Narrator] First Officer James Polehinke 45 00:01:54,940 --> 00:01:57,987 is also a seasoned pilot, with more than 6,500 hours. 46 00:01:59,989 --> 00:02:00,946 You up for flying this leg? 47 00:02:00,990 --> 00:02:02,557 Yeah, I'll take us to Atlanta. 48 00:02:04,211 --> 00:02:05,995 Both the captain and the first officer 49 00:02:06,038 --> 00:02:07,344 were very highly regarded. 50 00:02:08,867 --> 00:02:11,261 They had an outstanding professional reputation, 51 00:02:11,305 --> 00:02:13,394 and individuals that had flown with them had nothing 52 00:02:13,437 --> 00:02:16,092 but high marks and very favorable comments 53 00:02:16,136 --> 00:02:17,528 as far as their qualities. 54 00:02:20,314 --> 00:02:24,056 [Narrator] The crew is flying a Bombardier CRJ-100, 55 00:02:24,100 --> 00:02:27,495 a small twin-engine jet designed for short commuter flights. 56 00:02:31,803 --> 00:02:34,023 Shawn Pruchnicki flew that aircraft 57 00:02:34,066 --> 00:02:37,331 for Comair for ten years. 58 00:02:37,418 --> 00:02:39,811 [Shawn] The CRJ is an aircraft that's built for 59 00:02:39,855 --> 00:02:41,335 short haul flights. 60 00:02:41,378 --> 00:02:43,075 For example, the Lexington to Atlanta, 61 00:02:43,119 --> 00:02:44,860 less than an hour-type flight is really what 62 00:02:44,903 --> 00:02:46,949 these airplanes are designed to do. 63 00:02:51,649 --> 00:02:53,477 Ladies and gentlemen, we'd like to take this time 64 00:02:53,521 --> 00:02:55,914 to welcome you on board Comair flight 5191, 65 00:02:56,001 --> 00:02:57,612 direct to Atlanta. 66 00:02:57,655 --> 00:02:59,570 We'll try to keep it as quiet possible. 67 00:02:59,657 --> 00:03:02,138 Hopefully you can catch a nap on the way there. 68 00:03:02,225 --> 00:03:04,184 It's our pleasure having you on board today. 69 00:03:06,011 --> 00:03:07,926 [Narrator] There are 47 passengers 70 00:03:08,013 --> 00:03:10,364 and one flight attendant on today's flight. 71 00:03:15,456 --> 00:03:18,110 The pilots begin their briefing. 72 00:03:18,154 --> 00:03:20,852 Right flex takeoff procedures off of? 73 00:03:20,896 --> 00:03:22,680 He said what runway? 2-4? 74 00:03:22,724 --> 00:03:23,768 It's 2-2. 75 00:03:25,727 --> 00:03:27,685 [Shawn] Something that we do prior to takeoff is 76 00:03:27,729 --> 00:03:30,732 we do a flight briefing between the two crew members. 77 00:03:30,819 --> 00:03:32,690 And the primary reason we do this is to make sure 78 00:03:32,734 --> 00:03:35,693 that everyone has the same amount of information 79 00:03:35,737 --> 00:03:37,739 and knowledge to safely depart the airport. 80 00:03:39,436 --> 00:03:40,959 Huh, on 2-2 the ILS is out. 81 00:03:41,003 --> 00:03:43,048 Came in the other night, 82 00:03:43,092 --> 00:03:44,615 the runway identifier lights were out all over the place. 83 00:03:44,659 --> 00:03:45,790 All right. 84 00:03:47,314 --> 00:03:50,055 2-2's your short taxi. Any questions? 85 00:03:50,099 --> 00:03:52,232 No questions before starting. Your leisure. 86 00:04:02,111 --> 00:04:04,853 [Narrator] In the cabin, passengers prepare for takeoff. 87 00:04:06,289 --> 00:04:07,464 Seatbelt, please. 88 00:04:12,774 --> 00:04:15,429 [Narrator] Today they are bound for Atlanta, Georgia, 89 00:04:15,472 --> 00:04:17,866 just a 67-minute flight straight south 90 00:04:17,909 --> 00:04:20,085 from Lexington's Blue Grass Airport. 91 00:04:22,871 --> 00:04:25,221 Comair 1-91 is ready to taxi. 92 00:04:26,091 --> 00:04:29,225 Comair 1-91, taxi to runway 2-2. 93 00:04:29,269 --> 00:04:32,272 Altimeter 3-0-0-0. 94 00:04:33,534 --> 00:04:36,580 Winds are 2-0-0 at eight. 95 00:04:36,667 --> 00:04:38,930 [James] Three triple zero and taxi 2-2. 96 00:04:39,017 --> 00:04:41,106 Comair 1-91. 97 00:04:41,150 --> 00:04:42,499 [Narrator] Lexington's air traffic controller 98 00:04:42,543 --> 00:04:45,763 clears flight 5191 to the runway, 99 00:04:45,807 --> 00:04:48,331 and then turns his attention to another plane. 100 00:04:49,680 --> 00:04:53,554 Eagle flight runway 2-2, cleared for takeoff. 101 00:04:56,557 --> 00:04:58,820 [Narrator] With few planes at this small airport 102 00:04:58,907 --> 00:05:00,474 in near perfect weather, 103 00:05:00,561 --> 00:05:02,084 this flight is far from challenging 104 00:05:02,127 --> 00:05:04,042 for these seasoned pilots. 105 00:05:06,610 --> 00:05:08,569 [Shawn] During the taxi out, 106 00:05:08,612 --> 00:05:10,527 the captain is responsible primarily for navigating 107 00:05:10,571 --> 00:05:12,921 the aircraft on the airport surface. 108 00:05:12,964 --> 00:05:15,097 [Airplane Humming] 109 00:05:18,056 --> 00:05:21,625 The first officer is running numerous checklists 110 00:05:21,669 --> 00:05:24,367 and verifying that the aircraft is safe for departure. 111 00:05:26,804 --> 00:05:28,502 [James] Folks, we're gonna be underway momentarily. 112 00:05:28,545 --> 00:05:31,200 So sit back, relax and enjoy the flight. 113 00:05:34,551 --> 00:05:36,031 We're all ready in the cabin, sir. 114 00:05:36,074 --> 00:05:37,075 Thank you. 115 00:05:41,602 --> 00:05:43,386 Cabin reports received. 116 00:05:43,430 --> 00:05:44,779 Before takeoff checks complete. 117 00:05:44,866 --> 00:05:45,954 Ready. 118 00:05:45,997 --> 00:05:47,085 All set. 119 00:05:48,130 --> 00:05:49,914 At your leisure, Comair 1-21, 120 00:05:49,958 --> 00:05:52,003 ready to go. 121 00:05:52,047 --> 00:05:55,442 Comair 1-91, Lexington tower. 122 00:05:55,529 --> 00:05:56,617 Fly runway heading. 123 00:05:56,660 --> 00:05:58,009 Cleared for takeoff. 124 00:05:58,053 --> 00:06:00,055 [James] Ugh. 125 00:06:00,098 --> 00:06:02,449 Runway heading, cleared for takeoff, 1-91. 126 00:06:06,017 --> 00:06:07,932 [Airplane Humming] 127 00:06:23,208 --> 00:06:26,560 Anti-ice off, lights set, takeoff config's okay, 128 00:06:26,603 --> 00:06:27,735 lineup checks completed. 129 00:06:28,605 --> 00:06:31,695 All yours, Jim. 130 00:06:31,739 --> 00:06:34,002 [Narrator] Captain Clay hands control of the aircraft 131 00:06:34,045 --> 00:06:36,134 to First Officer Polehinke for takeoff. 132 00:06:37,919 --> 00:06:39,486 My brakes, my controls. 133 00:06:43,577 --> 00:06:45,274 [Airplane Whirring] 134 00:06:51,715 --> 00:06:52,586 Set thrust, please. 135 00:06:55,153 --> 00:06:56,067 [Jeff] Thrust set. 136 00:06:58,679 --> 00:07:00,594 [Airplane Roaring] 137 00:07:02,422 --> 00:07:04,641 [Dramatic Music] 138 00:07:09,341 --> 00:07:10,821 That is weird with no lights. 139 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:13,084 Yeah. 140 00:07:14,695 --> 00:07:17,828 [Airplane Roaring] 141 00:07:17,872 --> 00:07:19,830 [Dramatic Music] 142 00:07:19,874 --> 00:07:20,962 100 knots. 143 00:07:21,049 --> 00:07:22,006 [James] Checks. 144 00:07:25,096 --> 00:07:26,794 [Narrator] Something's not right. 145 00:07:26,837 --> 00:07:28,665 V-1. 146 00:07:28,709 --> 00:07:30,319 Rotate. 147 00:07:30,362 --> 00:07:32,408 [Narrator] As 5191 prepares to lift off. 148 00:07:33,757 --> 00:07:35,542 -[Airplane Rattling] -Whoa. 149 00:07:37,631 --> 00:07:40,503 -[Dramatic Music] -[Airplane Roaring] 150 00:07:40,547 --> 00:07:41,548 [James] Dammit! 