Original subtitles

[Music]

these tanks are of course much more

sophisticated than those things

the german army and the soviet army had

40 years ago

and

today

all our forces in general europe are

fully mechanized forces but in those

days

we had only about 10 percent panzer

tank

or mechanized forces on both sides

and still these 10 percent

bore the brunt of the better

their tactics were decisive for the

outcome of many

operations especially the defensive

operations

and therefore i think even 40 years

later it is quite appropriate

to study

not only the theoretical doctrinal

principles of those tactics

but also

the skills the practical skills of

commanders

and troops of those commanders and

troops who stem for more than four years

the tide of this numerically vastly

superior enemy

[Applause]

[Music]

the german army which inflicted

lightning defeats on poland in september

1939 and western europe in june 1940

was spearheaded by panzer forces which

had been in existence for only four

years

the versailles treaty of 1919 had

prohibited the development of modern

offensive weapons by germany after world

war one

and so the first three panzer divisions

formed in 1935

were disguised as motor demonstration

commands and the first tank as a light

agricultural tractor

[Music]

this did not prevent far-sighted

officers such as colonel heinz guderian

from studying the writings of leading

british exponents of armoured warfare

fuller and little heart

he used armored cars motorcycles and a

tank guns and dummy tanks

in exercises which may have looked

primitive but were vital in developing

command and control techniques

particularly

radio the first three models of german

tanks were all lightly armed and nightly

armored

however the panzer iv weighed 18 tons

and had a top speed of 35 kilometers per

hour

its gun was the somewhat inaccurate

short barrel 75 millimeter

despite its shortcomings it became the

standard tank of the german army and

remained in production until the end of

the second world war

while the germans were experimenting

with dummy tanks

the soviets had already begun creating

powerful armored forces

by 1932 soviet industry was turning out

3 000 armored fighting vocals per month

by 1935 the red army already possessed

four mechanized cores each with one

rifle and two tank divisions

[Music]

however soviet armor made a poor showing

in the spanish civil war

and it was decided to disband the

unwieldy tank cause

the winter war against finland was

another disaster and gave the germans an

exaggerated view of the red army's

incompetence

before the tank cause could be

completely disbanded they were given a

reprieve

in june 1940 german panzer formations

cut a swathe across western europe

and even the powerful french army and

british expeditionary force could not

halt them

in july 1940 in response to the german

victories the red army ordered the

formation of 29 tank cores each with a

thousand or more tanks

however not a single one of these new

tank cores had completed its formation

by the time the germans struck

for example the 14th tank corps of the

western military district formed in

march 1941 with an establishment of 1023

tanks

including the new heavy kv and medium

t34

could only field 508 tanks most of which

were worn out t26s

in june 1941 the soviet union had about

five million men under arms

three million of these were to be found

in the 170 formations and supporting

units deployed in the west of the

country

the air force which was not a separate

arm

had 1 500 modern planes and thousands of

obsolete

[Music]

