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1
00:00:02,135 --> 00:00:04,537
Computer: Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up.
2
00:00:04,604 --> 00:00:08,007
Narrator: A final approach
goes horribly wrong.
3
00:00:10,877 --> 00:00:13,880
Man: Just wondering
how it's gonna end.
4
00:00:13,947 --> 00:00:16,282
Narrator: The dramatic rescue
in San Francisco
5
00:00:16,349 --> 00:00:18,385
is caught on camera.
6
00:00:18,451 --> 00:00:21,421
Man: They used the terms
"mass casualty event.".
7
00:00:21,488 --> 00:00:23,123
Narrator: The search
for a cause...
8
00:00:23,189 --> 00:00:24,257
Man: Bingo!
9
00:00:24,324 --> 00:00:26,226
Narrator: ...divides
air safety experts.
10
00:00:26,292 --> 00:00:27,827
Man: The worst mode possible!
11
00:00:27,894 --> 00:00:29,195
Man: I disagree.
12
00:00:29,262 --> 00:00:31,364
Narrator: Was it the pilots,
the plane,
13
00:00:31,431 --> 00:00:35,535
or something else that doomed
Asiana flight 214?
14
00:00:35,602 --> 00:00:36,936
Man: The hard part is to say
15
00:00:37,003 --> 00:00:41,441
which one is the straw that
broke the camel's back?
16
00:00:41,508 --> 00:00:42,342
Flight attendant:
Ladies and gentlemen,
17
00:00:42,409 --> 00:00:43,743
we are starting our approach.
18
00:00:43,810 --> 00:00:44,978
Pilot: We lost both engines!
19
00:00:45,044 --> 00:00:46,079
Flight attendant:
Put the mask over your nose.
20
00:00:46,146 --> 00:00:46,980
Emergency descent.
21
00:00:47,046 --> 00:00:48,047
Pilot: Mayday, mayday.
22
00:00:48,114 --> 00:00:50,083
Flight attendant:
Brace for impact!
23
00:00:50,150 --> 00:00:51,351
Controller: I think I lost one.
24
00:00:51,418 --> 00:00:52,952
Man: Investigation starting
into this tragedy...
25
00:00:54,421 --> 00:00:56,222
Man: He's gonna crash!
26
00:01:10,537 --> 00:01:11,471
Lee Kang Kuk:
Ladies and gentlemen,
27
00:01:11,538 --> 00:01:12,739
this is your captain speaking.
28
00:01:12,806 --> 00:01:14,908
We hope you had
a pleasant flight.
29
00:01:14,974 --> 00:01:18,344
We'll be on the ground
in about 30 minutes.
30
00:01:18,411 --> 00:01:22,415
Enjoy your stay in San Francisco
and hope to see you again soon.
31
00:01:22,482 --> 00:01:24,951
Narrator: Asiana flight 214
is nearing the end
32
00:01:25,018 --> 00:01:29,289
of an overnight flight from
Seoul, Korea, to San Francisco.
33
00:01:31,324 --> 00:01:35,728
Ben levy is a frequent flyer
returning home.
34
00:01:35,795 --> 00:01:38,565
Ben levy: I fly pretty often for
business or visiting my family.
35
00:01:38,631 --> 00:01:39,732
I'm originally from France,
36
00:01:39,799 --> 00:01:42,268
and so, you know, I fly
long distance a lot.
37
00:01:42,335 --> 00:01:47,874
I fly in and out of SFO a lot,
so I know the airport very well.
38
00:01:47,941 --> 00:01:51,511
Narrator: Many of the other
291 passengers are Chinese,
39
00:01:51,578 --> 00:01:53,012
including a group of teenagers
40
00:01:53,079 --> 00:01:56,749
on their way to summer camp
in the united states.
41
00:01:56,816 --> 00:01:58,718
Levy: I think they were all
pretty excited about the trip.
42
00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:01,421
I think they were all like,
you know, having a good time
43
00:02:01,488 --> 00:02:06,226
and excited to be in that plane
and going to the U.S.
44
00:02:06,292 --> 00:02:07,861
Kang Kuk:
Is that the golden gate?
45
00:02:07,927 --> 00:02:10,296
Narrator: Captain lee Kang Kuk
takes in the sights
46
00:02:10,363 --> 00:02:13,800
as he guides the plane
toward the airport.
47
00:02:13,867 --> 00:02:15,668
Lee Jung Min:
Golden gate's over there.
48
00:02:15,735 --> 00:02:17,370
That bridge goes to Oakland.
49
00:02:17,437 --> 00:02:19,539
Kang Kuk: Ah. Okay.
50
00:02:19,606 --> 00:02:21,574
Narrator: Lee Jung Min,
also a captain,
51
00:02:21,641 --> 00:02:24,444
is serving as first officer
today.
52
00:02:24,511 --> 00:02:26,779
Levy: Yeah, I remember it being
a just gorgeous day,
53
00:02:26,846 --> 00:02:28,348
as good as it can be.
54
00:02:28,414 --> 00:02:33,386
No wind, beautiful, sunny day,
not a single cloud in the sky.
55
00:02:33,453 --> 00:02:35,255
Les Abend: The arrival
into San Francisco
56
00:02:35,321 --> 00:02:37,590
is a very scenic approach.
57
00:02:37,657 --> 00:02:39,259
From the sierra mountains
58
00:02:39,325 --> 00:02:42,629
all the way into
the San Francisco bay area,
59
00:02:42,695 --> 00:02:45,465
it's a very pretty arrival.
60
00:02:47,767 --> 00:02:49,369
Jung Min: Runway in sight.
61
00:02:49,435 --> 00:02:52,672
Controller: Asiana 214 heavy,
turn left 3-1-0 degrees,
62
00:02:52,739 --> 00:02:54,507
cleared visual approach.
63
00:02:54,574 --> 00:02:55,775
Narrator: Controllers
clear the crew
64
00:02:55,842 --> 00:02:58,378
for their final turn
to the runway.
65
00:02:58,444 --> 00:03:00,413
Abend: It is a busy piece
of airspace.
66
00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:02,448
You do have to listen
on the frequency
67
00:03:02,515 --> 00:03:04,183
and you do have to anticipate
68
00:03:04,250 --> 00:03:06,786
what the controller
is going to give you.
69
00:03:06,853 --> 00:03:09,289
In addition,
experience really counts
70
00:03:09,355 --> 00:03:11,524
flying into San Francisco.
71
00:03:11,591 --> 00:03:15,161
Jung Min: Cleared
visual approach, Asiana 214.
72
00:03:15,228 --> 00:03:16,195
Kang Kuk: Okay.
73
00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,531
Gear down, sir.
74
00:03:21,367 --> 00:03:22,602
Jung Min: Gear down.
75
00:03:22,669 --> 00:03:24,771
Abend: The way we put
on the brakes in an airplane
76
00:03:24,837 --> 00:03:26,973
is by putting our, our
trailing edge flaps down
77
00:03:27,040 --> 00:03:30,543
and our leading edge devices
down, and even the gear.
78
00:03:30,610 --> 00:03:33,279
That's our brake.
79
00:03:33,346 --> 00:03:35,615
Narrator: They then enter
an altitude to climb to
80
00:03:35,682 --> 00:03:37,850
in case of a missed approach.
81
00:03:37,917 --> 00:03:40,486
Kang Kuk: Missed approach,
3,000 feet.
82
00:03:43,823 --> 00:03:45,091
Narrator: In the cabin,
83
00:03:45,158 --> 00:03:48,461
the flight attendants prepare
passengers for landing.
84
00:03:51,230 --> 00:03:56,769
Controller: Asiana 214 heavy,
runway 2-8 left, clear to land.
85
00:03:56,836 --> 00:03:58,571
Jung Min:
Landing checklist complete.
86
00:03:58,638 --> 00:03:59,806
Clear to land.
87
00:03:59,872 --> 00:04:01,941
On glide path.
88
00:04:02,008 --> 00:04:04,377
Narrator: The pilots check a set
of lights beside the runway
89
00:04:04,444 --> 00:04:07,914
that can help guide them
to a safe landing.
90
00:04:07,981 --> 00:04:10,116
Kang Kuk: Check.
91
00:04:14,087 --> 00:04:17,190
Narrator: The plane is less than
a minute from the runway
92
00:04:17,256 --> 00:04:20,793
when ben levy realizes
something is wrong.
93
00:04:22,895 --> 00:04:25,765
Levy: I remember noticing that
there's a small pier
94
00:04:25,832 --> 00:04:27,433
that extends out of the runway,
95
00:04:27,500 --> 00:04:31,838
and I'm like, wow,
we're very low.
96
00:04:31,904 --> 00:04:32,839
And I dismissed the thought,
97
00:04:32,905 --> 00:04:34,741
thinking, well,
what can go wrong?
98
00:04:34,807 --> 00:04:36,042
There's all the technology
on board
99
00:04:36,109 --> 00:04:39,545
to make sure that those guys
don't, don't mess up.
100
00:04:39,612 --> 00:04:41,047
Narrator: In the cockpit...
101
00:04:41,114 --> 00:04:42,048
Jung Min: Speed!
102
00:04:42,115 --> 00:04:43,282
Narrator: ...a crisis hits.
103
00:04:43,349 --> 00:04:45,018
Computer: Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up.
104
00:04:45,084 --> 00:04:47,353
Jung Min: I've got control.
105
00:04:49,055 --> 00:04:51,624
Oh, god! Go around!
106
00:04:54,227 --> 00:04:55,862
Levy: In that fraction
of a second,
107
00:04:55,928 --> 00:05:00,833
I feel the thrust of the engine
re-engaging full throttle.
108
00:05:00,900 --> 00:05:05,738
Narrator: The captain pulls up
the nose and tries to climb.
109
00:05:05,805 --> 00:05:08,341
But it may be too late.
110
00:05:08,408 --> 00:05:11,477
Levy: Hang on. Looks like we're
not gonna make the runway.
111
00:05:11,544 --> 00:05:14,847
At that point I'm thinking
we're gonna hit the water.
