All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S11E02.Killer.Attitude.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.AAC2.0.H.264-maldini_track3_[eng]

NARRATOR: In northern
Minnesota, a commuter crash

kills everyone on board.

NEWSCASTER (Archive):
The deadliest US plane crash

in more than a
year and a half now.

NARRATOR:
Investigators face intense
pressure to find the cause.

JOHN DELISI: The tragedy that
has occurred puts a real focus

on what we need to do.

FO. ERICKSON: One to go.
CAPT. FALITZ: 2040? Okay.

NARRATOR: The cockpit
voice recording raises

disturbing questions
about an inexperienced pilot.

JOHN DELISI:
Why isn't the First Officer
making his altitude callouts?

MALCOLM: What had happened
here? What was his role?

NARRATOR: But when
investigators dig deeper...

JOHN DELISI: Wow.

NARRATOR: They
uncover a darker truth.

CSA: I checked twice, sir. We
don't have your authorization.

AL: I was amazed
when I read that.

NARRATOR: A deadly sequence
of events that began months

before the plane
ever left the ground.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Northwest
Airlink Flight 5719

cruises across the
skies of Minnesota.

First Officer Chad
Erickson is two months

into his first airline job.

CRAIG: I'm sure
that Chad was excited.

That was the first
step in getting the job

that would lead
you to the big job

to fly the big
iron at big airlines.

NARRATOR: This is the
first time he's flown a route

with an overnight stay.

FO. ERICKSON: Do
we get our own room?

CAPT. FALITZ: No. You're
gonna have to room with me.

And it's only a single bed,

so you'll have to
curl up at my feet.

Of course you get your own
room. You're on a contract now.

NARRATOR: Erickson's
captain is Marvin Falitz.

MALCOLM: Well, the Captain
grew up in New York City.

He was described as
having a personality

that was somewhat at odds
with a Midwestern personality.

It was a very
outgoing personality

and a sarcastic sense of humor.

CAPT. FALITZ: Freakin'
coffee tastes like piss.

MALCOLM: The First Officer
had a different background

and upbringing
than the Captain did.

He grew up around Minneapolis,

and the Midwest
sense of humor I think

is perhaps more understated.

FO. ERICKSON: Oh, uh,
see that falling star?

CAPT. FALITZ: Either that or
a plane falling out of the sky.

NARRATOR: Captain Falitz
and First Officer Erickson

are flying a Jetstream BA-3100,
a small twin-engine turboprop.

CRAIG: The Jetstream
was a handful to fly.

And we had to fly it
by hand all the time.

NARRATOR: Craig Railsback is a
former Northwest Airlink pilot

who also flew the BA-3100.

CRAIG: It was fairly unstable.

It was like balancing a beach
ball on top of a Coke bottle.

The upside of flying
an airplane like that

was you were incredibly
proficient. I mean you...

We got to be really
good at instrument flying,

and we flew in some
really, really difficult,

challenging conditions which,
you know, for a young guy

was great fun.

NARRATOR: It's the start
of the Christmas season,

and many of the sixteen
passengers are flying home

to spend time
with their families.

Flight 5719 took off from
Minneapolis shortly before 7 pm.

Its first destination
is Hibbing, Minnesota,

about an hour away.

After that, it's scheduled
to continue on to a final stop

in International Falls.

AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Twin City 7-19.

Hibbing weather: Sky partially
obscured. Freezing drizzle.

JOHN COX:
Hibbing's a small airport.

It does not have
a control tower.

At about the twenty
miles from the airport,

they'll clear you for
the instrument approach

if the weather is
below visual limits.

And at that point once
you're cleared for the approach

you're pretty much on your own.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Expect vector for the ILS

final approach
course at Hibbing.

FO. ERICKSON: Okay.
Thanks a lot. Twin City 7-19.

CAPT. FALITZ: We
can't take the ILS-3-1.

FO. ERICKSON: Because
of the snow on the runway?

CAPT. FALITZ: What?

FO. ERICKSON: Because of the
snow on the, uh, the runway?

I mean that's why, right?

Because you can't land on a
tail wind with a snowy runway?

CAPT. FALITZ: I don't like to
land with a tail wind anyway.

Tell them we'll take the
localizer back course to 1-3.

NARRATOR: The Captain decides
to approach Hibbing's runway

from the other side.

This approach is not equipped
with the instruments needed

to fully guide the
pilots to the runway.

It is known as a
non-precision approach.

