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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:01,034 --> 00:00:03,303 CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in a dive. We're in a dive! 2 00:00:03,303 --> 00:00:05,305 NARRATOR: A commuter flight to Detroit... 3 00:00:05,305 --> 00:00:07,407 CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on! Get out of it for God's sake! 4 00:00:07,407 --> 00:00:11,545 NARRATOR: ... ends in a harrowing spiral. 5 00:00:11,545 --> 00:00:13,780 FO. REECE: Ohhhhh! 6 00:00:13,780 --> 00:00:16,083 RICHARD: Tremendous destruction of the aircraft, 7 00:00:16,083 --> 00:00:18,952 and it was a very severe impact. 8 00:00:18,952 --> 00:00:21,288 RICHARD: Whatever happened happened in a heartbeat. 9 00:00:21,288 --> 00:00:23,190 NARRATOR: Close analysis of flight data... 10 00:00:23,190 --> 00:00:25,192 CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection. FO. REECE: Standard seven. 11 00:00:25,192 --> 00:00:27,628 NARRATOR: ... leads to a stunning realization. 12 00:00:27,628 --> 00:00:30,697 RICHARD: It's Roselawn all over again. 13 00:00:30,697 --> 00:00:33,400 NARRATOR: What doomed Flight 3272 14 00:00:33,400 --> 00:00:37,704 is a danger the industry has known about for years. 15 00:00:37,704 --> 00:00:38,939 RICHARD: Why would you wait? 16 00:00:38,939 --> 00:00:42,376 RICHARD: In aviation, myths die hard. 17 00:00:42,376 --> 00:00:45,078 NARRATOR: To fulfill their mission, investigators confront 18 00:00:45,078 --> 00:00:48,415 some of aviation's biggest players. 19 00:00:48,415 --> 00:00:51,285 JOHN: It was time to break that myth. 20 00:01:09,603 --> 00:01:23,083 ♪ ♪ 21 00:01:23,083 --> 00:01:24,751 NARRATOR: Twenty-six passengers are on their way 22 00:01:24,751 --> 00:01:29,289 to Detroit, Michigan, aboard Comair Flight 3272. 23 00:01:33,160 --> 00:01:34,695 It's a short afternoon flight 24 00:01:34,695 --> 00:01:37,965 operated by one of America's largest regional airlines. 25 00:01:42,602 --> 00:01:46,406 The workhorse of the Comair fleet is the Embraer 120, 26 00:01:46,406 --> 00:01:48,442 a Brazilian-made turboprop. 27 00:01:48,442 --> 00:01:51,611 STEWART: The airplane handled quite nicely, uh, 28 00:01:51,611 --> 00:01:53,981 just about every regime that you could think of, 29 00:01:53,981 --> 00:01:57,284 uh, that would be appropriate for the type of operation 30 00:01:57,284 --> 00:02:01,221 that we were doing. 31 00:02:01,221 --> 00:02:03,590 NARRATOR: Darinda Ogden has been a Comair flight attendant 32 00:02:03,590 --> 00:02:07,694 for five years. 33 00:02:07,694 --> 00:02:09,796 DARINDA: Here's your drink, Ken. 34 00:02:09,796 --> 00:02:13,467 FO. REECE: Thank you very much for the ice. 35 00:02:13,467 --> 00:02:16,403 NARRATOR: First Officer Kenneth Reece and Captain Dann Carlsen 36 00:02:16,403 --> 00:02:21,208 have been trading piloting duties all day. 37 00:02:21,208 --> 00:02:24,144 This is the day's third leg, and First Officer Reece 38 00:02:24,144 --> 00:02:26,246 is at the controls. 39 00:02:26,246 --> 00:02:30,083 STEWART: I flew with Kenneth two or three times. 40 00:02:30,083 --> 00:02:33,720 NARRATOR: Stewart Lauer is a former Comair pilot. 41 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:36,556 STEWART: I found him to be a very capable pilot. 42 00:02:36,556 --> 00:02:38,291 He knew what he was doing. 43 00:02:38,291 --> 00:02:43,363 FO. REECE: Out of Detroit we're looking at 2-39 radio. 44 00:02:43,363 --> 00:02:46,166 NARRATOR: Flight 3272 left from an airport 45 00:02:46,166 --> 00:02:50,337 near Cincinnati, Ohio, at 3:08 pm. 46 00:02:50,337 --> 00:02:52,639 It's expected to land in Detroit just after 47 00:02:52,639 --> 00:02:56,043 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 48 00:02:56,043 --> 00:02:59,713 STEWART: What we want to do is just fly from point A to point B, 49 00:02:59,713 --> 00:03:03,917 get the passengers there safely and not scare them to death. 50 00:03:03,917 --> 00:03:08,889 CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading 0-3-0 to join the arrival, Comair 3272. 51 00:03:08,889 --> 00:03:10,991 NARRATOR: The crew has the plane on autopilot 52 00:03:10,991 --> 00:03:17,130 as they descend from nineteen thousand feet. 53 00:03:17,130 --> 00:03:19,499 Closing in on their destination... 54 00:03:19,499 --> 00:03:23,537 ♪ ♪ 55 00:03:23,537 --> 00:03:24,838 DARINDA: Just some bumps. 56 00:03:24,838 --> 00:03:28,075 NARRATOR: ... they hit some unexpected turbulence. 57 00:03:28,075 --> 00:03:30,210 Despite the rough ride, the flight is still running 58 00:03:30,210 --> 00:03:31,611 on schedule. 59 00:03:31,611 --> 00:03:36,950 ♪ ♪ 60 00:03:36,950 --> 00:03:39,486 At Detroit approach control, Steven Cochran 61 00:03:39,486 --> 00:03:44,524 guides Flight 3272 on its path to the runway. 62 00:03:44,524 --> 00:03:46,793 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, Detroit approach, 63 00:03:46,793 --> 00:03:50,831 heading 0-5-0, vector to runway 3-right. 64 00:03:50,831 --> 00:03:52,666 NARRATOR: It's another busy Thursday afternoon 65 00:03:52,666 --> 00:03:56,236 for the veteran controller. 66 00:03:56,236 --> 00:03:59,239 AMERICAN WEST PILOT: Detroit, Cactus 50 level at 1-3000. 67 00:03:59,239 --> 00:04:02,642 NARRATOR: The crew of an Airbus radios in. 68 00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:04,744 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Cactus 50, Detroit roger. 69 00:04:04,744 --> 00:04:07,247 Expect vectors for 3-right. 70 00:04:07,247 --> 00:04:09,082 NARRATOR: The controller wants the larger Airbus 71 00:04:09,082 --> 00:04:13,753 to land before Comair 3272. 72 00:04:13,753 --> 00:04:16,623 RICHARD: The jet was much faster than the Comair flight, 73 00:04:16,623 --> 00:04:18,558 so the air traffic controller made the decision 74 00:04:18,558 --> 00:04:22,429 to give the jet priority over the turboprop 75 00:04:22,429 --> 00:04:24,598 and gave them a slower speed. 76 00:04:24,598 --> 00:04:27,134 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair, maintain one-niner-zero knots. 77 00:04:27,134 --> 00:04:29,436 If unable, advise. 78 00:04:29,436 --> 00:04:34,908 CAPT. CARLSEN: Roger. One-niner-zero knots, Comair 3272. 79 00:04:34,908 --> 00:04:37,110 NARRATOR: First Officer Reece reduces his speed 80 00:04:37,110 --> 00:04:40,480 to a hundred and ninety knots 81 00:04:40,480 --> 00:04:43,550 to let the incoming Airbus land first. 82 00:04:43,550 --> 00:04:48,088 RICHARD: The fact that 3272 was placed behind Cactus 50 83 00:04:48,088 --> 00:04:55,262 added just a little bit to the maneuvering that was required. 84 00:04:55,262 --> 00:04:57,464 DARINDA: Ladies and gentlemen, we're on our final approach 85 00:04:57,464 --> 00:04:59,232 to Detroit. 86 00:04:59,232 --> 00:05:04,104 Please fasten your seat belts and stow away your tray tables. 87 00:05:04,104 --> 00:05:09,609 NARRATOR: 88 00:05:04,104 --> 00:05:09,609 The turboprop should be on the runway in less than 15 minutes. 89 00:05:09,609 --> 00:05:15,215 ♪ ♪ 90 00:05:15,215 --> 00:05:17,184 FO. REECE: Let's run the descent check. 91 00:05:17,184 --> 00:05:19,519 RICHARD: The approach phase is the busiest time 92 00:05:19,519 --> 00:05:22,189 from a workload standpoint for the pilot, 93 00:05:22,189 --> 00:05:23,957 and that's the time that he would like to have 94 00:05:23,957 --> 00:05:26,126 the assistance of the autopilot. 