All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S11E03.Deadly.Myth.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.AAC2.0.H.264-maldini_track3_[eng]

CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!

NARRATOR: A commuter
flight to Detroit...

CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on!
Get out of it for God's sake!

NARRATOR: ... ends
in a harrowing spiral.

FO. REECE: Ohhhhh!

RICHARD: Tremendous
destruction of the aircraft,

and it was a very severe impact.

RICHARD: Whatever happened
happened in a heartbeat.

NARRATOR: Close
analysis of flight data...

CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.
FO. REECE: Standard seven.

NARRATOR: ... leads to
a stunning realization.

RICHARD: It's
Roselawn all over again.

NARRATOR: What
doomed Flight 3272

is a danger the industry
has known about for years.

RICHARD: Why would you wait?

RICHARD: In
aviation, myths die hard.

NARRATOR: To fulfill their
mission, investigators confront

some of
aviation's biggest players.

JOHN: It was time
to break that myth.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Twenty-six
passengers are on their way

to Detroit, Michigan,
aboard Comair Flight 3272.

It's a short afternoon flight

operated by one of America's
largest regional airlines.

The workhorse of the Comair
fleet is the Embraer 120,

a Brazilian-made turboprop.

STEWART: The airplane
handled quite nicely, uh,

just about every regime
that you could think of,

uh, that would be appropriate
for the type of operation

that we were doing.

NARRATOR: Darinda Ogden has
been a Comair flight attendant

for five years.

DARINDA: Here's your drink, Ken.

FO. REECE: Thank you
very much for the ice.

NARRATOR: First Officer Kenneth
Reece and Captain Dann Carlsen

have been trading
piloting duties all day.

This is the day's third
leg, and First Officer Reece

is at the controls.

STEWART: I flew with
Kenneth two or three times.

NARRATOR: Stewart Lauer
is a former Comair pilot.

STEWART: I found him to
be a very capable pilot.

He knew what he was doing.

FO. REECE: Out of Detroit
we're looking at 2-39 radio.

NARRATOR: Flight
3272 left from an airport

near Cincinnati,
Ohio, at 3:08 pm.

It's expected to land
in Detroit just after

4 o'clock in the afternoon.

STEWART:
What we want to do is just
fly from point A to point B,

get the passengers there safely
and not scare them to death.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading 0-3-0 to
join the arrival, Comair 3272.

NARRATOR: The crew has
the plane on autopilot

as they descend from
nineteen thousand feet.

Closing in on
their destination...

♪ ♪

DARINDA: Just some bumps.

NARRATOR: ... they hit
some unexpected turbulence.

Despite the rough ride,
the flight is still running

on schedule.

♪ ♪

At Detroit approach
control, Steven Cochran

guides Flight 3272 on
its path to the runway.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Comair 3272, Detroit approach,

heading 0-5-0,
vector to runway 3-right.

NARRATOR: It's another
busy Thursday afternoon

for the veteran controller.

AMERICAN WEST PILOT: Detroit,
Cactus 50 level at 1-3000.

NARRATOR: The crew
of an Airbus radios in.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Cactus 50, Detroit roger.

Expect vectors for 3-right.

NARRATOR: The controller
wants the larger Airbus

to land before Comair 3272.

RICHARD: The jet was much
faster than the Comair flight,

so the air traffic
controller made the decision

to give the jet
priority over the turboprop

and gave them a slower speed.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair,
maintain one-niner-zero knots.

If unable, advise.

CAPT. CARLSEN:
Roger. One-niner-zero
knots, Comair 3272.

NARRATOR: First Officer
Reece reduces his speed

to a hundred and ninety knots

to let the
incoming Airbus land first.

RICHARD: The fact that 3272
was placed behind Cactus 50

added just a little bit to the
maneuvering that was required.

DARINDA: Ladies and gentlemen,
we're on our final approach

to Detroit.

Please fasten your seat belts
and stow away your tray tables.