FO. ERICKSON: We'd like
to back course up to 1-3.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Roger.
Proceed, but you're on your own.

JOHN COX:
Non-precision approaches
are in fact more demanding

than the precision
ones for the reason that

you have to monitor the descent
rate, the descent altitude,

the navigation where you are
laterally across the ground --

so there's actually
quite a bit more going on.

FO. ERICKSON:
We're cleared for the
localizer back course approach.

Twin City 7-19.

JOHN COX: Non-precision
approaches are more challenging,

and as a result they have
a higher rate of accidents

than precision approaches.

CAPT. FALITZ:
Call the company and tell them
we're gonna have to fuel up.

FO. ERICKSON: Ops, 7-19...
CAPT. FALITZ: Say Hibbing.

HIBBING OPS: Hibbing. Go ahead.

FO. ERICKSON:
Uh, yeah, uh, Hibbing,
this is, uh, 7-19 in range.

We're gonna need some more fuel.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. In range. Positive fuel.

See you in a bit.

FO. ERICKSON: Ladies
and gentlemen, we've begun

our final descent
for landing at Hibbing.

For passengers continuing
on to International Falls,

it will be a few
minutes on the ground

and we'll be off
shortly. Thanks.

CAPT. FALITZ: Okay.
In range checklist.

FO. ERICKSON: Okay.
Uh, pressurization... set.

The pilots make their
final preparations for landing.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, altimeter
is 2-9er-8-6 set right.

CAPT. FALITZ: Set left.

JOHN COX: The accuracy
of altimeters is something

that has to be
checked very carefully.

If you believe you're at a
thousand feet when in fact

you're at eight
hundred, you're much closer

to an obstacle or the
ground than you anticipate,

and so there's a constant
cross-check that goes on

for a faulty altimeter.

NARRATOR: Just
before 7:50 pm, Flight 5719

starts descending into the
clouds and the blowing snow

of a cold Minnesota night.

♪ ♪

CAPT. FALITZ: Gear down.
FO. ERICKSON: Gear down.

CAPT. FALITZ: Did you
click the airport lights?

JOHN COX: An airport like
Hibbing that does not have

a lot of traffic, in
an effort to save money,

because the light
bulbs are very expensive,

they are what's called
pilot controlled lighting.

CAPT. FALITZ: Did you click it?
FO. ERICKSON: Uh. I, um...

JOHN COX: The pilots,
with a series of clicks

from their radios, can
turn the lights up and down.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh...
CAPT. FALITZ:
Clicked it seven times.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, I got it now.

NARRATOR: The runway lights are
not what the pilots see next.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Twenty minutes pass.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Twin
City 7-19, have you landed yet?

NARRATOR: By now,
air traffic controllers

should have received
confirmation from Flight 5719

that it has landed.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Twin City 7-19, please come in.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR:
An hour later, emergency
responders locate the crash site

two miles northwest of the
airport at Hibbing, Minnesota.

There are no survivors.

FAMILY MEMBER
(Archive): They just said that
there had been a plane crash

on Vic Powers Park and
that one of our family members

was on the plane.

NARRATOR: Many of the
passengers were from Hibbing,

a town now devastated by grief.

The community is left
desperate for answers.

NEWSCASTER (Archive): In
northern Minnesota tonight,

investigators are
looking into the cause

of the deadliest US plane crash

in more than a
year and a half now.

NARRATOR: The fatal crash of
Flight 5719 mobilizes experts

from the National
Transportation Safety Board.

JOHN DELISI: Well, I got a
call from the, uh, comm center,

and the plan was for
the go team to mobilize

in the early morning hours
to arrive at the accident scene

by dawn the next morning.

NARRATOR: Systems investigator
John DeLisi has been with

the NTSB for just over a year.

The snowy
hillside outside Hibbing

is one of the most gruesome
crash sites he's ever seen.

JOHN DELISI: The
wreckage was up on a hill,

so it was in a
precarious position,

and some of the
bodies had been ejected.

Many were still
inside the fuselage.

♪ ♪

It was the holiday season,

so many folks
that were traveling

had brought Christmas presents.

They were
scattered in the debris.

There was blood in the snow.

It really was one of the
most difficult accident sites

I'd ever been to.

NARRATOR: The task
now is to figure out

what brought down Flight 5719

so that that deadly
crash is never repeated.

JOHN DELISI: The
tragedy that has occurred

puts a real focus
on what we need to do

bringing pieces of the
puzzle together quickly.