ones soviet russia's western borders ran

four and a half thousand kilometers from

the barren sea in the north to the black

sea in the south

the

3375 kilometers of land frontier was

defended by 56 divisions to a depth of

about 50 kilometers

the second echelon containing most of

the tank formations was to be found

anywhere from 50 to 100 kilometers

behind the frontier

the reserves which also included a

number of mechanized calls

were deployed from 150 to 400 kilometers

from the frontier

at the outbreak of world war ii in

september 1939

the german army had 70 active divisions

of which 13 were classified as motorized

and five as panzer divisions

a typical panzer division had a panzer

brigade with two panzer regiments each

with two pounds of battalions each with

four companies of light tanks and a

motorized infantry brigade with one

rifle regiment with a motorcycle

battalion and three infantry battalions

in 1940 the number of panzer divisions

was doubled but the tank strength of

each was halved by reducing the number

of light and medium tanks

and replacing them by fewer heavier

models with increased firepower

the infantry component was increased and

this made a more balanced formation

before dawn on the 22nd of june 1941

152 german divisions including 19 panzer

and 14 motorized divisions and 29

satellite divisions totaling some five

and a half million men

invaded the soviet union

this huge force was divided into three

army groups spearheaded by the panzer

divisions

army group north von leybe was to

advance northeastwards to leningrad

while his northern flank was to trap

soviet forces with their backs to the

baltic sea

army group center von bok was to take

the most direct route from brest litovsk

to smolensk over the river at nipper and

either north to leningrad or straight on

to moscow a distance as the crow flies

of one thousand kilometers

army group south von runstadt was to

advance with its 600 tanks on kiev and

the nipper valley and destroy all soviet

forces between the pre-patch marshes and

the black sea

[Music]

skinned

the artillery bombardment started at

zero 400 hours and at about zero six

hundred or zero seven hundred hours we

crossed the bridge which had been taken

by the infantry

there were a few lights of your tanks

amphibious steps but they presented no

problem to us

we pressed on fairly quickly in the

direction of berdychev which was the

objective of our attack and we had

hardly any sleep since we drove right

through both day and night with

luftwaffe support until we encountered

the first t-34s in front of berdychev

my thoughts on crossing the russian

frontier were as follows

we were a very old experienced panzer

division

which had fought in poland and france

and we felt superior to any opponent

the russians were no real match for us

this impression changed quickly on the

very first day

we crossed the frontier at tauragee

and there we encountered russian

frontier troops

who fought so hard that by noon on the

first day

we had expanded

all the ammunition

in the panzer form

in the first days of war german forces

were advancing very swiftly and this put

the entire staff of the red army in a

state of shock as it were

this state of shock stayed with us for

quite a long time

as far as i know the soviets weren't

organized to fight until july or even

the beginning of august

this was in the region of stararusa to

the west of novgorod but before that

let's say in july the soviet army was

retreating in such case

that reconnaissance of the northwestern

front had to send special detachment to

find out not where the enemy was

positioned but where the soviet units

their own army was

air superiority was another decisive

factor

by midday on the 22nd of june 1941 the

luftwaffe had attacked 66 airfields and

destroyed some 800 aircraft on the

ground

then after the germans enjoyed almost

complete air superiority

[Music]

as the armored spearheads penetrated

deeper into soviet territory

they began to experience not only

increasingly bitter resistance

but the other problems of waging war in

russia

vast distances heat dust exhaustion and

wear and tear on vehicles and equipment

in many ways the soviet union was an

ideal country for armored warfare

but the enormous distances lowered the

morale of the infantrymen who had to

march most of the way so that the foot

soldier often went into battle already

exhausted

russia had many roads but only one

metaled highway from brest litovsk to

moscow

the other roads were little more than

tracks

the wooden bridges which crossed the

many streams and rivers were often too

weak to take the weight of heavy

military traffic

the soviet railway system left much to

be desired

since the tracks were a wider gauge

every kilometer of line had to be

narrowed

the few rail heads assumed considerable

strategic and tactical importance

once supplies had been offloaded they

might then have to be transported as

much as 500 kilometers by road to the

front

by the autumn of 1941

the red army had suffered a series of

shattering defeats and encirclements

and its losses in material and men were

astronomical

the morale of the troops was so low

that at the beginning of the war some

soviet divisions and even some armies

encircled by the germans didn't even try

to fight back but gave themselves up

never before in the whole history of

russia had anyone seen full blooded

fully armed divisions or cause

surrender without a shot being fired

at this critical phase of the operation

when the germans had reached the line

leningrad smolensk kiev there was a

conflict of opinion

hitler became increasingly concerned

with the economic and political

objectives such as the far-off caucasian

oil fields and the ukrainian cornfields

the field commanders insisted that the

first priority must be the destruction

of the red army

the generals particularly guderian

wanted to press on to moscow

but three vital weeks passed before

hitler finally decided on the ukraine

the panzer forces were redeployed in the

ukraine an army group south reinforced

by guderian's tanks advanced into the

crimea

[Music]

