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CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!
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00:00:03,303 --> 00:00:05,305
NARRATOR: A commuter
flight to Detroit...
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00:00:05,305 --> 00:00:07,407
CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on!
Get out of it for God's sake!
4
00:00:07,407 --> 00:00:11,545
NARRATOR: ... ends
in a harrowing spiral.
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00:00:11,545 --> 00:00:13,780
FO. REECE: Ohhhhh!
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00:00:13,780 --> 00:00:16,083
RICHARD: Tremendous
destruction of the aircraft,
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00:00:16,083 --> 00:00:18,952
and it was a very severe impact.
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RICHARD: Whatever happened
happened in a heartbeat.
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00:00:21,288 --> 00:00:23,190
NARRATOR: Close
analysis of flight data...
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00:00:23,190 --> 00:00:25,192
CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.
FO. REECE: Standard seven.
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00:00:25,192 --> 00:00:27,628
NARRATOR: ... leads to
a stunning realization.
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00:00:27,628 --> 00:00:30,697
RICHARD: It's
Roselawn all over again.
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00:00:30,697 --> 00:00:33,400
NARRATOR: What
doomed Flight 3272
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00:00:33,400 --> 00:00:37,704
is a danger the industry
has known about for years.
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RICHARD: Why would you wait?
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RICHARD: In
aviation, myths die hard.
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NARRATOR: To fulfill their
mission, investigators confront
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some of
aviation's biggest players.
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JOHN: It was time
to break that myth.
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♪ ♪
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NARRATOR: Twenty-six
passengers are on their way
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to Detroit, Michigan,
aboard Comair Flight 3272.
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It's a short afternoon flight
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operated by one of America's
largest regional airlines.
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The workhorse of the Comair
fleet is the Embraer 120,
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a Brazilian-made turboprop.
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STEWART: The airplane
handled quite nicely, uh,
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just about every regime
that you could think of,
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uh, that would be appropriate
for the type of operation
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that we were doing.
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NARRATOR: Darinda Ogden has
been a Comair flight attendant
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for five years.
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DARINDA: Here's your drink, Ken.
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FO. REECE: Thank you
very much for the ice.
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NARRATOR: First Officer Kenneth
Reece and Captain Dann Carlsen
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have been trading
piloting duties all day.
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This is the day's third
leg, and First Officer Reece
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is at the controls.
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STEWART: I flew with
Kenneth two or three times.
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NARRATOR: Stewart Lauer
is a former Comair pilot.
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STEWART: I found him to
be a very capable pilot.
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He knew what he was doing.
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FO. REECE: Out of Detroit
we're looking at 2-39 radio.
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NARRATOR: Flight
3272 left from an airport
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near Cincinnati,
Ohio, at 3:08 pm.
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It's expected to land
in Detroit just after
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4 o'clock in the afternoon.
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STEWART:
What we want to do is just
fly from point A to point B,
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get the passengers there safely
and not scare them to death.
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00:03:03,917 --> 00:03:08,889
CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading 0-3-0 to
join the arrival, Comair 3272.
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NARRATOR: The crew has
the plane on autopilot
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as they descend from
nineteen thousand feet.
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Closing in on
their destination...
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♪ ♪
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DARINDA: Just some bumps.
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NARRATOR: ... they hit
some unexpected turbulence.
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Despite the rough ride,
the flight is still running
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on schedule.
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♪ ♪
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At Detroit approach
control, Steven Cochran
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guides Flight 3272 on
its path to the runway.
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CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Comair 3272, Detroit approach,
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heading 0-5-0,
vector to runway 3-right.
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NARRATOR: It's another
busy Thursday afternoon
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for the veteran controller.
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AMERICAN WEST PILOT: Detroit,
Cactus 50 level at 1-3000.
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00:03:59,239 --> 00:04:02,642
NARRATOR: The crew
of an Airbus radios in.
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CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Cactus 50, Detroit roger.
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00:04:04,744 --> 00:04:07,247
Expect vectors for 3-right.
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00:04:07,247 --> 00:04:09,082
NARRATOR: The controller
wants the larger Airbus
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to land before Comair 3272.
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00:04:13,753 --> 00:04:16,623
RICHARD: The jet was much
faster than the Comair flight,
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00:04:16,623 --> 00:04:18,558
so the air traffic
controller made the decision
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to give the jet
priority over the turboprop
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and gave them a slower speed.
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CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair,
maintain one-niner-zero knots.
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If unable, advise.
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CAPT. CARLSEN:
Roger. One-niner-zero
knots, Comair 3272.
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NARRATOR: First Officer
Reece reduces his speed
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00:04:37,110 --> 00:04:40,480
to a hundred and ninety knots
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to let the
incoming Airbus land first.
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00:04:43,550 --> 00:04:48,088
RICHARD: The fact that 3272
was placed behind Cactus 50
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00:04:48,088 --> 00:04:55,262
added just a little bit to the
maneuvering that was required.
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00:04:55,262 --> 00:04:57,464
DARINDA: Ladies and gentlemen,
we're on our final approach
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to Detroit.
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Please fasten your seat belts
and stow away your tray tables.
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00:05:04,104 --> 00:05:09,609
NARRATOR:
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The turboprop should be on the
runway in less than 15 minutes.
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00:05:09,609 --> 00:05:15,215
♪ ♪
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00:05:15,215 --> 00:05:17,184
FO. REECE: Let's
run the descent check.
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00:05:17,184 --> 00:05:19,519
RICHARD: The approach
phase is the busiest time
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00:05:19,519 --> 00:05:22,189
from a workload
standpoint for the pilot,
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00:05:22,189 --> 00:05:23,957
and that's the time
that he would like to have
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00:05:23,957 --> 00:05:26,126
the assistance of the autopilot.
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00:05:26,126 --> 00:05:27,894
CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.
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FO. REECE:
Windshield, props, standard 7.
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00:05:31,131 --> 00:05:32,299
CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization?
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00:05:32,299 --> 00:05:34,768
NARRATOR: As they descend
towards eight thousand feet,
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00:05:34,768 --> 00:05:37,637
the pilots perform a
series of standard checks.
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00:05:37,637 --> 00:05:38,905
CAPT. CARLSEN: Auto.
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00:05:38,905 --> 00:05:41,174
STEWART: As you come
in to land, we go into
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what's called a sterile cockpit.
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FO. REECE: On.
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STEWART: There's no chitchat.
It's just strictly business.
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00:05:47,414 --> 00:05:52,886
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.
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00:05:52,886 --> 00:05:55,155
NARRATOR: The controller now
wants the turboprop to reduce
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00:05:55,155 --> 00:05:58,291
its airspeed to a
hundred and fifty knots.
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00:06:02,062 --> 00:06:06,999
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.
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00:06:06,999 --> 00:06:13,840
CAPT. CARLSEN: Uh,
speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272.
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00:06:13,840 --> 00:06:15,909
They always gotta
tell us everything twice.
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00:06:15,909 --> 00:06:17,944
FO. REECE: He's got a
short-term memory disorder.
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00:06:17,944 --> 00:06:19,813
CAPT. CARLSEN: Is
that what that is?
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00:06:19,813 --> 00:06:22,549
FO. REECE: Yeah,
that's what it is.
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00:06:22,549 --> 00:06:27,787
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272,
now turn left heading 0-9-0.
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00:06:27,787 --> 00:06:30,824
CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading
0-niner-0, Comair 3272.
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00:06:30,824 --> 00:06:32,926
JOHN: The airplane
was responding properly
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to all the air
traffic control inputs
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00:06:34,928 --> 00:06:37,831
and not indicating any problem.
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00:06:37,831 --> 00:06:39,799
♪ ♪
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00:06:39,799 --> 00:06:44,037
NARRATOR:
The plane banks left as the
pilots make their final turn.
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00:06:44,037 --> 00:06:46,106
First Officer Reece
expects the autopilot
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to roll the plane back to level.
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00:06:50,443 --> 00:06:52,312
AUTOMATION:
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00:06:52,312 --> 00:06:53,680
CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.
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00:06:53,680 --> 00:06:55,348
FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.
CAPT. CARLSEN: Power.
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00:06:55,348 --> 00:06:59,619
NARRATOR: The Captain pushes
the throttles to gain speed.
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00:06:59,619 --> 00:07:02,022
But it doesn't work.
