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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,135 --> 00:00:04,537 Computer: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 2 00:00:04,604 --> 00:00:08,007 Narrator: A final approach goes horribly wrong. 3 00:00:10,877 --> 00:00:13,880 Man: Just wondering how it's gonna end. 4 00:00:13,947 --> 00:00:16,282 Narrator: The dramatic rescue in San Francisco 5 00:00:16,349 --> 00:00:18,385 is caught on camera. 6 00:00:18,451 --> 00:00:21,421 Man: They used the terms "mass casualty event.". 7 00:00:21,488 --> 00:00:23,123 Narrator: The search for a cause... 8 00:00:23,189 --> 00:00:24,257 Man: Bingo! 9 00:00:24,324 --> 00:00:26,226 Narrator: ...divides air safety experts. 10 00:00:26,292 --> 00:00:27,827 Man: The worst mode possible! 11 00:00:27,894 --> 00:00:29,195 Man: I disagree. 12 00:00:29,262 --> 00:00:31,364 Narrator: Was it the pilots, the plane, 13 00:00:31,431 --> 00:00:35,535 or something else that doomed Asiana flight 214? 14 00:00:35,602 --> 00:00:36,936 Man: The hard part is to say 15 00:00:37,003 --> 00:00:41,441 which one is the straw that broke the camel's back? 16 00:00:41,508 --> 00:00:42,342 Flight attendant: Ladies and gentlemen, 17 00:00:42,409 --> 00:00:43,743 we are starting our approach. 18 00:00:43,810 --> 00:00:44,978 Pilot: We lost both engines! 19 00:00:45,044 --> 00:00:46,079 Flight attendant: Put the mask over your nose. 20 00:00:46,146 --> 00:00:46,980 Emergency descent. 21 00:00:47,046 --> 00:00:48,047 Pilot: Mayday, mayday. 22 00:00:48,114 --> 00:00:50,083 Flight attendant: Brace for impact! 23 00:00:50,150 --> 00:00:51,351 Controller: I think I lost one. 24 00:00:51,418 --> 00:00:52,952 Man: Investigation starting into this tragedy... 25 00:00:54,421 --> 00:00:56,222 Man: He's gonna crash! 26 00:01:10,537 --> 00:01:11,471 Lee Kang Kuk: Ladies and gentlemen, 27 00:01:11,538 --> 00:01:12,739 this is your captain speaking. 28 00:01:12,806 --> 00:01:14,908 We hope you had a pleasant flight. 29 00:01:14,974 --> 00:01:18,344 We'll be on the ground in about 30 minutes. 30 00:01:18,411 --> 00:01:22,415 Enjoy your stay in San Francisco and hope to see you again soon. 31 00:01:22,482 --> 00:01:24,951 Narrator: Asiana flight 214 is nearing the end 32 00:01:25,018 --> 00:01:29,289 of an overnight flight from Seoul, Korea, to San Francisco. 33 00:01:31,324 --> 00:01:35,728 Ben levy is a frequent flyer returning home. 34 00:01:35,795 --> 00:01:38,565 Ben levy: I fly pretty often for business or visiting my family. 35 00:01:38,631 --> 00:01:39,732 I'm originally from France, 36 00:01:39,799 --> 00:01:42,268 and so, you know, I fly long distance a lot. 37 00:01:42,335 --> 00:01:47,874 I fly in and out of SFO a lot, so I know the airport very well. 38 00:01:47,941 --> 00:01:51,511 Narrator: Many of the other 291 passengers are Chinese, 39 00:01:51,578 --> 00:01:53,012 including a group of teenagers 40 00:01:53,079 --> 00:01:56,749 on their way to summer camp in the united states. 41 00:01:56,816 --> 00:01:58,718 Levy: I think they were all pretty excited about the trip. 42 00:01:58,785 --> 00:02:01,421 I think they were all like, you know, having a good time 43 00:02:01,488 --> 00:02:06,226 and excited to be in that plane and going to the U.S. 44 00:02:06,292 --> 00:02:07,861 Kang Kuk: Is that the golden gate? 45 00:02:07,927 --> 00:02:10,296 Narrator: Captain lee Kang Kuk takes in the sights 46 00:02:10,363 --> 00:02:13,800 as he guides the plane toward the airport. 47 00:02:13,867 --> 00:02:15,668 Lee Jung Min: Golden gate's over there. 48 00:02:15,735 --> 00:02:17,370 That bridge goes to Oakland. 49 00:02:17,437 --> 00:02:19,539 Kang Kuk: Ah. Okay. 50 00:02:19,606 --> 00:02:21,574 Narrator: Lee Jung Min, also a captain, 51 00:02:21,641 --> 00:02:24,444 is serving as first officer today. 52 00:02:24,511 --> 00:02:26,779 Levy: Yeah, I remember it being a just gorgeous day, 53 00:02:26,846 --> 00:02:28,348 as good as it can be. 54 00:02:28,414 --> 00:02:33,386 No wind, beautiful, sunny day, not a single cloud in the sky. 55 00:02:33,453 --> 00:02:35,255 Les Abend: The arrival into San Francisco 56 00:02:35,321 --> 00:02:37,590 is a very scenic approach. 57 00:02:37,657 --> 00:02:39,259 From the sierra mountains 58 00:02:39,325 --> 00:02:42,629 all the way into the San Francisco bay area, 59 00:02:42,695 --> 00:02:45,465 it's a very pretty arrival. 60 00:02:47,767 --> 00:02:49,369 Jung Min: Runway in sight. 61 00:02:49,435 --> 00:02:52,672 Controller: Asiana 214 heavy, turn left 3-1-0 degrees, 62 00:02:52,739 --> 00:02:54,507 cleared visual approach. 63 00:02:54,574 --> 00:02:55,775 Narrator: Controllers clear the crew 64 00:02:55,842 --> 00:02:58,378 for their final turn to the runway. 65 00:02:58,444 --> 00:03:00,413 Abend: It is a busy piece of airspace. 66 00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:02,448 You do have to listen on the frequency 67 00:03:02,515 --> 00:03:04,183 and you do have to anticipate 68 00:03:04,250 --> 00:03:06,786 what the controller is going to give you. 69 00:03:06,853 --> 00:03:09,289 In addition, experience really counts 70 00:03:09,355 --> 00:03:11,524 flying into San Francisco. 71 00:03:11,591 --> 00:03:15,161 Jung Min: Cleared visual approach, Asiana 214. 72 00:03:15,228 --> 00:03:16,195 Kang Kuk: Okay. 73 00:03:16,262 --> 00:03:18,531 Gear down, sir. 74 00:03:21,367 --> 00:03:22,602 Jung Min: Gear down. 75 00:03:22,669 --> 00:03:24,771 Abend: The way we put on the brakes in an airplane 76 00:03:24,837 --> 00:03:26,973 is by putting our, our trailing edge flaps down 77 00:03:27,040 --> 00:03:30,543 and our leading edge devices down, and even the gear. 78 00:03:30,610 --> 00:03:33,279 That's our brake. 79 00:03:33,346 --> 00:03:35,615 Narrator: They then enter an altitude to climb to 80 00:03:35,682 --> 00:03:37,850 in case of a missed approach. 81 00:03:37,917 --> 00:03:40,486 Kang Kuk: Missed approach, 3,000 feet. 82 00:03:43,823 --> 00:03:45,091 Narrator: In the cabin, 83 00:03:45,158 --> 00:03:48,461 the flight attendants prepare passengers for landing. 84 00:03:51,230 --> 00:03:56,769 Controller: Asiana 214 heavy, runway 2-8 left, clear to land. 85 00:03:56,836 --> 00:03:58,571 Jung Min: Landing checklist complete. 86 00:03:58,638 --> 00:03:59,806 Clear to land. 87 00:03:59,872 --> 00:04:01,941 On glide path. 88 00:04:02,008 --> 00:04:04,377 Narrator: The pilots check a set of lights beside the runway 89 00:04:04,444 --> 00:04:07,914 that can help guide them to a safe landing. 90 00:04:07,981 --> 00:04:10,116 Kang Kuk: Check. 91 00:04:14,087 --> 00:04:17,190 Narrator: The plane is less than a minute from the runway 92 00:04:17,256 --> 00:04:20,793 when ben levy realizes something is wrong. 93 00:04:22,895 --> 00:04:25,765 Levy: I remember noticing that there's a small pier 94 00:04:25,832 --> 00:04:27,433 that extends out of the runway, 95 00:04:27,500 --> 00:04:31,838 and I'm like, wow, we're very low. 96 00:04:31,904 --> 00:04:32,839 And I dismissed the thought, 97 00:04:32,905 --> 00:04:34,741 thinking, well, what can go wrong? 98 00:04:34,807 --> 00:04:36,042 There's all the technology on board 99 00:04:36,109 --> 00:04:39,545 to make sure that those guys don't, don't mess up. 100 00:04:39,612 --> 00:04:41,047 Narrator: In the cockpit... 101 00:04:41,114 --> 00:04:42,048 Jung Min: Speed! 102 00:04:42,115 --> 00:04:43,282 Narrator: ...a crisis hits. 103 00:04:43,349 --> 00:04:45,018 Computer: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 104 00:04:45,084 --> 00:04:47,353 Jung Min: I've got control. 105 00:04:49,055 --> 00:04:51,624 Oh, god! Go around! 106 00:04:54,227 --> 00:04:55,862 Levy: In that fraction of a second, 107 00:04:55,928 --> 00:05:00,833 I feel the thrust of the engine re-engaging full throttle. 108 00:05:00,900 --> 00:05:05,738 Narrator: The captain pulls up the nose and tries to climb. 109 00:05:05,805 --> 00:05:08,341 But it may be too late. 110 00:05:08,408 --> 00:05:11,477 Levy: Hang on. Looks like we're not gonna make the runway. 111 00:05:11,544 --> 00:05:14,847 At that point I'm thinking we're gonna hit the water. 112 00:05:17,150 --> 00:05:19,952 Computer: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 113 00:05:21,754 --> 00:05:23,723 Levy: The impact was very violent. 114 00:05:23,790 --> 00:05:32,231 ♪ 115 00:05:32,298 --> 00:05:33,800 Just wondering how it's gonna end, 116 00:05:33,866 --> 00:05:38,037 how it's gonna stop and when it's gonna stop. 117 00:05:38,104 --> 00:05:40,473 Jung Min: Hang on! Hang on! 118 00:05:51,117 --> 00:05:53,686 Levy: So the plane comes to a rest. 119 00:05:57,990 --> 00:06:01,294 And nothing moves. 