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1
00:00:02,869 --> 00:00:05,438
PASSENGERS:
2
00:00:05,505 --> 00:00:08,875
NARRATOR: Two jumbo jets.
3
00:00:08,942 --> 00:00:11,077
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people.
4
00:00:11,144 --> 00:00:14,247
NARRATOR: The deadliest
air crash of all time.
5
00:00:14,314 --> 00:00:18,351
JOHN: This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
6
00:00:18,418 --> 00:00:21,154
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I
could actually lose my license.
7
00:00:21,221 --> 00:00:24,290
NARRATOR: Blame
soon falls on one pilot.
8
00:00:24,357 --> 00:00:26,726
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
9
00:00:26,793 --> 00:00:29,362
DENNIS: Why would he
ignore those instructions?
10
00:00:29,429 --> 00:00:32,866
NARRATOR: But as investigators
sift through all the evidence...
11
00:00:32,932 --> 00:00:34,167
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
12
00:00:34,234 --> 00:00:38,138
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
13
00:00:38,204 --> 00:00:39,539
NARRATOR: The
disaster in Tenerife
14
00:00:39,606 --> 00:00:43,243
grows more and more mysterious.
15
00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:47,881
INVESTIGATOR: Why didn't they
get off where they were told?
16
00:00:47,947 --> 00:00:49,215
DENNIS: These are the top guys.
17
00:00:49,282 --> 00:00:52,952
These are the best in the
business. How could this happen?
18
00:00:53,353 --> 00:00:55,388
Flight attendant:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
WE ARE STARTING OUR APPROACH.
19
00:00:55,455 --> 00:00:56,656
Pilot: WE LOST BOTH ENGINES!
20
00:00:56,723 --> 00:00:57,924
Flight attendant:
PUT THE MASK OVER YOUR NOSE.
21
00:00:57,991 --> 00:00:58,858
EMERGENCY DESCENT.
22
00:00:58,925 --> 00:00:59,926
Pilot: MAYDAY, MAYDAY.
23
00:00:59,993 --> 00:01:01,694
Flight attendant:
BRACE FOR IMPACT!
24
00:01:01,761 --> 00:01:02,996
Controller: I THINK I LOST ONE.
25
00:01:03,062 --> 00:01:06,132
Man: INVESTIGATION STARTING
INTO THIS TRAGEDY...
26
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Man: HE'S GONNA CRASH!
27
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♪
28
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AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Sunjet 2-8-2,
29
00:01:24,784 --> 00:01:28,288
proceed directly to
runway, backtrack and hold.
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00:01:28,354 --> 00:01:31,324
NARRATOR: Los Rodeos Airport on
the Spanish island of Tenerife
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00:01:31,391 --> 00:01:34,360
is busier than it's ever been.
32
00:01:34,427 --> 00:01:36,729
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: BA-783,
hold short of the runway
33
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and stand by for taxi clearance.
34
00:01:39,499 --> 00:01:41,668
NARRATOR: The
controllers are swamped.
35
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Scandinavian 1-4-2-0,
36
00:01:44,571 --> 00:01:46,539
you are
cleared for takeoff.
37
00:01:46,606 --> 00:01:49,576
Sterling 7-3-9-2,
you are next in line.
38
00:01:49,642 --> 00:01:54,147
Sierra Alpha Tango Alpha
69, right turn, heading 0-4-0.
39
00:01:54,214 --> 00:01:55,215
Goodbye.
40
00:01:59,953 --> 00:02:03,122
NARRATOR:
A few hours ago, dozens
of flights were diverted here
41
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after a terrorist bombing
shut down a larger airport
42
00:02:05,825 --> 00:02:09,496
in nearby Las Palmas.
43
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JIM: It's a
single-runway airport
44
00:02:11,331 --> 00:02:13,199
with a single parallel taxiway,
45
00:02:13,266 --> 00:02:16,936
and because of the
terrorist event in the region,
46
00:02:17,003 --> 00:02:18,238
they had much more traffic
47
00:02:18,304 --> 00:02:22,208
than I'm certain that
they would normally see.
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00:02:22,275 --> 00:02:25,044
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sterling
7-3-9-2, taxi to the runway
49
00:02:25,111 --> 00:02:28,815
and exit at taxiway Charlie 3.
50
00:02:28,882 --> 00:02:30,049
JIM: They were
dealing with aircraft
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00:02:30,116 --> 00:02:32,785
that had been delayed
for a good part of the day,
52
00:02:32,852 --> 00:02:34,654
and now there was
a sense of urgency
53
00:02:34,721 --> 00:02:38,858
to get them out and
safely on their way.
54
00:02:38,925 --> 00:02:41,661
NARRATOR: With so many
planes parked on the taxiways,
55
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the controllers
instruct departing flights
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to taxi along the
airport's only runway
57
00:02:46,366 --> 00:02:48,368
to get into
position for takeoff.
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00:02:52,272 --> 00:02:54,340
One of the planes
waiting to get to Las Palmas
59
00:02:54,407 --> 00:03:00,647
is Pan Am flight 1736.
60
00:03:00,713 --> 00:03:02,181
CPT. GRUBBS: We
must be getting close.
61
00:03:02,248 --> 00:03:05,318
FO. BRAGG: I sure hope
so. I'm ready for the beach.
62
00:03:05,385 --> 00:03:06,719
NARRATOR: Thirty-nine-year-old
Robert Bragg
63
00:03:06,786 --> 00:03:08,821
is the first officer.
64
00:03:08,888 --> 00:03:10,657
ROBERT: After we
got to Las Palmas,
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00:03:10,723 --> 00:03:12,592
we were supposed
to have a day there
66
00:03:12,659 --> 00:03:16,362
and then fly the airplane
to Paris and have a day off
67
00:03:16,429 --> 00:03:17,897
and then back to New York.
68
00:03:17,964 --> 00:03:20,733
So it was supposed
to be a very good trip.
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00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,070
NARRATOR: His
captain is Victor Grubbs.
70
00:03:24,137 --> 00:03:25,605
Flight engineer George Warns
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00:03:25,672 --> 00:03:29,208
completes the
highly experienced crew.
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00:03:29,275 --> 00:03:32,345
JOHN: Pan American World
Airways was not only a pioneer,
73
00:03:32,412 --> 00:03:35,348
but they were the one we
all looked up to tremendously.
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00:03:35,415 --> 00:03:37,817
Those of us who wanted to
be pilots and who later were
75
00:03:37,884 --> 00:03:40,119
always had that fantasy
that we might some day fly
76
00:03:40,186 --> 00:03:41,521
for Pan American.
77
00:03:41,588 --> 00:03:46,626
So they were the creme de la
creme for so many, many decades.
78
00:03:46,693 --> 00:03:50,163
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew is
ready to get back in the air,
79
00:03:50,229 --> 00:03:53,399
but they can't
taxi to the runway.
80
00:03:53,466 --> 00:03:57,604
A KLM 747 has stopped in
front of them to refuel.
81
00:03:57,670 --> 00:04:01,741
ROBERT: We were about 12 feet
short of getting around them,
82
00:04:01,808 --> 00:04:03,476
and we were all
on the same radio.
83
00:04:03,543 --> 00:04:08,047
I asked him how long would it
be for him to finish fueling.
84
00:04:08,114 --> 00:04:11,217
He said about 45 minutes.
85
00:04:11,284 --> 00:04:12,452
JOHN: You're trying
to get your passengers
86
00:04:12,518 --> 00:04:16,222
where they want to go
and now KLM wants more fuel
87
00:04:16,289 --> 00:04:18,891
and it's just one of those
things. It gets frustrating.
88
00:04:18,958 --> 00:04:21,361
These irritations are small,
but at the end of a long day
89
00:04:21,427 --> 00:04:26,165
they begin to add up.
90
00:04:26,232 --> 00:04:27,834
PASSENGER: Not even a sandwich?
91
00:04:27,900 --> 00:04:31,004
NARRATOR: It's been a long
day for the 378 passengers
92
00:04:31,070 --> 00:04:35,141
on board the Pan Am airplane.
93
00:04:35,208 --> 00:04:37,543
The flight started in
Los Angeles before stopping
94
00:04:37,610 --> 00:04:40,647
in New York and
now in Tenerife.
95
00:04:40,713 --> 00:04:44,517
ROBERT: They had been on
the airplane 12, 13 hours.
96
00:04:44,584 --> 00:04:47,186
So they were getting tired.
97
00:04:47,253 --> 00:04:48,688
NARRATOR: The
passengers have no idea
98
00:04:48,755 --> 00:04:54,927
how long the delay will last.
99
00:04:54,994 --> 00:04:56,963
ROBERT: KLM was our big concern.
100
00:04:57,030 --> 00:05:00,900
And we found out his
fueling would be finished.
101
00:05:00,967 --> 00:05:03,536
FO. MEURS:
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
We've finished refueling.
102
00:05:03,603 --> 00:05:05,905
Requesting
clearance for start up.
103
00:05:05,972 --> 00:05:10,243
NARRATOR: The KLM aircraft
is finally ready to roll.
104
00:05:10,309 --> 00:05:15,214
Both 747s should be
back in the air soon.