JOHN DELISI: The flight
recorders should be back there.

Come on.

NARRATOR: DeLisi searches for
the plane's recording devices.

JOHN DELISI: I was stepping
over some of the victims

to get to the aft
cargo compartment.

NARRATOR: He knows that
on a plane of this size

he'll likely find only
one of the black boxes,

the cockpit voice recorder.

JOHN DELISI: Here's the CVR.

JOHN DELISI: At the
time, a commuter airplane

with nineteen or less
seats, only a requirement

for a cockpit voice recorder,
not a flight data recorder.

JOHN DELISI: Like I
thought. No data recorder.

All right. Let's go.

NARRATOR: With no
FDR, the difficult job

of understanding the
crash just got harder.

AL: An FDR is very helpful.

It can give you
speeds and altitudes

and all the flight controls.

You can check and see
if anything malfunctioned

by looking at the data.

JOHN DELISI: When there's
no flight data recorder,

it puts us in a bit of an old
school type of investigation

where the analysis of
the physical evidence

becomes so much more critical.

JOHN DELISI: All right. Let's
see what the data tells us.

NARRATOR: As the
team waits for the CVR,

DeLisi turns to radar
data from approach control.

He tracks Flight
5719's descent path.

JOHN DELISI: The radar data
itself was very valuable for us.

It showed the
profile, the flight path

that the airplane took to
get to the accident site.

So we quickly
began to analyze that.

NARRATOR: Immediately he
spots something highly unusual.

JOHN DELISI: Look at this rate
of descent. It's ridiculous.

AL: The rate of descent was
double what we'd normally see.

It should be about a
thousand feet per minute.

Now in this case it
was over two thousand,

sometimes up at two
thousand, two hundred.

JOHN DELISI: They're
supposed to be over here,

but they're all the way up
here. What are they doing?

NARRATOR: A look at the approach
chart for the back course

into Hibbing
reveals that the turboprop

didn't fly the
standard approach.

Instead of following a gradual
step-down to the runway,

Flight 5719 remained
level for five miles,

then descended rapidly.

JOHN DELISI: Why did they
start their descent so late?

JOHN DELISI: A normal
approach is gonna fly

a relatively stable glide path
with a slow and steady rate

of descent to get to the runway.

But this airplane seemed
to stay high for a long time

and then have a very high
rate of descent to the impact.

JOHN DELISI: We need to hear
what the pilots were saying.

Do we have the CVR yet?

AL: Me as a pilot, it
does make you wonder,

because the later
you start the descent

the faster you're gonna
have to descend to get down.

And the faster you
descend, the harder it is

to break that rate of descent.

JOHN DELISI:
One of the real tragic
aspects about this accident

was that some
important new safety technology

was coming online, the Ground
Proximity Warning System.

It's just a shame that that
system was not yet installed

on this particular airplane.

NARRATOR: The ground
proximity warning system

uses an onboard computer that
senses when the plane is too low

and warns the pilots.

JOHN DELISI: That technology
was required by the FAA,

and it had to be in
all commuter airplanes

by April of the following year.

So this airplane was scheduled
to come out of service

for maintenance to get the
Ground Proximity Warning System

installed within a
month or so of the accident.

NARRATOR: Investigators know
the Northwest Airlink pilots

could not have heard
a low altitude warning.

But they still don't
understand why the plane

was descending so rapidly.

They wonder if
weather conditions

may have played a role.

JOHN DELISI: It was
important to determine if

there was anything atmospheric
like a build-up of ice

that might have contributed
to this exceedingly high rate

of descent.

NARRATOR: They
check the temperatures

and the type of precipitation
encountered by the turboprop.

They make an
important discovery.

JOHN DELISI: These are
prime conditions for icing.

The plane would have
descended right through it.

JOHN DELISI: The build-up of
ice, particularly on the wings

of an airplane,
can kill the lift

that the wings are
capable of generating.

So sometimes an airplane
with a rapid rate of descent

might be indicative of
an out of control motion

caused by a build-up of ice.

NARRATOR: DeLisi
reviews the accident history

of the Jetstream 3100
and makes a disturbing find

about the aircraft's
winter weather performance.

JOHN DELISI:
The Jetstream had been involved
in some previous accidents

in which the build-up
of ice contributed to

a loss of control.

CRAIG: The Jetstream had
a history of what they call

tail plane icing problems

where you could
actually end up in a position

where you couldn't flare
the aircraft for landing,

which obviously
would be important.

