All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S02E07.Pilot.vs.Plane.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-maldini_track3_[eng]

It's the first
public demonstration

of the world's most
sophisticated passenger jet.

Ok, you have 100 feet there.

The Airbus A320 is
being introduced to the world.

Mesdames et messieurs,

votre attention,
s'il vous plait,

l'Airbus A320 arrive.

That introduction
turns into a fatal calamity.

It can't be!

Merde!

It could not
possibly have come

at a worse time for Airbus.

The crash was
a major embarrassment.

There's enormous
pressure on investigators.

If Airbus is to survive,

they must find the answer
to one crucial question.

Was it the pilot
or was it the plane?

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

We lost both engines!

Put the mask over your nose.

Emergency descent.

Mayday, mayday.

Brace for impact!

I think I lost one.

Investigation starting...

He's gonna crash!

It's 2:30 in
the afternoon

on June 26, 1988.

An unusual charter flight

prepares to depart
Basel-Mulhouse Airport

in France,
near the Swiss border.

Anti-ice.

Captain Michel Asseline

is one of air France's
most distinguished pilots.

On.

Though only 44, he's
the head of pilot training

for the company's newest plane--

the Airbus A320.

It's only the third of its kind
to roll off the assembly line.

He flew this very aircraft
from the factory in Toulouse

just two days earlier.

I was in charge
of the launching of the 320

in air France.

The company used me
to promote the aircraft.

I had speeches to make.

I was constantly on the,
on the television, on newspaper.

Air charter 296,
we'd like to roll, please.

Asseline's first
officer, Pierre Mazieres,

is also a senior
air France pilot.

He's invited two
off-duty flight attendants

to come along for the ride
on this special flight.

The aircraft is booked to
perform a low-altitude flyover

at a local air show.

There are 130 people
on board this A320,

which is unusual for an air show
demonstration flight.

They have no luggage.

For some, it's their first time
on an airplane.

There are even children,

like seven-year-old
Mariama Barry,

unaccompanied by their parents.

After the flyover, they will be
taken on a sightseeing tour

around Mont Blanc, the highest
peak in Western Europe.

Most got their tickets
as promotional gifts

from a local bank and newspaper.

Jean-Marie Schreiber
is a young reporter

covering the launch
of the new plane.

As a journalist ,

I was thrilled to be
on the flight,

to have a chance to see how
people reacted inside the plane.

Another journalist
on board, Jean-Claude Boetsch,

has been busy
recording the event.

As I got on the plane,

I thought: "Great,

this is going to be
an unforgettable experience",

and it really was unforgettable.

The A320
is the first civil aircraft

to use fly-by-wire,
a cutting-edge technology

that computerizes
flight controls.

The system had previously mainly
been used by the military.

On the fly-by-wire system,

the pilot essentially
flies the computer,

and the computer flies
the aircraft.

Fly-by-wire
alters the relationship

between pilot and plane.

It gives computers the ability
to override human inputs

to prevent pilot error.

The A320's flight computer
won't let its human operators

do anything it determines
to be dangerous.

Airbus is the first
civil aircraft maker

to embrace this technology.

It hopes this
will give it an edge

over its longtime
American rival, Boeing.

In its first
public presentation,

Airbus has a lot on the line.

Ok, tell me
what you want

in terms of speed and altitude.

Ok, then,
takeoff right turn,

we go nice and easy
to find our thing.

We tried
to demonstrate

the capability of this aircraft.

To say we wanted to show off,
not exactly.

We wanted to make a good job,

and we were sure
to make a good job.

Once we identify the airfield,

we extend flaps to three,

we'll do the flyover at 100,

landing gear out,
and you just leave it up to me.

I'll give it alpha max.

I've done it 20 times.

Ok.

Captain Asseline
is planning

a breathtaking maneuver:

A low-altitude nose-high flyby
at alpha max.

That is the slowest a plane
can fly without stalling.

Ladies and gentlemen,

hello and welcome aboard
this Airbus A320,

which was put into service
just two days ago.