105
00:05:15,281 --> 00:05:19,619
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
requesting start clearance.
106
00:05:19,686 --> 00:05:24,791
ROBERT: I said okay, Pan
Am is ready to start also.
107
00:05:24,857 --> 00:05:26,292
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
108
00:05:26,359 --> 00:05:27,760
you are cleared to start.
109
00:05:27,827 --> 00:05:33,132
♪
110
00:05:33,199 --> 00:05:36,202
CPT. GRUBBS: Okay.
Pre-start checklist please.
111
00:05:40,873 --> 00:05:42,809
FO. BRAGG: Ladies and gentlemen,
the flight deck once again.
112
00:05:42,875 --> 00:05:47,346
I'm happy to say we've been
finally cleared to get moving.
113
00:05:47,413 --> 00:05:50,349
We should have you in the air
in about 15 minutes from now.
114
00:05:55,421 --> 00:05:59,192
NARRATOR: The Canary Islands lie
off the west coast of Africa.
115
00:05:59,258 --> 00:06:03,563
Tenerife is one of seven
in the Spanish archipelago.
116
00:06:03,629 --> 00:06:04,697
The mountainous island
117
00:06:04,764 --> 00:06:07,400
is famous for
constantly changing weather.
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00:06:12,505 --> 00:06:15,541
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I
can't see anything out there.
119
00:06:15,608 --> 00:06:17,176
JIM: A fog bank rolled in,
120
00:06:17,243 --> 00:06:21,314
and visibility went
down to almost zero.
121
00:06:21,380 --> 00:06:23,015
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
122
00:06:23,082 --> 00:06:27,787
clear taxi into the runway
following the 747 from KLM.
123
00:06:27,854 --> 00:06:32,825
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
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00:06:32,892 --> 00:06:38,231
JIM: To expedite the departures
of both KLM and Pan Am,
125
00:06:38,297 --> 00:06:40,733
they taxied both on the
runway at the same time
126
00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:42,401
to put them in a position
where they would be ready
127
00:06:42,468 --> 00:06:43,970
for a departure.
128
00:06:50,676 --> 00:06:55,848
ROBERT: He said follow KLM
down the runway, backtrack,
129
00:06:55,915 --> 00:07:00,586
make an exit to get
around back of KLM.
130
00:07:00,653 --> 00:07:05,191
So that's what we were doing.
131
00:07:05,258 --> 00:07:07,660
NARRATOR: Once they get in the
air, the flight to Las Palmas
132
00:07:07,727 --> 00:07:11,130
should only take
about 25 minutes.
133
00:07:11,197 --> 00:07:14,233
♪
134
00:07:14,300 --> 00:07:16,435
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
135
00:07:16,502 --> 00:07:19,172
how many taxiways did you pass?
136
00:07:19,238 --> 00:07:21,941
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
137
00:07:22,008 --> 00:07:23,409
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
138
00:07:23,476 --> 00:07:28,581
NARRATOR: The KLM 747 will
be the next plane to take off.
139
00:07:28,648 --> 00:07:31,284
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway make a 180
140
00:07:31,350 --> 00:07:37,790
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
141
00:07:37,857 --> 00:07:43,162
(In Spanish) Ya despues
de estos dos ya terminamos.
142
00:07:43,229 --> 00:07:46,566
NARRATOR: First Officer Bragg
is unfamiliar with the airport.
143
00:07:46,632 --> 00:07:51,070
He checks a runway diagram
to help find their turning.
144
00:07:51,137 --> 00:07:54,073
FO. BRAGG: Okay,
that's this one right here.
145
00:07:54,140 --> 00:07:57,877
CPT. GRUBBS: It goes ahead. It's
going to put us on the taxiway.
146
00:07:57,944 --> 00:07:59,078
NARRATOR: As they taxi,
147
00:07:59,145 --> 00:08:01,080
they listen to the
tower controller tell
148
00:08:01,147 --> 00:08:05,718
the KLM crew ahead of them
what to do after departure.
149
00:08:05,785 --> 00:08:07,653
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
150
00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:10,656
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
151
00:08:10,723 --> 00:08:13,559
Right turn after takeoff.
152
00:08:13,626 --> 00:08:16,262
FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the
Papa Beacon. Flight level 9-0.
153
00:08:16,329 --> 00:08:19,265
Right turn at...we
are now at takeoff.
154
00:08:19,332 --> 00:08:21,968
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
155
00:08:22,034 --> 00:08:23,903
I will call you.
156
00:08:23,970 --> 00:08:25,605
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
157
00:08:25,671 --> 00:08:28,007
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
158
00:08:28,074 --> 00:08:30,509
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
159
00:08:30,576 --> 00:08:33,212
report runway clear.
160
00:08:33,279 --> 00:08:35,882
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
161
00:08:35,948 --> 00:08:37,216
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
162
00:08:37,283 --> 00:08:39,051
NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew
will be turning off the runway
163
00:08:39,118 --> 00:08:44,357
in just a few more yards.
164
00:08:44,423 --> 00:08:47,159
But now something's wrong.
165
00:08:47,226 --> 00:08:50,630
First Officer Bragg can
see a plane through the fog.
166
00:08:50,696 --> 00:08:53,766
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
167
00:08:53,833 --> 00:08:55,301
ROBERT: And I
looked up and there he was
168
00:08:55,368 --> 00:08:57,103
coming down the runway.
169
00:08:57,169 --> 00:08:59,939
It was very
obvious that he was moving
170
00:09:00,006 --> 00:09:03,342
because his landing
lights were shaking.
171
00:09:03,409 --> 00:09:07,413
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
172
00:09:07,480 --> 00:09:09,081
ROBERT: He saw KLM too.
173
00:09:09,148 --> 00:09:11,183
FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off!
174
00:09:11,250 --> 00:09:15,588
♪
175
00:09:15,655 --> 00:09:17,323
NARRATOR: Captain
Grubbs tries to steer clear
176
00:09:17,390 --> 00:09:23,763
of the oncoming KLM.
177
00:09:23,829 --> 00:09:27,333
But it's bearing down on them
at nearly 200 miles an hour.
178
00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:36,575
ROBERT: He had
lifted off the runway.
179
00:09:36,642 --> 00:09:40,012
I could see his
rotating beacon underneath.
180
00:09:40,079 --> 00:09:41,981
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
181
00:09:42,048 --> 00:09:43,316
Get off. Get off. Get off!
182
00:09:43,382 --> 00:09:47,253
ROBERT: And then I ducked
and said a real quick prayer.
183
00:09:51,857 --> 00:09:53,859
"God, I hope he misses us."
184
00:09:56,429 --> 00:09:59,432
PASSENGERS:
185
00:10:10,409 --> 00:10:13,479
♪
186
00:10:13,546 --> 00:10:16,916
NARRATOR: The unimaginable
collision between two jumbo jets
187
00:10:16,983 --> 00:10:20,486
has turned a runway in
Tenerife into a disaster zone.
188
00:10:29,762 --> 00:10:31,297
ROBERT: I opened my eyes.
189
00:10:31,364 --> 00:10:37,937
The first thing I noticed,
all the windows were gone,
190
00:10:38,004 --> 00:10:42,508
and it looked like
somebody had taken a big knife
191
00:10:42,575 --> 00:10:46,278
and just cut the whole
top of the airplane off.
192
00:10:46,345 --> 00:10:51,384
FO. BRAGG: Get out! Get out!
193
00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:56,789
ROBERT: That's when I
decided it was time to leave.
194
00:10:56,856 --> 00:11:01,227
NARRATOR: It's a 45-foot
drop onto solid concrete.
195
00:11:01,293 --> 00:11:03,062
ROBERT: And I just
jumped right over the side.
196
00:11:03,129 --> 00:11:05,131
I didn't even think about it.
197
00:11:10,536 --> 00:11:16,075
When I hit I rolled on
the ground and looked around
198
00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:17,643
and discovered I wasn't hurt.
199
00:11:22,715 --> 00:11:24,183
WOMAN:
200
00:11:24,250 --> 00:11:26,118
NARRATOR:
Some passengers in the shattered
cabin of the Pan Am jet
201
00:11:26,185 --> 00:11:27,953
have also survived.
202
00:11:28,020 --> 00:11:30,356
FEMALE PASSENGER: Get out!
203
00:11:30,423 --> 00:11:36,462
NARRATOR: They're
desperate to get off the plane.
204
00:11:36,529 --> 00:11:39,331
ROBERT: The airplane
was totally burning.
205
00:11:39,398 --> 00:11:44,270
There were flames
probably 200 feet high.
206
00:11:44,336 --> 00:11:45,805
NARRATOR: An
opening in the fuselage
207
00:11:45,871 --> 00:11:48,741
offers the
possibility of escape,
208
00:11:48,808 --> 00:11:51,410
but there are no
emergency slides.
209
00:11:51,477 --> 00:11:56,082
The long drop to the
runway could be fatal.
210
00:11:56,148 --> 00:12:01,253
With the plane engulfed in
flames, it's the only way out.
211
00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:02,621
PASSENGER: We're
going to have to jump.
212
00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:06,459
ROBERT: I thought the
airplane was going to blow up.