AL: So therefore if there's
any indication of icing, that

does lead you towards looking
into that in more detail.

NARRATOR: Investigators
need to know how bad

the icing conditions
were just before the crash.

JOHN DELISI: I was wondering if
you have a couple of minutes.

NARRATOR:
They talk to other pilots who
flew into Hibbing that night.

JOHN DELISI: So you
were aware of the potential

for icing during your
approach into Hibbing?

NARRATOR: The pilots
tell DeLisi they faced

moderate icing conditions.

JOHN DELISI:
But why would these two pilots
start their descent so late?

They also describe
a common technique

used to prevent
ice accumulation.

JOHN DELISI: Well, in talking
to other pilots at Northwest,

we began to learn about
what they referred to as

a slam dunk approach.

A slam dunk approach was
described as one in which,

while you have to pass
through an area of icing,

crews want to minimize
the time they spend there.

So they may hold their
altitude close into the airport

and then very
rapidly do a steep descent

to get through the altitudes
in which there was icing

as quickly as possible.

That's not a standard technique.

But as we began
to hear about it,

it matched what
we were seeing on

the air traffic control radar.

NARRATOR: It now seems
the rapid descent was not due

to a loss of
control caused by icing.

Instead, it looks like it was
part of a deliberate strategy

to avoid icing.

JOHN COX:
It's something professional
pilots deal with a lot,

and it requires a lot of
skill in aircraft handling

to get the airplane down quickly

without having the speed go up
to an unacceptably high level.

NARRATOR: Marvin Falitz
was an experienced captain

who'd flown in winter weather
conditions countless times.

He was more than
capable of safely performing

a slam dunk approach.

So what went
wrong on Flight 5719?

NARRATOR: While he waits to hear
what the cockpit voice recorder

will reveal, John
DeLisi tries to figure out

why the pilots of Flight 5719

didn't slow their
rapid descent into Hibbing.

JOHN DELISI: They should
have leveled off right here.

We've got to get our
hands on those altimeters.

JOHN DELISI: As some of
the pieces began to develop

in this accident, it
fit into the category

of what we refer to as CFIT,
Controlled Flight Into Terrain,

a perfectly good
airplane that hits the ground.

Very important for us
in an accident like that

to understand what
altitude the crew believed

the airplane was at.

NARRATOR: The Jetstream BA-3100
has two cockpit altimeters.

JOHN DELISI: Got it.

NARRATOR: DeLisi
wants them both checked

for any sign of malfunction.

JOHN DELISI: Put this
altimeter with the other one.

Let's get them
tested right away.

JOHN DELISI: Had there been a
malfunction of the altimeters,

it might have
indicated to the crew

that the airplane was
still well above the ground

when in fact it wasn't.

♪ ♪

JOHN DELISI: Nothing
other than impact damage, huh?

Let's look at the
pivot on this one.

JOHN DELISI:
So we did a thorough
examination and teardown

of both the Captain's and
the First Officer's altimeter.

NARRATOR: But the
analysis turns up nothing.

JOHN DELISI: There was no
evidence of any malfunction.

Both altimeters seemed
to be working just fine.

JOHN DELISI: Let's see what the
rest of the wreckage tells us.

AL: Well, you look
closely at the engines.

You wanna recover the engines.

You wanna do
what testing you can.

Sometimes you're able
to restart the engines,

a lot of times not.

But you can see if there's any
malfunctions that are obvious.

JOHN DELISI: Definitely spinning
when they hit the ground.

JOHN DELISI: A loss
of power could have led

to a loss of control.

It might have contributed
to a high rate of descent.

JOHN DELISI: Thrust levers
were functioning properly.

No sign of a jam.

NARRATOR:
Once again, they find no
clues to the cause of the crash.

JOHN DELISI: There was no
evidence of engine malfunction.

Both engines appeared
to be working just fine.

JOHN DELISI: Are we ready with
the CVR? Assemble the team.

I'll be there in a minute.

NARRATOR: Finally,
investigators get the evidence

they've been waiting for:
the cockpit voice recording.

JOHN DELISI: All right,
everybody ready? Play the tape.

FO. ERICKSON:
Uh, cancel on 127.4.

We're cleared for the
localizer back course approach.

Twin City 7-19.

NARRATOR: They
listen as Captain Falitz

and First Officer Erickson
prepare to land in Hibbing.

CAPT. FALITZ: Okay. What
altitude can we go down to?

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, 2040.