We will soon be taking off
for a short sightseeing flight,

which we'll start
from the Habsheim flying club

and then we'll be flying
around Mont Blanc.

I wish you
a very pleasant flight.

That's done.

ACF 296C,
clear for takeoff.

Runway 16.

We're rolling.

Takeoff. Go.

Parameters normal.

100.

100.

It's already
requesting climb.

Do you see that?

Yes, that happens.

I know the bug.

V-1.

Rotate.

Gear up, flaps one.

After takeoff checklist
completed.

It's only
a five-minute flight

to Habsheim airfield, where
the air show is being held.

For this sleepy Alsatian town,

the air show is the highlight
of the summer.

The air show drew
more than 5,000 people.

There was significant interest
from the public.

The airfield
is so small,

its coordinates aren't stored in
the plane's navigation database,

so the pilots must
find it by sight.

You're at eight nautical miles,

you'll soon see it.

There's the highway.

We leave the highway
to the left, don't we?

No, to the right of the highway.

It's slightly
to the right of the highway.

There's the airfield!

You've got it, have you?

The pilots have
spotted the airfield late.

They will have to rush

to descend to the planned
altitude for the flyover.

Many passengers have friends and
family watching from the ground.

Air charter 296,
good afternoon.

Habsheim, hello.

We're coming into view
of the airfield for the flyover.

Yes, I can see you.

You're cleared.

The sky is clear.

Gear down.

Ok, we're going in

for low-altitude,
low-speed flyover, 296.

Roger.

Flaps two.

Quebec November hotel,
Habsheim, Fox Echo 984.

Ok.

984, put in 984.

Flaps three.

Flaps three.

That's the airfield,
you confirm?

Affirmative.

Flight 296
makes a gentle turn

to line up with the runway.

The pilots must now lose
more altitude and speed

to get into position
for the flyover.

200.

200.

Mesdames et messieurs,

votre attention,
s'il vous plait.

L'Airbus A320 arrive.

Ok, you're
at 100 feet there.

100.

Watch it, watch it.

The aircraft is now
at the planned altitude.

For Asseline, this will be

the most delicate part
of the maneuver.

He must keep the plane
in a stable position,

with the nose up,
but not too high.

I looked
at the ground and said:

"Look, he's not high enough",

because you could see the grass
right out your window.

Ok, I'm ok there.

Disconnect auto throttle.

He disables one
of the plane's safety features

so that the computer won't
speed up the slow-moving plane.

Only now, Captain Asseline
sees something

that makes his blood run cold.

The A320's low speed
flyover at the Habsheim airfield

is suddenly not going
according to plan.

There's a forest in the path
of Captain Asseline's plane.

30.

Takeoff,
go-around power!

He selects
the highest thrust setting

and pulls back on the controls,

expecting the aircraft
to pull up.

But the plane keeps dropping.

It can't be!

Merde!

I started to see through the
window, tree branches.

I was astonished.

You can imagine being
on a trail in a large vehicle,

a bumpy trail, driving at 80
or 100 kilometers an hour

and you're shaking
from all sides.

It was like that.

I was saying to myself:

"The plane has to stay
in one piece,

"because if the plane
stays whole, we'll be ok.

If it breaks up,
we're done for".

Oh, no, oh, no,
oh, no, oh, no!

Still full of fuel,

the right wing of the jet
is sheared off.

The fuel ignites
immediately on impact.

We stopped
very quickly.

And on the ground,
I broke my seat,

just because I was
holding very firmly,

I broke my seat and I could see
a lot of flames all over.

The first officer
is badly injured.

And he has
a lot of blood.

And even with a full harness,

he hit something
in front of him.

What the hell have you done?

I don't know.

I don't understand.

There was a moment of silence

when the plane finally stopped.

Incredibly, the
fuselage is still in one piece.

Everyone has survived
the impact.

But they're not
out of danger yet.

So I lean to the right

and I see red flames,
the windows were red.

And I think: "We held together

but we're going to
burn to death".

Only two exits
can be used for evacuation--

the rest are engulfed in flames.

But thick branches
block the doors,

making evacuation difficult.