151 00:07:42,636 --> 00:07:44,942 [Airplane Roaring] 152 00:07:44,986 --> 00:07:47,075 [Passengers Screaming] 153 00:07:49,556 --> 00:07:52,689 [Airplane Roaring] 154 00:07:54,082 --> 00:07:55,997 [Passengers Screaming] 155 00:08:01,045 --> 00:08:04,745 [Narrator] Comair flight 5191 hurtles into a field 156 00:08:04,788 --> 00:08:06,660 less than half a mile from the runway. 157 00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:12,492 This is Lexington. 158 00:08:12,535 --> 00:08:13,797 Alert three. 159 00:08:13,884 --> 00:08:15,407 West side of the runway 160 00:08:15,451 --> 00:08:17,148 with a Comair regional jet taking off. 161 00:08:19,194 --> 00:08:20,500 [Suspenseful Music] 162 00:08:26,984 --> 00:08:28,943 [Pete Maupin] We knew something was wrong. 163 00:08:28,986 --> 00:08:30,988 We never get an alert three. 164 00:08:31,032 --> 00:08:31,902 We never get one. 165 00:08:34,165 --> 00:08:36,603 [Dramatic Music] 166 00:08:36,690 --> 00:08:38,126 [Narrator] Public Safety Officer Pete Maupin 167 00:08:38,169 --> 00:08:39,562 rushes to the scene. 168 00:08:41,956 --> 00:08:44,741 It's hot. I mean, it's very hot. 169 00:08:45,699 --> 00:08:47,352 [Dramatic Music] 170 00:08:47,396 --> 00:08:49,398 There were explosions. 171 00:08:49,485 --> 00:08:51,792 -[Saw Buzzing] -[Sirens Wailing] 172 00:08:53,271 --> 00:08:55,273 Can we save anybody? 173 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:57,493 That's what I was thinking when I saw this ball of fire. 174 00:08:58,755 --> 00:09:00,757 -[Dramatic Music] -[Flames Crackling] 175 00:09:02,063 --> 00:09:03,630 [Sirens Wailing] 176 00:09:11,028 --> 00:09:14,075 [Helicopter Whirring] 177 00:09:14,118 --> 00:09:17,034 [Narrator] 49 people are dead after the tragic takeoff 178 00:09:17,078 --> 00:09:18,949 of Comair flight 5191. 179 00:09:21,038 --> 00:09:23,824 First Officer Polehinke is the only survivor. 180 00:09:26,304 --> 00:09:28,872 [Shawn] The first responders' quick actions were the reason 181 00:09:28,916 --> 00:09:32,093 that First Officer Polehinke survived this accident. 182 00:09:32,180 --> 00:09:34,051 He was so traumatically injured 183 00:09:34,095 --> 00:09:37,838 that they recognized that time was of the essence 184 00:09:37,881 --> 00:09:39,753 and transported him to the hospital 185 00:09:39,840 --> 00:09:43,104 rather than waiting for an ambulance. 186 00:09:43,147 --> 00:09:44,758 [Pete] And he thanked me for saving his life. 187 00:09:46,063 --> 00:09:47,891 I told him that was my job, 188 00:09:47,978 --> 00:09:50,459 but I was glad that I was there to do what I did, 189 00:09:50,546 --> 00:09:51,765 and I told him that. 190 00:09:54,855 --> 00:09:57,118 [Narrator] The question NTSB investigators 191 00:09:57,205 --> 00:10:01,818 now need to answer is why Comair flight 5191 192 00:10:01,862 --> 00:10:03,254 couldn't get off the ground. 193 00:10:03,341 --> 00:10:04,821 [Helicopters Whirring] 194 00:10:10,131 --> 00:10:14,701 As soon as the fires are put out and the crash site is safe, 195 00:10:14,744 --> 00:10:17,051 NTSB investigators begin looking for clues 196 00:10:17,094 --> 00:10:21,142 to discover why Comair flight 5191 crashed 197 00:10:21,229 --> 00:10:24,275 less than half a mile from Lexington's Blue Grass Airport. 198 00:10:26,495 --> 00:10:28,671 Ensure every scrap is documented. 199 00:10:28,715 --> 00:10:29,933 We need a clear picture of the path 200 00:10:30,020 --> 00:10:31,761 this plane took before impact. 201 00:10:34,677 --> 00:10:36,461 [Narrator] Lead investigator Joe Sedor 202 00:10:36,505 --> 00:10:39,073 is among the first to arrive at the crash site. 203 00:10:39,116 --> 00:10:41,815 In this case it was quite interesting because 204 00:10:41,858 --> 00:10:44,905 initially we didn't have much. 205 00:10:44,948 --> 00:10:46,950 An airplane had crashed. 206 00:10:46,994 --> 00:10:48,778 We didn't know if it was on the airport, off the airport. 207 00:10:51,172 --> 00:10:53,522 We actually started at the final resting place 208 00:10:53,565 --> 00:10:54,958 for the wreckage, 209 00:10:55,045 --> 00:10:56,786 and then we walked back towards the airport. 210 00:10:58,614 --> 00:11:00,050 First impact point is there. 211 00:11:02,923 --> 00:11:05,665 [Airplane Roaring] 212 00:11:12,628 --> 00:11:14,282 And the plane hit those trees over there. 213 00:11:15,413 --> 00:11:17,764 [Airplane Roaring] 214 00:11:23,552 --> 00:11:25,859 Those impact marks are more than 20 feet up those trunks. 215 00:11:29,210 --> 00:11:32,953 [Evan Byrne] We were looking at the trajectory of the airplane. 216 00:11:32,996 --> 00:11:35,172 Clearly looked like it took off just about 217 00:11:35,216 --> 00:11:36,826 the end of the runway, 218 00:11:36,870 --> 00:11:39,568 and immediately started contacting trees 219 00:11:39,611 --> 00:11:40,874 into the wreckage site. 220 00:11:43,093 --> 00:11:45,139 [Soft Dramatic Music] 221 00:11:50,100 --> 00:11:52,102 [Narrator] The wreckage path tells investigators 222 00:11:52,189 --> 00:11:55,018 that the plane was struggling to get off the ground. 223 00:11:55,105 --> 00:11:57,978 Was it engine trouble or something else? 224 00:11:58,021 --> 00:12:00,110 It looks like they took off from runway 26. 225 00:12:05,550 --> 00:12:06,769 Hang on. 226 00:12:10,599 --> 00:12:12,035 26 wasn't in use last night. 227 00:12:16,997 --> 00:12:19,260 [Narrator] Lexington airport has two runways: 228 00:12:19,347 --> 00:12:22,263 runway 2-6, then runway 2-2. 229 00:12:25,135 --> 00:12:26,658 According to the flight plan, 230 00:12:26,702 --> 00:12:28,312 they were supposed to take off from runway 22. 231 00:12:30,924 --> 00:12:32,752 So how the heck did they end up over here? 232 00:12:35,363 --> 00:12:37,452 [Narrator] Investigators are surprised to discover 233 00:12:37,495 --> 00:12:41,673 that flight 5191 took off from the wrong runway. 234 00:12:41,717 --> 00:12:43,153 [Joe] Well, at that point in time because we knew 235 00:12:43,197 --> 00:12:45,068 that it was a wrong runway takeoff, 236 00:12:45,155 --> 00:12:46,983 the question is, is why, right? 237 00:12:47,027 --> 00:12:49,333 And that's, and it's one that doesn't make sense. 238 00:12:51,292 --> 00:12:53,860 [Narrator] Did they misunderstand their instructions 239 00:12:53,903 --> 00:12:56,253 or deliberately change their plans to take off 240 00:12:56,297 --> 00:12:58,342 from a different runway? 241 00:12:58,386 --> 00:13:00,301 There's gotta be something on that CVR about why 242 00:13:00,388 --> 00:13:01,998 they were on runway 26. 243 00:13:03,826 --> 00:13:06,524 Get those to Washington. 244 00:13:06,611 --> 00:13:09,658 [Joe] The flight recorder and the cockpit voice recorder 245 00:13:09,701 --> 00:13:12,356 were retrieved and flown back here to Washington D.C. 246 00:13:13,401 --> 00:13:15,011 [Airplane Roaring] 247 00:13:15,055 --> 00:13:16,752 [Narrator] But being on the wrong runway 248 00:13:16,839 --> 00:13:19,581 doesn't explain why the plane barely made it off the ground. 