NARRATOR:

The turboprop should be on the
runway in less than 15 minutes.

♪ ♪

FO. REECE: Let's
run the descent check.

RICHARD: The approach
phase is the busiest time

from a workload
standpoint for the pilot,

and that's the time
that he would like to have

the assistance of the autopilot.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.

FO. REECE:
Windshield, props, standard 7.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization?

NARRATOR: As they descend
towards eight thousand feet,

the pilots perform a
series of standard checks.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Auto.

STEWART: As you come
in to land, we go into

what's called a sterile cockpit.

FO. REECE: On.

STEWART: There's no chitchat.
It's just strictly business.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.

NARRATOR: The controller now
wants the turboprop to reduce

its airspeed to a
hundred and fifty knots.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Uh,
speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272.

They always gotta
tell us everything twice.

FO. REECE: He's got a
short-term memory disorder.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Is
that what that is?

FO. REECE: Yeah,
that's what it is.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272,
now turn left heading 0-9-0.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Heading
0-niner-0, Comair 3272.

JOHN: The airplane
was responding properly

to all the air
traffic control inputs

and not indicating any problem.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR:
The plane banks left as the
pilots make their final turn.

First Officer Reece
expects the autopilot

to roll the plane back to level.

AUTOMATION:

CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.

FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.
CAPT. CARLSEN: Power.

NARRATOR: The Captain pushes
the throttles to gain speed.

But it doesn't work.

Instead, the plane's
autopilot disconnects.

JOHN: When the
autopilot disconnected

a very sudden left roll began.

NARRATOR: Reece struggles
to level the plane by hand.

STEWART: The amount of
effort it takes to move

those control surfaces,
you've gotta muscle it

until you can get it
where you want it to go.

NARRATOR: He wrenches the
control column to the right,

trying to correct
the steep left bank.

RICHARD: Nothing
really happened.

The aircraft continued
rolling over to the left.

♪ ♪

CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!

FO. REECE: No!
CAPT. CARLSEN: Oh god!

FO. REECE: No! Nooo.

♪ ♪

STEWART: You never give up.

You do what you gotta
do to try to make it.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on! Get
out of there for God's sake!

FO. REECE: No! Ugh. Ooh.
CAPT. CARLSEN: God.

NARRATOR: But there seems to
be nothing the pilots can do

to save their
spiraling aircraft.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: There was
virtually no controllability.

Nothing can be done.

There's just insufficient
altitude to recover.

FO. REECE: Noooooo!

♪ ♪

RICHARD: It was a
very severe impact,

a tremendous
destruction of the aircraft.

NARRATOR: Comair Flight 3272 en
route from Cincinnati to Detroit

has crashed into a field 22
miles southwest of the runway.

First responders and news
crews arrive at the scene.

They soon discover
that all 26 passengers

and three crew members are dead.

♪ ♪

PRESS CONFERENCE (Archive):
We'd like to offer our
condolences to the families.

Our hearts go out to
those that have lost

their loved ones today.

NARRATOR: The
sudden loss of 29 lives

leaves families and
friends in anguish.

How could a commercial
flight on approach to

a major U.S. airport
go so horribly wrong?

NARRATOR:
The morning after the crash, a
blackened scar on a frozen field

marks the fatal
impact zone of Flight 3272.

Families and friends
attend a memorial service

for the crash victims.

A team from the National
Transportation Safety Board

is already at work recovering
pieces of wreckage for analysis.

♪ ♪

JOHN: God, it's cold out there.

NARRATOR: NTSB systems
specialist John DeLisi

faces one of the biggest
challenges of his career.

JOHN: We knew the airplane
was on approach into Detroit

and something dramatic happened.
Something went wrong suddenly.

RICHARD: What a mess.

NARRATOR:
The NTSB's Richard Rodriguez
leads the investigation.

RICHARD: Our mission is to
find the cause of an accident,

make recommendations
that will prevent it

from ever happening again.

NARRATOR: Their first
task is to find the airplane's

black boxes and get
them to a lab for analysis.