the offensive against moscow was finally

resumed on the 30th of september 1941

the sudden switch took the soviets by

surprise and soon huge red army forces

found themselves encircled at briansk

and viasma

when on the 16th of october these

pockets surrendered

army group center had taken one and a

half million prisoners since the

beginning of the campaign

the way to moscow appeared to be wide

open

but when the first ominous fall of snow

suddenly melted

the roads dissolved into a quagmire

and the german advance was reduced to an

average of 12 kilometers a day

there was so much in such deep mud that

only large tractors could move

tanks could move practice could move but

no lorries with petrol or ammunition

could move forward

and we had to wait until the ground

throws up again and when the frost came

we were off again to moscow

we pressed unfairly smartly and we came

to a road junction north of moscow about

25 kilometers from moscow and then an

icy cold set in and also very stiff

russian resistance

the coal was so severe that our tanks

were practically immobilized

it was quite the coldest russian winter

with temperatures more than 40 degrees

below freezing

and if one considers that at the time we

had no winter clothing things were

particularly severe

as far as the vehicles were concerned we

had difficulties in getting them to

start in the mornings and sometimes we

had to make fire under the motor as even

with the jump starter the vehicles

couldn't be started otherwise with

everything stuck in the frozen oil

the germans had fought their way over

900 kilometers and moscow was just 30

kilometers away when on the 6th of

december 1941

with temperatures below minus 30 degrees

centigrade the offensive was called off

the soviet supreme command sensed that

the germans had shot their boat

and with reinforcements arriving from

the far east the red army went on to the

offensive

sad and also astonishing for us was

that the russians with their t-34s paid

no attention to the

cold the siberian divisions that came

here to europe just shook themselves and

said oh how warm and fought us

and the retreat naturally depressed us

even more

for the first time we felt that we were

beaten

in appalling weather and despite

hitler's categoric order not to give up

a single meter of soviet territory the

germans were pushed back until they were

able to establish a line east of

smolensk south to the muse river

there they remained until operations

could be resumed again in the spring

despite the optimism which continued to

prevail in the furore's headquarters not

one of hitler's primary objectives had

been attained

leningrad and moscow had not fallen

while in the south much of the ukraine

lay beyond germany's reach

in many ways the soviets had contributed

to their own defeats during the first

months of the campaign

by attempting a linear defense of every

kilometer of their vast frontier they

had spread out their forces so that the

germans were always able to achieve

overwhelming superiority in the areas of

their main effort

by placing their reserves so far back

rudimentary communications bad roads

lack of motor transport and

inexperienced commanders meant that they

were easily out fought by more flexible

and mobile german forces

the whole command system of soviet

regiments and divisions is based on the

principle of very strict subordination

from top to bottom

that extremely strict subordination

existed before the war

so the whole of the officer corps was

trained to execute very precisely the

orders received from above

but just before the war many senior

officers had been liquidated in stalin's

purges and the newly promoted senior

officers were quite unprepared to show

initiative anyhow they were not expected

to show initiative on the contrary it

was forbidden by military regulations

which specified that each officer and

each man was only to execute the orders

of his immediate superior

initiative was considered risky

those commanders that survived were

mostly stalin's old favorites like the

russian civil war heroes budjani

boroshilov and timoshenko who were

completely out of their depth when it

came to marshalling vast armies in the

era of the tank

the german had to come to terms with the

fact that in the t-34 the soviets

possessed an armored fighting vehicle

which was far superior to anything they

had

at that time i was a lance corporal in a

panzer ii which anyway couldn't harm

enemy tanks

in the woman pocket we saw the t-34 for

the first time