213
00:12:06,525 --> 00:12:10,029
And I yelled out at them to
start jumping. And they did.
214
00:12:17,837 --> 00:12:22,608
NARRATOR: Only 61 people
from the Pan Am flight survive.
215
00:12:22,675 --> 00:12:28,914
The cockpit crew is
alive, but 335 others are dead.
216
00:12:28,981 --> 00:12:33,252
On the KLM flight,
there are no survivors.
217
00:12:33,319 --> 00:12:35,287
Two hundred and
forty-eight passengers and crew
218
00:12:35,354 --> 00:12:38,023
have been killed.
219
00:12:38,090 --> 00:12:42,795
All told, the
disaster claims 583 lives.
220
00:12:42,862 --> 00:12:45,798
It's the deadliest
aviation accident of all time.
221
00:12:45,865 --> 00:12:51,570
♪
222
00:12:51,637 --> 00:12:53,706
JOHN: Five hundred
and eighty-three people,
223
00:12:53,772 --> 00:12:55,808
with only a few
getting out on Pan Am.
224
00:12:55,875 --> 00:12:58,878
This was something that we
really had not contemplated
225
00:12:58,944 --> 00:13:01,547
when we started
building bigger airplanes.
226
00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,149
Nobody ever thought,
what if we lost two of them
227
00:13:03,215 --> 00:13:05,551
in a collision on the ground?
228
00:13:05,618 --> 00:13:09,488
This was a nightmare
beyond all expectation.
229
00:13:09,555 --> 00:13:12,358
♪
230
00:13:12,424 --> 00:13:14,960
NARRATOR: The next morning,
investigators from Spain,
231
00:13:15,027 --> 00:13:19,532
the Netherlands and the
United States are on the scene.
232
00:13:19,598 --> 00:13:21,033
DENNIS: We didn't have
a whole lot of experience
233
00:13:21,100 --> 00:13:24,136
with 747s
crashing at that point.
234
00:13:24,203 --> 00:13:26,472
So from an accident
investigation standpoint
235
00:13:26,539 --> 00:13:30,476
it was going to be as
big a deal as you can get.
236
00:13:30,543 --> 00:13:32,311
INVESTIGATOR: Pan Am
clearing the runway.
237
00:13:32,378 --> 00:13:36,615
KLM on its takeoff
roll. Someone messed up.
238
00:13:36,682 --> 00:13:38,050
NARRATOR: They face a huge task,
239
00:13:38,117 --> 00:13:40,019
trying to untangle
the chain of events
240
00:13:40,085 --> 00:13:42,588
that led to this
catastrophic runway collision.
241
00:13:48,194 --> 00:13:51,697
The search for the black
boxes begins immediately.
242
00:13:51,764 --> 00:13:53,666
The recorders could
hold important details
243
00:13:53,732 --> 00:13:56,535
about what was
happening in both cockpits.
244
00:13:56,602 --> 00:14:00,706
DENNIS: The voice recorders
in this case were vital.
245
00:14:00,773 --> 00:14:04,977
You had two airworthy aircraft
coming together on the runway.
246
00:14:05,044 --> 00:14:10,549
So the events leading up
to that, you know, were key.
247
00:14:10,616 --> 00:14:12,117
INVESTIGATOR: It was busy.
248
00:14:12,184 --> 00:14:14,553
Controllers had to get
almost 50 planes off the ground
249
00:14:14,620 --> 00:14:16,055
in just a few hours.
250
00:14:16,121 --> 00:14:18,457
NARRATOR: Investigators
know that Los Rodeos Airport
251
00:14:18,524 --> 00:14:22,795
has no ground radar to
help controllers track planes.
252
00:14:22,861 --> 00:14:26,198
JIM: At a busy location,
it's unusual for a controller
253
00:14:26,265 --> 00:14:28,901
to have to work
without ground radar.
254
00:14:28,968 --> 00:14:31,870
It increases the stress
a little bit in the tower.
255
00:14:31,937 --> 00:14:33,672
NARRATOR: There's no
question that the small airport
256
00:14:33,739 --> 00:14:37,209
was dealing with
more traffic than usual.
257
00:14:37,276 --> 00:14:40,646
Was it too much for
controllers to handle?
258
00:14:40,713 --> 00:14:44,316
Did they make a fatal mistake?
259
00:14:44,383 --> 00:14:47,720
A visit to the tower
is the obvious next step.
260
00:14:47,786 --> 00:14:49,955
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
We've never been that busy.
261
00:14:50,022 --> 00:14:54,893
And the planes were
parked here and here.
262
00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:55,928
They had to use the runway
263
00:14:55,995 --> 00:14:58,831
to taxi into
position one at a time.
264
00:14:58,897 --> 00:15:01,934
JIM: They were actually having
to park aircraft on the taxiway,
265
00:15:02,001 --> 00:15:07,172
the only taxiway that they had,
and therefore kind of deviate
266
00:15:07,239 --> 00:15:09,174
from their standard
operating procedures.
267
00:15:09,241 --> 00:15:13,646
And anytime you do
that, unfortunately, risk,
268
00:15:13,712 --> 00:15:15,247
things get a little bit riskier.
269
00:15:15,314 --> 00:15:17,316
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
So I instructed KLM to taxi
270
00:15:17,383 --> 00:15:20,953
to the foot of the
runway, make a 180,
271
00:15:21,020 --> 00:15:25,124
and wait for takeoff clearance.
272
00:15:25,190 --> 00:15:27,226
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the
end of the runway, make a 180
273
00:15:27,293 --> 00:15:33,165
and report ready
for ATC clearance.
274
00:15:33,232 --> 00:15:34,533
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And a couple of minutes later,
275
00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:38,704
he reported that he
was in position here.
276
00:15:38,771 --> 00:15:42,041
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
277
00:15:42,107 --> 00:15:44,710
JOHN: When KLM had turned
around at the end of the runway
278
00:15:44,777 --> 00:15:46,345
and was in position for takeoff,
279
00:15:46,412 --> 00:15:49,148
we call that "line up and wait."
280
00:15:49,214 --> 00:15:51,884
So they are waiting
for takeoff clearance,
281
00:15:51,950 --> 00:15:55,521
which will equal a clear runway.
282
00:15:55,587 --> 00:15:59,792
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
And then I had Pan Am move up
the runway right behind the KLM.
283
00:15:59,858 --> 00:16:04,930
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Papa Alpha
1-7-3-6 report runway clear.
284
00:16:04,997 --> 00:16:07,700
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
285
00:16:07,766 --> 00:16:08,901
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
It's true we were busier
286
00:16:08,967 --> 00:16:12,805
than we've ever been
before, but we were managing.
287
00:16:12,871 --> 00:16:16,975
We were getting the job done.
288
00:16:17,042 --> 00:16:19,044
NARRATOR: It's
becoming clear to investigators
289
00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:21,280
that the cause of the
Tenerife tragedy goes beyond
290
00:16:21,347 --> 00:16:23,816
a busy airport.
291
00:16:23,882 --> 00:16:28,053
Controllers had a lot to do,
but they were not overwhelmed.
292
00:16:28,120 --> 00:16:30,289
There must have been
other factors at play.
293
00:16:34,560 --> 00:16:35,361
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Que paso?
294
00:16:35,427 --> 00:16:36,762
JOHN: In accident investigation,
295
00:16:36,829 --> 00:16:39,598
we learned a long time
ago that there is never ever
296
00:16:39,665 --> 00:16:40,933
just one cause,
297
00:16:40,999 --> 00:16:44,236
and there are a multiplicity
of moving parts on this.
298
00:16:44,303 --> 00:16:47,373
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: I couldn't
actually see what happened.
299
00:16:47,439 --> 00:16:51,543
A thick fog had rolled in.
300
00:16:51,610 --> 00:16:54,213
Visibility was
almost zero by then.
301
00:16:54,279 --> 00:16:56,615
DENNIS: This particular airport
had a unique characteristic
302
00:16:56,682 --> 00:17:01,220
in that it was high
enough so that you would get
303
00:17:01,286 --> 00:17:05,557
actually clouds
rolling in across the runway.
304
00:17:05,624 --> 00:17:07,559
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
305
00:17:07,626 --> 00:17:10,062
how many taxiways did you pass?
306
00:17:10,129 --> 00:17:11,864
JIM: The controllers
looking out the window
307
00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:15,467
could not see any
aircraft that were taxiing,
308
00:17:15,534 --> 00:17:18,003
either on the
taxiways or on the runways,
309
00:17:18,070 --> 00:17:22,908
and instead had to rely solely
on transmissions from the pilots
310
00:17:22,975 --> 00:17:26,145
to report whether or not
they were clear of the runway.
311
00:17:26,211 --> 00:17:27,513
NARRATOR:
Investigators know that
312
00:17:27,579 --> 00:17:31,083
if the controller couldn't see
the airplanes through the fog,
313
00:17:31,150 --> 00:17:36,855
his instructions to the pilots
would have to be crystal clear.
314
00:17:36,922 --> 00:17:40,125
They gather recordings
from air traffic control.
315
00:17:40,192 --> 00:17:42,428
Perhaps the tapes can
paint a better picture
316
00:17:42,494 --> 00:17:44,563
of what really happened.
