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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,869 --> 00:00:05,438 PASSENGERS: 2 00:00:05,505 --> 00:00:08,875 NARRATOR: Two jumbo jets. 3 00:00:08,942 --> 00:00:11,077 JOHN: Five hundred and eighty-three people. 4 00:00:11,144 --> 00:00:14,247 NARRATOR: The deadliest air crash of all time. 5 00:00:14,314 --> 00:00:18,351 JOHN: This was a nightmare beyond all expectation. 6 00:00:18,418 --> 00:00:21,154 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: If I mess this up, I could actually lose my license. 7 00:00:21,221 --> 00:00:24,290 NARRATOR: Blame soon falls on one pilot. 8 00:00:24,357 --> 00:00:26,726 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Stand by for takeoff. I will call you. 9 00:00:26,793 --> 00:00:29,362 DENNIS: Why would he ignore those instructions? 10 00:00:29,429 --> 00:00:32,866 NARRATOR: But as investigators sift through all the evidence... 11 00:00:32,932 --> 00:00:34,167 FO. MEURS: We are now at takeoff. 12 00:00:34,234 --> 00:00:38,138 DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa. What just happened there? 13 00:00:38,204 --> 00:00:39,539 NARRATOR: The disaster in Tenerife 14 00:00:39,606 --> 00:00:43,243 grows more and more mysterious. 15 00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:47,881 INVESTIGATOR: Why didn't they get off where they were told? 16 00:00:47,947 --> 00:00:49,215 DENNIS: These are the top guys. 17 00:00:49,282 --> 00:00:52,952 These are the best in the business. How could this happen? 18 00:00:53,353 --> 00:00:55,388 Flight attendant: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE ARE STARTING OUR APPROACH. 19 00:00:55,455 --> 00:00:56,656 Pilot: WE LOST BOTH ENGINES! 20 00:00:56,723 --> 00:00:57,924 Flight attendant: PUT THE MASK OVER YOUR NOSE. 21 00:00:57,991 --> 00:00:58,858 EMERGENCY DESCENT. 22 00:00:58,925 --> 00:00:59,926 Pilot: MAYDAY, MAYDAY. 23 00:00:59,993 --> 00:01:01,694 Flight attendant: BRACE FOR IMPACT! 24 00:01:01,761 --> 00:01:02,996 Controller: I THINK I LOST ONE. 25 00:01:03,062 --> 00:01:06,132 Man: INVESTIGATION STARTING INTO THIS TRAGEDY... 26 00:01:06,199 --> 00:01:07,700 Man: HE'S GONNA CRASH! 27 00:01:08,735 --> 00:01:23,483 ♪ 28 00:01:23,550 --> 00:01:24,717 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sunjet 2-8-2, 29 00:01:24,784 --> 00:01:28,288 proceed directly to runway, backtrack and hold. 30 00:01:28,354 --> 00:01:31,324 NARRATOR: Los Rodeos Airport on the Spanish island of Tenerife 31 00:01:31,391 --> 00:01:34,360 is busier than it's ever been. 32 00:01:34,427 --> 00:01:36,729 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: BA-783, hold short of the runway 33 00:01:36,796 --> 00:01:39,432 and stand by for taxi clearance. 34 00:01:39,499 --> 00:01:41,668 NARRATOR: The controllers are swamped. 35 00:01:41,734 --> 00:01:44,504 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Scandinavian 1-4-2-0, 36 00:01:44,571 --> 00:01:46,539 you are cleared for takeoff. 37 00:01:46,606 --> 00:01:49,576 Sterling 7-3-9-2, you are next in line. 38 00:01:49,642 --> 00:01:54,147 Sierra Alpha Tango Alpha 69, right turn, heading 0-4-0. 39 00:01:54,214 --> 00:01:55,215 Goodbye. 40 00:01:59,953 --> 00:02:03,122 NARRATOR: A few hours ago, dozens of flights were diverted here 41 00:02:03,189 --> 00:02:05,758 after a terrorist bombing shut down a larger airport 42 00:02:05,825 --> 00:02:09,496 in nearby Las Palmas. 43 00:02:09,562 --> 00:02:11,264 JIM: It's a single-runway airport 44 00:02:11,331 --> 00:02:13,199 with a single parallel taxiway, 45 00:02:13,266 --> 00:02:16,936 and because of the terrorist event in the region, 46 00:02:17,003 --> 00:02:18,238 they had much more traffic 47 00:02:18,304 --> 00:02:22,208 than I'm certain that they would normally see. 48 00:02:22,275 --> 00:02:25,044 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Sterling 7-3-9-2, taxi to the runway 49 00:02:25,111 --> 00:02:28,815 and exit at taxiway Charlie 3. 50 00:02:28,882 --> 00:02:30,049 JIM: They were dealing with aircraft 51 00:02:30,116 --> 00:02:32,785 that had been delayed for a good part of the day, 52 00:02:32,852 --> 00:02:34,654 and now there was a sense of urgency 53 00:02:34,721 --> 00:02:38,858 to get them out and safely on their way. 54 00:02:38,925 --> 00:02:41,661 NARRATOR: With so many planes parked on the taxiways, 55 00:02:41,728 --> 00:02:43,763 the controllers instruct departing flights 56 00:02:43,830 --> 00:02:46,299 to taxi along the airport's only runway 57 00:02:46,366 --> 00:02:48,368 to get into position for takeoff. 58 00:02:52,272 --> 00:02:54,340 One of the planes waiting to get to Las Palmas 59 00:02:54,407 --> 00:03:00,647 is Pan Am flight 1736. 60 00:03:00,713 --> 00:03:02,181 CPT. GRUBBS: We must be getting close. 61 00:03:02,248 --> 00:03:05,318 FO. BRAGG: I sure hope so. I'm ready for the beach. 62 00:03:05,385 --> 00:03:06,719 NARRATOR: Thirty-nine-year-old Robert Bragg 63 00:03:06,786 --> 00:03:08,821 is the first officer. 64 00:03:08,888 --> 00:03:10,657 ROBERT: After we got to Las Palmas, 65 00:03:10,723 --> 00:03:12,592 we were supposed to have a day there 66 00:03:12,659 --> 00:03:16,362 and then fly the airplane to Paris and have a day off 67 00:03:16,429 --> 00:03:17,897 and then back to New York. 68 00:03:17,964 --> 00:03:20,733 So it was supposed to be a very good trip. 69 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:24,070 NARRATOR: His captain is Victor Grubbs. 70 00:03:24,137 --> 00:03:25,605 Flight engineer George Warns 71 00:03:25,672 --> 00:03:29,208 completes the highly experienced crew. 72 00:03:29,275 --> 00:03:32,345 JOHN: Pan American World Airways was not only a pioneer, 73 00:03:32,412 --> 00:03:35,348 but they were the one we all looked up to tremendously. 74 00:03:35,415 --> 00:03:37,817 Those of us who wanted to be pilots and who later were 75 00:03:37,884 --> 00:03:40,119 always had that fantasy that we might some day fly 76 00:03:40,186 --> 00:03:41,521 for Pan American. 77 00:03:41,588 --> 00:03:46,626 So they were the creme de la creme for so many, many decades. 78 00:03:46,693 --> 00:03:50,163 NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew is ready to get back in the air, 79 00:03:50,229 --> 00:03:53,399 but they can't taxi to the runway. 80 00:03:53,466 --> 00:03:57,604 A KLM 747 has stopped in front of them to refuel. 81 00:03:57,670 --> 00:04:01,741 ROBERT: We were about 12 feet short of getting around them, 82 00:04:01,808 --> 00:04:03,476 and we were all on the same radio. 83 00:04:03,543 --> 00:04:08,047 I asked him how long would it be for him to finish fueling. 84 00:04:08,114 --> 00:04:11,217 He said about 45 minutes. 85 00:04:11,284 --> 00:04:12,452 JOHN: You're trying to get your passengers 86 00:04:12,518 --> 00:04:16,222 where they want to go and now KLM wants more fuel 87 00:04:16,289 --> 00:04:18,891 and it's just one of those things. It gets frustrating. 88 00:04:18,958 --> 00:04:21,361 These irritations are small, but at the end of a long day 89 00:04:21,427 --> 00:04:26,165 they begin to add up. 90 00:04:26,232 --> 00:04:27,834 PASSENGER: Not even a sandwich? 91 00:04:27,900 --> 00:04:31,004 NARRATOR: It's been a long day for the 378 passengers 92 00:04:31,070 --> 00:04:35,141 on board the Pan Am airplane. 93 00:04:35,208 --> 00:04:37,543 The flight started in Los Angeles before stopping 94 00:04:37,610 --> 00:04:40,647 in New York and now in Tenerife. 95 00:04:40,713 --> 00:04:44,517 ROBERT: They had been on the airplane 12, 13 hours. 96 00:04:44,584 --> 00:04:47,186 So they were getting tired. 97 00:04:47,253 --> 00:04:48,688 NARRATOR: The passengers have no idea 98 00:04:48,755 --> 00:04:54,927 how long the delay will last. 99 00:04:54,994 --> 00:04:56,963 ROBERT: KLM was our big concern. 100 00:04:57,030 --> 00:05:00,900 And we found out his fueling would be finished. 101 00:05:00,967 --> 00:05:03,536 FO. MEURS: Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5. We've finished refueling. 102 00:05:03,603 --> 00:05:05,905 Requesting clearance for start up. 103 00:05:05,972 --> 00:05:10,243 NARRATOR: The KLM aircraft is finally ready to roll. 104 00:05:10,309 --> 00:05:15,214 Both 747s should be back in the air soon. 105 00:05:15,281 --> 00:05:19,619 FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6, requesting start clearance. 