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GPWS: Pull up.
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00:00:01,668 --> 00:00:05,214
FO. HAYES: I
remember a very hard impact.
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00:00:05,214 --> 00:00:06,256
We hit the ground.
4
00:00:06,256 --> 00:00:07,382
NARRATOR: A
commuter flight slams
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00:00:07,382 --> 00:00:10,219
into a North
Carolina neighborhood.
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00:00:10,219 --> 00:00:11,637
FO. HAYES: What has
just happened to us?
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00:00:11,637 --> 00:00:13,472
NARRATOR:
Thirty-seven souls are lost,
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00:00:13,472 --> 00:00:16,141
but the crew survives
to explain what happened.
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FO. HAYES: The
problem was the weather.
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GREG: All of a sudden
they ran into this rain shaft.
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00:00:21,772 --> 00:00:23,607
NARRATOR: But for
investigators, weather alone
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can't explain the deadly impact.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Rain
did not cause this crash.
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FO. HAYES: Flaps to 15.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Wait. Stop the tape.
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Did he just say push
it down? Play it again.
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GREG: We replayed
that a dozen times.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down.
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GREG: Did he really say that?
And what did he mean by that?
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♪ ♪
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NARRATOR: US Air
Flight 1016 is en route
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from Columbia, South Carolina,
to Charlotte, North Carolina.
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, good evening.
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Climb and maintain
one two thousand. Twelve.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: One
two thousand, US Air 1016.
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NARRATOR: Captain Mike Greenlee
is one of US Air's top pilots.
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He's an Air Force
veteran who still flies
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fighter jets in the reserves.
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FO. HAYES: I believe he flew the
F-4, and then he flew the F-16.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
One two thousand.
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FO. HAYES: Ten.
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NARRATOR: The first officer,
Phil Hayes, is a seasoned pilot
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who's dreamed of
flying since he was a boy.
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FO. HAYES: And I went
for a ride in an airplane
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when I was about fifteen
and... fourteen or fifteen,
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and the bug bit, and I
wanted to fly after that.
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FO. HAYES: So, how
old are you, Mike?
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CAPT. GREENLEE: Thirty-eight.
How about yourself?
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FO. HAYES: I'll be
42 on the 26th of July.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: Is that right?
I had you figured about 35.
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FO. HAYES: Did you really?
CAPT. GREENLEE: Oh yeah.
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FO. HAYES: I
knew there was something
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I liked about you.
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NARRATOR: This is the first time
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00:02:27,481 --> 00:02:29,775
the two pilots
have flown together.
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FO. HAYES: Mike was a very
affable, very likeable fella,
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and we hit it off right away.
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♪ ♪
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NARRATOR: Many of
the fifty-two passengers
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are traveling
for summer holidays.
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RICHARD: This was a
Saturday prior to July 4th,
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so there were a lot
of leisure travelers.
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RICHARD: Can I
offer you a snack?
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NARRATOR:
Flight attendant Richard
DeMary has been on the job
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00:03:01,139 --> 00:03:04,101
for two years. He
enjoys his work so much
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00:03:04,101 --> 00:03:08,563
that he looks for
ways to get more hours.
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RICHARD: I picked up this flight
as part of a series of flights
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over a number of days.
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00:03:13,819 --> 00:03:20,117
It was a three-day trip
with multiple legs each day.
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NARRATOR: Today's flight to
Charlotte is on board a DC-9,
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one of the many aircraft types
Greenlee and Hayes have flown.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: What kind of
airplanes you fly corporate?
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FO. HAYES: A few Lear, Cessna
Citation, King Air Beechcraft.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: Oh,
that's nice equipment.
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FO. HAYES: Yeah,
yeah, pretty nice.
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RICHARD: Flight
crews at US Air typically
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were always very professional.
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FO. HAYES: And a lot of piston
bangers, Navajos and that stuff.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
Yeah? I got a lot of time
in Navajos, Aztecs, Senecas.
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RICHARD: With that, there was a
lot of trust in the individuals
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that you were
working with, both from
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a flight attendant perspective
as well as the pilots.
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00:03:59,281 --> 00:04:04,202
NARRATOR: The US Air crew is
on its fourth leg of the day.
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00:04:04,202 --> 00:04:07,372
They started out this
morning in Pittsburgh,
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00:04:07,372 --> 00:04:13,670
flew to New York City, then
Charlotte and on to Columbia.
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Now, they're on their
way back to Charlotte.
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FO. HAYES: There was no weather.
There were no thunderstorms.
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There was, there was nothing.
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00:04:23,221 --> 00:04:31,521
It was a completely benign,
beautiful summertime day.
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00:04:31,521 --> 00:04:37,694
NARRATOR:
The DC-9 is now roughly
fifteen minutes from landing.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
Ladies and gentlemen,
we're 40 miles from Charlotte.
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At this time we'd like to
ask the flight attendants
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to secure the cabin for arrival.
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00:04:46,953 --> 00:04:50,123
RICHARD: Here, let me
clear this away for you.
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00:04:50,123 --> 00:04:55,795
RICHARD:
The flight between Columbia
and Charlotte was normal.
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00:04:55,795 --> 00:04:59,424
It was short. Even though
it was a 50 minute flight,
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00:04:59,424 --> 00:05:02,719
the actual flight time
was much less than that.
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00:05:02,719 --> 00:05:04,471
NARRATOR: As they
approach the airport,
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00:05:04,471 --> 00:05:09,142
the skies begin to darken.
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00:05:09,142 --> 00:05:12,604
FO. HAYES: There's more rain out
there than I thought there was.
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00:05:12,604 --> 00:05:15,398
FO. HAYES: We could see one
little... what we refer to
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00:05:15,398 --> 00:05:18,401
in the aviation
business as a build-up.
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00:05:18,401 --> 00:05:20,403
It has a little rain in it.
95
00:05:20,403 --> 00:05:25,367
But it's not anything
to be concerned about.
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00:05:25,367 --> 00:05:27,953
It's just a little shower.
97
00:05:27,953 --> 00:05:32,457
Mike reached over
and turned the radar on.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: It
looks like it's sitting
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just off the
edge of the airport.
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00:05:35,544 --> 00:05:39,798
NARRATOR: The radar shows
some rain directly ahead.
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CAPT. GREENLEE:
Charlotte, US Air 1016.
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, go ahead.
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00:05:44,427 --> 00:05:46,638
CAPT. GREENLEE: We're
showing a little build-up here.
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00:05:46,638 --> 00:05:50,475
It looks like it's
sitting on the radial.
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00:05:50,475 --> 00:05:53,270
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
About how far ahead
are you looking, 1016?
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00:05:53,270 --> 00:05:55,146
CAPT. GREENLEE: About 15 miles.
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00:05:55,146 --> 00:05:57,357
NARRATOR:
The controller explains
that he'll be directing them
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00:05:57,357 --> 00:05:59,859
away from the rain shower.
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00:05:59,859 --> 00:06:02,487
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
I'll turn you just
before you get there
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00:06:02,487 --> 00:06:05,240
about five miles northbound.
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00:06:05,240 --> 00:06:11,246
CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay.
FO. HAYES: Good call.
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00:06:11,246 --> 00:06:14,082
NARRATOR: US Air Flight 1016
is now less than ten minutes
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00:06:14,082 --> 00:06:17,919
from its destination.
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00:06:17,919 --> 00:06:21,339
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air
1016, Charlotte. Maintain 4,000.
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00:06:21,339 --> 00:06:23,550
Runway one-eight-right.
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00:06:23,550 --> 00:06:25,552
CAPT. GREENLEE:
4,000 for the right side.
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00:06:25,552 --> 00:06:30,890
FO. HAYES: That's one-eleven
and three and one-eighty-one.
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NARRATOR: The pilots are
ready for final approach.
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00:06:33,518 --> 00:06:37,105
CAPT. GREENLEE: The cabin's
down. Seat belt signs on.
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00:06:37,105 --> 00:06:38,481
Hydraulics on.
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00:06:38,481 --> 00:06:44,362
Altimeters, flight
instruments thirty-oh-one, set.
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00:06:44,362 --> 00:06:45,572
FO. HAYES: Set.
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00:06:45,572 --> 00:06:48,575
NARRATOR: As promised, the
controller turns Flight 1016
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00:06:48,575 --> 00:06:50,243
away from the storm.
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00:06:50,243 --> 00:06:52,579
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: US Air
1016, turn ten degrees right,
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00:06:52,579 --> 00:06:54,497
descend and
maintain 2,300.