JOHN: We spent about
eight hours that first day

pulling the wreckage apart.

But by late
afternoon, we were able to find

the cockpit voice recorder
and flight data recorder

and got those on their
way back to Washington, D.C.

RICHARD: Let's get
those both packed up.

NARRATOR: While they wait
for news on the black boxes,

investigators head to
Detroit Metropolitan airport.

They want to hear
from the last person

to speak with the pilots,
the approach controller.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: It
was coming on rush hour.

We had winter weather.

JOHN: From air traffic
control we learned that the

weather was bad and airplanes
were starting to pile up

on their approach into Detroit.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: That's when
American West Airlines Flight 50

made contact, right after 3272.

AMERICAN WEST PILOT:
Detroit, Cactus 50 level
at one-three thousand.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: So I
told Comair pilots to slow up.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair,
maintain 1-niner-0 knots.

If unable, advise.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
I made sure there was plenty
of distance between them.

JOHN: There were other airplanes
on approach to Detroit,

so sometimes when
they're in close proximity

there can be an issue with wake
vortex coming off one airplane

that may affect another.

NARRATOR: A wake vortex
is a horizontal tornado

that trails behind an aircraft.

If one plane flies too
close to the wake of another,

it can encounter sudden
and extreme turbulence.

♪ ♪

RICHARD:
So here's the Airbus, American
West Airlines Flight 50.

NARRATOR:
The Airbus is almost twice
the size of the Embraer 120.

RICHARD: And here's
our Comair Flight 3272.

NARRATOR: Did the big jet's
wake vortex knock Flight 3272

out of the sky?

JOHN: We needed to see
if the accident airplane

flew underneath that
one and crossing its wake.

RICHARD: The
Embraer is miles back

and fifteen hundred
feet below the Airbus.

It could have got
caught in the wake.

Get the data off to NASA.
Let's see what they think.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: A wake vortex
incident seems possible.

FO. REECE: Oh God.

NARRATOR: But investigators
won't know for certain

until experts at NASA
analyze the radar data.

♪ ♪

Meanwhile, Rodriguez
explores other possibilities.

RICHARD: What
happened to the propellers?

NARRATOR: He's very familiar
with this type of plane,

having
investigated previous accidents

involving the Embraer 120.

RICHARD: The Embraer 120
propeller blade had separated

due to a fatigue crack over in
an accident earlier in Georgia.

The crew was able to land it,

but it was very
difficult to control.

NARRATOR: In two previous cases,
part of a propeller blade

broke off in mid-flight.
Could it have happened again?

RICHARD: If they were barely
able to control the aircraft,

this could have been a
problem for, uh, 3272.

NARRATOR:
Rodriguez reviews details
of where the two propellers

were found at the
Detroit crash site.

He makes a troubling discovery.

Part of one blade
ended up 75 feet away

from the main impact crater.

He can't help but wonder
-- is this the third time

he's seen an
Embraer 120 propeller fail?

RICHARD: We need to take a
look at those propeller blades.

RICHARD: We wanted to get
those blades of the propeller

to ensure they
were intact at impact.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Rodriguez
studies the blade fragment,

looking for evidence of failure.

If the propeller
blades were all attached

and spinning at impact,

they would have all hit the
ground with tremendous force,

resulting in distinctive
damage on every blade.

RICHARD: This is impact damage.

They were spinning
right till the end.

NARRATOR: The
analysis leaves no doubt.

Though the propellers fragmented
when they hit the ground,

they did not fail in flight.

JOHN: We were able to tell that
nothing broke off the airplane

during the flight path.

NARRATOR: Just as investigators
rule out one possible cause,

they uncover
another intriguing clue.

JOHN: Richard.
RICHARD: What'd you find?

JOHN: It's the
engine fire lever.

It looks like it's been pulled.

RICHARD: Well, what do you know?

JOHN: This is a lever that a
crew member would grab and pull

and twist if one of
the engines was on fire.