112
00:05:17,150 --> 00:05:19,952
Computer: Terrain. Terrain.
Pull up.
113
00:05:21,754 --> 00:05:23,723
Levy: The impact was
very violent.
114
00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:32,231
♪
115
00:05:32,298 --> 00:05:33,800
Just wondering
how it's gonna end,
116
00:05:33,866 --> 00:05:38,037
how it's gonna stop
and when it's gonna stop.
117
00:05:38,104 --> 00:05:40,473
Jung Min: Hang on! Hang on!
118
00:05:51,117 --> 00:05:53,686
Levy: So the plane
comes to a rest.
119
00:05:57,990 --> 00:06:01,294
And nothing moves.
120
00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:03,096
And all you hear is moaning
121
00:06:03,162 --> 00:06:06,933
from people that are
hurt and injured.
122
00:06:06,999 --> 00:06:09,102
Here. Here.
123
00:06:09,168 --> 00:06:12,038
If you press hard
it will stop the bleeding.
124
00:06:14,273 --> 00:06:17,110
Narrator: In the cockpit,
the pilots have survived,
125
00:06:17,176 --> 00:06:22,348
but they have no idea how badly
damaged their aircraft is.
126
00:06:22,415 --> 00:06:27,286
The brutal impact has torn the
tail off the body of the plane.
127
00:06:27,353 --> 00:06:29,088
Jung Min: Control, come in.
128
00:06:29,155 --> 00:06:31,524
It's Asiana 214.
129
00:06:31,591 --> 00:06:35,094
Initiating evacuation checklist.
130
00:06:35,161 --> 00:06:36,596
We need help out here.
131
00:06:36,662 --> 00:06:37,797
Controller: Asiana 214 heavy,
132
00:06:37,864 --> 00:06:39,832
emergency vehicles
are responding.
133
00:06:45,805 --> 00:06:47,507
Narrator: An engine is burning.
134
00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:51,677
If fire spreads to the fuel
tanks, the plane could explode.
135
00:06:51,744 --> 00:06:55,515
Passengers need to find
a way out, fast.
136
00:06:55,581 --> 00:06:56,983
Levy: Let's see if we can
open this door.
137
00:06:57,049 --> 00:06:59,218
I remember just going
for that big lever
138
00:06:59,285 --> 00:07:01,320
on the right-hand side
of this airplane
139
00:07:01,387 --> 00:07:05,992
and just opening this door and
was shocked at how easy it was.
140
00:07:06,058 --> 00:07:09,562
Narrator: But getting down
to the ground will not be easy.
141
00:07:09,629 --> 00:07:12,865
Levy: I'm expecting at that
point to see a slide open.
142
00:07:12,932 --> 00:07:14,600
I had the whole, like,
hey, you open the door,
143
00:07:14,667 --> 00:07:18,471
the slide's gonna open,
and there's no slide.
144
00:07:19,872 --> 00:07:20,873
Whoa.
145
00:07:20,940 --> 00:07:22,341
Okay.
146
00:07:22,408 --> 00:07:24,277
Help each other.
147
00:07:24,343 --> 00:07:25,578
Come on.
148
00:07:25,645 --> 00:07:27,814
Narrator: Luckily, some crumpled
pieces of the fuselage
149
00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:32,185
have formed a makeshift
set of stairs.
150
00:07:32,251 --> 00:07:33,619
Ben levy stays by the door
151
00:07:33,686 --> 00:07:36,689
to help the other passengers
climb down.
152
00:07:36,756 --> 00:07:37,857
Levy: Come on.
153
00:07:37,924 --> 00:07:39,292
You know, in this whole disaster
154
00:07:39,358 --> 00:07:41,427
they find that the fuselage
actually had crumbled on itself,
155
00:07:41,494 --> 00:07:45,264
almost provided like a step
that became probably critical
156
00:07:45,331 --> 00:07:48,134
for people, people to exit
that plane.
157
00:07:48,201 --> 00:07:51,571
Woman: Oh, my god. That's scary.
158
00:07:51,637 --> 00:07:53,606
Narrator: Eyewitness video
captures the dramatic scene
159
00:07:53,673 --> 00:07:57,844
as hundreds of people flee
the cabin from only a few exits.
160
00:08:01,247 --> 00:08:03,316
The triple seven
has eight exits.
161
00:08:03,382 --> 00:08:06,886
Each is equipped with
an emergency escape slide.
162
00:08:06,953 --> 00:08:10,489
The slides are supposed to
inflate automatically,
163
00:08:10,556 --> 00:08:13,793
but only two have
deployed properly.
164
00:08:17,730 --> 00:08:19,365
Flight attendant: Someone?
165
00:08:19,432 --> 00:08:21,033
Please help me!
166
00:08:21,100 --> 00:08:23,502
Narrator: What's worse,
two of the malfunctioning slides
167
00:08:23,569 --> 00:08:26,906
have inflated inside the plane.
168
00:08:26,973 --> 00:08:28,641
A flight attendant is trapped.
169
00:08:28,708 --> 00:08:31,410
Flight attendant: I can't move.
170
00:08:31,477 --> 00:08:34,413
If you pull, I can try.
171
00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:35,781
No.
172
00:08:35,848 --> 00:08:37,884
Get something sharp.
173
00:08:37,950 --> 00:08:40,186
Ah! Ugh!
174
00:08:40,253 --> 00:08:43,089
Bill bramble: She couldn't
breathe under the slide.
175
00:08:43,155 --> 00:08:46,359
Narrator: Bill bramble is
an air emergency expert.
176
00:08:46,425 --> 00:08:50,062
He understands the desperation
the crew is facing.
177
00:08:50,129 --> 00:08:52,064
Bramble: They were worried
about her suffocating,
178
00:08:52,131 --> 00:08:54,433
and so it was a very strong
sense of urgency
179
00:08:54,500 --> 00:08:55,868
to try and get her out.
180
00:08:55,935 --> 00:08:58,638
Plus, there was a fire outside
the fuselage as well.
181
00:08:58,704 --> 00:09:02,508
So, yeah, it was a pretty
serious situation.
182
00:09:09,282 --> 00:09:11,918
Narrator: At San Francisco
international airport,
183
00:09:11,984 --> 00:09:15,254
runway 28-L is a disaster zone.
184
00:09:15,321 --> 00:09:18,891
Fire crews battle to keep flames
from consuming the fuselage
185
00:09:18,958 --> 00:09:22,395
of Asiana flight 214.
186
00:09:22,461 --> 00:09:24,530
Levy: Come on.
187
00:09:24,597 --> 00:09:26,766
Get out.
188
00:09:26,832 --> 00:09:28,601
Narrator:
Inside the burning plane,
189
00:09:28,668 --> 00:09:32,004
a flight attendant
is still trapped.
190
00:09:34,307 --> 00:09:36,342
Bramble: The slides are
pretty tough.
191
00:09:36,409 --> 00:09:38,110
You need a sharp, strong object
192
00:09:38,177 --> 00:09:39,779
to be able to puncture
the slide,
193
00:09:39,845 --> 00:09:43,316
and a crash axe,
do the trick.
194
00:09:46,552 --> 00:09:49,055
♪
195
00:09:58,898 --> 00:10:01,968
Narrator: With rescuers now
on board to help the injured,
196
00:10:02,034 --> 00:10:05,037
ben levy finally
heads to safety.
197
00:10:09,175 --> 00:10:10,776
Levy: I think in my head
I was like,
198
00:10:10,843 --> 00:10:12,611
I'm alive, it's incredible.
199
00:10:12,678 --> 00:10:15,881
Narrator: He's soon sharing his
harrowing story with the media.
200
00:10:15,948 --> 00:10:17,583
Levy: In your head everything
goes in slow motion.
201
00:10:17,650 --> 00:10:19,218
You just don't believe
it's happening.
202
00:10:19,285 --> 00:10:20,453
You don't know if
you're gonna be dead
203
00:10:20,519 --> 00:10:22,355
at the end of the slow motion
or not.
204
00:10:22,421 --> 00:10:24,557
Woman: The entire trauma team
has come together
205
00:10:24,623 --> 00:10:25,825
as they would in a trauma,
206
00:10:25,891 --> 00:10:28,861
although this is very large,
multi-casualty incident.
207
00:10:28,928 --> 00:10:32,164
Narrator: Nearly 50 people
are seriously injured.
208
00:10:32,231 --> 00:10:34,367
Six were thrown out of
the back of the plane
209
00:10:34,433 --> 00:10:36,469
when the tail broke off.
210
00:10:36,535 --> 00:10:38,404
Two of them are dead,
211
00:10:38,471 --> 00:10:43,042
including a young teenager run
over by an emergency vehicle.
212
00:10:43,109 --> 00:10:45,811
Man: The fire truck did go over
the victim, that's a fact.
213
00:10:45,878 --> 00:10:47,313
Now, what caused the death,
214
00:10:47,380 --> 00:10:50,816
whether the victim was deceased
before or as a result,
215
00:10:50,883 --> 00:10:53,019
that is what we're
trying to figure out.
216
00:10:54,887 --> 00:10:56,255
Narrator: Like thousands
of others,
217
00:10:56,322 --> 00:10:59,058
investigators at the national
transportation safety board
218
00:10:59,125 --> 00:11:03,729
in Washington are riveted
by the pictures.
219
00:11:03,796 --> 00:11:05,865
Bill English: They used
the terms "mass casualty
event.".
220
00:11:05,931 --> 00:11:08,000
We really didn't know what
was going on at the time.
221
00:11:08,067 --> 00:11:11,037
The first things I heard was
an airplane cartwheeled,
222
00:11:11,103 --> 00:11:14,507
mass casualties, and we knew
it was a triple seven,
223
00:11:14,573 --> 00:11:17,410
so it was going to be
a very significant event.
224
00:11:17,476 --> 00:11:19,412
Narrator: Senior investigator
bill English
225
00:11:19,478 --> 00:11:22,381
will lead the high profile
investigation.
226
00:11:22,448 --> 00:11:24,817
English: Everyone's on standby
as of right now.