128
00:07:02,022 --> 00:07:06,860
Instead, the plane's
autopilot disconnects.
129
00:07:10,530 --> 00:07:12,766
JOHN: When the
autopilot disconnected
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00:07:12,766 --> 00:07:19,906
a very sudden left roll began.
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00:07:27,647 --> 00:07:31,351
NARRATOR: Reece struggles
to level the plane by hand.
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00:07:31,351 --> 00:07:33,153
STEWART: The amount of
effort it takes to move
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00:07:33,153 --> 00:07:36,423
those control surfaces,
you've gotta muscle it
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00:07:36,423 --> 00:07:39,225
until you can get it
where you want it to go.
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00:07:39,225 --> 00:07:41,561
NARRATOR: He wrenches the
control column to the right,
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00:07:41,561 --> 00:07:45,632
trying to correct
the steep left bank.
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00:07:45,632 --> 00:07:46,800
RICHARD: Nothing
really happened.
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00:07:46,800 --> 00:07:49,936
The aircraft continued
rolling over to the left.
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00:07:49,936 --> 00:07:52,639
♪ ♪
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00:08:01,581 --> 00:08:05,385
CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!
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00:08:05,385 --> 00:08:06,486
FO. REECE: No!
CAPT. CARLSEN: Oh god!
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00:08:06,486 --> 00:08:08,755
FO. REECE: No! Nooo.
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00:08:08,755 --> 00:08:11,024
♪ ♪
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00:08:11,024 --> 00:08:11,958
STEWART: You never give up.
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00:08:11,958 --> 00:08:14,260
You do what you gotta
do to try to make it.
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00:08:14,260 --> 00:08:16,196
CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on! Get
out of there for God's sake!
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00:08:16,196 --> 00:08:21,134
FO. REECE: No! Ugh. Ooh.
CAPT. CARLSEN: God.
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00:08:21,134 --> 00:08:23,603
NARRATOR: But there seems to
be nothing the pilots can do
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00:08:23,603 --> 00:08:25,472
to save their
spiraling aircraft.
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00:08:28,708 --> 00:08:35,281
♪ ♪
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00:08:35,281 --> 00:08:38,184
RICHARD: There was
virtually no controllability.
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00:08:38,184 --> 00:08:39,686
Nothing can be done.
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00:08:39,686 --> 00:08:43,823
There's just insufficient
altitude to recover.
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00:08:43,823 --> 00:08:47,560
FO. REECE: Noooooo!
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00:08:51,664 --> 00:09:03,410
♪ ♪
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00:09:03,410 --> 00:09:05,345
RICHARD: It was a
very severe impact,
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00:09:05,345 --> 00:09:10,784
a tremendous
destruction of the aircraft.
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00:09:10,784 --> 00:09:15,355
NARRATOR: Comair Flight 3272 en
route from Cincinnati to Detroit
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00:09:15,355 --> 00:09:21,461
has crashed into a field 22
miles southwest of the runway.
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00:09:21,461 --> 00:09:26,399
First responders and news
crews arrive at the scene.
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00:09:26,399 --> 00:09:29,002
They soon discover
that all 26 passengers
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00:09:29,002 --> 00:09:32,205
and three crew members are dead.
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00:09:32,205 --> 00:09:37,010
♪ ♪
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00:09:37,010 --> 00:09:42,348
PRESS CONFERENCE (Archive):
We'd like to offer our
condolences to the families.
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00:09:42,348 --> 00:09:44,851
Our hearts go out to
those that have lost
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00:09:44,851 --> 00:09:47,654
their loved ones today.
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00:09:47,654 --> 00:09:49,722
NARRATOR: The
sudden loss of 29 lives
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00:09:49,722 --> 00:09:54,627
leaves families and
friends in anguish.
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00:09:54,627 --> 00:09:56,696
How could a commercial
flight on approach to
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a major U.S. airport
go so horribly wrong?
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00:10:06,473 --> 00:10:10,443
NARRATOR:
The morning after the crash, a
blackened scar on a frozen field
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00:10:10,443 --> 00:10:15,715
marks the fatal
impact zone of Flight 3272.
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00:10:15,715 --> 00:10:17,851
Families and friends
attend a memorial service
174
00:10:17,851 --> 00:10:21,721
for the crash victims.
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00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:24,424
A team from the National
Transportation Safety Board
176
00:10:24,424 --> 00:10:28,194
is already at work recovering
pieces of wreckage for analysis.
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00:10:28,194 --> 00:10:42,442
♪ ♪
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00:10:42,442 --> 00:10:48,381
JOHN: God, it's cold out there.
179
00:10:48,381 --> 00:10:51,017
NARRATOR: NTSB systems
specialist John DeLisi
180
00:10:51,017 --> 00:10:55,855
faces one of the biggest
challenges of his career.
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00:10:55,855 --> 00:10:58,191
JOHN: We knew the airplane
was on approach into Detroit
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00:10:58,191 --> 00:11:05,131
and something dramatic happened.
Something went wrong suddenly.
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00:11:05,131 --> 00:11:06,733
RICHARD: What a mess.
184
00:11:06,733 --> 00:11:10,770
NARRATOR:
The NTSB's Richard Rodriguez
leads the investigation.
185
00:11:10,770 --> 00:11:13,506
RICHARD: Our mission is to
find the cause of an accident,
186
00:11:13,506 --> 00:11:15,208
make recommendations
that will prevent it
187
00:11:15,208 --> 00:11:18,144
from ever happening again.
188
00:11:18,144 --> 00:11:20,179
NARRATOR: Their first
task is to find the airplane's
189
00:11:20,179 --> 00:11:24,150
black boxes and get
them to a lab for analysis.
190
00:11:24,150 --> 00:11:26,519
JOHN: We spent about
eight hours that first day
191
00:11:26,519 --> 00:11:31,591
pulling the wreckage apart.
192
00:11:31,591 --> 00:11:33,660
But by late
afternoon, we were able to find
193
00:11:33,660 --> 00:11:36,229
the cockpit voice recorder
and flight data recorder
194
00:11:36,229 --> 00:11:39,599
and got those on their
way back to Washington, D.C.
195
00:11:43,102 --> 00:11:46,005
RICHARD: Let's get
those both packed up.
196
00:11:46,005 --> 00:11:48,508
NARRATOR: While they wait
for news on the black boxes,
197
00:11:48,508 --> 00:11:53,947
investigators head to
Detroit Metropolitan airport.
198
00:11:53,947 --> 00:11:55,548
They want to hear
from the last person
199
00:11:55,548 --> 00:11:59,552
to speak with the pilots,
the approach controller.
200
00:11:59,552 --> 00:12:01,220
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: It
was coming on rush hour.
201
00:12:01,220 --> 00:12:02,622
We had winter weather.
202
00:12:02,622 --> 00:12:04,624
JOHN: From air traffic
control we learned that the
203
00:12:04,624 --> 00:12:07,794
weather was bad and airplanes
were starting to pile up
204
00:12:07,794 --> 00:12:09,963
on their approach into Detroit.
205
00:12:09,963 --> 00:12:11,965
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: That's when
American West Airlines Flight 50
206
00:12:11,965 --> 00:12:16,469
made contact, right after 3272.
207
00:12:16,469 --> 00:12:19,939
AMERICAN WEST PILOT:
Detroit, Cactus 50 level
at one-three thousand.
208
00:12:19,939 --> 00:12:22,575
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: So I
told Comair pilots to slow up.
209
00:12:22,575 --> 00:12:25,178
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair,
maintain 1-niner-0 knots.
210
00:12:25,178 --> 00:12:27,780
If unable, advise.
211
00:12:27,780 --> 00:12:30,450
CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
I made sure there was plenty
of distance between them.
212
00:12:30,450 --> 00:12:32,719
JOHN: There were other airplanes
on approach to Detroit,
213
00:12:32,719 --> 00:12:35,655
so sometimes when
they're in close proximity
214
00:12:35,655 --> 00:12:39,025
there can be an issue with wake
vortex coming off one airplane
215
00:12:39,025 --> 00:12:41,828
that may affect another.
216
00:12:41,828 --> 00:12:44,497
NARRATOR: A wake vortex
is a horizontal tornado
217
00:12:44,497 --> 00:12:48,768
that trails behind an aircraft.
218
00:12:48,768 --> 00:12:51,804
If one plane flies too
close to the wake of another,
219
00:12:51,804 --> 00:12:56,075
it can encounter sudden
and extreme turbulence.