NARRATOR: It's a discovery that
has frightening implications.

JOHN: So are we looking
at an engine fire here?

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Yeah.
Put that one here.

NARRATOR: NTSB investigators
explore a disturbing theory

as they try to figure
out why Comair Flight 3272

plunged from the sky.

It looks like one
of the pilots pulled

an engine fire shut-off lever.

The crew may have been
fighting an in-flight fire.

RICHARD: No doubt
there was a fire. But when?

NARRATOR: While the engines
are clearly fire damaged,

investigators need to
determine if the fire started

before or after the
plane hit the ground.

RICHARD: In flight
fire would probably be

at a higher
temperature than ground fire.

So you would have some
perhaps disintegration

or disappearance of the
metal in the engine cowling

and so forth.

NARRATOR:
If the fire started while
the plane was moving forward,

Rodriguez should find soot
marks in a horizontal pattern.

If it started on the ground,

the flames would
have gone straight up.

RICHARD: In this case it was
a relatively low temperature.

All the soot
patterns were vertical.

There was no airstream affecting
it to show in-flight fire.

RICHARD: I'm
seeing post-impact fire.

There was no fire
in flight. No way.

JOHN: But upon further
examination, we realized

that the extended
position of that handle

was just the result of the hard
crush damage that occurred.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: With
engine fire ruled out,

investigators turn to NASA
analysis of airport radar data.

Perhaps there's evidence
that the small turboprop

flew too close to a big jet.

RICHARD: And that settles that.

NARRATOR: But
it's another dead end.

RICHARD: It
wasn't a wake vortex.

NARRATOR: The
analysis reveals that the wake

from American Airlines Flight 50

could not have dropped to
the altitude of Comair 3272.

Investigators are
back where they started.

Why 29 people died
just minutes before landing

is still a mystery.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Okay. Are we all ready?

NARRATOR: They finally
have access to the information

stored on the plane's
flight data recorder.

RICHARD: Left engine please.

NARRATOR: It should
give them important details

on how the
aircraft was performing...

RICHARD: Now the right engine.

NARRATOR: ... right up
to the moment of impact.

RICHARD: Here it's starting.
The engines are guzzling fuel.

The speed stays the same.

NARRATOR: The data
reveals a puzzling detail.

Just before the
plane's sudden upset,

the engines were working
hard but to little effect.

RICHARD: The flight
data recorder indicated that

the aircraft had received
significant degradation

in the performance.

RICHARD: Look what's happening
here. Autopilot is on.

Turn is done. It should
level off here, but it doesn't.

It keeps rolling.

DAN: What really
jumped out at us was

the airplane continued to roll

even though the autopilot
was commanding it to go back

to wings level.

RICHARD: Something's
holding the engines back.

NARRATOR: As
Rodriguez studies the data,

he thinks he knows what may be
causing the loss of performance.

RICHARD: Four thousand
feet and it falls from the sky.

NARRATOR:
It has all the hallmarks of
something he's seen before.

RICHARD: It's
Roselawn all over again.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR:
In October 1994, the pilots
of American Eagle Flight 4184

suddenly lost control
of their twin turboprop.

It plummeted from the sky
and crashed near the town

of Roselawn, Indiana.

All 68 people
aboard were killed.

The cause was a
phenomenon known as icing,

where a build-up
of ice on the wings

leads to an aerodynamic stall.

STEWART: When that happens
you're not producing the lift

that you're supposed to.

The loss of lift is what the
word stall is pertaining to.

When we stall a
wing we lose lift.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Following
the Roselawn accident,

the FAA was very
concerned about the performance

of turboprop aircraft
in, um, icing conditions.

NARRATOR: The Federal Aviation
Administration was so concerned

that it conducted full-scale
tests, flying a turboprop

in super cooled precipitation
sprayed from a water tanker.

RICHARD: They found that
the aircraft did accumulate ice

on the top of the wing to
generate, uh, significant drag.