127
00:06:54,497 --> 00:06:57,292
Vectors to visual
approach to one-eight-right.
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00:06:57,292 --> 00:07:01,379
FO. HAYES: The controller
said descend to 2,300 feet.
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00:07:01,379 --> 00:07:04,507
He said, I'll turn you at the
marker for the visual approach.
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00:07:04,507 --> 00:07:09,387
CAPT. GREENLEE: Ten
right. Down 2,300, US Air 1016.
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00:07:09,387 --> 00:07:11,139
FO. HAYES: Another
confirmation that there was
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00:07:11,139 --> 00:07:15,518
absolutely nothing going on.
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00:07:15,518 --> 00:07:18,438
RICHARD: At that point
in the landing phase,
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00:07:18,438 --> 00:07:19,648
the cabin had been secured
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00:07:19,648 --> 00:07:22,567
and we were in our
seats ready for landing.
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00:07:22,567 --> 00:07:33,000
♪ ♪
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FO. HAYES: Gear down.
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00:07:41,010 --> 00:07:46,100
Flaps 40, please.
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CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps.
FO. HAYES: Ugh.
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00:07:52,020 --> 00:07:56,820
FO. HAYES:
Suddenly this very heavy rain
seemed to come from nowhere.
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00:07:56,820 --> 00:07:59,240
It did not go light
rain, moderate rain,
142
00:07:59,240 --> 00:08:01,700
heavy rain,
extreme. It didn't do that.
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00:08:01,700 --> 00:08:05,160
It was just all of a sudden like
you're in... under a waterfall.
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00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:10,290
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Here come the wipers.
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00:08:10,290 --> 00:08:14,130
FO. HAYES: That's,
10 knots right there.
146
00:08:14,130 --> 00:08:16,130
FO. HAYES: Now we're
like, oh. What has happened?
147
00:08:16,130 --> 00:08:20,050
You know, what changed?
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00:08:20,050 --> 00:08:24,800
RICHARD: In other rain events
you can see out the window.
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00:08:24,800 --> 00:08:28,140
You can make things out.
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00:08:28,140 --> 00:08:33,100
This rain completely obstructed
any view out of the window.
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00:08:33,100 --> 00:08:34,310
FO. HAYES: Whoa!
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00:08:34,310 --> 00:08:36,150
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Okay, you're plus twenty.
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00:08:36,150 --> 00:08:39,280
FO. HAYES:
Visibility had been reduced,
and with this heavy rain,
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00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:44,110
Mike and I made the same
decision at about the same time.
155
00:08:44,110 --> 00:08:45,870
Let's go around.
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00:08:45,870 --> 00:08:47,870
CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it
around. Go to the right.
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00:08:47,870 --> 00:08:54,210
FO. HAYES: Let's play
it safe. So I reached up
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00:08:54,210 --> 00:08:57,290
and pushed the power
up, started a right turn,
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00:08:57,290 --> 00:09:02,170
and at this point Mike picked up
the microphone and he said...
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00:09:02,170 --> 00:09:04,340
CAPT. GREENLEE: US
Air 1016's on the go.
161
00:09:04,340 --> 00:09:10,850
♪ ♪
162
00:09:10,850 --> 00:09:13,140
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, I understand
you're on the go, sir.
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00:09:13,140 --> 00:09:17,440
Fly runway heading,
climb and maintain 3,000.
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00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,280
NARRATOR: It's what
pilots call a missed approach.
165
00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:24,030
RICHARD: You have the
noise of the engines.
166
00:09:24,030 --> 00:09:29,240
You have the feeling on
your body that you're climbing.
167
00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:32,290
Go-arounds are not that unusual.
168
00:09:32,290 --> 00:09:36,290
I've been in go-arounds before.
169
00:09:36,290 --> 00:09:39,090
NARRATOR: But this is
not a normal go-around.
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00:09:39,090 --> 00:09:42,510
GPWS: Pull up. Terrain! Terrain!
171
00:09:42,510 --> 00:09:45,050
FO. HAYES: All of a sudden the
aircraft wasn't flying anymore.
172
00:09:45,050 --> 00:09:46,300
It was just falling.
173
00:09:46,300 --> 00:09:49,350
And we were losing
airspeed very, very rapidly.
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00:09:49,350 --> 00:09:52,020
GPWS: Terrain! Terrain!
175
00:09:52,020 --> 00:09:59,190
RICHARD:
It was very alarming. This
was not part of a go-around.
176
00:09:59,190 --> 00:10:01,230
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Ugh. Firewall power.
177
00:10:01,230 --> 00:10:07,110
NARRATOR: Phil Hayes jams
the throttles to maximum.
178
00:10:07,110 --> 00:10:12,240
RICHARD: We're sinking,
and I'm preparing myself.
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00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:16,080
♪ ♪
180
00:10:16,080 --> 00:10:18,130
FO. HAYES: I
remember the stick shaker,
181
00:10:18,130 --> 00:10:21,000
and I remember the ground
proximity warning system go off.
182
00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:22,380
It said, pull up. Pull up.
183
00:10:22,380 --> 00:10:26,010
GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
184
00:10:26,010 --> 00:10:29,220
♪ ♪
185
00:10:29,220 --> 00:10:31,600
FO. HAYES: And then I
remember a very hard impact.
186
00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:35,270
And we hit the ground.
187
00:10:43,980 --> 00:10:46,190
RICHARD: We were
sliding along the ground,
188
00:10:46,190 --> 00:10:49,360
and I started hearing
the snapping of trees.
189
00:10:57,160 --> 00:10:59,500
FO. HAYES: And the
left wing sheared off.
190
00:11:04,380 --> 00:11:08,260
And the cockpit came to
rest in the middle of a road.
191
00:11:11,050 --> 00:11:20,270
♪ ♪
192
00:11:20,270 --> 00:11:24,440
NARRATOR:
US Air Flight 1016 destined
for Charlotte, North Carolina,
193
00:11:24,440 --> 00:11:31,370
has slammed into the ground less
than a mile from the airport.
194
00:11:31,370 --> 00:11:36,040
Fight attendant Richard DeMary
has no idea how he survived.
195
00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:40,250
RICHARD: There was a
tremendous amount of disbelief
196
00:11:40,250 --> 00:11:48,300
and disorientation,
197
00:11:48,300 --> 00:11:51,470
and it took a few
seconds to get my bearings.
198
00:11:51,470 --> 00:11:58,310
And I
should say that I was scared.
199
00:11:58,310 --> 00:12:01,310
You know, there
was a lot of fear
200
00:12:01,310 --> 00:12:06,820
because of the smoke and the
heat coming off of the airplane.
201
00:12:06,820 --> 00:12:12,490
And I remember the real thought
of, I've survived the accident.
202
00:12:12,490 --> 00:12:19,410
I don't wanna die afterwards.
203
00:12:19,410 --> 00:12:24,170
NARRATOR:
First Officer Phil Hayes
has also survived the crash.
204
00:12:24,170 --> 00:12:26,840
FO. HAYES: I
remember looking to my left,
205
00:12:26,840 --> 00:12:31,430
and there was nobody
in the captain's seat.
206
00:12:31,430 --> 00:12:34,590
And in my mind I know I was
trying to put things together,
207
00:12:34,590 --> 00:12:38,850
like, what has
just happened to us?
208
00:12:38,850 --> 00:12:44,350
And so I got out of my harness
and crawled out of the opening,
209
00:12:44,350 --> 00:12:47,610
and I found Captain
Mike Greenlee tending
210
00:12:47,610 --> 00:12:53,820
to one of the flight attendants
who had been injured.
211
00:12:53,820 --> 00:12:55,370
RICHARD: You know,
the full realization
212
00:12:55,370 --> 00:12:58,660
that we had been in
an accident hit home.
213
00:12:58,660 --> 00:13:01,580
So I thought, I gotta
do something to help.
214
00:13:01,580 --> 00:13:06,670
So I start to yell,
release seat belts and get out.
215
00:13:06,670 --> 00:13:13,630
Release seat belts and get out.
Release seat belts and get out.
216
00:13:15,470 --> 00:13:16,760
NEWS ANCHOR (Archive):
Good evening.
217
00:13:16,760 --> 00:13:18,430
Emergency workers in
Charlotte, North Carolina,
218
00:13:18,430 --> 00:13:20,810
spent this Sunday pulling
bodies from the wreckage
219
00:13:20,810 --> 00:13:24,940
of a US Air jet that
crashed there last night.