220
00:12:56,075 --> 00:12:59,779
♪ ♪
221
00:12:59,779 --> 00:13:07,754
RICHARD:
So here's the Airbus, American
West Airlines Flight 50.
222
00:13:07,754 --> 00:13:11,858
NARRATOR:
The Airbus is almost twice
the size of the Embraer 120.
223
00:13:11,858 --> 00:13:17,697
RICHARD: And here's
our Comair Flight 3272.
224
00:13:17,697 --> 00:13:21,868
NARRATOR: Did the big jet's
wake vortex knock Flight 3272
225
00:13:21,868 --> 00:13:24,804
out of the sky?
226
00:13:24,804 --> 00:13:27,140
JOHN: We needed to see
if the accident airplane
227
00:13:27,140 --> 00:13:31,778
flew underneath that
one and crossing its wake.
228
00:13:31,778 --> 00:13:33,446
RICHARD: The
Embraer is miles back
229
00:13:33,446 --> 00:13:39,452
and fifteen hundred
feet below the Airbus.
230
00:13:39,452 --> 00:13:45,358
It could have got
caught in the wake.
231
00:13:45,358 --> 00:13:49,028
Get the data off to NASA.
Let's see what they think.
232
00:13:49,028 --> 00:13:50,797
♪ ♪
233
00:13:50,797 --> 00:13:54,233
NARRATOR: A wake vortex
incident seems possible.
234
00:13:54,233 --> 00:13:55,301
FO. REECE: Oh God.
235
00:13:55,301 --> 00:13:56,669
NARRATOR: But investigators
won't know for certain
236
00:13:56,669 --> 00:14:04,444
until experts at NASA
analyze the radar data.
237
00:14:04,444 --> 00:14:06,279
♪ ♪
238
00:14:06,279 --> 00:14:13,519
Meanwhile, Rodriguez
explores other possibilities.
239
00:14:13,519 --> 00:14:15,621
RICHARD: What
happened to the propellers?
240
00:14:15,621 --> 00:14:18,024
NARRATOR: He's very familiar
with this type of plane,
241
00:14:18,024 --> 00:14:19,659
having
investigated previous accidents
242
00:14:19,659 --> 00:14:23,162
involving the Embraer 120.
243
00:14:23,162 --> 00:14:26,833
RICHARD: The Embraer 120
propeller blade had separated
244
00:14:26,833 --> 00:14:32,004
due to a fatigue crack over in
an accident earlier in Georgia.
245
00:14:32,004 --> 00:14:33,840
The crew was able to land it,
246
00:14:33,840 --> 00:14:37,310
but it was very
difficult to control.
247
00:14:37,310 --> 00:14:40,179
NARRATOR: In two previous cases,
part of a propeller blade
248
00:14:40,179 --> 00:14:45,918
broke off in mid-flight.
Could it have happened again?
249
00:14:45,918 --> 00:14:48,721
RICHARD: If they were barely
able to control the aircraft,
250
00:14:48,721 --> 00:14:53,092
this could have been a
problem for, uh, 3272.
251
00:14:53,092 --> 00:14:55,828
NARRATOR:
Rodriguez reviews details
of where the two propellers
252
00:14:55,828 --> 00:14:58,731
were found at the
Detroit crash site.
253
00:14:58,731 --> 00:15:01,300
He makes a troubling discovery.
254
00:15:01,300 --> 00:15:04,237
Part of one blade
ended up 75 feet away
255
00:15:04,237 --> 00:15:07,273
from the main impact crater.
256
00:15:07,273 --> 00:15:10,343
He can't help but wonder
-- is this the third time
257
00:15:10,343 --> 00:15:13,746
he's seen an
Embraer 120 propeller fail?
258
00:15:13,746 --> 00:15:17,650
RICHARD: We need to take a
look at those propeller blades.
259
00:15:17,650 --> 00:15:19,919
RICHARD: We wanted to get
those blades of the propeller
260
00:15:19,919 --> 00:15:23,189
to ensure they
were intact at impact.
261
00:15:23,189 --> 00:15:30,930
♪ ♪
262
00:15:30,930 --> 00:15:32,999
NARRATOR: Rodriguez
studies the blade fragment,
263
00:15:32,999 --> 00:15:35,067
looking for evidence of failure.
264
00:15:38,871 --> 00:15:40,907
If the propeller
blades were all attached
265
00:15:40,907 --> 00:15:42,875
and spinning at impact,
266
00:15:42,875 --> 00:15:45,545
they would have all hit the
ground with tremendous force,
267
00:15:45,545 --> 00:15:52,752
resulting in distinctive
damage on every blade.
268
00:15:52,752 --> 00:15:54,587
RICHARD: This is impact damage.
269
00:15:54,587 --> 00:15:56,956
They were spinning
right till the end.
270
00:15:56,956 --> 00:15:58,991
NARRATOR: The
analysis leaves no doubt.
271
00:15:58,991 --> 00:16:01,828
Though the propellers fragmented
when they hit the ground,
272
00:16:01,828 --> 00:16:04,564
they did not fail in flight.
273
00:16:04,564 --> 00:16:08,067
JOHN: We were able to tell that
nothing broke off the airplane
274
00:16:08,067 --> 00:16:10,736
during the flight path.
275
00:16:10,736 --> 00:16:16,008
NARRATOR: Just as investigators
rule out one possible cause,
276
00:16:16,008 --> 00:16:19,111
they uncover
another intriguing clue.
277
00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:26,619
JOHN: Richard.
RICHARD: What'd you find?
278
00:16:26,619 --> 00:16:30,723
JOHN: It's the
engine fire lever.
279
00:16:30,723 --> 00:16:35,094
It looks like it's been pulled.
280
00:16:35,094 --> 00:16:36,495
RICHARD: Well, what do you know?
281
00:16:36,495 --> 00:16:40,233
JOHN: This is a lever that a
crew member would grab and pull
282
00:16:40,233 --> 00:16:44,337
and twist if one of
the engines was on fire.
283
00:16:44,337 --> 00:16:48,140
NARRATOR: It's a discovery that
has frightening implications.
284
00:16:48,140 --> 00:16:51,510
JOHN: So are we looking
at an engine fire here?
285
00:16:56,983 --> 00:17:01,520
♪ ♪
286
00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:03,689
RICHARD: Yeah.
Put that one here.
287
00:17:03,689 --> 00:17:07,059
NARRATOR: NTSB investigators
explore a disturbing theory
288
00:17:07,059 --> 00:17:10,830
as they try to figure
out why Comair Flight 3272
289
00:17:10,830 --> 00:17:15,368
plunged from the sky.
290
00:17:15,368 --> 00:17:17,136
It looks like one
of the pilots pulled
291
00:17:17,136 --> 00:17:19,906
an engine fire shut-off lever.
292
00:17:19,906 --> 00:17:23,976
The crew may have been
fighting an in-flight fire.
293
00:17:23,976 --> 00:17:28,714
RICHARD: No doubt
there was a fire. But when?
294
00:17:28,714 --> 00:17:31,250
NARRATOR: While the engines
are clearly fire damaged,
295
00:17:31,250 --> 00:17:33,753
investigators need to
determine if the fire started
296
00:17:33,753 --> 00:17:37,223
before or after the
plane hit the ground.
297
00:17:37,223 --> 00:17:39,492
RICHARD: In flight
fire would probably be
298
00:17:39,492 --> 00:17:42,261
at a higher
temperature than ground fire.
299
00:17:42,261 --> 00:17:45,097
So you would have some
perhaps disintegration
300
00:17:45,097 --> 00:17:48,968
or disappearance of the
metal in the engine cowling
301
00:17:48,968 --> 00:17:51,971
and so forth.
302
00:17:51,971 --> 00:17:54,774
NARRATOR:
If the fire started while
the plane was moving forward,
303
00:17:54,774 --> 00:17:58,411
Rodriguez should find soot
marks in a horizontal pattern.
304
00:17:58,411 --> 00:18:00,079
If it started on the ground,
305
00:18:00,079 --> 00:18:02,815
the flames would
have gone straight up.
306
00:18:02,815 --> 00:18:05,918
RICHARD: In this case it was
a relatively low temperature.
307
00:18:05,918 --> 00:18:08,120
All the soot
patterns were vertical.
308
00:18:08,120 --> 00:18:13,960
There was no airstream affecting
it to show in-flight fire.
