All language subtitles for In.The.Name.Of.Peace.John.Hume.In.America.2017.720p.WEBRip.x264.AAC-[YTS.MX]

This programme contains some scenes
which some viewers may find upsetting

I first became aware of John Hume

when he became widely written about
in the news.

First, he was real,
and secondly,

he didn't seem to have an agenda
other than the one he was pursuing.

He wanted an inclusive peace.

And he thought that non-violence was
the best way to pursue it.

He was...

..the Irish conflict's
Martin Luther King.

John quickly came to the view that

if I want to influence American
policy, somehow or other

I'm going to have to break in
to the Washington scene.

Where is the power?

Who has the power?

And how can I enter
that zone of power?

John Hume saw an opening.

If you want to solve problems,
you have to have power.

And power can only be got
through influence.

And the influence in America
was very, very substantial.

It was to the top,

to the Capital, to the White House.

Jimmy Carter as president.

Tip O'Neill, Ted Kennedy.

All of those men got a new insight

into what was happening here.

Language, of course,

works in all kinds
of directions in John's story.

Because the ability to speak
the language of the American

politic better than them is a plus.

When I was elected president
and gave my inaugural address,

I called for the United States to be
a champion of human rights,

and to promote peace everywhere we
could in the world, and obviously

I learned very quickly that
one of the main challenges for peace

and human rights
was in Northern Ireland,

and its relationship
with the rest of Ireland

and also with Great Britain.

Born into a background of
injustice and division,

John Hume was a decisive leader
of the civil rights movement

in Northern Ireland
in 1968.

Elected to the
parliaments of Britain, Europe

and Northern Ireland, he resolutely
pursued a peaceful path

throughout the Northern Irish
conflict.

Hume believed that the partition
of Ireland in 1921 was a failure

to confront the colonial legacy
between Britain and Ireland,

and that the political structure
of the Northern Irish state

was a barrier to resolving
the division between the people.

This is the story of how John Hume
harnessed the political influence

of the Irish-American diaspora

to address that legacy of division
and to achieve peace.

Derry had had a terrible year.

The whole of the North was a
cauldron of conflict at that stage.

We had Bloody Sunday and just
continual shootings and bombings.

I was teaching,
I was the breadwinner.

We had five small children,
so, when, in 1972,

he got a phone call
from Senator Ted Kennedy,

he just couldn't believe it.

His reaction was,
"Well, pull my other leg!"

Ted Kennedy was coming
to Bonn for a Nato meeting

and he asked John
if they could meet up.

So he went to the Credit Union and
he got a loan from the Credit Union

for a flight to Bonn
and one night's accommodation.

He identified Hume, in a sense,
as a civil rights leader.

It was simply John Hume
and Ted Kennedy in the study

of the ambassador's residence, so
nobody knows exactly what happened.

But I do know that
immediately afterwards,

Ted Kennedy said to Sean Ronan,
"That's the man.

"That's the man I will listen to."

This is... Yes, that's Eunice
and Bobby and Pat,

and Mother, me and the president
and Teddy.

Teddy particularly was interested
because, being the youngest

in our family, he'd heard a lot from
our parents about our Irish roots.

And he was in a position
to do something.

He was just captured by the whole
problem and by the difficulties

that John understood so well.

I think his relationship
was very close.

I think he trusted him
absolutely.

I think he realised that
he didn't want a victory,

that he wanted peace.

The sentence that everybody always
knew was,

"What does John Hume think?"

Because he was so clear.

I mean, he didn't say, "Well, we're
right and you're wrong."

In 1976,
John went to Harvard as a fellow

in the Center for
International Affairs.

And he spent four months there,
and it was during this period

that he did... That he and
Michael Lillis from the Department

of Foreign Affairs, they did
intense work on Capitol Hill.

Working with John Hume often meant
spending a lot of time saying

nothing, because he would
say nothing.

He thought his way through every
situation with extraordinary

clarity, strategy, and
I would say brilliance, actually.

What he discovered in this
situation was that there was a

combination of circumstances,
particularly from 1976 on,

when Jimmy Carter became president,

and when the Speaker of the House
was Tip O'Neill,

one of the most admired and
effective senators -

Senator Kennedy - ably backed by
Senator Moynihan from New York,

and by the governor of the state
of New York, Hugh Carey.

What Hume did was he created

a sort of a combination
between those four.

Michael had the diplomatic standing,
he represented the Irish government.

But the real voice of what was
happening in Northern Ireland

was that of John Hume.

And it was a really happy
coincidence that we came together

and what we now call
"The Four Horsemen" emerged.

Carey - governor of New York.

Pat Moynihan -
senator from New York/

Ted Kennedy - senator
for Massachusetts.

Tip O'Neill - very
powerful figure.

"Boys", he said,
"you must understand,

"the problems in Northern Ireland

"were not created by the people
in Northern Ireland.

"They were created in London
and in Dublin."

He said, "And the problems
in Northern Ireland won't be

"resolved by the people
of Northern Ireland.

"We need the cooperation
and the help of London,

"Dublin and Washington.

"It's only you in Washington
that can make the difference

"and can really pull this together."

When I was elected president,
Pat Moynihan in the Senate,

and Ted Kennedy, Tip O'Neill
would quote John Hume

and his efforts
for a peaceful resolution

of the Irish problem.

I became convinced that the United
States should speak out for change

on this issue and called for
honouring the desire

of the Northern Ireland people

for peace with Great Britain
and for the rest of Ireland,

and also for recognition
by the international community.

He described the situation in Derry,

and the unemployment was at 47%,

it was, like, a staggering
figure to absorb.

And he described in eloquent detail
that people, being unemployed,

had time on their hands
and had, really, nothing to do

but engage in this violent
situation that existed there.

"What is it all about?"

is the rhetorical question
to which people would prefer

not to hear a reply.

This has been the disastrous
attitude which generated

the political vacuum.

Not alone is this attitude
irresponsible and immoral,

it is also dangerous to us all

because it has encouraged
the killers.

When you have
someone who's the instructor

and comes with having lived through
the turbulence, whose life has been

threatened, he's seen all the
dangers, he was the focus of trust.

He was as effective as a single
individual as any senator could be.

There's no way to overstate what
his impact was in the United States.

All the different venues to whom he
spoke, he gave that message, and the

message was, almost
every conflict in history

is economic at its base.

It's who controls the jobs,

who controls where the money flows.