In the chaos of the cabin,

some passengers struggle
with their seatbelts.

Marie Francoise Froesch

is one of the last passengers
to leave her seat.

She comes across Mariama Barry,
who's trapped in her seat.

Mariama Barry,
she was seven, eight.

After the accident,
people pushing toward the exit,

pushed on the backs
of the seats,

the backs that folded over her

and then she was trapped
by her seatbelt.

No one saw her.
She was forgotten.

But it's too late.

We'll be ok.

Both are overcome
by smoke

before they can get
off the plane.

In the cockpit,
Captain Asseline struggles

to get his injured first officer
out of the burning aircraft.

I took him
from his seat, unbelt him,

carried, I don't know how,
and I put him on the slide.

When the passengers,
all of them,

the last one was
out of the plane,

I saw my crew.

They told me: "Captain, Captain,
they are all out".

I couldn't believe it.

But the crew is
wrong.

Not all the passengers
make it out.

Marie Francoise Froesch,
Mariama Barry,

and another young boy are dead.

In addition to the tragic
loss of life,

the accident is a pr disaster
for Airbus.

The crash
could not possibly have come

at a worse time for Airbus.

They were trying out
this new concept,

which they had touted
very widely

as a new level of safety
for civil flight,

and here's a pilot
going and crashing one.

For those who actually
saw the accident,

and it was broadcast
on the news media

throughout the world the same
evening that it happened,

there was amazement.

Oh, no, oh, no, oh, no...

The crash
was a major embarrassment.

Investigators
from France's

Accident
Investigation Bureau

are on the scene of the crash
within hours.

They recover the plane's
data and voice recorders.

Claude Bechet will head
the investigation.

Was it the pilot
or was it the plane?

We need to know.

Like the pilots
of flight 296,

he also works for Air France
as an airline Captain...

Let's get to work.

...which is unusual
for a state investigator.

Along with
the flight recorders,

investigators have a remarkable
piece of evidence to consider:

A high-quality video
of the accident

recorded by a French cameraman.

It was the first time
we had video of an accident.

Normally, an accident happens
in the middle of nowhere,

where nobody is there
with a camera to film it.

The tape
clearly shows the plane

flying right at the trees
at the end of the runway.

It doesn't seem to be
climbing at all.

The cockpit voice recorder
offers a confounding clue.

Takeoff,
go-around power.

30.

30.

It can't be!

Merde!

It's clear,
the crew had no idea

there was an obstacle
at the end of the runway.

Investigators are puzzled.

How could a forest
take a pilot by surprise?

Investigators bring
Captain Asseline in

for questioning about
the flyover at Habsheim.

They need to know
what his plan was.

My intention was
to carry out a flyover

at slow speed.

As a qualified A320 pilot,

Claude Bechet is familiar
with the plane's capabilities.

...over the airstrip,
and we go to alpha max.

Very good.

He sees nothing wrong
with Captain Asseline's plan.

It was not bad.

Making a slow pass,
it was well planned.

And he seemed to me
to be very open

and ready to help,

to work with
the Investigation Commission.

Investigators
turn their attention

to how Air France
prepared the flight crew

for the air show.

They discover a memo
setting out the rules

for all air show flights.

What draws the attention
of investigators

is the minimum altitude
air France had selected

for air show flyovers: 100 feet.

It was in violation
of national regulations.

He should have been
at 500 feet as a matter of fact.

But there was,
there had at the time

a tendency for pilots

who were
making air shows like that

to go a little bit lower
and sometimes much lower.

Chief investigator
Claude Bechet now wonders

if there were
any other mistakes

in the planning of the flight.

He soon learns that Air France's
flight division

didn't start drawing up

a flight plan
for the demonstration

until less than 48 hours
before the air show.

Air France employees had
prepared maps of the airfield

for the crew of flight 296.

Investigators find
a serious flaw.

The forest around
Habsheim airfield

did not show up
on the photocopies.

The Air France employee who
put together the flight package

didn't have time
to double check.

You were using
a navigation chart?

While
questioning Asseline,

Bechet discovers that
the pilots

were also given
little time to prepare.