309
00:18:13,960 --> 00:18:16,462
RICHARD: I'm
seeing post-impact fire.
310
00:18:16,462 --> 00:18:20,466
There was no fire
in flight. No way.
311
00:18:20,466 --> 00:18:23,135
JOHN: But upon further
examination, we realized
312
00:18:23,135 --> 00:18:25,705
that the extended
position of that handle
313
00:18:25,705 --> 00:18:30,977
was just the result of the hard
crush damage that occurred.
314
00:18:30,977 --> 00:18:35,081
♪ ♪
315
00:18:35,081 --> 00:18:36,782
NARRATOR: With
engine fire ruled out,
316
00:18:36,782 --> 00:18:41,153
investigators turn to NASA
analysis of airport radar data.
317
00:18:41,153 --> 00:18:43,656
Perhaps there's evidence
that the small turboprop
318
00:18:43,656 --> 00:18:48,561
flew too close to a big jet.
319
00:18:48,561 --> 00:18:50,796
RICHARD: And that settles that.
320
00:18:50,796 --> 00:18:52,732
NARRATOR: But
it's another dead end.
321
00:18:52,732 --> 00:18:55,501
RICHARD: It
wasn't a wake vortex.
322
00:18:55,501 --> 00:18:57,169
NARRATOR: The
analysis reveals that the wake
323
00:18:57,169 --> 00:18:59,472
from American Airlines Flight 50
324
00:18:59,472 --> 00:19:05,478
could not have dropped to
the altitude of Comair 3272.
325
00:19:05,478 --> 00:19:09,815
Investigators are
back where they started.
326
00:19:09,815 --> 00:19:13,386
Why 29 people died
just minutes before landing
327
00:19:13,386 --> 00:19:16,222
is still a mystery.
328
00:19:16,222 --> 00:19:19,325
♪ ♪
329
00:19:19,325 --> 00:19:21,027
RICHARD: Okay. Are we all ready?
330
00:19:21,027 --> 00:19:22,928
NARRATOR: They finally
have access to the information
331
00:19:22,928 --> 00:19:26,966
stored on the plane's
flight data recorder.
332
00:19:26,966 --> 00:19:28,968
RICHARD: Left engine please.
333
00:19:28,968 --> 00:19:30,770
NARRATOR: It should
give them important details
334
00:19:30,770 --> 00:19:33,472
on how the
aircraft was performing...
335
00:19:33,472 --> 00:19:34,807
RICHARD: Now the right engine.
336
00:19:34,807 --> 00:19:38,444
NARRATOR: ... right up
to the moment of impact.
337
00:19:38,444 --> 00:19:42,481
RICHARD: Here it's starting.
The engines are guzzling fuel.
338
00:19:42,481 --> 00:19:44,817
The speed stays the same.
339
00:19:44,817 --> 00:19:47,420
NARRATOR: The data
reveals a puzzling detail.
340
00:19:47,420 --> 00:19:49,955
Just before the
plane's sudden upset,
341
00:19:49,955 --> 00:19:54,727
the engines were working
hard but to little effect.
342
00:19:54,727 --> 00:19:56,462
RICHARD: The flight
data recorder indicated that
343
00:19:56,462 --> 00:20:00,132
the aircraft had received
significant degradation
344
00:20:00,132 --> 00:20:01,767
in the performance.
345
00:20:01,767 --> 00:20:06,372
RICHARD: Look what's happening
here. Autopilot is on.
346
00:20:06,372 --> 00:20:12,645
Turn is done. It should
level off here, but it doesn't.
347
00:20:12,645 --> 00:20:13,813
It keeps rolling.
348
00:20:13,813 --> 00:20:16,215
DAN: What really
jumped out at us was
349
00:20:16,215 --> 00:20:19,852
the airplane continued to roll
350
00:20:19,852 --> 00:20:22,755
even though the autopilot
was commanding it to go back
351
00:20:22,755 --> 00:20:26,826
to wings level.
352
00:20:26,826 --> 00:20:31,163
RICHARD: Something's
holding the engines back.
353
00:20:31,163 --> 00:20:34,366
NARRATOR: As
Rodriguez studies the data,
354
00:20:34,366 --> 00:20:40,873
he thinks he knows what may be
causing the loss of performance.
355
00:20:40,873 --> 00:20:46,245
RICHARD: Four thousand
feet and it falls from the sky.
356
00:20:46,245 --> 00:20:49,815
NARRATOR:
It has all the hallmarks of
something he's seen before.
357
00:20:54,653 --> 00:20:56,655
RICHARD: It's
Roselawn all over again.
358
00:20:56,655 --> 00:20:58,791
♪ ♪
359
00:20:58,791 --> 00:21:03,829
NARRATOR:
In October 1994, the pilots
of American Eagle Flight 4184
360
00:21:03,829 --> 00:21:08,634
suddenly lost control
of their twin turboprop.
361
00:21:08,634 --> 00:21:10,870
It plummeted from the sky
and crashed near the town
362
00:21:10,870 --> 00:21:14,773
of Roselawn, Indiana.
363
00:21:16,709 --> 00:21:22,414
All 68 people
aboard were killed.
364
00:21:22,414 --> 00:21:25,351
The cause was a
phenomenon known as icing,
365
00:21:25,351 --> 00:21:27,319
where a build-up
of ice on the wings
366
00:21:27,319 --> 00:21:30,990
leads to an aerodynamic stall.
367
00:21:30,990 --> 00:21:33,192
STEWART: When that happens
you're not producing the lift
368
00:21:33,192 --> 00:21:34,460
that you're supposed to.
369
00:21:34,460 --> 00:21:40,232
The loss of lift is what the
word stall is pertaining to.
370
00:21:40,232 --> 00:21:43,769
When we stall a
wing we lose lift.
371
00:21:43,769 --> 00:21:45,404
♪ ♪
372
00:21:45,404 --> 00:21:47,239
RICHARD: Following
the Roselawn accident,
373
00:21:47,239 --> 00:21:49,375
the FAA was very
concerned about the performance
374
00:21:49,375 --> 00:21:56,182
of turboprop aircraft
in, um, icing conditions.
375
00:21:56,182 --> 00:21:59,451
NARRATOR: The Federal Aviation
Administration was so concerned
376
00:21:59,451 --> 00:22:02,521
that it conducted full-scale
tests, flying a turboprop
377
00:22:02,521 --> 00:22:07,159
in super cooled precipitation
sprayed from a water tanker.
378
00:22:07,159 --> 00:22:10,162
RICHARD: They found that
the aircraft did accumulate ice
379
00:22:10,162 --> 00:22:17,203
on the top of the wing to
generate, uh, significant drag.
380
00:22:17,203 --> 00:22:19,672
NARRATOR: The flight test's
most dramatic finding was that
381
00:22:19,672 --> 00:22:22,975
a layer of ice as thin
as a sheet of sandpaper
382
00:22:22,975 --> 00:22:26,145
could cause major
problems for pilots.
383
00:22:26,145 --> 00:22:28,447
JOHN: And we were
very surprised to see that
384
00:22:28,447 --> 00:22:33,752
a trace amount of ice was enough
to affect the aerodynamics
385
00:22:33,752 --> 00:22:37,756
and possibly cause
a wing to lose lift.
386
00:22:37,756 --> 00:22:41,527
NARRATOR: In March 2001, a
turboprop suffered severe icing
387
00:22:41,527 --> 00:22:43,529
and plummeted eight
thousand feet before
388
00:22:43,529 --> 00:22:47,633
the captain
managed to regain control.
389
00:22:47,633 --> 00:22:50,169
That captain was Stewart Lauer.
390
00:22:50,169 --> 00:22:51,971
STEWART: I had the
shakes something fierce.
391
00:22:51,971 --> 00:22:55,007
I mean the
adrenaline was flowing.
392
00:22:55,007 --> 00:22:57,042
NARRATOR: Just like
Stewart Lauer's flight...
393
00:22:57,042 --> 00:22:58,444
CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.
394
00:22:58,444 --> 00:22:59,812
FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.
395
00:22:59,812 --> 00:23:03,315
NARRATOR:
... Comair 3272 dropped
from the sky in an instant.
396
00:23:03,315 --> 00:23:05,584
DAN: It's very
complex aerodynamically,
397
00:23:05,584 --> 00:23:09,388
especially when there's ice
contamination on the airplane.