227
00:11:24,884 --> 00:11:27,219
So the triple seven had been
in service for about 20 years
228
00:11:27,286 --> 00:11:28,621
at the time of this accident,
229
00:11:28,687 --> 00:11:31,157
and this was the first fatal
accident of a triple seven
230
00:11:31,223 --> 00:11:33,292
in that entire time.
231
00:11:33,359 --> 00:11:35,594
We knew we were going to be
launching a very large team,
232
00:11:35,661 --> 00:11:38,097
so we pulled out all the stops.
233
00:11:38,164 --> 00:11:44,670
♪
234
00:11:44,737 --> 00:11:45,905
Narrator: By the next morning,
235
00:11:45,971 --> 00:11:49,475
there's a full team
of investigators on site.
236
00:11:49,542 --> 00:11:54,413
Their first impression is that
the media reports must be wrong.
237
00:11:54,480 --> 00:11:57,383
English: I had heard the phrase
"The airplane cartwheeled.".
238
00:11:57,450 --> 00:11:59,552
And the first photos that I saw
239
00:11:59,618 --> 00:12:01,454
showed the airplane
right side up,
240
00:12:01,520 --> 00:12:02,621
wings still attached,
241
00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:04,490
still looking pretty much
like an airplane
242
00:12:04,557 --> 00:12:05,891
sitting next to the runway.
243
00:12:05,958 --> 00:12:08,260
So we thought that
couldn't be true.
244
00:12:08,327 --> 00:12:10,563
Narrator: When a plane
cartwheels on touchdown,
245
00:12:10,629 --> 00:12:13,432
the result is usually
a catastrophic breakup
246
00:12:13,499 --> 00:12:16,702
that leaves a long trail
of debris.
247
00:12:16,769 --> 00:12:20,172
That's what happened in 1989
in Sioux city, Iowa,
248
00:12:20,239 --> 00:12:25,511
where a dc-10 cartwheeled off
the runway, killing 111 people.
249
00:12:29,115 --> 00:12:33,552
The wreckage from Asiana 214
looks nothing like Sioux city.
250
00:12:33,619 --> 00:12:37,022
English can hardly believe
the triple seven cartwheeled,
251
00:12:37,089 --> 00:12:41,427
until he spots
some telltale evidence.
252
00:12:41,494 --> 00:12:43,062
English: We noticed the marks
on the runway,
253
00:12:43,129 --> 00:12:45,498
scrape marks and everything,
looked strange.
254
00:12:45,564 --> 00:12:47,533
It looked like the airplane
twisted and turned around.
255
00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:50,970
We thought did the airplane
actually turn around?
256
00:12:51,036 --> 00:12:53,772
And then we saw the video.
257
00:12:56,775 --> 00:12:58,777
Narrator: Airport surveillance
cameras leave no doubt
258
00:12:58,844 --> 00:13:03,349
about flight 214's
violent trajectory.
259
00:13:03,415 --> 00:13:05,718
English: The surveillance video
did show the airplane
260
00:13:05,784 --> 00:13:09,488
literally pirouetting, lifting
a good 30 degrees into the air,
261
00:13:09,555 --> 00:13:14,693
spinning almost a full circle
around before coming to rest.
262
00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:17,096
Jung Min: Hang on!
263
00:13:17,163 --> 00:13:19,765
Levy: It's just a miracle
in so many ways,
264
00:13:19,832 --> 00:13:22,368
the fact that this plane
stayed in one piece,
265
00:13:22,434 --> 00:13:25,271
the fact that the wing
didn't break apart.
266
00:13:25,337 --> 00:13:26,772
I mean, if we had landed
back any other way,
267
00:13:26,839 --> 00:13:30,042
it could have been terrible.
268
00:13:30,109 --> 00:13:31,810
Narrator: Investigators
must now determine
269
00:13:31,877 --> 00:13:35,915
why the triple seven crashed
short of the runway.
270
00:13:35,981 --> 00:13:37,783
But they also face
important questions
271
00:13:37,850 --> 00:13:42,421
about the evacuation and rescue.
272
00:13:42,488 --> 00:13:45,324
Jason Fedok: How did you end up
out there?
273
00:13:45,391 --> 00:13:47,092
Narrator: Investigator
Jason Fedok will try
274
00:13:47,159 --> 00:13:51,764
to figure out what happened to
the passengers after the impact.
275
00:13:51,830 --> 00:13:53,699
Fedok: Can you remember
where you were sitting?
276
00:13:53,766 --> 00:13:55,501
People who were actually
involved in the accident
277
00:13:55,568 --> 00:13:57,102
can give us a wealth
of information
278
00:13:57,169 --> 00:13:58,504
that we couldn't otherwise learn
279
00:13:58,571 --> 00:14:00,506
about what happened
inside the cabin.
280
00:14:00,573 --> 00:14:02,808
Was she wearing her seat belt?
281
00:14:02,875 --> 00:14:05,244
In this case,
we talked to the seat mates
282
00:14:05,311 --> 00:14:06,812
of one of the ejected passengers
283
00:14:06,879 --> 00:14:08,781
who explained that she was not
wearing her seat belt
284
00:14:08,847 --> 00:14:10,349
at the time of the accident.
285
00:14:10,416 --> 00:14:11,750
English: This investigation
was almost
286
00:14:11,817 --> 00:14:13,485
two investigations in one.
287
00:14:13,552 --> 00:14:17,022
We broke it up into the part
that got us to the seawall.
288
00:14:17,089 --> 00:14:18,991
How did this airplane
impact those rocks
289
00:14:19,058 --> 00:14:20,659
and come to this accident?
290
00:14:20,726 --> 00:14:24,563
After that was a whole other
story to be told.
291
00:14:24,630 --> 00:14:26,031
Narrator: The complex
investigation
292
00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:30,703
puts the entire team
under enormous pressure.
293
00:14:30,769 --> 00:14:34,106
There could be clues
inside the ruined cockpit,
294
00:14:34,173 --> 00:14:37,076
but toxic fumes and scorched
debris make it too dangerous
295
00:14:37,142 --> 00:14:40,746
to enter without
protective gear.
296
00:14:40,813 --> 00:14:43,782
Roger Cox: Okay. Here we go.
297
00:14:43,849 --> 00:14:46,619
Narrator: For NTSB investigator
Roger Cox,
298
00:14:46,685 --> 00:14:49,955
the hunt for evidence
is worth the risk.
299
00:14:50,022 --> 00:14:54,426
Cox: It was a tricky
accident site.
300
00:14:54,493 --> 00:14:56,562
We had to be properly
garbed up to make sure
301
00:14:56,629 --> 00:14:58,197
that we weren't
affected too much
302
00:14:58,264 --> 00:15:01,533
by the dangerous wreckage
that was there.
303
00:15:04,803 --> 00:15:05,971
If you get out there right away
304
00:15:06,038 --> 00:15:08,774
before anybody's had time
to move anything around,
305
00:15:08,841 --> 00:15:12,177
you can actually reconstruct
what went on.
306
00:15:12,244 --> 00:15:14,046
Narrator: Cox gathers
the pilots' charts
307
00:15:14,113 --> 00:15:15,447
and personal effects,
308
00:15:15,514 --> 00:15:17,750
hoping to find clues about
what they were doing
309
00:15:17,816 --> 00:15:19,918
in the final stages
of the flight.
310
00:15:19,985 --> 00:15:22,655
Cox: That's everything
I could find.
311
00:15:22,721 --> 00:15:25,424
We removed every single document
312
00:15:25,491 --> 00:15:28,794
and then made sure that we
photographed every single page
313
00:15:28,861 --> 00:15:30,229
of every single document
314
00:15:30,296 --> 00:15:33,966
in order to see if any of it
was of value.
315
00:15:34,033 --> 00:15:36,735
Narrator: Many of the documents
are in Korean.
316
00:15:36,802 --> 00:15:38,003
They'll need to be translated
317
00:15:38,070 --> 00:15:40,673
before they can be
fully analyzed.
318
00:15:44,777 --> 00:15:46,345
The crash zone,
on the other hand,
319
00:15:46,412 --> 00:15:48,080
immediately provides
investigators
320
00:15:48,147 --> 00:15:50,783
with some important details.
321
00:15:53,152 --> 00:15:55,587
English: Where it impacted
on the rocks of the seawall
322
00:15:55,654 --> 00:15:57,389
pretty much tells us
it was too low.
323
00:15:57,456 --> 00:16:00,726
It landed well short
of where it should have.
324
00:16:00,793 --> 00:16:02,294
Narrator: The scenario
reminds English
325
00:16:02,361 --> 00:16:04,897
of another very similar
accident.
326
00:16:04,963 --> 00:16:06,832
English: One of the things
we initially thought about
327
00:16:06,899 --> 00:16:08,701
was a previous
triple seven accident
328
00:16:08,767 --> 00:16:10,369
that happened
in London, England,
329
00:16:10,436 --> 00:16:12,271
where both engines rolled back
330
00:16:12,338 --> 00:16:15,974
and the crew didn't have any
power at all on final approach.
331
00:16:16,041 --> 00:16:18,377
Narrator: The triple seven has
one of the best safety records
332
00:16:18,444 --> 00:16:22,514
of any plane in the sky.
333
00:16:22,581 --> 00:16:26,985
But in 2008 British airways
flight 38 slammed to the ground
334
00:16:27,052 --> 00:16:29,288
short of the runway
at Heathrow airport
335
00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:32,491
after losing power
in both engines.
336
00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:37,830
Investigators determined
that ice in the fuel lines
337
00:16:37,896 --> 00:16:40,366
had caused dual engine failure.
338
00:16:40,432 --> 00:16:43,802
Is that what happened
to Asiana 214?
339
00:16:45,904 --> 00:16:48,440
A close look at the engines
tells bill English
340
00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:51,176
the answer is no.
341
00:16:51,243 --> 00:16:54,980
He sees clear evidence that
they were working normally.