120 00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:03,096 And all you hear is moaning 121 00:06:03,162 --> 00:06:06,933 from people that are hurt and injured. 122 00:06:06,999 --> 00:06:09,102 Here. Here. 123 00:06:09,168 --> 00:06:12,038 If you press hard it will stop the bleeding. 124 00:06:14,273 --> 00:06:17,110 Narrator: In the cockpit, the pilots have survived, 125 00:06:17,176 --> 00:06:22,348 but they have no idea how badly damaged their aircraft is. 126 00:06:22,415 --> 00:06:27,286 The brutal impact has torn the tail off the body of the plane. 127 00:06:27,353 --> 00:06:29,088 Jung Min: Control, come in. 128 00:06:29,155 --> 00:06:31,524 It's Asiana 214. 129 00:06:31,591 --> 00:06:35,094 Initiating evacuation checklist. 130 00:06:35,161 --> 00:06:36,596 We need help out here. 131 00:06:36,662 --> 00:06:37,797 Controller: Asiana 214 heavy, 132 00:06:37,864 --> 00:06:39,832 emergency vehicles are responding. 133 00:06:45,805 --> 00:06:47,507 Narrator: An engine is burning. 134 00:06:47,573 --> 00:06:51,677 If fire spreads to the fuel tanks, the plane could explode. 135 00:06:51,744 --> 00:06:55,515 Passengers need to find a way out, fast. 136 00:06:55,581 --> 00:06:56,983 Levy: Let's see if we can open this door. 137 00:06:57,049 --> 00:06:59,218 I remember just going for that big lever 138 00:06:59,285 --> 00:07:01,320 on the right-hand side of this airplane 139 00:07:01,387 --> 00:07:05,992 and just opening this door and was shocked at how easy it was. 140 00:07:06,058 --> 00:07:09,562 Narrator: But getting down to the ground will not be easy. 141 00:07:09,629 --> 00:07:12,865 Levy: I'm expecting at that point to see a slide open. 142 00:07:12,932 --> 00:07:14,600 I had the whole, like, hey, you open the door, 143 00:07:14,667 --> 00:07:18,471 the slide's gonna open, and there's no slide. 144 00:07:19,872 --> 00:07:20,873 Whoa. 145 00:07:20,940 --> 00:07:22,341 Okay. 146 00:07:22,408 --> 00:07:24,277 Help each other. 147 00:07:24,343 --> 00:07:25,578 Come on. 148 00:07:25,645 --> 00:07:27,814 Narrator: Luckily, some crumpled pieces of the fuselage 149 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:32,185 have formed a makeshift set of stairs. 150 00:07:32,251 --> 00:07:33,619 Ben levy stays by the door 151 00:07:33,686 --> 00:07:36,689 to help the other passengers climb down. 152 00:07:36,756 --> 00:07:37,857 Levy: Come on. 153 00:07:37,924 --> 00:07:39,292 You know, in this whole disaster 154 00:07:39,358 --> 00:07:41,427 they find that the fuselage actually had crumbled on itself, 155 00:07:41,494 --> 00:07:45,264 almost provided like a step that became probably critical 156 00:07:45,331 --> 00:07:48,134 for people, people to exit that plane. 157 00:07:48,201 --> 00:07:51,571 Woman: Oh, my god. That's scary. 158 00:07:51,637 --> 00:07:53,606 Narrator: Eyewitness video captures the dramatic scene 159 00:07:53,673 --> 00:07:57,844 as hundreds of people flee the cabin from only a few exits. 160 00:08:01,247 --> 00:08:03,316 The triple seven has eight exits. 161 00:08:03,382 --> 00:08:06,886 Each is equipped with an emergency escape slide. 162 00:08:06,953 --> 00:08:10,489 The slides are supposed to inflate automatically, 163 00:08:10,556 --> 00:08:13,793 but only two have deployed properly. 164 00:08:17,730 --> 00:08:19,365 Flight attendant: Someone? 165 00:08:19,432 --> 00:08:21,033 Please help me! 166 00:08:21,100 --> 00:08:23,502 Narrator: What's worse, two of the malfunctioning slides 167 00:08:23,569 --> 00:08:26,906 have inflated inside the plane. 168 00:08:26,973 --> 00:08:28,641 A flight attendant is trapped. 169 00:08:28,708 --> 00:08:31,410 Flight attendant: I can't move. 170 00:08:31,477 --> 00:08:34,413 If you pull, I can try. 171 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:35,781 No. 172 00:08:35,848 --> 00:08:37,884 Get something sharp. 173 00:08:37,950 --> 00:08:40,186 Ah! Ugh! 174 00:08:40,253 --> 00:08:43,089 Bill bramble: She couldn't breathe under the slide. 175 00:08:43,155 --> 00:08:46,359 Narrator: Bill bramble is an air emergency expert. 176 00:08:46,425 --> 00:08:50,062 He understands the desperation the crew is facing. 177 00:08:50,129 --> 00:08:52,064 Bramble: They were worried about her suffocating, 178 00:08:52,131 --> 00:08:54,433 and so it was a very strong sense of urgency 179 00:08:54,500 --> 00:08:55,868 to try and get her out. 180 00:08:55,935 --> 00:08:58,638 Plus, there was a fire outside the fuselage as well. 181 00:08:58,704 --> 00:09:02,508 So, yeah, it was a pretty serious situation. 182 00:09:09,282 --> 00:09:11,918 Narrator: At San Francisco international airport, 183 00:09:11,984 --> 00:09:15,254 runway 28-L is a disaster zone. 184 00:09:15,321 --> 00:09:18,891 Fire crews battle to keep flames from consuming the fuselage 185 00:09:18,958 --> 00:09:22,395 of Asiana flight 214. 186 00:09:22,461 --> 00:09:24,530 Levy: Come on. 187 00:09:24,597 --> 00:09:26,766 Get out. 188 00:09:26,832 --> 00:09:28,601 Narrator: Inside the burning plane, 189 00:09:28,668 --> 00:09:32,004 a flight attendant is still trapped. 190 00:09:34,307 --> 00:09:36,342 Bramble: The slides are pretty tough. 191 00:09:36,409 --> 00:09:38,110 You need a sharp, strong object 192 00:09:38,177 --> 00:09:39,779 to be able to puncture the slide, 193 00:09:39,845 --> 00:09:43,316 and a crash axe, do the trick. 194 00:09:46,552 --> 00:09:49,055 ♪ 195 00:09:58,898 --> 00:10:01,968 Narrator: With rescuers now on board to help the injured, 196 00:10:02,034 --> 00:10:05,037 ben levy finally heads to safety. 197 00:10:09,175 --> 00:10:10,776 Levy: I think in my head I was like, 198 00:10:10,843 --> 00:10:12,611 I'm alive, it's incredible. 199 00:10:12,678 --> 00:10:15,881 Narrator: He's soon sharing his harrowing story with the media. 200 00:10:15,948 --> 00:10:17,583 Levy: In your head everything goes in slow motion. 201 00:10:17,650 --> 00:10:19,218 You just don't believe it's happening. 202 00:10:19,285 --> 00:10:20,453 You don't know if you're gonna be dead 203 00:10:20,519 --> 00:10:22,355 at the end of the slow motion or not. 204 00:10:22,421 --> 00:10:24,557 Woman: The entire trauma team has come together 205 00:10:24,623 --> 00:10:25,825 as they would in a trauma, 206 00:10:25,891 --> 00:10:28,861 although this is very large, multi-casualty incident. 207 00:10:28,928 --> 00:10:32,164 Narrator: Nearly 50 people are seriously injured. 208 00:10:32,231 --> 00:10:34,367 Six were thrown out of the back of the plane 209 00:10:34,433 --> 00:10:36,469 when the tail broke off. 210 00:10:36,535 --> 00:10:38,404 Two of them are dead, 211 00:10:38,471 --> 00:10:43,042 including a young teenager run over by an emergency vehicle. 212 00:10:43,109 --> 00:10:45,811 Man: The fire truck did go over the victim, that's a fact. 213 00:10:45,878 --> 00:10:47,313 Now, what caused the death, 214 00:10:47,380 --> 00:10:50,816 whether the victim was deceased before or as a result, 215 00:10:50,883 --> 00:10:53,019 that is what we're trying to figure out. 216 00:10:54,887 --> 00:10:56,255 Narrator: Like thousands of others, 217 00:10:56,322 --> 00:10:59,058 investigators at the national transportation safety board 218 00:10:59,125 --> 00:11:03,729 in Washington are riveted by the pictures. 219 00:11:03,796 --> 00:11:05,865 Bill English: They used the terms "mass casualty event.". 220 00:11:05,931 --> 00:11:08,000 We really didn't know what was going on at the time. 221 00:11:08,067 --> 00:11:11,037 The first things I heard was an airplane cartwheeled, 222 00:11:11,103 --> 00:11:14,507 mass casualties, and we knew it was a triple seven, 223 00:11:14,573 --> 00:11:17,410 so it was going to be a very significant event. 224 00:11:17,476 --> 00:11:19,412 Narrator: Senior investigator bill English 225 00:11:19,478 --> 00:11:22,381 will lead the high profile investigation. 226 00:11:22,448 --> 00:11:24,817 English: Everyone's on standby as of right now. 227 00:11:24,884 --> 00:11:27,219 So the triple seven had been in service for about 20 years 228 00:11:27,286 --> 00:11:28,621 at the time of this accident, 229 00:11:28,687 --> 00:11:31,157 and this was the first fatal accident of a triple seven 230 00:11:31,223 --> 00:11:33,292 in that entire time. 231 00:11:33,359 --> 00:11:35,594 We knew we were going to be launching a very large team, 232 00:11:35,661 --> 00:11:38,097 so we pulled out all the stops. 233 00:11:38,164 --> 00:11:44,670 ♪ 234 00:11:44,737 --> 00:11:45,905 Narrator: By the next morning, 235 00:11:45,971 --> 00:11:49,475 there's a full team of investigators on site. 236 00:11:49,542 --> 00:11:54,413 Their first impression is that the media reports must be wrong. 