95 00:05:26,126 --> 00:05:27,894 CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection. 96 00:05:27,894 --> 00:05:31,131 FO. REECE: Windshield, props, standard 7. 97 00:05:31,131 --> 00:05:32,299 CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization? 98 00:05:32,299 --> 00:05:34,768 NARRATOR: As they descend towards eight thousand feet, 99 00:05:34,768 --> 00:05:37,637 the pilots perform a series of standard checks. 100 00:05:37,637 --> 00:05:38,905 CAPT. CARLSEN: Auto. 101 00:05:38,905 --> 00:05:41,174 STEWART: As you come in to land, we go into 102 00:05:41,174 --> 00:05:43,343 what's called a sterile cockpit. 103 00:05:43,343 --> 00:05:44,544 FO. REECE: On. 104 00:05:44,544 --> 00:05:47,414 STEWART: There's no chitchat. It's just strictly business. 105 00:05:47,414 --> 00:05:52,886 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, reduce speed 1-5-0. 106 00:05:52,886 --> 00:05:55,155 NARRATOR: The controller now wants the turboprop to reduce 107 00:05:55,155 --> 00:05:58,291 its airspeed to a hundred and fifty knots. 108 00:06:02,062 --> 00:06:06,999 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, reduce speed 1-5-0. 109 00:06:06,999 --> 00:06:13,840 CAPT. CARLSEN: Uh, speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272. 110 00:06:13,840 --> 00:06:15,909 They always gotta tell us everything twice. 111 00:06:15,909 --> 00:06:17,944 FO. REECE: He's got a short-term memory disorder. 112 00:06:17,944 --> 00:06:19,813 CAPT. CARLSEN: Is that what that is? 113 00:06:19,813 --> 00:06:22,549 FO. REECE: Yeah, that's what it is. 114 00:06:22,549 --> 00:06:27,787 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, now turn left heading 0-9-0. 115 00:06:27,787 --> 00:06:30,824 CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading 0-niner-0, Comair 3272. 116 00:06:30,824 --> 00:06:32,926 JOHN: The airplane was responding properly 117 00:06:32,926 --> 00:06:34,928 to all the air traffic control inputs 118 00:06:34,928 --> 00:06:37,831 and not indicating any problem. 119 00:06:37,831 --> 00:06:39,799 ♪ ♪ 120 00:06:39,799 --> 00:06:44,037 NARRATOR: The plane banks left as the pilots make their final turn. 121 00:06:44,037 --> 00:06:46,106 First Officer Reece expects the autopilot 122 00:06:46,106 --> 00:06:50,443 to roll the plane back to level. 123 00:06:50,443 --> 00:06:52,312 AUTOMATION: 124 00:06:52,312 --> 00:06:53,680 CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks like your low speed indicator. 125 00:06:53,680 --> 00:06:55,348 FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it. CAPT. CARLSEN: Power. 126 00:06:55,348 --> 00:06:59,619 NARRATOR: The Captain pushes the throttles to gain speed. 127 00:06:59,619 --> 00:07:02,022 But it doesn't work. 128 00:07:02,022 --> 00:07:06,860 Instead, the plane's autopilot disconnects. 129 00:07:10,530 --> 00:07:12,766 JOHN: When the autopilot disconnected 130 00:07:12,766 --> 00:07:19,906 a very sudden left roll began. 131 00:07:27,647 --> 00:07:31,351 NARRATOR: Reece struggles to level the plane by hand. 132 00:07:31,351 --> 00:07:33,153 STEWART: The amount of effort it takes to move 133 00:07:33,153 --> 00:07:36,423 those control surfaces, you've gotta muscle it 134 00:07:36,423 --> 00:07:39,225 until you can get it where you want it to go. 135 00:07:39,225 --> 00:07:41,561 NARRATOR: He wrenches the control column to the right, 136 00:07:41,561 --> 00:07:45,632 trying to correct the steep left bank. 137 00:07:45,632 --> 00:07:46,800 RICHARD: Nothing really happened. 138 00:07:46,800 --> 00:07:49,936 The aircraft continued rolling over to the left. 139 00:07:49,936 --> 00:07:52,639 ♪ ♪ 140 00:08:01,581 --> 00:08:05,385 CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in a dive. We're in a dive! 141 00:08:05,385 --> 00:08:06,486 FO. REECE: No! CAPT. CARLSEN: Oh god! 142 00:08:06,486 --> 00:08:08,755 FO. REECE: No! Nooo. 143 00:08:08,755 --> 00:08:11,024 ♪ ♪ 144 00:08:11,024 --> 00:08:11,958 STEWART: You never give up. 145 00:08:11,958 --> 00:08:14,260 You do what you gotta do to try to make it. 146 00:08:14,260 --> 00:08:16,196 CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on! Get out of there for God's sake! 147 00:08:16,196 --> 00:08:21,134 FO. REECE: No! Ugh. Ooh. CAPT. CARLSEN: God. 148 00:08:21,134 --> 00:08:23,603 NARRATOR: But there seems to be nothing the pilots can do 149 00:08:23,603 --> 00:08:25,472 to save their spiraling aircraft. 150 00:08:28,708 --> 00:08:35,281 ♪ ♪ 151 00:08:35,281 --> 00:08:38,184 RICHARD: There was virtually no controllability. 152 00:08:38,184 --> 00:08:39,686 Nothing can be done. 153 00:08:39,686 --> 00:08:43,823 There's just insufficient altitude to recover. 154 00:08:43,823 --> 00:08:47,560 FO. REECE: Noooooo! 155 00:08:51,664 --> 00:09:03,410 ♪ ♪ 156 00:09:03,410 --> 00:09:05,345 RICHARD: It was a very severe impact, 157 00:09:05,345 --> 00:09:10,784 a tremendous destruction of the aircraft. 158 00:09:10,784 --> 00:09:15,355 NARRATOR: Comair Flight 3272 en route from Cincinnati to Detroit 159 00:09:15,355 --> 00:09:21,461 has crashed into a field 22 miles southwest of the runway. 160 00:09:21,461 --> 00:09:26,399 First responders and news crews arrive at the scene. 161 00:09:26,399 --> 00:09:29,002 They soon discover that all 26 passengers 162 00:09:29,002 --> 00:09:32,205 and three crew members are dead. 163 00:09:32,205 --> 00:09:37,010 ♪ ♪ 164 00:09:37,010 --> 00:09:42,348 PRESS CONFERENCE (Archive): We'd like to offer our condolences to the families. 165 00:09:42,348 --> 00:09:44,851 Our hearts go out to those that have lost 166 00:09:44,851 --> 00:09:47,654 their loved ones today. 167 00:09:47,654 --> 00:09:49,722 NARRATOR: The sudden loss of 29 lives 168 00:09:49,722 --> 00:09:54,627 leaves families and friends in anguish. 169 00:09:54,627 --> 00:09:56,696 How could a commercial flight on approach to 170 00:09:56,696 --> 00:10:00,900 a major U.S. airport go so horribly wrong? 171 00:10:06,473 --> 00:10:10,443 NARRATOR: The morning after the crash, a blackened scar on a frozen field 172 00:10:10,443 --> 00:10:15,715 marks the fatal impact zone of Flight 3272. 173 00:10:15,715 --> 00:10:17,851 Families and friends attend a memorial service 174 00:10:17,851 --> 00:10:21,721 for the crash victims. 175 00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:24,424 A team from the National Transportation Safety Board 176 00:10:24,424 --> 00:10:28,194 is already at work recovering pieces of wreckage for analysis. 177 00:10:28,194 --> 00:10:42,442 ♪ ♪ 178 00:10:42,442 --> 00:10:48,381 JOHN: God, it's cold out there. 179 00:10:48,381 --> 00:10:51,017 NARRATOR: NTSB systems specialist John DeLisi 180 00:10:51,017 --> 00:10:55,855 faces one of the biggest challenges of his career. 181 00:10:55,855 --> 00:10:58,191 JOHN: We knew the airplane was on approach into Detroit 182 00:10:58,191 --> 00:11:05,131 and something dramatic happened. Something went wrong suddenly. 183 00:11:05,131 --> 00:11:06,733 RICHARD: What a mess. 184 00:11:06,733 --> 00:11:10,770 NARRATOR: The NTSB's Richard Rodriguez leads the investigation. 185 00:11:10,770 --> 00:11:13,506 RICHARD: Our mission is to find the cause of an accident, 186 00:11:13,506 --> 00:11:15,208 make recommendations that will prevent it 187 00:11:15,208 --> 00:11:18,144 from ever happening again. 188 00:11:18,144 --> 00:11:20,179 NARRATOR: Their first task is to find the airplane's 189 00:11:20,179 --> 00:11:24,150 black boxes and get them to a lab for analysis. 