342
00:16:55,047 --> 00:16:56,682
English: There are certain
signatures in the metal,
343
00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:58,751
in the blades of the engine
that show us
344
00:16:58,817 --> 00:17:02,721
that they were developing power
and hadn't failed.
345
00:17:02,788 --> 00:17:05,124
Narrator: For now, English has
no solid leads
346
00:17:05,190 --> 00:17:09,294
to explain why a plane that
seemed about to land safely
347
00:17:09,361 --> 00:17:14,066
crashed just seconds
from the runway.
348
00:17:14,133 --> 00:17:15,267
English: We knew the weather
was good,
349
00:17:15,334 --> 00:17:17,970
winds were calm,
visibility was good.
350
00:17:18,036 --> 00:17:20,005
There was no distress call
from the airplane
351
00:17:20,072 --> 00:17:22,975
that we'd heard of, so there was
nothing really obvious
352
00:17:23,041 --> 00:17:25,744
as to why this would
have occurred.
353
00:17:32,251 --> 00:17:33,986
Narrator: Runway crews
assess the damage
354
00:17:34,052 --> 00:17:36,655
at San Francisco
international airport
355
00:17:36,722 --> 00:17:38,524
while investigators
search for a lead
356
00:17:38,590 --> 00:17:41,693
in the crash of Asiana 214.
357
00:17:43,195 --> 00:17:46,832
Air traffic controllers
provide some answers.
358
00:17:46,899 --> 00:17:48,033
English: They could see it
on radar,
359
00:17:48,100 --> 00:17:50,202
and of course visually
see it from the tower.
360
00:17:50,269 --> 00:17:55,073
Controller: Visibility was
ten miles, um, a few clouds,
361
00:17:55,140 --> 00:17:56,642
not an issue.
362
00:17:56,708 --> 00:17:58,343
Narrator: Controllers tell
investigators
363
00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:00,012
that it was a normal day,
364
00:18:00,078 --> 00:18:02,381
except for the fact that
some runway equipment
365
00:18:02,448 --> 00:18:06,418
was not in operation.
366
00:18:06,485 --> 00:18:07,619
Controller: And that runway's
glide slope
367
00:18:07,686 --> 00:18:10,923
was, was out of service.
368
00:18:10,989 --> 00:18:13,459
Narrator: Electronic equipment
installed on runways
369
00:18:13,525 --> 00:18:16,528
can send signals to
a plane's autopilot.
370
00:18:16,595 --> 00:18:20,666
The signals can help guide the
plane down at a precise angle.
371
00:18:23,135 --> 00:18:26,138
But the main runway at the
airport is under construction,
372
00:18:26,205 --> 00:18:29,741
and the equipment
is switched off.
373
00:18:29,808 --> 00:18:32,144
It's a revealing discovery.
374
00:18:32,211 --> 00:18:35,547
A combination of high traffic
and compact runways
375
00:18:35,614 --> 00:18:37,616
have earned
San Francisco airport
376
00:18:37,683 --> 00:18:41,520
a reputation
for difficult landings.
377
00:18:41,587 --> 00:18:43,255
To manage the high traffic,
378
00:18:43,322 --> 00:18:47,392
controllers often ask pilots
to come in fast and steep,
379
00:18:47,459 --> 00:18:52,030
leaving lower altitudes open for
departing planes to climb out.
380
00:18:52,097 --> 00:18:53,866
Abend: Very often we are given
381
00:18:53,932 --> 00:18:57,002
what we call
the slam dunk approach,
382
00:18:57,069 --> 00:19:00,372
where we're high and we have
to get down quickly,
383
00:19:00,439 --> 00:19:03,942
and it does create a little bit
of a challenge.
384
00:19:08,180 --> 00:19:11,917
Cox: Alright, so there's
San Francisco airport.
385
00:19:11,984 --> 00:19:13,585
Palo alto's down here,
you know...
386
00:19:13,652 --> 00:19:15,454
Narrator: Roger Cox
knows firsthand
387
00:19:15,521 --> 00:19:20,192
how challenging landing at
San Francisco airport can be.
388
00:19:20,259 --> 00:19:21,660
Cox: I could say from my own
personal experience
389
00:19:21,727 --> 00:19:22,895
flying in there many, many times
390
00:19:22,961 --> 00:19:25,197
that it's very easy
to get high and hot,
391
00:19:25,264 --> 00:19:28,200
uh, and you have to really stay
on top of the airplane.
392
00:19:28,267 --> 00:19:29,801
Controller: Asiana 214 heavy,
393
00:19:29,868 --> 00:19:32,671
runway 2-8 left,
cleared to land.
394
00:19:32,738 --> 00:19:35,774
Narrator: It all leads to
some troubling questions.
395
00:19:35,841 --> 00:19:39,545
Were the Asiana pilots
flying into danger?
396
00:19:39,611 --> 00:19:41,847
Did they face
an extraordinary risk
397
00:19:41,914 --> 00:19:46,485
at an airport notorious
for difficult landings?
398
00:19:46,552 --> 00:19:48,687
Cox: So he'd be coming in
from this direction
399
00:19:48,754 --> 00:19:50,689
straight across the bay.
400
00:19:50,756 --> 00:19:53,825
Narrator: Roger Cox studies
airport radar records.
401
00:19:53,892 --> 00:19:58,030
He wants to know if controllers
assigned Asiana flight 214
402
00:19:58,096 --> 00:20:01,700
an approach that was too fast
and steep to fly safely.
403
00:20:01,767 --> 00:20:03,135
Kang Kuk: Clear to land.
404
00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,671
Cox: There were some complaints
initially from the operator
405
00:20:05,737 --> 00:20:07,005
that this crew was being asked
to do something
406
00:20:07,072 --> 00:20:08,140
that was unreasonable,
407
00:20:08,206 --> 00:20:09,641
so we wanted to spend
quite a bit of time
408
00:20:09,708 --> 00:20:12,578
looking at whether
that was true.
409
00:20:12,644 --> 00:20:16,081
Same instructions.
Same approach.
410
00:20:16,148 --> 00:20:18,517
No one else had a problem.
411
00:20:18,584 --> 00:20:20,352
Narrator: Airport records
reveal controllers
412
00:20:20,419 --> 00:20:22,754
gave two other planes
the same instructions
413
00:20:22,821 --> 00:20:25,724
just before Asiana touched down.
414
00:20:27,392 --> 00:20:29,294
Both landed safely.
415
00:20:29,361 --> 00:20:33,031
Cox: You can't fault
the controller.
416
00:20:33,098 --> 00:20:36,168
They managed to land
triple sevens safely
417
00:20:36,234 --> 00:20:37,436
without any difficulty,
418
00:20:37,502 --> 00:20:41,740
so although it is a somewhat
challenging environment,
419
00:20:41,807 --> 00:20:47,980
we found that nothing that ATC
did really caused the accident.
420
00:20:48,046 --> 00:20:50,248
Narrator: It's another dead end.
421
00:20:50,315 --> 00:20:55,554
For now, what brought down
Asiana 214 remains a mystery.
422
00:20:57,122 --> 00:20:59,124
Along with the cause
of the accident,
423
00:20:59,191 --> 00:21:03,061
investigators are grappling with
another troubling question.
424
00:21:03,128 --> 00:21:05,464
Escape slides are engineered
to withstand
425
00:21:05,530 --> 00:21:08,367
the forces of aviation
accidents.
426
00:21:08,433 --> 00:21:13,005
Why did so many fail during
the crash of flight 214?
427
00:21:14,673 --> 00:21:17,743
English: Only two of them did
what they were supposed to do.
428
00:21:17,809 --> 00:21:21,613
Narrator: Six of the eight
slides didn't deploy properly,
429
00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:26,051
causing potentially deadly
delays in the evacuation.
430
00:21:26,118 --> 00:21:28,487
English: The fire took some time
to get into the cabin.
431
00:21:28,553 --> 00:21:29,688
That's a good thing.
432
00:21:29,755 --> 00:21:31,790
But had a fuel tank
been punctured
433
00:21:31,857 --> 00:21:33,992
or some obstacle been in the way
434
00:21:34,059 --> 00:21:35,861
and we had a much more
rapid fire,
435
00:21:35,927 --> 00:21:39,765
things could have been
very different.
436
00:21:39,831 --> 00:21:41,366
Narrator: They'll have to search
for answers
437
00:21:41,433 --> 00:21:44,803
without the help of the plane's
flight data recorder.
438
00:21:46,772 --> 00:21:49,141
The recorder is located
in the tail section
439
00:21:49,207 --> 00:21:54,646
and stopped recording when the
tail smashed into the seawall.
440
00:21:54,713 --> 00:21:56,715
There's no information
on what was happening
441
00:21:56,782 --> 00:21:59,951
at the moment
the slides deployed.
442
00:22:00,018 --> 00:22:01,119
Fedok: Okay.
443
00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:03,021
Let's see what these slides
can take.
444
00:22:03,088 --> 00:22:04,823
Narrator: To get the data
they need,
445
00:22:04,890 --> 00:22:07,693
Jason Fedok turns to
a crash test facility
446
00:22:07,759 --> 00:22:10,662
more often used
for testing cars.
447
00:22:10,729 --> 00:22:13,265
Fedok: This was unlike anything
anyone had ever seen before,
448
00:22:13,331 --> 00:22:16,101
so we wanted to figure out
how that happened.
449
00:22:16,168 --> 00:22:18,236
Narrator: He discovers that
at low speeds
450
00:22:18,303 --> 00:22:20,806
the slides perform well.
451
00:22:20,872 --> 00:22:25,844
But in high-speed impacts, like
the one on board flight 214,
452
00:22:25,911 --> 00:22:30,515
the inflation mechanism
can fail quite easily.
453
00:22:30,582 --> 00:22:33,985
Fedok: We made a recommendation
to the FAA to look at the data
454
00:22:34,052 --> 00:22:35,620
we produced from this accident
455
00:22:35,687 --> 00:22:37,122
and see if there were
improvements that could be made
456
00:22:37,189 --> 00:22:43,495
to future slide design to help
make that part more robust.