237 00:11:54,480 --> 00:11:57,383 English: I had heard the phrase "The airplane cartwheeled.". 238 00:11:57,450 --> 00:11:59,552 And the first photos that I saw 239 00:11:59,618 --> 00:12:01,454 showed the airplane right side up, 240 00:12:01,520 --> 00:12:02,621 wings still attached, 241 00:12:02,688 --> 00:12:04,490 still looking pretty much like an airplane 242 00:12:04,557 --> 00:12:05,891 sitting next to the runway. 243 00:12:05,958 --> 00:12:08,260 So we thought that couldn't be true. 244 00:12:08,327 --> 00:12:10,563 Narrator: When a plane cartwheels on touchdown, 245 00:12:10,629 --> 00:12:13,432 the result is usually a catastrophic breakup 246 00:12:13,499 --> 00:12:16,702 that leaves a long trail of debris. 247 00:12:16,769 --> 00:12:20,172 That's what happened in 1989 in Sioux city, Iowa, 248 00:12:20,239 --> 00:12:25,511 where a dc-10 cartwheeled off the runway, killing 111 people. 249 00:12:29,115 --> 00:12:33,552 The wreckage from Asiana 214 looks nothing like Sioux city. 250 00:12:33,619 --> 00:12:37,022 English can hardly believe the triple seven cartwheeled, 251 00:12:37,089 --> 00:12:41,427 until he spots some telltale evidence. 252 00:12:41,494 --> 00:12:43,062 English: We noticed the marks on the runway, 253 00:12:43,129 --> 00:12:45,498 scrape marks and everything, looked strange. 254 00:12:45,564 --> 00:12:47,533 It looked like the airplane twisted and turned around. 255 00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:50,970 We thought did the airplane actually turn around? 256 00:12:51,036 --> 00:12:53,772 And then we saw the video. 257 00:12:56,775 --> 00:12:58,777 Narrator: Airport surveillance cameras leave no doubt 258 00:12:58,844 --> 00:13:03,349 about flight 214's violent trajectory. 259 00:13:03,415 --> 00:13:05,718 English: The surveillance video did show the airplane 260 00:13:05,784 --> 00:13:09,488 literally pirouetting, lifting a good 30 degrees into the air, 261 00:13:09,555 --> 00:13:14,693 spinning almost a full circle around before coming to rest. 262 00:13:14,760 --> 00:13:17,096 Jung Min: Hang on! 263 00:13:17,163 --> 00:13:19,765 Levy: It's just a miracle in so many ways, 264 00:13:19,832 --> 00:13:22,368 the fact that this plane stayed in one piece, 265 00:13:22,434 --> 00:13:25,271 the fact that the wing didn't break apart. 266 00:13:25,337 --> 00:13:26,772 I mean, if we had landed back any other way, 267 00:13:26,839 --> 00:13:30,042 it could have been terrible. 268 00:13:30,109 --> 00:13:31,810 Narrator: Investigators must now determine 269 00:13:31,877 --> 00:13:35,915 why the triple seven crashed short of the runway. 270 00:13:35,981 --> 00:13:37,783 But they also face important questions 271 00:13:37,850 --> 00:13:42,421 about the evacuation and rescue. 272 00:13:42,488 --> 00:13:45,324 Jason Fedok: How did you end up out there? 273 00:13:45,391 --> 00:13:47,092 Narrator: Investigator Jason Fedok will try 274 00:13:47,159 --> 00:13:51,764 to figure out what happened to the passengers after the impact. 275 00:13:51,830 --> 00:13:53,699 Fedok: Can you remember where you were sitting? 276 00:13:53,766 --> 00:13:55,501 People who were actually involved in the accident 277 00:13:55,568 --> 00:13:57,102 can give us a wealth of information 278 00:13:57,169 --> 00:13:58,504 that we couldn't otherwise learn 279 00:13:58,571 --> 00:14:00,506 about what happened inside the cabin. 280 00:14:00,573 --> 00:14:02,808 Was she wearing her seat belt? 281 00:14:02,875 --> 00:14:05,244 In this case, we talked to the seat mates 282 00:14:05,311 --> 00:14:06,812 of one of the ejected passengers 283 00:14:06,879 --> 00:14:08,781 who explained that she was not wearing her seat belt 284 00:14:08,847 --> 00:14:10,349 at the time of the accident. 285 00:14:10,416 --> 00:14:11,750 English: This investigation was almost 286 00:14:11,817 --> 00:14:13,485 two investigations in one. 287 00:14:13,552 --> 00:14:17,022 We broke it up into the part that got us to the seawall. 288 00:14:17,089 --> 00:14:18,991 How did this airplane impact those rocks 289 00:14:19,058 --> 00:14:20,659 and come to this accident? 290 00:14:20,726 --> 00:14:24,563 After that was a whole other story to be told. 291 00:14:24,630 --> 00:14:26,031 Narrator: The complex investigation 292 00:14:26,098 --> 00:14:30,703 puts the entire team under enormous pressure. 293 00:14:30,769 --> 00:14:34,106 There could be clues inside the ruined cockpit, 294 00:14:34,173 --> 00:14:37,076 but toxic fumes and scorched debris make it too dangerous 295 00:14:37,142 --> 00:14:40,746 to enter without protective gear. 296 00:14:40,813 --> 00:14:43,782 Roger Cox: Okay. Here we go. 297 00:14:43,849 --> 00:14:46,619 Narrator: For NTSB investigator Roger Cox, 298 00:14:46,685 --> 00:14:49,955 the hunt for evidence is worth the risk. 299 00:14:50,022 --> 00:14:54,426 Cox: It was a tricky accident site. 300 00:14:54,493 --> 00:14:56,562 We had to be properly garbed up to make sure 301 00:14:56,629 --> 00:14:58,197 that we weren't affected too much 302 00:14:58,264 --> 00:15:01,533 by the dangerous wreckage that was there. 303 00:15:04,803 --> 00:15:05,971 If you get out there right away 304 00:15:06,038 --> 00:15:08,774 before anybody's had time to move anything around, 305 00:15:08,841 --> 00:15:12,177 you can actually reconstruct what went on. 306 00:15:12,244 --> 00:15:14,046 Narrator: Cox gathers the pilots' charts 307 00:15:14,113 --> 00:15:15,447 and personal effects, 308 00:15:15,514 --> 00:15:17,750 hoping to find clues about what they were doing 309 00:15:17,816 --> 00:15:19,918 in the final stages of the flight. 310 00:15:19,985 --> 00:15:22,655 Cox: That's everything I could find. 311 00:15:22,721 --> 00:15:25,424 We removed every single document 312 00:15:25,491 --> 00:15:28,794 and then made sure that we photographed every single page 313 00:15:28,861 --> 00:15:30,229 of every single document 314 00:15:30,296 --> 00:15:33,966 in order to see if any of it was of value. 315 00:15:34,033 --> 00:15:36,735 Narrator: Many of the documents are in Korean. 316 00:15:36,802 --> 00:15:38,003 They'll need to be translated 317 00:15:38,070 --> 00:15:40,673 before they can be fully analyzed. 318 00:15:44,777 --> 00:15:46,345 The crash zone, on the other hand, 319 00:15:46,412 --> 00:15:48,080 immediately provides investigators 320 00:15:48,147 --> 00:15:50,783 with some important details. 321 00:15:53,152 --> 00:15:55,587 English: Where it impacted on the rocks of the seawall 322 00:15:55,654 --> 00:15:57,389 pretty much tells us it was too low. 323 00:15:57,456 --> 00:16:00,726 It landed well short of where it should have. 324 00:16:00,793 --> 00:16:02,294 Narrator: The scenario reminds English 325 00:16:02,361 --> 00:16:04,897 of another very similar accident. 326 00:16:04,963 --> 00:16:06,832 English: One of the things we initially thought about 327 00:16:06,899 --> 00:16:08,701 was a previous triple seven accident 328 00:16:08,767 --> 00:16:10,369 that happened in London, England, 329 00:16:10,436 --> 00:16:12,271 where both engines rolled back 330 00:16:12,338 --> 00:16:15,974 and the crew didn't have any power at all on final approach. 331 00:16:16,041 --> 00:16:18,377 Narrator: The triple seven has one of the best safety records 332 00:16:18,444 --> 00:16:22,514 of any plane in the sky. 333 00:16:22,581 --> 00:16:26,985 But in 2008 British airways flight 38 slammed to the ground 334 00:16:27,052 --> 00:16:29,288 short of the runway at Heathrow airport 335 00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:32,491 after losing power in both engines. 336 00:16:34,693 --> 00:16:37,830 Investigators determined that ice in the fuel lines 337 00:16:37,896 --> 00:16:40,366 had caused dual engine failure. 338 00:16:40,432 --> 00:16:43,802 Is that what happened to Asiana 214? 339 00:16:45,904 --> 00:16:48,440 A close look at the engines tells bill English 340 00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:51,176 the answer is no. 341 00:16:51,243 --> 00:16:54,980 He sees clear evidence that they were working normally. 342 00:16:55,047 --> 00:16:56,682 English: There are certain signatures in the metal, 343 00:16:56,749 --> 00:16:58,751 in the blades of the engine that show us 344 00:16:58,817 --> 00:17:02,721 that they were developing power and hadn't failed. 345 00:17:02,788 --> 00:17:05,124 Narrator: For now, English has no solid leads 346 00:17:05,190 --> 00:17:09,294 to explain why a plane that seemed about to land safely 347 00:17:09,361 --> 00:17:14,066 crashed just seconds from the runway. 