190 00:11:24,150 --> 00:11:26,519 JOHN: We spent about eight hours that first day 191 00:11:26,519 --> 00:11:31,591 pulling the wreckage apart. 192 00:11:31,591 --> 00:11:33,660 But by late afternoon, we were able to find 193 00:11:33,660 --> 00:11:36,229 the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder 194 00:11:36,229 --> 00:11:39,599 and got those on their way back to Washington, D.C. 195 00:11:43,102 --> 00:11:46,005 RICHARD: Let's get those both packed up. 196 00:11:46,005 --> 00:11:48,508 NARRATOR: While they wait for news on the black boxes, 197 00:11:48,508 --> 00:11:53,947 investigators head to Detroit Metropolitan airport. 198 00:11:53,947 --> 00:11:55,548 They want to hear from the last person 199 00:11:55,548 --> 00:11:59,552 to speak with the pilots, the approach controller. 200 00:11:59,552 --> 00:12:01,220 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: It was coming on rush hour. 201 00:12:01,220 --> 00:12:02,622 We had winter weather. 202 00:12:02,622 --> 00:12:04,624 JOHN: From air traffic control we learned that the 203 00:12:04,624 --> 00:12:07,794 weather was bad and airplanes were starting to pile up 204 00:12:07,794 --> 00:12:09,963 on their approach into Detroit. 205 00:12:09,963 --> 00:12:11,965 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: That's when American West Airlines Flight 50 206 00:12:11,965 --> 00:12:16,469 made contact, right after 3272. 207 00:12:16,469 --> 00:12:19,939 AMERICAN WEST PILOT: Detroit, Cactus 50 level at one-three thousand. 208 00:12:19,939 --> 00:12:22,575 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: So I told Comair pilots to slow up. 209 00:12:22,575 --> 00:12:25,178 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair, maintain 1-niner-0 knots. 210 00:12:25,178 --> 00:12:27,780 If unable, advise. 211 00:12:27,780 --> 00:12:30,450 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: I made sure there was plenty of distance between them. 212 00:12:30,450 --> 00:12:32,719 JOHN: There were other airplanes on approach to Detroit, 213 00:12:32,719 --> 00:12:35,655 so sometimes when they're in close proximity 214 00:12:35,655 --> 00:12:39,025 there can be an issue with wake vortex coming off one airplane 215 00:12:39,025 --> 00:12:41,828 that may affect another. 216 00:12:41,828 --> 00:12:44,497 NARRATOR: A wake vortex is a horizontal tornado 217 00:12:44,497 --> 00:12:48,768 that trails behind an aircraft. 218 00:12:48,768 --> 00:12:51,804 If one plane flies too close to the wake of another, 219 00:12:51,804 --> 00:12:56,075 it can encounter sudden and extreme turbulence. 220 00:12:56,075 --> 00:12:59,779 ♪ ♪ 221 00:12:59,779 --> 00:13:07,754 RICHARD: So here's the Airbus, American West Airlines Flight 50. 222 00:13:07,754 --> 00:13:11,858 NARRATOR: The Airbus is almost twice the size of the Embraer 120. 223 00:13:11,858 --> 00:13:17,697 RICHARD: And here's our Comair Flight 3272. 224 00:13:17,697 --> 00:13:21,868 NARRATOR: Did the big jet's wake vortex knock Flight 3272 225 00:13:21,868 --> 00:13:24,804 out of the sky? 226 00:13:24,804 --> 00:13:27,140 JOHN: We needed to see if the accident airplane 227 00:13:27,140 --> 00:13:31,778 flew underneath that one and crossing its wake. 228 00:13:31,778 --> 00:13:33,446 RICHARD: The Embraer is miles back 229 00:13:33,446 --> 00:13:39,452 and fifteen hundred feet below the Airbus. 230 00:13:39,452 --> 00:13:45,358 It could have got caught in the wake. 231 00:13:45,358 --> 00:13:49,028 Get the data off to NASA. Let's see what they think. 232 00:13:49,028 --> 00:13:50,797 ♪ ♪ 233 00:13:50,797 --> 00:13:54,233 NARRATOR: A wake vortex incident seems possible. 234 00:13:54,233 --> 00:13:55,301 FO. REECE: Oh God. 235 00:13:55,301 --> 00:13:56,669 NARRATOR: But investigators won't know for certain 236 00:13:56,669 --> 00:14:04,444 until experts at NASA analyze the radar data. 237 00:14:04,444 --> 00:14:06,279 ♪ ♪ 238 00:14:06,279 --> 00:14:13,519 Meanwhile, Rodriguez explores other possibilities. 239 00:14:13,519 --> 00:14:15,621 RICHARD: What happened to the propellers? 240 00:14:15,621 --> 00:14:18,024 NARRATOR: He's very familiar with this type of plane, 241 00:14:18,024 --> 00:14:19,659 having investigated previous accidents 242 00:14:19,659 --> 00:14:23,162 involving the Embraer 120. 243 00:14:23,162 --> 00:14:26,833 RICHARD: The Embraer 120 propeller blade had separated 244 00:14:26,833 --> 00:14:32,004 due to a fatigue crack over in an accident earlier in Georgia. 245 00:14:32,004 --> 00:14:33,840 The crew was able to land it, 246 00:14:33,840 --> 00:14:37,310 but it was very difficult to control. 247 00:14:37,310 --> 00:14:40,179 NARRATOR: In two previous cases, part of a propeller blade 248 00:14:40,179 --> 00:14:45,918 broke off in mid-flight. Could it have happened again? 249 00:14:45,918 --> 00:14:48,721 RICHARD: If they were barely able to control the aircraft, 250 00:14:48,721 --> 00:14:53,092 this could have been a problem for, uh, 3272. 251 00:14:53,092 --> 00:14:55,828 NARRATOR: Rodriguez reviews details of where the two propellers 252 00:14:55,828 --> 00:14:58,731 were found at the Detroit crash site. 253 00:14:58,731 --> 00:15:01,300 He makes a troubling discovery. 254 00:15:01,300 --> 00:15:04,237 Part of one blade ended up 75 feet away 255 00:15:04,237 --> 00:15:07,273 from the main impact crater. 256 00:15:07,273 --> 00:15:10,343 He can't help but wonder -- is this the third time 257 00:15:10,343 --> 00:15:13,746 he's seen an Embraer 120 propeller fail? 258 00:15:13,746 --> 00:15:17,650 RICHARD: We need to take a look at those propeller blades. 259 00:15:17,650 --> 00:15:19,919 RICHARD: We wanted to get those blades of the propeller 260 00:15:19,919 --> 00:15:23,189 to ensure they were intact at impact. 261 00:15:23,189 --> 00:15:30,930 ♪ ♪ 262 00:15:30,930 --> 00:15:32,999 NARRATOR: Rodriguez studies the blade fragment, 263 00:15:32,999 --> 00:15:35,067 looking for evidence of failure. 264 00:15:38,871 --> 00:15:40,907 If the propeller blades were all attached 265 00:15:40,907 --> 00:15:42,875 and spinning at impact, 266 00:15:42,875 --> 00:15:45,545 they would have all hit the ground with tremendous force, 267 00:15:45,545 --> 00:15:52,752 resulting in distinctive damage on every blade. 268 00:15:52,752 --> 00:15:54,587 RICHARD: This is impact damage. 269 00:15:54,587 --> 00:15:56,956 They were spinning right till the end. 270 00:15:56,956 --> 00:15:58,991 NARRATOR: The analysis leaves no doubt. 271 00:15:58,991 --> 00:16:01,828 Though the propellers fragmented when they hit the ground, 272 00:16:01,828 --> 00:16:04,564 they did not fail in flight. 273 00:16:04,564 --> 00:16:08,067 JOHN: We were able to tell that nothing broke off the airplane 274 00:16:08,067 --> 00:16:10,736 during the flight path. 275 00:16:10,736 --> 00:16:16,008 NARRATOR: Just as investigators rule out one possible cause, 276 00:16:16,008 --> 00:16:19,111 they uncover another intriguing clue. 277 00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:26,619 JOHN: Richard. RICHARD: What'd you find? 278 00:16:26,619 --> 00:16:30,723 JOHN: It's the engine fire lever. 279 00:16:30,723 --> 00:16:35,094 It looks like it's been pulled. 280 00:16:35,094 --> 00:16:36,495 RICHARD: Well, what do you know? 281 00:16:36,495 --> 00:16:40,233 JOHN: This is a lever that a crew member would grab and pull 282 00:16:40,233 --> 00:16:44,337 and twist if one of the engines was on fire. 283 00:16:44,337 --> 00:16:48,140 NARRATOR: It's a discovery that has frightening implications. 