457
00:22:43,562 --> 00:22:45,230
Narrator: The violent force
of the impact
458
00:22:45,297 --> 00:22:47,999
also accounts for the injuries
suffered by the six people
459
00:22:48,066 --> 00:22:49,601
thrown from the plane,
460
00:22:49,668 --> 00:22:53,939
including the young teenager who
was run over by a fire truck.
461
00:22:56,475 --> 00:22:59,311
Autopsy results confirm
she died immediately
462
00:22:59,377 --> 00:23:02,314
after the crash impact.
463
00:23:02,380 --> 00:23:06,718
She was already dead by the time
her body was run over.
464
00:23:06,785 --> 00:23:08,220
Fedok: One of the most important
lessons here
465
00:23:08,286 --> 00:23:10,055
is to always keep
your seat belt fastened
466
00:23:10,122 --> 00:23:11,957
whenever possible
on an aircraft.
467
00:23:12,023 --> 00:23:14,793
You never know when you're gonna
have unexpected turbulence
468
00:23:14,860 --> 00:23:17,596
or be in an accident.
469
00:23:17,662 --> 00:23:20,665
Narrator: Investigators hope
flight 214's flight recorders
470
00:23:20,732 --> 00:23:23,835
will help them answer
the other urgent question.
471
00:23:23,902 --> 00:23:25,103
Jung Min: I've got control.
472
00:23:25,170 --> 00:23:28,173
Narrator: Why did flight 214
slam into the seawall
473
00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:29,508
in the first place?
474
00:23:29,574 --> 00:23:32,377
Levy: I don't think we're going
to make the runway.
475
00:23:35,080 --> 00:23:36,615
Narrator: Modern flight
recorders capture
476
00:23:36,681 --> 00:23:41,019
detailed information about
virtually every system on board,
477
00:23:41,086 --> 00:23:42,888
including the complex automation
478
00:23:42,954 --> 00:23:45,524
that helps the pilots
fly the plane.
479
00:23:45,590 --> 00:23:48,426
English: We were able to see all
the basic things, like airspeed,
480
00:23:48,493 --> 00:23:51,563
altitude, the configuration
of the airplane.
481
00:23:51,630 --> 00:23:55,500
We were also able to see all
the inputs that the crew made.
482
00:23:55,567 --> 00:23:58,270
Narrator: English carefully
plots the data.
483
00:23:58,336 --> 00:24:01,940
Most of it looks
completely normal.
484
00:24:02,007 --> 00:24:05,410
But then he spots
something unexpected.
485
00:24:05,477 --> 00:24:07,913
A little more than a minute away
from the runway,
486
00:24:07,979 --> 00:24:10,715
engine power suddenly
drops to idle.
487
00:24:10,782 --> 00:24:12,284
English: Right here.
488
00:24:12,350 --> 00:24:16,454
Narrator: The sudden change in
power settings makes no sense.
489
00:24:16,521 --> 00:24:18,223
Normally, the last moments
of flight
490
00:24:18,290 --> 00:24:21,726
are when pilots need more power,
not less.
491
00:24:21,793 --> 00:24:24,529
They need extra thrust to
overcome increased drag
492
00:24:24,596 --> 00:24:28,834
from the landing gear
and wing flaps.
493
00:24:28,900 --> 00:24:30,769
The investigation has
already determined
494
00:24:30,836 --> 00:24:35,073
that there was nothing wrong
with the engines themselves.
495
00:24:35,140 --> 00:24:37,242
English: We could see that the
engines were making proper power
496
00:24:37,309 --> 00:24:39,711
all the way through
the approach.
497
00:24:39,778 --> 00:24:42,514
Narrator: The question now--
what was the crew doing
498
00:24:42,581 --> 00:24:44,115
to control engine power
499
00:24:44,182 --> 00:24:46,351
in the critical final moments
of flight?
500
00:24:46,418 --> 00:24:47,919
Jung Min: Speed.
501
00:24:47,986 --> 00:24:49,120
English: So that brought us
right back
502
00:24:49,187 --> 00:24:52,390
to how did the pilots
operate the airplane?
503
00:24:52,457 --> 00:24:55,994
Why did they do what they did
that got the airplane too low?
504
00:24:56,061 --> 00:24:58,163
Cox: What really struck me
505
00:24:58,230 --> 00:25:00,332
was how could a couple
506
00:25:00,398 --> 00:25:03,168
of highly trained,
experienced pilots
507
00:25:03,235 --> 00:25:06,371
simply fly an airplane into
the ground short of the runway?
508
00:25:06,438 --> 00:25:08,039
I, that was the mystery.
509
00:25:08,106 --> 00:25:09,608
Jung Min: Damn it!
510
00:25:13,678 --> 00:25:17,349
Narrator: The investigation
into Asiana 214 now focuses
511
00:25:17,415 --> 00:25:21,152
squarely on the actions
of the pilots.
512
00:25:21,219 --> 00:25:22,821
Kang Kuk: Gear down, sir.
513
00:25:22,888 --> 00:25:24,322
Narrator: Understanding
every nuance
514
00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:27,826
of the cockpit voice recording
becomes crucial.
515
00:25:27,893 --> 00:25:29,194
Bramble: The CVR is key.
516
00:25:29,261 --> 00:25:30,929
Jung Min: Gear down.
517
00:25:30,996 --> 00:25:33,131
Bramble: You can tell what
the flight crew are doing.
518
00:25:33,198 --> 00:25:35,267
You can tell what they're
thinking sometimes
519
00:25:35,333 --> 00:25:36,668
because they're verbalizing it.
520
00:25:36,735 --> 00:25:38,270
You can tell how
they're deciding,
521
00:25:38,336 --> 00:25:40,538
you know, what to do next.
522
00:25:40,605 --> 00:25:43,541
Narrator: They listen as
the pilots prepare for landing.
523
00:25:43,608 --> 00:25:46,111
Kang Kuk:
Missed approach 3,000 feet.
524
00:25:46,177 --> 00:25:48,914
Narrator: They combine what
they hear with the FDR data
525
00:25:48,980 --> 00:25:52,817
that shows how the pilots were
manipulating the controls.
526
00:25:52,884 --> 00:25:54,786
Jung Min:
This seems a little high.
527
00:25:54,853 --> 00:25:56,554
Narrator: As the crew
nears the runway,
528
00:25:56,621 --> 00:26:00,125
the recording hints at the first
sign of trouble.
529
00:26:00,191 --> 00:26:02,294
Kang Kuk:
I will descend more.
530
00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:05,530
Narrator: The plane isn't
descending fast enough.
531
00:26:05,597 --> 00:26:09,334
The captain flying takes steps
to fix the problem,
532
00:26:09,401 --> 00:26:14,205
but he doesn't explain
his actions to his co-pilot.
533
00:26:14,272 --> 00:26:15,473
Bramble: No call-out.
534
00:26:15,540 --> 00:26:17,909
How's anyone supposed to know
what he's doing?
535
00:26:17,976 --> 00:26:19,678
Narrator: For investigator
bill bramble,
536
00:26:19,744 --> 00:26:21,913
it's a troubling clue.
537
00:26:21,980 --> 00:26:24,616
Bramble: The pilot flying
is supposed to actually
538
00:26:24,683 --> 00:26:26,851
select things with
the auto flight system
539
00:26:26,918 --> 00:26:28,019
and call out what he's doing,
540
00:26:28,086 --> 00:26:30,855
and the pilot monitoring
is supposed to verify
541
00:26:30,922 --> 00:26:33,224
that the change has
actually occurred.
542
00:26:33,291 --> 00:26:35,226
In this case, we saw
kind of a breakdown
543
00:26:35,293 --> 00:26:38,863
in that standard pattern of
communication and coordination.
544
00:26:38,930 --> 00:26:42,133
Kang Kuk: Flaps 20.
545
00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:45,070
Narrator: What the recording
reveals next is stunning.
546
00:26:45,136 --> 00:26:47,639
Less than 90 seconds
before impact,
547
00:26:47,706 --> 00:26:50,875
the captain makes
an inexplicable blunder.
548
00:26:50,942 --> 00:26:54,079
He switches the autopilot
to an incorrect setting,
549
00:26:54,145 --> 00:26:56,147
flight level change mode.
550
00:26:56,214 --> 00:26:59,684
That interrupts the landing and
instructs the computer to climb
551
00:26:59,751 --> 00:27:03,455
to the go-around altitude
of 3,000 feet.
552
00:27:04,656 --> 00:27:06,825
English: He made an entry
to the autopilot
553
00:27:06,891 --> 00:27:11,262
that at first actually
made the airplane climb.
554
00:27:11,329 --> 00:27:13,398
Obviously he didn't want
to do that.
555
00:27:13,465 --> 00:27:15,533
Bramble: The autopilot mode
switches here,
556
00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:17,602
starts all the confusion.
557
00:27:17,669 --> 00:27:19,504
Narrator: To bring his plane
back down,
558
00:27:19,571 --> 00:27:23,274
the captain immediately pulls
the throttles back to idle,
559
00:27:23,341 --> 00:27:26,311
a move with major repercussions.
560
00:27:26,378 --> 00:27:31,383
But once again, he doesn't tell
the other pilot what he's doing.
561
00:27:31,449 --> 00:27:33,918
Bramble: Not calling out
one single action
562
00:27:33,985 --> 00:27:37,555
wouldn't necessarily be
a fatal flaw,
563
00:27:37,622 --> 00:27:39,624
but in this particular case
564
00:27:39,691 --> 00:27:42,761
it had a big influence
on the conduct of the flight.
565
00:27:42,827 --> 00:27:43,862
Jung Min: It's low.
566
00:27:43,928 --> 00:27:45,563
Narrator: Investigators
now understand
567
00:27:45,630 --> 00:27:47,732
how the engines got to idle.
568
00:27:47,799 --> 00:27:49,000
Kang Kuk: Yeah.
569
00:27:49,067 --> 00:27:51,069
Narrator: But why would
an experienced captain
570
00:27:51,136 --> 00:27:53,705
make the mistake
of leaving them there?