348 00:17:14,133 --> 00:17:15,267 English: We knew the weather was good, 349 00:17:15,334 --> 00:17:17,970 winds were calm, visibility was good. 350 00:17:18,036 --> 00:17:20,005 There was no distress call from the airplane 351 00:17:20,072 --> 00:17:22,975 that we'd heard of, so there was nothing really obvious 352 00:17:23,041 --> 00:17:25,744 as to why this would have occurred. 353 00:17:32,251 --> 00:17:33,986 Narrator: Runway crews assess the damage 354 00:17:34,052 --> 00:17:36,655 at San Francisco international airport 355 00:17:36,722 --> 00:17:38,524 while investigators search for a lead 356 00:17:38,590 --> 00:17:41,693 in the crash of Asiana 214. 357 00:17:43,195 --> 00:17:46,832 Air traffic controllers provide some answers. 358 00:17:46,899 --> 00:17:48,033 English: They could see it on radar, 359 00:17:48,100 --> 00:17:50,202 and of course visually see it from the tower. 360 00:17:50,269 --> 00:17:55,073 Controller: Visibility was ten miles, um, a few clouds, 361 00:17:55,140 --> 00:17:56,642 not an issue. 362 00:17:56,708 --> 00:17:58,343 Narrator: Controllers tell investigators 363 00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:00,012 that it was a normal day, 364 00:18:00,078 --> 00:18:02,381 except for the fact that some runway equipment 365 00:18:02,448 --> 00:18:06,418 was not in operation. 366 00:18:06,485 --> 00:18:07,619 Controller: And that runway's glide slope 367 00:18:07,686 --> 00:18:10,923 was, was out of service. 368 00:18:10,989 --> 00:18:13,459 Narrator: Electronic equipment installed on runways 369 00:18:13,525 --> 00:18:16,528 can send signals to a plane's autopilot. 370 00:18:16,595 --> 00:18:20,666 The signals can help guide the plane down at a precise angle. 371 00:18:23,135 --> 00:18:26,138 But the main runway at the airport is under construction, 372 00:18:26,205 --> 00:18:29,741 and the equipment is switched off. 373 00:18:29,808 --> 00:18:32,144 It's a revealing discovery. 374 00:18:32,211 --> 00:18:35,547 A combination of high traffic and compact runways 375 00:18:35,614 --> 00:18:37,616 have earned San Francisco airport 376 00:18:37,683 --> 00:18:41,520 a reputation for difficult landings. 377 00:18:41,587 --> 00:18:43,255 To manage the high traffic, 378 00:18:43,322 --> 00:18:47,392 controllers often ask pilots to come in fast and steep, 379 00:18:47,459 --> 00:18:52,030 leaving lower altitudes open for departing planes to climb out. 380 00:18:52,097 --> 00:18:53,866 Abend: Very often we are given 381 00:18:53,932 --> 00:18:57,002 what we call the slam dunk approach, 382 00:18:57,069 --> 00:19:00,372 where we're high and we have to get down quickly, 383 00:19:00,439 --> 00:19:03,942 and it does create a little bit of a challenge. 384 00:19:08,180 --> 00:19:11,917 Cox: Alright, so there's San Francisco airport. 385 00:19:11,984 --> 00:19:13,585 Palo alto's down here, you know... 386 00:19:13,652 --> 00:19:15,454 Narrator: Roger Cox knows firsthand 387 00:19:15,521 --> 00:19:20,192 how challenging landing at San Francisco airport can be. 388 00:19:20,259 --> 00:19:21,660 Cox: I could say from my own personal experience 389 00:19:21,727 --> 00:19:22,895 flying in there many, many times 390 00:19:22,961 --> 00:19:25,197 that it's very easy to get high and hot, 391 00:19:25,264 --> 00:19:28,200 uh, and you have to really stay on top of the airplane. 392 00:19:28,267 --> 00:19:29,801 Controller: Asiana 214 heavy, 393 00:19:29,868 --> 00:19:32,671 runway 2-8 left, cleared to land. 394 00:19:32,738 --> 00:19:35,774 Narrator: It all leads to some troubling questions. 395 00:19:35,841 --> 00:19:39,545 Were the Asiana pilots flying into danger? 396 00:19:39,611 --> 00:19:41,847 Did they face an extraordinary risk 397 00:19:41,914 --> 00:19:46,485 at an airport notorious for difficult landings? 398 00:19:46,552 --> 00:19:48,687 Cox: So he'd be coming in from this direction 399 00:19:48,754 --> 00:19:50,689 straight across the bay. 400 00:19:50,756 --> 00:19:53,825 Narrator: Roger Cox studies airport radar records. 401 00:19:53,892 --> 00:19:58,030 He wants to know if controllers assigned Asiana flight 214 402 00:19:58,096 --> 00:20:01,700 an approach that was too fast and steep to fly safely. 403 00:20:01,767 --> 00:20:03,135 Kang Kuk: Clear to land. 404 00:20:03,201 --> 00:20:05,671 Cox: There were some complaints initially from the operator 405 00:20:05,737 --> 00:20:07,005 that this crew was being asked to do something 406 00:20:07,072 --> 00:20:08,140 that was unreasonable, 407 00:20:08,206 --> 00:20:09,641 so we wanted to spend quite a bit of time 408 00:20:09,708 --> 00:20:12,578 looking at whether that was true. 409 00:20:12,644 --> 00:20:16,081 Same instructions. Same approach. 410 00:20:16,148 --> 00:20:18,517 No one else had a problem. 411 00:20:18,584 --> 00:20:20,352 Narrator: Airport records reveal controllers 412 00:20:20,419 --> 00:20:22,754 gave two other planes the same instructions 413 00:20:22,821 --> 00:20:25,724 just before Asiana touched down. 414 00:20:27,392 --> 00:20:29,294 Both landed safely. 415 00:20:29,361 --> 00:20:33,031 Cox: You can't fault the controller. 416 00:20:33,098 --> 00:20:36,168 They managed to land triple sevens safely 417 00:20:36,234 --> 00:20:37,436 without any difficulty, 418 00:20:37,502 --> 00:20:41,740 so although it is a somewhat challenging environment, 419 00:20:41,807 --> 00:20:47,980 we found that nothing that ATC did really caused the accident. 420 00:20:48,046 --> 00:20:50,248 Narrator: It's another dead end. 421 00:20:50,315 --> 00:20:55,554 For now, what brought down Asiana 214 remains a mystery. 422 00:20:57,122 --> 00:20:59,124 Along with the cause of the accident, 423 00:20:59,191 --> 00:21:03,061 investigators are grappling with another troubling question. 424 00:21:03,128 --> 00:21:05,464 Escape slides are engineered to withstand 425 00:21:05,530 --> 00:21:08,367 the forces of aviation accidents. 426 00:21:08,433 --> 00:21:13,005 Why did so many fail during the crash of flight 214? 427 00:21:14,673 --> 00:21:17,743 English: Only two of them did what they were supposed to do. 428 00:21:17,809 --> 00:21:21,613 Narrator: Six of the eight slides didn't deploy properly, 429 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:26,051 causing potentially deadly delays in the evacuation. 430 00:21:26,118 --> 00:21:28,487 English: The fire took some time to get into the cabin. 431 00:21:28,553 --> 00:21:29,688 That's a good thing. 432 00:21:29,755 --> 00:21:31,790 But had a fuel tank been punctured 433 00:21:31,857 --> 00:21:33,992 or some obstacle been in the way 434 00:21:34,059 --> 00:21:35,861 and we had a much more rapid fire, 435 00:21:35,927 --> 00:21:39,765 things could have been very different. 436 00:21:39,831 --> 00:21:41,366 Narrator: They'll have to search for answers 437 00:21:41,433 --> 00:21:44,803 without the help of the plane's flight data recorder. 438 00:21:46,772 --> 00:21:49,141 The recorder is located in the tail section 439 00:21:49,207 --> 00:21:54,646 and stopped recording when the tail smashed into the seawall. 440 00:21:54,713 --> 00:21:56,715 There's no information on what was happening 441 00:21:56,782 --> 00:21:59,951 at the moment the slides deployed. 442 00:22:00,018 --> 00:22:01,119 Fedok: Okay. 443 00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:03,021 Let's see what these slides can take. 444 00:22:03,088 --> 00:22:04,823 Narrator: To get the data they need, 445 00:22:04,890 --> 00:22:07,693 Jason Fedok turns to a crash test facility 446 00:22:07,759 --> 00:22:10,662 more often used for testing cars. 447 00:22:10,729 --> 00:22:13,265 Fedok: This was unlike anything anyone had ever seen before, 448 00:22:13,331 --> 00:22:16,101 so we wanted to figure out how that happened. 449 00:22:16,168 --> 00:22:18,236 Narrator: He discovers that at low speeds 450 00:22:18,303 --> 00:22:20,806 the slides perform well. 451 00:22:20,872 --> 00:22:25,844 But in high-speed impacts, like the one on board flight 214, 452 00:22:25,911 --> 00:22:30,515 the inflation mechanism can fail quite easily. 453 00:22:30,582 --> 00:22:33,985 Fedok: We made a recommendation to the FAA to look at the data 454 00:22:34,052 --> 00:22:35,620 we produced from this accident 455 00:22:35,687 --> 00:22:37,122 and see if there were improvements that could be made 456 00:22:37,189 --> 00:22:43,495 to future slide design to help make that part more robust. 457 00:22:43,562 --> 00:22:45,230 Narrator: The violent force of the impact 458 00:22:45,297 --> 00:22:47,999 also accounts for the injuries suffered by the six people 459 00:22:48,066 --> 00:22:49,601 thrown from the plane, 460 00:22:49,668 --> 00:22:53,939 including the young teenager who was run over by a fire truck. 