284 00:16:48,140 --> 00:16:51,510 JOHN: So are we looking at an engine fire here? 285 00:16:56,983 --> 00:17:01,520 ♪ ♪ 286 00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:03,689 RICHARD: Yeah. Put that one here. 287 00:17:03,689 --> 00:17:07,059 NARRATOR: NTSB investigators explore a disturbing theory 288 00:17:07,059 --> 00:17:10,830 as they try to figure out why Comair Flight 3272 289 00:17:10,830 --> 00:17:15,368 plunged from the sky. 290 00:17:15,368 --> 00:17:17,136 It looks like one of the pilots pulled 291 00:17:17,136 --> 00:17:19,906 an engine fire shut-off lever. 292 00:17:19,906 --> 00:17:23,976 The crew may have been fighting an in-flight fire. 293 00:17:23,976 --> 00:17:28,714 RICHARD: No doubt there was a fire. But when? 294 00:17:28,714 --> 00:17:31,250 NARRATOR: While the engines are clearly fire damaged, 295 00:17:31,250 --> 00:17:33,753 investigators need to determine if the fire started 296 00:17:33,753 --> 00:17:37,223 before or after the plane hit the ground. 297 00:17:37,223 --> 00:17:39,492 RICHARD: In flight fire would probably be 298 00:17:39,492 --> 00:17:42,261 at a higher temperature than ground fire. 299 00:17:42,261 --> 00:17:45,097 So you would have some perhaps disintegration 300 00:17:45,097 --> 00:17:48,968 or disappearance of the metal in the engine cowling 301 00:17:48,968 --> 00:17:51,971 and so forth. 302 00:17:51,971 --> 00:17:54,774 NARRATOR: If the fire started while the plane was moving forward, 303 00:17:54,774 --> 00:17:58,411 Rodriguez should find soot marks in a horizontal pattern. 304 00:17:58,411 --> 00:18:00,079 If it started on the ground, 305 00:18:00,079 --> 00:18:02,815 the flames would have gone straight up. 306 00:18:02,815 --> 00:18:05,918 RICHARD: In this case it was a relatively low temperature. 307 00:18:05,918 --> 00:18:08,120 All the soot patterns were vertical. 308 00:18:08,120 --> 00:18:13,960 There was no airstream affecting it to show in-flight fire. 309 00:18:13,960 --> 00:18:16,462 RICHARD: I'm seeing post-impact fire. 310 00:18:16,462 --> 00:18:20,466 There was no fire in flight. No way. 311 00:18:20,466 --> 00:18:23,135 JOHN: But upon further examination, we realized 312 00:18:23,135 --> 00:18:25,705 that the extended position of that handle 313 00:18:25,705 --> 00:18:30,977 was just the result of the hard crush damage that occurred. 314 00:18:30,977 --> 00:18:35,081 ♪ ♪ 315 00:18:35,081 --> 00:18:36,782 NARRATOR: With engine fire ruled out, 316 00:18:36,782 --> 00:18:41,153 investigators turn to NASA analysis of airport radar data. 317 00:18:41,153 --> 00:18:43,656 Perhaps there's evidence that the small turboprop 318 00:18:43,656 --> 00:18:48,561 flew too close to a big jet. 319 00:18:48,561 --> 00:18:50,796 RICHARD: And that settles that. 320 00:18:50,796 --> 00:18:52,732 NARRATOR: But it's another dead end. 321 00:18:52,732 --> 00:18:55,501 RICHARD: It wasn't a wake vortex. 322 00:18:55,501 --> 00:18:57,169 NARRATOR: The analysis reveals that the wake 323 00:18:57,169 --> 00:18:59,472 from American Airlines Flight 50 324 00:18:59,472 --> 00:19:05,478 could not have dropped to the altitude of Comair 3272. 325 00:19:05,478 --> 00:19:09,815 Investigators are back where they started. 326 00:19:09,815 --> 00:19:13,386 Why 29 people died just minutes before landing 327 00:19:13,386 --> 00:19:16,222 is still a mystery. 328 00:19:16,222 --> 00:19:19,325 ♪ ♪ 329 00:19:19,325 --> 00:19:21,027 RICHARD: Okay. Are we all ready? 330 00:19:21,027 --> 00:19:22,928 NARRATOR: They finally have access to the information 331 00:19:22,928 --> 00:19:26,966 stored on the plane's flight data recorder. 332 00:19:26,966 --> 00:19:28,968 RICHARD: Left engine please. 333 00:19:28,968 --> 00:19:30,770 NARRATOR: It should give them important details 334 00:19:30,770 --> 00:19:33,472 on how the aircraft was performing... 335 00:19:33,472 --> 00:19:34,807 RICHARD: Now the right engine. 336 00:19:34,807 --> 00:19:38,444 NARRATOR: ... right up to the moment of impact. 337 00:19:38,444 --> 00:19:42,481 RICHARD: Here it's starting. The engines are guzzling fuel. 338 00:19:42,481 --> 00:19:44,817 The speed stays the same. 339 00:19:44,817 --> 00:19:47,420 NARRATOR: The data reveals a puzzling detail. 340 00:19:47,420 --> 00:19:49,955 Just before the plane's sudden upset, 341 00:19:49,955 --> 00:19:54,727 the engines were working hard but to little effect. 342 00:19:54,727 --> 00:19:56,462 RICHARD: The flight data recorder indicated that 343 00:19:56,462 --> 00:20:00,132 the aircraft had received significant degradation 344 00:20:00,132 --> 00:20:01,767 in the performance. 345 00:20:01,767 --> 00:20:06,372 RICHARD: Look what's happening here. Autopilot is on. 346 00:20:06,372 --> 00:20:12,645 Turn is done. It should level off here, but it doesn't. 347 00:20:12,645 --> 00:20:13,813 It keeps rolling. 348 00:20:13,813 --> 00:20:16,215 DAN: What really jumped out at us was 349 00:20:16,215 --> 00:20:19,852 the airplane continued to roll 350 00:20:19,852 --> 00:20:22,755 even though the autopilot was commanding it to go back 351 00:20:22,755 --> 00:20:26,826 to wings level. 352 00:20:26,826 --> 00:20:31,163 RICHARD: Something's holding the engines back. 353 00:20:31,163 --> 00:20:34,366 NARRATOR: As Rodriguez studies the data, 354 00:20:34,366 --> 00:20:40,873 he thinks he knows what may be causing the loss of performance. 355 00:20:40,873 --> 00:20:46,245 RICHARD: Four thousand feet and it falls from the sky. 356 00:20:46,245 --> 00:20:49,815 NARRATOR: It has all the hallmarks of something he's seen before. 357 00:20:54,653 --> 00:20:56,655 RICHARD: It's Roselawn all over again. 358 00:20:56,655 --> 00:20:58,791 ♪ ♪ 359 00:20:58,791 --> 00:21:03,829 NARRATOR: In October 1994, the pilots of American Eagle Flight 4184 360 00:21:03,829 --> 00:21:08,634 suddenly lost control of their twin turboprop. 361 00:21:08,634 --> 00:21:10,870 It plummeted from the sky and crashed near the town 362 00:21:10,870 --> 00:21:14,773 of Roselawn, Indiana. 363 00:21:16,709 --> 00:21:22,414 All 68 people aboard were killed. 364 00:21:22,414 --> 00:21:25,351 The cause was a phenomenon known as icing, 365 00:21:25,351 --> 00:21:27,319 where a build-up of ice on the wings 366 00:21:27,319 --> 00:21:30,990 leads to an aerodynamic stall. 367 00:21:30,990 --> 00:21:33,192 STEWART: When that happens you're not producing the lift 368 00:21:33,192 --> 00:21:34,460 that you're supposed to. 369 00:21:34,460 --> 00:21:40,232 The loss of lift is what the word stall is pertaining to. 370 00:21:40,232 --> 00:21:43,769 When we stall a wing we lose lift. 371 00:21:43,769 --> 00:21:45,404 ♪ ♪ 372 00:21:45,404 --> 00:21:47,239 RICHARD: Following the Roselawn accident, 373 00:21:47,239 --> 00:21:49,375 the FAA was very concerned about the performance 374 00:21:49,375 --> 00:21:56,182 of turboprop aircraft in, um, icing conditions. 375 00:21:56,182 --> 00:21:59,451 NARRATOR: The Federal Aviation Administration was so concerned 376 00:21:59,451 --> 00:22:02,521 that it conducted full-scale tests, flying a turboprop 377 00:22:02,521 --> 00:22:07,159 in super cooled precipitation sprayed from a water tanker. 378 00:22:07,159 --> 00:22:10,162 RICHARD: They found that the aircraft did accumulate ice 379 00:22:10,162 --> 00:22:17,203 on the top of the wing to generate, uh, significant drag. 380 00:22:17,203 --> 00:22:19,672 NARRATOR: The flight test's most dramatic finding was that 381 00:22:19,672 --> 00:22:22,975 a layer of ice as thin as a sheet of sandpaper 382 00:22:22,975 --> 00:22:26,145 could cause major problems for pilots. 