That's what wars are fought about.

Sure, it was tribal.

Sure, it was the reaction
to years of colonisation,

and it was Protestant and Catholic,

but it was, at the end of the day,
economic.

For the men, one out of
five of them are out of work,

tearing the soul from a city,
shrouding it in hopelessness,

and giving birth to the apathy
born of years of idleness

and frustration that has been the
sickness of Derry down the years.

He knew words alone wouldn't do it.

He knew that he had
to bring some industry,

some jobs into Northern Ireland,
so people could work together.

It was kind of...
He was a novel voice, and when

we would be on this campaign
to bring industry

to Northern Ireland,

we'd be constantly advocating
for that, and John would show up,

he'd take the trip
across the Atlantic and he'd

encourage that and he'd praise
the businesses for coming in.

The articles that John wrote for the
Irish Times - I think two articles,

in 1964 - in my view, that set out
not just John Hume's agenda,

but that became eventually
the Irish nationalist agenda.

There were two or three key points.

One, nothing could be achieved by
the use of violence.

That was key.

Second point, we're not talking
about reuniting two pieces of turf.

We're talking about uniting people.

And that unification has to
begin in Northern Ireland.

And it can only happen... Whatever
happens can only happen by consent.

And as far back as 1964,
John had set that down.

If one wishes to create a united
Ireland by constitutional means,

then one must accept
the constitutional position.

There is nothing inconsistent
with such acceptance

and a belief that a 32-county
republic is best for Ireland.

We instantly hit it off
because we had similar philosophy.

You know, what I always felt
was economic injustice

creates a lot of problems.

And giving people hope
and opportunity and dignity,

they would always be interested
in hearing American politics.

He was fascinated
with Martin Luther King,

and, of course, Martin Luther King
was a strong presence in Boston.

I'd tell John stories about
how I saw Martin Luther King

out in the Roxbury neighbourhood,
marching into downtown Boston.

John would be fascinated with that.

He'd want to know
the whole background

and how the people responded to him.

ARCHIVE: And throughout the nation,
even in Canada,

there were marches through
the streets of towns and cities.

In New York's Harlem,
more than 15,000,

half of them white, filed sombrely
through the streets in quiet

but agonised protest.

The events in Selma had been brought
to a climax by a night-time attack

on a white Boston minister
by white men.

He died two days later.

The American media could easily
relate to what was happening

in Northern Ireland,
particularly in '68, '69.

It was almost a copy of
the civil rights movement

in their own country.

Now, it was obviously much more
complex, and the complexities

were not easily understood
in the United States.

People understood civil rights.

You know, housing,
electoral reform, discrimination.

All of these things were understood.

What was not easily understood was,
where was Northern Ireland?

Why was it part of
the United Kingdom?

What was the background?

Why did people want

a united Ireland?

The fact that we are now launched
on a massive campaign of passive

resistance, if Faulkner thinks that
the taking down of barricades here

today means that the
people of this area

have withdrawn their opposition
to the regime, then of course

he's being very deluded.

Is it your opinion that the
barricades should go back up again?

Well, it's my opinion
that we should...

Hey, hey, hey!

It's my opinion that we should
launch a massive... Hey!

INDISTINCT SHOUTING

We know what works in the world
is inclusive politics,

inclusive economics,
inclusive social policies.

But the more people are polarised
and distrusting,

in particularly
if they're shooting guns,

the more difficult it is to say,

"I'm for inclusive cooperation,
I'm for peace."

And John just held the line.

We Unionists built, effectively,
Northern Ireland.

And we built a good house there.

But it was a cold house
for Catholics.

The Unionist point of view
would have regarded the

civil rights movement
as being unnecessary.

Unionism could not accommodate
this demand for equal rights.

They fragmented,
they imploded, factionalised.

They found solidarity, reassurance
in a new form of intransigence.

They saw IRA conspiracies
everywhere

at a time when the IRA
barely existed.

They provoked the revival
and recruitment of the IRA,

the force in history which
they hated and feared most.

In 1971,
the Northern Irish government

began a policy of
interning Catholics,

without evidence
and without trial.

Over 300 Catholics were taken

from their beds at 4:30,

five o'clock in the morning,

and put in various places.

Some in Magilligan Prison.

The protests were huge -
intense anger about internment.

John arranged a march in Magilligan.

GUNSHOTS

SHOUTING

Could you tell me on what authority

that you're holding us back here
from...?

This is a prohibited area. You're
not allowed in a prohibited area.

Under what law?

Would you ask those men to stop
firing rubber bullets

at women, please?
They will not.

They'll stop it providing you keep
away form the wire

and don't try to enter
this prohibited area.

Under what law is this prohibited,

or under what authority
is it prohibited? Can you tell me?

It's prohibited by the police
and by the government.

But the police tell me that
it's you that is in command here,

not them.

I'm in place with the military
here. This is a military area.

Under the authority of the
government,

this has decreed
a prohibited area.

And are you proud of the way your
men have treated this crowd today?

This crowd has tried to
come into a prohibited area.

You, as a member of parliament,
should try to stop them.

You shot at them with
rubber bullets and gas.

The crowd was marching over there,
the leaders were going

to speak to you. Before we even
got there, you opened fire.

That's right. Fire was opened
after they came through the wire.

No, it was not.
No, it was not.

Fire was opened as the crowd
was coming across the beach.

Mr Hume, I'm not here to enter into
an argument with you.

Oh, I'm not here either.

But I wouldn't be very proud
of the conduct of your men today.

A crowd of people, and they're
totally unarmed people,

as you can see for yourself.

If you lead your people away,
then we'll go away, too.

Yeah, but we want to march in there.

You're not allowed to march in here.
Why not?

It doesn't belong to you.
It's prohibited.

It doesn't belong to you.
You can't prohibit it.

It's been prohibited by
your government. Whose government?

The government of Northern Ireland.
Not OUR government.

And that's why you're here,
because it's not our government.

There was a number of possible
reactions to what had happened at

Magilligan. One was John's reaction.

To say, "Well, if that's the way
it's going to be,

"we want to draw back from it, that
these people are going to kill us."

John didn't seem to grasp that what
had happened at Magilligan made

a big march in Derry the following
week absolutely inevitable.

John was very worried about this,

and he asked Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association

to cancel it.

He made it known that he would not

be participating in the march.