461 00:22:56,475 --> 00:22:59,311 Autopsy results confirm she died immediately 462 00:22:59,377 --> 00:23:02,314 after the crash impact. 463 00:23:02,380 --> 00:23:06,718 She was already dead by the time her body was run over. 464 00:23:06,785 --> 00:23:08,220 Fedok: One of the most important lessons here 465 00:23:08,286 --> 00:23:10,055 is to always keep your seat belt fastened 466 00:23:10,122 --> 00:23:11,957 whenever possible on an aircraft. 467 00:23:12,023 --> 00:23:14,793 You never know when you're gonna have unexpected turbulence 468 00:23:14,860 --> 00:23:17,596 or be in an accident. 469 00:23:17,662 --> 00:23:20,665 Narrator: Investigators hope flight 214's flight recorders 470 00:23:20,732 --> 00:23:23,835 will help them answer the other urgent question. 471 00:23:23,902 --> 00:23:25,103 Jung Min: I've got control. 472 00:23:25,170 --> 00:23:28,173 Narrator: Why did flight 214 slam into the seawall 473 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:29,508 in the first place? 474 00:23:29,574 --> 00:23:32,377 Levy: I don't think we're going to make the runway. 475 00:23:35,080 --> 00:23:36,615 Narrator: Modern flight recorders capture 476 00:23:36,681 --> 00:23:41,019 detailed information about virtually every system on board, 477 00:23:41,086 --> 00:23:42,888 including the complex automation 478 00:23:42,954 --> 00:23:45,524 that helps the pilots fly the plane. 479 00:23:45,590 --> 00:23:48,426 English: We were able to see all the basic things, like airspeed, 480 00:23:48,493 --> 00:23:51,563 altitude, the configuration of the airplane. 481 00:23:51,630 --> 00:23:55,500 We were also able to see all the inputs that the crew made. 482 00:23:55,567 --> 00:23:58,270 Narrator: English carefully plots the data. 483 00:23:58,336 --> 00:24:01,940 Most of it looks completely normal. 484 00:24:02,007 --> 00:24:05,410 But then he spots something unexpected. 485 00:24:05,477 --> 00:24:07,913 A little more than a minute away from the runway, 486 00:24:07,979 --> 00:24:10,715 engine power suddenly drops to idle. 487 00:24:10,782 --> 00:24:12,284 English: Right here. 488 00:24:12,350 --> 00:24:16,454 Narrator: The sudden change in power settings makes no sense. 489 00:24:16,521 --> 00:24:18,223 Normally, the last moments of flight 490 00:24:18,290 --> 00:24:21,726 are when pilots need more power, not less. 491 00:24:21,793 --> 00:24:24,529 They need extra thrust to overcome increased drag 492 00:24:24,596 --> 00:24:28,834 from the landing gear and wing flaps. 493 00:24:28,900 --> 00:24:30,769 The investigation has already determined 494 00:24:30,836 --> 00:24:35,073 that there was nothing wrong with the engines themselves. 495 00:24:35,140 --> 00:24:37,242 English: We could see that the engines were making proper power 496 00:24:37,309 --> 00:24:39,711 all the way through the approach. 497 00:24:39,778 --> 00:24:42,514 Narrator: The question now-- what was the crew doing 498 00:24:42,581 --> 00:24:44,115 to control engine power 499 00:24:44,182 --> 00:24:46,351 in the critical final moments of flight? 500 00:24:46,418 --> 00:24:47,919 Jung Min: Speed. 501 00:24:47,986 --> 00:24:49,120 English: So that brought us right back 502 00:24:49,187 --> 00:24:52,390 to how did the pilots operate the airplane? 503 00:24:52,457 --> 00:24:55,994 Why did they do what they did that got the airplane too low? 504 00:24:56,061 --> 00:24:58,163 Cox: What really struck me 505 00:24:58,230 --> 00:25:00,332 was how could a couple 506 00:25:00,398 --> 00:25:03,168 of highly trained, experienced pilots 507 00:25:03,235 --> 00:25:06,371 simply fly an airplane into the ground short of the runway? 508 00:25:06,438 --> 00:25:08,039 I, that was the mystery. 509 00:25:08,106 --> 00:25:09,608 Jung Min: Damn it! 510 00:25:13,678 --> 00:25:17,349 Narrator: The investigation into Asiana 214 now focuses 511 00:25:17,415 --> 00:25:21,152 squarely on the actions of the pilots. 512 00:25:21,219 --> 00:25:22,821 Kang Kuk: Gear down, sir. 513 00:25:22,888 --> 00:25:24,322 Narrator: Understanding every nuance 514 00:25:24,389 --> 00:25:27,826 of the cockpit voice recording becomes crucial. 515 00:25:27,893 --> 00:25:29,194 Bramble: The CVR is key. 516 00:25:29,261 --> 00:25:30,929 Jung Min: Gear down. 517 00:25:30,996 --> 00:25:33,131 Bramble: You can tell what the flight crew are doing. 518 00:25:33,198 --> 00:25:35,267 You can tell what they're thinking sometimes 519 00:25:35,333 --> 00:25:36,668 because they're verbalizing it. 520 00:25:36,735 --> 00:25:38,270 You can tell how they're deciding, 521 00:25:38,336 --> 00:25:40,538 you know, what to do next. 522 00:25:40,605 --> 00:25:43,541 Narrator: They listen as the pilots prepare for landing. 523 00:25:43,608 --> 00:25:46,111 Kang Kuk: Missed approach 3,000 feet. 524 00:25:46,177 --> 00:25:48,914 Narrator: They combine what they hear with the FDR data 525 00:25:48,980 --> 00:25:52,817 that shows how the pilots were manipulating the controls. 526 00:25:52,884 --> 00:25:54,786 Jung Min: This seems a little high. 527 00:25:54,853 --> 00:25:56,554 Narrator: As the crew nears the runway, 528 00:25:56,621 --> 00:26:00,125 the recording hints at the first sign of trouble. 529 00:26:00,191 --> 00:26:02,294 Kang Kuk: I will descend more. 530 00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:05,530 Narrator: The plane isn't descending fast enough. 531 00:26:05,597 --> 00:26:09,334 The captain flying takes steps to fix the problem, 532 00:26:09,401 --> 00:26:14,205 but he doesn't explain his actions to his co-pilot. 533 00:26:14,272 --> 00:26:15,473 Bramble: No call-out. 534 00:26:15,540 --> 00:26:17,909 How's anyone supposed to know what he's doing? 535 00:26:17,976 --> 00:26:19,678 Narrator: For investigator bill bramble, 536 00:26:19,744 --> 00:26:21,913 it's a troubling clue. 537 00:26:21,980 --> 00:26:24,616 Bramble: The pilot flying is supposed to actually 538 00:26:24,683 --> 00:26:26,851 select things with the auto flight system 539 00:26:26,918 --> 00:26:28,019 and call out what he's doing, 540 00:26:28,086 --> 00:26:30,855 and the pilot monitoring is supposed to verify 541 00:26:30,922 --> 00:26:33,224 that the change has actually occurred. 542 00:26:33,291 --> 00:26:35,226 In this case, we saw kind of a breakdown 543 00:26:35,293 --> 00:26:38,863 in that standard pattern of communication and coordination. 544 00:26:38,930 --> 00:26:42,133 Kang Kuk: Flaps 20. 545 00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:45,070 Narrator: What the recording reveals next is stunning. 546 00:26:45,136 --> 00:26:47,639 Less than 90 seconds before impact, 547 00:26:47,706 --> 00:26:50,875 the captain makes an inexplicable blunder. 548 00:26:50,942 --> 00:26:54,079 He switches the autopilot to an incorrect setting, 549 00:26:54,145 --> 00:26:56,147 flight level change mode. 550 00:26:56,214 --> 00:26:59,684 That interrupts the landing and instructs the computer to climb 551 00:26:59,751 --> 00:27:03,455 to the go-around altitude of 3,000 feet. 552 00:27:04,656 --> 00:27:06,825 English: He made an entry to the autopilot 553 00:27:06,891 --> 00:27:11,262 that at first actually made the airplane climb. 554 00:27:11,329 --> 00:27:13,398 Obviously he didn't want to do that. 555 00:27:13,465 --> 00:27:15,533 Bramble: The autopilot mode switches here, 556 00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:17,602 starts all the confusion. 557 00:27:17,669 --> 00:27:19,504 Narrator: To bring his plane back down, 558 00:27:19,571 --> 00:27:23,274 the captain immediately pulls the throttles back to idle, 559 00:27:23,341 --> 00:27:26,311 a move with major repercussions. 560 00:27:26,378 --> 00:27:31,383 But once again, he doesn't tell the other pilot what he's doing. 561 00:27:31,449 --> 00:27:33,918 Bramble: Not calling out one single action 562 00:27:33,985 --> 00:27:37,555 wouldn't necessarily be a fatal flaw, 563 00:27:37,622 --> 00:27:39,624 but in this particular case 564 00:27:39,691 --> 00:27:42,761 it had a big influence on the conduct of the flight. 565 00:27:42,827 --> 00:27:43,862 Jung Min: It's low. 566 00:27:43,928 --> 00:27:45,563 Narrator: Investigators now understand 567 00:27:45,630 --> 00:27:47,732 how the engines got to idle. 568 00:27:47,799 --> 00:27:49,000 Kang Kuk: Yeah. 569 00:27:49,067 --> 00:27:51,069 Narrator: But why would an experienced captain 570 00:27:51,136 --> 00:27:53,705 make the mistake of leaving them there? 571 00:27:53,772 --> 00:27:54,606 Computer: Pull up. 572 00:27:54,672 --> 00:27:55,840 Jung Min: Oh, god. 573 00:27:55,907 --> 00:27:56,975 Go around! 