249 00:13:19,624 --> 00:13:21,322 [Airplane Roaring] 250 00:13:24,978 --> 00:13:27,023 Let's take a closer look at those engines. 251 00:13:29,069 --> 00:13:30,766 [Joe] When the engines are examined, 252 00:13:30,853 --> 00:13:33,769 what the investigator is looking for is damage. 253 00:13:35,945 --> 00:13:38,208 The more damage that there is and the type of damage 254 00:13:38,295 --> 00:13:40,515 tells us that if it was turning at high speed 255 00:13:40,558 --> 00:13:41,821 or turning at a lower speed. 256 00:13:45,476 --> 00:13:47,783 Yeah, they were spinning, all right. 257 00:13:47,870 --> 00:13:49,567 [Narrator] Evidence of deformed blades 258 00:13:49,654 --> 00:13:52,353 suggests the engines were running on impact. 259 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:55,312 [Joe] All the indications were that both engines 260 00:13:55,356 --> 00:13:57,010 were operating at high power 261 00:13:57,097 --> 00:13:58,315 when the breakup sequence started. 262 00:13:58,359 --> 00:14:00,840 There was no problem with the engines. 263 00:14:00,883 --> 00:14:02,493 [Engine Roaring] 264 00:14:08,195 --> 00:14:10,197 Something else must have kept them from getting airborne. 265 00:14:13,156 --> 00:14:16,116 Maybe they were too heavy? 266 00:14:16,159 --> 00:14:18,031 [Narrator] With engine failure ruled out, 267 00:14:18,074 --> 00:14:20,250 the team wonders if the plane was loaded 268 00:14:20,294 --> 00:14:23,819 with too much weight to take off. 269 00:14:23,906 --> 00:14:25,690 [Joe] There's a certain maximum weight that the aircraft 270 00:14:25,734 --> 00:14:27,736 can take off safely with. 271 00:14:27,779 --> 00:14:29,912 So what we do is we calculate the load 272 00:14:29,956 --> 00:14:31,871 that's on the aircraft at the time of the accident. 273 00:14:36,919 --> 00:14:38,616 Hmm. 274 00:14:38,660 --> 00:14:40,357 Ah, here it is. 275 00:14:40,401 --> 00:14:42,316 CRJ's max takeoff weight 276 00:14:42,359 --> 00:14:44,753 is 50,178 pounds. 277 00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,060 [Suspenseful Music] 278 00:14:53,066 --> 00:14:54,981 And the load manifest said the plane weighed 279 00:14:55,068 --> 00:14:58,941 49,087 pounds on that day. 280 00:15:01,509 --> 00:15:04,338 It's close, but it's within their limit. 281 00:15:04,381 --> 00:15:08,733 [Narrator] The aircraft wasn't too heavy to take off. 282 00:15:08,777 --> 00:15:11,519 In that aircraft on that day with that weight, 283 00:15:11,562 --> 00:15:13,347 how much runway would be needed to take off safely? 284 00:15:15,262 --> 00:15:17,525 [Narrator] Using the actual weight of the aircraft 285 00:15:17,568 --> 00:15:20,528 and the CRJ-100 specifications, 286 00:15:20,571 --> 00:15:23,009 investigators calculate how much runway the plane 287 00:15:23,096 --> 00:15:25,881 needed to lift off. 288 00:15:25,968 --> 00:15:28,014 A weight of the aircraft affects how fast 289 00:15:28,057 --> 00:15:30,016 they have to be going to be able to lift off, 290 00:15:30,059 --> 00:15:32,975 and that is directly correlated to how much runway 291 00:15:33,019 --> 00:15:34,934 it takes to be able to achieve that speed. 292 00:15:37,023 --> 00:15:39,721 3,744 feet. 293 00:15:40,896 --> 00:15:43,725 3,744 feet. 294 00:15:43,768 --> 00:15:45,988 And runway 2-6 is? 295 00:15:47,903 --> 00:15:49,949 3,501 feet. 296 00:15:53,604 --> 00:15:56,477 [Narrator] Investigators reach an astonishing conclusion. 297 00:15:58,044 --> 00:16:01,003 Runway 2-6 is 243 feet too short. 298 00:16:02,787 --> 00:16:04,224 They ran out of runway. 299 00:16:06,400 --> 00:16:07,879 [Narrator] They now understand 300 00:16:07,923 --> 00:16:09,403 why the plane couldn't get airborne, 301 00:16:10,970 --> 00:16:12,884 but they're still mystified. 302 00:16:12,928 --> 00:16:16,105 Why didn't flight 5191 take off from the longer runway? 303 00:16:17,411 --> 00:16:20,196 [Airplane Roaring] 304 00:16:25,941 --> 00:16:28,813 Hate to say this, but you're not gonna get any answers 305 00:16:28,857 --> 00:16:30,946 from the first officer, either. 306 00:16:30,990 --> 00:16:32,817 His injuries are very severe. 307 00:16:35,472 --> 00:16:37,387 [Narrator] The first officer is medically unfit 308 00:16:37,431 --> 00:16:39,041 to be interviewed. 309 00:16:39,085 --> 00:16:41,739 It's a big loss to the investigation. 310 00:16:41,783 --> 00:16:43,828 [Evan Sighing] 311 00:16:43,872 --> 00:16:45,700 [Evan] It can be frustrating when you're not able 312 00:16:45,743 --> 00:16:47,745 to speak with people that you'd like to speak with, 313 00:16:47,832 --> 00:16:51,053 but as investigators we need to work with 314 00:16:51,097 --> 00:16:52,185 the data that we have. 315 00:16:54,317 --> 00:16:56,189 [Narrator] Investigators look for other clues 316 00:16:56,276 --> 00:17:00,106 that might reveal why flight 5191 ended up on a runway 317 00:17:00,193 --> 00:17:02,238 they were not cleared to use. 318 00:17:04,066 --> 00:17:07,722 All right, they left the gate here. 319 00:17:07,765 --> 00:17:09,419 They taxi along here. 320 00:17:11,465 --> 00:17:15,121 They're supposed to leave from runway 2-2 here, 321 00:17:18,428 --> 00:17:20,343 but they end up here. 322 00:17:22,215 --> 00:17:24,869 The question is why? 323 00:17:24,956 --> 00:17:27,002 [Joe] So when we were looking into trying to understand why 324 00:17:27,089 --> 00:17:29,091 this flight crew thought they are on runway 2-2, 325 00:17:29,135 --> 00:17:31,441 we looked at anything that was different, 326 00:17:31,485 --> 00:17:34,314 anything that the flight crew may have misunderstood 327 00:17:34,357 --> 00:17:38,492 with regard to both the airport and the charts 328 00:17:38,535 --> 00:17:39,841 or any of their training. 329 00:17:40,885 --> 00:17:42,322 Hey, look at this. 330 00:17:42,365 --> 00:17:44,019 Our guys got some shots of the runway. 331 00:17:53,159 --> 00:17:54,334 Hey, check this out. 332 00:17:58,555 --> 00:18:03,691 Taxi way to runway 2-2 was blocked off by construction. 333 00:18:03,778 --> 00:18:05,388 [Shawn] There were numerous construction projects 334 00:18:05,432 --> 00:18:06,911 that were in place at the Lexington airport 335 00:18:06,955 --> 00:18:08,435 the day of the accident. 336 00:18:09,697 --> 00:18:10,959 Okay? Sure. 337 00:18:11,046 --> 00:18:12,352 But wasn't that in their chart? 338 00:18:13,831 --> 00:18:16,225 [Narrator] Normally, when a taxiway is closed, 339 00:18:16,269 --> 00:18:18,532 pilots receive an interim airport chart 340 00:18:18,575 --> 00:18:19,924 with an alternate route. 341 00:18:21,970 --> 00:18:23,711 Nope, nothing on the chart. 342 00:18:27,280 --> 00:18:29,151 [Narrator] Investigators are amazed to learn 343 00:18:29,195 --> 00:18:32,285 that the crew's airport chart only showed the taxi route 344 00:18:32,328 --> 00:18:33,938 before construction, 345 00:18:35,157 --> 00:18:37,072 not the updated taxi route. 