He had no difficulty

in his own security,

but it was trying to
guarantee the safety

of everybody else on the march,

and he felt it was a chance
that he couldn't take,

having seen the Paras
on the previous Sunday.

PIPE MUSIC PLAYS

I remember Tip coming to Derry,

to the homestead
of Tip's grandmother,

situated in the most
beautiful part of Donegal,

where you have the Swilly
laid out in front of you,

and the sea was glistening

and all the relations were gathered,
and Tip was deeply moved.

I suppose he thought,
of the young Eunice Fullerton,

who had left home, not knowing
if she would ever be back again,

and heading off to this
big, big country.

His father's father had
worked in brickyards in Ireland,

and when he came to America he
landed, naturally enough, Cambridge

because there were brickyards
in North Cambridge,

and so the folks that came
from that area of Cork

found themselves emigrating
to that side of Cambridge.

And that was the history of it.

And a couple of generations after
that came Tip O'Neill.

He certainly knew
the history of the Irish

and what the Irish-American
condition was, and he was old enough

and early enough in
American history to understand

the British and what they felt

about the Irish coming to America.

Certainly I'm talking
about the Brahmins

and the patrician Yankees
here in New England

and how they treated the Irish -

and others, frankly, coming
in from other European nations.

The Irish were Democrats,
the Irish-Americans were Democrats.

They always had great sympathy
for the underdog. Tip certainly did.

And within Massachusetts,
you had this amazing rivalry

between Irish Catholics
and White Anglo-Saxon Protestants -

a struggle that went on
for 200 years for control.

The Protestant elite, the Wasps,
were identified with England,

and so Tip identified with
Ireland as the underdogs.

"No Irish need apply.
No Catholics need apply."

We grew up with that as kids.

We heard those stories from our
parents and from our grandparents.

So we sought... We sought peace,

we sought unity, we sought justice.

But he always used to talk about
the fact that the IRA had this

strong emotional grip within his

neighbourhoods in North Cambridge,

which it did in many, many working
class neighbourhoods in Boston.

So that, I think, is how
he first got introduced

to the whole notion

of Irish independence

and being on the side of

the Irish Catholics in the North.

There was a bank run by the Yankees
in North Cambridge which bypassed

all the ethnics, all the Irish and
Italians, and never gave them loans.

And so my father went to the bank
president and said, "You know,

"you've got it on deposit,
all the Irish money

"and all the French-Canadian
money from our neighbourhoods.

"There'll be a run on your bank
if you don't start

"loaning the money out."

And so, the next day, the bank
started loaning the money out.

Tip took his lead and
Tip took his politics

and Tip took the view
of what John was saying.

I would say, in those days,
Tip was taking far more from John

than he was from the
Irish government, quite frankly.

ARCHIVE: The car bomb was left
just outside the front door.

Even when I think
we tired of it in Ireland,

it was still hitting
the international news,

so, for Tip O'Neill and for
senior politicians in America,

it was on their desk every day.

Hume had an extraordinary
effect on O'Neill in particular,

as of course he had on Kennedy
and the other two.

But O'Neill was the most
powerful of the four of them.

He was the second most powerful
politician in the United States,

and he took this on as passionately

as any basic American priority.

When he went to the States,
one of the models that he

talked about a lot, written

on the grave of Abraham Lincoln,

"E pluribus unum."

"From many, we are one."

And he felt that here were people

who had had to leave

the place of their birth because of

conflict, because of intolerance,

and they went to the States

and they were able to come together
under the one constitution.

And he felt that this was the model.

"Why can we not get over
our differences?

"Why can we not come together?"

John Hume turned to me and said,

"You know what the most amazing
thing is about the United States?"

And I said,
"Well, I'd like to know."

And he said,
"That it's one country."

It was just a great moment
for me to see,

through his filter, just how

important we were as a model.

Those who have tried to
bring down this Executive

and who, in fact, have succeeded,
will, in the long-term, in my view,

be the losers,
because our view remains solid

and rock-like in the SDLP

that the only way to solve the
problems of Northern Ireland

is not through conflict between the
different sections of our people

but through partnership.

That is the only way forward.

It would now appear that
the representatives of the

majority of the people in Northern
Ireland have rejected that concept.

I think that is a tragedy.

For the first time
in the history of this country,

a long and bitter history,
at least for five months, Catholics

and Protestants sat together
to administer, and we would hope

that the day will not be too long
distant when they can do so again.

Mr Hume again visited New York
on Friday, November 19, 1976,

and attended a luncheon.

Included among the guests
were Mr Graham Hovey

of the editorial board
of the New York Times,

Mr James Chase, managing editor
of Foreign Affairs magazine,

and Mr Edmund McDowell, editorial
writer of the Wall Street Journal.

John Hume called in the
Secretary-General of

the United Nations on the
18th of March.

Those visits to America
did him good as well,

because politics here,
during those years, were in limbo.

And when he went to the States,
he was energised,

and when he could see that
politics do work,

and came back, ready to start again.

The President of the United States,
in order to pass

his legislative programme, he
needed the support of Tip O'Neill.

Tip O'Neill had a very different
view on many of these issues

from Carter, but they negotiated.

Obviously, if you're at the
State Department and you're

worried about Nato, you're
worried about the Soviet Union,

you're worried about the special
relationship with London,

you don't want to take on, kind
of, a side issue that's been

going on for 800 years,
not going to go anywhere.

For several months,
we were negotiating what was called

the Carter Initiative,
largely led by John Hume.

The battle flowed back and forwards,

and frequently it seemed that the
British were winning.

That would have meant that
President Carter could not have said

anything about the North except
what the previous presidents had

said, which was,
"None of our business.

"We can't get involved."

The British had
nothing against power-sharing,

but they didn't want the President
to say anything which suggested

that the US could take an interest
in the problem of Northern Ireland.

So this statement, therefore,
was hugely important

when you look at it in a historic
context, because it's

the background to all the things
that have happened ever since.

You know, it's a rare
thing for the United States to take

a position against the policies
of Great Britain, government,

because some people, many, most
people consider that to be an

internal affair, just for the people
in London to decide, ultimately.

The State Department was
not in favour of what I did,

as you may know.

But I didn't really consult with
them too thoroughly.

"To heck with the State Department,"

because this was about bigger
issues.

It was one of the important
moments in which the United States

took an issue of importance to

an ethnic community

and turned it on its head, and
helped with the education of people.