383 00:22:26,145 --> 00:22:28,447 JOHN: And we were very surprised to see that 384 00:22:28,447 --> 00:22:33,752 a trace amount of ice was enough to affect the aerodynamics 385 00:22:33,752 --> 00:22:37,756 and possibly cause a wing to lose lift. 386 00:22:37,756 --> 00:22:41,527 NARRATOR: In March 2001, a turboprop suffered severe icing 387 00:22:41,527 --> 00:22:43,529 and plummeted eight thousand feet before 388 00:22:43,529 --> 00:22:47,633 the captain managed to regain control. 389 00:22:47,633 --> 00:22:50,169 That captain was Stewart Lauer. 390 00:22:50,169 --> 00:22:51,971 STEWART: I had the shakes something fierce. 391 00:22:51,971 --> 00:22:55,007 I mean the adrenaline was flowing. 392 00:22:55,007 --> 00:22:57,042 NARRATOR: Just like Stewart Lauer's flight... 393 00:22:57,042 --> 00:22:58,444 CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks like your low speed indicator. 394 00:22:58,444 --> 00:22:59,812 FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it. 395 00:22:59,812 --> 00:23:03,315 NARRATOR: ... Comair 3272 dropped from the sky in an instant. 396 00:23:03,315 --> 00:23:05,584 DAN: It's very complex aerodynamically, 397 00:23:05,584 --> 00:23:09,388 especially when there's ice contamination on the airplane. 398 00:23:09,388 --> 00:23:11,991 At that point it's very hard to recover 399 00:23:11,991 --> 00:23:16,795 unless you gain airspeed, and the only way to do that 400 00:23:16,795 --> 00:23:18,364 is point the nose to the ground, 401 00:23:18,364 --> 00:23:21,100 not something that a pilot wants to do 402 00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:22,868 while trying to recover an airplane. 403 00:23:22,868 --> 00:23:26,538 ♪ ♪ 404 00:23:26,538 --> 00:23:28,574 CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on! Get out of it for God's sake! 405 00:23:31,810 --> 00:23:34,380 We're in a dive. We're in a dive! 406 00:23:34,380 --> 00:23:36,715 FO. REECE: Ohhhhh. CAPT. CARLSEN: God. 407 00:23:36,715 --> 00:23:39,918 STEWART: I was lucky. I had plenty of altitude. 408 00:23:39,918 --> 00:23:43,622 It took me over seven thousand feet 409 00:23:43,622 --> 00:23:47,192 to regain control of the aircraft. 410 00:23:47,192 --> 00:23:50,162 They didn't have it. They only had four. 411 00:23:53,032 --> 00:23:56,335 ♪ ♪ 412 00:24:00,039 --> 00:24:03,108 ♪ ♪ 413 00:24:03,108 --> 00:24:05,544 RICHARD: Okay. Let's see what they flew through. 414 00:24:05,544 --> 00:24:07,780 NARRATOR: Investigators need to learn all they can 415 00:24:07,780 --> 00:24:10,449 about the weather conditions the Comair pilots faced 416 00:24:10,449 --> 00:24:14,720 as they approached Detroit. 417 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:19,291 RICHARD: Okay. Let's pull up the weather data. 418 00:24:19,291 --> 00:24:22,528 NARRATOR: They know that for ice to build up on the wings on a plane... 419 00:24:22,528 --> 00:24:24,163 RICHARD: Now let's see the flight path. 420 00:24:24,163 --> 00:24:26,899 NARRATOR: ... temperature, precipitation and aircraft speed 421 00:24:26,899 --> 00:24:30,602 must all fall within a very specific range. 422 00:24:30,602 --> 00:24:33,605 JOHN: The weather data began to paint a picture of an airplane 423 00:24:33,605 --> 00:24:37,242 that was on approach flying in what were considered 424 00:24:37,242 --> 00:24:40,412 light icing conditions. 425 00:24:40,412 --> 00:24:41,914 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Cactus 50, be advised there are 426 00:24:41,914 --> 00:24:43,916 slick runways and poor visibility. 427 00:24:43,916 --> 00:24:45,284 How is it up there? 428 00:24:45,284 --> 00:24:48,354 NARRATOR: According to Detroit controllers, other aircraft, 429 00:24:48,354 --> 00:24:52,057 including the flight directly in front of Comair 3272, 430 00:24:52,057 --> 00:24:55,160 reported icing conditions. 431 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,897 PILOT: Yeah, it's 237 at 32 up here, moderate icing 432 00:24:58,897 --> 00:25:01,800 with a possibility of freezing drizzle. 433 00:25:01,800 --> 00:25:06,305 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Roger that. Comair 3272, how is it up there? 434 00:25:06,305 --> 00:25:11,677 NARRATOR: Strangely, the Comair pilots never mentioned icing at all. 435 00:25:11,677 --> 00:25:18,117 CAPT. CARLSEN: Comair 3272, uh, just a little turbulence but that's all. 436 00:25:18,117 --> 00:25:20,185 RICHARD: It definitely flew through icing conditions. 437 00:25:24,556 --> 00:25:27,259 NARRATOR: Investigators know that even a thin layer of ice 438 00:25:27,259 --> 00:25:29,061 can be dangerous. 439 00:25:29,061 --> 00:25:34,566 Perhaps the Comair pilots didn't see ice on their wings. 440 00:25:34,566 --> 00:25:36,468 RICHARD: The Embraer is probably a good twenty feet 441 00:25:36,468 --> 00:25:40,172 from the cockpit window back to the top of the wing 442 00:25:40,172 --> 00:25:42,608 where the ice would be forming, 443 00:25:42,608 --> 00:25:46,512 so it's very difficult to see in poor lighting conditions, 444 00:25:46,512 --> 00:25:51,984 as 3272 was operating in cloud and late in the afternoon. 445 00:25:51,984 --> 00:25:53,852 NARRATOR: But there's something that doesn't add up. 446 00:25:58,190 --> 00:26:02,161 If the Comair pilots lost control due to ice buildup, 447 00:26:02,161 --> 00:26:05,964 why were they the only ones affected by the weather? 448 00:26:05,964 --> 00:26:07,699 JOHN: None of the other airplanes that were on approach 449 00:26:07,699 --> 00:26:10,469 to Detroit experienced any problems. 450 00:26:10,469 --> 00:26:12,504 So we needed to look hard about what was unique 451 00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:14,973 about this airplane. 452 00:26:17,342 --> 00:26:19,044 ♪ ♪ 453 00:26:19,044 --> 00:26:20,879 NARRATOR: NTSB investigators are now certain 454 00:26:20,879 --> 00:26:26,218 that Comair Flight 3272 flew through icing conditions. 455 00:26:26,218 --> 00:26:28,220 What they don't know is if those conditions 456 00:26:28,220 --> 00:26:32,458 were severe enough to bring down the plane. 457 00:26:32,458 --> 00:26:34,626 JOHN: We wanted to understand what role icing played 458 00:26:34,626 --> 00:26:38,030 in the slow and steady left roll that the airplane 459 00:26:38,030 --> 00:26:40,632 seemed to be experiencing. 460 00:26:40,632 --> 00:26:45,704 NARRATOR: In search of answers, they visit a NASA test facility. 461 00:26:45,704 --> 00:26:48,841 Here they can see with their own eyes how and when 462 00:26:48,841 --> 00:26:53,412 ice would have formed on the wings of Flight 3272. 463 00:26:53,412 --> 00:26:55,814 ♪ ♪ 464 00:26:55,814 --> 00:26:57,483 RICHARD: We ready to go? 465 00:26:57,483 --> 00:27:01,320 TOM: We were helping the NTSB identify potential ice shapes 466 00:27:01,320 --> 00:27:03,055 and what those ice shapes could do 467 00:27:03,055 --> 00:27:06,825 to the flight characteristics. 468 00:27:06,825 --> 00:27:09,294 NARRATOR: Tom Ratvasky is a NASA researcher. 469 00:27:09,294 --> 00:27:12,698 ♪ ♪ 470 00:27:12,698 --> 00:27:15,834 A section of a wing is installed in a wind tunnel. 471 00:27:15,834 --> 00:27:18,604 TOM: We were able to get our hands on an actual 472 00:27:18,604 --> 00:27:20,739 EMB-120 wing section. 