220
00:13:24,940 --> 00:13:27,900
NARRATOR: The crash of Flight
1016 is the first accident
221
00:13:27,900 --> 00:13:36,410
involving a major airline in
North Carolina in twenty years.
222
00:13:36,410 --> 00:13:39,530
Both pilots and the
cabin crew have survived.
223
00:13:39,530 --> 00:13:42,700
But of the fifty-two passengers,
thirty-seven are dead.
224
00:13:42,700 --> 00:13:49,540
♪ ♪
225
00:13:49,540 --> 00:13:51,630
FO. HAYES: As I
looked back at the wreckage,
226
00:13:51,630 --> 00:13:54,840
it was just very surreal.
227
00:13:54,840 --> 00:13:59,930
How could this have happened to
us when the day was so benign?
228
00:13:59,930 --> 00:14:04,640
There was no
weather. There was no threat.
229
00:14:04,640 --> 00:14:07,520
How could this have happened?
230
00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:09,520
NARRATOR: Greg
Feith, senior investigator
231
00:14:09,520 --> 00:14:11,530
with the National
Transportation Safety Board,
232
00:14:11,530 --> 00:14:14,610
will lead the investigation.
233
00:14:14,610 --> 00:14:17,110
GREG: Any time you go to
an airplane accident site,
234
00:14:17,110 --> 00:14:20,410
a crash site, there's
always this wave of emotion.
235
00:14:20,410 --> 00:14:23,580
I don't care how seasoned
an investigator you are,
236
00:14:23,580 --> 00:14:26,160
because you know that people
have been seriously injured
237
00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:29,960
or killed in that
particular event.
238
00:14:29,960 --> 00:14:31,550
And so as the
investigator in charge,
239
00:14:31,550 --> 00:14:34,050
you have to compartmentalize
that, because you can't
240
00:14:34,050 --> 00:14:38,840
get emotionally attached and
still be able to do your job.
241
00:14:38,840 --> 00:14:41,760
NARRATOR: Examining the wreckage
is the team's first task.
242
00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:43,770
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
So what have we got?
243
00:14:43,770 --> 00:14:46,100
NARRATOR: They must determine
if a loss of engine power
244
00:14:46,100 --> 00:14:48,520
was a factor in the crash.
245
00:14:48,520 --> 00:14:52,860
They examine the DC-9's two
Pratt & Whitney power plants.
246
00:14:52,860 --> 00:14:54,730
GREG: There are a
variety of things that
247
00:14:54,730 --> 00:14:57,570
these power plant experts
are gonna be looking for
248
00:14:57,570 --> 00:15:00,660
to determine if in
fact there was some sort of
249
00:15:00,660 --> 00:15:04,200
operational issue, mechanical
malfunction or failure
250
00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:06,830
with the engine or engines.
251
00:15:06,830 --> 00:15:11,630
NARRATOR: Right away, they
spot something unexpected.
252
00:15:11,630 --> 00:15:14,460
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that.
253
00:15:14,460 --> 00:15:18,880
The thrust reverser on
this engine is deployed.
254
00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:22,100
GREG: Their examination of
the right engine indicated that
255
00:15:22,100 --> 00:15:25,720
the thrust reverser was
in the deployed position
256
00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:28,890
and that the thrust
reverser on the left engine
257
00:15:28,890 --> 00:15:30,850
was in the stowed position,
258
00:15:30,850 --> 00:15:34,570
and of course that always starts
the red flag up the pole,
259
00:15:34,570 --> 00:15:36,190
if you will, going, hmm.
260
00:15:36,190 --> 00:15:39,030
Why is this one not in the
same position as the other?
261
00:15:39,030 --> 00:15:42,620
Because they
should be symmetrical.
262
00:15:42,620 --> 00:15:44,660
NARRATOR: Thrust reversers
are deployed upon landing
263
00:15:44,660 --> 00:15:47,620
to help slow the plane down.
264
00:15:47,620 --> 00:15:49,250
They work by
redirecting the engines'
265
00:15:49,250 --> 00:15:52,630
high-powered
exhaust gasses forward.
266
00:15:52,630 --> 00:15:55,340
GREG: If it happens in flight
that's detrimental, because
267
00:15:55,340 --> 00:15:58,340
if it happens on one engine
on a multi-engine airplane
268
00:15:58,340 --> 00:16:03,010
you create an
asymmetrical thrust situation.
269
00:16:03,010 --> 00:16:07,020
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Maybe that's
what brought this flight down.
270
00:16:07,020 --> 00:16:10,440
Like Lauda Air 004.
271
00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:13,860
NARRATOR: Three years earlier
in Thailand, Lauda Air Flight 4
272
00:16:13,860 --> 00:16:22,240
crashed, killing 223 people.
A thrust reverser was to blame.
273
00:16:22,240 --> 00:16:24,370
GREG: We've had thrust
reversers deploy in flight
274
00:16:24,370 --> 00:16:27,080
and, depending on the
speed of the aircraft,
275
00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:31,120
you can literally break that
engine right off the aircraft.
276
00:16:31,120 --> 00:16:33,750
NARRATOR: Closer investigation
reveals abrasion marks
277
00:16:33,750 --> 00:16:36,880
on the metal of the
right side reverser,
278
00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:41,130
marks that suggest a
heavy impact with the ground.
279
00:16:41,130 --> 00:16:44,260
It's an important clue.
280
00:16:44,260 --> 00:16:47,890
Further analysis leads
to a definitive answer.
281
00:16:47,890 --> 00:16:50,390
Investigators know
exactly when and how
282
00:16:50,390 --> 00:16:53,400
the right side reverser opened.
283
00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:56,310
GREG: They were able to
make a determination that the
284
00:16:56,310 --> 00:17:00,280
reverser on that right engine,
even though it was deployed,
285
00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:03,950
happened during the
course of the impact sequence
286
00:17:03,950 --> 00:17:06,990
and did not happen in flight.
287
00:17:06,990 --> 00:17:09,950
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: At least we
know it wasn't thrust reversers.
288
00:17:09,950 --> 00:17:11,870
NARRATOR:
Eliminating one potential cause
289
00:17:11,870 --> 00:17:15,420
is a step forward
for investigators.
290
00:17:15,420 --> 00:17:17,210
But they're still a
long way from understanding
291
00:17:17,210 --> 00:17:20,840
what brought down
US Air Flight 1016.
292
00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:22,260
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Keep
looking through this wreckage.
293
00:17:22,260 --> 00:17:29,810
See if you can find any clues.
I'm gonna speak with the crew.
294
00:17:29,810 --> 00:17:33,940
NARRATOR:
Perhaps the pilots can shed
some light on what happened.
295
00:17:33,940 --> 00:17:36,650
GPWS: Pull up.
296
00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:41,650
FO. HAYES: The impact broke
my foot and cut my head open,
297
00:17:41,650 --> 00:17:46,280
and so I was in the hospital
about three days, I believe,
298
00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:48,660
and when we were
released from the hospital
299
00:17:48,660 --> 00:17:53,160
we were taken to a hotel.
300
00:17:53,160 --> 00:17:56,920
NARRATOR: First Officer
Phil Hayes meets with the NTSB.
301
00:17:56,920 --> 00:17:59,340
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Thank you
so much for seeing us today.
302
00:17:59,340 --> 00:18:02,050
We just have a few
questions. This won't take long.
303
00:18:02,050 --> 00:18:07,720
BARRY: We recognize that this is
not a pleasant time for them.
304
00:18:07,720 --> 00:18:12,100
They've been through what is
most likely the most difficult
305
00:18:12,100 --> 00:18:16,100
professional event
they've ever been through.
306
00:18:16,100 --> 00:18:20,440
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
On the day of the crash,
can you tell us what happened?
307
00:18:20,440 --> 00:18:22,440
FO. HAYES: The
problem was the weather.
308
00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:24,360
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Tell me about the weather.
309
00:18:24,360 --> 00:18:32,240
FO. HAYES: Flaps 40, please.
CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps.
310
00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:35,000
♪ ♪
311
00:18:35,000 --> 00:18:39,000
GREG: All of a sudden
they ran into this rain shaft.
312
00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,750
FO. HAYES: We
lost all visibility.
313
00:18:41,750 --> 00:18:43,380
CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it
around. Go to the right.
314
00:18:43,380 --> 00:18:45,720
GREG: That's when the captain
called for the first officer,
315
00:18:45,720 --> 00:18:48,590
who in this case was the
flying pilot at the time,
316
00:18:48,590 --> 00:18:50,140
to execute a go-around.