But it was very important for me

to express myself
personally to the

prime ministers of Great Britain,
to let them

know that this was not just
a superficial

statement on my part,
but I really meant it,

and it was an important
part of American policy.

So that's why
I talked mostly to Jim Callaghan,

and then after a couple of years
he was replaced as Prime Minister

by Margaret Thatcher,
and I'd also discussed it with her.

So I let it be known,
both to the British leaders

and also to the general public,

and to my Irish supporters
in the United States, that

I had one policy towards Ireland,
and that was peace,

human rights
and an absence of violence.

"To Ted Kennedy...

"I discussed Northern Ireland
with PM Thatcher,

"and will report results of our
conversation next time I see you.

"Jimmy."

Well, the British relationship with
Ireland was incredibly

troubled for all the obvious
reasons,

but then you had the American
influence,

which was a very strange
thing for British politics,

because at one level, for example,
Margaret Thatcher,

a huge ally of Ronald Reagan.

At another level, you know,
there were people in America,

even people on the Republican
side of American politics,

willing to support and finance
republicanism in Northern Ireland,

which obviously had a completely
different complexion to it.

I suppose, if you go back
even to the 19th century,

you find a concern in British
circles about the impact

of Irish immigrants
in the United States.

As they saw it,

the monster of Irish nationalism had
escaped the confines of the island.

It was now frolicking
in the United States

and being a spoiler again
and again to what they saw

as the relationship between the two
Anglo-Saxon sister democracies.

You had a series of efforts
by leaders of Irish nationalism,

responding to the enormous
Irish-American

interest in Anglo-Irish relations

and in the cause of Irish freedom.

What they wanted, of course,

was to get the United States to
pressure the British to be

flexible, to be helpful, or
even to give in to Irish demands.

And that would have to involve
the President of the United States,

the Secretary of State
and the State Department.

But those three
offices in the United States,

which actually make up the foreign
policy of America,

were completely
controlled by the British.

There was a huge block in America,

including a fair number of
Irish-Americans,

who didn't want us to do this,

didn't want us to put our
relationship with the UK at risk.

The so-called "special relationship"
had been used to basically

freeze us out, even though America
had the largest diaspora and

the largest Northern Irish diaspora
in the world by a large margin.

In the early '20s and
before, political leaders went to

America to raise money
for the cause of Irish freedom,

but John Hume had a structure
and a strategy to what he was at.

And he did mobilise
the Irish-American

influence in the Senate
and on Capitol Hill.

And once he got his foot in that
door, he kept it open.

What John Hume and Michael Lillis
achieved was to get

the Americans to
agree to come to the table

and to be part of a process,
but we did not

and we were very careful not to ask
the Americans to take sides.

It balanced the situation out.

We didn't get, of course, from our
side, everything that we wanted.

That's not possible
in diplomacy ever.

But we actually got a voice
and considerable influence.

This was resisted, I would say,

in the most bruising possible
way by the British.

The IRA had great
support here in the United States.

The widows and orphans fund,
which also went to purchase weapons.

There were lots of incidences
where weapons flew

directly from here to there.

"Brits out. Bloody Sunday.

"Why are these guys counselling
something else?"

So, it was a risk for them.

And in Boston, where you had all
these jars on the bars,

collecting money for the IRA,
it was a risk for Tip and Ted,

and it was also a political
danger to them.

By the time I joined
Senator Kennedy's staff in 1985,

we were writing annual statements
called The Friends of Ireland,

as opposed to the other
group in the Congress that was more

aligned with Sinn Fein.

When I got to Washington,
Tip O'Neill created what was

called The Friends of Ireland.

And it was a membership made
up of congressmen who would support

the Irish government, support
John Hume, support Tip O'Neill.

And I eventually... I joined
it as soon as it was formed.

Every year we'd put out
competing statements.

Theirs was harsher on the British

and more supportive
of Sinn Fein's agenda.

And when I wouldn't support the IRA
and join the Biaggi Committee,

I'd say I was greeted on a number
of occasions less than friendly.

Banners - "Charlie Dougherty is a
traitor."

"Charlie Dougherty is pro-British."

And I remember standing outside
John's home.

They stuck a pole with
a mirror under his car,

and Pat was obviously... She
said, "This goes on every morning."

They were very concerned somebody
would have planted a bomb.

So, John was dealing with a much

more dangerous, high-level...

Multiple kinds of parties involved.

The 1980s were
a time in the United States

when we were still in the peak

years of the Cold War,

and when foreign policy had been
reduced to kind of very

simple algorithms.

"Good guys, bad guys"
was the essential point.

The Irish debate was also seen
as a fight between good and evil.

And if you take it as
a good-and-evil fight,

it's very hard to find
a middle ground.

All the foreign news was generated
outside the United States.

Northern Ireland, basically, the
news coverage came through London.

So, the news coverage of what was
happening in Northern Ireland

was very heavily
influenced by the British view.

And that was particularly obvious
after Bloody Sunday,

when the British had essentially

fed to the journalists in London

a particular line about what had

happened in Derry on that Sunday.

And that duly turned up
in the US media.

There was very little we could
do in Washington or New York to

change that.

But what was possible was to get

in touch with the editorial types,

the people who wrote the editorials,

and in particular the people who

wrote columns, opinion columns.

It was easier to
write about the bombing,

bombs and the bullets, and the
conflict and, "Why are Catholics

"killing Protestants
and Protestants killing Catholics?"

as if it was some
sort of medieval story.

So, to turn that around and make
it into a failure of policy,

which it was -
and John pointed that out,

that there actually was a better
way forward, and here it is.

And he just kept on telling that
story until enough people

believed him and began to
write it in editorials.

He would go and meet the editorial
board, have lunch with them,

talk about Ireland.

And it was particularly helpful, if

John Hume happened to be visiting,

to bring him along, because, again,

that gave legitimacy.

Over the years,

a small but very influential

group of journalists emerged who

became specialist on Ireland.

People like Michael Kilian -
Chicago Tribune, Mary McGrory

in the Washington Post, Ron Apple
in the New York Times.

Jimmy Breslin and Pete Hamill
up in New York. You had Kevin Cullen

at the Boston Globe.
Marty Nolan, David Nayan.

A bunch of Irish names
sprinkled throughout

journalism in the United States.

And our first reaction was to
be sympathetic,

anti-British. "Brits out".

So there was a process of education
that had to be undergone, not

just for American political leaders,
but also for the American press.