- Here's the flight package.
- Thanks.

That's highly unusual

for an air show flight.

Investigators then make
an intriguing discovery

at the crash site.

They measure the height of
the trees hit by flight 296...

And discover the average height
of the forest

to be only 40 feet.

This poses an urgent question:

How could an Airbus

that was supposed to be flying
at 100 feet

hit trees less than half
that height?

It's clear to investigators

that flight 296 fatally deviated
from its original flight plan,

losing altitude before plunging
into a forest.

But only the black box data
can help them understand

how and why this happened.

Information from the A320's
flight data recorder

is recovered within hours
of the crash.

The device records information
about 200 aircraft functions.

It paints a detailed picture
of how flight 296 was operating

in the final minutes
of its journey.

It can't be!

We could reconstruct
the entire accident.

We could live with the crew

as the accident was happening.

Investigators make
two striking observations

from the data.

The first is that flight 296

suffered no
mechanical breakdowns.

The second is that the A320

followed a very different
flight path

than the one Captain Asseline
had planned.

Instead of maintaining
a stable airspeed and altitude,

flight 296 had slowed down
and lost altitude

as it performed the flyover.

As the A320 crossed
the Habsheim airfield,

its speed dropped
to only 112 knots.

The plane's deceleration
was so dramatic

it was even visible
on the video.

Michel Asseline was one
of Air France's top pilots.

Claude Bechet is hard pressed
to understand

how he could have mishandled
such a high-profile flight.

Pressed further,

Asseline explains
how the trouble started.

You were using
a navigation chart?

Yes.

We had some difficulty
locating the airfield.

We leave the highway
to the left, don't we?

No, to the right of the highway.

It's slightly
to the right of the highway.

There's the airfield.

You've got it, have you?

They spotted
the airfield too late.

So when they did,

they reduced
the power and they descended.

So they rushed
their descent

in order to get into position
for the flyover.

And they were
still slowing down

when they reached the airfield.

That's the airfield,
you confirm?

Affirmative.

But then another
problem emerged.

The spectators were lined up
on a different runway

from the one the crew
was heading for.

The crew
of Air France flight 296

is ill-prepared
for their demonstration.

In planning for the air show,

Air France provided the crew
information only for runway two,

Habsheim's only paved airstrip.

But Captain Asseline
sees the crowds aligned

on a much shorter
adjacent grass field.

I was expecting
a normal runway.

And at the last moment, I saw
that it was a grass runway.

Captain Asseline
lined up with the grass strip.

I have no idea

that at the end of the runway
was a forest.

For me it was bushes only,
or something.

Ok, you're
at 100 feet there.

100.

Watch it, watch it.

Because they had to
rush their descent,

by the time the flight
got to the airfield

it was flying too fast.

To lose speed, Captain Asseline

kept the thrust
on its lowest power setting,

well below the setting
pilots normally use

for alpha max flight.

But another serious problem
was developing.

The aircraft had dropped
below 100 feet

and was continuing to fall.

The crew didn't seem to notice.

50.

I'm ok there.

Disconnect auto throttle.

In a matter of seconds,

the altitude had fallen
to only 30 feet.

What was extremely clear

is that airplane was flying

at approximately 30 feet

above the ground.

Regardless of any other data,

this data was
extremely important.

No airplane of that size
or of any other size

should make a flight pass
that low.

The data is clear.
You were at 30 feet, not 100.

I believed
I was at 100 feet.

Claude Bechet is
still uncertain

how the A320 ended up

so dangerously close
to the ground.

Captain Asseline insists
his instruments failed him.

Flaps two.

Quebec November hotel,
Habsheim Fox Echo 984.

Ok, 984.

Captain Asseline
was relying

on his barometric
altimeter.

It uses air pressure

to measure how high he was
above the ground.

It had to be set
to local atmospheric pressure

to be accurate.

Quebec November hotel,
Habsheim Fox Echo 984.

Ok, 984.

Put in 984.

The cockpit recorder proves

that the tower provided
the pressure reading

and the crew set
their instrument.