106 00:05:19,686 --> 00:05:24,791 ROBERT: I said okay, Pan Am is ready to start also. 107 00:05:24,857 --> 00:05:26,292 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6, 108 00:05:26,359 --> 00:05:27,760 you are cleared to start. 109 00:05:27,827 --> 00:05:33,132 ♪ 110 00:05:33,199 --> 00:05:36,202 CPT. GRUBBS: Okay. Pre-start checklist please. 111 00:05:40,873 --> 00:05:42,809 FO. BRAGG: Ladies and gentlemen, the flight deck once again. 112 00:05:42,875 --> 00:05:47,346 I'm happy to say we've been finally cleared to get moving. 113 00:05:47,413 --> 00:05:50,349 We should have you in the air in about 15 minutes from now. 114 00:05:55,421 --> 00:05:59,192 NARRATOR: The Canary Islands lie off the west coast of Africa. 115 00:05:59,258 --> 00:06:03,563 Tenerife is one of seven in the Spanish archipelago. 116 00:06:03,629 --> 00:06:04,697 The mountainous island 117 00:06:04,764 --> 00:06:07,400 is famous for constantly changing weather. 118 00:06:12,505 --> 00:06:15,541 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I can't see anything out there. 119 00:06:15,608 --> 00:06:17,176 JIM: A fog bank rolled in, 120 00:06:17,243 --> 00:06:21,314 and visibility went down to almost zero. 121 00:06:21,380 --> 00:06:23,015 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6, 122 00:06:23,082 --> 00:06:27,787 clear taxi into the runway following the 747 from KLM. 123 00:06:27,854 --> 00:06:32,825 FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6. 124 00:06:32,892 --> 00:06:38,231 JIM: To expedite the departures of both KLM and Pan Am, 125 00:06:38,297 --> 00:06:40,733 they taxied both on the runway at the same time 126 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:42,401 to put them in a position where they would be ready 127 00:06:42,468 --> 00:06:43,970 for a departure. 128 00:06:50,676 --> 00:06:55,848 ROBERT: He said follow KLM down the runway, backtrack, 129 00:06:55,915 --> 00:07:00,586 make an exit to get around back of KLM. 130 00:07:00,653 --> 00:07:05,191 So that's what we were doing. 131 00:07:05,258 --> 00:07:07,660 NARRATOR: Once they get in the air, the flight to Las Palmas 132 00:07:07,727 --> 00:07:11,130 should only take about 25 minutes. 133 00:07:11,197 --> 00:07:14,233 ♪ 134 00:07:14,300 --> 00:07:16,435 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5, 135 00:07:16,502 --> 00:07:19,172 how many taxiways did you pass? 136 00:07:19,238 --> 00:07:21,941 FO. MEURS: I think we just passed Charlie 4 now. 137 00:07:22,008 --> 00:07:23,409 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 138 00:07:23,476 --> 00:07:28,581 NARRATOR: The KLM 747 will be the next plane to take off. 139 00:07:28,648 --> 00:07:31,284 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the end of the runway make a 180 140 00:07:31,350 --> 00:07:37,790 and report ready for ATC clearance. 141 00:07:37,857 --> 00:07:43,162 (In Spanish) Ya despues de estos dos ya terminamos. 142 00:07:43,229 --> 00:07:46,566 NARRATOR: First Officer Bragg is unfamiliar with the airport. 143 00:07:46,632 --> 00:07:51,070 He checks a runway diagram to help find their turning. 144 00:07:51,137 --> 00:07:54,073 FO. BRAGG: Okay, that's this one right here. 145 00:07:54,140 --> 00:07:57,877 CPT. GRUBBS: It goes ahead. It's going to put us on the taxiway. 146 00:07:57,944 --> 00:07:59,078 NARRATOR: As they taxi, 147 00:07:59,145 --> 00:08:01,080 they listen to the tower controller tell 148 00:08:01,147 --> 00:08:05,718 the KLM crew ahead of them what to do after departure. 149 00:08:05,785 --> 00:08:07,653 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You are cleared to the Papa Beacon. 150 00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:10,656 Climb to and maintain flight level niner-zero. 151 00:08:10,723 --> 00:08:13,559 Right turn after takeoff. 152 00:08:13,626 --> 00:08:16,262 FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the Papa Beacon. Flight level 9-0. 153 00:08:16,329 --> 00:08:19,265 Right turn at...we are now at takeoff. 154 00:08:19,332 --> 00:08:21,968 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. Stand by for takeoff. 155 00:08:22,034 --> 00:08:23,903 I will call you. 156 00:08:23,970 --> 00:08:25,605 FO. BRAGG: And we're still taxiing down the runway, 157 00:08:25,671 --> 00:08:28,007 Clipper 1-7-3-6. 158 00:08:28,074 --> 00:08:30,509 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6, 159 00:08:30,576 --> 00:08:33,212 report runway clear. 160 00:08:33,279 --> 00:08:35,882 FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll report when we're clear. 161 00:08:35,948 --> 00:08:37,216 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Thank you. 162 00:08:37,283 --> 00:08:39,051 NARRATOR: The Pan Am crew will be turning off the runway 163 00:08:39,118 --> 00:08:44,357 in just a few more yards. 164 00:08:44,423 --> 00:08:47,159 But now something's wrong. 165 00:08:47,226 --> 00:08:50,630 First Officer Bragg can see a plane through the fog. 166 00:08:50,696 --> 00:08:53,766 FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving. 167 00:08:53,833 --> 00:08:55,301 ROBERT: And I looked up and there he was 168 00:08:55,368 --> 00:08:57,103 coming down the runway. 169 00:08:57,169 --> 00:08:59,939 It was very obvious that he was moving 170 00:09:00,006 --> 00:09:03,342 because his landing lights were shaking. 171 00:09:03,409 --> 00:09:07,413 CPT. GRUBBS: Look at him. That idiot's coming! 172 00:09:07,480 --> 00:09:09,081 ROBERT: He saw KLM too. 173 00:09:09,148 --> 00:09:11,183 FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off! 174 00:09:11,250 --> 00:09:15,588 ♪ 175 00:09:15,655 --> 00:09:17,323 NARRATOR: Captain Grubbs tries to steer clear 176 00:09:17,390 --> 00:09:23,763 of the oncoming KLM. 177 00:09:23,829 --> 00:09:27,333 But it's bearing down on them at nearly 200 miles an hour. 178 00:09:34,840 --> 00:09:36,575 ROBERT: He had lifted off the runway. 179 00:09:36,642 --> 00:09:40,012 I could see his rotating beacon underneath. 180 00:09:40,079 --> 00:09:41,981 FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off. Get off. 181 00:09:42,048 --> 00:09:43,316 Get off. Get off. Get off! 182 00:09:43,382 --> 00:09:47,253 ROBERT: And then I ducked and said a real quick prayer. 183 00:09:51,857 --> 00:09:53,859 "God, I hope he misses us." 184 00:09:56,429 --> 00:09:59,432 PASSENGERS: 185 00:10:10,409 --> 00:10:13,479 ♪ 186 00:10:13,546 --> 00:10:16,916 NARRATOR: The unimaginable collision between two jumbo jets 187 00:10:16,983 --> 00:10:20,486 has turned a runway in Tenerife into a disaster zone. 188 00:10:29,762 --> 00:10:31,297 ROBERT: I opened my eyes. 189 00:10:31,364 --> 00:10:37,937 The first thing I noticed, all the windows were gone, 190 00:10:38,004 --> 00:10:42,508 and it looked like somebody had taken a big knife 191 00:10:42,575 --> 00:10:46,278 and just cut the whole top of the airplane off. 192 00:10:46,345 --> 00:10:51,384 FO. BRAGG: Get out! Get out! 193 00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:56,789 ROBERT: That's when I decided it was time to leave. 194 00:10:56,856 --> 00:11:01,227 NARRATOR: It's a 45-foot drop onto solid concrete. 195 00:11:01,293 --> 00:11:03,062 ROBERT: And I just jumped right over the side. 196 00:11:03,129 --> 00:11:05,131 I didn't even think about it. 197 00:11:10,536 --> 00:11:16,075 When I hit I rolled on the ground and looked around 198 00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:17,643 and discovered I wasn't hurt. 199 00:11:22,715 --> 00:11:24,183 WOMAN: 200 00:11:24,250 --> 00:11:26,118 NARRATOR: Some passengers in the shattered cabin of the Pan Am jet 201 00:11:26,185 --> 00:11:27,953 have also survived. 202 00:11:28,020 --> 00:11:30,356 FEMALE PASSENGER: Get out! 203 00:11:30,423 --> 00:11:36,462 NARRATOR: They're desperate to get off the plane. 204 00:11:36,529 --> 00:11:39,331 ROBERT: The airplane was totally burning. 205 00:11:39,398 --> 00:11:44,270 There were flames probably 200 feet high. 206 00:11:44,336 --> 00:11:45,805 NARRATOR: An opening in the fuselage 207 00:11:45,871 --> 00:11:48,741 offers the possibility of escape, 208 00:11:48,808 --> 00:11:51,410 but there are no emergency slides. 209 00:11:51,477 --> 00:11:56,082 The long drop to the runway could be fatal. 210 00:11:56,148 --> 00:12:01,253 With the plane engulfed in flames, it's the only way out. 211 00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:02,621 PASSENGER: We're going to have to jump. 212 00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:06,459 ROBERT: I thought the airplane was going to blow up. 213 00:12:06,525 --> 00:12:10,029 And I yelled out at them to start jumping. And they did. 214 00:12:17,837 --> 00:12:22,608 NARRATOR: Only 61 people from the Pan Am flight survive. 