NARRATOR: The flight test's
most dramatic finding was that

a layer of ice as thin
as a sheet of sandpaper

could cause major
problems for pilots.

JOHN: And we were
very surprised to see that

a trace amount of ice was enough
to affect the aerodynamics

and possibly cause
a wing to lose lift.

NARRATOR: In March 2001, a
turboprop suffered severe icing

and plummeted eight
thousand feet before

the captain
managed to regain control.

That captain was Stewart Lauer.

STEWART: I had the
shakes something fierce.

I mean the
adrenaline was flowing.

NARRATOR: Just like
Stewart Lauer's flight...

CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.

FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.

NARRATOR:
... Comair 3272 dropped
from the sky in an instant.

DAN: It's very
complex aerodynamically,

especially when there's ice
contamination on the airplane.

At that point it's
very hard to recover

unless you gain airspeed,
and the only way to do that

is point the nose to the ground,

not something that
a pilot wants to do

while trying to
recover an airplane.

♪ ♪

CAPT. CARLSEN: Come on!
Get out of it for God's sake!

We're in a dive.
We're in a dive!

FO. REECE: Ohhhhh.
CAPT. CARLSEN: God.

STEWART: I was lucky. I
had plenty of altitude.

It took me over
seven thousand feet

to regain
control of the aircraft.

They didn't have
it. They only had four.

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Okay. Let's
see what they flew through.

NARRATOR: Investigators
need to learn all they can

about the weather conditions
the Comair pilots faced

as they approached Detroit.

RICHARD: Okay. Let's
pull up the weather data.

NARRATOR:
They know that for ice to build
up on the wings on a plane...

RICHARD: Now let's
see the flight path.

NARRATOR: ... temperature,
precipitation and aircraft speed

must all fall within
a very specific range.

JOHN: The weather data began to
paint a picture of an airplane

that was on approach
flying in what were considered

light icing conditions.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN:
Cactus 50, be advised there are

slick runways
and poor visibility.

How is it up there?

NARRATOR: According to Detroit
controllers, other aircraft,

including the flight directly
in front of Comair 3272,

reported icing conditions.

PILOT: Yeah, it's 237 at
32 up here, moderate icing

with a possibility
of freezing drizzle.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Roger that.
Comair 3272, how is it up there?

NARRATOR:
Strangely, the Comair pilots
never mentioned icing at all.

CAPT. CARLSEN:
Comair 3272, uh, just a little
turbulence but that's all.

RICHARD: It definitely
flew through icing conditions.

NARRATOR: Investigators know
that even a thin layer of ice

can be dangerous.

Perhaps the Comair pilots
didn't see ice on their wings.

RICHARD: The Embraer is
probably a good twenty feet

from the cockpit window
back to the top of the wing

where the ice would be forming,

so it's very difficult to see
in poor lighting conditions,

as 3272 was operating in cloud
and late in the afternoon.

NARRATOR: But there's
something that doesn't add up.

If the Comair pilots lost
control due to ice buildup,

why were they the only
ones affected by the weather?

JOHN: None of the other
airplanes that were on approach

to Detroit
experienced any problems.

So we needed to look
hard about what was unique

about this airplane.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: NTSB
investigators are now certain

that Comair Flight 3272
flew through icing conditions.

What they don't know
is if those conditions

were severe enough to
bring down the plane.

JOHN: We wanted to understand
what role icing played

in the slow and steady
left roll that the airplane

seemed to be experiencing.

NARRATOR: In search of answers,
they visit a NASA test facility.

Here they can see with
their own eyes how and when

ice would have formed on
the wings of Flight 3272.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: We ready to go?

TOM: We were helping the NTSB
identify potential ice shapes

and what those
ice shapes could do

to the flight characteristics.

NARRATOR: Tom
Ratvasky is a NASA researcher.

♪ ♪

A section of a wing is
installed in a wind tunnel.

TOM: We were able to
get our hands on an actual

EMB-120 wing section.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Let's initiate.
Temperature and wind speed set?