But Asseline insists
the altimeter was giving him

a false reading.

I tell you,
the altimeter said the plane

was at 100 feet.

Michel Asseline stated
that the barometric altimeter

was, in fact to be precise,

67 feet out.

And that is something
that he claims led him

to be flying at 30 feet
instead of at 100 feet.

Investigators
are skeptical.

Asseline had
more than one instrument

to give him
altitude information.

The A320 has a second altimeter
that uses radio waves

to calculate the plane's
distance from the ground.

That altimeter displays the
altitude on a digital display,

but Captain Asseline claims
it was difficult to read.

We could not use
the radio altimeter

because this radio altimeter
is digital,

and nobody can fly
by reading numbers.

I try that later,
on a simulator,

I never succeed to do it.

But the
radio altimeter

has another way of
alerting pilots.

I'm ok there.

50.

A digital
voice callout.

Disconnect auto throttle.

50.

But Asseline claims

he and his first officer,
Pierre Mazieres,

could not hear it.

Some people said:
"But you could have heard

the radio altimeter saying,
30, 30, 50, 40, 30".

No, because at that time,

this aircraft was
very, very noisy.

And we have the headsets.

And we have demonstrated
at that time

that the radio altimeter
warnings,

the radio altimeter callouts,

they were not going
through the headset.

Despite
Asseline's defense,

investigators are certain

that the crew of flight 296
mishandled a risky maneuver.

Bechet has more questions
for the Captain.

What did you do
when you saw the trees?

I did what
any pilot would do--

I tried to climb over them.

Investigators learn

that in the final moments
before the crash...

Takeoff,
go-around power.

...Captain Asseline
applied full throttle.

And when I was waiting
for the engine to spool up,

then I realized in front of me
there were trees.

And then I was waiting,
waiting, waiting, waiting.

But he claims
the engines did not respond.

And when they finally kicked in,
it was too late.

Merde!

I tell you,
the engines did not come on

when I gave it full throttle!

Captain Asseline's
testimony

raises a troubling prospect.

If there was a prolonged delay
in engine response,

it could indicate a critical
problem with the A320.

He's convinced the engines
didn't respond quickly enough

in the final seconds
of the flight

and makes his mission
to prove it.

He uncovers an Airbus document
warning of a defect in the A320

which states that
the plane's engine speed

could stagnate at low altitude,

a condition caused
by poor airflow.

When this occurs,
the engine cannot accelerate.

But investigators can find
no evidence of such a failure

in any of the data
from the plane.

30.

Takeoff,
go-around power.

In the five seconds
after Captain Asseline

applied full power
on the thrust levers,

the A320 twin engines
had begun to spool up--

reaching 84% thrust,
close to full power,

just before the plane
hit the trees.

When you put from idle
to full power,

you have the impression
that nothing happens--

for a few seconds--
and then the power comes.

That was normal, exactly as
predicted by the certification.

Investigators
are increasingly certain

the engines on flight 296
didn't fail.

They find a novel way
to verify the data.

Video of the crash picked up
the distinctive sound

of the A320's engines
accelerating.

By studying that
sound, engineers can determine

how much power the engines
were generating

in the final seconds
before the crash.

We were able to compare

the rpm of the engines
from that film

and from the flight data
recorder.

There was nothing wrong
with the engines,

any of the two engines.

Chief investigator
Claude Bechet

has a new headache.

Captain Asseline is convinced

there is a conspiracy
against him.

He cuts off all cooperation
with the investigation.

Very well.

The investigation committee,

I tried to cooperate with them,
but I began to be suspicious.

In the press each week,
"the aircraft is good,

"the aircraft has nothing,

pilot error, pilot error,
pilot error".

All that was
a big, big, big cover-up.

My opinion.

Captain Asseline
begins a campaign

to challenge
the French investigation.

He appears on British television
to make a dramatic assertion.

When I pull the stick
to up position,

the flight controls,
the limiter control

go to down position.

So on any aircraft,
if you ask up,

following the order
of the pilots,

the limiter control goes to up.

And not that, on that one,
it went to down.

Why?

That will be the good question.