317
00:18:50,140 --> 00:18:53,560
They were gonna climb to
3,000 feet, roll to the right
318
00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:55,480
to turn right,
and of course you're
319
00:18:55,480 --> 00:18:59,190
bringing the power
up at the same time.
320
00:18:59,190 --> 00:19:03,480
FO. HAYES: The next thing I
knew the aircraft was falling.
321
00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:08,570
FO. HAYES:
It's a terrible feeling
to feel the aircraft fall
322
00:19:08,570 --> 00:19:14,080
and you realize it
isn't flying anymore.
323
00:19:14,080 --> 00:19:21,500
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Why did you decide to fly into
the storm in the first place?
324
00:19:21,500 --> 00:19:23,500
NARRATOR: Pilots
usually avoid thunderstorms
325
00:19:23,500 --> 00:19:25,550
because they can
produce violent air currents
326
00:19:25,550 --> 00:19:29,840
that can cause turbulence
or even damage the aircraft.
327
00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:32,260
JOHN: You're always
respectful of thunderstorms.
328
00:19:32,260 --> 00:19:34,720
The weather there was growing,
that was the big thing.
329
00:19:34,720 --> 00:19:36,220
And it was growing quickly.
330
00:19:36,220 --> 00:19:41,360
That's a key indicator that
the situation's deteriorating.
331
00:19:41,360 --> 00:19:43,110
FO. HAYES: Well, air
traffic control told us
332
00:19:43,110 --> 00:19:45,530
the weather was
nothing to worry about.
333
00:19:45,530 --> 00:19:48,110
FO. HAYES: And the
controllers really did not
334
00:19:48,110 --> 00:19:51,870
say anything to us about it.
335
00:19:51,870 --> 00:19:54,080
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I'll
tell you what, US Air 1016.
336
00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,580
You may get some rain
just south of the field.
337
00:19:56,580 --> 00:20:00,290
There might be a
little coming off the north.
338
00:20:00,290 --> 00:20:05,000
BARRY: In fact, some rain was
misleading. It wasn't some rain.
339
00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:07,670
It was a very
heavy thunderstorm.
340
00:20:07,670 --> 00:20:10,300
NARRATOR: Investigators have
learned that air traffic control
341
00:20:10,300 --> 00:20:12,930
failed to warn the
crew of Flight 1016
342
00:20:12,930 --> 00:20:16,520
that there was a
powerful storm in their path.
343
00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:18,980
BARRY: They mistakenly
believed that it would be
344
00:20:18,980 --> 00:20:22,440
safe for them to land.
345
00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:24,190
NARRATOR: The
question now is why?
346
00:20:28,780 --> 00:20:31,950
NARRATOR:
Investigators need to understand
why air traffic control
347
00:20:31,950 --> 00:20:35,330
in Charlotte didn't
warn US Air Flight 1016
348
00:20:35,330 --> 00:20:39,200
about a fierce
storm over the airport.
349
00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:41,460
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Oh,
hey. Good to meet you.
350
00:20:41,460 --> 00:20:44,170
JOHN:
The air traffic controllers
had more information,
351
00:20:44,170 --> 00:20:47,170
and they could see and they had
been watching this thunderstorm
352
00:20:47,170 --> 00:20:50,170
for much longer than
the flight crew had.
353
00:20:50,170 --> 00:20:52,680
So we knew very
early on it was gonna be
354
00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:57,060
one of the central areas
of focus to understand it.
355
00:20:57,060 --> 00:20:58,270
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Why
did you tell the pilots
356
00:20:58,270 --> 00:21:01,310
the weather was
good enough to land in?
357
00:21:01,310 --> 00:21:04,860
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The
weather reports told us it was.
358
00:21:04,860 --> 00:21:07,480
NARRATOR: The controller reveals
that he relied on a bulletin
359
00:21:07,480 --> 00:21:09,860
from the
National Weather Service.
360
00:21:09,860 --> 00:21:12,070
It showed that conditions
were well within limits
361
00:21:12,070 --> 00:21:14,160
for a safe landing.
362
00:21:14,160 --> 00:21:17,120
JOHN: The reports on
the field were light winds.
363
00:21:17,120 --> 00:21:19,870
There had been
some rain on and off.
364
00:21:19,870 --> 00:21:22,330
There's nothing to
key them to say that
365
00:21:22,330 --> 00:21:24,920
this is an unsafe condition
366
00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:27,090
and that they
shouldn't continue to fly it.
367
00:21:27,090 --> 00:21:28,420
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
I even asked a pilot
368
00:21:28,420 --> 00:21:30,380
who landed four
minutes earlier how it was.
369
00:21:30,380 --> 00:21:33,470
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 983, how was the
ride on your final approach?
370
00:21:33,470 --> 00:21:37,050
PILOT: Smooth. US Air 983.
371
00:21:37,050 --> 00:21:41,480
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, previous
flight just exited the runway.
372
00:21:41,480 --> 00:21:43,810
He said it was a smooth ride.
373
00:21:43,810 --> 00:21:47,440
♪ ♪
374
00:21:47,440 --> 00:21:49,730
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
It was fine, no problems.
375
00:21:49,730 --> 00:21:52,440
BARRY: That's
pretty significant in that
376
00:21:52,440 --> 00:21:55,280
all the
information that crews have,
377
00:21:55,280 --> 00:21:58,910
real-time information from
people flying for their airline,
378
00:21:58,910 --> 00:22:00,700
carries a lot of weight.
379
00:22:00,700 --> 00:22:03,700
NARRATOR: The weather
bulletin issued at 6:36 PM
380
00:22:03,700 --> 00:22:10,380
was indeed correct.
Conditions were clear to land.
381
00:22:10,380 --> 00:22:13,090
But minutes later, the
skies over the airport
382
00:22:13,090 --> 00:22:16,760
opened up and
heavy rain poured down.
383
00:22:16,760 --> 00:22:21,430
♪ ♪
384
00:22:21,430 --> 00:22:24,810
CAPT. GREENLEE: Take it
around. Go to the right.
385
00:22:24,810 --> 00:22:28,770
US Air 1016's on the go.
386
00:22:28,770 --> 00:22:30,770
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, understand
you're on the go, sir.
387
00:22:30,770 --> 00:22:34,280
Fly runway heading,
climb and maintain 3,000.
388
00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:36,490
NARRATOR: At the same time,
the controller acknowledges
389
00:22:36,490 --> 00:22:39,240
the crew's missed approach.
390
00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:45,870
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
US Air 1016, understand you're
turning right? Go ahead, 1016.
391
00:22:45,870 --> 00:22:48,790
NARRATOR: He
never gets a response.
392
00:22:58,220 --> 00:23:02,390
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
By the time I got to the
next bulletin, it was too late.
393
00:23:02,390 --> 00:23:04,850
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Listen, I
really appreciate your help.
394
00:23:04,850 --> 00:23:06,470
If I have more
questions, is it all right
395
00:23:06,470 --> 00:23:07,930
if I call you, all right?
396
00:23:07,930 --> 00:23:08,680
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sure.
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Thanks.
397
00:23:08,680 --> 00:23:09,810
NARRATOR: It's now
clear to investigators
398
00:23:09,810 --> 00:23:11,940
that weather conditions
at the Charlotte Airport
399
00:23:11,940 --> 00:23:17,860
changed very quickly.
400
00:23:17,860 --> 00:23:20,650
What's unclear is why the
controller's weather report
401
00:23:20,650 --> 00:23:23,870
failed to forecast the change.
402
00:23:23,870 --> 00:23:26,870
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Let's see what we have here.
403
00:23:26,870 --> 00:23:28,870
NARRATOR:
They study the reports that
the National Weather Service
404
00:23:28,870 --> 00:23:35,790
issued for
Charlotte Airport that day.
405
00:23:35,790 --> 00:23:48,680
6:36 PM. Light rain showers.
6:40 PM. Heavy rain showers.
406
00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:50,940
It seems the weather
service correctly identified
407
00:23:50,940 --> 00:23:52,850
the change in conditions.
408
00:23:52,850 --> 00:23:56,730
But then investigators
make an important discovery.
409
00:23:56,730 --> 00:23:58,320
It took two minutes
for the weather service
410
00:23:58,320 --> 00:24:02,860
to transmit the new information
in an updated bulletin.