473 00:27:20,739 --> 00:27:22,808 ♪ ♪ 474 00:27:22,808 --> 00:27:29,181 RICHARD: Let's initiate. Temperature and wind speed set? 475 00:27:29,181 --> 00:27:30,649 TOM: The temperature is cooled down to match 476 00:27:30,649 --> 00:27:32,251 the flight condition. 477 00:27:32,251 --> 00:27:34,486 The fan is turned on to get the speed to match 478 00:27:34,486 --> 00:27:36,655 the flight condition. 479 00:27:36,655 --> 00:27:41,026 RICHARD: Okay. Let's add the precipitation. 480 00:27:41,026 --> 00:27:42,861 TOM: There's also a spray bar system, 481 00:27:42,861 --> 00:27:48,934 which introduces the liquid water into that air stream. 482 00:27:48,934 --> 00:27:51,570 NARRATOR: The test simulates the exact conditions faced 483 00:27:51,570 --> 00:27:54,006 by Flight 3272. 484 00:27:54,006 --> 00:27:59,745 ♪ ♪ 485 00:27:59,745 --> 00:28:03,615 Slowly, almost imperceptibly, ice begins to accumulate 486 00:28:03,615 --> 00:28:05,284 on the wing. 487 00:28:05,284 --> 00:28:09,154 ♪ ♪ 488 00:28:09,154 --> 00:28:11,256 RICHARD: Even in a lighted wind tunnel 489 00:28:11,256 --> 00:28:14,426 it was very difficult to see. 490 00:28:14,426 --> 00:28:17,596 TOM: The type of ice that was accreted was relatively clear. 491 00:28:17,596 --> 00:28:20,232 It was very rough. 492 00:28:20,232 --> 00:28:22,434 Ice reshapes the wing surface 493 00:28:22,434 --> 00:28:25,404 so these aerodynamic surfaces aren't doing 494 00:28:25,404 --> 00:28:28,774 what they're supposed to do. 495 00:28:28,774 --> 00:28:30,943 RICHARD: Can we get some measurements please? 496 00:28:30,943 --> 00:28:34,279 ♪ ♪ 497 00:28:34,279 --> 00:28:36,181 NARRATOR: The test leaves little doubt. 498 00:28:36,181 --> 00:28:39,351 A thin but dangerous layer of ice almost certainly formed 499 00:28:39,351 --> 00:28:43,689 on the wings of Flight 3272. 500 00:28:43,689 --> 00:28:47,059 RICHARD: NASA gave us ironclad knowledge that 501 00:28:47,059 --> 00:28:52,831 the accumulation of thin amounts of ice was very dangerous 502 00:28:52,831 --> 00:28:55,667 and troublesome to the pilot and to the aircraft. 503 00:28:59,972 --> 00:29:02,541 RICHARD: Okay, thanks for your help with this. Thanks. 504 00:29:02,541 --> 00:29:04,910 NARRATOR: But there's still something about the Comair crash 505 00:29:04,910 --> 00:29:08,246 that the NASA test doesn't explain. 506 00:29:12,584 --> 00:29:15,721 The Embraer 120, like most commercial planes, has 507 00:29:15,721 --> 00:29:23,629 anti-icing and de-icing systems for winter weather flying. 508 00:29:23,629 --> 00:29:25,931 Investigators need to know if the pilots 509 00:29:25,931 --> 00:29:30,802 activated those systems. 510 00:29:30,802 --> 00:29:35,907 RICHARD: You guys ready? Let's play it. 511 00:29:35,907 --> 00:29:39,778 NARRATOR: They turn to the cockpit voice recorder. 512 00:29:39,778 --> 00:29:45,584 CAPT. CARLSEN: Let's run the descent check. Ice protection. 513 00:29:45,584 --> 00:29:49,955 FO. REECE: Wind shield, props, Standard 7. 514 00:29:49,955 --> 00:29:51,757 RICHARD: The pilots are required to go through 515 00:29:51,757 --> 00:29:53,859 an approach checklist. 516 00:29:53,859 --> 00:29:56,662 One of the items on that approach checklist is 517 00:29:56,662 --> 00:29:59,665 the standard 7, which is the, um, the 518 00:29:59,665 --> 00:30:06,004 various anti-icing facilities that they have on the aircraft. 519 00:30:06,004 --> 00:30:08,040 NARRATOR: The anti-icing system electrically heats 520 00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:11,143 the windshield and the propellers. 521 00:30:11,143 --> 00:30:13,578 But for the wings there's a different system, 522 00:30:13,578 --> 00:30:18,650 one that relies on mechanical devices called de-icing boots. 523 00:30:18,650 --> 00:30:20,485 The boots are made of rubber and are part of 524 00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,288 the leading edge of the wings. 525 00:30:23,288 --> 00:30:26,024 When activated, they inflate and expand 526 00:30:26,024 --> 00:30:28,860 to crack off any accumulated ice. 527 00:30:28,860 --> 00:30:31,697 STEWART: The ice is just hard enough that it cracks 528 00:30:31,697 --> 00:30:34,666 and the airstream blows it away. 529 00:30:34,666 --> 00:30:36,935 CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization? 530 00:30:36,935 --> 00:30:39,171 FO. REECE: It's reset for our landing in Detroit. 531 00:30:39,171 --> 00:30:41,540 NARRATOR: Rodriguez listens, waiting for the pilots 532 00:30:41,540 --> 00:30:44,643 to activate the de-icing boots. 533 00:30:44,643 --> 00:30:47,979 CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights. FO. REECE: Landing lights on. 534 00:30:47,979 --> 00:30:52,517 CAPT. CARLSEN: Cross-feed? FO. REECE: Cross-feed's off. 535 00:30:52,517 --> 00:30:55,520 CAPT. CARLSEN: That completes that. 536 00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:57,355 RICHARD: They cover everything but activating the boots. 537 00:30:57,355 --> 00:31:00,158 What gives? 538 00:31:00,158 --> 00:31:02,594 RICHARD: There was no discussion to indicate 539 00:31:02,594 --> 00:31:08,700 that they were concerned about icing on the aircraft. 540 00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:11,303 RICHARD: Do you have the pre-flight documents? 541 00:31:11,303 --> 00:31:13,572 NARRATOR: Investigators want to know why the pilots 542 00:31:13,572 --> 00:31:15,941 didn't activate an onboard system 543 00:31:15,941 --> 00:31:19,044 that could have saved their plane. 544 00:31:19,044 --> 00:31:21,046 They check dispatch records. 545 00:31:21,046 --> 00:31:22,581 Maybe the crew was never briefed 546 00:31:22,581 --> 00:31:26,151 on the weather conditions they'd face. 547 00:31:26,151 --> 00:31:29,521 RICHARD: The flight had received their papers for dispatch 548 00:31:29,521 --> 00:31:32,457 from Cincinnati, which included warnings 549 00:31:32,457 --> 00:31:36,027 about icing in the Detroit area. 550 00:31:36,027 --> 00:31:38,196 CAPT. CARLSEN: There could be some ice in our path. 551 00:31:38,196 --> 00:31:40,966 FO. REECE: What a shock. Ice in January. 552 00:31:40,966 --> 00:31:47,239 ♪ ♪ 553 00:31:47,239 --> 00:31:49,274 RICHARD: They knew they were gonna hit ice, 554 00:31:49,274 --> 00:31:52,544 but they never popped the boots. 555 00:31:52,544 --> 00:31:55,781 JOHN: The de-ice boots did not appear to have been activated. 556 00:31:55,781 --> 00:31:58,250 So we really wanted to take a good hard look 557 00:31:58,250 --> 00:32:00,085 at when that system should be used 558 00:32:00,085 --> 00:32:03,288 and why it wasn't used on this approach. 559 00:32:03,288 --> 00:32:06,958 ♪ ♪ 560 00:32:08,927 --> 00:32:11,096 ♪ ♪ 561 00:32:11,096 --> 00:32:14,633 NARRATOR: NTSB investigators know Flight 3272 562 00:32:14,633 --> 00:32:17,636 flew through dangerous icing conditions. 563 00:32:17,636 --> 00:32:19,838 They also know that the pilots never activated 564 00:32:19,838 --> 00:32:24,876 a critical de-icing system. But they don't know why. 565 00:32:24,876 --> 00:32:28,079 RICHARD: They should have been aware there was icing taking place. 566 00:32:28,079 --> 00:32:29,948 They certainly had to suspect it. 567 00:32:29,948 --> 00:32:35,220 ♪ ♪ 568 00:32:35,220 --> 00:32:36,822 NARRATOR: The pilots' work records reveal that 569 00:32:36,822 --> 00:32:42,794 Captain Carlsen was a seven-year veteran with Comair. 570 00:32:42,794 --> 00:32:43,795 He even helped write 571 00:32:43,795 --> 00:32:45,964 pilot training procedures for the airline. 