574 00:27:57,042 --> 00:27:58,743 Narrator: And why did the crew not notice 575 00:27:58,810 --> 00:28:02,580 they were dangerously low until it was too late? 576 00:28:02,647 --> 00:28:04,816 Jung Min: Damn it! 577 00:28:07,385 --> 00:28:10,655 Bramble: It's like they just sat there and watched it happen. 578 00:28:12,857 --> 00:28:15,393 Narrator: To find answers, bramble and cox prepare 579 00:28:15,460 --> 00:28:17,429 for a sensitive and difficult interview 580 00:28:17,495 --> 00:28:20,498 with the pilot who was flying the plane. 581 00:28:20,565 --> 00:28:22,333 Kang Kuk: I'll try to help if I can. 582 00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:23,701 Bramble: We wanted to find out, 583 00:28:23,768 --> 00:28:27,372 you know, how much of what happened did they understand? 584 00:28:27,439 --> 00:28:30,241 We wanted to find out when they became aware 585 00:28:30,308 --> 00:28:32,210 that something was amiss, 586 00:28:32,277 --> 00:28:35,880 and so the only way to do that was by asking them. 587 00:28:35,947 --> 00:28:37,949 Kang Kuk: I was a bit nervous. 588 00:28:38,016 --> 00:28:39,651 Narrator: The captain explains he was worried 589 00:28:39,717 --> 00:28:42,220 about landing in San Francisco, 590 00:28:42,287 --> 00:28:44,722 on a day when there was no electronic runway equipment 591 00:28:44,789 --> 00:28:47,759 to help guide him. 592 00:28:47,826 --> 00:28:49,027 Cox: I thought that was very unusual 593 00:28:49,094 --> 00:28:50,562 coming from an experienced pilot, 594 00:28:50,628 --> 00:28:53,832 because no one really needs an electronic glide slope 595 00:28:53,898 --> 00:28:56,534 on a clear day to be able to land an airplane. 596 00:28:56,601 --> 00:28:58,169 It's a fundamental skill that you have to learn 597 00:28:58,236 --> 00:29:00,171 from the time you're a private pilot. 598 00:29:00,238 --> 00:29:04,742 Kang Kuk: Other pilots were making that landing. 599 00:29:04,809 --> 00:29:07,212 I thought I should be able to make it, too. 600 00:29:07,278 --> 00:29:08,880 Cox: He said everyone else was doing it, 601 00:29:08,947 --> 00:29:11,116 so I could not say I could not do it. 602 00:29:11,182 --> 00:29:13,751 Jung Min: It seems a little high. 603 00:29:15,787 --> 00:29:17,922 Kang Kuk: I will descend more. 604 00:29:17,989 --> 00:29:19,290 Bramble: I think he didn't want to show 605 00:29:19,357 --> 00:29:23,928 that he was not confident or that he was not prepared. 606 00:29:23,995 --> 00:29:25,930 But I think... 607 00:29:25,997 --> 00:29:28,633 I think he just didn't want to admit the weakness. 608 00:29:28,700 --> 00:29:30,635 Jung Min: It's low. 609 00:29:30,702 --> 00:29:32,203 Narrator: The captain tells investigators 610 00:29:32,270 --> 00:29:33,438 he doesn't understand 611 00:29:33,505 --> 00:29:37,809 why the plane didn't have enough power on landing. 612 00:29:37,876 --> 00:29:38,977 Kang Kuk: I know I made some mistakes, 613 00:29:39,043 --> 00:29:40,912 but I was certain that the auto throttle 614 00:29:40,979 --> 00:29:44,315 would control the speed. 615 00:29:44,382 --> 00:29:45,950 Narrator: Like other modern jets, 616 00:29:46,017 --> 00:29:48,119 the triple seven can automatically increase 617 00:29:48,186 --> 00:29:49,754 or decrease engine power 618 00:29:49,821 --> 00:29:52,991 through a system known as the auto throttle. 619 00:29:54,993 --> 00:29:56,628 English: Similar to, but much more sophisticated, 620 00:29:56,694 --> 00:29:58,796 than your cruise control. 621 00:29:58,863 --> 00:30:00,031 Bramble: He was confident the auto throttle 622 00:30:00,098 --> 00:30:02,667 was actually gonna take care of speed for him. 623 00:30:02,734 --> 00:30:08,139 And in his prior experience, they had. 624 00:30:08,206 --> 00:30:10,441 Narrator: During his triple seven flight training, 625 00:30:10,508 --> 00:30:11,609 the captain was taught about 626 00:30:11,676 --> 00:30:14,846 the auto throttle's special wake-up feature. 627 00:30:14,913 --> 00:30:16,981 If the plane's speed drops too low, 628 00:30:17,048 --> 00:30:20,084 the auto throttle engages and adds power, 629 00:30:20,151 --> 00:30:21,886 even if it's switched off. 630 00:30:21,953 --> 00:30:23,321 Kang Kuk: Amazing. 631 00:30:23,388 --> 00:30:25,623 Bramble: As he had seen this demonstration in the simulator 632 00:30:25,690 --> 00:30:27,859 that the auto throttles would wake up 633 00:30:27,926 --> 00:30:29,661 even if the auto throttle was off, 634 00:30:29,727 --> 00:30:33,331 so he had this really high level of expectancy 635 00:30:33,398 --> 00:30:35,400 that the auto throttles would wake up, 636 00:30:35,466 --> 00:30:38,403 advance the thrust, and keep them safe. 637 00:30:38,469 --> 00:30:41,639 Narrator: Investigators consider a chilling possibility. 638 00:30:41,706 --> 00:30:45,176 Did a critical automated system on a Boeing triple seven 639 00:30:45,243 --> 00:30:47,078 fail in flight? 640 00:30:47,145 --> 00:30:50,982 Is that what doomed Asiana 214? 641 00:30:55,386 --> 00:30:59,224 Cox: So the auto throttle and autopilot 642 00:30:59,290 --> 00:31:03,528 both change modes here and then again here. 643 00:31:03,595 --> 00:31:06,097 Narrator: Investigators dig deeper into the flight data 644 00:31:06,164 --> 00:31:09,133 from Asiana 214. 645 00:31:09,200 --> 00:31:12,237 They search for any evidence of a failure or malfunction 646 00:31:12,303 --> 00:31:15,940 in the plane's automated flight systems. 647 00:31:16,007 --> 00:31:18,443 Cox: I think the most important thing that we wanted to know 648 00:31:18,509 --> 00:31:23,881 was what auto throttle and autopilot modes were engaged 649 00:31:23,948 --> 00:31:28,253 during the last two or three minutes of the flight. 650 00:31:28,319 --> 00:31:30,355 Kang Kuk: Missed approach 3,000 feet. 651 00:31:30,421 --> 00:31:32,590 Narrator: An undetected problem with the autopilot 652 00:31:32,657 --> 00:31:34,058 or auto throttle 653 00:31:34,125 --> 00:31:37,595 could easily have led the pilots to disaster. 654 00:31:39,597 --> 00:31:44,035 Tracing all the computerized functions is a mammoth task. 655 00:31:44,102 --> 00:31:48,673 English studies every input, every mode change. 656 00:31:48,740 --> 00:31:52,143 The exhaustive analysis leaves no doubt. 657 00:31:52,210 --> 00:31:56,981 None of flight 214's automated systems failed in any way. 658 00:31:57,048 --> 00:31:59,183 But there is evidence of something else 659 00:31:59,250 --> 00:32:01,986 that could finally explain what went wrong. 660 00:32:02,053 --> 00:32:04,956 English: It was pretty evident that we could see 661 00:32:05,023 --> 00:32:07,992 some strange things happening with automation inputs 662 00:32:08,059 --> 00:32:11,296 while that airplane was on short final. 663 00:32:11,362 --> 00:32:15,300 Narrator: The analysis reveals that the pilots of Asiana 214 664 00:32:15,366 --> 00:32:18,703 punched in a bizarre sequence of inputs, 665 00:32:18,770 --> 00:32:22,440 a sequence that most pilots would never carry out. 666 00:32:22,507 --> 00:32:27,512 First choosing an autopilot mode rarely used during descent, 667 00:32:27,578 --> 00:32:29,480 then pulling back on the thrust levers 668 00:32:29,547 --> 00:32:33,117 when that error put the plane into a climb. 669 00:32:37,055 --> 00:32:38,623 Cox: Bingo! 670 00:32:38,690 --> 00:32:40,124 That does it. 671 00:32:40,191 --> 00:32:42,527 Narrator: The unusual combination of commands 672 00:32:42,593 --> 00:32:46,564 switches off the triple seven's built-in speed protection, 673 00:32:46,631 --> 00:32:48,866 leaving the engines at idle. 674 00:32:48,933 --> 00:32:50,935 English: At that point he disconnected the autopilot, 675 00:32:51,002 --> 00:32:54,572 so now up, down, left, and right was in his hands. 676 00:32:54,639 --> 00:32:56,974 He grabbed the throttles and reduced them, 677 00:32:57,041 --> 00:32:59,177 like taking his foot off the gas. 678 00:32:59,243 --> 00:33:01,412 By doing that, that sent the signal 679 00:33:01,479 --> 00:33:03,181 to the auto throttle system 680 00:33:03,247 --> 00:33:05,783 that he wanted control of the power as well. 681 00:33:05,850 --> 00:33:07,452 So at that point in effect 682 00:33:07,518 --> 00:33:10,655 the airplane was basically just gliding. 683 00:33:10,722 --> 00:33:13,991 Narrator: Investigators finally understand why the auto throttle 684 00:33:14,058 --> 00:33:18,162 did not re-engage and boost engine thrust on landing. 685 00:33:18,229 --> 00:33:20,565 But puzzling questions remain. 686 00:33:20,631 --> 00:33:25,002 Why was the captain so uncertain about autopilot functions? 687 00:33:25,069 --> 00:33:30,375 And why couldn't the crew react in time to save the plane? 688 00:33:30,441 --> 00:33:34,612 Cox: 22,000 hours between them. 689 00:33:34,679 --> 00:33:38,549 You'd think they'd notice the speed. 