317
00:17:44,630 --> 00:17:47,299
DENNIS: That was the key
to the whole investigation.
318
00:17:47,366 --> 00:17:49,968
Where were the
aircraft on the runways,
319
00:17:50,035 --> 00:17:53,472
and what was being said along
their path down the runway?
320
00:17:55,941 --> 00:17:58,444
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off! Get off!
321
00:18:03,882 --> 00:18:06,018
NARRATOR: History's deadliest
air crash is leading newscasts
322
00:18:06,084 --> 00:18:08,487
around the world.
323
00:18:08,554 --> 00:18:11,557
The pressure for
answers is not about to let up.
324
00:18:11,623 --> 00:18:14,159
DENNIS: We knew we had a
tremendous task on our hands
325
00:18:14,226 --> 00:18:15,794
to solve this accident.
326
00:18:15,861 --> 00:18:27,806
♪
327
00:18:27,873 --> 00:18:30,342
INVESTIGATOR: All right,
let's start with KLM clearing
328
00:18:30,409 --> 00:18:33,412
the end of the runway. 5-0-2.
329
00:18:33,479 --> 00:18:36,415
NARRATOR: Investigators want to
know if the Tenerife controller
330
00:18:36,482 --> 00:18:39,284
said anything to the
KLM or Pan Am pilots
331
00:18:39,351 --> 00:18:41,520
that could have
led to the collision.
332
00:18:41,587 --> 00:18:46,024
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
KLM 4-8-0-5, how many
taxiways did you pass?
333
00:18:46,091 --> 00:18:49,795
NARRATOR:
They listen to the recordings
from inside the tower.
334
00:18:49,862 --> 00:18:52,197
FO. MEURS: I think we
just passed Charlie 4 now.
335
00:18:52,264 --> 00:18:56,602
INVESTIGATOR: Okay, so they just
passed Charlie 4 right here.
336
00:18:56,668 --> 00:18:59,805
♪
337
00:18:59,872 --> 00:19:03,909
NARRATOR:
KLM Captain Jacob Van Zanten and
his first officer, Klaas Meurs,
338
00:19:03,976 --> 00:19:08,347
taxi up the runway in thick fog.
339
00:19:08,413 --> 00:19:11,750
JOHN: By the time that the main
island airport at Las Palmas
340
00:19:11,817 --> 00:19:14,052
reopened and everybody
was getting ready to go,
341
00:19:14,119 --> 00:19:16,822
it was down to about 700
to 900 yards' visibility,
342
00:19:16,889 --> 00:19:19,725
and that's just
right at minimums.
343
00:19:19,791 --> 00:19:21,093
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
At the end of the runway,
344
00:19:21,159 --> 00:19:26,331
make a 180 and report
ready for ATC clearance.
345
00:19:26,398 --> 00:19:27,599
INVESTIGATOR: Okay.
346
00:19:27,666 --> 00:19:30,402
KLM was told to proceed
to the end of the runway,
347
00:19:30,469 --> 00:19:33,739
turn around and wait.
348
00:19:33,805 --> 00:19:35,541
What was the Pan
Am flight told to do?
349
00:19:35,607 --> 00:19:37,175
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6,
350
00:19:37,242 --> 00:19:42,581
leave the runway
3-1 to your left.
351
00:19:42,648 --> 00:19:45,284
INVESTIGATOR: Whoa. What
did they just ask him to do?
352
00:19:45,350 --> 00:19:47,052
FO. BRAGG: I'm
sorry. Say again please.
353
00:19:47,119 --> 00:19:48,887
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Leave the runway,
354
00:19:48,954 --> 00:19:51,156
the third one to your left.
355
00:19:51,223 --> 00:19:53,258
FO. BRAGG: Okay.
Taxi down the runway
356
00:19:53,325 --> 00:19:55,994
and leave the runway at the
first intersection on the left.
357
00:19:56,061 --> 00:19:57,563
Is that correct?
358
00:19:57,629 --> 00:20:01,633
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Negative. The
third one. The third one.
359
00:20:01,700 --> 00:20:03,135
JOHN: Whenever we
look at the question of
360
00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,470
whether or not the air traffic
controllers in the tower,
361
00:20:05,537 --> 00:20:07,773
the two gentlemen in the tower
were giving clear instructions,
362
00:20:07,839 --> 00:20:10,542
you've gotta remember we have
kind of a linguistic problem
363
00:20:10,609 --> 00:20:12,878
here because these were two
Spaniards who speak Spanish
364
00:20:12,945 --> 00:20:14,313
as their native
language attempting
365
00:20:14,379 --> 00:20:17,282
to speak in aviation
English to an American crew
366
00:20:17,349 --> 00:20:19,051
and to a KLM Dutch crew.
367
00:20:19,117 --> 00:20:20,419
INVESTIGATOR: He's
on an active runway,
368
00:20:20,485 --> 00:20:22,955
and he doesn't know if he's
being told to get off here,
369
00:20:23,021 --> 00:20:26,858
here, or maybe here.
370
00:20:26,925 --> 00:20:28,393
JIM: There seemed
to be some confusion
371
00:20:28,460 --> 00:20:33,031
as to which exit they
were supposed to take,
372
00:20:33,098 --> 00:20:36,068
and I have a feeling
part of that had to do
373
00:20:36,134 --> 00:20:39,271
with the accents involved.
374
00:20:39,338 --> 00:20:41,473
FO. BRAGG: Maybe
I'll ask him again.
375
00:20:41,540 --> 00:20:45,077
Would you confirm that you want
Clipper 1-7-3-6 to turn left
376
00:20:45,143 --> 00:20:47,245
at the third intersection?
377
00:20:47,312 --> 00:20:48,847
NARRATOR: It
takes an extra effort,
378
00:20:48,914 --> 00:20:52,017
but the controller eventually
makes himself understood.
379
00:20:52,084 --> 00:20:55,253
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The
third one, sir. One, two, three.
380
00:20:55,320 --> 00:20:57,689
The third one, third!
381
00:20:57,756 --> 00:20:59,057
NARRATOR: The
controller's accent
382
00:20:59,124 --> 00:21:02,027
may have been another
complicating factor for pilots
383
00:21:02,094 --> 00:21:06,298
in an unfamiliar
airport on a very busy day.
384
00:21:06,365 --> 00:21:10,268
But for investigators, it's not
enough to explain the crash.
385
00:21:10,335 --> 00:21:12,104
They need to keep digging.
386
00:21:12,170 --> 00:21:14,973
INVESTIGATOR: One, two, three.
387
00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:16,508
This is where they
were told to get off,
388
00:21:16,575 --> 00:21:22,914
and they clearly understood.
But they moved past C-3.
389
00:21:22,981 --> 00:21:27,085
Why didn't they get
off where they were told?
390
00:21:27,152 --> 00:21:30,355
NARRATOR: The Pan Am plane
taxied past the third exit.
391
00:21:30,422 --> 00:21:32,858
Why did it stay on the runway?
392
00:21:32,924 --> 00:21:35,794
For more insight, investigators
examine the geometry
393
00:21:35,861 --> 00:21:39,364
of the turn the Pan Am
pilots were asked to make.
394
00:21:39,431 --> 00:21:42,401
That leads to a
surprising discovery.
395
00:21:42,467 --> 00:21:45,871
INVESTIGATOR: So you
have a 148-degree turn here,
396
00:21:45,937 --> 00:21:52,044
followed by another one here.
397
00:21:52,110 --> 00:21:54,246
NARRATOR: Leaving the runway
at the third intersection
398
00:21:54,312 --> 00:21:56,581
would have required
two very sharp turns,
399
00:21:56,648 --> 00:22:00,018
both tighter than 90 degrees.
400
00:22:00,085 --> 00:22:01,586
INVESTIGATOR: That's
practically impossible.
401
00:22:01,653 --> 00:22:05,123
JOHN: A 747 is a beast.
This is a big, big airplane.
402
00:22:05,190 --> 00:22:06,692
You just can't
turn it on a dime.
403
00:22:06,758 --> 00:22:09,227
So a crew is going
to always be reluctant,
404
00:22:09,294 --> 00:22:11,563
an experienced crew
especially like Pan Am's,
405
00:22:11,630 --> 00:22:14,399
to take a turn if it
doesn't look logical to them.
406
00:22:14,466 --> 00:22:16,435
And this one did not
look logical to them.
407
00:22:16,501 --> 00:22:19,738
INVESTIGATOR: All right. So
the collision happened here.
408
00:22:19,805 --> 00:22:24,509
So he obviously passed
C-3 and was headed for C-4.
409
00:22:24,576 --> 00:22:26,478
NARRATOR: Instead of
leaving the runway at an exit
410
00:22:26,545 --> 00:22:29,381
that required two
very difficult turns,
411
00:22:29,448 --> 00:22:32,350
the Pan Am crew
headed for the fourth exit.
412
00:22:32,417 --> 00:22:33,919
It was further along the runway
413
00:22:33,985 --> 00:22:35,987
but provided a much easier turn.
414
00:22:37,656 --> 00:22:43,261
ROBERT: If you see
C-4, it's the only taxiway
415
00:22:43,328 --> 00:22:47,132
going off the runway
at a 45-degree angle.