215 00:12:22,675 --> 00:12:28,914 The cockpit crew is alive, but 335 others are dead. 216 00:12:28,981 --> 00:12:33,252 On the KLM flight, there are no survivors. 217 00:12:33,319 --> 00:12:35,287 Two hundred and forty-eight passengers and crew 218 00:12:35,354 --> 00:12:38,023 have been killed. 219 00:12:38,090 --> 00:12:42,795 All told, the disaster claims 583 lives. 220 00:12:42,862 --> 00:12:45,798 It's the deadliest aviation accident of all time. 221 00:12:45,865 --> 00:12:51,570 ♪ 222 00:12:51,637 --> 00:12:53,706 JOHN: Five hundred and eighty-three people, 223 00:12:53,772 --> 00:12:55,808 with only a few getting out on Pan Am. 224 00:12:55,875 --> 00:12:58,878 This was something that we really had not contemplated 225 00:12:58,944 --> 00:13:01,547 when we started building bigger airplanes. 226 00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,149 Nobody ever thought, what if we lost two of them 227 00:13:03,215 --> 00:13:05,551 in a collision on the ground? 228 00:13:05,618 --> 00:13:09,488 This was a nightmare beyond all expectation. 229 00:13:09,555 --> 00:13:12,358 ♪ 230 00:13:12,424 --> 00:13:14,960 NARRATOR: The next morning, investigators from Spain, 231 00:13:15,027 --> 00:13:19,532 the Netherlands and the United States are on the scene. 232 00:13:19,598 --> 00:13:21,033 DENNIS: We didn't have a whole lot of experience 233 00:13:21,100 --> 00:13:24,136 with 747s crashing at that point. 234 00:13:24,203 --> 00:13:26,472 So from an accident investigation standpoint 235 00:13:26,539 --> 00:13:30,476 it was going to be as big a deal as you can get. 236 00:13:30,543 --> 00:13:32,311 INVESTIGATOR: Pan Am clearing the runway. 237 00:13:32,378 --> 00:13:36,615 KLM on its takeoff roll. Someone messed up. 238 00:13:36,682 --> 00:13:38,050 NARRATOR: They face a huge task, 239 00:13:38,117 --> 00:13:40,019 trying to untangle the chain of events 240 00:13:40,085 --> 00:13:42,588 that led to this catastrophic runway collision. 241 00:13:48,194 --> 00:13:51,697 The search for the black boxes begins immediately. 242 00:13:51,764 --> 00:13:53,666 The recorders could hold important details 243 00:13:53,732 --> 00:13:56,535 about what was happening in both cockpits. 244 00:13:56,602 --> 00:14:00,706 DENNIS: The voice recorders in this case were vital. 245 00:14:00,773 --> 00:14:04,977 You had two airworthy aircraft coming together on the runway. 246 00:14:05,044 --> 00:14:10,549 So the events leading up to that, you know, were key. 247 00:14:10,616 --> 00:14:12,117 INVESTIGATOR: It was busy. 248 00:14:12,184 --> 00:14:14,553 Controllers had to get almost 50 planes off the ground 249 00:14:14,620 --> 00:14:16,055 in just a few hours. 250 00:14:16,121 --> 00:14:18,457 NARRATOR: Investigators know that Los Rodeos Airport 251 00:14:18,524 --> 00:14:22,795 has no ground radar to help controllers track planes. 252 00:14:22,861 --> 00:14:26,198 JIM: At a busy location, it's unusual for a controller 253 00:14:26,265 --> 00:14:28,901 to have to work without ground radar. 254 00:14:28,968 --> 00:14:31,870 It increases the stress a little bit in the tower. 255 00:14:31,937 --> 00:14:33,672 NARRATOR: There's no question that the small airport 256 00:14:33,739 --> 00:14:37,209 was dealing with more traffic than usual. 257 00:14:37,276 --> 00:14:40,646 Was it too much for controllers to handle? 258 00:14:40,713 --> 00:14:44,316 Did they make a fatal mistake? 259 00:14:44,383 --> 00:14:47,720 A visit to the tower is the obvious next step. 260 00:14:47,786 --> 00:14:49,955 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: We've never been that busy. 261 00:14:50,022 --> 00:14:54,893 And the planes were parked here and here. 262 00:14:54,960 --> 00:14:55,928 They had to use the runway 263 00:14:55,995 --> 00:14:58,831 to taxi into position one at a time. 264 00:14:58,897 --> 00:15:01,934 JIM: They were actually having to park aircraft on the taxiway, 265 00:15:02,001 --> 00:15:07,172 the only taxiway that they had, and therefore kind of deviate 266 00:15:07,239 --> 00:15:09,174 from their standard operating procedures. 267 00:15:09,241 --> 00:15:13,646 And anytime you do that, unfortunately, risk, 268 00:15:13,712 --> 00:15:15,247 things get a little bit riskier. 269 00:15:15,314 --> 00:15:17,316 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: So I instructed KLM to taxi 270 00:15:17,383 --> 00:15:20,953 to the foot of the runway, make a 180, 271 00:15:21,020 --> 00:15:25,124 and wait for takeoff clearance. 272 00:15:25,190 --> 00:15:27,226 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the end of the runway, make a 180 273 00:15:27,293 --> 00:15:33,165 and report ready for ATC clearance. 274 00:15:33,232 --> 00:15:34,533 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: And a couple of minutes later, 275 00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:38,704 he reported that he was in position here. 276 00:15:38,771 --> 00:15:42,041 FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for takeoff, waiting for ATC clearance. 277 00:15:42,107 --> 00:15:44,710 JOHN: When KLM had turned around at the end of the runway 278 00:15:44,777 --> 00:15:46,345 and was in position for takeoff, 279 00:15:46,412 --> 00:15:49,148 we call that "line up and wait." 280 00:15:49,214 --> 00:15:51,884 So they are waiting for takeoff clearance, 281 00:15:51,950 --> 00:15:55,521 which will equal a clear runway. 282 00:15:55,587 --> 00:15:59,792 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: And then I had Pan Am move up the runway right behind the KLM. 283 00:15:59,858 --> 00:16:04,930 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6 report runway clear. 284 00:16:04,997 --> 00:16:07,700 FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll report when we're clear. 285 00:16:07,766 --> 00:16:08,901 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: It's true we were busier 286 00:16:08,967 --> 00:16:12,805 than we've ever been before, but we were managing. 287 00:16:12,871 --> 00:16:16,975 We were getting the job done. 288 00:16:17,042 --> 00:16:19,044 NARRATOR: It's becoming clear to investigators 289 00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:21,280 that the cause of the Tenerife tragedy goes beyond 290 00:16:21,347 --> 00:16:23,816 a busy airport. 291 00:16:23,882 --> 00:16:28,053 Controllers had a lot to do, but they were not overwhelmed. 292 00:16:28,120 --> 00:16:30,289 There must have been other factors at play. 293 00:16:34,560 --> 00:16:35,361 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Que paso? 294 00:16:35,427 --> 00:16:36,762 JOHN: In accident investigation, 295 00:16:36,829 --> 00:16:39,598 we learned a long time ago that there is never ever 296 00:16:39,665 --> 00:16:40,933 just one cause, 297 00:16:40,999 --> 00:16:44,236 and there are a multiplicity of moving parts on this. 298 00:16:44,303 --> 00:16:47,373 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: I couldn't actually see what happened. 299 00:16:47,439 --> 00:16:51,543 A thick fog had rolled in. 300 00:16:51,610 --> 00:16:54,213 Visibility was almost zero by then. 301 00:16:54,279 --> 00:16:56,615 DENNIS: This particular airport had a unique characteristic 302 00:16:56,682 --> 00:17:01,220 in that it was high enough so that you would get 303 00:17:01,286 --> 00:17:05,557 actually clouds rolling in across the runway. 304 00:17:05,624 --> 00:17:07,559 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5, 305 00:17:07,626 --> 00:17:10,062 how many taxiways did you pass? 306 00:17:10,129 --> 00:17:11,864 JIM: The controllers looking out the window 307 00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:15,467 could not see any aircraft that were taxiing, 308 00:17:15,534 --> 00:17:18,003 either on the taxiways or on the runways, 309 00:17:18,070 --> 00:17:22,908 and instead had to rely solely on transmissions from the pilots 310 00:17:22,975 --> 00:17:26,145 to report whether or not they were clear of the runway. 311 00:17:26,211 --> 00:17:27,513 NARRATOR: Investigators know that 312 00:17:27,579 --> 00:17:31,083 if the controller couldn't see the airplanes through the fog, 313 00:17:31,150 --> 00:17:36,855 his instructions to the pilots would have to be crystal clear. 