TOM: The temperature
is cooled down to match

the flight condition.

The fan is turned on
to get the speed to match

the flight condition.

RICHARD: Okay. Let's
add the precipitation.

TOM: There's also
a spray bar system,

which introduces the liquid
water into that air stream.

NARRATOR: The test simulates
the exact conditions faced

by Flight 3272.

♪ ♪

Slowly, almost imperceptibly,
ice begins to accumulate

on the wing.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Even in a
lighted wind tunnel

it was very difficult to see.

TOM: The type of ice that was
accreted was relatively clear.

It was very rough.

Ice reshapes the wing surface

so these aerodynamic
surfaces aren't doing

what they're supposed to do.

RICHARD: Can we get
some measurements please?

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: The test
leaves little doubt.

A thin but dangerous layer
of ice almost certainly formed

on the wings of Flight 3272.

RICHARD: NASA gave us
ironclad knowledge that

the accumulation of thin amounts
of ice was very dangerous

and troublesome to the
pilot and to the aircraft.

RICHARD: Okay, thanks for
your help with this. Thanks.

NARRATOR: But there's still
something about the Comair crash

that the NASA
test doesn't explain.

The Embraer 120, like
most commercial planes, has

anti-icing and de-icing systems
for winter weather flying.

Investigators need
to know if the pilots

activated those systems.

RICHARD: You guys
ready? Let's play it.

NARRATOR: They turn to
the cockpit voice recorder.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Let's run the
descent check. Ice protection.

FO. REECE: Wind
shield, props, Standard 7.

RICHARD: The pilots
are required to go through

an approach checklist.

One of the items on
that approach checklist is

the standard 7,
which is the, um, the

various anti-icing facilities
that they have on the aircraft.

NARRATOR: The anti-icing
system electrically heats

the windshield
and the propellers.

But for the wings
there's a different system,

one that relies on mechanical
devices called de-icing boots.

The boots are made of
rubber and are part of

the leading edge of the wings.

When activated,
they inflate and expand

to crack off any
accumulated ice.

STEWART: The ice is just
hard enough that it cracks

and the airstream blows it away.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Pressurization?

FO. REECE: It's reset
for our landing in Detroit.

NARRATOR: Rodriguez
listens, waiting for the pilots

to activate the de-icing boots.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights.
FO. REECE: Landing lights on.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Cross-feed?
FO. REECE: Cross-feed's off.

CAPT. CARLSEN:
That completes that.

RICHARD: They cover everything
but activating the boots.

What gives?

RICHARD: There was no
discussion to indicate

that they were concerned
about icing on the aircraft.

RICHARD: Do you have
the pre-flight documents?

NARRATOR: Investigators
want to know why the pilots

didn't activate
an onboard system

that could have
saved their plane.

They check dispatch records.

Maybe the crew was never briefed

on the weather
conditions they'd face.

RICHARD: The flight had received
their papers for dispatch

from Cincinnati,
which included warnings

about icing in the Detroit area.

CAPT. CARLSEN: There
could be some ice in our path.

FO. REECE: What a
shock. Ice in January.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: They knew
they were gonna hit ice,

but they never popped the boots.

JOHN: The de-ice boots did not
appear to have been activated.

So we really wanted
to take a good hard look

at when that
system should be used

and why it wasn't
used on this approach.

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: NTSB
investigators know Flight 3272

flew through
dangerous icing conditions.

They also know that
the pilots never activated

a critical de-icing system.
But they don't know why.

RICHARD:
They should have been aware
there was icing taking place.

They certainly
had to suspect it.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: The pilots'
work records reveal that

Captain Carlsen was a
seven-year veteran with Comair.

He even helped write

pilot training
procedures for the airline.

RICHARD: The Captain was known
as a by-the-book type of pilot.

First Officer Kenneth Reece
was an equally proficient pilot

who was also a
certified flight instructor.