411
00:24:02,860 --> 00:24:05,910
GREG: The problem came from
the air traffic controllers
412
00:24:05,910 --> 00:24:09,660
not having a full
body of information
413
00:24:09,660 --> 00:24:11,870
from the
National Weather Service.
414
00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:18,590
FO. HAYES: Flaps 40, please.
415
00:24:18,590 --> 00:24:21,920
GREG: So they weren't
providing real-time information
416
00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:23,930
to the flight crew.
417
00:24:23,930 --> 00:24:29,600
CAPT. GREENLEE: Forty flaps.
418
00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:33,730
GREG: They were very delayed in
providing essential information
419
00:24:33,730 --> 00:24:36,650
that would have assisted this
crew in their decision-making
420
00:24:36,650 --> 00:24:39,650
as they progressed
towards the airport.
421
00:24:39,650 --> 00:24:44,450
NARRATOR: Weather radar images
soon lead to another discovery.
422
00:24:44,450 --> 00:24:46,910
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: This
is crazy. Look at that.
423
00:24:46,910 --> 00:24:49,580
There are two storm
cells moving in here.
424
00:24:49,580 --> 00:24:54,040
As the US Air pilots were trying
to avoid one storm formation...
425
00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:55,750
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: 18:40.
426
00:24:55,750 --> 00:24:58,630
NARRATOR: Another storm cell...
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: 18:42.
427
00:24:58,630 --> 00:25:00,590
NARRATOR: ... suddenly
increased in intensity.
428
00:25:00,590 --> 00:25:02,670
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
They were blindsided.
429
00:25:02,670 --> 00:25:03,880
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Here come the wipers.
430
00:25:03,880 --> 00:25:05,760
NARRATOR: The late
weather report left the crew
431
00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:09,970
unprepared for
the sudden downpour.
432
00:25:09,970 --> 00:25:13,230
The critical question now:
Was the rainstorm strong enough
433
00:25:13,230 --> 00:25:17,560
to knock Flight
1016 out of the sky?
434
00:25:17,560 --> 00:25:20,770
GREG: We had to look
at that to see if in fact
435
00:25:20,770 --> 00:25:23,190
this heavy rain
shower had any kind of cause
436
00:25:23,190 --> 00:25:27,740
or contributing
factor in this accident.
437
00:25:27,740 --> 00:25:30,950
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
NASA has studied this.
438
00:25:30,950 --> 00:25:33,200
NARRATOR: Investigators
review NASA research
439
00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:37,290
that shows heavy rain can stick
to a wing, increasing drag
440
00:25:37,290 --> 00:25:42,000
and increasing the
chance of an aerodynamic stall.
441
00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,760
GREG: If the volume of
rain striking the aircraft
442
00:25:44,760 --> 00:25:47,260
is sufficient, it will
disrupt the smooth airflow and
443
00:25:47,260 --> 00:25:53,930
decrease the efficiency, the
lifting capability of the wing.
444
00:25:53,930 --> 00:25:56,100
NARRATOR: Testing has shown
that the amount of rain needed
445
00:25:56,100 --> 00:25:59,310
to stall a wing and
cause a crash is huge --
446
00:25:59,310 --> 00:26:07,030
thirty to forty inches per hour.
447
00:26:07,030 --> 00:26:08,990
Investigators
examine precipitation data
448
00:26:08,990 --> 00:26:10,910
from the day of the crash.
449
00:26:10,910 --> 00:26:16,120
They want to know just
how bad the rain really was.
450
00:26:16,120 --> 00:26:18,120
What they find is surprising.
451
00:26:18,120 --> 00:26:20,130
The rate of precipitation
during the downpour
452
00:26:20,130 --> 00:26:23,050
was only ten inches per hour.
453
00:26:23,050 --> 00:26:25,710
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Not
enough to bring the plane down.
454
00:26:25,710 --> 00:26:27,300
GREG: We were able to
determine that there was
455
00:26:27,300 --> 00:26:31,220
a negligible effect of
this heavy rain shower
456
00:26:31,220 --> 00:26:34,390
on the
performance of the airplane.
457
00:26:34,390 --> 00:26:39,940
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Rain
did not cause this crash.
458
00:26:39,940 --> 00:26:42,060
NARRATOR: If it wasn't the
sudden downpour that caused
459
00:26:42,060 --> 00:26:47,740
Flight 1016 to fall
out of the sky, what did?
460
00:26:49,110 --> 00:26:52,160
♪ ♪
461
00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:55,120
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Can you bring up the FDR?
462
00:26:55,120 --> 00:26:57,750
NARRATOR: Evidence
recovered from US Air 1016's
463
00:26:57,750 --> 00:27:01,960
flight data recorder is
now ready to be examined.
464
00:27:01,960 --> 00:27:05,050
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
So what have we got?
465
00:27:05,050 --> 00:27:07,210
NARRATOR: The device
captures critical indicators
466
00:27:07,210 --> 00:27:09,010
such as airspeed, altitude
467
00:27:09,010 --> 00:27:13,050
and the position of
key flight controls.
468
00:27:13,050 --> 00:27:15,060
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Can you blow this up?
469
00:27:15,060 --> 00:27:18,270
NARRATOR:
Almost immediately, they
come across something puzzling.
470
00:27:18,270 --> 00:27:20,230
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that.
471
00:27:20,230 --> 00:27:23,020
NARRATOR: The data shows
that seconds before impact,
472
00:27:23,020 --> 00:27:28,240
the airspeed inexplicably
begins to fluctuate.
473
00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:33,870
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The
airspeed's all over the place.
474
00:27:33,870 --> 00:27:37,540
FO. HAYES: Ugh.
That's 10 knots right there.
475
00:27:37,540 --> 00:27:40,250
NARRATOR: First, it
falls by ten knots.
476
00:27:40,250 --> 00:27:41,580
FO. HAYES: Whoa.
477
00:27:41,580 --> 00:27:44,130
NARRATOR: Then it
increases by thirty knots.
478
00:27:44,130 --> 00:27:45,880
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Okay. You're plus 20.
479
00:27:45,880 --> 00:27:48,090
JOHN: You could see
the change on the airplane
480
00:27:48,090 --> 00:27:51,010
because the
airspeed started jumping.
481
00:27:51,010 --> 00:27:53,090
NARRATOR: Airspeed is
the speed on an aircraft
482
00:27:53,090 --> 00:27:56,140
relative to the air
it's flying through.
483
00:27:56,140 --> 00:27:58,890
If the plane encounters
a tailwind, airspeed drops
484
00:27:58,890 --> 00:28:04,060
because the rate of airflow
over the wings decreases.
485
00:28:04,060 --> 00:28:07,150
A headwind has the opposite
effect, increasing airspeed
486
00:28:07,150 --> 00:28:10,570
by accelerating the
airflow over the wings.
487
00:28:10,570 --> 00:28:13,110
GREG: What happens is you
have a performance increase
488
00:28:13,110 --> 00:28:16,370
because you're
flying into a headwind.
489
00:28:16,370 --> 00:28:18,450
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Maybe the
wind brought this plane down.
490
00:28:18,450 --> 00:28:21,080
NARRATOR: Could
strong winds be the culprit?
491
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:22,410
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Where's that airport map?
492
00:28:22,410 --> 00:28:24,290
To answer that question,
investigators will need
493
00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:29,590
precise wind data from
the time of the crash.
494
00:28:29,590 --> 00:28:32,170
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Yeah, thank you.
495
00:28:32,170 --> 00:28:34,340
NARRATOR: Like dozens
of other US airports...
496
00:28:34,340 --> 00:28:35,340
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: One here.
497
00:28:35,340 --> 00:28:36,390
NARRATOR: ...
Charlotte Airport is equipped
498
00:28:36,390 --> 00:28:39,180
with a system of
special wind sensors.
499
00:28:39,180 --> 00:28:49,690
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
One here. One here. Here.
Here. And here. Six in total.
500
00:28:49,690 --> 00:28:52,190
JOHN: The low level wind
shear alert system is a number
501
00:28:52,190 --> 00:28:56,410
of anemometers, wind speed
and direction sensors, that
502
00:28:56,410 --> 00:29:00,200
are placed in various places
around and near the airport.
503
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:04,370
And they compare the winds
at one part of the airport
504
00:29:04,370 --> 00:29:06,330
with winds at another part.
505
00:29:06,330 --> 00:29:08,340
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. Run it.