HELICOPTER BLADES WHIR

May I make one point about the
hunger strike in the Maze prison?

And I want this to be utterly clear.

There can be no political
justification for murder

or any other crime.

MURMURS OF SUPPORT

The Government will never concede
political status to the

hunger strikers,

or to any others convicted of
criminal offences in the province.

Suddenly, with the hunger strikes,
I mean, the mythology of total

victim, total tyrant oppressor,
was resurrected with a vengeance.

You had the hunger strikers on one
hand, the morbid deathwatch going

60, 70 days for a young person.

You know, it would engage anyone
on humane grounds.

You had the imagery of, you know,
with it echoes of Terence MacSwiney,

echoes of Christ's Passion,
echoes maybe of ancient Celtic

systems, where the hunger strike was
the ultimate weapon of protest.

On the other hand,
you had Mrs Thatcher incorporating,

for the Irish Americans, the worst
stereotype of English cruelty.

You had huge demonstrations,
which the

British didn't dare fly their flag,
for example.

Massachusetts asked
the State Department to remove

the British Consulate.

As I recall, it wasn't like you
began to shift allegiances.

That there was just intransigence

about dealing with this at all was
infuriating.

And so you began to say, "Look,
I'm approaching...

"The Hume approach makes sense,
but this is outrageous."

I would not support
the hunger strike.

So there was a big rally in my
district, I'm told 5,000 people.

At a major crossroads, which
was like the heart of the district,

and then they marched down to where
I lived. We weren't home.

The police had said,
"Take your family and go away."

So we were told 5,000 people
marched by, carrying coffins,

saying I was supporting the British
and killing Irish patriots.

And that got a little dicey.

"I regret the death of Bobby Sands.

"I regret it particularly
since it was so unnecessary

"and could have been avoided.

"The British Government wanted
Bobby Sands to die or to surrender.

"The Provisional IRA wanted Bobby
Sands to have a victory or to die.

"The unionists wanted
Mr Sands to die.

"The only people who wanted Mr Sands
to live were the ordinary

"people of Northern Ireland."

BAGPIPES PLAY

For 11 years, I went to meet
the President on St Patrick's Day

and we got that excess, we'd take up
nearly the whole day of 17th March

with the President
of the United States.

Irish Taoiseachs and Irish
presidents and Irish everybody had

that huge influence, but that all
started with John and Tip.

I had met Ronald Reagan when
he was running for the presidency.

And I asked him, as I would ask
anyone with a name like that,

how far back his Irish
connections went.

To my surprise, he said, "You know,
I've often looked into it,

"but I'm not sure that we have an
Irish connection."

And with a lot of help, we were
able, eventually, to get the

shipping records, obviously trace
the President back to Ballyporeen.

He had said to me
during the election campaign,

"If you find that I'm Irish,
I will mark it on the first

"St Patrick's Day
if I'm in the White House."

So, as soon as he arrived
in Washington, I got in touch

with him and invited him to lunch
at the embassy on St Patrick's Day.

And obviously,
among my many guests,

I had Tip O'Neill, Ted Kennedy,
Hugh Carey, Pat Moynihan.

During the lunch, Tip O'Neill said
to President Reagan,

"Next year, I'll do the lunch,
if you would come to it."

There was a tradition in Washington
that the President never

visited the hill except to make his
State of the Union

speech once a year.

But on the spot, the President,
Reagan, agreed with O'Neill,

"Yeah, I'll come, you give a party
next St Patrick's Day, I'll come."

And ever since then, the Speaker has
had a lunch on St Patrick's Day,

and so far every president
has attended.

There will always be a special
kinship between our two countries.

And that is why we are here today.

That is why Ronald Reagan
and Tip O'Neill kicked this off many

years ago, to show that admiration
and to celebrate this kinship.

It is an act of defiance to poke
fun at your opponents

and then to break bread with them.

Most of the support for the Irish,
including economic support,

historically came out
of the Congress from Irish-American

members more than the White House.

Even when President Kennedy was
there, it was John McCormack,

the Speaker of the House, who always
had a big Irish force.

It is always a privilege to join
you for this wonderful

St Patrick's Day celebration.

And with names like Obama, Biden,
Ryan, McConnell, you can

rest assured that the old sod's
stranglehold on power

in Washington is as strong as ever.

LAUGHTER

Back in 2008, the Corrigan
Brothers even penned a song

called There's No-one
As Irish As Barack Obama.

This is true.

As the lyrics go,
"From Kerry to Cork,

"let's hear it for Barack
from old Moneygall."

And somehow that line did not
result in cries for my birth

certificate on the campaign trail.

LAUGHTER

But we do enjoy this luncheon.

And I want to thank
Speaker Ryan for continuing it.

It's a welcome
break from politics as usual.

A moment
when we all trade in our red

and power blue
ties for our green ones.

I always imagine every Taoiseach
leaving this lunch

marvelling at how cheerful
and bipartisan Washington is.

LAUGHTER

There are two things at least
on which Democrats

and Republicans in America,
they heartily agree.

One is that we take seriously
our responsibility to be good to

Ireland's sons and daughters,
because so many of us are Ireland's

sons and daughters.

The other is that we strongly
support a peaceful

and prosperous Northern Ireland,

and America will always remain
a partner in that process.

There are those here who
have fought long

and hard to create
peace in Northern Ireland,

and understand what happens when we
start going into these dark places.

I think it's just worth
remembering how

John Hume took down the emotional

temperature of the Troubles,

just enough
so that reason could be heard.

MARGARET THATCHER:
A de-unified Ireland, that is out.

A confederation, that is out.

Joint authority, that is out.

I think that Mrs Thatcher,
at that time, was in very much

her black-and-white phase,

that everything was good and evil,
and so on,

and that she changed over time.

And I would like to think that
our editorials admonishing her

not to throw in the sponge on this
played some small part

in showing that there were
other voices in the room.

Here, I have to give credit
to something I never thought

I would do - in this respect,
at least - to Margaret Thatcher,

because it was Mrs Thatcher who,

during some of the worst times that
I had to write about Ireland,

helped initiate the dialogue

that led ultimately
to agreement with both sides.

When she signed the agreement
with Garret FitzGerald,

I think unionists were
initially shocked,

almost disbelieving
that someone like

Margaret Thatcher could do this.