571
00:27:53,772 --> 00:27:54,606
Computer: Pull up.
572
00:27:54,672 --> 00:27:55,840
Jung Min: Oh, god.
573
00:27:55,907 --> 00:27:56,975
Go around!
574
00:27:57,042 --> 00:27:58,743
Narrator: And why did the crew
not notice
575
00:27:58,810 --> 00:28:02,580
they were dangerously low
until it was too late?
576
00:28:02,647 --> 00:28:04,816
Jung Min: Damn it!
577
00:28:07,385 --> 00:28:10,655
Bramble: It's like they just
sat there and watched it happen.
578
00:28:12,857 --> 00:28:15,393
Narrator: To find answers,
bramble and cox prepare
579
00:28:15,460 --> 00:28:17,429
for a sensitive and
difficult interview
580
00:28:17,495 --> 00:28:20,498
with the pilot who was
flying the plane.
581
00:28:20,565 --> 00:28:22,333
Kang Kuk:
I'll try to help if I can.
582
00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:23,701
Bramble: We wanted to find out,
583
00:28:23,768 --> 00:28:27,372
you know, how much of what
happened did they understand?
584
00:28:27,439 --> 00:28:30,241
We wanted to find out
when they became aware
585
00:28:30,308 --> 00:28:32,210
that something was amiss,
586
00:28:32,277 --> 00:28:35,880
and so the only way to do that
was by asking them.
587
00:28:35,947 --> 00:28:37,949
Kang Kuk:
I was a bit nervous.
588
00:28:38,016 --> 00:28:39,651
Narrator: The captain explains
he was worried
589
00:28:39,717 --> 00:28:42,220
about landing in San Francisco,
590
00:28:42,287 --> 00:28:44,722
on a day when there was
no electronic runway equipment
591
00:28:44,789 --> 00:28:47,759
to help guide him.
592
00:28:47,826 --> 00:28:49,027
Cox: I thought that
was very unusual
593
00:28:49,094 --> 00:28:50,562
coming from
an experienced pilot,
594
00:28:50,628 --> 00:28:53,832
because no one really needs
an electronic glide slope
595
00:28:53,898 --> 00:28:56,534
on a clear day to be able
to land an airplane.
596
00:28:56,601 --> 00:28:58,169
It's a fundamental skill
that you have to learn
597
00:28:58,236 --> 00:29:00,171
from the time you're
a private pilot.
598
00:29:00,238 --> 00:29:04,742
Kang Kuk: Other pilots
were making that landing.
599
00:29:04,809 --> 00:29:07,212
I thought I should be able
to make it, too.
600
00:29:07,278 --> 00:29:08,880
Cox: He said everyone else
was doing it,
601
00:29:08,947 --> 00:29:11,116
so I could not say
I could not do it.
602
00:29:11,182 --> 00:29:13,751
Jung Min:
It seems a little high.
603
00:29:15,787 --> 00:29:17,922
Kang Kuk:
I will descend more.
604
00:29:17,989 --> 00:29:19,290
Bramble: I think he didn't
want to show
605
00:29:19,357 --> 00:29:23,928
that he was not confident
or that he was not prepared.
606
00:29:23,995 --> 00:29:25,930
But I think...
607
00:29:25,997 --> 00:29:28,633
I think he just didn't want
to admit the weakness.
608
00:29:28,700 --> 00:29:30,635
Jung Min: It's low.
609
00:29:30,702 --> 00:29:32,203
Narrator: The captain tells
investigators
610
00:29:32,270 --> 00:29:33,438
he doesn't understand
611
00:29:33,505 --> 00:29:37,809
why the plane didn't have
enough power on landing.
612
00:29:37,876 --> 00:29:38,977
Kang Kuk: I know
I made some mistakes,
613
00:29:39,043 --> 00:29:40,912
but I was certain
that the auto throttle
614
00:29:40,979 --> 00:29:44,315
would control the speed.
615
00:29:44,382 --> 00:29:45,950
Narrator:
Like other modern jets,
616
00:29:46,017 --> 00:29:48,119
the triple seven can
automatically increase
617
00:29:48,186 --> 00:29:49,754
or decrease engine power
618
00:29:49,821 --> 00:29:52,991
through a system known
as the auto throttle.
619
00:29:54,993 --> 00:29:56,628
English: Similar to,
but much more sophisticated,
620
00:29:56,694 --> 00:29:58,796
than your cruise control.
621
00:29:58,863 --> 00:30:00,031
Bramble: He was confident
the auto throttle
622
00:30:00,098 --> 00:30:02,667
was actually gonna take care
of speed for him.
623
00:30:02,734 --> 00:30:08,139
And in his prior experience,
they had.
624
00:30:08,206 --> 00:30:10,441
Narrator: During his
triple seven flight training,
625
00:30:10,508 --> 00:30:11,609
the captain was taught about
626
00:30:11,676 --> 00:30:14,846
the auto throttle's special
wake-up feature.
627
00:30:14,913 --> 00:30:16,981
If the plane's speed
drops too low,
628
00:30:17,048 --> 00:30:20,084
the auto throttle engages
and adds power,
629
00:30:20,151 --> 00:30:21,886
even if it's switched off.
630
00:30:21,953 --> 00:30:23,321
Kang Kuk: Amazing.
631
00:30:23,388 --> 00:30:25,623
Bramble: As he had seen this
demonstration in the simulator
632
00:30:25,690 --> 00:30:27,859
that the auto throttles
would wake up
633
00:30:27,926 --> 00:30:29,661
even if the auto throttle
was off,
634
00:30:29,727 --> 00:30:33,331
so he had this really
high level of expectancy
635
00:30:33,398 --> 00:30:35,400
that the auto throttles
would wake up,
636
00:30:35,466 --> 00:30:38,403
advance the thrust,
and keep them safe.
637
00:30:38,469 --> 00:30:41,639
Narrator: Investigators consider
a chilling possibility.
638
00:30:41,706 --> 00:30:45,176
Did a critical automated system
on a Boeing triple seven
639
00:30:45,243 --> 00:30:47,078
fail in flight?
640
00:30:47,145 --> 00:30:50,982
Is that what doomed Asiana 214?
641
00:30:55,386 --> 00:30:59,224
Cox: So the auto throttle
and autopilot
642
00:30:59,290 --> 00:31:03,528
both change modes here
and then again here.
643
00:31:03,595 --> 00:31:06,097
Narrator: Investigators dig
deeper into the flight data
644
00:31:06,164 --> 00:31:09,133
from Asiana 214.
645
00:31:09,200 --> 00:31:12,237
They search for any evidence
of a failure or malfunction
646
00:31:12,303 --> 00:31:15,940
in the plane's automated
flight systems.
647
00:31:16,007 --> 00:31:18,443
Cox: I think the most important
thing that we wanted to know
648
00:31:18,509 --> 00:31:23,881
was what auto throttle and
autopilot modes were engaged
649
00:31:23,948 --> 00:31:28,253
during the last two or three
minutes of the flight.
650
00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:30,355
Kang Kuk:
Missed approach 3,000 feet.
651
00:31:30,421 --> 00:31:32,590
Narrator: An undetected problem
with the autopilot
652
00:31:32,657 --> 00:31:34,058
or auto throttle
653
00:31:34,125 --> 00:31:37,595
could easily have led the pilots
to disaster.
654
00:31:39,597 --> 00:31:44,035
Tracing all the computerized
functions is a mammoth task.
655
00:31:44,102 --> 00:31:48,673
English studies every input,
every mode change.
656
00:31:48,740 --> 00:31:52,143
The exhaustive analysis
leaves no doubt.
657
00:31:52,210 --> 00:31:56,981
None of flight 214's automated
systems failed in any way.
658
00:31:57,048 --> 00:31:59,183
But there is evidence
of something else
659
00:31:59,250 --> 00:32:01,986
that could finally explain
what went wrong.
660
00:32:02,053 --> 00:32:04,956
English: It was pretty evident
that we could see
661
00:32:05,023 --> 00:32:07,992
some strange things happening
with automation inputs
662
00:32:08,059 --> 00:32:11,296
while that airplane was
on short final.
663
00:32:11,362 --> 00:32:15,300
Narrator: The analysis reveals
that the pilots of Asiana 214
664
00:32:15,366 --> 00:32:18,703
punched in a bizarre
sequence of inputs,
665
00:32:18,770 --> 00:32:22,440
a sequence that most pilots
would never carry out.
666
00:32:22,507 --> 00:32:27,512
First choosing an autopilot mode
rarely used during descent,
667
00:32:27,578 --> 00:32:29,480
then pulling back
on the thrust levers
668
00:32:29,547 --> 00:32:33,117
when that error put the plane
into a climb.
669
00:32:37,055 --> 00:32:38,623
Cox: Bingo!
670
00:32:38,690 --> 00:32:40,124
That does it.
671
00:32:40,191 --> 00:32:42,527
Narrator: The unusual
combination of commands
672
00:32:42,593 --> 00:32:46,564
switches off the triple seven's
built-in speed protection,
673
00:32:46,631 --> 00:32:48,866
leaving the engines at idle.
674
00:32:48,933 --> 00:32:50,935
English: At that point
he disconnected the autopilot,
675
00:32:51,002 --> 00:32:54,572
so now up, down, left, and right
was in his hands.
676
00:32:54,639 --> 00:32:56,974
He grabbed the throttles
and reduced them,
677
00:32:57,041 --> 00:32:59,177
like taking his foot
off the gas.
678
00:32:59,243 --> 00:33:01,412
By doing that,
that sent the signal
679
00:33:01,479 --> 00:33:03,181
to the auto throttle system
680
00:33:03,247 --> 00:33:05,783
that he wanted control
of the power as well.
681
00:33:05,850 --> 00:33:07,452
So at that point in effect
682
00:33:07,518 --> 00:33:10,655
the airplane was basically
just gliding.
683
00:33:10,722 --> 00:33:13,991
Narrator: Investigators finally
understand why the auto throttle
684
00:33:14,058 --> 00:33:18,162
did not re-engage and boost
engine thrust on landing.