346 00:18:41,032 --> 00:18:44,166 [Joe] It is a surprise to see that the airport construction 347 00:18:44,210 --> 00:18:45,950 had not been updated in the charts 348 00:18:45,994 --> 00:18:47,300 that the flight crew had. 349 00:18:50,041 --> 00:18:52,087 [Narrator] It's a disturbing find. 350 00:18:52,174 --> 00:18:55,612 Could out-of-date taxi charts have misled the pilots 351 00:18:55,656 --> 00:18:57,875 into taking off from a runway that was too short 352 00:18:57,919 --> 00:18:59,225 for their plane? 353 00:19:05,187 --> 00:19:06,101 So they get out there and they find 354 00:19:06,145 --> 00:19:07,798 their taxi ways blocked. 355 00:19:07,842 --> 00:19:09,017 And they don't have anything to tell them 356 00:19:09,060 --> 00:19:10,410 how to get to runway 2-2. 357 00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:14,283 That could trip you up. 358 00:19:16,024 --> 00:19:17,939 [Narrator] But something doesn't add up. 359 00:19:19,810 --> 00:19:23,031 Comair flight 5191 wasn't the only plane 360 00:19:23,074 --> 00:19:24,511 departing Lexington that morning. 361 00:19:25,773 --> 00:19:27,340 Other planes left before them 362 00:19:27,427 --> 00:19:29,342 and none of them ended up on runway 2-6. 363 00:19:32,301 --> 00:19:35,783 Eagle flight runway 2-2, cleared for takeoff. 364 00:19:39,439 --> 00:19:42,616 [Joe] The other two flights took off prior to 5191. 365 00:19:42,659 --> 00:19:45,227 Received the same information that the flight crew 366 00:19:45,271 --> 00:19:47,186 from 5191 received, 367 00:19:47,229 --> 00:19:48,926 and did not have any difficulties 368 00:19:49,013 --> 00:19:51,059 in navigating to the runway. 369 00:19:51,102 --> 00:19:54,018 [Evan] The fact the two other aircraft were able to 370 00:19:54,062 --> 00:19:56,282 depart successfully that morning 371 00:19:56,369 --> 00:19:58,284 caused us to look deeper. 372 00:19:58,327 --> 00:20:00,373 -[Airplane Roaring] -[Dramatic Music] 373 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,338 Maybe there's something on the security footage. 374 00:20:09,382 --> 00:20:10,905 [Narrator] Investigators turn their attention 375 00:20:10,948 --> 00:20:14,735 to CCTV footage in the hopes that it will explain 376 00:20:14,778 --> 00:20:17,781 why Comair flight 5191 took off from the wrong runway. 377 00:20:18,913 --> 00:20:20,044 [Airplane Roaring] 378 00:20:20,088 --> 00:20:21,437 [Passengers Screaming] 379 00:20:27,965 --> 00:20:29,880 [Suspenseful Music] 380 00:20:33,101 --> 00:20:36,191 We were able to retrieve security footage from cameras 381 00:20:36,278 --> 00:20:38,280 on the parking garage that showed our aircraft 382 00:20:38,324 --> 00:20:39,890 taxiing out that morning. 383 00:20:41,762 --> 00:20:45,374 All right, let's see what they were actually up to. 384 00:20:45,418 --> 00:20:46,897 [Narrator] Investigators quickly confirm 385 00:20:46,941 --> 00:20:49,248 how straightforward the taxi route was. 386 00:20:50,945 --> 00:20:53,513 Taxi is short and there's no other aircraft in sight. 387 00:20:55,906 --> 00:20:57,952 [Evan] Our assessment based on examination 388 00:20:57,995 --> 00:21:01,129 of surveillance video showed that it was a nominal taxi. 389 00:21:04,741 --> 00:21:09,964 The taxi route from the ramp to runway 2-2 390 00:21:10,007 --> 00:21:12,009 was straightforward and only required 391 00:21:12,096 --> 00:21:14,447 one runway crossing, 2-6. 392 00:21:16,231 --> 00:21:17,580 Wait, stop it right there. 393 00:21:19,147 --> 00:21:20,366 [Suspenseful Music] 394 00:21:23,107 --> 00:21:26,285 It looks like they've stopped at the hold short line 395 00:21:26,328 --> 00:21:27,895 for runway 26. 396 00:21:32,073 --> 00:21:33,553 [Narrator] Before takeoff, 397 00:21:33,596 --> 00:21:36,556 planes stop or hold short the runway 398 00:21:36,599 --> 00:21:39,515 until they're cleared to proceed by air traffic control. 399 00:21:39,559 --> 00:21:41,387 No, they were on their way to runway 22. 400 00:21:41,430 --> 00:21:44,825 Why the heck would they stop there? 401 00:21:44,868 --> 00:21:48,785 [Narrator] Investigators are startled by the discovery. 402 00:21:48,829 --> 00:21:51,527 [Joe] We noticed at that time that the aircraft had stopped 403 00:21:51,571 --> 00:21:56,358 prior to runway 2-6 for over 50 seconds. 404 00:21:56,402 --> 00:21:58,926 This is unusual because there was no real reason 405 00:21:58,969 --> 00:22:00,406 for them to stop there. 406 00:22:00,493 --> 00:22:01,581 [Joe Sighing] 407 00:22:01,624 --> 00:22:03,104 We need to see the taxi route. 408 00:22:03,974 --> 00:22:05,759 All right. 409 00:22:05,802 --> 00:22:07,717 [Narrator] Were there clues telling the pilots 410 00:22:07,761 --> 00:22:09,850 they were in the wrong place? 411 00:22:09,937 --> 00:22:12,287 [Evan] One of our main questions when we realized 412 00:22:12,374 --> 00:22:14,942 that they stopped for 50 seconds at the hold short line 413 00:22:14,985 --> 00:22:18,075 for runway 2-6 was what could they have been seeing? 414 00:22:20,295 --> 00:22:22,123 [Narrator] To better understand why the pilots 415 00:22:22,166 --> 00:22:24,952 of Comair flight 5191 416 00:22:25,039 --> 00:22:27,650 stopped at the hold short line for the wrong runway. 417 00:22:27,737 --> 00:22:30,305 All right, now let's get started. 418 00:22:30,392 --> 00:22:32,960 [Narrator] Investigators retrace their taxi route. 419 00:22:33,003 --> 00:22:34,222 [Evan Sighing] 420 00:22:38,748 --> 00:22:41,229 We want to understand what the flight crew was seeing. 421 00:22:41,272 --> 00:22:45,625 In order to do that, we had to do a taxi demonstration 422 00:22:45,668 --> 00:22:49,063 to identify all the signage, the markings, 423 00:22:49,106 --> 00:22:50,978 and the cues available to the flight crew. 424 00:22:52,240 --> 00:22:54,155 [Suspenseful Music] 425 00:22:58,333 --> 00:23:01,597 There on the left there's a sign for runway 26. 426 00:23:07,037 --> 00:23:08,648 Straight ahead, 427 00:23:08,691 --> 00:23:10,780 I can see the hold short line for runway 26. 428 00:23:10,824 --> 00:23:12,347 I mean, it's clear as day. 429 00:23:15,219 --> 00:23:17,918 [Evan] Things that we're looking for during that taxi demo 430 00:23:18,005 --> 00:23:21,965 were things like the quality of the markings 431 00:23:22,009 --> 00:23:23,837 on the taxi way, 432 00:23:23,880 --> 00:23:26,796 the signage, whether it was illuminated or not. 433 00:23:26,840 --> 00:23:29,669 The taxi line splits three ways. 434 00:23:29,712 --> 00:23:32,062 [Narrator] Investigators can see what the pilots 435 00:23:32,106 --> 00:23:35,326 would have seen from the hold short line for runway 2-6. 436 00:23:35,370 --> 00:23:37,981 The line on the left goes to runway 2-6. 437 00:23:42,377 --> 00:23:45,249 The line in the middle is the route to runway 2-2. 438 00:23:48,949 --> 00:23:52,082 The line on the right is runway 2-2's old taxi route, 439 00:23:54,215 --> 00:23:56,086 blocked by barricades. 440 00:23:57,740 --> 00:23:59,873 I can clearly see the signs telling us 441 00:23:59,916 --> 00:24:03,180 that we're at the hold short line for runway 26. 