506
00:29:08,340 --> 00:29:10,130
NARRATOR: Investigators
hope the combined data
507
00:29:10,130 --> 00:29:13,130
from all six sensors at
Charlotte Airport will tell them
508
00:29:13,130 --> 00:29:17,510
just how dangerous the winds
were on the day of the crash.
509
00:29:17,510 --> 00:29:22,270
JOHN: There was light wind
which was not at all severe.
510
00:29:22,270 --> 00:29:23,810
NARRATOR: They
discover that top wind speeds
511
00:29:23,810 --> 00:29:25,520
were not very high that day.
512
00:29:25,520 --> 00:29:29,270
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Wait a
second. Look at that wind.
513
00:29:29,270 --> 00:29:31,360
It's blowing all over the place.
514
00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:34,700
NARRATOR:
But the changes in wind speed
and direction were extreme.
515
00:29:34,700 --> 00:29:37,320
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look at that.
516
00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:39,370
NARRATOR: Less than two
minutes before the accident,
517
00:29:39,370 --> 00:29:42,200
four of the six sensors
signaled a weather event
518
00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:47,420
known as wind shear.
519
00:29:47,420 --> 00:29:51,210
Wind shear is a sudden shift
in wind direction and velocity
520
00:29:51,210 --> 00:29:52,750
that can cause a
plane's airspeed
521
00:29:52,750 --> 00:29:56,510
to become dangerously erratic.
522
00:29:56,510 --> 00:30:00,180
FRED: What makes the wind
shear events near the airports
523
00:30:00,180 --> 00:30:02,260
at low levels very hazardous is
524
00:30:02,260 --> 00:30:05,770
because the aircraft
coming in for landing
525
00:30:05,770 --> 00:30:10,610
have very low airspeeds
and are close to the ground.
526
00:30:10,610 --> 00:30:13,360
So there's not
much room for managing
527
00:30:13,360 --> 00:30:16,740
the energy state
of the aircraft.
528
00:30:16,740 --> 00:30:20,320
NARRATOR:
Investigators may finally
be close to a breakthrough.
529
00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:23,830
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Let's get this data to NASA,
see what they make of it.
530
00:30:23,830 --> 00:30:25,750
NARRATOR: But they won't
know if it was wind shear
531
00:30:25,750 --> 00:30:27,750
that brought down the DC-9
532
00:30:27,750 --> 00:30:32,380
until experts analyze
the weather data in detail.
533
00:30:32,380 --> 00:30:35,380
♪ ♪
534
00:30:35,380 --> 00:30:38,430
NASA meteorologist Fred
Proctor gets the assignment.
535
00:30:38,430 --> 00:30:44,640
♪ ♪
536
00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:49,560
FRED: I was asked by the
NTSB to help them understand
537
00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:51,310
what happened in this event
538
00:30:51,310 --> 00:30:56,440
and whether or not wind shear
was a factor in the accident.
539
00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:59,700
FRED: Okay, let's see
what the data tells us.
540
00:30:59,700 --> 00:31:03,660
Adding temperature. Humidity.
541
00:31:03,660 --> 00:31:05,790
NARRATOR: Using a weather
simulator, Proctor enters
542
00:31:05,790 --> 00:31:11,290
the airport wind data,
along with other key variables.
543
00:31:11,290 --> 00:31:15,000
FRED: I used a model
that I had developed earlier
544
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:17,800
and used in wind shear studies
545
00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:23,550
to recreate the thunderstorm
that occurred on that day.
546
00:31:23,550 --> 00:31:28,980
FRED: That should be it. Let's
check out this simulation.
547
00:31:28,980 --> 00:31:32,020
FRED: And so from there
I began to piece together
548
00:31:32,020 --> 00:31:35,940
or reconstruct
the accident event.
549
00:31:35,940 --> 00:31:38,490
NARRATOR: The simulation renders
the forces within the storm
550
00:31:38,490 --> 00:31:40,070
in precise detail.
551
00:31:40,070 --> 00:31:41,740
FRED: That's incredible.
552
00:31:41,740 --> 00:31:44,320
NARRATOR: Proctor
makes a startling discovery.
553
00:31:44,320 --> 00:31:47,490
The DC-9 didn't just
encounter wind shear.
554
00:31:47,490 --> 00:31:50,040
It flew into
something even more deadly.
555
00:31:50,790 --> 00:31:52,330
♪ ♪
556
00:31:52,330 --> 00:31:56,000
NARRATOR:
NASA meteorologist Fred Proctor
now has the complete picture
557
00:31:56,000 --> 00:32:01,170
of the violent weather event
that blindsided US Air 1016.
558
00:32:01,170 --> 00:32:04,340
FRED: That's no wind
shear. That's a microburst.
559
00:32:04,640 --> 00:32:07,850
FRED: A microburst is a
strong low-level downdraft
560
00:32:07,850 --> 00:32:10,480
that spreads out at the ground
561
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:13,690
and creates strong
low level wind shear.
562
00:32:13,690 --> 00:32:15,980
NARRATOR: The microburst
downdraft hits the ground
563
00:32:15,980 --> 00:32:19,190
with tremendous force,
spreading out in all directions
564
00:32:19,190 --> 00:32:21,740
and creating wind shear.
565
00:32:21,740 --> 00:32:25,910
JOHN: You can think of it as
suspending a cold block of air
566
00:32:25,910 --> 00:32:29,790
like an anvil and then pulling
that support out from under it.
567
00:32:29,790 --> 00:32:33,500
When it starts down
it has enormous force.
568
00:32:33,500 --> 00:32:36,040
FRED: When you hit the shear
it's like you're coming to
569
00:32:36,040 --> 00:32:37,920
the top of a roller coaster.
570
00:32:39,500 --> 00:32:43,510
And then it's like
the bottom drops out.
571
00:32:43,510 --> 00:32:46,220
NARRATOR: It has long been known
that these powerful downdrafts
572
00:32:46,220 --> 00:32:50,100
can be lethal for aircraft
during takeoff or landing.
573
00:32:50,100 --> 00:32:54,100
GREG:
There were a number of accidents
in the '60s and in the '70s
574
00:32:54,100 --> 00:32:56,520
that were
attributed to a microburst
575
00:32:56,520 --> 00:32:58,520
or wind-shear type environment.
576
00:32:58,520 --> 00:33:00,610
We just didn't know
what to call it then.
577
00:33:00,610 --> 00:33:02,190
We hadn't had a
lot of information.
578
00:33:02,190 --> 00:33:03,820
Nobody really studied it.
579
00:33:03,820 --> 00:33:06,110
♪ ♪
580
00:33:06,110 --> 00:33:09,240
NARRATOR: In 1985, a
microburst caused the crash
581
00:33:09,240 --> 00:33:15,210
of Delta Airlines Flight
191 at Dallas/Fort Worth.
582
00:33:15,210 --> 00:33:17,210
One hundred and
thirty-five people died,
583
00:33:17,210 --> 00:33:22,590
spurring a major effort to
find ways to reduce the threat.
584
00:33:22,590 --> 00:33:27,220
JOHN: Following Delta 191,
NASA and a number of people
585
00:33:27,220 --> 00:33:30,470
within the industry
started to study thunderstorms
586
00:33:30,470 --> 00:33:34,520
and this microburst, and they
found that the microbursts were
587
00:33:34,520 --> 00:33:39,730
far more prevalent and numerous
than previously thought.
588
00:33:39,730 --> 00:33:42,190
NARRATOR: The NASA simulation
not only confirms that
589
00:33:42,190 --> 00:33:46,110
the DC-9 was hit by a
microburst, it reveals that
590
00:33:46,110 --> 00:33:49,700
it was one of the most powerful
researchers have ever seen.
591
00:33:49,700 --> 00:33:53,830
FRED: This wind shear event
would have been in the top 1%
592
00:33:53,830 --> 00:33:57,580
of most intense microbursts
that we had looked at.
593
00:33:57,580 --> 00:34:00,750
I've only seen
maybe one or two cases
594
00:34:00,750 --> 00:34:06,590
where microburst wind
shear was actually stronger.
595
00:34:06,590 --> 00:34:08,390
NARRATOR: Investigators
now know that it was
596
00:34:08,390 --> 00:34:12,400
an extreme microburst
that brought down Flight 1016.
597
00:34:14,320 --> 00:34:18,650
But their
questioning doesn't end there.
598
00:34:20,900 --> 00:34:22,820
CAPT. GREENLEE: Firewall power!
599
00:34:22,820 --> 00:34:24,360
NARRATOR: They also
know that pilots are trained
600
00:34:24,360 --> 00:34:27,490
to deal with such events.