His accusations go to
the heart of doubts

about the aircraft:

That Airbus' fly-by-wire system

had given the A320's computers
too much control.

Asseline's claim that the plane
didn't follow his instructions

is supported by data from
the plane's flight recorder.

The black box recorded
every movement

of the pilot's
side stick controller.

It does show that
seconds before the crash,

Captain Asseline pulled it back
to get the plane's nose up.

Investigators compare it with
what the plane did in response.

They make
a perplexing discovery.

He's telling the truth.
The elevator moved down.

In the final seconds
before the accident,

the pilots had desperately
tried to pull up.

The side stick controls
the plane's elevator.

Pulling back on it
should raise the elevator

and pitch the plane upwards.

30, 30.

But that's not
what happened on this flight.

One of the strange
things about the crash flight

which became apparent

when the digital flight recorder

was analyzed,

was that during
the last few seconds,

prior to contact with the trees,

the pilot was dragging back

on the stick
as hard as he could,

but the flight surfaces
were moving into a position

to put the nose down.

Captain Asseline
believes the plane's descent

triggered an automatic response
by the flight computers.

Asseline inadvertently
brought his plane

to within 30 feet of the ground

with his landing gear down
and his flaps extended.

Investigators now wonder
if the plane's computer

determined that Asseline
was landing

and initiated the necessary
steps to accomplish that.

As the plane leveled up
with the airfield,

it overflew a little copse
of trees,

which took the radar altitude

momentarily below 30 feet.

That would have been sufficient

to trigger
the flight control system

to enter landing mode.

It's possible
that in spite

of what Captain Asseline
was commanding the plane to do,

the computer brought the plane's
nose down for landing.

Investigators must try
to determine

whether the A320 overrode
its pilot at a critical moment.

They analyze the data
from the flight recorder.

Stop it there.

But to their
disappointment...

So was the plane
in landing mode or not?

...the flight data
recorder can't confirm

if the plane went
into landing mode.

The A320's systems
are so advanced

that the recorder can't track
all the plane's functions.

Investigator Claude Bechet

comes up with another way
to find out.

He replicates
Asseline's approach

to the Habsheim airfield

to see how the A320 responds.

Ok, let's start
the descent.

Power to flight idle.

Now put it into alpha max.

That's it, gently.

I replayed the accident,

but on the longest runway

in Toulouse.

Altitude 40 feet.

35 feet.

We replayed the accident
exactly what it was.

Bechet's plan
is to descend to 30 feet,

as Asseline's A320 did.

Now pull up slightly
to level off.

Hold it there.

Bechet wants to see
if the flight computer

puts the plane in landing mode.

Ok, now full thrust.

Did you feel that?

Alpha protection.

The test flight has
triggered a nose-down response

from the plane's computers,

like the crash of flight 296.

But the plane hadn't gone
into landing mode.

Instead, the flyover
had activated

one of the A320's
main safety features:

Stall protection.

Due to a lack of airflow
over the wings,

flying slowly
in a nose-high position

can cause a plane to lose lift.

The A320's computer
has been programmed

to bring the plane's nose down
when it gets close to stalling.

This means that in theory,

as long as the flight control
system is in operation,

the pilot cannot
stall the plane.

Bechet concludes
the flight's computers

did override
Captain Asseline's command.

But he believes
that by doing so,

it had prevented the plane
from stalling and crashing

just short of the tree line.

That airplane didn't stall

and let's say landed
on the trees.

The investigation
into the crash at Habsheim

is coming to an end.

Claude Bechet prepares
to deliver his verdict.

The conclusion
of my report

was that the airplane
was too low, too slow

and with not enough power.

Bechet concludes that
mistakes

made by Captain Asseline

led to the Airbus crash.

As far as Claude Bechet
is concerned,

the report is the final word
on the Habsheim tragedy.

The case, however,
is far from over.

The French justice system

is moving towards a judgment
of Captain Asseline.

He is charged
with involuntary homicide

in the deaths
of three passengers

and faces the prospect
of a long prison sentence.

But Captain Asseline believes
he has found evidence

that will exonerate him.