DAN: These pilots
were well-trained

and had plenty of experience
flying in the Midwest corridor

where there's a lot
of icing conditions.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: So if ice is just
beginning to form on your wing,

what would you do?

NARRATOR: Investigators
contact other Comair pilots

for insight into how they would
handle a similar scenario.

RICHARD:
What would you do? You'd
wait? You'd wait? You'd wait.

How much ice?

JOHN: We were getting
feedback that they'd wait

until one-quarter to one-half
inch of ice had accumulated

before they'd
activate the de-ice boots.

That was a
surprise for us to see.

NARRATOR: The revelation
suggests that at Comair,

outdated ideas about icing

are putting pilots
and passengers at risk.

RICHARD: Why would
you wait? Bridging.

JOHN: When de-ice
boots were first invented,

they inflated at a very slow
pressure and stayed inflated

for a while, and
pilots became concerned

that ice might form over
the inflated shape of the boot,

a phenomenon known as bridging.

NARRATOR: Ice
bridging was a concern

with older de-icing systems that
inflated and deflated slowly.

There was a risk that, if pilots
activated the boots too soon,

ice might build up and
form a shell or bridge

beyond the limit
of the inflated boot.

That could render the
de-icing system useless.

♪ ♪

Investigators know that modern
de-icing boots have evolved.

Bridging is no longer a
problem for turboprop aircraft.

JOHN: The de-ice boots on
this airplane inflate rapidly

in less than a second,

would break off any amount
of ice that was accumulated

and deflate again right
away with vacuum suction.

So de-ice boot bridging was not
gonna happen on this airplane.

RICHARD: All right. Let's
take a look at the manuals

these guys were following.

RICHARD: We were
interested in what guidance

had the crew received,
what instructions do they have,

what are they trained to do when
they're experiencing icing.

NARRATOR: Both Comair and the
plane's manufacturer, Embraer,

published flight
manuals for the 120 turboprop.

When
investigators compare the two,

they make a
surprising discovery.

RICHARD: What?

JOHN: What jumped out
at us was that Comair

was instructing
their pilots to wait until

a significant amount of
ice had accumulated before

activating the de-ice boots.
That was surprising to us.

RICHARD: The Comair
manual tells them to wait.

NARRATOR: The Comair
manual advises pilots to wait

until half an inch of
ice forms before de-icing,

while the Embraer manual says
something completely different.

RICHARD:
Embraer says activate boots
at the first sign of icing.

RICHARD: The material with
respect to the icing conditions

were not clear and
they were not consistent

for the pilots to know
what they should be doing.

RICHARD: Let's
see what we can find.

NARRATOR: The Comair accident
is the first fatal crash

of an Embraer
120 caused by icing.

But how many close
calls have there been?

♪ ♪

RICHARD: Six in less
than eight years. Man oh man.

RICHARD:
There were six previous loss-
of-control accidents involving

icing with the Embraer,
which is pretty significant.

RICHARD: So what did
the FAA do about this?

NARRATOR: It's a
disturbing record of accidents.

Investigators wonder
what steps the FAA has taken

to fix the problem.

♪ ♪

The Federal Aviation
Administration is responsible

for setting safety standards
throughout the industry.

♪ ♪

Rodriguez finds disturbing
evidence in FAA files.

RICHARD:
Icing. Icing. Icing. Well, you
sure created a lot of reports.

NARRATOR: Comair pilots may
not be the only ones who held

out-of-date
views about de-icing.

The federal
regulators themselves

may be part of the problem.

JOHN: I think we began to
realize that we were working

not against knowledge
that wasn't out there.

We were working against a
long thought trend in aviation

that de-ice boot
bridging is a concern.

It was... de-ice
boot bridging was a myth.

RICHARD: In
aviation myths die hard.

JOHN: It was time
to break that myth.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Investigators
are trying to understand why

Comair and Embraer provided
conflicting instructions

to pilots regarding icing.

♪ ♪

Digging through FAA files, they
find some intriguing documents.

RICHARD: Develop means
to prevent ice formation.