601
00:34:27,490 --> 00:34:30,820
JOHN: If you do find yourself in
a microburst, what do you do?
602
00:34:30,820 --> 00:34:35,020
Max power. Get as much lift
out of the wings as you can.
603
00:34:35,020 --> 00:34:37,150
Try to keep it flying because
604
00:34:37,150 --> 00:34:39,570
you'll be through
it fairly quickly.
605
00:34:39,570 --> 00:34:41,950
NARRATOR: Why weren't
the pilots of Flight 1016
606
00:34:41,950 --> 00:34:46,790
able to recover
and avoid disaster?
607
00:34:46,790 --> 00:34:50,370
The NTSB gathers pilot
training materials from US Air
608
00:34:50,370 --> 00:34:53,540
in the hope of
answering that question.
609
00:34:53,540 --> 00:34:56,880
GREG: Those pilots had
been trained in the simulator
610
00:34:56,880 --> 00:34:59,550
to a variety of
different types of scenarios
611
00:34:59,550 --> 00:35:03,050
that were based on accidents
and incidents in the past.
612
00:35:04,390 --> 00:35:07,720
BARRY: And at this
point crews had been trained.
613
00:35:07,720 --> 00:35:10,180
In the event that they
encounter a microburst they
614
00:35:10,180 --> 00:35:14,350
were trained to traverse them
safely and get out of there.
615
00:35:14,350 --> 00:35:17,480
NARRATOR: Investigators learn
that US Air trains its pilots
616
00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:22,030
to do two things in
the event of a microburst:
617
00:35:22,030 --> 00:35:28,160
apply firewall power and
raise the nose into a climb.
618
00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:30,200
GREG: If you're gonna do
this wind shear environment
619
00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:34,830
escape maneuver, you go
full power and nose up.
620
00:35:34,830 --> 00:35:38,170
You get maximum performance to
fly through this environment.
621
00:35:38,170 --> 00:35:42,880
NARRATOR:
But did the pilots even know
there was a risk of wind shear?
622
00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:46,510
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
We need to know what was
going on in that cockpit.
623
00:35:46,510 --> 00:35:50,310
Ready? Okay, let's hear it.
624
00:35:50,310 --> 00:35:52,850
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Ladies and gentlemen,
we're 40 miles from Charlotte.
625
00:35:52,850 --> 00:35:55,350
NARRATOR: Flight 1016's
cockpit voice recording
626
00:35:55,350 --> 00:35:59,190
is the investigators' best
hope of finding an answer.
627
00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:01,570
FO. HAYES: There's more rain out
there than I thought there was.
628
00:36:01,570 --> 00:36:03,780
CAPT. GREENLEE:
It looks like it's hitting just
off the edge of the airport.
629
00:36:03,780 --> 00:36:05,360
NARRATOR: The
recording reveals that the crew
630
00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:08,990
saw the storm
forming over the airport.
631
00:36:08,990 --> 00:36:11,580
The pilots were
confident they could handle it.
632
00:36:11,580 --> 00:36:12,790
CAPT. GREENLEE: If
we have to bail out,
633
00:36:12,790 --> 00:36:15,420
it looks like we'll
bail out to the right.
634
00:36:15,420 --> 00:36:16,580
FO. HAYES: Amen.
635
00:36:16,580 --> 00:36:20,460
CAPT. GREENLEE: So I
think we should be all right.
636
00:36:20,460 --> 00:36:22,880
Chance of shear. Heads up.
637
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:24,510
FO. HAYES: Roger that.
638
00:36:24,510 --> 00:36:27,430
NARRATOR:
Captain Greenlee not only
knew wind shear was possible,
639
00:36:27,430 --> 00:36:30,310
he was ready with
a plan of action.
640
00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:34,310
BARRY: And they were fully
prepared to abort the landing,
641
00:36:34,310 --> 00:36:36,400
perform what's
called a missed approach
642
00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,690
should the weather
deteriorate at any point
643
00:36:38,690 --> 00:36:41,940
before they touch down.
644
00:36:41,940 --> 00:36:45,150
NARRATOR:
Investigators also discover
that when the microburst hit,
645
00:36:45,150 --> 00:36:47,800
the pilots initially
did the right thing.
646
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,090
CAPT. GREENLEE: Max power.
FO. HAYES: Max power.
647
00:36:51,090 --> 00:36:53,550
JOHN: They initiated a
normal missed approach
648
00:36:53,550 --> 00:36:57,300
and started to accelerate,
pitched the nose up, increased
649
00:36:57,300 --> 00:37:01,720
the power on the engines,
a normal routine go-around.
650
00:37:01,720 --> 00:37:02,890
CAPT. GREENLEE: Max power.
651
00:37:02,890 --> 00:37:04,770
NARRATOR: But as
they continue listening,
652
00:37:04,770 --> 00:37:07,520
they hear something
completely unexpected.
653
00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:10,020
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down!
654
00:37:10,020 --> 00:37:15,860
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Wait, stop the tape. Does
he just say, push it down?
655
00:37:15,860 --> 00:37:17,950
Play it again.
656
00:37:17,950 --> 00:37:20,910
GREG: When we heard the
captain say down, push it down,
657
00:37:20,910 --> 00:37:24,660
we replayed that
statement a dozen times
658
00:37:24,660 --> 00:37:29,130
trying to put it in context
as to, did he really say that,
659
00:37:29,130 --> 00:37:33,130
and what did he mean by that?
660
00:37:33,130 --> 00:37:35,300
ROBERT: Flaps to 15.
661
00:37:35,300 --> 00:37:38,680
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down. Push it down.
662
00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:40,850
NARRATOR: Based on their
training, they should keep
663
00:37:40,850 --> 00:37:43,020
the plane's nose up to climb.
664
00:37:43,020 --> 00:37:46,520
But the captain tells his
first officer to drop the nose.
665
00:37:47,940 --> 00:37:51,070
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down.
666
00:37:51,070 --> 00:37:52,940
BARRY: We were all
surprised when that came out.
667
00:37:52,940 --> 00:37:54,530
None of us were expecting that.
668
00:37:54,530 --> 00:37:58,530
It goes against what
pilots are supposed to do
669
00:37:58,530 --> 00:38:01,660
in a wind shear escape maneuver.
670
00:38:01,660 --> 00:38:03,540
GWPS: Terrain. Terrain.
671
00:38:03,540 --> 00:38:05,040
GREG: If he didn't
push the nose over,
672
00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:06,870
they wouldn't have
flown into the ground.
673
00:38:06,870 --> 00:38:10,420
GWPS: Terrain. Terrain. Terrain.
674
00:38:10,420 --> 00:38:12,800
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Ugh. Firewall power!
675
00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:15,960
GWPS: Terrain. Terrain.
676
00:38:15,960 --> 00:38:20,550
♪ ♪
677
00:38:20,550 --> 00:38:22,550
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
What was he thinking?
678
00:38:24,010 --> 00:38:26,560
♪ ♪
679
00:38:26,560 --> 00:38:29,020
NARRATOR: Investigators
return to the US Air pilots,
680
00:38:29,020 --> 00:38:31,980
hoping to learn why they didn't
keep the plane's nose up
681
00:38:31,980 --> 00:38:33,690
as they were trained to do.
682
00:38:33,690 --> 00:38:35,900
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Hey. Good to see you.
683
00:38:35,900 --> 00:38:37,690
Listen, I need your
help with one thing
684
00:38:37,690 --> 00:38:39,110
I just can't understand.
685
00:38:39,110 --> 00:38:42,950
Why did the captain
decide to push the nose down?
686
00:38:42,950 --> 00:38:46,620
FO. HAYES: I, I
don't really remember.
687
00:38:46,620 --> 00:38:51,790
FO. HAYES:
I'm not sure if I have a
clear recollection of that,
688
00:38:51,790 --> 00:38:54,800
of him saying that or if it was,
689
00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:56,210
or if I just
remember listening to it
690
00:38:56,210 --> 00:38:58,050
on the cockpit voice recorder.
691
00:38:58,050 --> 00:39:01,720
All I remember is that
we were losing airspeed.
692
00:39:01,720 --> 00:39:03,010
We could have stalled.
693
00:39:03,010 --> 00:39:04,640
BARRY: They were
re-interviewed about that,
694
00:39:04,640 --> 00:39:06,010
why the captain called for that.
695
00:39:06,010 --> 00:39:08,230
And I don't believe
that we got an answer,
696
00:39:08,230 --> 00:39:12,190
though that explained it.