572 00:32:47,299 --> 00:32:53,071 RICHARD: The Captain was known as a by-the-book type of pilot. 573 00:32:53,071 --> 00:32:56,107 First Officer Kenneth Reece was an equally proficient pilot 574 00:32:56,107 --> 00:33:00,212 who was also a certified flight instructor. 575 00:33:00,212 --> 00:33:02,080 DAN: These pilots were well-trained 576 00:33:02,080 --> 00:33:07,185 and had plenty of experience flying in the Midwest corridor 577 00:33:07,185 --> 00:33:09,487 where there's a lot of icing conditions. 578 00:33:09,487 --> 00:33:13,458 ♪ ♪ 579 00:33:13,458 --> 00:33:15,493 RICHARD: So if ice is just beginning to form on your wing, 580 00:33:15,493 --> 00:33:17,329 what would you do? 581 00:33:17,329 --> 00:33:19,998 NARRATOR: Investigators contact other Comair pilots 582 00:33:19,998 --> 00:33:25,837 for insight into how they would handle a similar scenario. 583 00:33:25,837 --> 00:33:31,810 RICHARD: What would you do? You'd wait? You'd wait? You'd wait. 584 00:33:31,810 --> 00:33:33,211 How much ice? 585 00:33:33,211 --> 00:33:36,081 JOHN: We were getting feedback that they'd wait 586 00:33:36,081 --> 00:33:39,951 until one-quarter to one-half inch of ice had accumulated 587 00:33:39,951 --> 00:33:43,021 before they'd activate the de-ice boots. 588 00:33:43,021 --> 00:33:45,724 That was a surprise for us to see. 589 00:33:45,724 --> 00:33:48,493 NARRATOR: The revelation suggests that at Comair, 590 00:33:48,493 --> 00:33:50,729 outdated ideas about icing 591 00:33:50,729 --> 00:33:54,733 are putting pilots and passengers at risk. 592 00:33:54,733 --> 00:34:02,741 RICHARD: Why would you wait? Bridging. 593 00:34:02,741 --> 00:34:04,276 JOHN: When de-ice boots were first invented, 594 00:34:04,276 --> 00:34:07,679 they inflated at a very slow pressure and stayed inflated 595 00:34:07,679 --> 00:34:10,448 for a while, and pilots became concerned 596 00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,819 that ice might form over the inflated shape of the boot, 597 00:34:14,819 --> 00:34:18,523 a phenomenon known as bridging. 598 00:34:18,523 --> 00:34:19,758 NARRATOR: Ice bridging was a concern 599 00:34:19,758 --> 00:34:25,030 with older de-icing systems that inflated and deflated slowly. 600 00:34:25,030 --> 00:34:28,633 There was a risk that, if pilots activated the boots too soon, 601 00:34:28,633 --> 00:34:31,136 ice might build up and form a shell or bridge 602 00:34:31,136 --> 00:34:34,839 beyond the limit of the inflated boot. 603 00:34:34,839 --> 00:34:40,645 That could render the de-icing system useless. 604 00:34:40,645 --> 00:34:43,815 ♪ ♪ 605 00:34:43,815 --> 00:34:47,485 Investigators know that modern de-icing boots have evolved. 606 00:34:47,485 --> 00:34:52,157 Bridging is no longer a problem for turboprop aircraft. 607 00:34:52,157 --> 00:34:54,926 JOHN: The de-ice boots on this airplane inflate rapidly 608 00:34:54,926 --> 00:34:56,127 in less than a second, 609 00:34:56,127 --> 00:34:59,297 would break off any amount of ice that was accumulated 610 00:34:59,297 --> 00:35:02,801 and deflate again right away with vacuum suction. 611 00:35:02,801 --> 00:35:09,307 So de-ice boot bridging was not gonna happen on this airplane. 612 00:35:09,307 --> 00:35:10,875 RICHARD: All right. Let's take a look at the manuals 613 00:35:10,875 --> 00:35:13,578 these guys were following. 614 00:35:13,578 --> 00:35:16,081 RICHARD: We were interested in what guidance 615 00:35:16,081 --> 00:35:19,417 had the crew received, what instructions do they have, 616 00:35:19,417 --> 00:35:24,923 what are they trained to do when they're experiencing icing. 617 00:35:24,923 --> 00:35:27,993 NARRATOR: Both Comair and the plane's manufacturer, Embraer, 618 00:35:27,993 --> 00:35:32,364 published flight manuals for the 120 turboprop. 619 00:35:32,364 --> 00:35:34,332 When investigators compare the two, 620 00:35:34,332 --> 00:35:36,534 they make a surprising discovery. 621 00:35:36,534 --> 00:35:38,303 RICHARD: What? 622 00:35:38,303 --> 00:35:40,238 JOHN: What jumped out at us was that Comair 623 00:35:40,238 --> 00:35:42,874 was instructing their pilots to wait until 624 00:35:42,874 --> 00:35:46,011 a significant amount of ice had accumulated before 625 00:35:46,011 --> 00:35:50,749 activating the de-ice boots. That was surprising to us. 626 00:35:50,749 --> 00:35:53,551 RICHARD: The Comair manual tells them to wait. 627 00:35:53,551 --> 00:35:56,121 NARRATOR: The Comair manual advises pilots to wait 628 00:35:56,121 --> 00:36:00,525 until half an inch of ice forms before de-icing, 629 00:36:00,525 --> 00:36:04,162 while the Embraer manual says something completely different. 630 00:36:04,162 --> 00:36:08,733 RICHARD: Embraer says activate boots at the first sign of icing. 631 00:36:08,733 --> 00:36:11,403 RICHARD: The material with respect to the icing conditions 632 00:36:11,403 --> 00:36:14,973 were not clear and they were not consistent 633 00:36:14,973 --> 00:36:18,877 for the pilots to know what they should be doing. 634 00:36:18,877 --> 00:36:22,547 RICHARD: Let's see what we can find. 635 00:36:22,547 --> 00:36:24,849 NARRATOR: The Comair accident is the first fatal crash 636 00:36:24,849 --> 00:36:29,487 of an Embraer 120 caused by icing. 637 00:36:29,487 --> 00:36:32,323 But how many close calls have there been? 638 00:36:32,323 --> 00:36:40,231 ♪ ♪ 639 00:36:40,231 --> 00:36:44,469 RICHARD: Six in less than eight years. Man oh man. 640 00:36:44,469 --> 00:36:48,640 RICHARD: There were six previous loss- of-control accidents involving 641 00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:54,112 icing with the Embraer, which is pretty significant. 642 00:36:54,112 --> 00:36:56,948 RICHARD: So what did the FAA do about this? 643 00:36:56,948 --> 00:36:59,651 NARRATOR: It's a disturbing record of accidents. 644 00:36:59,651 --> 00:37:02,487 Investigators wonder what steps the FAA has taken 645 00:37:02,487 --> 00:37:06,224 to fix the problem. 646 00:37:06,224 --> 00:37:07,659 ♪ ♪ 647 00:37:07,659 --> 00:37:10,028 The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible 648 00:37:10,028 --> 00:37:12,931 for setting safety standards throughout the industry. 649 00:37:12,931 --> 00:37:22,107 ♪ ♪ 650 00:37:22,107 --> 00:37:27,812 Rodriguez finds disturbing evidence in FAA files. 651 00:37:27,812 --> 00:37:35,220 RICHARD: Icing. Icing. Icing. Well, you sure created a lot of reports. 652 00:37:35,220 --> 00:37:37,555 NARRATOR: Comair pilots may not be the only ones who held 653 00:37:37,555 --> 00:37:40,859 out-of-date views about de-icing. 654 00:37:40,859 --> 00:37:42,961 The federal regulators themselves 655 00:37:42,961 --> 00:37:45,163 may be part of the problem. 656 00:37:45,163 --> 00:37:47,499 JOHN: I think we began to realize that we were working 657 00:37:47,499 --> 00:37:49,968 not against knowledge that wasn't out there. 658 00:37:49,968 --> 00:37:55,406 We were working against a long thought trend in aviation 659 00:37:55,406 --> 00:37:57,509 that de-ice boot bridging is a concern. 660 00:37:57,509 --> 00:38:00,044 It was... de-ice boot bridging was a myth. 661 00:38:00,044 --> 00:38:05,183 RICHARD: In aviation myths die hard. 662 00:38:05,183 --> 00:38:08,052 JOHN: It was time to break that myth. 663 00:38:08,052 --> 00:38:11,756 ♪ ♪ 664 00:38:11,756 --> 00:38:14,058 NARRATOR: Investigators are trying to understand why 665 00:38:14,058 --> 00:38:17,395 Comair and Embraer provided conflicting instructions 666 00:38:17,395 --> 00:38:19,697 to pilots regarding icing. 