On reflection, I think that
the Anglo-Irish Agreement, er,

was the catalyst within unionism
for a realisation that, in the end,

we were going to have to
sit down and negotiate

with nationalists to
find a way forward.

That if we wanted to get rid of what
we described as this diktat -

in the form of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement - imposed upon us,

then there was only one way
we were going to move it,

and it wasn't by protest.
It was by negotiation.

What had happened was that

the political leader
of the Tory Party who

most effectively and in
almost incarnate terms

represented the unionist position

betrayed that position in
the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Where do the terrorists
operate from?

From the Irish Republic,

that's where they come from!

CHEERING AND APPLAUSE

Where do the terrorists

return to for sanctuary?

To the Irish Republic!

And yet, Mrs Thatcher tells us

that that Republic
must have some say

in our province! We say, never!

Never! Never! Never! Never!

The improbable development of
Mrs Thatcher

signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement,

which was a tremendously
significant step

in terms of Anglo-Irish relations,

that that essentially
came from her exasperation

that every time she got together
with Ronald Reagan

to manage the Free World
between them, or...

her to manage the Free World
through him,

he would tiresomely come up

with this Irish issue.

And in that, Reagan was channelling

Tip O'Neill and Ted Kennedy who,
in turn, were channelling John Hume.

Dear Mr President, I understand
that you will be meeting with

Prime Minister Thatcher...

I want to personally share with you
my deep concern that the Forum,

which is the best hope
for a peaceful,

lawful and constitutional
resolution to the tragedy of

Northern Ireland,
may be in serious jeopardy...

During my meeting with
Mrs Thatcher at Camp David,

I made a special effort
to bring your letter to

her personal attention and to convey
your message of concern...

The President then
offered his support to

the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Mr Reagan had told the Taoiseach

that on St Patrick's Day,

all Americans and people
of goodwill everywhere

honour the Irish by helping them
build a peaceful

and prosperous future.

..Important and it's
a distinct honour to receive

the traditional shamrock,

and to wear it as an expression
of shared hope

for peace and goodwill
in the year ahead.

She, herself, of course,
came to dislike it greatly

because it went against the grain.

Afterwards, she said, through
one of her closest associates,

Lord McAlpine, "It was the Americans
who made me do it."

It was a mistake that unionism
didn't recognise earlier

the importance of that influence.

The way in which Hume would use
the pressure point of Washington

to apply pressure on London,
er, to do business with Dublin,

almost to the exclusion of
the unionists. So, erm,

I don't think that we really
caught on to that soon enough.

And it was only in the latter years
that we began to recognise that

there was no point howling
at the moon for John Hume

and his influence in Washington -
we needed to be on the Hill.

We needed to be in Washington,

giving the counterbalance
to that influence and saying, look,

any solution in Northern Ireland

has to be one which both sides
can endorse.

The eruption of the Troubles,
the enormous turbulence there was,

particularly maybe in Derry
in the early years of the Troubles,

forced him to reflect very deeply on

where the exit was
from these dilemmas.

There was, broadly speaking,

in Northern Ireland, a hope that

the moderate element
of the population could,

erm, isolate the extremists.

It had everything going for it.

It had everything going for it
except one thing -

that it had been tried in
all possible variations

and had never worked.

John got a huge nationalist vote.

John got a huge republican vote.

Many people who were supporters
of the armed struggle,

they equally were supporting
John Hume. And I think

John had that in his understanding
that, you know,

he was representing
all of these people.

And that, erm, you know,
I think he...

That's how he was able to have
those, you know,

secret meetings and connections.

But the secret meetings
didn't come out of nothing.

I mean, I think John knew all along

that some day, in some way, you

had to pull all of this together.

I welcome the opportunity
of facing them,

of meeting them face-to-face,
to say to them that I believe that

violence is destroying this country,
and to ask them to stop it.

Where many other people
might have quit,

he would intensify his efforts.

He just believed that he was
on the right side of history

and that he had read
the Irish psyche properly.

I think that anybody
who has followed closely

the events of the last couple
of days would not interpret

what I am doing as any disrespect
to the memory of people

who have died in Northern Ireland.
Rather, the opposite -

an attempt to stop any
further people dying.

You can't make peace
if you don't talk to the warriors.

And you don't have to approve of
what they're doing.

And you certainly don't,
by talking to them,

approve of what they're doing.

We wasted years. You know, we...

Not through any foolishness
on our part,

but I suppose through naivete.

What stood by us
and the peace process was that

we probably met privately,
without anybody knowing,

for about 18 months. So
we developed a sense of each other.

This was going on too long.
You know, the violent campaign -

whether you call it
the British Army violent campaign

or the IRA campaign,
or the UDA or the UVF campaign -

simply went on too long.

And Long Kesh was containing

a large number of men
who were growing old,

certainly dark into middle age.

And I think John realised that,
you know, that pugnacity

was wearing down,
that it wasn't worth it any more.

And I think that by bringing in
the Irish-Americans,

he was able to open a window
and say, look, there IS a future

beyond walls and barricades.

He did it not by describing the IRA

and Sinn Fein as terrorists,

but describing how the goals of
nationalism and republicanism

could be met differently

and could be met by a
process of engagement

if, you know, the Americans

were to use their influence
with the British.

I was an MP at this time,
you know, I had a mandate,

so it was ridiculous that my voice
was banned and I was censored.

And that, you know,
just talking was prohibited

and, indeed, was disguised as

a moral imperative
that you couldn't talk.

John went against that.

There's only two possible
outcomes of our dialogue.

One is that we will fail, which
means that nothing has changed,

or that we will succeed,
which means that there will be

an enormous transformation
in the situation.

The startling shift that happened
at the time of Hume/Adams

was not in contradiction to what
Hume had been advocating before.

It was, rather,
that a recalcitrant constituency

had been recruited to it.

The only road to the future
for a divided people

is dialogue of all its
representatives coming together

as soon as possible
and facing up to the challenges...

APPLAUSE

..and reaching agreement,

because only on agreement
can we have the lasting stability

from which comes lasting peace.

Out of instability comes
all sorts of symptoms,

the worst of which are violence and
killing of innocent human beings.

So let us send
that strong and clear message.

Total opposition to violence,
and total and absolute support

for dialogue of all parties,
round the same table,

as soon as possible.

The traditional posture of Dublin
has been to claim that unity

is the only solution,
but what does it mean?

For too long,
it has been left undefined

and interpreted by unionists as

"conquest of the North
by the South".