398
00:23:09,388 --> 00:23:11,991
At that point it's
very hard to recover
399
00:23:11,991 --> 00:23:16,795
unless you gain airspeed,
and the only way to do that
400
00:23:16,795 --> 00:23:18,364
is point the nose to the ground,
401
00:23:18,364 --> 00:23:21,100
not something that
a pilot wants to do
402
00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:22,868
while trying to
recover an airplane.
403
00:23:22,868 --> 00:23:26,538
♪ ♪
404
00:23:26,538 --> 00:23:28,574
CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on!
Get out of it for God's sake!
405
00:23:31,810 --> 00:23:34,380
We're in a dive.
We're in a dive!
406
00:23:34,380 --> 00:23:36,715
FO. REECE: Ohhhhh.
CAPT. CARLSEN: God.
407
00:23:36,715 --> 00:23:39,918
STEWART: I was lucky. I
had plenty of altitude.
408
00:23:39,918 --> 00:23:43,622
It took me over
seven thousand feet
409
00:23:43,622 --> 00:23:47,192
to regain
control of the aircraft.
410
00:23:47,192 --> 00:23:50,162
They didn't have
it. They only had four.
411
00:23:53,032 --> 00:23:56,335
♪ ♪
412
00:24:00,039 --> 00:24:03,108
♪ ♪
413
00:24:03,108 --> 00:24:05,544
RICHARD: Okay. Let's
see what they flew through.
414
00:24:05,544 --> 00:24:07,780
NARRATOR: Investigators
need to learn all they can
415
00:24:07,780 --> 00:24:10,449
about the weather conditions
the Comair pilots faced
416
00:24:10,449 --> 00:24:14,720
as they approached Detroit.
417
00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:19,291
RICHARD: Okay. Let's
pull up the weather data.
418
00:24:19,291 --> 00:24:22,528
NARRATOR:
They know that for ice to build
up on the wings on a plane...
419
00:24:22,528 --> 00:24:24,163
RICHARD: Now let's
see the flight path.
420
00:24:24,163 --> 00:24:26,899
NARRATOR: ... temperature,
precipitation and aircraft speed
421
00:24:26,899 --> 00:24:30,602
must all fall within
a very specific range.
422
00:24:30,602 --> 00:24:33,605
JOHN: The weather data began to
paint a picture of an airplane
423
00:24:33,605 --> 00:24:37,242
that was on approach
flying in what were considered
424
00:24:37,242 --> 00:24:40,412
light icing conditions.
425
00:24:40,412 --> 00:24:41,914
CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Cactus 50, be advised there are
426
00:24:41,914 --> 00:24:43,916
slick runways
and poor visibility.
427
00:24:43,916 --> 00:24:45,284
How is it up there?
428
00:24:45,284 --> 00:24:48,354
NARRATOR: According to Detroit
controllers, other aircraft,
429
00:24:48,354 --> 00:24:52,057
including the flight directly
in front of Comair 3272,
430
00:24:52,057 --> 00:24:55,160
reported icing conditions.
431
00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,897
PILOT: Yeah, it's 237 at
32 up here, moderate icing
432
00:24:58,897 --> 00:25:01,800
with a possibility
of freezing drizzle.
433
00:25:01,800 --> 00:25:06,305
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Roger that.
Comair 3272, how is it up there?
434
00:25:06,305 --> 00:25:11,677
NARRATOR:
Strangely, the Comair pilots
never mentioned icing at all.
435
00:25:11,677 --> 00:25:18,117
CAPT. CARLSEN:
Comair 3272, uh, just a little
turbulence but that's all.
436
00:25:18,117 --> 00:25:20,185
RICHARD: It definitely
flew through icing conditions.
437
00:25:24,556 --> 00:25:27,259
NARRATOR: Investigators know
that even a thin layer of ice
438
00:25:27,259 --> 00:25:29,061
can be dangerous.
439
00:25:29,061 --> 00:25:34,566
Perhaps the Comair pilots
didn't see ice on their wings.
440
00:25:34,566 --> 00:25:36,468
RICHARD: The Embraer is
probably a good twenty feet
441
00:25:36,468 --> 00:25:40,172
from the cockpit window
back to the top of the wing
442
00:25:40,172 --> 00:25:42,608
where the ice would be forming,
443
00:25:42,608 --> 00:25:46,512
so it's very difficult to see
in poor lighting conditions,
444
00:25:46,512 --> 00:25:51,984
as 3272 was operating in cloud
and late in the afternoon.
445
00:25:51,984 --> 00:25:53,852
NARRATOR: But there's
something that doesn't add up.
446
00:25:58,190 --> 00:26:02,161
If the Comair pilots lost
control due to ice buildup,
447
00:26:02,161 --> 00:26:05,964
why were they the only
ones affected by the weather?
448
00:26:05,964 --> 00:26:07,699
JOHN: None of the other
airplanes that were on approach
449
00:26:07,699 --> 00:26:10,469
to Detroit
experienced any problems.
450
00:26:10,469 --> 00:26:12,504
So we needed to look
hard about what was unique
451
00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:14,973
about this airplane.
452
00:26:17,342 --> 00:26:19,044
♪ ♪
453
00:26:19,044 --> 00:26:20,879
NARRATOR: NTSB
investigators are now certain
454
00:26:20,879 --> 00:26:26,218
that Comair Flight 3272
flew through icing conditions.
455
00:26:26,218 --> 00:26:28,220
What they don't know
is if those conditions
456
00:26:28,220 --> 00:26:32,458
were severe enough to
bring down the plane.
457
00:26:32,458 --> 00:26:34,626
JOHN: We wanted to understand
what role icing played
458
00:26:34,626 --> 00:26:38,030
in the slow and steady
left roll that the airplane
459
00:26:38,030 --> 00:26:40,632
seemed to be experiencing.
460
00:26:40,632 --> 00:26:45,704
NARRATOR: In search of answers,
they visit a NASA test facility.
461
00:26:45,704 --> 00:26:48,841
Here they can see with
their own eyes how and when
462
00:26:48,841 --> 00:26:53,412
ice would have formed on
the wings of Flight 3272.
463
00:26:53,412 --> 00:26:55,814
♪ ♪
464
00:26:55,814 --> 00:26:57,483
RICHARD: We ready to go?
465
00:26:57,483 --> 00:27:01,320
TOM: We were helping the NTSB
identify potential ice shapes
466
00:27:01,320 --> 00:27:03,055
and what those
ice shapes could do
467
00:27:03,055 --> 00:27:06,825
to the flight characteristics.
468
00:27:06,825 --> 00:27:09,294
NARRATOR: Tom
Ratvasky is a NASA researcher.
469
00:27:09,294 --> 00:27:12,698
♪ ♪
470
00:27:12,698 --> 00:27:15,834
A section of a wing is
installed in a wind tunnel.
471
00:27:15,834 --> 00:27:18,604
TOM: We were able to
get our hands on an actual
472
00:27:18,604 --> 00:27:20,739
EMB-120 wing section.
473
00:27:20,739 --> 00:27:22,808
♪ ♪
474
00:27:22,808 --> 00:27:29,181
RICHARD: Let's initiate.
Temperature and wind speed set?
475
00:27:29,181 --> 00:27:30,649
TOM: The temperature
is cooled down to match
476
00:27:30,649 --> 00:27:32,251
the flight condition.
477
00:27:32,251 --> 00:27:34,486
The fan is turned on
to get the speed to match
478
00:27:34,486 --> 00:27:36,655
the flight condition.
479
00:27:36,655 --> 00:27:41,026
RICHARD: Okay. Let's
add the precipitation.
480
00:27:41,026 --> 00:27:42,861
TOM: There's also
a spray bar system,
481
00:27:42,861 --> 00:27:48,934
which introduces the liquid
water into that air stream.
482
00:27:48,934 --> 00:27:51,570
NARRATOR: The test simulates
the exact conditions faced
483
00:27:51,570 --> 00:27:54,006
by Flight 3272.
484
00:27:54,006 --> 00:27:59,745
♪ ♪
485
00:27:59,745 --> 00:28:03,615
Slowly, almost imperceptibly,
ice begins to accumulate
486
00:28:03,615 --> 00:28:05,284
on the wing.
487
00:28:05,284 --> 00:28:09,154
♪ ♪
488
00:28:09,154 --> 00:28:11,256
RICHARD: Even in a
lighted wind tunnel
489
00:28:11,256 --> 00:28:14,426
it was very difficult to see.