685
00:33:18,229 --> 00:33:20,565
But puzzling questions remain.
686
00:33:20,631 --> 00:33:25,002
Why was the captain so uncertain
about autopilot functions?
687
00:33:25,069 --> 00:33:30,375
And why couldn't the crew react
in time to save the plane?
688
00:33:30,441 --> 00:33:34,612
Cox: 22,000 hours between them.
689
00:33:34,679 --> 00:33:38,549
You'd think they'd
notice the speed.
690
00:33:38,616 --> 00:33:40,818
Narrator: Translated from
the original Korean,
691
00:33:40,885 --> 00:33:43,221
the cockpit documents
go a long way
692
00:33:43,287 --> 00:33:45,390
toward providing some answers.
693
00:33:45,456 --> 00:33:46,791
Cox: It turned out
one of the important things
694
00:33:46,858 --> 00:33:50,161
that we recovered was
the pilot's training record,
695
00:33:50,228 --> 00:33:54,031
which had detailed history
of what he had accomplished
696
00:33:54,098 --> 00:33:56,434
right up to the time
of the accident.
697
00:33:56,501 --> 00:33:59,270
Narrator: The documents reveal
flight 214
698
00:33:59,337 --> 00:34:02,974
was a critical training flight
for captain lee Kang Kuk.
699
00:34:03,040 --> 00:34:04,809
Kang Kuk:
Is that the golden gate?
700
00:34:04,876 --> 00:34:07,412
Narrator: He was transferring
to the Boeing triple seven
701
00:34:07,478 --> 00:34:10,448
after flying the airbus A320,
702
00:34:10,515 --> 00:34:14,252
an aircraft with a very
different type of automation.
703
00:34:14,318 --> 00:34:15,787
Jung Min: Golden gate's
over there.
704
00:34:15,853 --> 00:34:18,322
That bridge goes to Oakland.
705
00:34:18,389 --> 00:34:20,258
Abend: It's a different
philosophy of flying,
706
00:34:20,324 --> 00:34:23,428
and he had flown the airbus
for quite some time,
707
00:34:23,494 --> 00:34:28,399
so the transition may still
have been an awkward moment.
708
00:34:28,466 --> 00:34:29,801
Cox: It was a training flight.
709
00:34:29,867 --> 00:34:31,803
Narrator: The training records
reveal the captain
710
00:34:31,869 --> 00:34:35,072
had been having trouble
making the change.
711
00:34:35,139 --> 00:34:37,742
Cox: The instructor was
fairly critical.
712
00:34:37,809 --> 00:34:41,946
He indicated he felt that
the captain who was in training
713
00:34:42,013 --> 00:34:45,383
wasn't sufficiently diligent
and attentive to procedure.
714
00:34:45,450 --> 00:34:47,318
Narrator: That recent criticism
may have been
715
00:34:47,385 --> 00:34:52,323
on lee Kang Kuk's mind
as he headed to San Francisco.
716
00:34:52,390 --> 00:34:53,391
Bramble: He was a little bit
stressed,
717
00:34:53,458 --> 00:34:56,360
because it was
a training flight,
718
00:34:56,427 --> 00:35:00,431
and he was being monitored
by this more senior pilot,
719
00:35:00,498 --> 00:35:02,934
and possibly because
of this previous flight
720
00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:05,636
where he hadn't performed
so well.
721
00:35:08,239 --> 00:35:10,141
Narrator: But why were
the pilots so slow
722
00:35:10,208 --> 00:35:14,011
to recognize the danger?
723
00:35:14,078 --> 00:35:16,147
English: The question that
was on everybody's mind
724
00:35:16,214 --> 00:35:18,616
and carried all the way
through this investigation
725
00:35:18,683 --> 00:35:21,085
is what was going on
in the pilots' heads?
726
00:35:21,152 --> 00:35:22,620
Kang Kuk: Clear to land.
727
00:35:22,687 --> 00:35:23,921
Narrator: Even though
the landing system
728
00:35:23,988 --> 00:35:25,957
was out of service,
there was another way
729
00:35:26,023 --> 00:35:29,927
for the pilots to know
their plane was too low.
730
00:35:29,994 --> 00:35:31,929
The runway is equipped
with special lights
731
00:35:31,996 --> 00:35:33,664
that change color
to alert pilots
732
00:35:33,731 --> 00:35:37,468
if the approach angle is off.
733
00:35:37,535 --> 00:35:40,137
English: The papi, precision
approach path indicator,
734
00:35:40,204 --> 00:35:43,641
that also aid pilots
in the proper vertical path,
735
00:35:43,708 --> 00:35:45,743
those were operating and
were operating properly
736
00:35:45,810 --> 00:35:47,512
at the time of the accident.
737
00:35:47,578 --> 00:35:48,713
Jung Min: It's low.
738
00:35:48,779 --> 00:35:50,815
Narrator: The pilots were shown
four red lights,
739
00:35:50,882 --> 00:35:53,951
meaning the plane
is dangerously low.
740
00:35:54,018 --> 00:35:55,386
English: We had a lot of data,
741
00:35:55,453 --> 00:35:57,154
and it pretty much showed us
an airplane
742
00:35:57,221 --> 00:35:59,290
that was working exactly
as it was designed.
743
00:35:59,357 --> 00:36:00,758
That wasn't difficult.
744
00:36:00,825 --> 00:36:04,495
Getting into the whys of why
human beings do what they do
745
00:36:04,562 --> 00:36:08,299
or don't notice things
is a lot more difficult,
746
00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:13,704
and explaining that can be
the hardest task of all.
747
00:36:13,771 --> 00:36:15,172
Narrator: Especially troubling,
748
00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:17,575
why did the more experienced
commander wait
749
00:36:17,642 --> 00:36:22,079
until it was too late before
taking control of the plane?
750
00:36:22,146 --> 00:36:23,347
Jung Min: I've got control.
751
00:36:23,414 --> 00:36:24,949
Narrator: If he had
intervened sooner,
752
00:36:25,016 --> 00:36:29,654
he would almost certainly have
prevented the accident.
753
00:36:29,720 --> 00:36:31,422
English: The airplane was
perfectly flyable
754
00:36:31,489 --> 00:36:33,357
up until really the last minute,
755
00:36:33,424 --> 00:36:35,626
so at any point there were
a number of places
756
00:36:35,693 --> 00:36:38,396
where someone could intervene,
someone could take over,
757
00:36:38,462 --> 00:36:40,698
someone could make
a small change,
758
00:36:40,765 --> 00:36:42,667
and this would have come out
very differently.
759
00:36:42,733 --> 00:36:44,035
Cox: Yeah, we're just trying
to get a sense
760
00:36:44,101 --> 00:36:47,104
of how much experience your guys
would have flying by hand.
761
00:36:47,171 --> 00:36:48,973
Can you get me
some numbers on that?
762
00:36:49,040 --> 00:36:52,009
Narrator: They learn that Asiana
has strict policies
763
00:36:52,076 --> 00:36:55,246
encouraging pilots to rely
on their aircraft automation
764
00:36:55,313 --> 00:36:56,814
as much as possible.
765
00:36:56,881 --> 00:37:00,151
They rarely practice landing
the plane by hand.
766
00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:01,619
Cox: And we have to go to
the company's procedures
767
00:37:01,686 --> 00:37:03,721
and training, and there is where
768
00:37:03,788 --> 00:37:06,557
I think we put our finger
on the issue.
769
00:37:06,624 --> 00:37:08,893
Controller:
Cleared visual approach.
770
00:37:08,960 --> 00:37:11,128
Narrator: Investigators are
shocked to learn
771
00:37:11,195 --> 00:37:13,331
that this arrival
in San Francisco
772
00:37:13,397 --> 00:37:15,933
was the first time the captain
ever attempted
773
00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:17,668
to land a triple seven
774
00:37:17,735 --> 00:37:21,372
with no help from the glide
slope signal on the runway.
775
00:37:23,774 --> 00:37:26,377
Cox: When it comes
to visual landings,
776
00:37:26,444 --> 00:37:30,214
this guy's an absolute beginner.
777
00:37:30,281 --> 00:37:32,250
Bramble: The vast majority
of the time
778
00:37:32,316 --> 00:37:35,119
he had been flying instrument
approaches into airports,
779
00:37:35,186 --> 00:37:37,788
even when he was technically
flying the visual approach.
780
00:37:37,855 --> 00:37:42,693
Cox: 10,000 hours,
almost no hand flying.
781
00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:45,396
Narrator: It's a stunning
discovery.
782
00:37:45,463 --> 00:37:48,966
Despite nearly 10,000 hours
as an airline pilot,
783
00:37:49,033 --> 00:37:51,035
the captain has almost
no experience
784
00:37:51,102 --> 00:37:54,005
flying his plane by hand.
785
00:37:54,071 --> 00:37:55,906
Jung Min:
It seems a little high.
786
00:37:55,973 --> 00:37:58,175
Cox: You take away all the
time that was on the autopilot,
787
00:37:58,242 --> 00:38:00,645
and if you look at all of the
flight hours that they had...
788
00:38:00,711 --> 00:38:01,746
Kang Kuk:
I will descend more.
789
00:38:01,812 --> 00:38:03,314
Cox: ...they may have
actually only had
790
00:38:03,381 --> 00:38:06,484
a couple of hundred hours
of hand flying the airplane,
791
00:38:06,550 --> 00:38:10,521
maybe even less, during the
years that they had been flying.
792
00:38:10,588 --> 00:38:12,957
So they hadn't been
honing their skills.
793
00:38:13,024 --> 00:38:15,626
Narrator: Investigators also
learn that the commander,
794
00:38:15,693 --> 00:38:17,461
though an experienced pilot,
795
00:38:17,528 --> 00:38:21,732
had never before supervised
a training flight like this one.
796
00:38:21,799 --> 00:38:23,234
Jung Min: It's low.