416
00:22:47,199 --> 00:22:52,804
The other, C-3, would have
not done what we needed to do.
417
00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:55,607
JIM: I can see how that
would definitely have induced
418
00:22:55,674 --> 00:22:58,110
the Pan Am crew to
think that Charlie-4
419
00:22:58,176 --> 00:23:02,114
was the exit that they
were supposed to turn at.
420
00:23:02,180 --> 00:23:04,182
NARRATOR: In the
fog, the KLM crew
421
00:23:04,249 --> 00:23:07,753
would not have been
able to see that Pan Am 1736
422
00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:10,989
was taxiing past the
C3 exit as they waited
423
00:23:11,056 --> 00:23:13,558
for takeoff instructions
from the controller.
424
00:23:17,929 --> 00:23:21,266
FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for
takeoff. Awaiting ATC clearance.
425
00:23:21,333 --> 00:23:23,668
JIM: The first clearance
they were asking for was
426
00:23:23,735 --> 00:23:27,405
an air traffic
control route clearance,
427
00:23:27,472 --> 00:23:29,741
which tells pilots how to get
428
00:23:29,808 --> 00:23:32,878
from the airport that
they were at, Tenerife,
429
00:23:32,944 --> 00:23:35,881
to their destination airport.
430
00:23:35,947 --> 00:23:38,750
NARRATOR: The air traffic
recording suggests the KLM crew
431
00:23:38,817 --> 00:23:42,220
knew the correct procedures
and was following them.
432
00:23:42,287 --> 00:23:44,189
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
433
00:23:44,256 --> 00:23:47,526
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
434
00:23:47,592 --> 00:23:50,128
Right turn after takeoff.
435
00:23:50,195 --> 00:23:51,997
INVESTIGATOR: It sounds fine.
436
00:23:52,063 --> 00:23:53,698
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to Papa Beacon.
437
00:23:53,765 --> 00:23:58,303
Flight level nine-zero. Right
turn out. We are now at takeoff.
438
00:23:58,370 --> 00:24:01,439
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Standby for takeoff.
439
00:24:01,506 --> 00:24:02,808
I will call you.
440
00:24:02,874 --> 00:24:04,709
JIM: It's kind of a verification
between the controller and
441
00:24:04,776 --> 00:24:07,479
the pilot that they are doing
what they should be doing.
442
00:24:07,546 --> 00:24:10,682
INVESTIGATOR: He's telling the
tower he's in takeoff position,
443
00:24:10,749 --> 00:24:15,320
but he's been told to
wait for takeoff clearance.
444
00:24:15,387 --> 00:24:19,357
So why does he
start his takeoff roll?
445
00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:21,326
NARRATOR:
Investigators are mystified.
446
00:24:21,393 --> 00:24:23,295
Nothing on the tower
recording can explain
447
00:24:23,361 --> 00:24:26,031
why the KLM crew
started down the runway
448
00:24:26,097 --> 00:24:29,367
before they were
cleared to do so.
449
00:24:29,434 --> 00:24:31,036
DENNIS: The big
question then was, you know,
450
00:24:31,102 --> 00:24:33,772
once you get over the
horrific nature of it
451
00:24:33,839 --> 00:24:35,707
and say, how could this happen?
452
00:24:46,952 --> 00:24:48,019
NARRATOR: At the crash site,
453
00:24:48,086 --> 00:24:52,958
there's new hope of
finding some answers.
454
00:24:53,024 --> 00:24:56,194
Investigators have
recovered the black boxes.
455
00:24:56,261 --> 00:24:59,998
DENNIS: The voice recorders
were key to the investigation.
456
00:25:00,065 --> 00:25:01,533
That gave us an insight
457
00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:05,437
into what was going on
in the respective cockpits.
458
00:25:05,503 --> 00:25:07,572
NARRATOR: They can only hope
the new evidence will be enough
459
00:25:07,639 --> 00:25:10,876
to finally solve the mystery
of the worst air disaster
460
00:25:10,942 --> 00:25:13,478
the world has ever seen.
461
00:25:13,545 --> 00:25:16,648
INVESTIGATOR:
We've located the CVR.
462
00:25:16,715 --> 00:25:20,085
♪
463
00:25:20,151 --> 00:25:22,554
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the Tenerife disaster
464
00:25:22,621 --> 00:25:24,289
shifts to the
Washington headquarters
465
00:25:24,356 --> 00:25:28,994
of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
466
00:25:29,060 --> 00:25:31,997
Investigator Dennis Grossi
has painstakingly matched up
467
00:25:32,063 --> 00:25:34,633
the cockpit voice recordings
with the known movements
468
00:25:34,699 --> 00:25:36,968
of both planes.
469
00:25:37,035 --> 00:25:39,905
DENNIS: Okay. Let's
listen to the Pan Am.
470
00:25:39,971 --> 00:25:42,774
DENNIS: In this case,
fractions of a second mattered.
471
00:25:42,841 --> 00:25:48,146
So it was important that we
had those recorders synced up
472
00:25:48,213 --> 00:25:51,549
so you could hear it and you
could have precise measurements
473
00:25:51,616 --> 00:25:55,353
of when things were said.
474
00:25:55,420 --> 00:25:58,823
FO. BRAGG: Yeah.
That's that 45 there.
475
00:25:58,890 --> 00:26:03,895
That's this one right here.
The next one is almost a 45.
476
00:26:03,962 --> 00:26:06,564
Goes ahead. It's going
to put us on the taxiway.
477
00:26:06,631 --> 00:26:09,167
NARRATOR: The Pan Am cockpit
tape confirms that the crew
478
00:26:09,234 --> 00:26:13,471
was having a hard time figuring
out where to leave the runway.
479
00:26:13,538 --> 00:26:19,778
DENNIS: They're passing
C-3 and no one sees them.
480
00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:22,113
NARRATOR: Did the KLM
crew think the Pan Am plane
481
00:26:22,180 --> 00:26:24,883
was already off the runway?
482
00:26:24,950 --> 00:26:26,518
DENNIS: Keep it going.
483
00:26:26,584 --> 00:26:31,056
NARRATOR: What the tape reveals
next suggests the answer is no.
484
00:26:31,122 --> 00:26:33,124
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
485
00:26:33,191 --> 00:26:34,826
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
486
00:26:34,893 --> 00:26:37,729
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
487
00:26:37,796 --> 00:26:41,032
NARRATOR: Both crews are
using the same radio frequency.
488
00:26:41,099 --> 00:26:42,133
KLM should have heard
489
00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:46,104
First Officer Bragg
report his location.
490
00:26:46,171 --> 00:26:50,709
ROBERT: That's why I said,
"We're still on the runway,
491
00:26:50,775 --> 00:26:54,045
and we will report
clear of the runway."
492
00:26:54,112 --> 00:26:56,681
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
493
00:26:56,748 --> 00:26:58,950
report runway clear.
494
00:26:59,017 --> 00:27:02,454
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
495
00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,490
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
496
00:27:05,557 --> 00:27:07,092
DENNIS: Crystal
clear for all to hear.
497
00:27:07,158 --> 00:27:16,768
He's still on the runway.
Yet KLM continues to take off.
498
00:27:16,835 --> 00:27:19,337
NARRATOR: Captain Van Zanten
is a highly experienced pilot
499
00:27:19,404 --> 00:27:23,975
with more than
11,000 hours in the air.
500
00:27:24,042 --> 00:27:27,545
What led him to believe
the runway ahead was clear
501
00:27:27,612 --> 00:27:32,817
and that he had
permission to take off?
502
00:27:32,884 --> 00:27:34,552
DENNIS: It just seems so alien
503
00:27:34,619 --> 00:27:37,655
for the crew to
make that mistake.
504
00:27:37,722 --> 00:27:39,991
I mean, these are the top guys.
505
00:27:40,058 --> 00:27:43,561
These are the
best in the business.
506
00:27:43,628 --> 00:27:48,266
DENNIS: He lands
just after 13:30.
507
00:27:48,333 --> 00:27:50,568
NARRATOR: Investigators
turn to the KLM voice recording
508
00:27:50,635 --> 00:27:52,670
for answers.
509
00:27:52,737 --> 00:27:55,240
Perhaps something
said in that cockpit
510
00:27:55,306 --> 00:27:57,308
can explain the
incomprehensible decision
511
00:27:57,375 --> 00:27:59,844
to start down the runway.
512
00:27:59,911 --> 00:28:02,013
FE. SCHREUDER: We
landed here at 1:38.
513
00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:03,415
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Yes, I know that,
514
00:28:03,481 --> 00:28:06,518
but we have to start from 7:00.
That's when we checked in.
515
00:28:06,584 --> 00:28:08,686
DENNIS:
You're trying to recreate
the cockpit environment,
516
00:28:08,753 --> 00:28:13,425
why certain decisions were
made, why things were said.
517
00:28:13,491 --> 00:28:15,093
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: The time
limit is 10 hours of flying
518
00:28:15,160 --> 00:28:18,863
with an amplitude of 13 hours.
That's with one stopover.
519
00:28:18,930 --> 00:28:20,498
NARRATOR: The recording
reveals that the captain
520
00:28:20,565 --> 00:28:23,268
is worried about work hours.