690 00:33:38,616 --> 00:33:40,818 Narrator: Translated from the original Korean, 691 00:33:40,885 --> 00:33:43,221 the cockpit documents go a long way 692 00:33:43,287 --> 00:33:45,390 toward providing some answers. 693 00:33:45,456 --> 00:33:46,791 Cox: It turned out one of the important things 694 00:33:46,858 --> 00:33:50,161 that we recovered was the pilot's training record, 695 00:33:50,228 --> 00:33:54,031 which had detailed history of what he had accomplished 696 00:33:54,098 --> 00:33:56,434 right up to the time of the accident. 697 00:33:56,501 --> 00:33:59,270 Narrator: The documents reveal flight 214 698 00:33:59,337 --> 00:34:02,974 was a critical training flight for captain lee Kang Kuk. 699 00:34:03,040 --> 00:34:04,809 Kang Kuk: Is that the golden gate? 700 00:34:04,876 --> 00:34:07,412 Narrator: He was transferring to the Boeing triple seven 701 00:34:07,478 --> 00:34:10,448 after flying the airbus A320, 702 00:34:10,515 --> 00:34:14,252 an aircraft with a very different type of automation. 703 00:34:14,318 --> 00:34:15,787 Jung Min: Golden gate's over there. 704 00:34:15,853 --> 00:34:18,322 That bridge goes to Oakland. 705 00:34:18,389 --> 00:34:20,258 Abend: It's a different philosophy of flying, 706 00:34:20,324 --> 00:34:23,428 and he had flown the airbus for quite some time, 707 00:34:23,494 --> 00:34:28,399 so the transition may still have been an awkward moment. 708 00:34:28,466 --> 00:34:29,801 Cox: It was a training flight. 709 00:34:29,867 --> 00:34:31,803 Narrator: The training records reveal the captain 710 00:34:31,869 --> 00:34:35,072 had been having trouble making the change. 711 00:34:35,139 --> 00:34:37,742 Cox: The instructor was fairly critical. 712 00:34:37,809 --> 00:34:41,946 He indicated he felt that the captain who was in training 713 00:34:42,013 --> 00:34:45,383 wasn't sufficiently diligent and attentive to procedure. 714 00:34:45,450 --> 00:34:47,318 Narrator: That recent criticism may have been 715 00:34:47,385 --> 00:34:52,323 on lee Kang Kuk's mind as he headed to San Francisco. 716 00:34:52,390 --> 00:34:53,391 Bramble: He was a little bit stressed, 717 00:34:53,458 --> 00:34:56,360 because it was a training flight, 718 00:34:56,427 --> 00:35:00,431 and he was being monitored by this more senior pilot, 719 00:35:00,498 --> 00:35:02,934 and possibly because of this previous flight 720 00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:05,636 where he hadn't performed so well. 721 00:35:08,239 --> 00:35:10,141 Narrator: But why were the pilots so slow 722 00:35:10,208 --> 00:35:14,011 to recognize the danger? 723 00:35:14,078 --> 00:35:16,147 English: The question that was on everybody's mind 724 00:35:16,214 --> 00:35:18,616 and carried all the way through this investigation 725 00:35:18,683 --> 00:35:21,085 is what was going on in the pilots' heads? 726 00:35:21,152 --> 00:35:22,620 Kang Kuk: Clear to land. 727 00:35:22,687 --> 00:35:23,921 Narrator: Even though the landing system 728 00:35:23,988 --> 00:35:25,957 was out of service, there was another way 729 00:35:26,023 --> 00:35:29,927 for the pilots to know their plane was too low. 730 00:35:29,994 --> 00:35:31,929 The runway is equipped with special lights 731 00:35:31,996 --> 00:35:33,664 that change color to alert pilots 732 00:35:33,731 --> 00:35:37,468 if the approach angle is off. 733 00:35:37,535 --> 00:35:40,137 English: The papi, precision approach path indicator, 734 00:35:40,204 --> 00:35:43,641 that also aid pilots in the proper vertical path, 735 00:35:43,708 --> 00:35:45,743 those were operating and were operating properly 736 00:35:45,810 --> 00:35:47,512 at the time of the accident. 737 00:35:47,578 --> 00:35:48,713 Jung Min: It's low. 738 00:35:48,779 --> 00:35:50,815 Narrator: The pilots were shown four red lights, 739 00:35:50,882 --> 00:35:53,951 meaning the plane is dangerously low. 740 00:35:54,018 --> 00:35:55,386 English: We had a lot of data, 741 00:35:55,453 --> 00:35:57,154 and it pretty much showed us an airplane 742 00:35:57,221 --> 00:35:59,290 that was working exactly as it was designed. 743 00:35:59,357 --> 00:36:00,758 That wasn't difficult. 744 00:36:00,825 --> 00:36:04,495 Getting into the whys of why human beings do what they do 745 00:36:04,562 --> 00:36:08,299 or don't notice things is a lot more difficult, 746 00:36:08,366 --> 00:36:13,704 and explaining that can be the hardest task of all. 747 00:36:13,771 --> 00:36:15,172 Narrator: Especially troubling, 748 00:36:15,239 --> 00:36:17,575 why did the more experienced commander wait 749 00:36:17,642 --> 00:36:22,079 until it was too late before taking control of the plane? 750 00:36:22,146 --> 00:36:23,347 Jung Min: I've got control. 751 00:36:23,414 --> 00:36:24,949 Narrator: If he had intervened sooner, 752 00:36:25,016 --> 00:36:29,654 he would almost certainly have prevented the accident. 753 00:36:29,720 --> 00:36:31,422 English: The airplane was perfectly flyable 754 00:36:31,489 --> 00:36:33,357 up until really the last minute, 755 00:36:33,424 --> 00:36:35,626 so at any point there were a number of places 756 00:36:35,693 --> 00:36:38,396 where someone could intervene, someone could take over, 757 00:36:38,462 --> 00:36:40,698 someone could make a small change, 758 00:36:40,765 --> 00:36:42,667 and this would have come out very differently. 759 00:36:42,733 --> 00:36:44,035 Cox: Yeah, we're just trying to get a sense 760 00:36:44,101 --> 00:36:47,104 of how much experience your guys would have flying by hand. 761 00:36:47,171 --> 00:36:48,973 Can you get me some numbers on that? 762 00:36:49,040 --> 00:36:52,009 Narrator: They learn that Asiana has strict policies 763 00:36:52,076 --> 00:36:55,246 encouraging pilots to rely on their aircraft automation 764 00:36:55,313 --> 00:36:56,814 as much as possible. 765 00:36:56,881 --> 00:37:00,151 They rarely practice landing the plane by hand. 766 00:37:00,217 --> 00:37:01,619 Cox: And we have to go to the company's procedures 767 00:37:01,686 --> 00:37:03,721 and training, and there is where 768 00:37:03,788 --> 00:37:06,557 I think we put our finger on the issue. 769 00:37:06,624 --> 00:37:08,893 Controller: Cleared visual approach. 770 00:37:08,960 --> 00:37:11,128 Narrator: Investigators are shocked to learn 771 00:37:11,195 --> 00:37:13,331 that this arrival in San Francisco 772 00:37:13,397 --> 00:37:15,933 was the first time the captain ever attempted 773 00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:17,668 to land a triple seven 774 00:37:17,735 --> 00:37:21,372 with no help from the glide slope signal on the runway. 775 00:37:23,774 --> 00:37:26,377 Cox: When it comes to visual landings, 776 00:37:26,444 --> 00:37:30,214 this guy's an absolute beginner. 777 00:37:30,281 --> 00:37:32,250 Bramble: The vast majority of the time 778 00:37:32,316 --> 00:37:35,119 he had been flying instrument approaches into airports, 779 00:37:35,186 --> 00:37:37,788 even when he was technically flying the visual approach. 780 00:37:37,855 --> 00:37:42,693 Cox: 10,000 hours, almost no hand flying. 781 00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:45,396 Narrator: It's a stunning discovery. 782 00:37:45,463 --> 00:37:48,966 Despite nearly 10,000 hours as an airline pilot, 783 00:37:49,033 --> 00:37:51,035 the captain has almost no experience 784 00:37:51,102 --> 00:37:54,005 flying his plane by hand. 785 00:37:54,071 --> 00:37:55,906 Jung Min: It seems a little high. 786 00:37:55,973 --> 00:37:58,175 Cox: You take away all the time that was on the autopilot, 787 00:37:58,242 --> 00:38:00,645 and if you look at all of the flight hours that they had... 788 00:38:00,711 --> 00:38:01,746 Kang Kuk: I will descend more. 789 00:38:01,812 --> 00:38:03,314 Cox: ...they may have actually only had 790 00:38:03,381 --> 00:38:06,484 a couple of hundred hours of hand flying the airplane, 791 00:38:06,550 --> 00:38:10,521 maybe even less, during the years that they had been flying. 792 00:38:10,588 --> 00:38:12,957 So they hadn't been honing their skills. 793 00:38:13,024 --> 00:38:15,626 Narrator: Investigators also learn that the commander, 794 00:38:15,693 --> 00:38:17,461 though an experienced pilot, 795 00:38:17,528 --> 00:38:21,732 had never before supervised a training flight like this one. 796 00:38:21,799 --> 00:38:23,234 Jung Min: It's low. 797 00:38:23,300 --> 00:38:26,837 Narrator: His inexperience most likely led him to wait too long 798 00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:28,773 before taking over the controls. 799 00:38:28,839 --> 00:38:30,474 Jung Min: Speed! 