Unity, to many, has become,
incredibly, a dirty word.

Ireland must be one of the few
places on Earth where people

seriously suggest that
it is wrong to unite people.

Many of the things that we now
regard as the common stock of

concepts in Anglo-Irish relations
go back to Hume.

The three sets of relationships,
the Irish dimension, and so on,

were essentially either defined
by Hume in those terms

or related to a definition
that Hume had put forward.

Everything that is agreed
politically has to be reducible

to language in some shape or form.

I mean, it cannot be so nebulous
that nobody can say what it is.

So, on that definition, everything
does come back to language.

But Hume's contribution to that

went beyond merely accepting
the importance of that.

It involved an active role
in defining concepts,

redefining concepts, in a way
that meant they were capable

of accommodating more elements

than the traditional formulations.

We worked very hard
in many of the negotiations,

often hours and hours of endless
discussion over one sentence,

one paragraph,
getting the language right,

getting it in the right order,
getting the nuances right.

Because, of course... And some
people criticise some of what became

known as the "constructive
ambiguity" in some of the language

that is used, but you needed to
have a language that both sides

could attach themselves to.

In the speech,
in John's speech to the empty...

..to empty seats, the famous
speech, he says, er, he says,

"One day, we will understand the
meaning of the words we use today."

So words matter to this man.

The right of the Irish people to
self-determination was unquestioned,

but that they were divided
about how to exercise that,

now, that seems
almost hair-splitting,

but when you reflect on
the practical implications,

it was an enormously
fruitful definition

because it meant the
reality of partition

reflected a difference
between Irish people

about how their undoubted collective
right to self-determination

was to be exercised,

then the solution to the
problem lay in persuasion

of the people who didn't
want a unified approach

by the people who did.

These things don't happen overnight.

And in the European Council,
they were envious of the fact that

small little Ireland had such
access to the White House.

Well, Hume travelling to the States

was putting another piece
of the jigsaw together

that would eventually
form the picture in which

American President
after American President

sent over their envoys
and their assistants

and their influence to try to help
to bring about a solution.

Ladies and gentlemen,

my friend, the President of
the United States, Barack Obama,

the Taoiseach of Ireland,
Enda Kenny,

and his wife, Fionnuala.

CHEERING AND APPLAUSE

UPBEAT MUSIC

Those luncheons
around St Patrick's Day

really created great opportunities.

Not the luncheon itself,
that's the public event.

It's the meetings
that happened all around that.

A lot of meetings in what they call
a hideaway office.

John and the President, or other
people. Certainly, the Taoiseach

may be there, the Foreign
Ministers, the aides.

So you could really have
some very serious conversations.

What needed to be done,
what positions to take,

how to frame it. But there was
nothing like being there,

eyeballing each other,
trying to figure out

how best to move
this process forward.

I cultivated all the party leaders

of all the parties
in Northern Ireland.

We invited them all
to St Patrick's Day.

We urged them to sing together,
talk together.

A lot of diplomacy happened
in the United States

on the St Patrick's Days.

I knew, when I became President,
that I would have

a political opportunity, if I were
willing to assume the risks.

And it wasn't just the risk
of alienating the British,

it was also the risk that
I would stick my neck out

and IRA violence would continue,

innocent civilians
would continue to die,

and I would look like
I'd been played for a fool.

And that, over the long run,
had a bigger downside.

But I trusted Hume's instincts.

He said, "You know,
I can only take this so far.

Someone with credibility

"with the harder-line Republicans
has got to be here."

Now, I am standing here
and telling the government

that I believe that we have
a real process of lasting peace

and a total cessation of violence,

on the basis that
I have just stated.

And I'm saying to them,
hurry up and deal with it.

Will the member give way? And...
No, I'm not giving away any more.

Hurry up and deal with it.

He grabbed me by the wrists
and held my hands and said,

"Look, you can do it, you're near
it, it's possible, and keep going.

"Lloyd George couldn't get there,
others couldn't get there,

"but I really believe
we can get there."

And I could tell something was
going on in the fall of 1993

because I was hearing from... The...

Irish National Caucus people were...

You know, I had a pretty
open-door policy

and they all were telling us
something was happening.

And I kept hearing it
over and over and over again.

And then I would press
the US government,

the British government, the FBI,

the CIA, our Justice department,

all of whom uniformly came back
and said, "No.

"There's no division in the IRA,
there's no-one who's seriously

"pushing for a ceasefire, including
Adams. Don't believe them."

I naturally gravitated to John
because he was widely trusted

across the board in our Congress -

and I needed some support
in Congress to do this -

and he tended to legitimise

the notion that America
should do more.

The person I kept asking
was John Hume who,

in the spring and summer
of 1993 said,

"Not ready yet, don't get involved,
don't give Adams it easy yet."

By the fall, the two had married

and Hume saw that Adams
needed the support of coming here

to the United States,
to talk to the IRA supporters

here in the United States,
to get support for the ceasefire.

He could not deliver the ceasefire
without the support of the US.

Then the Joint Declaration came,

which essentially took away
the political reason

for the violence of the IRA, because
now they had a democratic way

to get an independent Ireland.

When we actually decided to do it,

it was a Sunday morning

and Warren Christopher spent
about half an hour on the phone

to the President about how
cooperation with the British

would end, and it was the wrong
thing to do, and terrorism -

the first World Trade Tower
attack had just happened.

The issue leaked quite quickly
and, um, the British,

we hadn't had time to tell the
British, and I have never seen

angrier British in my life!
That was probably the most dramatic.

John Major did not take our call
for a week.

There was some broken china there.
You know, I had a lot of trouble

with the British for a brief
period when I got involved.

But I think the fact that
John was there saying

there is a way out of this,
there is a peaceful way out of this,

there's an inclusive way out of
this, there's a way for a role

for the UK to continue
and a role for the Irish Republic,

and a shared power situation
in Northern Ireland,

it made it a whole lot easier.

There WAS a disagreement.

Downing Street was utterly clear
that the White House had indicated

they would not give Gerry Adams
a visa to fundraise

in the United States
while violence continued.

And I think President Clinton
came under a great deal of pressure

from others, and a visa was granted.

And I think, subsequently,

he would have conceded that
that was a mistake.

The British Government
has a different view of

this whole history.
That is to say, um,

there was opposition to what
I'll call the Clinton initiative,

which was the most concrete decision
by the American government

to play a role in what would
happen in Northern Ireland,

in contravention to what the British
government would have preferred.