314 00:17:36,922 --> 00:17:40,125 They gather recordings from air traffic control. 315 00:17:40,192 --> 00:17:42,428 Perhaps the tapes can paint a better picture 316 00:17:42,494 --> 00:17:44,563 of what really happened. 317 00:17:44,630 --> 00:17:47,299 DENNIS: That was the key to the whole investigation. 318 00:17:47,366 --> 00:17:49,968 Where were the aircraft on the runways, 319 00:17:50,035 --> 00:17:53,472 and what was being said along their path down the runway? 320 00:17:55,941 --> 00:17:58,444 FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off! Get off! 321 00:18:03,882 --> 00:18:06,018 NARRATOR: History's deadliest air crash is leading newscasts 322 00:18:06,084 --> 00:18:08,487 around the world. 323 00:18:08,554 --> 00:18:11,557 The pressure for answers is not about to let up. 324 00:18:11,623 --> 00:18:14,159 DENNIS: We knew we had a tremendous task on our hands 325 00:18:14,226 --> 00:18:15,794 to solve this accident. 326 00:18:15,861 --> 00:18:27,806 ♪ 327 00:18:27,873 --> 00:18:30,342 INVESTIGATOR: All right, let's start with KLM clearing 328 00:18:30,409 --> 00:18:33,412 the end of the runway. 5-0-2. 329 00:18:33,479 --> 00:18:36,415 NARRATOR: Investigators want to know if the Tenerife controller 330 00:18:36,482 --> 00:18:39,284 said anything to the KLM or Pan Am pilots 331 00:18:39,351 --> 00:18:41,520 that could have led to the collision. 332 00:18:41,587 --> 00:18:46,024 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5, how many taxiways did you pass? 333 00:18:46,091 --> 00:18:49,795 NARRATOR: They listen to the recordings from inside the tower. 334 00:18:49,862 --> 00:18:52,197 FO. MEURS: I think we just passed Charlie 4 now. 335 00:18:52,264 --> 00:18:56,602 INVESTIGATOR: Okay, so they just passed Charlie 4 right here. 336 00:18:56,668 --> 00:18:59,805 ♪ 337 00:18:59,872 --> 00:19:03,909 NARRATOR: KLM Captain Jacob Van Zanten and his first officer, Klaas Meurs, 338 00:19:03,976 --> 00:19:08,347 taxi up the runway in thick fog. 339 00:19:08,413 --> 00:19:11,750 JOHN: By the time that the main island airport at Las Palmas 340 00:19:11,817 --> 00:19:14,052 reopened and everybody was getting ready to go, 341 00:19:14,119 --> 00:19:16,822 it was down to about 700 to 900 yards' visibility, 342 00:19:16,889 --> 00:19:19,725 and that's just right at minimums. 343 00:19:19,791 --> 00:19:21,093 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: At the end of the runway, 344 00:19:21,159 --> 00:19:26,331 make a 180 and report ready for ATC clearance. 345 00:19:26,398 --> 00:19:27,599 INVESTIGATOR: Okay. 346 00:19:27,666 --> 00:19:30,402 KLM was told to proceed to the end of the runway, 347 00:19:30,469 --> 00:19:33,739 turn around and wait. 348 00:19:33,805 --> 00:19:35,541 What was the Pan Am flight told to do? 349 00:19:35,607 --> 00:19:37,175 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Clipper 1-7-3-6, 350 00:19:37,242 --> 00:19:42,581 leave the runway 3-1 to your left. 351 00:19:42,648 --> 00:19:45,284 INVESTIGATOR: Whoa. What did they just ask him to do? 352 00:19:45,350 --> 00:19:47,052 FO. BRAGG: I'm sorry. Say again please. 353 00:19:47,119 --> 00:19:48,887 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Leave the runway, 354 00:19:48,954 --> 00:19:51,156 the third one to your left. 355 00:19:51,223 --> 00:19:53,258 FO. BRAGG: Okay. Taxi down the runway 356 00:19:53,325 --> 00:19:55,994 and leave the runway at the first intersection on the left. 357 00:19:56,061 --> 00:19:57,563 Is that correct? 358 00:19:57,629 --> 00:20:01,633 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Negative. The third one. The third one. 359 00:20:01,700 --> 00:20:03,135 JOHN: Whenever we look at the question of 360 00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,470 whether or not the air traffic controllers in the tower, 361 00:20:05,537 --> 00:20:07,773 the two gentlemen in the tower were giving clear instructions, 362 00:20:07,839 --> 00:20:10,542 you've gotta remember we have kind of a linguistic problem 363 00:20:10,609 --> 00:20:12,878 here because these were two Spaniards who speak Spanish 364 00:20:12,945 --> 00:20:14,313 as their native language attempting 365 00:20:14,379 --> 00:20:17,282 to speak in aviation English to an American crew 366 00:20:17,349 --> 00:20:19,051 and to a KLM Dutch crew. 367 00:20:19,117 --> 00:20:20,419 INVESTIGATOR: He's on an active runway, 368 00:20:20,485 --> 00:20:22,955 and he doesn't know if he's being told to get off here, 369 00:20:23,021 --> 00:20:26,858 here, or maybe here. 370 00:20:26,925 --> 00:20:28,393 JIM: There seemed to be some confusion 371 00:20:28,460 --> 00:20:33,031 as to which exit they were supposed to take, 372 00:20:33,098 --> 00:20:36,068 and I have a feeling part of that had to do 373 00:20:36,134 --> 00:20:39,271 with the accents involved. 374 00:20:39,338 --> 00:20:41,473 FO. BRAGG: Maybe I'll ask him again. 375 00:20:41,540 --> 00:20:45,077 Would you confirm that you want Clipper 1-7-3-6 to turn left 376 00:20:45,143 --> 00:20:47,245 at the third intersection? 377 00:20:47,312 --> 00:20:48,847 NARRATOR: It takes an extra effort, 378 00:20:48,914 --> 00:20:52,017 but the controller eventually makes himself understood. 379 00:20:52,084 --> 00:20:55,253 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The third one, sir. One, two, three. 380 00:20:55,320 --> 00:20:57,689 The third one, third! 381 00:20:57,756 --> 00:20:59,057 NARRATOR: The controller's accent 382 00:20:59,124 --> 00:21:02,027 may have been another complicating factor for pilots 383 00:21:02,094 --> 00:21:06,298 in an unfamiliar airport on a very busy day. 384 00:21:06,365 --> 00:21:10,268 But for investigators, it's not enough to explain the crash. 385 00:21:10,335 --> 00:21:12,104 They need to keep digging. 386 00:21:12,170 --> 00:21:14,973 INVESTIGATOR: One, two, three. 387 00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:16,508 This is where they were told to get off, 388 00:21:16,575 --> 00:21:22,914 and they clearly understood. But they moved past C-3. 389 00:21:22,981 --> 00:21:27,085 Why didn't they get off where they were told? 390 00:21:27,152 --> 00:21:30,355 NARRATOR: The Pan Am plane taxied past the third exit. 391 00:21:30,422 --> 00:21:32,858 Why did it stay on the runway? 392 00:21:32,924 --> 00:21:35,794 For more insight, investigators examine the geometry 393 00:21:35,861 --> 00:21:39,364 of the turn the Pan Am pilots were asked to make. 394 00:21:39,431 --> 00:21:42,401 That leads to a surprising discovery. 395 00:21:42,467 --> 00:21:45,871 INVESTIGATOR: So you have a 148-degree turn here, 396 00:21:45,937 --> 00:21:52,044 followed by another one here. 397 00:21:52,110 --> 00:21:54,246 NARRATOR: Leaving the runway at the third intersection 398 00:21:54,312 --> 00:21:56,581 would have required two very sharp turns, 399 00:21:56,648 --> 00:22:00,018 both tighter than 90 degrees. 400 00:22:00,085 --> 00:22:01,586 INVESTIGATOR: That's practically impossible. 401 00:22:01,653 --> 00:22:05,123 JOHN: A 747 is a beast. This is a big, big airplane. 402 00:22:05,190 --> 00:22:06,692 You just can't turn it on a dime. 403 00:22:06,758 --> 00:22:09,227 So a crew is going to always be reluctant, 404 00:22:09,294 --> 00:22:11,563 an experienced crew especially like Pan Am's, 405 00:22:11,630 --> 00:22:14,399 to take a turn if it doesn't look logical to them. 406 00:22:14,466 --> 00:22:16,435 And this one did not look logical to them. 407 00:22:16,501 --> 00:22:19,738 INVESTIGATOR: All right. So the collision happened here. 408 00:22:19,805 --> 00:22:24,509 So he obviously passed C-3 and was headed for C-4. 409 00:22:24,576 --> 00:22:26,478 NARRATOR: Instead of leaving the runway at an exit 410 00:22:26,545 --> 00:22:29,381 that required two very difficult turns, 411 00:22:29,448 --> 00:22:32,350 the Pan Am crew headed for the fourth exit. 412 00:22:32,417 --> 00:22:33,919 It was further along the runway 413 00:22:33,985 --> 00:22:35,987 but provided a much easier turn. 414 00:22:37,656 --> 00:22:43,261 ROBERT: If you see C-4, it's the only taxiway 415 00:22:43,328 --> 00:22:47,132 going off the runway at a 45-degree angle. 