490
00:28:14,426 --> 00:28:17,596
TOM: The type of ice that was
accreted was relatively clear.
491
00:28:17,596 --> 00:28:20,232
It was very rough.
492
00:28:20,232 --> 00:28:22,434
Ice reshapes the wing surface
493
00:28:22,434 --> 00:28:25,404
so these aerodynamic
surfaces aren't doing
494
00:28:25,404 --> 00:28:28,774
what they're supposed to do.
495
00:28:28,774 --> 00:28:30,943
RICHARD: Can we get
some measurements please?
496
00:28:30,943 --> 00:28:34,279
♪ ♪
497
00:28:34,279 --> 00:28:36,181
NARRATOR: The test
leaves little doubt.
498
00:28:36,181 --> 00:28:39,351
A thin but dangerous layer
of ice almost certainly formed
499
00:28:39,351 --> 00:28:43,689
on the wings of Flight 3272.
500
00:28:43,689 --> 00:28:47,059
RICHARD: NASA gave us
ironclad knowledge that
501
00:28:47,059 --> 00:28:52,831
the accumulation of thin amounts
of ice was very dangerous
502
00:28:52,831 --> 00:28:55,667
and troublesome to the
pilot and to the aircraft.
503
00:28:59,972 --> 00:29:02,541
RICHARD: Okay, thanks for
your help with this. Thanks.
504
00:29:02,541 --> 00:29:04,910
NARRATOR: But there's still
something about the Comair crash
505
00:29:04,910 --> 00:29:08,246
that the NASA
test doesn't explain.
506
00:29:12,584 --> 00:29:15,721
The Embraer 120, like
most commercial planes, has
507
00:29:15,721 --> 00:29:23,629
anti-icing and de-icing systems
for winter weather flying.
508
00:29:23,629 --> 00:29:25,931
Investigators need
to know if the pilots
509
00:29:25,931 --> 00:29:30,802
activated those systems.
510
00:29:30,802 --> 00:29:35,907
RICHARD: You guys
ready? Let's play it.
511
00:29:35,907 --> 00:29:39,778
NARRATOR: They turn to
the cockpit voice recorder.
512
00:29:39,778 --> 00:29:45,584
CAPT. CARLSEN: Let's run the
descent check. Ice protection.
513
00:29:45,584 --> 00:29:49,955
FO. REECE: Wind
shield, props, Standard 7.
514
00:29:49,955 --> 00:29:51,757
RICHARD: The pilots
are required to go through
515
00:29:51,757 --> 00:29:53,859
an approach checklist.
516
00:29:53,859 --> 00:29:56,662
One of the items on
that approach checklist is
517
00:29:56,662 --> 00:29:59,665
the standard 7,
which is the, um, the
518
00:29:59,665 --> 00:30:06,004
various anti-icing facilities
that they have on the aircraft.
519
00:30:06,004 --> 00:30:08,040
NARRATOR: The anti-icing
system electrically heats
520
00:30:08,040 --> 00:30:11,143
the windshield
and the propellers.
521
00:30:11,143 --> 00:30:13,578
But for the wings
there's a different system,
522
00:30:13,578 --> 00:30:18,650
one that relies on mechanical
devices called de-icing boots.
523
00:30:18,650 --> 00:30:20,485
The boots are made of
rubber and are part of
524
00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,288
the leading edge of the wings.
525
00:30:23,288 --> 00:30:26,024
When activated,
they inflate and expand
526
00:30:26,024 --> 00:30:28,860
to crack off any
accumulated ice.
527
00:30:28,860 --> 00:30:31,697
STEWART: The ice is just
hard enough that it cracks
528
00:30:31,697 --> 00:30:34,666
and the airstream blows it away.
529
00:30:34,666 --> 00:30:36,935
CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization?
530
00:30:36,935 --> 00:30:39,171
FO. REECE: It's reset
for our landing in Detroit.
531
00:30:39,171 --> 00:30:41,540
NARRATOR: Rodriguez
listens, waiting for the pilots
532
00:30:41,540 --> 00:30:44,643
to activate the de-icing boots.
533
00:30:44,643 --> 00:30:47,979
CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights.
FO. REECE: Landing lights on.
534
00:30:47,979 --> 00:30:52,517
CAPT. CARLSEN: Cross-feed?
FO. REECE: Cross-feed's off.
535
00:30:52,517 --> 00:30:55,520
CAPT. CARLSEN:
That completes that.
536
00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:57,355
RICHARD: They cover everything
but activating the boots.
537
00:30:57,355 --> 00:31:00,158
What gives?
538
00:31:00,158 --> 00:31:02,594
RICHARD: There was no
discussion to indicate
539
00:31:02,594 --> 00:31:08,700
that they were concerned
about icing on the aircraft.
540
00:31:08,700 --> 00:31:11,303
RICHARD: Do you have
the pre-flight documents?
541
00:31:11,303 --> 00:31:13,572
NARRATOR: Investigators
want to know why the pilots
542
00:31:13,572 --> 00:31:15,941
didn't activate
an onboard system
543
00:31:15,941 --> 00:31:19,044
that could have
saved their plane.
544
00:31:19,044 --> 00:31:21,046
They check dispatch records.
545
00:31:21,046 --> 00:31:22,581
Maybe the crew was never briefed
546
00:31:22,581 --> 00:31:26,151
on the weather
conditions they'd face.
547
00:31:26,151 --> 00:31:29,521
RICHARD: The flight had received
their papers for dispatch
548
00:31:29,521 --> 00:31:32,457
from Cincinnati,
which included warnings
549
00:31:32,457 --> 00:31:36,027
about icing in the Detroit area.
550
00:31:36,027 --> 00:31:38,196
CAPT. CARLSEN: There
could be some ice in our path.
551
00:31:38,196 --> 00:31:40,966
FO. REECE: What a
shock. Ice in January.
552
00:31:40,966 --> 00:31:47,239
♪ ♪
553
00:31:47,239 --> 00:31:49,274
RICHARD: They knew
they were gonna hit ice,
554
00:31:49,274 --> 00:31:52,544
but they never popped the boots.
555
00:31:52,544 --> 00:31:55,781
JOHN: The de-ice boots did not
appear to have been activated.
556
00:31:55,781 --> 00:31:58,250
So we really wanted
to take a good hard look
557
00:31:58,250 --> 00:32:00,085
at when that
system should be used
558
00:32:00,085 --> 00:32:03,288
and why it wasn't
used on this approach.
559
00:32:03,288 --> 00:32:06,958
♪ ♪
560
00:32:08,927 --> 00:32:11,096
♪ ♪
561
00:32:11,096 --> 00:32:14,633
NARRATOR: NTSB
investigators know Flight 3272
562
00:32:14,633 --> 00:32:17,636
flew through
dangerous icing conditions.
563
00:32:17,636 --> 00:32:19,838
They also know that
the pilots never activated
564
00:32:19,838 --> 00:32:24,876
a critical de-icing system.
But they don't know why.
565
00:32:24,876 --> 00:32:28,079
RICHARD:
They should have been aware
there was icing taking place.
566
00:32:28,079 --> 00:32:29,948
They certainly
had to suspect it.
567
00:32:29,948 --> 00:32:35,220
♪ ♪
568
00:32:35,220 --> 00:32:36,822
NARRATOR: The pilots'
work records reveal that
569
00:32:36,822 --> 00:32:42,794
Captain Carlsen was a
seven-year veteran with Comair.
570
00:32:42,794 --> 00:32:43,795
He even helped write
571
00:32:43,795 --> 00:32:45,964
pilot training
procedures for the airline.
572
00:32:47,299 --> 00:32:53,071
RICHARD: The Captain was known
as a by-the-book type of pilot.
573
00:32:53,071 --> 00:32:56,107
First Officer Kenneth Reece
was an equally proficient pilot
574
00:32:56,107 --> 00:33:00,212
who was also a
certified flight instructor.
575
00:33:00,212 --> 00:33:02,080
DAN: These pilots
were well-trained
576
00:33:02,080 --> 00:33:07,185
and had plenty of experience
flying in the Midwest corridor
577
00:33:07,185 --> 00:33:09,487
where there's a lot
of icing conditions.