521
00:28:23,334 --> 00:28:25,603
If the crew
exceeds their duty time,
522
00:28:25,670 --> 00:28:29,774
they'll be forced
to cancel the flight.
523
00:28:29,841 --> 00:28:32,811
JOHN: And that means probably
thirty, $40,000 of hotel rooms
524
00:28:32,877 --> 00:28:34,179
for the outbound passengers
525
00:28:34,245 --> 00:28:36,381
who they're not going to be
able to carry back that night.
526
00:28:36,448 --> 00:28:38,116
It is a bit of a
logistical nightmare,
527
00:28:38,183 --> 00:28:41,386
especially in an
outstation in a foreign place.
528
00:28:41,453 --> 00:28:43,388
NARRATOR: Dutch
regulators have also recently
529
00:28:43,455 --> 00:28:48,526
tightened the rules governing
flight crew duty time.
530
00:28:48,593 --> 00:28:50,995
A Dutch pilot can now
have his license revoked
531
00:28:51,062 --> 00:28:56,367
if he exceeds the
legal number of hours.
532
00:28:56,434 --> 00:28:59,437
The crew left Amsterdam
at nine in the morning.
533
00:28:59,504 --> 00:29:02,707
They still have to get
their passengers to Las Palmas,
534
00:29:02,774 --> 00:29:04,943
pick up another
load of passengers,
535
00:29:05,009 --> 00:29:09,981
and get back to Amsterdam
before the clock runs out.
536
00:29:10,048 --> 00:29:12,517
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
If I mess this up, I could
actually lose my license.
537
00:29:12,584 --> 00:29:14,719
FE. SCHREUDER: We
certainly wouldn't want that.
538
00:29:14,786 --> 00:29:17,589
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Well, if we're waiting,
we might as well refuel.
539
00:29:17,655 --> 00:29:20,158
Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5.
540
00:29:20,225 --> 00:29:23,294
Now requesting
refueling at the apron.
541
00:29:23,361 --> 00:29:25,797
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
concern over duty time explains
542
00:29:25,864 --> 00:29:31,202
why he decided to
refuel while in Tenerife.
543
00:29:31,269 --> 00:29:34,572
DENNIS: He was going to
do everything in his power
544
00:29:34,639 --> 00:29:38,943
to make sure that he
could complete the flight
545
00:29:39,010 --> 00:29:43,081
within his legal
duty time limits.
546
00:29:43,148 --> 00:29:44,916
NARRATOR: But then,
a short time later,
547
00:29:44,983 --> 00:29:47,685
the airport in
Las Palmas reopens.
548
00:29:47,752 --> 00:29:49,921
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
To all aircraft, Las
Palmas has reopened.
549
00:29:49,988 --> 00:29:54,592
You may ask for start up and
clearances at your discretion.
550
00:29:54,659 --> 00:29:58,530
NARRATOR: And Van
Zanten's plan backfires.
551
00:29:58,596 --> 00:30:01,099
Refueling takes much
longer than expected,
552
00:30:01,166 --> 00:30:03,801
and now he can't
move until it's done.
553
00:30:03,868 --> 00:30:05,837
JOHN: When Las
Palmas reopened, here he is
554
00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:06,971
sucking on a fuel hose
555
00:30:07,038 --> 00:30:09,207
instead of starting
the engines and moving.
556
00:30:09,274 --> 00:30:10,742
FO. BRAGG: This
is Clipper 1-7-3-6
557
00:30:10,808 --> 00:30:12,810
requesting startup clearance.
558
00:30:12,877 --> 00:30:15,280
NARRATOR: Van Zanten's
decision has a huge impact
559
00:30:15,346 --> 00:30:17,615
on the Pan Am flight as well.
560
00:30:17,682 --> 00:30:18,783
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: The KLM beside you
561
00:30:18,850 --> 00:30:20,084
has requested a refuel,
562
00:30:20,151 --> 00:30:23,821
and it doesn't look like
you're going to get by him.
563
00:30:23,888 --> 00:30:25,723
JOHN: The Pan American 747
564
00:30:25,790 --> 00:30:27,959
didn't have enough
wing tip clearance.
565
00:30:28,026 --> 00:30:31,429
FO. BRAGG: You
gotta be kidding me.
566
00:30:31,496 --> 00:30:37,268
Roger Tenerife, Clipper 1-7-3-6.
567
00:30:37,335 --> 00:30:38,770
JOHN: The other
captains were unhappy with him
568
00:30:38,836 --> 00:30:42,607
because he was the
cork in the bottle.
569
00:30:42,674 --> 00:30:45,410
NARRATOR: The refueling
delay means the KLM crew
570
00:30:45,476 --> 00:30:49,847
now has only two hours
until they're grounded.
571
00:30:49,914 --> 00:30:52,550
DENNIS: A half hour to
taxi. A half hour to get there.
572
00:30:52,617 --> 00:30:59,190
An hour to swap passengers and
get back in the air. It's tight.
573
00:30:59,257 --> 00:31:05,129
And guess what? The
weather's getting worse.
574
00:31:05,196 --> 00:31:06,931
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5,
575
00:31:06,998 --> 00:31:09,968
you are clear to
taxi to the runway.
576
00:31:10,034 --> 00:31:12,337
NARRATOR: The question
facing investigators now is,
577
00:31:12,403 --> 00:31:15,773
did the rush to get off the
ground in worsening weather
578
00:31:15,840 --> 00:31:23,481
cause the KLM
crew to jump the gun?
579
00:31:23,548 --> 00:31:26,618
DENNIS: So he taxis to the end
of the runway and does this 180.
580
00:31:26,684 --> 00:31:28,019
We know this
from the tower tapes.
581
00:31:28,086 --> 00:31:31,990
Can we hear it
from that point please?
582
00:31:32,056 --> 00:31:34,459
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Starting. Landing lights on.
583
00:31:34,525 --> 00:31:35,693
Checklist complete.
584
00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:37,629
NARRATOR: Investigators
hear more evidence
585
00:31:37,695 --> 00:31:43,368
that the captain of KLM flight
4805 may have been in a rush.
586
00:31:43,434 --> 00:31:47,772
DENNIS: Is he throttling up?
587
00:31:47,839 --> 00:31:50,508
FO. MEURS: Wait a minute.
We do not have ATC clearance.
588
00:31:50,575 --> 00:31:55,013
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: No, I
know that. Go ahead and ask.
589
00:31:55,079 --> 00:31:59,450
DENNIS: It's obvious that
time was an important factor
590
00:31:59,517 --> 00:32:03,021
in the KLM
Captain's decision-making.
591
00:32:03,087 --> 00:32:04,956
He wasn't going
to waste any time
592
00:32:05,023 --> 00:32:08,159
once he got to the
end of the runway.
593
00:32:08,226 --> 00:32:11,629
FO. MEURS:
KLM is ready for takeoff,
waiting for ATC clearance.
594
00:32:11,696 --> 00:32:13,064
DENNIS: So he
requests ATC clearance.
595
00:32:13,131 --> 00:32:16,167
We're about a
minute from the collision.
596
00:32:16,234 --> 00:32:18,469
JOHN: When the first officer
asked for the clearance,
597
00:32:18,536 --> 00:32:20,705
he was asking for the air
traffic control clearance,
598
00:32:20,772 --> 00:32:21,939
completely
separate from the clearance
599
00:32:22,006 --> 00:32:25,376
to actually roll this
500, 600,000-pound monster
600
00:32:25,443 --> 00:32:27,078
down the runway.
601
00:32:27,145 --> 00:32:29,013
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
602
00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:32,250
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
603
00:32:32,317 --> 00:32:34,319
Right turn after takeoff.
604
00:32:34,385 --> 00:32:35,887
NARRATOR: What
investigators hear next
605
00:32:35,953 --> 00:32:40,224
answers many of the questions
plaguing this investigation.
606
00:32:40,291 --> 00:32:41,392
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
607
00:32:41,459 --> 00:32:42,894
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Clear to the Papa Beacon.
608
00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:44,195
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go! Check thrust.
609
00:32:44,262 --> 00:32:46,030
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0, right turn out.
610
00:32:46,097 --> 00:32:47,298
We are now at takeoff.
611
00:32:47,365 --> 00:32:48,599
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay.
612
00:32:48,666 --> 00:32:52,203
DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa.
What just happened there?
613
00:32:52,270 --> 00:32:53,638
Play that again, please.
614
00:32:53,705 --> 00:32:55,440
NARRATOR: The controller
is providing instructions
615
00:32:55,506 --> 00:32:58,076
for what to do after takeoff.
616
00:32:58,142 --> 00:32:59,977
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
617
00:33:00,044 --> 00:33:03,281
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
618
00:33:03,348 --> 00:33:05,350
Right turn after takeoff.
619
00:33:05,416 --> 00:33:06,651
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes!
620
00:33:06,718 --> 00:33:07,885
NARRATOR: But the captain reacts
621
00:33:07,952 --> 00:33:11,723
as if he's actually
been cleared for departure.