and understandably we were astonished to

see what kind of tank it was

particularly the quality of its armor

and its construction

consequently this tank could in practice

only be knocked out frontally by our 88

millimeter guns and from the side by our

5 centimeter or 7.5 centimeter anti-tank

guns

thus for example the 3.7 anti-tank gun

was more or less useless

we had to adjust ourselves to the idea

that with the anti-tank weapons

available to us

the 3.7 and 5 centimeter tank guns

we could not in practice knock out the

t-34

our heavy companies with 7.5 centimeter

guns discovered mainly by chance that

high explosive shells with a quarter

second delayed action fuse when fired at

the rear of the t-34 tank

either set on fire the diesel oil

canisters or caused a fire in the engine

compartment as a result of fire

penetrating the air induction gratings

during the early months of 1942 the

germans formed another four panzer

divisions

giving them an actual strength of 3 300

tanks on the eastern front in may 1942

armoured personnel carriers were still

in short supply however and only one

grenadier battalion in each panzer

division was equipped with them despite

their new designation of panzer

grenadiers

the other battalions continue to travel

in lorries

the point of maximum effort of the 1942

german summer offensive was in the kursk

region

army group b with three armies and

fourth panzer army was to head for the

dawn

then swing south along its banks

encircling as many soviet divisions as

it could in the river's great bend

between rostov and varanesh

the soviets expecting the offensive to

be resumed against moscow were taken by

surprise when on the 28th of june 1942

800 tanks and assault guns at 4th panzer

army broke through their lines in the

ukraine and struck across the rolling

plains to the river dawn

[Music]

as always the luftwaffe played a key

role

it had been ordered to support only the

armored spearheads and an officer in

luftwaffe uniform is often to be found

up amongst the leading tanks

one must make a distinction between the

so-called flivo and the two kali as an

officer or stukalite officer

the task of the flavor at core level lay

mainly in keeping the army corps command

informed about everything that the air

force was doing or at least everything

that could be of use to the core command

in assessing the situation

whereas the stuka liaison officer was

always at the front mostly with the

armored spearheads

[Music]

the stuka is an officer usually

stationed himself in the morning at

daybreak at the focal point of the

operations with his stack

behind the tank an arrow-shaped trench

was dug about one and a half meters deep

and an orange colored cloth laid in it

so that the dive bombers flying in would

recognize both our main fighting line

and likewise the enemy target

i remember a very unpleasant situation

in which we ran up against a russian

anti-tank barrier consisting of t-34s

and anti-tank aa guns

and in just the type of terrain where we

couldn't get ourselves under cover all

that quickly

the earliest officer who was in fact in

the same dangerous situation as we were

immediately called out the stukas

and before the battalion could even

fully react the stukas bombed the edge

of the wood where the russian anti-tank

front was located

and thereby eliminated the danger we

were facing

the panzer army also had direct control

over its reconnaissance flights

and used them to seek out soviet troop

movements in plenty of time to plan the

most effective countermeasures

momentum was maintained despite soviet

attempts to strike at fourth panzer

army's exposed flank as it sped towards

stalingrad on the river vulgar with very

little resistance

when hitler made a fatal decision

he ordered the fourth to swing south and

assist first panzer army in its crossing

of the river dawn

[Music]

on the 23rd of july the germans took

rostov gateway to the caucasus

when two weeks later fourth panzer army

resumed its advance on stalingrad the

soviets had just scraped together

sufficient forces to hold the germans

and their allies on the outskirts of the

city

the name alone stalin city was enough to

ensure its special significance in

hitler's eyes

although the town itself had no

strategic importance

by committing the sixth army to the

storming of stalingrad

hitler deprived his soldiers of their

one advantage mobility

while pitching them against the

inadequately trained but dogged

adversary the red army infantryman

[Applause]