667 00:38:19,697 --> 00:38:24,702 ♪ ♪ 668 00:38:24,702 --> 00:38:29,274 Digging through FAA files, they find some intriguing documents. 669 00:38:29,274 --> 00:38:34,045 RICHARD: Develop means to prevent ice formation. 670 00:38:34,045 --> 00:38:35,914 NARRATOR: An FAA memo makes it clear 671 00:38:35,914 --> 00:38:39,951 that the regulator was concerned about icing. 672 00:38:39,951 --> 00:38:43,655 RICHARD: There's only one way to do that -- activate the boots. 673 00:38:43,655 --> 00:38:46,157 NARRATOR: And a revision to the Embraer 120 flight manual 674 00:38:46,157 --> 00:38:48,526 shows that the manufacturer had clearly spelled out 675 00:38:48,526 --> 00:38:51,996 the need to de-ice quickly. 676 00:38:51,996 --> 00:38:54,666 RICHARD: Activation of de-icing boots at 677 00:38:54,666 --> 00:39:00,505 the first sign of ice formation. Embraer knew the answer. 678 00:39:00,505 --> 00:39:03,308 NARRATOR: So why were the Comair pilots still in the dark? 679 00:39:03,308 --> 00:39:04,976 CAPT. CARLSEN: There could be some ice in our path. 680 00:39:04,976 --> 00:39:10,915 FO. REECE: Oh, what a shock. Ice in January. 681 00:39:10,915 --> 00:39:13,251 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that the FAA approved 682 00:39:13,251 --> 00:39:18,856 the Embraer revision. But then a critical step was missed. 683 00:39:18,856 --> 00:39:23,962 The regulator did not require airlines to adopt the change. 684 00:39:23,962 --> 00:39:27,832 Many, including Comair, did not. 685 00:39:27,832 --> 00:39:31,369 RICHARD: Why not make it mandatory? It's a no brainer. 686 00:39:31,369 --> 00:39:34,539 RICHARD: While the FAA had a great deal of information, 687 00:39:34,539 --> 00:39:37,909 they never did officially sanction a standard 688 00:39:37,909 --> 00:39:43,281 that should be adhered to. 689 00:39:43,281 --> 00:39:44,983 NARRATOR: Investigators finally understand 690 00:39:44,983 --> 00:39:49,454 what caused the crash of Comair Flight 3272. 691 00:39:52,757 --> 00:39:56,327 ♪ ♪ 692 00:39:56,327 --> 00:39:57,829 NARRATOR: Just before landing... 693 00:39:57,829 --> 00:39:59,097 CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection. 694 00:39:59,097 --> 00:40:01,599 NARRATOR: ... the pilots enter icing conditions. 695 00:40:01,599 --> 00:40:04,102 But the Captain, following airline procedures, 696 00:40:04,102 --> 00:40:07,272 does not activate the de-icing boots. 697 00:40:07,272 --> 00:40:10,208 FO. REECE: It's reset for landing in Detroit. It looks good. 698 00:40:10,208 --> 00:40:12,677 CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights. FO. REECE: Landing lights. 699 00:40:12,677 --> 00:40:14,345 JOHN: The crew seemed to be aware that they were in 700 00:40:14,345 --> 00:40:17,048 light icing conditions, but per the instructions 701 00:40:17,048 --> 00:40:19,350 in the flight manual they were waiting 702 00:40:19,350 --> 00:40:23,488 until a significant amount of ice had accumulated. 703 00:40:23,488 --> 00:40:29,227 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, reduce speed 1-5-0. 704 00:40:29,227 --> 00:40:32,864 NARRATOR: The controller then instructs them to reduce speed. 705 00:40:32,864 --> 00:40:37,135 RICHARD: That's getting pretty slow, and it was a concern to us 706 00:40:37,135 --> 00:40:40,305 why would they have accepted that without question. 707 00:40:40,305 --> 00:40:43,541 But in their manuals there was no specific information 708 00:40:43,541 --> 00:40:47,879 that would tell them do not, uh, go below a certain airspeed 709 00:40:47,879 --> 00:40:51,716 in the icing condition. 710 00:40:51,716 --> 00:40:56,020 CAPT. CARLSEN: Speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272. 711 00:40:56,020 --> 00:41:00,591 STEWART: If you have icing on there and you're slowing down, 712 00:41:00,591 --> 00:41:03,895 who knows where that, that stall point is. 713 00:41:03,895 --> 00:41:08,766 CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272, now turn left heading 0-9-0. 714 00:41:08,766 --> 00:41:10,768 CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading 0-niner-0. 715 00:41:10,768 --> 00:41:14,572 NARRATOR: To make matters worse, the plane is on autopilot. 716 00:41:14,572 --> 00:41:17,575 JOHN: Since the autopilot was engaged they were unaware 717 00:41:17,575 --> 00:41:19,744 that this trace amount of ice 718 00:41:19,744 --> 00:41:23,281 was starting to affect their aerodynamics. 719 00:41:23,281 --> 00:41:27,552 STEWART: When the autopilot is on, the pilot can't feel 720 00:41:27,552 --> 00:41:30,822 what's happening until he starts to see something 721 00:41:30,822 --> 00:41:33,791 on the instrument gauges. 722 00:41:33,791 --> 00:41:35,860 AUTOMATION: 723 00:41:35,860 --> 00:41:37,929 CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks like your low speed indicator. 724 00:41:37,929 --> 00:41:40,498 RICHARD: The Captain was the first to notice the anomaly. 725 00:41:40,498 --> 00:41:42,033 FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it. CAPT. CARLSEN: Power. 726 00:41:42,033 --> 00:41:43,735 FO. REECE: Thanks. 727 00:41:43,735 --> 00:41:47,171 NARRATOR: But it's too late. The left wing has already stalled. 728 00:41:50,041 --> 00:41:52,043 RICHARD: The aircraft rolled rapidly to the left. 729 00:41:52,043 --> 00:41:57,281 They went from about 45 degrees angle of bank to the left 730 00:41:57,281 --> 00:42:05,690 to 140 degrees, which is basically inverted. 731 00:42:05,690 --> 00:42:07,458 STEWART: At that point the airplane just it's gonna do 732 00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:11,295 whatever it's gonna do, and God help them. 733 00:42:11,295 --> 00:42:13,030 CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in a dive. We're in a dive! 734 00:42:13,030 --> 00:42:15,433 JOHN: When that nose pitched straight into the ground, 735 00:42:15,433 --> 00:42:18,336 their fate was sealed. 736 00:42:24,409 --> 00:42:27,111 FO. REECE: No! No! No! 737 00:42:32,350 --> 00:42:37,054 STEWART: I'm sorry. I wish it hadn't happened. 738 00:42:37,054 --> 00:42:46,597 ♪ ♪ 739 00:42:46,597 --> 00:42:49,200 NARRATOR: The NTSB lays blame for the accident 740 00:42:49,200 --> 00:42:52,637 on the Federal Aviation Administration. 741 00:42:52,637 --> 00:42:55,440 The agency failed to establish adequate standards 742 00:42:55,440 --> 00:42:58,876 for flights in icing conditions. 743 00:42:58,876 --> 00:43:01,679 JOHN: Ultimately, we didn't believe that the FAA 744 00:43:01,679 --> 00:43:03,347 put forth the right leadership 745 00:43:03,347 --> 00:43:07,485 to help dispel the myth of de-ice boot bridging. 746 00:43:07,485 --> 00:43:09,687 NARRATOR: They recommend that all pilots be informed 747 00:43:09,687 --> 00:43:11,722 of the need to activate the boots 748 00:43:11,722 --> 00:43:16,394 the moment they encounter icing conditions. 749 00:43:16,394 --> 00:43:20,965 ♪ ♪ 750 00:43:20,965 --> 00:43:25,069 RICHARD: In this case, we had very good pilots, 751 00:43:25,069 --> 00:43:30,274 a very good aircraft. 752 00:43:30,274 --> 00:43:32,944 It's very difficult to reconcile that 753 00:43:32,944 --> 00:43:40,351 when you're talking with, um, next of kin. 754 00:43:40,351 --> 00:43:46,491 Hundreds of lives are affected. 755 00:43:46,491 --> 00:43:51,429 We now have information that could prevent that. 756 00:43:51,429 --> 00:43:59,036 ♪ ♪ 62249

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