442 00:24:03,267 --> 00:24:04,660 I mean, it's hard to miss that. 443 00:24:08,142 --> 00:24:09,839 [Narrator] Investigators discovered that the crew 444 00:24:09,883 --> 00:24:13,060 had clear cues that they were at the hold short line 445 00:24:13,103 --> 00:24:17,630 for runway 2-6, not 2-2. 446 00:24:17,717 --> 00:24:20,633 The question remains, how did they miss those cues? 447 00:24:22,504 --> 00:24:24,158 [Evan Sighing] 448 00:24:24,201 --> 00:24:26,203 Okay, let's go to 26. 449 00:24:29,511 --> 00:24:31,165 [Narrator] The test plane follows the line 450 00:24:31,208 --> 00:24:33,472 on the left to runway 2-6. 451 00:24:34,124 --> 00:24:35,996 Okay. See? 452 00:24:36,083 --> 00:24:37,867 That's where they should have taken the taxi route 453 00:24:37,911 --> 00:24:40,566 and stopped, the hold short line for runway 22. 454 00:24:43,830 --> 00:24:45,745 [Narrator] Investigators are surprised to learn 455 00:24:45,788 --> 00:24:50,663 that even as flight 5191 was turning onto runway 2-6, 456 00:24:50,706 --> 00:24:53,013 the crew had a clear view of the sign 457 00:24:53,100 --> 00:24:56,756 pointing to the runway they were meant to be on. 458 00:24:56,799 --> 00:24:59,672 There were no features in the environment 459 00:24:59,715 --> 00:25:02,892 in terms of the signs, marking or lighting 460 00:25:02,936 --> 00:25:06,374 that show they were on runway 2-2. 461 00:25:09,769 --> 00:25:13,033 All the cues are right there in plain sight. 462 00:25:15,209 --> 00:25:16,993 [Narrator] Joe Sedor then uncovers 463 00:25:17,037 --> 00:25:19,126 one more disturbing fact. 464 00:25:19,169 --> 00:25:22,042 When we taxied from the taxi way 465 00:25:22,129 --> 00:25:24,348 and turned onto runway 2-6, 466 00:25:24,392 --> 00:25:27,395 all of the lights on runway 2-6 were out 467 00:25:27,438 --> 00:25:29,484 and there was no lights in the distance. 468 00:25:31,965 --> 00:25:35,446 As an experienced pilot, I look at that and say, 469 00:25:35,490 --> 00:25:37,927 "Why did this flight crew take off from this runway?" 470 00:25:40,190 --> 00:25:42,192 We need to know what was going on in that cockpit. 471 00:25:43,237 --> 00:25:45,108 [Dramatic Music] 472 00:25:48,155 --> 00:25:49,548 That is weird with no lights. 473 00:25:51,027 --> 00:25:51,985 Yeah. 474 00:25:56,424 --> 00:25:58,208 [Narrator] The cockpit voice recorder 475 00:25:58,252 --> 00:26:01,429 from Comair flight 5191 is finally ready to be reviewed. 476 00:26:03,257 --> 00:26:04,780 Okay, let's hear what we've got. 477 00:26:07,609 --> 00:26:09,829 [Narrator] It may be the only hope of explaining 478 00:26:09,872 --> 00:26:12,875 why the crew ended up on an out of service runway 479 00:26:12,962 --> 00:26:16,183 instead of the one they were cleared to use. 480 00:26:16,226 --> 00:26:18,620 In this type of human factors accident, 481 00:26:18,664 --> 00:26:20,970 it's very difficult because we have to try 482 00:26:21,014 --> 00:26:25,192 to determine what the pilots were thinking. 483 00:26:25,235 --> 00:26:27,890 The main tool that we use in order to determine that 484 00:26:27,977 --> 00:26:30,414 is the cockpit voice recorder. 485 00:26:30,458 --> 00:26:32,721 The CVR was very important in understanding 486 00:26:32,765 --> 00:26:34,854 what the flight crew was talking about 487 00:26:34,897 --> 00:26:37,813 and what they were doing during the taxi and the takeoff. 488 00:26:40,337 --> 00:26:41,643 [Jeff] Are you up for flying this leg? 489 00:26:41,687 --> 00:26:43,253 [James] I'll take us to Atlanta. 490 00:26:43,297 --> 00:26:45,560 Okay, so the first officer's gonna fly. 491 00:26:45,604 --> 00:26:46,692 That's standard stuff. 492 00:26:49,303 --> 00:26:50,826 The flight crew were conducting themselves 493 00:26:50,870 --> 00:26:53,916 in a professional manner. 494 00:26:53,960 --> 00:26:55,526 [Jeff] For our own briefing, Comair standard. 495 00:26:55,570 --> 00:26:57,050 Run the checklist, your leisure. 496 00:26:57,093 --> 00:26:58,225 Keep me out of trouble. 497 00:26:58,268 --> 00:26:59,705 I'll do the same for you. 498 00:26:59,792 --> 00:27:01,097 I'll do the same. 499 00:27:01,141 --> 00:27:02,229 Whenever you're ready. 500 00:27:04,057 --> 00:27:07,277 Okay, here comes the taxi brief. 501 00:27:07,321 --> 00:27:10,367 [James] Right seat flex takeoff procedures off of? 502 00:27:10,454 --> 00:27:11,673 He said what runway? 2-4? 503 00:27:11,717 --> 00:27:12,979 That's 2-2. 504 00:27:13,022 --> 00:27:14,545 2-2. 505 00:27:14,589 --> 00:27:15,634 The ILS is out on 2-2. 506 00:27:16,635 --> 00:27:18,680 Came in the other night, 507 00:27:18,724 --> 00:27:20,073 the runway identifier lights were out all over the place. 508 00:27:20,116 --> 00:27:21,814 [Jeff] All right. 509 00:27:21,857 --> 00:27:23,903 2-2's your short taxi. Any questions? 510 00:27:23,946 --> 00:27:25,469 [James] No questions before starting. 511 00:27:25,513 --> 00:27:26,906 At your leisure. 512 00:27:26,949 --> 00:27:28,037 [Narrator] Something in the briefing 513 00:27:28,081 --> 00:27:30,300 surprises investigators. 514 00:27:30,344 --> 00:27:31,693 Wait, stop it right there. 515 00:27:33,129 --> 00:27:34,957 Is that not a short brief to you? 516 00:27:39,048 --> 00:27:40,789 [Narrator] They discover that the crew used 517 00:27:40,833 --> 00:27:43,183 an abbreviated version of the taxi brief 518 00:27:43,270 --> 00:27:44,880 called Comair standard. 519 00:27:46,882 --> 00:27:48,841 Pull up the Comair standard taxi brief. 520 00:27:50,494 --> 00:27:52,714 [Suspenseful Music] 521 00:27:58,894 --> 00:28:01,984 There's no mention of crossing runways 522 00:28:02,028 --> 00:28:05,640 or stopping to call ATC if they're unsure where they are. 523 00:28:05,727 --> 00:28:07,860 [Narrator] Investigators are baffled to discover 524 00:28:07,947 --> 00:28:09,775 that even the shortened taxi brief 525 00:28:09,862 --> 00:28:11,733 with eight checklist items, 526 00:28:11,777 --> 00:28:14,040 including a very crucial one, wasn't followed. 527 00:28:15,737 --> 00:28:16,956 Yeah, they never briefed on the runway 528 00:28:16,999 --> 00:28:20,176 they had to cross to get to runway 22. 529 00:28:20,220 --> 00:28:22,048 [Evan] The crew's abbreviated briefing that morning 530 00:28:22,091 --> 00:28:24,485 was a deviation from standard operating procedures 531 00:28:24,528 --> 00:28:25,921 that we identified. 532 00:28:27,749 --> 00:28:30,447 [Narrator] Had the crew done a full taxi briefing, 533 00:28:30,534 --> 00:28:33,537 they would have discussed the need to cross runway 2-6 534 00:28:33,581 --> 00:28:35,322 on the way to 2-2. 535 00:28:35,365 --> 00:28:39,630 They missed an opportunity to review the airport diagram 536 00:28:39,674 --> 00:28:42,546 and determined that they needed to cross runway 2-6, 537 00:28:42,590 --> 00:28:45,811 and intervening runway, before they reached runway 2-2. 538 00:28:48,596 --> 00:28:50,598 Okay, let's hear their taxi checklist. 539 00:28:52,426 --> 00:28:53,949 [James] Flight controls. 540 00:28:53,993 --> 00:28:55,168 [Jeff] Check left. 541 00:28:55,211 --> 00:28:56,952 [James] On the right, trims. 542 00:28:57,605 --> 00:28:59,128 Engage 07.2. 