416 00:22:47,199 --> 00:22:52,804 The other, C-3, would have not done what we needed to do. 417 00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:55,607 JIM: I can see how that would definitely have induced 418 00:22:55,674 --> 00:22:58,110 the Pan Am crew to think that Charlie-4 419 00:22:58,176 --> 00:23:02,114 was the exit that they were supposed to turn at. 420 00:23:02,180 --> 00:23:04,182 NARRATOR: In the fog, the KLM crew 421 00:23:04,249 --> 00:23:07,753 would not have been able to see that Pan Am 1736 422 00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:10,989 was taxiing past the C3 exit as they waited 423 00:23:11,056 --> 00:23:13,558 for takeoff instructions from the controller. 424 00:23:17,929 --> 00:23:21,266 FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for takeoff. Awaiting ATC clearance. 425 00:23:21,333 --> 00:23:23,668 JIM: The first clearance they were asking for was 426 00:23:23,735 --> 00:23:27,405 an air traffic control route clearance, 427 00:23:27,472 --> 00:23:29,741 which tells pilots how to get 428 00:23:29,808 --> 00:23:32,878 from the airport that they were at, Tenerife, 429 00:23:32,944 --> 00:23:35,881 to their destination airport. 430 00:23:35,947 --> 00:23:38,750 NARRATOR: The air traffic recording suggests the KLM crew 431 00:23:38,817 --> 00:23:42,220 knew the correct procedures and was following them. 432 00:23:42,287 --> 00:23:44,189 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You are cleared to the Papa Beacon. 433 00:23:44,256 --> 00:23:47,526 Climb to and maintain flight level niner-zero. 434 00:23:47,592 --> 00:23:50,128 Right turn after takeoff. 435 00:23:50,195 --> 00:23:51,997 INVESTIGATOR: It sounds fine. 436 00:23:52,063 --> 00:23:53,698 FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to Papa Beacon. 437 00:23:53,765 --> 00:23:58,303 Flight level nine-zero. Right turn out. We are now at takeoff. 438 00:23:58,370 --> 00:24:01,439 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. Standby for takeoff. 439 00:24:01,506 --> 00:24:02,808 I will call you. 440 00:24:02,874 --> 00:24:04,709 JIM: It's kind of a verification between the controller and 441 00:24:04,776 --> 00:24:07,479 the pilot that they are doing what they should be doing. 442 00:24:07,546 --> 00:24:10,682 INVESTIGATOR: He's telling the tower he's in takeoff position, 443 00:24:10,749 --> 00:24:15,320 but he's been told to wait for takeoff clearance. 444 00:24:15,387 --> 00:24:19,357 So why does he start his takeoff roll? 445 00:24:19,424 --> 00:24:21,326 NARRATOR: Investigators are mystified. 446 00:24:21,393 --> 00:24:23,295 Nothing on the tower recording can explain 447 00:24:23,361 --> 00:24:26,031 why the KLM crew started down the runway 448 00:24:26,097 --> 00:24:29,367 before they were cleared to do so. 449 00:24:29,434 --> 00:24:31,036 DENNIS: The big question then was, you know, 450 00:24:31,102 --> 00:24:33,772 once you get over the horrific nature of it 451 00:24:33,839 --> 00:24:35,707 and say, how could this happen? 452 00:24:46,952 --> 00:24:48,019 NARRATOR: At the crash site, 453 00:24:48,086 --> 00:24:52,958 there's new hope of finding some answers. 454 00:24:53,024 --> 00:24:56,194 Investigators have recovered the black boxes. 455 00:24:56,261 --> 00:24:59,998 DENNIS: The voice recorders were key to the investigation. 456 00:25:00,065 --> 00:25:01,533 That gave us an insight 457 00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:05,437 into what was going on in the respective cockpits. 458 00:25:05,503 --> 00:25:07,572 NARRATOR: They can only hope the new evidence will be enough 459 00:25:07,639 --> 00:25:10,876 to finally solve the mystery of the worst air disaster 460 00:25:10,942 --> 00:25:13,478 the world has ever seen. 461 00:25:13,545 --> 00:25:16,648 INVESTIGATOR: We've located the CVR. 462 00:25:16,715 --> 00:25:20,085 ♪ 463 00:25:20,151 --> 00:25:22,554 NARRATOR: The investigation into the Tenerife disaster 464 00:25:22,621 --> 00:25:24,289 shifts to the Washington headquarters 465 00:25:24,356 --> 00:25:28,994 of the National Transportation Safety Board. 466 00:25:29,060 --> 00:25:31,997 Investigator Dennis Grossi has painstakingly matched up 467 00:25:32,063 --> 00:25:34,633 the cockpit voice recordings with the known movements 468 00:25:34,699 --> 00:25:36,968 of both planes. 469 00:25:37,035 --> 00:25:39,905 DENNIS: Okay. Let's listen to the Pan Am. 470 00:25:39,971 --> 00:25:42,774 DENNIS: In this case, fractions of a second mattered. 471 00:25:42,841 --> 00:25:48,146 So it was important that we had those recorders synced up 472 00:25:48,213 --> 00:25:51,549 so you could hear it and you could have precise measurements 473 00:25:51,616 --> 00:25:55,353 of when things were said. 474 00:25:55,420 --> 00:25:58,823 FO. BRAGG: Yeah. That's that 45 there. 475 00:25:58,890 --> 00:26:03,895 That's this one right here. The next one is almost a 45. 476 00:26:03,962 --> 00:26:06,564 Goes ahead. It's going to put us on the taxiway. 477 00:26:06,631 --> 00:26:09,167 NARRATOR: The Pan Am cockpit tape confirms that the crew 478 00:26:09,234 --> 00:26:13,471 was having a hard time figuring out where to leave the runway. 479 00:26:13,538 --> 00:26:19,778 DENNIS: They're passing C-3 and no one sees them. 480 00:26:19,844 --> 00:26:22,113 NARRATOR: Did the KLM crew think the Pan Am plane 481 00:26:22,180 --> 00:26:24,883 was already off the runway? 482 00:26:24,950 --> 00:26:26,518 DENNIS: Keep it going. 483 00:26:26,584 --> 00:26:31,056 NARRATOR: What the tape reveals next suggests the answer is no. 484 00:26:31,122 --> 00:26:33,124 FO. MEURS: We are now at takeoff. 485 00:26:33,191 --> 00:26:34,826 FO. BRAGG: And we're still taxiing down the runway, 486 00:26:34,893 --> 00:26:37,729 Clipper 1-7-3-6. 487 00:26:37,796 --> 00:26:41,032 NARRATOR: Both crews are using the same radio frequency. 488 00:26:41,099 --> 00:26:42,133 KLM should have heard 489 00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:46,104 First Officer Bragg report his location. 490 00:26:46,171 --> 00:26:50,709 ROBERT: That's why I said, "We're still on the runway, 491 00:26:50,775 --> 00:26:54,045 and we will report clear of the runway." 492 00:26:54,112 --> 00:26:56,681 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6, 493 00:26:56,748 --> 00:26:58,950 report runway clear. 494 00:26:59,017 --> 00:27:02,454 FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll report when we're clear. 495 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,490 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Thank you. 496 00:27:05,557 --> 00:27:07,092 DENNIS: Crystal clear for all to hear. 497 00:27:07,158 --> 00:27:16,768 He's still on the runway. Yet KLM continues to take off. 498 00:27:16,835 --> 00:27:19,337 NARRATOR: Captain Van Zanten is a highly experienced pilot 499 00:27:19,404 --> 00:27:23,975 with more than 11,000 hours in the air. 500 00:27:24,042 --> 00:27:27,545 What led him to believe the runway ahead was clear 501 00:27:27,612 --> 00:27:32,817 and that he had permission to take off? 502 00:27:32,884 --> 00:27:34,552 DENNIS: It just seems so alien 503 00:27:34,619 --> 00:27:37,655 for the crew to make that mistake. 504 00:27:37,722 --> 00:27:39,991 I mean, these are the top guys. 505 00:27:40,058 --> 00:27:43,561 These are the best in the business. 506 00:27:43,628 --> 00:27:48,266 DENNIS: He lands just after 13:30. 507 00:27:48,333 --> 00:27:50,568 NARRATOR: Investigators turn to the KLM voice recording 508 00:27:50,635 --> 00:27:52,670 for answers. 509 00:27:52,737 --> 00:27:55,240 Perhaps something said in that cockpit 510 00:27:55,306 --> 00:27:57,308 can explain the incomprehensible decision 511 00:27:57,375 --> 00:27:59,844 to start down the runway. 512 00:27:59,911 --> 00:28:02,013 FE. SCHREUDER: We landed here at 1:38. 513 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:03,415 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes, I know that, 514 00:28:03,481 --> 00:28:06,518 but we have to start from 7:00. That's when we checked in. 515 00:28:06,584 --> 00:28:08,686 DENNIS: You're trying to recreate the cockpit environment, 516 00:28:08,753 --> 00:28:13,425 why certain decisions were made, why things were said. 517 00:28:13,491 --> 00:28:15,093 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: The time limit is 10 hours of flying 518 00:28:15,160 --> 00:28:18,863 with an amplitude of 13 hours. That's with one stopover. 519 00:28:18,930 --> 00:28:20,498 NARRATOR: The recording reveals that the captain 520 00:28:20,565 --> 00:28:23,268 is worried about work hours. 521 00:28:23,334 --> 00:28:25,603 If the crew exceeds their duty time, 522 00:28:25,670 --> 00:28:29,774 they'll be forced to cancel the flight. 