NARRATOR: An FAA
memo makes it clear

that the regulator was
concerned about icing.

RICHARD: There's only one way to
do that -- activate the boots.

NARRATOR: And a revision to
the Embraer 120 flight manual

shows that the manufacturer
had clearly spelled out

the need to de-ice quickly.

RICHARD: Activation
of de-icing boots at

the first sign of ice formation.
Embraer knew the answer.

NARRATOR: So why were the Comair
pilots still in the dark?

CAPT. CARLSEN: There
could be some ice in our path.

FO. REECE: Oh, what a
shock. Ice in January.

NARRATOR: Investigators
learn that the FAA approved

the Embraer revision. But then
a critical step was missed.

The regulator did not require
airlines to adopt the change.

Many, including Comair, did not.

RICHARD: Why not make it
mandatory? It's a no brainer.

RICHARD: While the FAA had
a great deal of information,

they never did
officially sanction a standard

that should be adhered to.

NARRATOR: Investigators
finally understand

what caused the crash
of Comair Flight 3272.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Just before landing...

CAPT. CARLSEN: Ice protection.

NARRATOR: ... the
pilots enter icing conditions.

But the Captain,
following airline procedures,

does not activate
the de-icing boots.

FO. REECE:
It's reset for landing
in Detroit. It looks good.

CAPT. CARLSEN: Landing lights.
FO. REECE: Landing lights.

JOHN: The crew seemed to
be aware that they were in

light icing conditions,
but per the instructions

in the flight
manual they were waiting

until a significant
amount of ice had accumulated.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair
3272, reduce speed 1-5-0.

NARRATOR: The controller then
instructs them to reduce speed.

RICHARD: That's getting pretty
slow, and it was a concern to us

why would they have
accepted that without question.

But in their manuals there
was no specific information

that would tell them do not,
uh, go below a certain airspeed

in the icing condition.

CAPT. CARLSEN:
Speed 1-5-0, Comair 3272.

STEWART: If you have icing on
there and you're slowing down,

who knows where
that, that stall point is.

CONTROLLER COCHRAN: Comair 3272,
now turn left heading 0-9-0.

CAPT. CARLSEN:
Heading 0-niner-0.

NARRATOR: To make matters worse,
the plane is on autopilot.

JOHN: Since the autopilot
was engaged they were unaware

that this trace amount of ice

was starting to
affect their aerodynamics.

STEWART: When the autopilot
is on, the pilot can't feel

what's happening until
he starts to see something

on the instrument gauges.

AUTOMATION:

CAPT. CARLSEN: It looks
like your low speed indicator.

RICHARD: The Captain was the
first to notice the anomaly.

FO. REECE: Yeah, I see it.
CAPT. CARLSEN: Power.

FO. REECE: Thanks.

NARRATOR: But it's too late. The
left wing has already stalled.

RICHARD: The aircraft
rolled rapidly to the left.

They went from about 45 degrees
angle of bank to the left

to 140 degrees, which
is basically inverted.

STEWART: At that point the
airplane just it's gonna do

whatever it's gonna
do, and God help them.

CAPT. CARLSEN: We're in
a dive. We're in a dive!

JOHN: When that nose pitched
straight into the ground,

their fate was sealed.

FO. REECE: No! No! No!

STEWART: I'm sorry. I
wish it hadn't happened.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: The NTSB
lays blame for the accident

on the Federal
Aviation Administration.

The agency failed to
establish adequate standards

for flights in icing conditions.

JOHN: Ultimately, we
didn't believe that the FAA

put forth the right leadership

to help dispel the myth
of de-ice boot bridging.

NARRATOR: They recommend
that all pilots be informed

of the need to
activate the boots

the moment they
encounter icing conditions.

♪ ♪

RICHARD: In this case,
we had very good pilots,

a very good aircraft.

It's very
difficult to reconcile that

when you're talking
with, um, next of kin.

Hundreds of lives are affected.

We now have information
that could prevent that.

♪ ♪