543 00:29:00,477 --> 00:29:02,131 Radar terrain displaced. 544 00:29:02,175 --> 00:29:04,133 All taxi checks complete. 545 00:29:04,220 --> 00:29:05,004 [Jeff] Finish up the Before Takeoff checklist, 546 00:29:05,047 --> 00:29:06,919 your leisure. 547 00:29:06,962 --> 00:29:09,051 [Joe] One other thing on the CVR we heard 548 00:29:09,138 --> 00:29:12,663 was the captain using the term "at your leisure." 549 00:29:12,707 --> 00:29:15,014 It was used so many times in the CVR. 550 00:29:15,057 --> 00:29:17,712 What this told us is that this flight crew was relaxed. 551 00:29:17,799 --> 00:29:20,280 Maybe they were a little bit too relaxed. 552 00:29:20,367 --> 00:29:22,499 [James] Ah, yeah, I know three guys at Kennedy. 553 00:29:22,543 --> 00:29:24,197 Actually two guys. 554 00:29:24,240 --> 00:29:25,938 One went, but he did get through the Sims. 555 00:29:25,981 --> 00:29:27,461 Oh, really? 556 00:29:27,504 --> 00:29:29,506 [James] Then a first officer from Cincinnati, 557 00:29:29,550 --> 00:29:31,378 he got through the second part and that's as far as he got. 558 00:29:31,421 --> 00:29:33,249 Stop it right there. 559 00:29:33,293 --> 00:29:34,990 [Narrator] Investigators cannot believe 560 00:29:35,034 --> 00:29:36,035 what they're hearing. 561 00:29:36,078 --> 00:29:38,428 What the heck is he talking about? 562 00:29:38,472 --> 00:29:40,866 [Narrator] Instead of focusing on their checklists, 563 00:29:40,909 --> 00:29:44,521 the crew of 5191 was having a casual conversation 564 00:29:44,565 --> 00:29:45,914 during a critical moment. 565 00:29:47,829 --> 00:29:49,526 It's a major breach of what's called 566 00:29:49,613 --> 00:29:51,702 the sterile cockpit rule. 567 00:29:51,746 --> 00:29:54,836 The sterile cockpit rule requires that pilots refrain 568 00:29:54,880 --> 00:29:58,622 from non-operational conversation 569 00:29:58,666 --> 00:30:00,711 during significant portions of flight. 570 00:30:00,755 --> 00:30:03,192 One of the key reasons for the sterile cockpit rule 571 00:30:03,279 --> 00:30:05,760 is that non-pertinent conversation can be distracting. 572 00:30:08,067 --> 00:30:09,938 [James] And that's as far as it got, 573 00:30:09,982 --> 00:30:11,853 and then he actually got offered the position. 574 00:30:11,897 --> 00:30:12,898 Did he take it or? 575 00:30:12,985 --> 00:30:14,682 Yeah, he took it. 576 00:30:14,769 --> 00:30:16,727 [Jeff] Oh, okay. 577 00:30:16,771 --> 00:30:18,120 The captain should be shutting this conversation down, 578 00:30:18,207 --> 00:30:20,557 not encouraging it. 579 00:30:20,644 --> 00:30:22,255 [Evan] Although the first officer 580 00:30:22,298 --> 00:30:24,039 started the conversation, 581 00:30:24,083 --> 00:30:26,999 the captain is responsible for ensuring 582 00:30:27,086 --> 00:30:29,218 that sterile cockpit rule's enforced 583 00:30:29,262 --> 00:30:31,438 and distractions do not enter the cockpit 584 00:30:31,481 --> 00:30:33,701 that could affect the safety of flight. 585 00:30:35,224 --> 00:30:38,967 [Narrator] After 40 seconds of casual conversation. 586 00:30:39,011 --> 00:30:40,099 [James] Second engine started. 587 00:30:40,142 --> 00:30:42,449 Anti-ice probes. Windshield low. 588 00:30:44,712 --> 00:30:46,322 [Narrator] Investigators hear the pilots turn 589 00:30:46,366 --> 00:30:48,107 to their takeoff checklist. 590 00:30:51,023 --> 00:30:53,242 Now they finally get back to their jobs. 591 00:30:53,286 --> 00:30:55,157 [Joe] We were surprised by that. 592 00:30:55,201 --> 00:30:58,291 That non-pertinent conversation was in a critical area 593 00:30:58,334 --> 00:31:01,250 when the flight crew was making their taxi out 594 00:31:01,294 --> 00:31:05,037 to the runway where the flight crew needs to be 595 00:31:05,080 --> 00:31:07,082 100% flying the aircraft. 596 00:31:08,301 --> 00:31:09,693 [Dramatic Music] 597 00:31:11,347 --> 00:31:13,480 [Narrator] Could that period of inattention 598 00:31:13,523 --> 00:31:15,612 hold the key to this tragic accident? 599 00:31:15,699 --> 00:31:16,962 [Airplane Roaring] 600 00:31:21,009 --> 00:31:22,445 Okay, let's see what we've got so far. 601 00:31:24,491 --> 00:31:27,450 [Narrator] Investigators wonder if a casual conversation 602 00:31:27,494 --> 00:31:30,627 is at the heart of the crash of Comair flight 5191. 603 00:31:32,412 --> 00:31:34,718 They skipped out of their briefing. 604 00:31:34,762 --> 00:31:37,025 It would have told them they needed to cross 26 605 00:31:38,157 --> 00:31:39,114 to get to 22. 606 00:31:42,944 --> 00:31:45,077 Then for almost a minute 607 00:31:45,120 --> 00:31:47,122 they violate the sterile cockpit rule. 608 00:31:50,734 --> 00:31:52,040 Let's see what happens when they get here. 609 00:31:55,304 --> 00:31:57,263 [Narrator] Investigators hope the crew will give 610 00:31:57,306 --> 00:32:00,353 some indication why they stopped at the hold short line 611 00:32:00,396 --> 00:32:02,094 for runway 2-6. 612 00:32:03,225 --> 00:32:05,401 Thrust reversers are armed. 613 00:32:05,445 --> 00:32:07,447 Autocross flow is manual. 614 00:32:08,448 --> 00:32:11,320 Ignition is off. 615 00:32:11,407 --> 00:32:14,454 Altimeters are three triple zero across the board. 616 00:32:15,585 --> 00:32:16,891 [James] Crosschecked. 617 00:32:16,935 --> 00:32:18,284 I'll check in with the cabin. 618 00:32:20,025 --> 00:32:22,027 That's it? 619 00:32:22,070 --> 00:32:25,465 It was surprising to us that there was no conversation 620 00:32:25,552 --> 00:32:28,598 about their location on the airfield 621 00:32:28,685 --> 00:32:30,600 or confusion about it 622 00:32:30,644 --> 00:32:33,081 while they were holding short on runway 2-6. 623 00:32:36,650 --> 00:32:38,347 We know they were distracted, 624 00:32:39,914 --> 00:32:41,785 but when they stopped their chit-chat 625 00:32:41,829 --> 00:32:44,701 they don't seem to recognize, know, or check where they are. 626 00:32:47,878 --> 00:32:51,230 We got no information based on the conversation 627 00:32:51,273 --> 00:32:52,796 of the flight crew while they were holding short 628 00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:54,842 that they were disoriented. 629 00:32:54,929 --> 00:32:57,497 No indications at all. 630 00:32:57,584 --> 00:32:58,846 [Narrator] Investigators are amazed 631 00:32:58,933 --> 00:33:00,891 by what they hear next. 632 00:33:00,935 --> 00:33:01,936 [James] At your leisure, 633 00:33:01,980 --> 00:33:04,460 Comair 1-21 ready to go. 634 00:33:04,504 --> 00:33:07,289 [Controller] Comair 1-91, Lexington tower. 635 00:33:10,510 --> 00:33:12,860 Fly runaway heading. Cleared for takeoff. 636 00:33:12,947 --> 00:33:14,818 Ugh. 637 00:33:14,862 --> 00:33:17,038 Hold there. 638 00:33:17,082 --> 00:33:21,303 So they're completely relaxed when they ask for clearance. 639 00:33:21,390 --> 00:33:23,305 They're so relaxed or distracted 640 00:33:23,349 --> 00:33:26,700 that the first officer uses the wrong flight number. 641 00:33:26,743 --> 00:33:30,051 [Narrator] Investigators realize the grim truth. 