CAPT. FALITZ:
Okay. Put it in there.

NARRATOR: They soon hear a
conversation that confirms

their theory about
the slam dunk approach.

FO. ERICKSON: So you...
you're just gonna stay up here

as long as you can?

CAPT. FALITZ: Yes.

JOHN DELISI: They definitely
knew what they were doing.

NARRATOR: It's clear
that the pilots were

in the midst of a
slam dunk approach

when something went wrong.

But what was it?
Investigators listen closely.

FO. ERICKSON: Localizers alive.
Final approach fix is at 14.

CAPT. FALITZ: Roger. Gear down.

FO. ERICKSON:
Speed checks. Gear down.

NARRATOR: What
they hear is baffling.

CAPT. FALITZ: Flaps 20.

NARRATOR:
In the flight's final moments,
there's no sign of trouble.

JOHN DELISI: We didn't
hear either crew member

express any concern
about the airplane.

There were no
issues being raised.

There were no warning
lights that they discussed.

There was no
aircraft malfunction

that they were addressing.

JOHN DELISI: If they
were in control of the plane,

why the hell did
they slam it into a hill?

Did we miss something?
All right. Rewind the tape.

CAPT. FALITZ: Looks like
I can't go lower than 2040.

Here. Take a look at it.

JOHN COX: Minimum descent
altitude is the lowest altitude

that the pilot can descend
to until they see the runway.

It's a critical altitude because

that's as close to
the ground as you can get

and still be in the clouds.

FO. ERICKSON:
Boost pumps are on.

NARRATOR:
The investigators listen
carefully to the recording.

FO. ERICKSON: Before
final checklist complete.

NARRATOR: It's what is not
said that alarms them the most.

JOHN DELISI:
Why isn't the First Officer
making his altitude callouts?

NARRATOR: First Officer Erickson
should be telling his captain

how close they are to
their minimum altitude and

warning him when they descend
past it. But he does neither.

JOHN DELISI: We didn't
hear the regular callouts

about two
thousand, one thousand feet,

distance from the airport.

It seemed as if
the First Officer

didn't really know what
was going on in the approach.

AL: Callouts are
very important, and

the higher the rate of descent
the more important they are.

FO. ERICKSON:
Gear down. Flaps 20.

JOHN DELISI: He
never told the Captain

how close they were
getting to the ground.

NARRATOR: Captain Falitz has his
hands full landing the plane.

He expects his first officer to
keep an eye on their altitude.

FO. ERICKSON: Flaps 20.

JOHN COX:
In an airliner cockpit,
there's a division of duties.

One person's going to
physically fly the airplane.

The other one
has several duties.

One is to monitor the way that
the airplane is being flown.

NARRATOR: But on this flight,
the First Officer never once

reports the altitude

as the plane speeds closer
and closer to the ground.

JOHN DELISI: Callouts
would have been standard,

something that they
would have rehearsed,

practiced in the simulator.

And when we didn't hear
them, those calls, we knew

something wasn't progressing
the way it was briefed.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: The CVR leads
investigators to wonder:

Was the loss of eighteen
lives in the Hibbing crash

due to the failings of an
inexperienced young pilot?

AL: He was the new guy.
Maybe he just wasn't aware.

REPORTER (Archive):
Material released
today in Washington, D.C.,

indicates that the
NTSB is now focusing

on the crew's performance.

NARRATOR: Malcolm Brenner is
an NTSB aviation psychologist.

MALCOLM: My role in the
investigation was to serve

as human
performance investigator.

So human performance, we
look at human issues such as

the background of the
pilots, their training,

their interaction,
company pressures,

any sort of issues that will
give us a broader perspective.

FO. ERICKSON: 1.93.

NARRATOR: Investigators
need to learn all they can

about the
25-year-old first officer

who failed to make
critical altitude callouts

during the flight's descent.

JOHN DELISI:
We found out that the First
Officer was relatively new.

He had put
himself through training.

He had no military background.

FO. ERICKSON: Do
we get our own room?

CRAIG: As a new pilot,
you're, you're overwhelmed with

just the job itself and you're
really struggling to keep up

'cause things are
happening at a very fast pace.

CAPT. FALITZ: Okay.
In range checklist.

FO. ERICKSON: Okay.
Uh, pressurization set.

NARRATOR: There's
nothing in Erickson's record

that points to a
pilot who was struggling

with the pressures of the job.

In fact, it's
quite the opposite.

AL: This guy graduated
number one in his class.