800 00:38:30,541 --> 00:38:32,543 English: As a flight instructor, knowing that critical point, 801 00:38:32,610 --> 00:38:33,978 when to intervene, 802 00:38:34,045 --> 00:38:38,349 when a pilot is, or a student is going a little bit too far, 803 00:38:38,416 --> 00:38:41,686 is one of the hardest tasks to learn as an instructor. 804 00:38:41,752 --> 00:38:46,490 It takes experience, time and a little bit of extra knowledge 805 00:38:46,557 --> 00:38:49,260 being ahead of the airplane yourself as the instructor 806 00:38:49,326 --> 00:38:51,996 to see these things starting to decay. 807 00:38:52,063 --> 00:38:54,465 Narrator: Investigators agree the Asiana crew 808 00:38:54,532 --> 00:38:57,501 made serious mistakes that caused the crash. 809 00:38:57,568 --> 00:39:00,304 Cox: Bottom line, they let their speed drop. 810 00:39:00,371 --> 00:39:01,372 Narrator: But they don't agree 811 00:39:01,439 --> 00:39:04,041 on why the pilots made those mistakes. 812 00:39:04,108 --> 00:39:07,545 Bramble: I think those modes would confuse most pilots. 813 00:39:07,611 --> 00:39:11,148 Cox: But it's their job not to be confused. 814 00:39:11,215 --> 00:39:15,152 Narrator: Bill bramble believes technology is to blame. 815 00:39:15,219 --> 00:39:16,754 Bramble: The way that we design airplanes 816 00:39:16,821 --> 00:39:19,924 and the way that airplane flight decks are evolving 817 00:39:19,990 --> 00:39:23,961 are influencing the ability of flight crews to stay in the loop 818 00:39:24,028 --> 00:39:26,464 and understand what's going on. 819 00:39:26,530 --> 00:39:28,466 Narrator: But Roger Cox believes the fault lies 820 00:39:28,532 --> 00:39:30,968 squarely with the human pilots. 821 00:39:31,035 --> 00:39:35,406 Cox: We say pilots use cues to figure out, "where are we?". 822 00:39:35,473 --> 00:39:40,544 So I couldn't quite grasp why a professional crew 823 00:39:40,611 --> 00:39:43,280 hadn't picked up on these obvious cues 824 00:39:43,347 --> 00:39:45,916 that were right in front of them. 825 00:39:47,885 --> 00:39:50,121 Narrator: The crash of Asiana 214 826 00:39:50,187 --> 00:39:52,823 sparks a heated discussion among industry experts 827 00:39:52,890 --> 00:39:57,595 working to make aviation safer. 828 00:39:57,661 --> 00:40:01,932 It's an age-old debate of man versus machine. 829 00:40:03,567 --> 00:40:04,869 English: What's more significant? 830 00:40:04,935 --> 00:40:07,304 Is it more significant that the pilots 831 00:40:07,371 --> 00:40:09,707 did not simply take manual control 832 00:40:09,774 --> 00:40:12,643 and fly this airplane to the runway or go around? 833 00:40:12,710 --> 00:40:15,946 Or is it more significant that they were in this environment 834 00:40:16,013 --> 00:40:19,350 of automation that some people think was too complex? 835 00:40:19,416 --> 00:40:23,020 Bramble: Well, they fluked into it, the worst mode possible. 836 00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,523 Narrator: The more complex automation becomes, 837 00:40:25,589 --> 00:40:27,057 the more difficult it can be 838 00:40:27,124 --> 00:40:30,528 for pilots to understand the entire system. 839 00:40:30,594 --> 00:40:33,297 Bramble: I am not confident that the majority of pilots, 840 00:40:33,364 --> 00:40:36,567 triple seven pilots at the time, would have been able to predict 841 00:40:36,634 --> 00:40:39,303 the modes that the airplane would end up in. 842 00:40:41,272 --> 00:40:43,774 Narrator: There have been other deadly accidents in recent years 843 00:40:43,841 --> 00:40:45,810 that underscore bill bramble's concern 844 00:40:45,876 --> 00:40:49,580 about automation confusion. 845 00:40:49,647 --> 00:40:54,118 Turkish airways flight 1951 was carrying 128 passengers 846 00:40:54,185 --> 00:40:56,587 on approach to Amsterdam 847 00:40:56,654 --> 00:41:01,458 when a faulty altimeter sent incorrect data to the autopilot. 848 00:41:01,525 --> 00:41:03,828 Speed began to drop. 849 00:41:03,894 --> 00:41:06,363 Like the crew of Asiana 214, 850 00:41:06,430 --> 00:41:09,533 the Turkish airways pilots failed to react, 851 00:41:09,600 --> 00:41:13,170 thinking the plane's automation would maintain a safe speed. 852 00:41:17,107 --> 00:41:20,544 Accidents like this are extremely rare. 853 00:41:20,611 --> 00:41:21,979 Jung Min: It's low. 854 00:41:22,046 --> 00:41:25,182 Narrator: But researchers say that's part of the problem. 855 00:41:25,249 --> 00:41:26,984 Automation fails so rarely... 856 00:41:27,051 --> 00:41:27,885 Kang Kuk: Yeah. 857 00:41:27,952 --> 00:41:29,220 Narrator: ...that when it does, 858 00:41:29,286 --> 00:41:33,524 pilots aren't able to react as quickly as they should. 859 00:41:33,591 --> 00:41:35,326 Jung Min: Damn it! 860 00:41:38,128 --> 00:41:41,098 Hang on! Hang on! 861 00:41:41,165 --> 00:41:43,133 Bramble: To me, this accident shows 862 00:41:43,200 --> 00:41:44,869 the inevitable consequences 863 00:41:44,935 --> 00:41:49,173 of the evolution of the modern flight deck-- 864 00:41:49,240 --> 00:41:52,610 the increased automation, which has improved reliability, 865 00:41:52,676 --> 00:41:55,145 efficiency and safety in many ways, 866 00:41:55,212 --> 00:41:57,581 but has left us with some unintended consequences 867 00:41:57,648 --> 00:42:02,386 when something anomalous occurs. 868 00:42:02,453 --> 00:42:05,022 Narrator: But not everyone agrees that cockpit automation 869 00:42:05,089 --> 00:42:07,391 has gone too far. 870 00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:10,661 Cox: Bottom line, it's the pilot's responsibility 871 00:42:10,728 --> 00:42:13,397 to fly that plane. 872 00:42:13,464 --> 00:42:14,798 Having flown a lot of airliners 873 00:42:14,865 --> 00:42:17,334 for well over 30 years in my career, 874 00:42:17,401 --> 00:42:19,570 I always felt it was incumbent on me and other, all pilots 875 00:42:19,637 --> 00:42:23,774 to fully and totally understand every aspect of the airplane, 876 00:42:23,841 --> 00:42:26,343 particularly the flight path control, 877 00:42:26,410 --> 00:42:28,512 the autopilot and the auto flight system, 878 00:42:28,579 --> 00:42:31,916 so you understood what it was going to do. 879 00:42:31,982 --> 00:42:35,653 Narrator: In their final report on the crash of Asiana 214, 880 00:42:35,719 --> 00:42:39,757 investigators address both sides of the argument. 881 00:42:39,823 --> 00:42:43,627 They list pilot error as the probable cause, 882 00:42:43,694 --> 00:42:45,362 but they also cite the complexities 883 00:42:45,429 --> 00:42:49,667 of the automation system as a contributing factor. 884 00:42:49,733 --> 00:42:51,435 In an unusual move, 885 00:42:51,502 --> 00:42:53,804 the report includes statements from four members 886 00:42:53,871 --> 00:42:56,507 of the national transportation safety board, 887 00:42:56,573 --> 00:43:00,911 each emphasizing their own personal views on the crash. 888 00:43:03,147 --> 00:43:05,816 The report calls for better training for pilots, 889 00:43:05,883 --> 00:43:12,089 including more time spent flying without the use of automation. 890 00:43:12,156 --> 00:43:13,657 English: There's a great movement now in the industry 891 00:43:13,724 --> 00:43:15,893 towards going back to basics. 892 00:43:15,960 --> 00:43:19,163 We've talked a lot about over-reliance on automation, 893 00:43:19,229 --> 00:43:21,065 but airplanes still fly pretty much the same way 894 00:43:21,131 --> 00:43:22,967 they have for decades. 895 00:43:23,033 --> 00:43:25,536 And we want to get back to making sure 896 00:43:25,602 --> 00:43:27,771 that pilots are ahead of the airplane, 897 00:43:27,838 --> 00:43:29,640 aware of what's going on around them, 898 00:43:29,707 --> 00:43:33,544 and able to keep themselves in that loop of flying, 899 00:43:33,610 --> 00:43:36,780 whether the automation is doing it or not. 900 00:43:36,847 --> 00:43:39,817 Narrator: The report also urges more intuitive designs 901 00:43:39,883 --> 00:43:43,554 for aircraft automation and better alarms in the cockpit 902 00:43:43,620 --> 00:43:48,092 to warn pilots if their speed gets too low. 903 00:43:48,158 --> 00:43:49,693 English: It's hardly ever that we have an accident 904 00:43:49,760 --> 00:43:51,362 that's really just one thing. 905 00:43:51,428 --> 00:43:53,163 The hard part is to say which one 906 00:43:53,230 --> 00:43:54,898 is really that critical event? 907 00:43:54,965 --> 00:43:57,067 Which is the straw that broke the camel's back? 908 00:43:57,134 --> 00:43:58,502 If there is any such thing. 909 00:43:58,569 --> 00:44:00,437 Sometimes it takes all those little things 910 00:44:00,504 --> 00:44:03,140 to make the accident happen. 73556

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