642 00:33:30,095 --> 00:33:33,098 These guys actually thought they were lined up 643 00:33:33,185 --> 00:33:35,317 for runway 22. 644 00:33:35,361 --> 00:33:38,233 [Evan] The fact that they stopped at runway 2-6 645 00:33:38,277 --> 00:33:41,062 and subsequently called for takeoff 646 00:33:41,106 --> 00:33:44,152 indicates that they lost awareness 647 00:33:44,196 --> 00:33:46,589 that they had not crossed runway 2-6. 648 00:33:48,200 --> 00:33:50,898 They turn onto runway 26. 649 00:33:50,985 --> 00:33:52,465 Then what? 650 00:33:52,508 --> 00:33:54,032 Keep going. 651 00:33:54,075 --> 00:33:55,903 [James] Lineup checks completed. 652 00:33:57,252 --> 00:33:58,688 [Jeff] All yours, Jim. 653 00:33:58,732 --> 00:34:01,082 First officer takes the controls. 654 00:34:01,126 --> 00:34:03,041 So he's looking ahead 655 00:34:03,084 --> 00:34:05,043 probably for the first time. 656 00:34:07,306 --> 00:34:10,265 [Joe] At this time the captain taxied the aircraft 657 00:34:10,309 --> 00:34:12,137 out onto the runway 658 00:34:12,180 --> 00:34:13,834 and then transferred controls 659 00:34:13,877 --> 00:34:15,662 to the first officer. 660 00:34:15,705 --> 00:34:17,446 So before this time, 661 00:34:17,490 --> 00:34:20,058 the first officer was heads down in the cockpit. 662 00:34:21,276 --> 00:34:23,887 My brakes, my controls. 663 00:34:23,931 --> 00:34:27,326 [Evan] When the first officer looked out, he saw a runway. 664 00:34:27,369 --> 00:34:31,330 He may not have perceived that it was a narrower runway 665 00:34:31,373 --> 00:34:33,332 than runway 2-2. 666 00:34:34,681 --> 00:34:37,118 They're looking down runway 26. 667 00:34:39,164 --> 00:34:41,601 Why don't they see the sign for 22 off to the right? 668 00:34:45,257 --> 00:34:47,520 [Evan] Neither pilot crosschecked their location 669 00:34:47,563 --> 00:34:49,391 at the time that they took the runway. 670 00:34:51,393 --> 00:34:54,092 [Airplane Whirring] 671 00:34:55,919 --> 00:34:57,356 Set thrust, please. 672 00:34:59,619 --> 00:35:01,360 Thrust set. 673 00:35:01,403 --> 00:35:04,145 -[Airplane Roaring] -[Dramatic Music] 674 00:35:12,197 --> 00:35:13,850 That is weird with no lights. 675 00:35:14,851 --> 00:35:16,070 Yeah. 676 00:35:19,508 --> 00:35:20,422 Hold on. 677 00:35:22,381 --> 00:35:24,992 Runway 26 is not in use, so it's not lit. 678 00:35:27,212 --> 00:35:29,475 They see the lights for 22 until they cross it. 679 00:35:35,829 --> 00:35:37,961 They're looking down a pitch dark runway, 680 00:35:39,137 --> 00:35:41,574 and it doesn't phase them. 681 00:35:41,617 --> 00:35:43,880 [Narrator] Investigators wonder if the pilots 682 00:35:43,924 --> 00:35:47,841 were confused about what the runway should have looked like. 683 00:35:47,884 --> 00:35:51,236 [Evan] When they began the takeoff roll on runway 2-6, 684 00:35:51,323 --> 00:35:53,325 they had no center line lights 685 00:35:53,368 --> 00:35:55,457 or edge lights on this runway. 686 00:35:55,501 --> 00:35:58,591 However, based on the first officer's previous experience 687 00:35:58,634 --> 00:36:00,070 the night before, 688 00:36:00,114 --> 00:36:02,116 he did not expect to see lights. 689 00:36:04,249 --> 00:36:06,903 The ILS is out on 2-2. Came in the other night, 690 00:36:06,947 --> 00:36:09,297 the runway identifier lights were out all over the place. 691 00:36:09,341 --> 00:36:11,125 And so it would not necessarily have been 692 00:36:11,169 --> 00:36:12,822 an unusual sight picture. 693 00:36:14,346 --> 00:36:16,130 [Narrator] Such decision-making based on 694 00:36:16,217 --> 00:36:19,046 a person's mistaken assessment is called confirmation bias. 695 00:36:21,135 --> 00:36:23,006 Confirmation bias is where the flight crew 696 00:36:23,050 --> 00:36:25,531 expects something to be there 697 00:36:25,574 --> 00:36:27,185 even though it might not actually be there. 698 00:36:30,492 --> 00:36:33,713 He noticed there was no lights on the runway, 699 00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:35,193 but he just accepted the fact. 700 00:36:36,890 --> 00:36:37,804 What happens next? 701 00:36:38,979 --> 00:36:40,633 [Dramatic Music] 702 00:36:45,377 --> 00:36:47,074 -[Jeff] 100 knots. -[James] Checks. 703 00:36:49,076 --> 00:36:51,426 [Narrator] Pilots now see they're almost out of runway. 704 00:36:51,470 --> 00:36:53,254 [Jeff] V-1. Rotate. 705 00:36:54,821 --> 00:36:56,257 [Narrator] And don't have the required speed 706 00:36:56,301 --> 00:36:57,084 to get airborne. 707 00:36:57,171 --> 00:36:58,216 Whoa. 708 00:36:59,173 --> 00:37:00,435 [Airplane Roaring] 709 00:37:00,479 --> 00:37:01,349 [James] Dammit! 710 00:37:02,263 --> 00:37:03,960 [Airplane Roaring] 711 00:37:05,092 --> 00:37:06,398 [Transmission Static Crackling] 712 00:37:07,834 --> 00:37:09,401 That's it. 713 00:37:09,488 --> 00:37:11,490 They finally realize something's wrong 714 00:37:11,533 --> 00:37:12,882 and it's too late. 715 00:37:15,189 --> 00:37:16,408 [Evan] Based on our calculations, 716 00:37:16,451 --> 00:37:18,323 the crew needed to recognize 717 00:37:18,366 --> 00:37:20,194 that they were on the wrong runway 718 00:37:20,281 --> 00:37:23,893 and successfully reject the takeoff about 20 seconds 719 00:37:23,937 --> 00:37:25,721 into the takeoff roll. 720 00:37:25,765 --> 00:37:29,899 However, their recognition did not occur until much later 721 00:37:29,943 --> 00:37:33,338 when the captain called rotate at a lower speed 722 00:37:35,078 --> 00:37:37,298 than what was required. 723 00:37:37,342 --> 00:37:39,039 [Airplane Roaring] 724 00:37:44,218 --> 00:37:46,525 [Narrator] Investigators have unraveled the mystery 725 00:37:46,568 --> 00:37:50,137 of what happened inside the cockpit of flight 5191. 726 00:37:51,094 --> 00:37:53,445 [Suspenseful Music] 727 00:37:57,362 --> 00:38:00,974 They started by skipping the full briefing. 728 00:38:01,017 --> 00:38:02,758 And then after a long discussion about the airline, 729 00:38:02,802 --> 00:38:05,544 they lose sight of where they are. 730 00:38:05,587 --> 00:38:08,416 They stop at the wrong place and they completely miss 731 00:38:08,460 --> 00:38:11,245 all the signage that they're at the wrong runway. 732 00:38:11,332 --> 00:38:13,552 By the time they figure out the mistake, it's too late. 733 00:38:15,728 --> 00:38:18,034 These guys were going through the motions 734 00:38:18,121 --> 00:38:19,819 when they should have been at full attention. 735 00:38:21,864 --> 00:38:24,040 [Narrator] The crew's failure to use available cues 736 00:38:24,127 --> 00:38:27,392 and aids to identify and check the plane's location 737 00:38:29,132 --> 00:38:32,135 led to the tragedy of Comair flight 5191. 738 00:38:34,703 --> 00:38:35,922 [Explosion Booming] 739 00:38:35,965 --> 00:38:37,489 [Flames Crackling] 740 00:38:40,709 --> 00:38:42,842 But the team still has one unanswered question. 741 00:38:44,278 --> 00:38:45,975 Why didn't the controller tell them 742 00:38:46,019 --> 00:38:47,325 they were at the wrong runway? 