MALCOLM: When he got
the job with the airline,

he said it was his dream job.

The First Officer had
prepared index cards with

aviation data for every airport
that the airline flew to.

This was above and beyond
what was normally required.

He was doing special studying
so he could be prepared

and be a better pilot.

♪ ♪

AL: Everybody that
flew with him thought

he was an excellent pilot.
So that doesn't explain it.

JOHN DELISI: No.
Wasn't the First Officer.

AL: So then you look for other.

Why would he not
make those callouts?

What would cause
him not to make those?

JOHN DELISI: So what do
we know about the Captain?

CAPT. FALITZ: Then they expect
you to work on your days off.

It's ridiculous. Yeah, sure.

Get yourself to
International Falls

just so you can fly back
to where you just came from

and then rush to get another
flight to God knows where.

You know, I think it's
gonna take three hours

before I'm
sitting behind the wheel

of my first flight of the day.
Man oh man. What a life. Huh?

AL: You first look at pilots
that had either flown with him

or knew of his
flying capabilities.

JOHN DELISI: Show me that file.

AL: Was there
anything that jumped out

that indicated there was
something not normal with him?

MALCOLM: The Captain was
described by his friends

as being intelligent and
an engaging personality.

JOHN DELISI: Let me
see his test records.

NARRATOR: Captain Falitz was
known as a skilled senior pilot.

But a deeper look reveals a
man with a troubling record.

JOHN DELISI: When we looked at
the Captain's training records,

we began to understand that
he had some previous issues

in his flight training.

JOHN DELISI: Boom. Boom. Boom.

MALCOLM: Soon after
he joined the company,

he failed his oral exam.

He failed two more proficiency
exams in his career.

That's unusual for
a professional pilot

to fail that many times.

AL: The problem hadn't
been tracked by anybody

in the organization
because they had failed

at different locations.

So nobody put everything
together... until we did.

♪ ♪

JOHN DELISI: Some of the
instructor pilots were noting

that his cockpit resource
management wasn't up to par

and that he had a tendency to
be domineering in the cockpit.

AL: He had an issue with
dealing with other people.

JOHN DELISI:
Are all these formal complaints
against Captain Falitz?

CRAIG:
Marvin was the first captain
I flew with after my IOE,

my initial operating experience,

and he tended to be a
little bit domineering

and would berate you and
was intolerant of mistakes

and really not a particularly
great instructor pilot.

JOHN DELISI: Hmm. Wow.

NARRATOR:
Perhaps the most disturbing
complaint against Captain Falitz

is that he once physically
struck a colleague in anger.

JOHN COX: For a professional
pilot to physically have

an altercation or
attempt to, quote,

"discipline" a fellow employee
is totally unacceptable.

JOHN DELISI:
I don't get it. What was
making this guy so angry?

CAPT. FALITZ: You gotta
be freaking kidding me!

NARRATOR: According
to people who knew him,

Captain Falitz's
morale took a big hit when

Northwest Airlink instituted
a new residence policy

for their pilots.

MALCOLM: About a
year before, the company

for cost-saving
purposes started a new policy

where they required the pilots
to reside at their outstations.

These would be small
towns outside of Minneapolis.

CAPT. FALITZ: Why are
we even doing this trip?

FO. ERICKSON: I
don't know. Why are we?

CAPT. FALITZ: Maybe
someone called in sick.

MALCOLM: It was received very
poorly by the pilot community

because it meant
they had to move, uh,

while they had
roots in Minneapolis

and children going to
school and spouses working

and mortgages to pay.

On short notice they had to move
to these small outstations.

CRAIG: The relationship between
the company and the pilots

was poor, and some of
us were extremely unhappy.

And I think Marvin was
very unhappy with the company.

AL: He'd gotten used to
living in the Minneapolis area.

He had friends there.
He had a social life.

MALCOLM: The Captain fought very
hard to remain in Minneapolis.

He did not want to move.

And the only way he could
do it was by downgrading.

It meant a twelve
percent cut in his salary.

CAPT. FALITZ: What time
were we out of the gate?

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, 52.

CAPT. FALITZ: According
to your watch or the clock?

FO. ERICKSON: Well
it's the, it's the same.

I, I sync my watch to the clock.

CRAIG: He was a very intelligent
man, but I think he was,

I think he was troubled
in the sense that his life

had not worked out maybe the
way he wanted it to work out.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Investigators make
another disturbing discovery.

Captain Falitz would
sometimes be deliberately rough

with the flight controls.