on the 14th of october 1942

hitler brought to a close the summer

offensive by halting all operations

except those on the southern sector in

the caucasus and around stalingrad

in november 1942 the front line ran from

leningrad in the north to jeff arial and

along the river dawn to stalingrad and

then south to the caucasus mountains and

the black sea east of novorossiysk

however the red army was still in the

field and even beginning to grow in

strength whereas the german army in the

east was nearing the end of its

offensive capabilities

its losses were approaching the two

million mark

and the survivors were battle weary

vehicles and equipment were in need of

maintenance while the armaments industry

was only just able to replace battle

losses

for both hitler and stalin the battle of

stalingrad assumed symbolic significance

far in excess of its strategic

importance

in purely military terms the main german

objective was to deprive the soviets of

their supply arteries of the rivers don

and volga

and this could have been done without

taking stalingrad itself

rather than eliminate soviet bridge

heads on the west bank of the volga

above and below stalingrad

the sixth army was committed to a battle

of attrition in the city's rubble

[Music]

[Applause]

the luftwaffe was so committed to the

battle of stalingrad that the soviets

were able to build up reserves without

having to contend with luftwaffe

interference

to prevent german forces exerting

additional pressure on the city's

defenders the soviets resumed activity

on sixth army's flanks during september

1942

throughout october the fighting in the

city rose in intensity until by the 20th

the remaining pockets of soviet

resistance had been pushed back to

within a thousand meters of the banks of

the bulgar

but during that critical month the

soviet high command was planning a

counter-offensive codenamed oran

it began to assume the shape of a single

strategic operation along a 300

kilometer long front involving the

stalingrad dawn and southwestern fronts

each of which was roughly equivalent to

a german army group

the southwestern front was to break

through the sector of the line held by

the romanians between sarafimovic and

kletskaya

and head southeast for kallach

three days were allowed for this 100

kilometer advance

the stalingrad front was to launch its

attack from the sarepta lakes against

the romanian line and converge on

kalanche

where it was to link up with the

southwestern front thus cutting off the

enemy between the rivers burger and dawn

its left flank was to attack in the

direction of kotelnikovo the dawn front

was to launch simultaneous offensives

from its kletskaya bridgehead and

destroyed the german forces in the small

bend of the dawn

the germans and their allies strung out

along the 400 kilometer long front on

the river dawn were not so much an army

group as a group of armies

south of stalingrad was the fourth

romanian army

while way out in the steppe near elista

was the 16th panzer grenadier division

in and around stalingrad itself with the

sixth army and fourth panzer army

from the city northwards to kursk were

the third romanian 8th italian second

hungarian and second german armies

in reserve behind the sector held by the

third romanian army was the 48th panzer

corps

its panzer divisions were to play the

key role in the defensive fighting along

the chian river

otherwise there were no significant

german reserves and little hope of

reinforcements

by november 1942

the romanian troops on the dawn were at

the end of a march which had taken them

across the ukraine and bessarabia to the

black sea

where for two months they had led siege

to odessa

during that journey they had lost one

hundred and thirty thousand of their

comrades

iron

they were clearly over taxed by the

russian assault

as far as equipment and training were

concerned they were not in a position to

resist a concentrated russian tank