743 00:38:48,717 --> 00:38:50,502 [Dramatic Music] 744 00:38:57,639 --> 00:38:59,598 [Narrator] Investigators wonder 745 00:38:59,641 --> 00:39:02,992 if the air traffic controller of Comair flight 5191 746 00:39:03,036 --> 00:39:05,299 could have picked up the crew's error 747 00:39:05,386 --> 00:39:06,518 and prevented the accident. 748 00:39:08,346 --> 00:39:10,522 Happy to answer any questions. 749 00:39:10,565 --> 00:39:12,306 [Evan] With the air traffic controller, 750 00:39:12,393 --> 00:39:14,830 we were trying to understand did the controller 751 00:39:14,874 --> 00:39:16,658 have an opportunity to see this airplane 752 00:39:16,745 --> 00:39:19,357 take the wrong runway and prevent the accident? 753 00:39:21,402 --> 00:39:24,579 At 6:05 they asked for takeoff clearance. 754 00:39:24,623 --> 00:39:26,668 Runway 2-2 was free, 755 00:39:26,755 --> 00:39:29,541 so I gave Comair clearance for takeoff. 756 00:39:32,282 --> 00:39:35,329 [James] At your leisure, Comair 1-21, ready to go. 757 00:39:35,373 --> 00:39:37,810 Comair 1-91, Lexington tower. 758 00:39:38,898 --> 00:39:39,899 Fly runway heading. 759 00:39:39,986 --> 00:39:42,075 Cleared for takeoff. 760 00:39:42,118 --> 00:39:43,990 [James] Runway heading. Cleared for takeoff, 1-91. 761 00:39:47,385 --> 00:39:48,777 And what did you do next? 762 00:39:50,431 --> 00:39:52,912 I saw the plane proceed towards runway 2-6, 763 00:39:52,999 --> 00:39:55,001 and then scanned runway 2-2 764 00:39:55,044 --> 00:39:56,481 to make sure there were no vehicles on it. 765 00:39:57,656 --> 00:39:59,701 Did you watch the flight take off? 766 00:39:59,788 --> 00:40:02,574 Not if I have other jobs to do. 767 00:40:02,661 --> 00:40:05,228 [Narrator] Investigators make one final discovery. 768 00:40:07,579 --> 00:40:09,711 And then I turned over here to count my flight strips. 769 00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:13,933 And why would you start counting your flight strips then? 770 00:40:13,976 --> 00:40:15,587 I wasn't busy. 771 00:40:17,327 --> 00:40:18,546 It only takes a few minutes 772 00:40:21,375 --> 00:40:22,376 and there was no reason to think 773 00:40:22,420 --> 00:40:24,247 that they'd have any problems. 774 00:40:24,291 --> 00:40:27,294 In 17 years I've never seen a plane that size 775 00:40:27,337 --> 00:40:28,948 try to take off from runway 2-6. 776 00:40:31,907 --> 00:40:35,171 [Joe] The controller was not watching the airplane 777 00:40:35,258 --> 00:40:38,044 and assumed that the airplane was going to take off 778 00:40:38,131 --> 00:40:41,047 on the correct runway because this is such a simple airport 779 00:40:41,090 --> 00:40:43,266 and because there was no other traffic 780 00:40:43,310 --> 00:40:45,443 on the airport at the time of the accident. 781 00:40:47,183 --> 00:40:49,272 And if you hadn't turned away, 782 00:40:49,316 --> 00:40:51,231 would you have noticed that they were in the wrong place? 783 00:40:56,323 --> 00:40:57,629 I might've. 784 00:40:59,848 --> 00:41:02,764 [Narrator] FAA regulations do not require controllers 785 00:41:02,851 --> 00:41:04,940 to monitor every takeoff, 786 00:41:04,984 --> 00:41:07,726 but if the controller had been watching the runway 787 00:41:07,769 --> 00:41:09,684 instead of counting flight strips, 788 00:41:09,728 --> 00:41:12,208 he might've noticed by 5191's mistake. 789 00:41:13,906 --> 00:41:15,647 [Shawn] He was not actually required, 790 00:41:15,734 --> 00:41:18,084 nor are any controllers required, 791 00:41:18,171 --> 00:41:21,566 to actually watch an aircraft during its takeoff roll. 792 00:41:21,609 --> 00:41:23,568 Had they been required to do that, 793 00:41:23,611 --> 00:41:25,570 this would have given an opportunity 794 00:41:25,657 --> 00:41:27,006 to have the takeoff aborted. 795 00:41:28,877 --> 00:41:31,793 [Narrator] The NTSB concludes that several factors 796 00:41:31,837 --> 00:41:34,013 led the pilots to lose track of their position 797 00:41:34,100 --> 00:41:35,667 on their way to the runway. 798 00:41:37,843 --> 00:41:42,108 Contributing to that was the flight crews' failure 799 00:41:42,151 --> 00:41:44,240 to maintain sterile cockpit 800 00:41:44,284 --> 00:41:47,809 and to have a non-pertinent conversation prior to takeoff. 801 00:41:47,896 --> 00:41:49,332 [Evan] This crashed happened 802 00:41:49,376 --> 00:41:53,467 because of a period of distraction 803 00:41:53,554 --> 00:41:56,731 during what was perceived as a relatively simple taxi. 804 00:41:58,690 --> 00:42:00,605 And it illustrates 805 00:42:00,692 --> 00:42:02,607 the perils of distraction 806 00:42:02,694 --> 00:42:05,261 in that it can take you off task. 807 00:42:05,348 --> 00:42:07,829 It can cause you to lose awareness. 808 00:42:07,873 --> 00:42:12,138 And in this case, both crew members lost awareness 809 00:42:12,181 --> 00:42:15,010 of where they were on that airport surface, 810 00:42:15,054 --> 00:42:17,926 and made a mistake that was extremely consequential. 811 00:42:21,974 --> 00:42:24,498 [Narrator] Among the NTSB recommendations 812 00:42:24,585 --> 00:42:27,414 is a basic technological change to prevent pilots 813 00:42:27,501 --> 00:42:30,025 from getting lost. 814 00:42:30,069 --> 00:42:34,900 The CRJ-100 at the time had sophisticated avionics, 815 00:42:34,943 --> 00:42:37,424 but it lacked a simple GPS system available 816 00:42:37,511 --> 00:42:39,078 in cars of the same era. 817 00:42:41,950 --> 00:42:46,564 Install moving map GPS displays in CRJ-100 cockpits. 818 00:42:48,478 --> 00:42:51,003 [Narrator] The NTSB also makes recommendations 819 00:42:51,046 --> 00:42:52,744 for flight crews. 820 00:42:52,831 --> 00:42:54,659 Require pilots to check that they are 821 00:42:54,746 --> 00:42:56,008 at their assigned runway 822 00:42:58,184 --> 00:43:00,229 before crossing the hold short line. 823 00:43:06,758 --> 00:43:08,324 [Narrator] First Officer James Polehinke, 824 00:43:08,411 --> 00:43:12,024 the lone survivor of Comair flight 5191, 825 00:43:12,067 --> 00:43:13,503 suffered severe injuries, 826 00:43:13,547 --> 00:43:15,201 including the loss of his left leg. 827 00:43:18,204 --> 00:43:20,206 He never returned to commercial aviation. 828 00:43:23,426 --> 00:43:25,559 This was a catastrophic accident. 829 00:43:26,821 --> 00:43:30,999 It affected scores and scores of lives, 830 00:43:31,043 --> 00:43:33,349 but the legacy of this accident 831 00:43:33,436 --> 00:43:36,135 are the safety changes 832 00:43:36,222 --> 00:43:38,703 that have been made to prevent this type of accident 833 00:43:38,746 --> 00:43:39,834 from happening in the future. 834 00:43:42,532 --> 00:43:46,145 [Joe] This accident shows that there are threats 835 00:43:46,232 --> 00:43:47,842 in any environment, 836 00:43:47,886 --> 00:43:50,584 no matter how docile they seem, 837 00:43:50,671 --> 00:43:53,239 and that flight crews have to be aware 838 00:43:53,326 --> 00:43:55,981 and have to be looking for all the threats at all the time. 839 00:43:58,070 --> 00:43:59,985 [Airplane Roaring] 64534

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