523 00:28:29,841 --> 00:28:32,811 JOHN: And that means probably thirty, $40,000 of hotel rooms 524 00:28:32,877 --> 00:28:34,179 for the outbound passengers 525 00:28:34,245 --> 00:28:36,381 who they're not going to be able to carry back that night. 526 00:28:36,448 --> 00:28:38,116 It is a bit of a logistical nightmare, 527 00:28:38,183 --> 00:28:41,386 especially in an outstation in a foreign place. 528 00:28:41,453 --> 00:28:43,388 NARRATOR: Dutch regulators have also recently 529 00:28:43,455 --> 00:28:48,526 tightened the rules governing flight crew duty time. 530 00:28:48,593 --> 00:28:50,995 A Dutch pilot can now have his license revoked 531 00:28:51,062 --> 00:28:56,367 if he exceeds the legal number of hours. 532 00:28:56,434 --> 00:28:59,437 The crew left Amsterdam at nine in the morning. 533 00:28:59,504 --> 00:29:02,707 They still have to get their passengers to Las Palmas, 534 00:29:02,774 --> 00:29:04,943 pick up another load of passengers, 535 00:29:05,009 --> 00:29:09,981 and get back to Amsterdam before the clock runs out. 536 00:29:10,048 --> 00:29:12,517 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: If I mess this up, I could actually lose my license. 537 00:29:12,584 --> 00:29:14,719 FE. SCHREUDER: We certainly wouldn't want that. 538 00:29:14,786 --> 00:29:17,589 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Well, if we're waiting, we might as well refuel. 539 00:29:17,655 --> 00:29:20,158 Tenerife, KLM 4-8-0-5. 540 00:29:20,225 --> 00:29:23,294 Now requesting refueling at the apron. 541 00:29:23,361 --> 00:29:25,797 NARRATOR: Van Zanten's concern over duty time explains 542 00:29:25,864 --> 00:29:31,202 why he decided to refuel while in Tenerife. 543 00:29:31,269 --> 00:29:34,572 DENNIS: He was going to do everything in his power 544 00:29:34,639 --> 00:29:38,943 to make sure that he could complete the flight 545 00:29:39,010 --> 00:29:43,081 within his legal duty time limits. 546 00:29:43,148 --> 00:29:44,916 NARRATOR: But then, a short time later, 547 00:29:44,983 --> 00:29:47,685 the airport in Las Palmas reopens. 548 00:29:47,752 --> 00:29:49,921 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: To all aircraft, Las Palmas has reopened. 549 00:29:49,988 --> 00:29:54,592 You may ask for start up and clearances at your discretion. 550 00:29:54,659 --> 00:29:58,530 NARRATOR: And Van Zanten's plan backfires. 551 00:29:58,596 --> 00:30:01,099 Refueling takes much longer than expected, 552 00:30:01,166 --> 00:30:03,801 and now he can't move until it's done. 553 00:30:03,868 --> 00:30:05,837 JOHN: When Las Palmas reopened, here he is 554 00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:06,971 sucking on a fuel hose 555 00:30:07,038 --> 00:30:09,207 instead of starting the engines and moving. 556 00:30:09,274 --> 00:30:10,742 FO. BRAGG: This is Clipper 1-7-3-6 557 00:30:10,808 --> 00:30:12,810 requesting startup clearance. 558 00:30:12,877 --> 00:30:15,280 NARRATOR: Van Zanten's decision has a huge impact 559 00:30:15,346 --> 00:30:17,615 on the Pan Am flight as well. 560 00:30:17,682 --> 00:30:18,783 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: The KLM beside you 561 00:30:18,850 --> 00:30:20,084 has requested a refuel, 562 00:30:20,151 --> 00:30:23,821 and it doesn't look like you're going to get by him. 563 00:30:23,888 --> 00:30:25,723 JOHN: The Pan American 747 564 00:30:25,790 --> 00:30:27,959 didn't have enough wing tip clearance. 565 00:30:28,026 --> 00:30:31,429 FO. BRAGG: You gotta be kidding me. 566 00:30:31,496 --> 00:30:37,268 Roger Tenerife, Clipper 1-7-3-6. 567 00:30:37,335 --> 00:30:38,770 JOHN: The other captains were unhappy with him 568 00:30:38,836 --> 00:30:42,607 because he was the cork in the bottle. 569 00:30:42,674 --> 00:30:45,410 NARRATOR: The refueling delay means the KLM crew 570 00:30:45,476 --> 00:30:49,847 now has only two hours until they're grounded. 571 00:30:49,914 --> 00:30:52,550 DENNIS: A half hour to taxi. A half hour to get there. 572 00:30:52,617 --> 00:30:59,190 An hour to swap passengers and get back in the air. It's tight. 573 00:30:59,257 --> 00:31:05,129 And guess what? The weather's getting worse. 574 00:31:05,196 --> 00:31:06,931 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: KLM 4-8-0-5, 575 00:31:06,998 --> 00:31:09,968 you are clear to taxi to the runway. 576 00:31:10,034 --> 00:31:12,337 NARRATOR: The question facing investigators now is, 577 00:31:12,403 --> 00:31:15,773 did the rush to get off the ground in worsening weather 578 00:31:15,840 --> 00:31:23,481 cause the KLM crew to jump the gun? 579 00:31:23,548 --> 00:31:26,618 DENNIS: So he taxis to the end of the runway and does this 180. 580 00:31:26,684 --> 00:31:28,019 We know this from the tower tapes. 581 00:31:28,086 --> 00:31:31,990 Can we hear it from that point please? 582 00:31:32,056 --> 00:31:34,459 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Starting. Landing lights on. 583 00:31:34,525 --> 00:31:35,693 Checklist complete. 584 00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:37,629 NARRATOR: Investigators hear more evidence 585 00:31:37,695 --> 00:31:43,368 that the captain of KLM flight 4805 may have been in a rush. 586 00:31:43,434 --> 00:31:47,772 DENNIS: Is he throttling up? 587 00:31:47,839 --> 00:31:50,508 FO. MEURS: Wait a minute. We do not have ATC clearance. 588 00:31:50,575 --> 00:31:55,013 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: No, I know that. Go ahead and ask. 589 00:31:55,079 --> 00:31:59,450 DENNIS: It's obvious that time was an important factor 590 00:31:59,517 --> 00:32:03,021 in the KLM Captain's decision-making. 591 00:32:03,087 --> 00:32:04,956 He wasn't going to waste any time 592 00:32:05,023 --> 00:32:08,159 once he got to the end of the runway. 593 00:32:08,226 --> 00:32:11,629 FO. MEURS: KLM is ready for takeoff, waiting for ATC clearance. 594 00:32:11,696 --> 00:32:13,064 DENNIS: So he requests ATC clearance. 595 00:32:13,131 --> 00:32:16,167 We're about a minute from the collision. 596 00:32:16,234 --> 00:32:18,469 JOHN: When the first officer asked for the clearance, 597 00:32:18,536 --> 00:32:20,705 he was asking for the air traffic control clearance, 598 00:32:20,772 --> 00:32:21,939 completely separate from the clearance 599 00:32:22,006 --> 00:32:25,376 to actually roll this 500, 600,000-pound monster 600 00:32:25,443 --> 00:32:27,078 down the runway. 601 00:32:27,145 --> 00:32:29,013 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You are cleared to the Papa Beacon. 602 00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:32,250 Climb to and maintain flight level niner-zero. 603 00:32:32,317 --> 00:32:34,319 Right turn after takeoff. 604 00:32:34,385 --> 00:32:35,887 NARRATOR: What investigators hear next 605 00:32:35,953 --> 00:32:40,224 answers many of the questions plaguing this investigation. 606 00:32:40,291 --> 00:32:41,392 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes! 607 00:32:41,459 --> 00:32:42,894 FO. MEURS: Roger. Clear to the Papa Beacon. 608 00:32:42,960 --> 00:32:44,195 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Let's go! Check thrust. 609 00:32:44,262 --> 00:32:46,030 FO. MEURS: Flight level 9-0, right turn out. 610 00:32:46,097 --> 00:32:47,298 We are now at takeoff. 611 00:32:47,365 --> 00:32:48,599 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 612 00:32:48,666 --> 00:32:52,203 DENNIS: Whoa. Whoa, whoa. What just happened there? 613 00:32:52,270 --> 00:32:53,638 Play that again, please. 614 00:32:53,705 --> 00:32:55,440 NARRATOR: The controller is providing instructions 615 00:32:55,506 --> 00:32:58,076 for what to do after takeoff. 616 00:32:58,142 --> 00:32:59,977 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You are cleared to the Papa Beacon. 617 00:33:00,044 --> 00:33:03,281 Climb to and maintain flight level niner-zero. 618 00:33:03,348 --> 00:33:05,350 Right turn after takeoff. 619 00:33:05,416 --> 00:33:06,651 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Yes! 620 00:33:06,718 --> 00:33:07,885 NARRATOR: But the captain reacts 621 00:33:07,952 --> 00:33:11,723 as if he's actually been cleared for departure. 622 00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:14,225 JIM: They get a clearance from air traffic control 623 00:33:14,292 --> 00:33:16,294 that contains the word takeoff, 624 00:33:16,361 --> 00:33:18,996 and that confirms for them that everything is 625 00:33:19,063 --> 00:33:22,400 the way it should be, when in fact everything was not. 626 00:33:22,467 --> 00:33:24,168 FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the Papa Beacon. 