797
00:38:23,300 --> 00:38:26,837
Narrator: His inexperience most
likely led him to wait too long
798
00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:28,773
before taking over the controls.
799
00:38:28,839 --> 00:38:30,474
Jung Min: Speed!
800
00:38:30,541 --> 00:38:32,543
English: As a flight instructor,
knowing that critical point,
801
00:38:32,610 --> 00:38:33,978
when to intervene,
802
00:38:34,045 --> 00:38:38,349
when a pilot is, or a student
is going a little bit too far,
803
00:38:38,416 --> 00:38:41,686
is one of the hardest tasks
to learn as an instructor.
804
00:38:41,752 --> 00:38:46,490
It takes experience, time and
a little bit of extra knowledge
805
00:38:46,557 --> 00:38:49,260
being ahead of the airplane
yourself as the instructor
806
00:38:49,326 --> 00:38:51,996
to see these things
starting to decay.
807
00:38:52,063 --> 00:38:54,465
Narrator: Investigators agree
the Asiana crew
808
00:38:54,532 --> 00:38:57,501
made serious mistakes
that caused the crash.
809
00:38:57,568 --> 00:39:00,304
Cox: Bottom line,
they let their speed drop.
810
00:39:00,371 --> 00:39:01,372
Narrator: But they don't agree
811
00:39:01,439 --> 00:39:04,041
on why the pilots made
those mistakes.
812
00:39:04,108 --> 00:39:07,545
Bramble: I think those modes
would confuse most pilots.
813
00:39:07,611 --> 00:39:11,148
Cox: But it's their job
not to be confused.
814
00:39:11,215 --> 00:39:15,152
Narrator: Bill bramble believes
technology is to blame.
815
00:39:15,219 --> 00:39:16,754
Bramble: The way that
we design airplanes
816
00:39:16,821 --> 00:39:19,924
and the way that airplane
flight decks are evolving
817
00:39:19,990 --> 00:39:23,961
are influencing the ability of
flight crews to stay in the loop
818
00:39:24,028 --> 00:39:26,464
and understand what's going on.
819
00:39:26,530 --> 00:39:28,466
Narrator: But Roger Cox believes
the fault lies
820
00:39:28,532 --> 00:39:30,968
squarely with the human pilots.
821
00:39:31,035 --> 00:39:35,406
Cox: We say pilots use cues
to figure out, "where are we?".
822
00:39:35,473 --> 00:39:40,544
So I couldn't quite grasp
why a professional crew
823
00:39:40,611 --> 00:39:43,280
hadn't picked up
on these obvious cues
824
00:39:43,347 --> 00:39:45,916
that were right
in front of them.
825
00:39:47,885 --> 00:39:50,121
Narrator: The crash
of Asiana 214
826
00:39:50,187 --> 00:39:52,823
sparks a heated discussion
among industry experts
827
00:39:52,890 --> 00:39:57,595
working to make aviation safer.
828
00:39:57,661 --> 00:40:01,932
It's an age-old debate
of man versus machine.
829
00:40:03,567 --> 00:40:04,869
English:
What's more significant?
830
00:40:04,935 --> 00:40:07,304
Is it more significant
that the pilots
831
00:40:07,371 --> 00:40:09,707
did not simply take
manual control
832
00:40:09,774 --> 00:40:12,643
and fly this airplane
to the runway or go around?
833
00:40:12,710 --> 00:40:15,946
Or is it more significant that
they were in this environment
834
00:40:16,013 --> 00:40:19,350
of automation that some people
think was too complex?
835
00:40:19,416 --> 00:40:23,020
Bramble: Well, they fluked into
it, the worst mode possible.
836
00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,523
Narrator: The more complex
automation becomes,
837
00:40:25,589 --> 00:40:27,057
the more difficult it can be
838
00:40:27,124 --> 00:40:30,528
for pilots to understand
the entire system.
839
00:40:30,594 --> 00:40:33,297
Bramble: I am not confident
that the majority of pilots,
840
00:40:33,364 --> 00:40:36,567
triple seven pilots at the time,
would have been able to predict
841
00:40:36,634 --> 00:40:39,303
the modes that the airplane
would end up in.
842
00:40:41,272 --> 00:40:43,774
Narrator: There have been other
deadly accidents in recent years
843
00:40:43,841 --> 00:40:45,810
that underscore
bill bramble's concern
844
00:40:45,876 --> 00:40:49,580
about automation confusion.
845
00:40:49,647 --> 00:40:54,118
Turkish airways flight 1951
was carrying 128 passengers
846
00:40:54,185 --> 00:40:56,587
on approach to Amsterdam
847
00:40:56,654 --> 00:41:01,458
when a faulty altimeter sent
incorrect data to the autopilot.
848
00:41:01,525 --> 00:41:03,828
Speed began to drop.
849
00:41:03,894 --> 00:41:06,363
Like the crew of Asiana 214,
850
00:41:06,430 --> 00:41:09,533
the Turkish airways pilots
failed to react,
851
00:41:09,600 --> 00:41:13,170
thinking the plane's automation
would maintain a safe speed.
852
00:41:17,107 --> 00:41:20,544
Accidents like this
are extremely rare.
853
00:41:20,611 --> 00:41:21,979
Jung Min: It's low.
854
00:41:22,046 --> 00:41:25,182
Narrator: But researchers say
that's part of the problem.
855
00:41:25,249 --> 00:41:26,984
Automation fails so rarely...
856
00:41:27,051 --> 00:41:27,885
Kang Kuk: Yeah.
857
00:41:27,952 --> 00:41:29,220
Narrator: ...that when it does,
858
00:41:29,286 --> 00:41:33,524
pilots aren't able to react
as quickly as they should.
859
00:41:33,591 --> 00:41:35,326
Jung Min: Damn it!
860
00:41:38,128 --> 00:41:41,098
Hang on! Hang on!
861
00:41:41,165 --> 00:41:43,133
Bramble: To me,
this accident shows
862
00:41:43,200 --> 00:41:44,869
the inevitable consequences
863
00:41:44,935 --> 00:41:49,173
of the evolution
of the modern flight deck--
864
00:41:49,240 --> 00:41:52,610
the increased automation,
which has improved reliability,
865
00:41:52,676 --> 00:41:55,145
efficiency and safety
in many ways,
866
00:41:55,212 --> 00:41:57,581
but has left us with some
unintended consequences
867
00:41:57,648 --> 00:42:02,386
when something anomalous occurs.
868
00:42:02,453 --> 00:42:05,022
Narrator: But not everyone
agrees that cockpit automation
869
00:42:05,089 --> 00:42:07,391
has gone too far.
870
00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:10,661
Cox: Bottom line,
it's the pilot's responsibility
871
00:42:10,728 --> 00:42:13,397
to fly that plane.
872
00:42:13,464 --> 00:42:14,798
Having flown a lot of airliners
873
00:42:14,865 --> 00:42:17,334
for well over 30 years
in my career,
874
00:42:17,401 --> 00:42:19,570
I always felt it was incumbent
on me and other, all pilots
875
00:42:19,637 --> 00:42:23,774
to fully and totally understand
every aspect of the airplane,
876
00:42:23,841 --> 00:42:26,343
particularly
the flight path control,
877
00:42:26,410 --> 00:42:28,512
the autopilot and
the auto flight system,
878
00:42:28,579 --> 00:42:31,916
so you understood what
it was going to do.
879
00:42:31,982 --> 00:42:35,653
Narrator: In their final report
on the crash of Asiana 214,
880
00:42:35,719 --> 00:42:39,757
investigators address both sides
of the argument.
881
00:42:39,823 --> 00:42:43,627
They list pilot error
as the probable cause,
882
00:42:43,694 --> 00:42:45,362
but they also cite
the complexities
883
00:42:45,429 --> 00:42:49,667
of the automation system
as a contributing factor.
884
00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:51,435
In an unusual move,
885
00:42:51,502 --> 00:42:53,804
the report includes statements
from four members
886
00:42:53,871 --> 00:42:56,507
of the national transportation
safety board,
887
00:42:56,573 --> 00:43:00,911
each emphasizing their own
personal views on the crash.
888
00:43:03,147 --> 00:43:05,816
The report calls for better
training for pilots,
889
00:43:05,883 --> 00:43:12,089
including more time spent flying
without the use of automation.
890
00:43:12,156 --> 00:43:13,657
English: There's a great
movement now in the industry
891
00:43:13,724 --> 00:43:15,893
towards going back to basics.
892
00:43:15,960 --> 00:43:19,163
We've talked a lot about
over-reliance on automation,
893
00:43:19,229 --> 00:43:21,065
but airplanes still fly
pretty much the same way
894
00:43:21,131 --> 00:43:22,967
they have for decades.
895
00:43:23,033 --> 00:43:25,536
And we want to get back
to making sure
896
00:43:25,602 --> 00:43:27,771
that pilots are ahead
of the airplane,
897
00:43:27,838 --> 00:43:29,640
aware of what's going on
around them,
898
00:43:29,707 --> 00:43:33,544
and able to keep themselves
in that loop of flying,
899
00:43:33,610 --> 00:43:36,780
whether the automation
is doing it or not.
900
00:43:36,847 --> 00:43:39,817
Narrator: The report also urges
more intuitive designs
901
00:43:39,883 --> 00:43:43,554
for aircraft automation
and better alarms in the cockpit
902
00:43:43,620 --> 00:43:48,092
to warn pilots if their speed
gets too low.
903
00:43:48,158 --> 00:43:49,693
English: It's hardly ever
that we have an accident
904
00:43:49,760 --> 00:43:51,362
that's really just one thing.
905
00:43:51,428 --> 00:43:53,163
The hard part is
to say which one
906
00:43:53,230 --> 00:43:54,898
is really that critical event?
907
00:43:54,965 --> 00:43:57,067
Which is the straw
that broke the camel's back?
908
00:43:57,134 --> 00:43:58,502
If there is any such thing.
909
00:43:58,569 --> 00:44:00,437
Sometimes it takes
all those little things
910
00:44:00,504 --> 00:44:03,140
to make the accident happen.
73556
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