CRAIG: His way of
getting revenge on the company

was to sometimes take
it out on the passengers.

AL: I was amazed when I read
that, to tell you the truth.

And I was amazed that a person

would intentionally make a rough
flight to make people mad,

because what good does that do?

This guy, from
what I understand,

he did it because he
wanted to punish the airline.

As more and more details

about the Captain's
personality emerge,

investigators are forced to
consider a troubling question.

JOHN DELISI: Could his anger
somehow have caused this crash?

NARRATOR: They learn
that one of the airline's

customer service agents
had a run-in with the Captain

shortly before he
boarded the doomed flight.

JOHN DELISI: We need to
hear this woman's story.

CSA: I remember every word. It's
like it happened yesterday.

CAPT. FALITZ: Hello, dear.
I'm deadheading this flight.

Marvin Falitz.

JOHN COX:
Deadheading is when the airline

will position pilots and flight
attendants at a different city

so that they can then act and
actively fly a flight later.

So you may go from point
A to point B as a passenger

and then from there then you
will act as a flying crew member

on a separate flight.

CSA: Sorry, but I don't
see your name on the list.

CAPT. FALITZ: Check again.
Marvin Falitz. F-A-L-I-T-Z.

CSA: I checked twice, sir. We
don't have your authorization.

MALCOLM: The
paperwork that the agent had

did not include a deadheading
clearance for the Captain.

CAPT. FALITZ: Look.
It's not rocket science.

Pick up the phone
and call dispatch.

CSA: I'm real busy. So
how about you call them?

CAPT. FALITZ: How do
you live with yourself

knowing that you
are completely useless?

MALCOLM: He effectively refused.

He insisted that she
should do it and stormed off.

CSA: I have never seen a
pilot that angry before.

MALCOLM: As a good
professional pilot,

he should be able to maintain
professional performance

even though he has
things in his life

or has these disturbances
going on. This captain did not.

NARRATOR: There's mounting
evidence that Captain Falitz

had serious anger
management issues.

What puzzles investigators
is why a bright young pilot

like First Officer
Erickson didn't intervene

if his captain was
behaving recklessly.

JOHN DELISI: Hello?

NARRATOR: They receive a phone
call from a ramp service agent

at Minneapolis airport.

He claims to have
important details regarding

the pilots who flew Flight 5719.

CAPT. FALITZ: Why isn't
the exterior pre-flight done?

FO. ERICKSON: I was...

CAPT. FALITZ: You didn't
check the damn exterior lights!

NARRATOR: The service
agent witnessed Captain Falitz

berating First Officer Erickson
over a pre-flight check.

FO. ERICKSON:
Uh, I was gonna check the
lights from inside the cockpit.

CAPT. FALITZ:
That's not how you do it!

You have to go outside and see
it with your own stupid eyes!

Does Northwest even
screen you guys anymore?

You know what? Screw
it. I'll do it myself.

FO. ERICKSON: You know, I...

AL: The Captain was
being very, very critical

of the First Officer,
and the First Officer

was a relatively new pilot.

So, you know, you're
gonna make mistakes.

So there was a
better way to handle it.

And the Captain did
not take the better way.

CAPT. FALITZ: If we're late
for departure, it's on you!

AL: This happened
immediately before the flight.

So it set the tone for the
two of them working together,

which was a bad
way to do things.

JOHN COX: Communication
between flight crew members

is an essential
component of aviation safety.

We call it Crew
Resource Management.

And it makes sure that
everybody in the flight deck

is agreeing with
what the airplane's doing

and what the intent is to do.

JOHN DELISI: Okay, thanks. Let's
get that CVR back in here.

We need to find out

what was going on
between those two pilots.

JOHN DELISI: All
right. Cue it up.

NARRATOR: After
uncovering stunning details

about Captain
Falitz's sometimes rude

and even aggressive
behavior, investigators listen

to the cockpit
recording in a new light.

CAPT. FALITZ:
Call the company and tell
them we need to fuel up.

MALCOLM: In listening to
the CVR, the Captain makes

a lot of corrections or
directions to the First Officer

of very simple things.

FO. ERICKSON: Ops 7-19...
CAPT. FALITZ: Say Hibbing.

HIBBING OPS: Hibbing, go ahead.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, Hibbing, uh...

MALCOLM: He was intimidating
and not constructive.

HIBBING OPS: Positive
fuel. See you in a bit.

CAPT. FALITZ: You
can't just say Ops.