578
00:33:09,487 --> 00:33:13,458
♪ ♪
579
00:33:13,458 --> 00:33:15,493
RICHARD: So if ice is just
beginning to form on your wing,
580
00:33:15,493 --> 00:33:17,329
what would you do?
581
00:33:17,329 --> 00:33:19,998
NARRATOR: Investigators
contact other Comair pilots
582
00:33:19,998 --> 00:33:25,837
for insight into how they would
handle a similar scenario.
583
00:33:25,837 --> 00:33:31,810
RICHARD:
What would you do? You'd
wait? You'd wait? You'd wait.
584
00:33:31,810 --> 00:33:33,211
How much ice?
585
00:33:33,211 --> 00:33:36,081
JOHN: We were getting
feedback that they'd wait
586
00:33:36,081 --> 00:33:39,951
until one-quarter to one-half
inch of ice had accumulated
587
00:33:39,951 --> 00:33:43,021
before they'd
activate the de-ice boots.
588
00:33:43,021 --> 00:33:45,724
That was a
surprise for us to see.
589
00:33:45,724 --> 00:33:48,493
NARRATOR: The revelation
suggests that at Comair,
590
00:33:48,493 --> 00:33:50,729
outdated ideas about icing
591
00:33:50,729 --> 00:33:54,733
are putting pilots
and passengers at risk.
592
00:33:54,733 --> 00:34:02,741
RICHARD: Why would
you wait? Bridging.
593
00:34:02,741 --> 00:34:04,276
JOHN: When de-ice
boots were first invented,
594
00:34:04,276 --> 00:34:07,679
they inflated at a very slow
pressure and stayed inflated
595
00:34:07,679 --> 00:34:10,448
for a while, and
pilots became concerned
596
00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:14,819
that ice might form over
the inflated shape of the boot,
597
00:34:14,819 --> 00:34:18,523
a phenomenon known as bridging.
598
00:34:18,523 --> 00:34:19,758
NARRATOR: Ice
bridging was a concern
599
00:34:19,758 --> 00:34:25,030
with older de-icing systems that
inflated and deflated slowly.
600
00:34:25,030 --> 00:34:28,633
There was a risk that, if pilots
activated the boots too soon,
601
00:34:28,633 --> 00:34:31,136
ice might build up and
form a shell or bridge
602
00:34:31,136 --> 00:34:34,839
beyond the limit
of the inflated boot.
603
00:34:34,839 --> 00:34:40,645
That could render the
de-icing system useless.
604
00:34:40,645 --> 00:34:43,815
♪ ♪
605
00:34:43,815 --> 00:34:47,485
Investigators know that modern
de-icing boots have evolved.
606
00:34:47,485 --> 00:34:52,157
Bridging is no longer a
problem for turboprop aircraft.
607
00:34:52,157 --> 00:34:54,926
JOHN: The de-ice boots on
this airplane inflate rapidly
608
00:34:54,926 --> 00:34:56,127
in less than a second,
609
00:34:56,127 --> 00:34:59,297
would break off any amount
of ice that was accumulated
610
00:34:59,297 --> 00:35:02,801
and deflate again right
away with vacuum suction.
611
00:35:02,801 --> 00:35:09,307
So de-ice boot bridging was not
gonna happen on this airplane.
612
00:35:09,307 --> 00:35:10,875
RICHARD: All right. Let's
take a look at the manuals
613
00:35:10,875 --> 00:35:13,578
these guys were following.
614
00:35:13,578 --> 00:35:16,081
RICHARD: We were
interested in what guidance
615
00:35:16,081 --> 00:35:19,417
had the crew received,
what instructions do they have,
616
00:35:19,417 --> 00:35:24,923
what are they trained to do when
they're experiencing icing.
617
00:35:24,923 --> 00:35:27,993
NARRATOR: Both Comair and the
plane's manufacturer, Embraer,
618
00:35:27,993 --> 00:35:32,364
published flight
manuals for the 120 turboprop.
619
00:35:32,364 --> 00:35:34,332
When
investigators compare the two,
620
00:35:34,332 --> 00:35:36,534
they make a
surprising discovery.
621
00:35:36,534 --> 00:35:38,303
RICHARD: What?
622
00:35:38,303 --> 00:35:40,238
JOHN: What jumped out
at us was that Comair
623
00:35:40,238 --> 00:35:42,874
was instructing
their pilots to wait until
624
00:35:42,874 --> 00:35:46,011
a significant amount of
ice had accumulated before
625
00:35:46,011 --> 00:35:50,749
activating the de-ice boots.
That was surprising to us.
626
00:35:50,749 --> 00:35:53,551
RICHARD: The Comair
manual tells them to wait.
627
00:35:53,551 --> 00:35:56,121
NARRATOR: The Comair
manual advises pilots to wait
628
00:35:56,121 --> 00:36:00,525
until half an inch of
ice forms before de-icing,
629
00:36:00,525 --> 00:36:04,162
while the Embraer manual says
something completely different.
630
00:36:04,162 --> 00:36:08,733
RICHARD:
Embraer says activate boots
at the first sign of icing.
631
00:36:08,733 --> 00:36:11,403
RICHARD: The material with
respect to the icing conditions
632
00:36:11,403 --> 00:36:14,973
were not clear and
they were not consistent
633
00:36:14,973 --> 00:36:18,877
for the pilots to know
what they should be doing.
634
00:36:18,877 --> 00:36:22,547
RICHARD: Let's
see what we can find.
635
00:36:22,547 --> 00:36:24,849
NARRATOR: The Comair accident
is the first fatal crash
636
00:36:24,849 --> 00:36:29,487
of an Embraer
120 caused by icing.
637
00:36:29,487 --> 00:36:32,323
But how many close
calls have there been?
638
00:36:32,323 --> 00:36:40,231
♪ ♪
639
00:36:40,231 --> 00:36:44,469
RICHARD: Six in less
than eight years. Man oh man.
640
00:36:44,469 --> 00:36:48,640
RICHARD:
There were six previous loss-
of-control accidents involving
641
00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:54,112
icing with the Embraer,
which is pretty significant.
642
00:36:54,112 --> 00:36:56,948
RICHARD: So what did
the FAA do about this?
643
00:36:56,948 --> 00:36:59,651
NARRATOR: It's a
disturbing record of accidents.
644
00:36:59,651 --> 00:37:02,487
Investigators wonder
what steps the FAA has taken
645
00:37:02,487 --> 00:37:06,224
to fix the problem.
646
00:37:06,224 --> 00:37:07,659
♪ ♪
647
00:37:07,659 --> 00:37:10,028
The Federal Aviation
Administration is responsible
648
00:37:10,028 --> 00:37:12,931
for setting safety standards
throughout the industry.
649
00:37:12,931 --> 00:37:22,107
♪ ♪
650
00:37:22,107 --> 00:37:27,812
Rodriguez finds disturbing
evidence in FAA files.
651
00:37:27,812 --> 00:37:35,220
RICHARD:
Icing. Icing. Icing. Well, you
sure created a lot of reports.
652
00:37:35,220 --> 00:37:37,555
NARRATOR: Comair pilots may
not be the only ones who held
653
00:37:37,555 --> 00:37:40,859
out-of-date
views about de-icing.
654
00:37:40,859 --> 00:37:42,961
The federal
regulators themselves
655
00:37:42,961 --> 00:37:45,163
may be part of the problem.
656
00:37:45,163 --> 00:37:47,499
JOHN: I think we began to
realize that we were working
657
00:37:47,499 --> 00:37:49,968
not against knowledge
that wasn't out there.
658
00:37:49,968 --> 00:37:55,406
We were working against a
long thought trend in aviation
659
00:37:55,406 --> 00:37:57,509
that de-ice boot
bridging is a concern.
660
00:37:57,509 --> 00:38:00,044
It was... de-ice
boot bridging was a myth.
661
00:38:00,044 --> 00:38:05,183
RICHARD: In
aviation myths die hard.
662
00:38:05,183 --> 00:38:08,052
JOHN: It was time
to break that myth.
663
00:38:08,052 --> 00:38:11,756
♪ ♪
664
00:38:11,756 --> 00:38:14,058
NARRATOR: Investigators
are trying to understand why
665
00:38:14,058 --> 00:38:17,395
Comair and Embraer provided
conflicting instructions
666
00:38:17,395 --> 00:38:19,697
to pilots regarding icing.