622
00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:14,225
JIM: They get a clearance
from air traffic control
623
00:33:14,292 --> 00:33:16,294
that contains the word takeoff,
624
00:33:16,361 --> 00:33:18,996
and that confirms for
them that everything is
625
00:33:19,063 --> 00:33:22,400
the way it should be, when
in fact everything was not.
626
00:33:22,467 --> 00:33:24,168
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
627
00:33:24,235 --> 00:33:25,703
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
628
00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:26,871
NARRATOR: Before
his first officer
629
00:33:26,938 --> 00:33:29,374
has finished reading
back the instructions,
630
00:33:29,440 --> 00:33:33,378
Captain Van Zanten
is already on the roll.
631
00:33:33,444 --> 00:33:35,680
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
632
00:33:35,747 --> 00:33:36,681
We are now at takeoff.
633
00:33:36,748 --> 00:33:38,082
NARRATOR: Investigators now know
634
00:33:38,149 --> 00:33:43,287
what the Dutch first
officer meant by "at takeoff."
635
00:33:43,354 --> 00:33:45,656
DENNIS: He's reporting
that he's actually taking off,
636
00:33:45,723 --> 00:33:48,593
not that he's ready to take off.
637
00:33:48,659 --> 00:33:50,461
JIM: Unfortunately, in this case
638
00:33:50,528 --> 00:33:55,500
it meant they were taking
off from the KLM perspective.
639
00:33:55,566 --> 00:33:59,003
And from the air
traffic control perspective,
640
00:33:59,070 --> 00:34:02,240
they were hearing, "We
are at takeoff position."
641
00:34:02,306 --> 00:34:03,641
NARRATOR: But for investigators
642
00:34:03,708 --> 00:34:05,843
there's something
about the radio exchange
643
00:34:05,910 --> 00:34:08,379
that still doesn't make sense.
644
00:34:08,446 --> 00:34:10,381
DENNIS: According to
the tower transcripts,
645
00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:15,987
the controller
advised him to stay put.
646
00:34:16,053 --> 00:34:18,956
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay. Stand by for takeoff.
647
00:34:19,023 --> 00:34:20,491
I will call you.
648
00:34:20,558 --> 00:34:23,661
NARRATOR:
Why didn't the KLM crew
follow that clear instruction
649
00:34:23,728 --> 00:34:25,496
to stand by?
650
00:34:25,563 --> 00:34:29,000
DENNIS: Give me Pan Am at 17:06.
651
00:34:29,067 --> 00:34:31,202
That's when Pan Am
reports on the same frequency
652
00:34:31,269 --> 00:34:35,706
that they're
still on the runway.
653
00:34:35,773 --> 00:34:37,108
FO. BRAGG: And we're
still taxiing down the runway,
654
00:34:37,175 --> 00:34:39,110
Clipper 1-7-3-6.
655
00:34:39,177 --> 00:34:48,352
DENNIS: Hold it there.
Why would he ignore them?
656
00:34:48,419 --> 00:34:49,487
NARRATOR: The cockpit recordings
657
00:34:49,554 --> 00:34:52,023
continue to
baffle investigators,
658
00:34:52,089 --> 00:34:56,561
until they hear another critical
moment on the KLM tape.
659
00:34:56,627 --> 00:34:58,329
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
660
00:34:58,396 --> 00:35:03,100
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay.
661
00:35:03,167 --> 00:35:05,870
DENNIS: That's what he heard?
662
00:35:05,937 --> 00:35:10,608
NARRATOR: It's a
stunning discovery.
663
00:35:10,675 --> 00:35:11,876
FO. MEURS: Flight
level 9-0. Right turn out.
664
00:35:11,943 --> 00:35:13,511
We're now at takeoff.
665
00:35:13,578 --> 00:35:17,748
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay.
666
00:35:17,815 --> 00:35:19,684
NARRATOR: The two
warnings to stay put
667
00:35:19,750 --> 00:35:23,788
were never heard
in the KLM cockpit.
668
00:35:23,855 --> 00:35:25,656
The tower and the Pan Am flight
669
00:35:25,723 --> 00:35:30,127
both made their critical
calls at the exact same moment.
670
00:35:30,194 --> 00:35:31,896
FO. BRAGG (Overlap): And we're
still taxiing down the runway.
671
00:35:31,963 --> 00:35:33,731
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
(overlap): Okay. Stand by
for takeoff. I will call you.
672
00:35:33,798 --> 00:35:35,700
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
673
00:35:35,766 --> 00:35:37,335
NARRATOR: The
simultaneous transmissions
674
00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,972
produced a four second
squeal in the KLM cockpit.
675
00:35:41,038 --> 00:35:42,840
FO. MEURS: We
are now at takeoff.
676
00:35:42,907 --> 00:35:45,610
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay.
677
00:35:45,676 --> 00:35:46,878
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6.
678
00:35:46,944 --> 00:35:50,781
NARRATOR: The crew
heard only one word: okay.
679
00:35:50,848 --> 00:35:54,452
JIM:
Unfortunately, this happened
680
00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:57,288
during that pause after
the controller says okay.
681
00:35:57,355 --> 00:35:58,990
For KLM, they had no opportunity
682
00:35:59,056 --> 00:36:01,959
to hear the controller
saying standby for takeoff,
683
00:36:02,026 --> 00:36:03,628
nor were they able to hear,
684
00:36:03,694 --> 00:36:05,496
because they were
speaking at the same time,
685
00:36:05,563 --> 00:36:12,069
the Pan Am crew reporting that
they were still on the runway.
686
00:36:12,136 --> 00:36:13,838
DENNIS: So what's next?
687
00:36:13,905 --> 00:36:15,273
NARRATOR: There's
one final transmission
688
00:36:15,339 --> 00:36:17,441
recorded in the KLM cockpit.
689
00:36:17,508 --> 00:36:20,011
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6,
690
00:36:20,077 --> 00:36:23,014
report runway clear.
691
00:36:23,080 --> 00:36:24,682
NARRATOR: It should
have alerted the crew
692
00:36:24,749 --> 00:36:26,717
that another plane
was still on the runway.
693
00:36:26,784 --> 00:36:29,153
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
694
00:36:29,220 --> 00:36:31,389
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
695
00:36:31,455 --> 00:36:34,825
NARRATOR:
Only the flight engineer
seems to have understood it.
696
00:36:34,892 --> 00:36:36,427
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
697
00:36:36,494 --> 00:36:37,728
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
698
00:36:37,795 --> 00:36:39,864
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
699
00:36:39,931 --> 00:36:41,532
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
700
00:36:41,599 --> 00:36:45,403
NARRATOR: The
pilots ignore his concern
701
00:36:45,469 --> 00:36:48,072
and miss their last
chance to avoid a disaster
702
00:36:48,139 --> 00:36:51,709
that will claim 583 lives.
703
00:36:51,776 --> 00:36:52,610
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
704
00:36:52,677 --> 00:36:54,612
♪
705
00:37:14,999 --> 00:37:16,200
DENNIS: Van Zanten
should not have moved
706
00:37:16,267 --> 00:37:18,536
without explicit clearance.
707
00:37:18,603 --> 00:37:22,273
ROBERT:
You learn that in probably
the first or second lesson
708
00:37:22,340 --> 00:37:27,778
in aviation: Do not take
off unless you get a clearance.
709
00:37:27,845 --> 00:37:29,547
NARRATOR: Investigators
dig into the career
710
00:37:29,614 --> 00:37:32,149
of Captain Van Zanten.
711
00:37:32,216 --> 00:37:34,385
They're looking for
anything that might explain
712
00:37:34,452 --> 00:37:38,956
why an experienced pilot would
violate such a fundamental rule.
713
00:37:39,023 --> 00:37:41,292
INVESTIGATOR: This
guy was a superstar.
714
00:37:41,359 --> 00:37:42,560
NARRATOR: They
learn that Van Zanten
715
00:37:42,627 --> 00:37:45,396
was one of KLM's top pilots.
716
00:37:45,463 --> 00:37:49,800
He was the face of the airline,
the director of flight safety,
717
00:37:49,867 --> 00:37:52,303
and head of the
flight training department.
718
00:37:52,370 --> 00:37:54,939
JOHN: How could a human being
with so much intelligence,
719
00:37:55,006 --> 00:37:58,676
so much capability and
experience and position,
720
00:37:58,743 --> 00:38:02,146
and the director of safety
-- how could he fail like this?
721
00:38:05,883 --> 00:38:10,554
♪
722
00:38:10,621 --> 00:38:13,524
NARRATOR: Investigators
suspect that, in an odd twist,
723
00:38:13,591 --> 00:38:15,493
the captain's elevated status
724
00:38:15,559 --> 00:38:18,929
may have played a role
in the Tenerife disaster.
725
00:38:18,996 --> 00:38:24,235
ROBERT: Back in those
times, everyone had an awe
726
00:38:24,301 --> 00:38:28,372
of the captain, if you
will. His word was god.
727
00:38:28,439 --> 00:38:32,843
His word was unquestioned.
728
00:38:32,910 --> 00:38:35,146
DENNIS: If he has
that kind of authority,
729
00:38:35,212 --> 00:38:39,216
it's less likely
for someone his junior,
730
00:38:39,283 --> 00:38:42,853
in this case the flight
engineer and the first officer,
731
00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:44,922
to challenge anything he does.