attack

moreover behind them there were hardly

any reserves so that the collapse on

these fronts could have been forecast

general adolf hollet commander of army

detachment hollet was also well aware of

the danger

i remember leaving the main headquarters

the fuhrer headquarters with an officer

and saying to him now have a look at

this we are surrounded right and left by

foreign soldiers our allies

they are the romanians and then the

italians and the hungarians are beyond

the romanians

they don't all measure up to the german

troops they can't because they haven't

got the same experience and above all

they haven't the same armament and i am

telling you this could conceivably cause

difficulties

so i don't trust these allies one little

bit

and the officer said to me

don't let the fear out of hear that

and then i got really cheeky and said

if he doesn't want to hear it then he

will soon feel it

during the first week of november as the

germans prepared to renew their efforts

to take stalingrad soviet forces began

to move into their forming up positions

for operation iran

the marshalling of this tremendous force

while the fighting for stalingrad still

raged was in itself an incredible

achievement

one and a half million men 13 500 guns

894 tanks and 1115 aircraft

carrying men and equipment across the

wide don and volga rivers and deploying

and concealing them in the open step was

a hazardous operation

increased soviet air activity during the

infrequent periods of good flying

weather reduced german air

reconnaissance significantly

on the eve of the soviet

counter-offensive german and soviet

forces along the 700 kilometer southern

sector were roughly equal

but by stripping other formations the

soviets were able to build up

significant superiority particularly

against germany's ill-equipped allies

operation iran began at o720 on the 19th

of november when the southwestern and

dawn fronts broke out of their

bridgeheads and struck the line weakly

held by the romanian third army

initially the soviet rifle divisions

with their weak armored complement were

held by the romanians

but mass soviet armor broke through

their flanks and drove out into the step

beyond

despite appalling weather and poor

visibility both the stalingrad and

southwestern fronts had penetrated deep

into sixth army's eastern flank and were

30 kilometers in the german ring

at 1400 hours on the 23rd of november

troops of the southwestern and

stalingrad fronts linked up at kallach

this initial encirclement trapped 270

000 german and allied troops of the

sixth army in the stalingrad pocket an

area 57 kilometers west to east and 35

kilometers north to south

the most important task now for the

soviet southwestern and southern fronts

was to strengthen the 160 kilometer long

outer encirclement of stalingrad by

building up a strong front so the german

efforts to relieve stalingrad from the

west and southwest could be held off

sixth army's first reaction on being

encircled was to break out to the west

but on the 24th of november hitler

ordered general paulus to stay put

having been assured by gerring that the

luftwaffe could keep the sixth army

supplied from the air

on the same day encouraged by its

initial success soviet high command

decided to extend operation iran and

began to plan operation saturn

this called for the left wing of the

varanesh front with 60 of the entire

soviet armored forces

to launch an offensive in the direction

of rostov

with the object of cutting off army

group a in the caucasus and on the dawn

on the 26th of november field marshal

von manstein was appointed commander of

a new army group dawn which consisted of

the remnants of sixth army the fourth

panzer army and the third romanian army

his task was to coordinate the defenses

on the flanks of the sixth army in

stalingrad

till marshall eric von mundstein was

born in berlin on the 24th of november

1897.