667
00:38:19,697 --> 00:38:24,702
♪ ♪
668
00:38:24,702 --> 00:38:29,274
Digging through FAA files, they
find some intriguing documents.
669
00:38:29,274 --> 00:38:34,045
RICHARD: Develop means
to prevent ice formation.
670
00:38:34,045 --> 00:38:35,914
NARRATOR: An FAA
memo makes it clear
671
00:38:35,914 --> 00:38:39,951
that the regulator was
concerned about icing.
672
00:38:39,951 --> 00:38:43,655
RICHARD: There's only one way to
do that -- activate the boots.
673
00:38:43,655 --> 00:38:46,157
NARRATOR: And a revision to
the Embraer 120 flight manual
674
00:38:46,157 --> 00:38:48,526
shows that the manufacturer
had clearly spelled out
675
00:38:48,526 --> 00:38:51,996
the need to de-ice quickly.
676
00:38:51,996 --> 00:38:54,666
RICHARD: Activation
of de-icing boots at
677
00:38:54,666 --> 00:39:00,505
the first sign of ice formation.
Embraer knew the answer.
678
00:39:00,505 --> 00:39:03,308
NARRATOR: So why were the Comair
pilots still in the dark?
679
00:39:03,308 --> 00:39:04,976
CAPT. CARLSEN: There
could be some ice in our path.
680
00:39:04,976 --> 00:39:10,915
FO. REECE: Oh, what a
shock. Ice in January.
681
00:39:10,915 --> 00:39:13,251
NARRATOR: Investigators
learn that the FAA approved
682
00:39:13,251 --> 00:39:18,856
the Embraer revision. But then
a critical step was missed.
683
00:39:18,856 --> 00:39:23,962
The regulator did not require
airlines to adopt the change.
684
00:39:23,962 --> 00:39:27,832
Many, including Comair, did not.
685
00:39:27,832 --> 00:39:31,369
RICHARD: Why not make it
mandatory? It's a no brainer.
686
00:39:31,369 --> 00:39:34,539
RICHARD: While the FAA had
a great deal of information,
687
00:39:34,539 --> 00:39:37,909
they never did
officially sanction a standard
688
00:39:37,909 --> 00:39:43,281
that should be adhered to.
689
00:39:43,281 --> 00:39:44,983
NARRATOR: Investigators
finally understand
690
00:39:44,983 --> 00:39:49,454
what caused the crash
of Comair Flight 3272.
691
00:39:52,757 --> 00:39:56,327
♪ ♪
692
00:39:56,327 --> 00:39:57,829
NARRATOR: Just before landing...
693
00:39:57,829 --> 00:39:59,097
CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.
694
00:39:59,097 --> 00:40:01,599
NARRATOR: ... the
pilots enter icing conditions.
695
00:40:01,599 --> 00:40:04,102
But the Captain,
following airline procedures,
696
00:40:04,102 --> 00:40:07,272
does not activate
the de-icing boots.
697
00:40:07,272 --> 00:40:10,208
FO. REECE:
It's reset for landing
in Detroit. It looks good.
698
00:40:10,208 --> 00:40:12,677
CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights.
FO. REECE: Landing lights.
699
00:40:12,677 --> 00:40:14,345
JOHN: The crew seemed to
be aware that they were in
700
00:40:14,345 --> 00:40:17,048
light icing conditions,
but per the instructions
701
00:40:17,048 --> 00:40:19,350
in the flight
manual they were waiting
702
00:40:19,350 --> 00:40:23,488
until a significant
amount of ice had accumulated.
703
00:40:23,488 --> 00:40:29,227
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.
704
00:40:29,227 --> 00:40:32,864
NARRATOR: The controller then
instructs them to reduce speed.
705
00:40:32,864 --> 00:40:37,135
RICHARD: That's getting pretty
slow, and it was a concern to us
706
00:40:37,135 --> 00:40:40,305
why would they have
accepted that without question.
707
00:40:40,305 --> 00:40:43,541
But in their manuals there
was no specific information
708
00:40:43,541 --> 00:40:47,879
that would tell them do not,
uh, go below a certain airspeed
709
00:40:47,879 --> 00:40:51,716
in the icing condition.
710
00:40:51,716 --> 00:40:56,020
CAPT. CARLSEN:
Speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272.
711
00:40:56,020 --> 00:41:00,591
STEWART: If you have icing on
there and you're slowing down,
712
00:41:00,591 --> 00:41:03,895
who knows where
that, that stall point is.
713
00:41:03,895 --> 00:41:08,766
CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272,
now turn left heading 0-9-0.
714
00:41:08,766 --> 00:41:10,768
CAPT. CARLSEN:
Heading 0-niner-0.
715
00:41:10,768 --> 00:41:14,572
NARRATOR: To make matters worse,
the plane is on autopilot.
716
00:41:14,572 --> 00:41:17,575
JOHN: Since the autopilot
was engaged they were unaware
717
00:41:17,575 --> 00:41:19,744
that this trace amount of ice
718
00:41:19,744 --> 00:41:23,281
was starting to
affect their aerodynamics.
719
00:41:23,281 --> 00:41:27,552
STEWART: When the autopilot
is on, the pilot can't feel
720
00:41:27,552 --> 00:41:30,822
what's happening until
he starts to see something
721
00:41:30,822 --> 00:41:33,791
on the instrument gauges.
722
00:41:33,791 --> 00:41:35,860
AUTOMATION:
723
00:41:35,860 --> 00:41:37,929
CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.
724
00:41:37,929 --> 00:41:40,498
RICHARD: The Captain was the
first to notice the anomaly.
725
00:41:40,498 --> 00:41:42,033
FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.
CAPT. CARLSEN: Power.
726
00:41:42,033 --> 00:41:43,735
FO. REECE: Thanks.
727
00:41:43,735 --> 00:41:47,171
NARRATOR: But it's too late. The
left wing has already stalled.
728
00:41:50,041 --> 00:41:52,043
RICHARD: The aircraft
rolled rapidly to the left.
729
00:41:52,043 --> 00:41:57,281
They went from about 45 degrees
angle of bank to the left
730
00:41:57,281 --> 00:42:05,690
to 140 degrees, which
is basically inverted.
731
00:42:05,690 --> 00:42:07,458
STEWART: At that point the
airplane just it's gonna do
732
00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:11,295
whatever it's gonna
do, and God help them.
733
00:42:11,295 --> 00:42:13,030
CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!
734
00:42:13,030 --> 00:42:15,433
JOHN: When that nose pitched
straight into the ground,
735
00:42:15,433 --> 00:42:18,336
their fate was sealed.
736
00:42:24,409 --> 00:42:27,111
FO. REECE: No! No! No!
737
00:42:32,350 --> 00:42:37,054
STEWART: I'm sorry. I
wish it hadn't happened.
738
00:42:37,054 --> 00:42:46,597
♪ ♪
739
00:42:46,597 --> 00:42:49,200
NARRATOR: The NTSB
lays blame for the accident
740
00:42:49,200 --> 00:42:52,637
on the Federal
Aviation Administration.
741
00:42:52,637 --> 00:42:55,440
The agency failed to
establish adequate standards
742
00:42:55,440 --> 00:42:58,876
for flights in icing conditions.
743
00:42:58,876 --> 00:43:01,679
JOHN: Ultimately, we
didn't believe that the FAA
744
00:43:01,679 --> 00:43:03,347
put forth the right leadership
745
00:43:03,347 --> 00:43:07,485
to help dispel the myth
of de-ice boot bridging.
746
00:43:07,485 --> 00:43:09,687
NARRATOR: They recommend
that all pilots be informed
747
00:43:09,687 --> 00:43:11,722
of the need to
activate the boots
748
00:43:11,722 --> 00:43:16,394
the moment they
encounter icing conditions.
749
00:43:16,394 --> 00:43:20,965
♪ ♪
750
00:43:20,965 --> 00:43:25,069
RICHARD: In this case,
we had very good pilots,
751
00:43:25,069 --> 00:43:30,274
a very good aircraft.
752
00:43:30,274 --> 00:43:32,944
It's very
difficult to reconcile that
753
00:43:32,944 --> 00:43:40,351
when you're talking
with, um, next of kin.
754
00:43:40,351 --> 00:43:46,491
Hundreds of lives are affected.
755
00:43:46,491 --> 00:43:51,429
We now have information
that could prevent that.
756
00:43:51,429 --> 00:43:59,036
♪ ♪
62249
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