627 00:33:24,235 --> 00:33:25,703 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Let's go. Check thrust. 628 00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:26,871 NARRATOR: Before his first officer 629 00:33:26,938 --> 00:33:29,374 has finished reading back the instructions, 630 00:33:29,440 --> 00:33:33,378 Captain Van Zanten is already on the roll. 631 00:33:33,444 --> 00:33:35,680 FO. MEURS: Flight level 9-0. Right turn out. 632 00:33:35,747 --> 00:33:36,681 We are now at takeoff. 633 00:33:36,748 --> 00:33:38,082 NARRATOR: Investigators now know 634 00:33:38,149 --> 00:33:43,287 what the Dutch first officer meant by "at takeoff." 635 00:33:43,354 --> 00:33:45,656 DENNIS: He's reporting that he's actually taking off, 636 00:33:45,723 --> 00:33:48,593 not that he's ready to take off. 637 00:33:48,659 --> 00:33:50,461 JIM: Unfortunately, in this case 638 00:33:50,528 --> 00:33:55,500 it meant they were taking off from the KLM perspective. 639 00:33:55,566 --> 00:33:59,003 And from the air traffic control perspective, 640 00:33:59,070 --> 00:34:02,240 they were hearing, "We are at takeoff position." 641 00:34:02,306 --> 00:34:03,641 NARRATOR: But for investigators 642 00:34:03,708 --> 00:34:05,843 there's something about the radio exchange 643 00:34:05,910 --> 00:34:08,379 that still doesn't make sense. 644 00:34:08,446 --> 00:34:10,381 DENNIS: According to the tower transcripts, 645 00:34:10,448 --> 00:34:15,987 the controller advised him to stay put. 646 00:34:16,053 --> 00:34:18,956 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. Stand by for takeoff. 647 00:34:19,023 --> 00:34:20,491 I will call you. 648 00:34:20,558 --> 00:34:23,661 NARRATOR: Why didn't the KLM crew follow that clear instruction 649 00:34:23,728 --> 00:34:25,496 to stand by? 650 00:34:25,563 --> 00:34:29,000 DENNIS: Give me Pan Am at 17:06. 651 00:34:29,067 --> 00:34:31,202 That's when Pan Am reports on the same frequency 652 00:34:31,269 --> 00:34:35,706 that they're still on the runway. 653 00:34:35,773 --> 00:34:37,108 FO. BRAGG: And we're still taxiing down the runway, 654 00:34:37,175 --> 00:34:39,110 Clipper 1-7-3-6. 655 00:34:39,177 --> 00:34:48,352 DENNIS: Hold it there. Why would he ignore them? 656 00:34:48,419 --> 00:34:49,487 NARRATOR: The cockpit recordings 657 00:34:49,554 --> 00:34:52,023 continue to baffle investigators, 658 00:34:52,089 --> 00:34:56,561 until they hear another critical moment on the KLM tape. 659 00:34:56,627 --> 00:34:58,329 FO. MEURS: We are now at takeoff. 660 00:34:58,396 --> 00:35:03,100 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 661 00:35:03,167 --> 00:35:05,870 DENNIS: That's what he heard? 662 00:35:05,937 --> 00:35:10,608 NARRATOR: It's a stunning discovery. 663 00:35:10,675 --> 00:35:11,876 FO. MEURS: Flight level 9-0. Right turn out. 664 00:35:11,943 --> 00:35:13,511 We're now at takeoff. 665 00:35:13,578 --> 00:35:17,748 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 666 00:35:17,815 --> 00:35:19,684 NARRATOR: The two warnings to stay put 667 00:35:19,750 --> 00:35:23,788 were never heard in the KLM cockpit. 668 00:35:23,855 --> 00:35:25,656 The tower and the Pan Am flight 669 00:35:25,723 --> 00:35:30,127 both made their critical calls at the exact same moment. 670 00:35:30,194 --> 00:35:31,896 FO. BRAGG (Overlap): And we're still taxiing down the runway. 671 00:35:31,963 --> 00:35:33,731 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER (overlap): Okay. Stand by for takeoff. I will call you. 672 00:35:33,798 --> 00:35:35,700 FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6. 673 00:35:35,766 --> 00:35:37,335 NARRATOR: The simultaneous transmissions 674 00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,972 produced a four second squeal in the KLM cockpit. 675 00:35:41,038 --> 00:35:42,840 FO. MEURS: We are now at takeoff. 676 00:35:42,907 --> 00:35:45,610 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 677 00:35:45,676 --> 00:35:46,878 FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1-7-3-6. 678 00:35:46,944 --> 00:35:50,781 NARRATOR: The crew heard only one word: okay. 679 00:35:50,848 --> 00:35:54,452 JIM: Unfortunately, this happened 680 00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:57,288 during that pause after the controller says okay. 681 00:35:57,355 --> 00:35:58,990 For KLM, they had no opportunity 682 00:35:59,056 --> 00:36:01,959 to hear the controller saying standby for takeoff, 683 00:36:02,026 --> 00:36:03,628 nor were they able to hear, 684 00:36:03,694 --> 00:36:05,496 because they were speaking at the same time, 685 00:36:05,563 --> 00:36:12,069 the Pan Am crew reporting that they were still on the runway. 686 00:36:12,136 --> 00:36:13,838 DENNIS: So what's next? 687 00:36:13,905 --> 00:36:15,273 NARRATOR: There's one final transmission 688 00:36:15,339 --> 00:36:17,441 recorded in the KLM cockpit. 689 00:36:17,508 --> 00:36:20,011 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Papa Alpha 1-7-3-6, 690 00:36:20,077 --> 00:36:23,014 report runway clear. 691 00:36:23,080 --> 00:36:24,682 NARRATOR: It should have alerted the crew 692 00:36:24,749 --> 00:36:26,717 that another plane was still on the runway. 693 00:36:26,784 --> 00:36:29,153 FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll report when we're clear. 694 00:36:29,220 --> 00:36:31,389 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Thank you. 695 00:36:31,455 --> 00:36:34,825 NARRATOR: Only the flight engineer seems to have understood it. 696 00:36:34,892 --> 00:36:36,427 FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not clear then? 697 00:36:36,494 --> 00:36:37,728 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: What did you say? 698 00:36:37,795 --> 00:36:39,864 FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not clear then, the Pan American? 699 00:36:39,931 --> 00:36:41,532 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes. 700 00:36:41,599 --> 00:36:45,403 NARRATOR: The pilots ignore his concern 701 00:36:45,469 --> 00:36:48,072 and miss their last chance to avoid a disaster 702 00:36:48,139 --> 00:36:51,709 that will claim 583 lives. 703 00:36:51,776 --> 00:36:52,610 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it! 704 00:36:52,677 --> 00:36:54,612 ♪ 705 00:37:14,999 --> 00:37:16,200 DENNIS: Van Zanten should not have moved 706 00:37:16,267 --> 00:37:18,536 without explicit clearance. 707 00:37:18,603 --> 00:37:22,273 ROBERT: You learn that in probably the first or second lesson 708 00:37:22,340 --> 00:37:27,778 in aviation: Do not take off unless you get a clearance. 709 00:37:27,845 --> 00:37:29,547 NARRATOR: Investigators dig into the career 710 00:37:29,614 --> 00:37:32,149 of Captain Van Zanten. 711 00:37:32,216 --> 00:37:34,385 They're looking for anything that might explain 712 00:37:34,452 --> 00:37:38,956 why an experienced pilot would violate such a fundamental rule. 713 00:37:39,023 --> 00:37:41,292 INVESTIGATOR: This guy was a superstar. 714 00:37:41,359 --> 00:37:42,560 NARRATOR: They learn that Van Zanten 715 00:37:42,627 --> 00:37:45,396 was one of KLM's top pilots. 716 00:37:45,463 --> 00:37:49,800 He was the face of the airline, the director of flight safety, 717 00:37:49,867 --> 00:37:52,303 and head of the flight training department. 718 00:37:52,370 --> 00:37:54,939 JOHN: How could a human being with so much intelligence, 719 00:37:55,006 --> 00:37:58,676 so much capability and experience and position, 720 00:37:58,743 --> 00:38:02,146 and the director of safety -- how could he fail like this? 721 00:38:05,883 --> 00:38:10,554 ♪ 722 00:38:10,621 --> 00:38:13,524 NARRATOR: Investigators suspect that, in an odd twist, 723 00:38:13,591 --> 00:38:15,493 the captain's elevated status 724 00:38:15,559 --> 00:38:18,929 may have played a role in the Tenerife disaster. 725 00:38:18,996 --> 00:38:24,235 ROBERT: Back in those times, everyone had an awe 726 00:38:24,301 --> 00:38:28,372 of the captain, if you will. His word was god. 727 00:38:28,439 --> 00:38:32,843 His word was unquestioned. 728 00:38:32,910 --> 00:38:35,146 DENNIS: If he has that kind of authority, 729 00:38:35,212 --> 00:38:39,216 it's less likely for someone his junior, 730 00:38:39,283 --> 00:38:42,853 in this case the flight engineer and the first officer, 731 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:44,922 to challenge anything he does. 732 00:38:50,294 --> 00:38:52,897 FO. BRAGG: Okay. We'll report when we're clear. 