he was commissioned into the prussian

foot guards in 1906

and during the first world war served on

both the eastern and western fronts

between the wars he held several general

staff appointments and in october 1936

was promoted major general

in july 1942 in recognition of his

superb general ship which had

contributed so much to germany's

victories hitler promoted him field

marshall

he was the typical commander of the old

school who during the first world war

commanded from far in the rear far

removed from the actual events of the

fighting and from weather conditions and

hardships

but who could nevertheless make the

right strategic decisions

in this respect he differed

fundamentally from the more tactical

troop commander such as model or romel

or guderian

but even so with his outstanding

strategic talents he was one among very

few comparable commanders in chief and

battle arbiters of the second world war

chief of the general staff was general

zeitzler and his deputy for operations

was lieutenant general hoizinger

for the whole of the eastern front there

were only 14 general staff officers

dealing with operational matters

central to the system of command in the

prussian german army was the concept of

auftrag's tactic

or orders by directive

that is that

ever since i became a soldier and that

was in the summer of 1909

my experience has been that subordinate

commanders in our army were trained to

look after themselves

to act on their own initiative

and to make their own decisions

this has been my experience throughout

my entire military life

and it was also taken to heart on the

first world war

and it paid off

in particular the point about

subordinates using their initiative

which was put into practice and used in

the training of the rakesville

our army at that time

under colonel

the objective of every military

operation is the destruction of the

adversary

as this can be changed by conducting the

fighting in various ways according to a

particular situation the senior

commanders that is to say the divisional

commanders and above

must be let free to choose the method of

fighting

they received a directive and this was

known as off-tax tactic

commanders of companies battalions and

regiments in general received orders

which usually went into detail

since the beginning of the war formation

commanders often led from the front

and took important decisions on the spot

they were usually found forward where

the major effort was being made

when the commander was with the troops

as was normal almost every day

the chief of staff had to maintain

contact over the combat area both with

the divisions under core command and

with the senior army headquarters above

him

but as has already been said if

decisions were necessary because of the

changing situation

the chief of staff also had to be able

to deal with changes in the steps taken

by the corps and heads to give the

corresponding orders to the divisions by

telephone

flexible command which encouraged

initiative and a highly developed

tactical communications net but in stark

contrast to the rigid textbook approach

of the soviets

[Music]

it was not easy to command armor

flexibly when tank commanders had to

rely on visual signaling to convey their

orders

if von manstein was to attempt to

relieve the encircled sixth army

it was essential that his forces remain

as close to stalingrad as possible

and so throughout december the soviets

exerted enormous pressure on the german

and allied forces between the rivers don

and cheer in their efforts to extend the

outer ring as far to the west as

possible

the cheer line was held by makeshift

units composed of remnants of the third

romanian army german infantry ad hoc

alarm units made up of rear service

personnel and luftwaffe field divisions

these divisions were created by gerding

from surplus air force personnel they

were well equipped but lacked training

and were commanded by officers with no

experience of ground combat

on the 2nd of december 1942 48th panzer

corps ordered its infantry to form a

defensive line along the cheer by

constructing strong points in depth not

linear

the strong points for all-round defense

were to be manned by at least a platoon

individual soldiers were to be deployed

between the strong points to prevent

soviet infiltration

heavy weapons which included the 88

millimeter guns were to be dug in and

covered and alternative positions were

to be prepared for

the them headquarters reminded its

subordinate commanders of their

responsibility to ensure that they

established contact with their next

highest headquarters

units were to report in every two hours

at least even when all was quiet because

situation unchanged signals were also

helpful to core headquarters to build up

an overall picture of what was happening

the ensuing battle which developed

around the state collective farm

79

is a classic example of the superiority

of flexible german battle tactics which

time and time again

enabled small numbers of well-trained

experienced and well-commanded troops to

defeat soviet forces which outnumbered

them between four and eight times

at the beginning of december 1942 the

headquarters of 48th panzer corps was at

nigeria where the chia river runs into

the dawn

since it was the nearest point to troops

of the sixth army in stalingrad it was a

vital bridgehead for fourth panzer

army's attempt to relieve stalingrad

elsewhere along the cheer the 336th

infantry division was holding the line

from nizhny cheer to sorokina

at the beginning of december fifth tank

army began to launch a series of heavy

attacks across the chair in an attempt

to drive the germans as far away from

stalingrad as possible

on the 7th of december 1942 11th panzer

division with 46 tanks was moving up

from rostov

it was then ordered to halt the soviet

first tank core which had crossed the

chair between obliviskaya and sorovino

on the left flank of 336th infantry

division and had advanced to and taken

state collective farm number 79.

[Music]