732
00:38:50,294 --> 00:38:52,897
FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll
report when we're clear.
733
00:38:52,963 --> 00:38:54,398
AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLER: Thank you.
734
00:38:54,465 --> 00:38:55,933
FE. SCHREUDER: Is
he not clear then?
735
00:38:56,000 --> 00:38:57,234
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
What did you say?
736
00:38:57,301 --> 00:38:59,670
FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not
clear then, the Pan American?
737
00:38:59,737 --> 00:39:01,038
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes.
738
00:39:01,105 --> 00:39:03,107
NARRATOR: The
conversation in the KLM cockpit
739
00:39:03,174 --> 00:39:07,111
leading up to the accident
seems to support that notion.
740
00:39:07,178 --> 00:39:09,814
But Van Zanten's
esteemed status doesn't explain
741
00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:12,983
the most
troubling question of all.
742
00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:16,921
Why did he believe it was safe
to take off in the first place?
743
00:39:16,987 --> 00:39:19,023
DENNIS: Logically, you
should make extra clear that,
744
00:39:19,090 --> 00:39:24,662
hey, we're taking
off. Is the runway clear?
745
00:39:24,729 --> 00:39:27,331
NARRATOR: Investigators search
desperately for an answer and
746
00:39:27,398 --> 00:39:31,102
come across a stunning detail
in the captain's flight log.
747
00:39:31,168 --> 00:39:33,671
It could be the
final piece of the puzzle.
748
00:39:33,738 --> 00:39:37,942
INVESTIGATOR: This was his
first flight in three months.
749
00:39:38,008 --> 00:39:40,544
NARRATOR: Records show
that Van Zanten's cockpit hours
750
00:39:40,611 --> 00:39:43,614
had dropped
dramatically in recent years.
751
00:39:43,681 --> 00:39:46,183
He was spending most of
his time in a simulator
752
00:39:46,250 --> 00:39:48,152
training other pilots.
753
00:39:48,219 --> 00:39:49,987
JOHN: The
simulation is interesting
754
00:39:50,054 --> 00:39:52,456
because, when you spend a
lot of time as an instructor
755
00:39:52,523 --> 00:39:54,525
in a simulator, it's
an artificial environment
756
00:39:54,592 --> 00:39:57,061
that we try to make
as real as possible.
757
00:39:57,128 --> 00:40:01,132
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay. Checklist
complete. Let's go. Thrust.
758
00:40:03,467 --> 00:40:05,836
NARRATOR: Flight simulators
do a remarkably good job
759
00:40:05,903 --> 00:40:09,039
at recreating the
experience of a real flight.
760
00:40:09,106 --> 00:40:12,510
But there is one very
important element missing.
761
00:40:12,576 --> 00:40:17,014
There is no air traffic
controller in a simulator.
762
00:40:17,081 --> 00:40:18,883
DENNIS: His
focus was on training,
763
00:40:18,949 --> 00:40:21,719
and there was this
difference in the way
764
00:40:21,786 --> 00:40:25,790
you treat air traffic
control communications
765
00:40:25,856 --> 00:40:28,893
in a training environment
versus the real world.
766
00:40:28,959 --> 00:40:34,498
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay, let's
go. Thrust. V-1. Here we go.
767
00:40:34,565 --> 00:40:39,236
Takeoff thrust. Rotate.
Okay let's go. Takeoff thrust.
768
00:40:39,303 --> 00:40:41,305
Thrust. Let's go.
769
00:40:41,372 --> 00:40:42,740
INVESTIGATOR: All that
time he spent in a simulator
770
00:40:42,807 --> 00:40:44,408
works against him.
771
00:40:44,475 --> 00:40:45,776
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Climb to and maintain
772
00:40:45,843 --> 00:40:49,446
flight level niner-zero.
Right turn after takeoff.
773
00:40:49,513 --> 00:40:51,048
FO. MEURS: Roger.
Cleared to the Papa Beacon.
774
00:40:51,115 --> 00:40:54,618
CPT. VAN ZANTEN:
Let's go. Check thrust.
775
00:40:54,685 --> 00:40:56,854
JOHN: Jacob Van
Zanten's attempt to take off
776
00:40:56,921 --> 00:40:57,922
without a clearance
777
00:40:57,988 --> 00:41:00,324
resulted from his
time in the simulator
778
00:41:00,391 --> 00:41:02,526
and that he kind
of reset himself.
779
00:41:02,593 --> 00:41:07,298
He was his own clearance
authority in the simulator.
780
00:41:07,364 --> 00:41:09,066
INVESTIGATOR: And then
two separate radio calls
781
00:41:09,133 --> 00:41:11,268
that should have told him
the Pan Am was off the runway
782
00:41:11,335 --> 00:41:13,470
cancel each other out.
783
00:41:13,537 --> 00:41:15,773
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Okay.
784
00:41:15,840 --> 00:41:18,809
FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1736.
785
00:41:18,876 --> 00:41:20,811
The world's
deadliest airline accident
786
00:41:20,878 --> 00:41:24,515
is now all but inevitable.
787
00:41:24,582 --> 00:41:28,552
FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving.
788
00:41:28,619 --> 00:41:31,589
CPT. GRUBBS: Look at
him. That idiot's coming!
789
00:41:31,655 --> 00:41:35,826
♪
790
00:41:35,893 --> 00:41:37,161
JOHN: Basically we had a captain
791
00:41:37,228 --> 00:41:41,365
who wanted to get off the
ground as rapidly as possible.
792
00:41:41,432 --> 00:41:42,466
CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it!
793
00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:51,575
♪
794
00:41:51,642 --> 00:41:53,844
JOHN: The weather
was not cooperating,
795
00:41:53,911 --> 00:41:55,646
and he was about
out of crew duty time,
796
00:41:55,713 --> 00:41:58,315
and in a situation
like that, the human mind,
797
00:41:58,382 --> 00:42:02,219
our carbon-based brains tend to
jump a few cogs, so to speak.
798
00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:04,088
FO. BRAGG: Get
off. Get off. Get off.
799
00:42:04,154 --> 00:42:05,656
Get off! Get off! Get off!
800
00:42:15,332 --> 00:42:17,801
JOHN: He had a gun cocked
and loaded by various factors
801
00:42:17,868 --> 00:42:19,336
and he was the one
that pulled the trigger.
802
00:42:19,403 --> 00:42:23,807
But you have to take
them all in connection.
803
00:42:28,679 --> 00:42:31,315
NARRATOR: The investigation
into the collision at Tenerife
804
00:42:31,382 --> 00:42:33,918
results in dozens
of recommendations.
805
00:42:33,984 --> 00:42:36,587
Few aviation accidents
have triggered a greater number
806
00:42:36,654 --> 00:42:40,157
of significant changes.
807
00:42:40,224 --> 00:42:43,060
JOHN: That's what began
to be the seed of training
808
00:42:43,127 --> 00:42:45,162
for what we later called
crew resource management
809
00:42:45,229 --> 00:42:47,464
where we said to the
captain, we're onto you, bub.
810
00:42:47,531 --> 00:42:48,832
You're a human being.
811
00:42:48,899 --> 00:42:51,001
You can make mistakes, even
when you have no intention to,
812
00:42:51,068 --> 00:42:53,070
and even when you're
completely qualified.
813
00:42:57,074 --> 00:42:58,742
NARRATOR: KLM and other airlines
814
00:42:58,809 --> 00:43:01,745
transform their
training methods for captains,
815
00:43:01,812 --> 00:43:05,449
helping them become more
responsive to their crew-mates.
816
00:43:05,516 --> 00:43:06,817
DENNIS: Even the most senior
817
00:43:06,884 --> 00:43:12,623
and the most highly trained
individuals can make mistakes
818
00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:16,527
and we need to
rely on the resources
819
00:43:16,593 --> 00:43:23,567
of all the crew members
to compensate for that.
820
00:43:23,634 --> 00:43:25,569
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You
are cleared to the Papa Beacon.
821
00:43:25,636 --> 00:43:28,439
Climb to and maintain
flight level niner-zero.
822
00:43:28,505 --> 00:43:30,307
Right turn after takeoff.
823
00:43:30,374 --> 00:43:33,043
NARRATOR: The accident
also changes the very language
824
00:43:33,110 --> 00:43:37,181
used by
controllers around the world.
825
00:43:37,247 --> 00:43:39,350
JIM: Controllers
don't use the word takeoff
826
00:43:39,416 --> 00:43:42,219
unless they
actually mean and intend
827
00:43:42,286 --> 00:43:46,323
for the aircraft to be
doing just that, taking off.
828
00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:50,527
Instead, they will substitute
the word "after departure turn
829
00:43:50,594 --> 00:43:54,098
right heading zero-four-zero"
or something to that effect.
830
00:43:54,164 --> 00:43:58,569
JOHN: Those 583
people did not die in vain.
831
00:43:58,635 --> 00:44:00,004
We have learned those lessons.
832
00:44:00,070 --> 00:44:03,774
They changed the whole
face of aviation safety.
833
00:44:03,841 --> 00:44:05,342
♪
68564
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