733 00:38:52,963 --> 00:38:54,398 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Thank you. 734 00:38:54,465 --> 00:38:55,933 FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not clear then? 735 00:38:56,000 --> 00:38:57,234 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: What did you say? 736 00:38:57,301 --> 00:38:59,670 FE. SCHREUDER: Is he not clear then, the Pan American? 737 00:38:59,737 --> 00:39:01,038 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, yes. 738 00:39:01,105 --> 00:39:03,107 NARRATOR: The conversation in the KLM cockpit 739 00:39:03,174 --> 00:39:07,111 leading up to the accident seems to support that notion. 740 00:39:07,178 --> 00:39:09,814 But Van Zanten's esteemed status doesn't explain 741 00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:12,983 the most troubling question of all. 742 00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:16,921 Why did he believe it was safe to take off in the first place? 743 00:39:16,987 --> 00:39:19,023 DENNIS: Logically, you should make extra clear that, 744 00:39:19,090 --> 00:39:24,662 hey, we're taking off. Is the runway clear? 745 00:39:24,729 --> 00:39:27,331 NARRATOR: Investigators search desperately for an answer and 746 00:39:27,398 --> 00:39:31,102 come across a stunning detail in the captain's flight log. 747 00:39:31,168 --> 00:39:33,671 It could be the final piece of the puzzle. 748 00:39:33,738 --> 00:39:37,942 INVESTIGATOR: This was his first flight in three months. 749 00:39:38,008 --> 00:39:40,544 NARRATOR: Records show that Van Zanten's cockpit hours 750 00:39:40,611 --> 00:39:43,614 had dropped dramatically in recent years. 751 00:39:43,681 --> 00:39:46,183 He was spending most of his time in a simulator 752 00:39:46,250 --> 00:39:48,152 training other pilots. 753 00:39:48,219 --> 00:39:49,987 JOHN: The simulation is interesting 754 00:39:50,054 --> 00:39:52,456 because, when you spend a lot of time as an instructor 755 00:39:52,523 --> 00:39:54,525 in a simulator, it's an artificial environment 756 00:39:54,592 --> 00:39:57,061 that we try to make as real as possible. 757 00:39:57,128 --> 00:40:01,132 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay. Checklist complete. Let's go. Thrust. 758 00:40:03,467 --> 00:40:05,836 NARRATOR: Flight simulators do a remarkably good job 759 00:40:05,903 --> 00:40:09,039 at recreating the experience of a real flight. 760 00:40:09,106 --> 00:40:12,510 But there is one very important element missing. 761 00:40:12,576 --> 00:40:17,014 There is no air traffic controller in a simulator. 762 00:40:17,081 --> 00:40:18,883 DENNIS: His focus was on training, 763 00:40:18,949 --> 00:40:21,719 and there was this difference in the way 764 00:40:21,786 --> 00:40:25,790 you treat air traffic control communications 765 00:40:25,856 --> 00:40:28,893 in a training environment versus the real world. 766 00:40:28,959 --> 00:40:34,498 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Okay, let's go. Thrust. V-1. Here we go. 767 00:40:34,565 --> 00:40:39,236 Takeoff thrust. Rotate. Okay let's go. Takeoff thrust. 768 00:40:39,303 --> 00:40:41,305 Thrust. Let's go. 769 00:40:41,372 --> 00:40:42,740 INVESTIGATOR: All that time he spent in a simulator 770 00:40:42,807 --> 00:40:44,408 works against him. 771 00:40:44,475 --> 00:40:45,776 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Climb to and maintain 772 00:40:45,843 --> 00:40:49,446 flight level niner-zero. Right turn after takeoff. 773 00:40:49,513 --> 00:40:51,048 FO. MEURS: Roger. Cleared to the Papa Beacon. 774 00:40:51,115 --> 00:40:54,618 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Let's go. Check thrust. 775 00:40:54,685 --> 00:40:56,854 JOHN: Jacob Van Zanten's attempt to take off 776 00:40:56,921 --> 00:40:57,922 without a clearance 777 00:40:57,988 --> 00:41:00,324 resulted from his time in the simulator 778 00:41:00,391 --> 00:41:02,526 and that he kind of reset himself. 779 00:41:02,593 --> 00:41:07,298 He was his own clearance authority in the simulator. 780 00:41:07,364 --> 00:41:09,066 INVESTIGATOR: And then two separate radio calls 781 00:41:09,133 --> 00:41:11,268 that should have told him the Pan Am was off the runway 782 00:41:11,335 --> 00:41:13,470 cancel each other out. 783 00:41:13,537 --> 00:41:15,773 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Okay. 784 00:41:15,840 --> 00:41:18,809 FO. BRAGG: Clipper 1736. 785 00:41:18,876 --> 00:41:20,811 The world's deadliest airline accident 786 00:41:20,878 --> 00:41:24,515 is now all but inevitable. 787 00:41:24,582 --> 00:41:28,552 FO. BRAGG: I think he's moving. 788 00:41:28,619 --> 00:41:31,589 CPT. GRUBBS: Look at him. That idiot's coming! 789 00:41:31,655 --> 00:41:35,826 ♪ 790 00:41:35,893 --> 00:41:37,161 JOHN: Basically we had a captain 791 00:41:37,228 --> 00:41:41,365 who wanted to get off the ground as rapidly as possible. 792 00:41:41,432 --> 00:41:42,466 CPT. VAN ZANTEN: Oh, damn it! 793 00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:51,575 ♪ 794 00:41:51,642 --> 00:41:53,844 JOHN: The weather was not cooperating, 795 00:41:53,911 --> 00:41:55,646 and he was about out of crew duty time, 796 00:41:55,713 --> 00:41:58,315 and in a situation like that, the human mind, 797 00:41:58,382 --> 00:42:02,219 our carbon-based brains tend to jump a few cogs, so to speak. 798 00:42:02,286 --> 00:42:04,088 FO. BRAGG: Get off. Get off. Get off. 799 00:42:04,154 --> 00:42:05,656 Get off! Get off! Get off! 800 00:42:15,332 --> 00:42:17,801 JOHN: He had a gun cocked and loaded by various factors 801 00:42:17,868 --> 00:42:19,336 and he was the one that pulled the trigger. 802 00:42:19,403 --> 00:42:23,807 But you have to take them all in connection. 803 00:42:28,679 --> 00:42:31,315 NARRATOR: The investigation into the collision at Tenerife 804 00:42:31,382 --> 00:42:33,918 results in dozens of recommendations. 805 00:42:33,984 --> 00:42:36,587 Few aviation accidents have triggered a greater number 806 00:42:36,654 --> 00:42:40,157 of significant changes. 807 00:42:40,224 --> 00:42:43,060 JOHN: That's what began to be the seed of training 808 00:42:43,127 --> 00:42:45,162 for what we later called crew resource management 809 00:42:45,229 --> 00:42:47,464 where we said to the captain, we're onto you, bub. 810 00:42:47,531 --> 00:42:48,832 You're a human being. 811 00:42:48,899 --> 00:42:51,001 You can make mistakes, even when you have no intention to, 812 00:42:51,068 --> 00:42:53,070 and even when you're completely qualified. 813 00:42:57,074 --> 00:42:58,742 NARRATOR: KLM and other airlines 814 00:42:58,809 --> 00:43:01,745 transform their training methods for captains, 815 00:43:01,812 --> 00:43:05,449 helping them become more responsive to their crew-mates. 816 00:43:05,516 --> 00:43:06,817 DENNIS: Even the most senior 817 00:43:06,884 --> 00:43:12,623 and the most highly trained individuals can make mistakes 818 00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:16,527 and we need to rely on the resources 819 00:43:16,593 --> 00:43:23,567 of all the crew members to compensate for that. 820 00:43:23,634 --> 00:43:25,569 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: You are cleared to the Papa Beacon. 821 00:43:25,636 --> 00:43:28,439 Climb to and maintain flight level niner-zero. 822 00:43:28,505 --> 00:43:30,307 Right turn after takeoff. 823 00:43:30,374 --> 00:43:33,043 NARRATOR: The accident also changes the very language 824 00:43:33,110 --> 00:43:37,181 used by controllers around the world. 825 00:43:37,247 --> 00:43:39,350 JIM: Controllers don't use the word takeoff 826 00:43:39,416 --> 00:43:42,219 unless they actually mean and intend 827 00:43:42,286 --> 00:43:46,323 for the aircraft to be doing just that, taking off. 828 00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:50,527 Instead, they will substitute the word "after departure turn 829 00:43:50,594 --> 00:43:54,098 right heading zero-four-zero" or something to that effect. 830 00:43:54,164 --> 00:43:58,569 JOHN: Those 583 people did not die in vain. 831 00:43:58,635 --> 00:44:00,004 We have learned those lessons. 832 00:44:00,070 --> 00:44:03,774 They changed the whole face of aviation safety. 833 00:44:03,841 --> 00:44:05,342 ♪ 68564

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