after night march the 11th panzer

division's commander general bulk

using his anti-aircraft guns as

anti-tank artillery placed them south of

the farm

the artillery of 336th infantry division

was to operate on the panzer division's

northeast flank

15th panzer and 111th panzer grenadier

regiments advanced undetected along the

heights west and north of the farm while

110th panzer grenadier regiment

delivered a holding attack

the panzers hit the rear of the soviet

tank formations and their supply columns

just as they were about to attack the

rear of 336th infantry division

by the end of the battle the soviet

first tank corps had been virtually

wiped out with a loss of 50 tanks

german losses were negligible

on the evening of the 11th of december

other soviet forces broke through the

chair line at lesinsky and nizhny

kalinovsky which were about 22

kilometers apart

fourth panzer army began its attempt to

break through to stalingrad on the 12th

of december

simultaneously 11th panzer division

smashed the soviet breakthrough at

lesinsky and then marched northwest and

struck the soviet forces at nizhny

kalinovsky and compressed the bridgehead

on the 14th after a short low 11th

panzer division slipped quietly away

from its positions containing the nizhny

kalinovsky bridgehead

and moved to nizhnyachir

where it was to force a passage over the

half frozen dawn to join the left flank

of fourth panzer army which was

approaching the river aksai

by the 16th fourth panzer army had

fought its way to the aksai only 64

kilometers from the nearest troops of

the encircled sixth army

this offensive launched on the 12th of

december

led the soviets to reconsider their

planned major counter-offensive called

saturn aimed at rostov

and to launch little saturn

which called for the southwestern front

to swing the main axis of its attack

from the south to the southeast and so

disrupt the german lines of

communication concentrated in the

morozovsk area

powerful armored forces of the

southwestern front crossed the cheer at

ostrovsky and swinging around to the

southeast headed for morozovsk

simultaneously the varanesh front swept

away the 8th italian army on the middle

dawn and sped southwest

[Music]

on the 17th of december just as eleventh

panzer division was about to cross the

dawn

reports came in of a soviet breakthrough

in 336th infantry division sector nine

kilometers north of nizhny chief

instead of joining fourth panzer army

eleventh panzer division was committed

to eliminating this bridgehead

but while engaged in that task the

dormant bridgehead that nizhny

kalinovsky suddenly burst into life and

presented another dire threat and the

weary division the only mobile reserve

left

set out on another 19 kilometer night

march

at 0 500 hours on the 19th of december

panzer regiment 15 of 11th panzer

division with 25 tanks

surprised a soviet tank force just as it

was about to move off

while 110th panzer grenadier regiment

blocked its advance

15th panzer regiment fell in behind the

soviet tanks and in a few minutes

knocked out 42 vehicles before their

crews realized what was happening

quite simply we always had the edge on

them since the russian army was so very

badly led we came the impression that no

one knew what the other fellow was up to

or what he was supposed to be doing

himself they were just individual tanks

milling around so the secret was to gain

as much ground as you could just as fast

as you could so that the russians didn't

know where they were or didn't know

where our leading tank spearheads were

either

the panzer regiment's right flank was

guarded by 111th panzer grenadier

regiment which also acted as a reserve

force

[Music]

[Applause]

[Music]

from high ground panzer regiment 15

spotted another soviet column moving

south and fell in behind it forming a

secondary

in a few minutes another 20 tanks were

destroyed making the day's total 65

the back of the soviet attack was broken

and the shattered remnants fled in the

northwesterly direction

our communication system also played a

role in our successes

at that time the communication system

was so good among the german troops that

without saying who we were by name we

could tell from the voice who was

speaking

of course this is all part and parcel of

the value of getting to know one another

our communications were comprehensive in

scale they functioned splendidly and

they were so good in their own way that

we were able to talk to one another as

if we were all sitting around one table

during a battle

although operations

had failed to achieve all their

objectives

the red army had inflicted grievous

wounds on the germans and their allies

on the eastern front

no amount of individual heroism and

self-sacrifice could now help the

germans overcome the power and growing

confidence of the red army

the soviet union is a vast country

so the soviet army had plenty of room in

which to maneuver it could retreat for

thousands of kilometers to regroup

concentrate its forces restore the

morale of demand receive land leaves aid

from its allies and return to the attack

a strategic counter-offensive so the

very size of the soviet union meant that

in spite of great losses in spite of the

fact that a large part of european ussr

had been abandoned to the german

occupying forces the soviet high command

could concentrate its forces bringing in

units from the far east and from siberia

to muster them beyond the volga and then

launch the great counter-attack which

ended in the victory of the soviet union