You have to specify
who's supposed to answer:

Hibbing, Sioux City, Duluth?

CRAIG: Before I
was an airline pilot,

I was a flight instructor.

And one guaranteed way
to have that guy shut down

and not be able to
perform was to berate them,

humiliate them, embarrass them.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, do
we get our own room?

CAPT. FALITZ: No, you're
gonna have to room with me,

and it's only a single bed.

So you'll just have
to curl up at my feet.

MALCOLM: The Captain's
tone was not very receptive

and was aggressive

and led to a
breakdown in proper management

with the First Officer.

FO. ERICKSON: Um... you've
got nine miles to the arc.

CAPT. FALITZ: Just put
it up in your clipboard

and talk me through it
when I need information, okay?

MALCOLM: So the Captain
was talking down to him.

CAPT. FALITZ: No! This
thing. That's what this is for.

JOHN DELISI: He was
paralyzed with fear.

That's why he didn't make
his callouts to the Captain.

He was, he was terrified of him.

MALCOLM: The danger of
an aggressive attitude

is that it breaks
down crew performance.

JOHN DELISI: I'd be
reluctant to speak up too.

♪ ♪

NARRATOR: Investigators
think they finally understand

all the events and circumstances

that sent a Northwest
Airlink commuter plane

speeding headlong into the
ground near Hibbing, Minnesota.

JOHN DELISI: It was
disturbing to hear about

the Captain's background and
his anger management issues.

CAPT. FALITZ: How do you
live with yourself knowing

that you are completely useless?

CAPT. FALITZ: You have
to go outside and see it

with your own stupid eyes!

JOHN DELISI: And when
we pieced that together

with the environment that we
heard him set in the cockpit

on the cockpit voice recorder,
things began to add up.

FO. ERICKSON: You, uh,
you're just gonna stay up here

as long as you can?

CAPT. FALITZ: Yes.

JOHN COX: The Captain had a
plan, but because it wasn't

the standard plan the First
Officer didn't know what it was.

CAPT. FALITZ: Did you
click the airport lights?

FO. ERICKSON: Uh...

JOHN DELISI: While they were
inside the final approach fix

with a rate of descent at over
two thousand feet per minute...

CAPT. FALITZ: Click it.
You clicked it seven times.

FO. ERICKSON: Uh, yeah. I, uh...

JOHN DELISI:
... the Captain seems to be
berating the First Officer

about clicking the radio button
to turn on the runway lights.

FO. ERICKSON:
Okay. I got it now.

AL: He was
afraid to do anything.

So that kind of explained why he
was silent a lot of the time.

JOHN DELISI: The First Officer
wasn't able to participate

in monitoring the
airspeed and altitude.

The First Officer was
really just along for the ride.

CRAIG: Flying, for the most
part, the stakes are very high.

And when you see what happens in
the aftermath of an accident,

it brings home just
how serious this job is

and how serious everybody
involved in the airline business

needs to take it.

NARRATOR: The crash of Flight
5719 exposed deficiencies

in Crew Resource
Management training

and highlighted the importance
of interpersonal relationships

in flying.

CRAIG: Airline
flying's a team sport.

FO. ERICKSON: Minimums.
CAPT. FALITZ: Got it.

CRAIG: It's important
to have a team attitude.

JOHN DELISI: Well,
this accident in many ways

has become a case study
in just how valuable it is

to empower either crew
member to be assertive

and to speak up when
something isn't going right.

FO. ERICKSON:
Pressurization set.

JOHN COX: A first officer,
even though they may be new

and very junior, is
not only given permission

but is encouraged to ask or
question a very senior captain

when they get uncomfortable.

Ma'am or sir, I don't
know why we're doing this.

I'm not comfortable here.

NARRATOR:
Among the NTSB's recommendations
is closer oversight

of pilot training programs

so that airlines can
address potential issues

before an accident occurs.

AL: Do CRM training
on a regular basis.

Make sure that
they're monitored.

Go, you know, fly with your
crews every once in a while

just to see what's going on.

There's a lot of
things that can be done.

CRAIG: One way some airlines
deal with a personality conflict

is they have a no pairing list.

In other words, if you
have a personality conflict

with a certain pilot
you can check off a box

and they won't make
you fly with that person.

JOHN COX: It's one
of those accidents that

we learned a lot from,

and it became a good
means to show failures

within the system
that could be corrected.

So I would say that
we learned from it,

and as a result the
aviation industry is safer.