He's convinced
there was a conspiracy

to tamper with
the plane's black boxes,

to conceal problems with the
A320's fly-by-wire technology.

There has been a
cover-up with

some phony recorders.

That's the first point.

The second point,

they have been changing
the content of the recorders.

It all begins,
according to Asseline,

at the crash site.

An employee of France's
civil aviation authority

is photographed carrying
the A320's flight recorders

from the scene.

Those same black boxes

are presented as evidence
at Asseline's trial.

But inexplicably,
they look different.

I had a chance
to see the black boxes

held by the court,

but when I see the state
they're in,

they're old boxes,
full of scratches,

dusty, with chipped paint.

I think: "Wait, these can't be
the boxes from the crash.

The plane was new.
They're not the right ones".

Captain Asseline hires

a Swiss criminology institute

to compare the two photographs.

Its conclusion: They're not
the same flight recorders.

Captain Asseline claims

the black box data
from his flight

has been tampered with.

But investigator Claude Bechet

rejects the accusations
as outrageous.

They were trying to prove

that the tapes had been
tampered with,

which we could not understand

because every recorder expert

knew that it was
physically impossible.

But there is
one expert

who believes the black boxes
are suspicious.

Ray Davis is a former head
of flight recorder analysis

at Britain's Air Accidents
Investigation branch.

He has been hired
by British television

to review the French
investigators' work.

It was a little bit
of an eye opener in a way,

in that prior

to reading the report,

I had a totally different
impression

of the possible causes
of this accident.

Whereas when I read the report,
there were so many anomalies

and questions raised
by the report

that my whole attitude
towards the accident

changed completely.

Davis discovers
evidence

that could vindicate Asseline.

It raises questions about
when the crew applied power

to try to over-fly the trees.

30...

Takeoff,
go-around power.

30.

While studying
the black box data,

Davis comes across
a curious inconsistency.

French investigators had
synchronized the black boxes

with a transcript of air traffic
control communications.

Davis examines
the last conversation

the pilots had with the tower
before the crash.

It was recorded
by both air traffic control

and the plane's own black box.

Ray Davis discovers
a time discrepancy

between the two recordings,

amounting to a loss
of several seconds.

According to the black box data,

the aircraft was five seconds
from impact with the trees

when Captain Asseline commanded
full thrust from the engines.

But according
to Ray Davis' analysis,

this actually took place
four seconds earlier.

This four-second gap

dramatically changes
the calculus of the accident.

It's the difference between a
normal delay in engine response

and a serious malfunction.

Merde!

Asseline claims that
on this particular occasion,

the delay was more
than he expected.

And depending upon which side

of the argument
you come down at,

as to whether or not

the four-second delay in the
digital flight data recording

was real or not,

then, you know,

he's either an idiot,

or you know, he's right.

The French justice system

does not believe
that Asseline is right.

After multiple appeals,

Michel Asseline is convicted
of involuntary homicide

and sentenced to ten months
in prison.

Still, the controversy
over the black boxes

and the missing four seconds
lingers on.

It promises to forever
cloud the results

of the Bechet investigation.

The public opinion
thought probably: "Oh, well,

"there was so much at stake,
you know.

"It was the future of all

"European aviation industry

"which was at stake.

"So they managed
to tamper the tapes

so they could blame the pilot
and not the airplane".

But this is just impossible.

The investigation
into the Habsheim accident

made several recommendations.

It calls for passengers
to be banned

on all demonstration flights.

It also calls
for better reconnaissance

of airfields by flight crews.

And they want airline procedures
to be reviewed

to ensure they conform

with official regulations
concerning altitude.

Michel Asseline
went on to a career

as a teacher and inventor
in the aviation industry.

He continues to appeal
his conviction,

and has devoted much of his life
to clearing his name.

The tragedy at Habsheim

would have little impact
on Airbus industry.

The A320 would go on to become

one of the most successful
commercial aircraft in history,

selling over 750 planes
in its first 10 years.

And fly-by-wire technology
would be safely adopted

by a new generation
of passenger aircraft.