697
00:39:12,190 --> 00:39:13,980
GREG: And when we
showed them the data,
698
00:39:13,980 --> 00:39:16,150
and we let the
captain and the first officer
699
00:39:16,150 --> 00:39:19,070
listen to the
cockpit voice recorder.
700
00:39:19,070 --> 00:39:23,280
It's like, that's you.
Why'd you say that? Don't know.
701
00:39:23,280 --> 00:39:25,910
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Okay. Well thanks again.
702
00:39:25,910 --> 00:39:29,000
JOHN: Trying to get
precise information from them
703
00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:32,210
in an interview
proved to be pretty hard,
704
00:39:32,210 --> 00:39:33,830
not because they were
withholding anything;
705
00:39:33,830 --> 00:39:37,750
just because humans don't
always remember great detail
706
00:39:37,750 --> 00:39:40,220
under high-stress events.
707
00:39:40,220 --> 00:39:42,800
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Next slide, please.
708
00:39:42,800 --> 00:39:44,600
NARRATOR: Investigators
can only speculate
709
00:39:44,600 --> 00:39:47,140
about why the
captain reacted as he did.
710
00:39:47,140 --> 00:39:48,220
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: And
the next slide, please.
711
00:39:48,220 --> 00:39:50,020
NARRATOR: It suggests
he fell into the grip
712
00:39:50,020 --> 00:39:52,270
of a deadly
phenomenon that aviators call
713
00:39:52,270 --> 00:39:56,020
spatial disorientation.
714
00:39:56,020 --> 00:39:58,940
GREG: How we maintain
our orientation in space
715
00:39:58,940 --> 00:40:03,820
is with our feet on the ground,
basically the force of gravity,
716
00:40:03,820 --> 00:40:07,120
and the fluid in our inner
ear and primarily our eyes.
717
00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:10,080
So when you look out at the
horizon you know what is up,
718
00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:11,080
what is down.
719
00:40:11,080 --> 00:40:12,620
FO. HAYES: Whoa.
720
00:40:12,620 --> 00:40:14,670
CAPT. GREENLEE: Okay,
you're plus 20. Take it around.
721
00:40:14,670 --> 00:40:20,130
Go to the right. US
Air 1016's on the go.
722
00:40:20,130 --> 00:40:22,970
NARRATOR: In flight,
extreme changes in speed,
723
00:40:22,970 --> 00:40:26,680
direction and altitude create
physical forces on the body
724
00:40:26,680 --> 00:40:29,060
that can confuse the senses.
725
00:40:29,060 --> 00:40:30,640
This may cause the
pilot to lose track
726
00:40:30,640 --> 00:40:33,890
of the plane's orientation.
727
00:40:33,890 --> 00:40:36,270
GREG: What happens
with pilots is that
728
00:40:36,270 --> 00:40:39,650
during the course of
acceleration and deceleration
729
00:40:39,650 --> 00:40:42,240
the fluid in their
inner ear starts to move.
730
00:40:42,240 --> 00:40:44,240
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down!
731
00:40:44,240 --> 00:40:46,280
GREG: And so your
body will fool you,
732
00:40:46,280 --> 00:40:52,290
because all you have is
basically the body sensation.
733
00:40:52,290 --> 00:40:54,080
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: He's
coming in for his landing
734
00:40:54,080 --> 00:40:55,790
and he gets hit
by the thunderstorm.
735
00:40:55,790 --> 00:40:58,340
So he decides to
do a missed approach.
736
00:40:58,340 --> 00:41:00,210
But just as they're climbing,
737
00:41:00,210 --> 00:41:03,970
the microburst pushes the plane
down. It slows the airspeed.
738
00:41:03,970 --> 00:41:06,760
Now the captain
believes that the plane is
739
00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:10,390
about to stall and
that they're pointed up.
740
00:41:10,390 --> 00:41:12,180
JOHN: And a stall
that close to the ground
741
00:41:12,180 --> 00:41:14,020
would have been catastrophic.
742
00:41:14,020 --> 00:41:18,770
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: But in
reality they're nearly level.
743
00:41:18,770 --> 00:41:24,320
So he tells the first
officer to push the plane down.
744
00:41:24,320 --> 00:41:29,410
CAPT. GREENLEE:
Down! Push it down!
745
00:41:29,410 --> 00:41:31,120
NARRATOR: For
Captain Greenlee...
746
00:41:31,120 --> 00:41:32,870
CAPT. GREENLEE: Firewall power!
747
00:41:32,870 --> 00:41:34,500
NARRATOR: ... it would
have felt like the DC-9
748
00:41:34,500 --> 00:41:37,370
was in a
dangerously steep climb,
749
00:41:37,370 --> 00:41:40,960
a false sensation
called somatogravic illusion.
750
00:41:40,960 --> 00:41:42,340
GREG: The somatogravic illusion
751
00:41:42,340 --> 00:41:47,380
is a very
disconcerting illusion because
752
00:41:47,380 --> 00:41:50,010
your body
sensations can trick you.
753
00:41:50,010 --> 00:41:51,890
He thought, we're
pitching too fast,
754
00:41:51,890 --> 00:41:55,810
when in fact it was perfect.
755
00:41:55,810 --> 00:41:57,810
JOHN: Had they been able to
just sustain the flight for
756
00:41:57,810 --> 00:42:06,190
another thirty seconds, they'd
have been out the backside.
757
00:42:06,190 --> 00:42:08,490
NARRATOR: In their final
report, investigators highlight
758
00:42:08,490 --> 00:42:10,910
the need for
prompt weather updates
759
00:42:10,910 --> 00:42:14,490
whenever there's a
risk of thunderstorms.
760
00:42:14,490 --> 00:42:17,500
They also call on the
FAA to make sure that
761
00:42:17,500 --> 00:42:19,920
controllers are
displaying the highest level
762
00:42:19,920 --> 00:42:23,090
of precipitation intensity
on their radar screens
763
00:42:23,090 --> 00:42:28,260
and relaying that
information to flight crews.
764
00:42:28,260 --> 00:42:31,220
Finally, since the
Flight 1016 tragedy,
765
00:42:31,220 --> 00:42:35,060
a more sophisticated type
of radar called Doppler radar
766
00:42:35,060 --> 00:42:37,390
has become standard
equipment at most airports
767
00:42:37,390 --> 00:42:40,440
and on board many aircraft.
768
00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:43,070
GREG: You can see the
intensities of the wind,
769
00:42:43,070 --> 00:42:45,320
the vertical and the
horizontal velocities.
770
00:42:45,320 --> 00:42:47,530
That's great information.
771
00:42:47,530 --> 00:42:50,160
JOHN: They have predictive
wind shear, and so it can
772
00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:54,410
actually look and predict
before the airplane arrives
773
00:42:54,410 --> 00:42:58,250
so that you get a
much earlier warning.
774
00:42:58,250 --> 00:43:02,580
FRED: Because of our increased
understanding of wind shear
775
00:43:02,580 --> 00:43:07,300
and the development of new
technologies, there has not been
776
00:43:07,300 --> 00:43:11,760
a case in the United
States of a wind shear accident
777
00:43:11,760 --> 00:43:17,180
since the Charlotte event.
778
00:43:17,180 --> 00:43:19,350
NARRATOR: Both Mike
Greenlee and Phil Hayes
779
00:43:19,350 --> 00:43:22,480
resumed their flying careers,
eventually becoming pilots
780
00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:23,690
for American Airlines
781
00:43:23,690 --> 00:43:27,570
when American merged
with US Airways in 2013.
782
00:43:27,570 --> 00:43:30,320
As for flight
attendant Richard DeMary,
783
00:43:30,320 --> 00:43:32,660
his brave actions in
the immediate aftermath
784
00:43:32,660 --> 00:43:37,330
of the Flight 1016 crash earned
him no fewer than five awards,
785
00:43:37,330 --> 00:43:39,660
including the US
Department of Transportation's
786
00:43:39,660 --> 00:43:42,540
Award for Heroism.
787
00:43:42,540 --> 00:43:44,750
RICHARD: I
believe that while I was
788
00:43:44,750 --> 00:43:49,550
the individual in the event,
the awards really represent
789
00:43:49,550 --> 00:43:52,590
a recognition of the
flight attendant profession,
790
00:43:52,590 --> 00:43:56,510
and that flight attendants play
a role of extreme importance
791
00:43:56,510 --> 00:43:58,640
on each and every flight.
66764
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