I had this view that, as we
approached the 21st century,

this historical struggle

was a leftover from a bygone age

that should be
capable of resolution.

I mean, the Republic of Ireland
had become a confident nation.

We were in the European Union,
they were in the European Union.

This was a struggle in the North
that neither side, in the end,

could win by force. So, surely,

in the interests of people,
it should be...

There should be
a rational way through.

When you read Gladstone's comments,

when you reach Churchill's comments,

and when you are in
the presence of Tony Blair,

they knew that
American opinion counted.

And Gladstone forewarned, he said,

"You cannot win this argument
in America."

Tony Blair, when he spoke, he said,

after all these years of incendiary
commentary back and forth

and bickering and arguing
here from Congress,

where British ambassadors
were regular summonsed

to Capitol Hill, he said,

"I want to thank you for helping
to get us through this morass."

Sometimes, you get
points in politics

when it's appropriate to
put the past behind you.

This was, I felt, such a moment,

not just for the
British relationship with

the Republic of Ireland, but also
with the British relationship

with America over this issue.

John Hume opposed
the MacBride Principles,

which were designed to reinforce

equal employment opportunities
for American companies

investing in Northern Ireland.

John Hume reacted to the MacBride
Principles in a very hostile way.

He had early on adopted the view

that what Northern Ireland
required was an increase in

foreign direct investment,

economic growth as a way of
solving all local conflicts,

and he feared that the
MacBride Principles, if applied,

would lead to the flight of foreign
capital from Northern Ireland.

And it's one of the few
major strategic errors

that John Hume made in the course
of his political career.

I understand why he made it,
but I still judge it to have been

a major strategic error.

Not only because he was, in effect,

opposing the logical consequences

of a civil rights principle,

but because, in effect,
by opposing it,

he left this political space open
for Sinn Fein to capture.

He went on solo runs.

But sometimes, very disturbing
for other members,

he could not take criticism well.

He wouldn't take it at all.

But that was changed.

He always preferred
to be on his own.

He always enjoyed company,

but much preferred working alone.

It caused difficulties.

Well, I don't think John felt
so locked into history

as most of the people
around him did. I mean, he saw

all the importance of it
and he understood,

in a very visionary way,
how important it was,

but I think that once he decided
that there must be a future

as well as a past, a lot of
people moved away from him.

President Clinton sent an envoy
to Northern Ireland,

who led the all-party negotiations
for a peace settlement.

The envoy determined to start with
John Hume's formula

of seeing the conflict
in its wider context.

Well, one strand involved
the relationship within

Northern Ireland,
between the two communities.

So you couldn't really solve
the issue without establishing

a new and firmer basis
for the relationship

between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland.

That was a second strand.

Going further, you couldn't

take out of the discussion the
reality that Northern Ireland

is part of the United Kingdom.

So there had to be

included in the discussion

the relationship between Ireland

and the United Kingdom.

That was the third strand.

Once that was understood

and accepted by all, there was

the possibility of devising a way

that embraced all three strands.

And that was the...

political genius of John Hume,

because it was that architecture

that made possible
getting an agreement.

The night we were in Derry
together in 1995

and the whole town square was full,

and all the streets up the hill,
behind the old wall,

people knew it was the beginning of
something really special

because, by then, the ceasefire
had come and we were ready to roll.

Because I felt that we were
riding along a surge of history

that really had begun
in the vision of one man.

Hillary and I are proud to be here,
in the home of Ireland's

most tireless champion
for civil rights,

and its most eloquent voice
of non-violence, John Hume.

CHEERING AND APPLAUSE

I know that, at least twice already,

I have had the honour of hosting
John and Pat in Washington,

and the last time I saw him, I said,

"You can't come back to
Washington one more time

"until you let me come to Derry."

And here I am!

CHEERING

In 1998,
the Good Friday Agreement was signed

and roundly endorsed in referenda

on both sides of the Irish border,

and the Northern Irish Troubles
ended. The agreement's provisions

for a power-sharing government,

North-South cooperation,

the principle of non-violence

and consent to constitutional change
had all been described

in John Hume's 1964 articles.

Hume's strategy
had become a political reality.

He knew very well that he might be
creating political circumstances

in which his party could never be
the majority party,

and which the public could never
reward him politically because

once there was a united government,
people would be tempted to vote for

the people they thought would most
fiercely advocate their position.

He did it anyway. He did it because

the worst form of
imperfect democracy

is better than
continued hatred and killing.

It was typical of John Hume
that he should have been preparing

to launch a jobs drive for his
beloved Derry when he heard that

he and David Trimble
had won the prize.

I see it not as an award to myself,

but as a very powerful
international approval

of the peace process
in Northern Ireland,

and a very strong international
approval of peace for all of

the people of Northern Ireland.

It was a great day,
with great scenes.

David Trimble was obviously being
recognised that night as well.

They all gathered - the Trimble
crowd and the Hume crowd -

gathered in the hotel bar,

and they were singing each
other's songs in this pub.

I mean, you bring these guys
together any place other...

..than Ireland somewhere
and they gravitate to each other.

I don't think any of the presidents
that came after me

lacked an interest in the benefits
of resolving the Irish problem.

Of course,
when it was finally successful,

well, then,
the whole world celebrated.

And later, you know, when
I dealt with other issues where...

..peace seemed impossible,

I always used the Irish example.
Well, if we can do it in Ireland,

we can do it almost anywhere
in the world.

I think if you really wanted to make

a parallel between

Northern Ireland and Bosnia,

or Northern Ireland and the
Middle East, it's education.

Lack of education leads to

the most emotional decision making.

It's reason, not emotion,

you need to resolve problems.

And that means, of course,

everyone being educated together.

The Bogside has become
a tourist attraction.

We get loads of people going around
parties being led around by guides.

I listened in to one of these guys

giving schoolchildren
from Southern Ireland

an account of the
history of the Bogside,

in which John Hume
didn't figure

until the Hume-Adams Talks.

I mean, that's the level of

the distortion of history

which supporters of the IRA

sort of are involved in now,

because they have to -
they can't tell the truth.

It's forgotten now, but it will...

..become clear
as history is written.

His major achievement was
the creation of the new agenda

back in 1964.

And the way he was able

to steer
that through

Dublin, London,
Brussels, Washington,

and eventually persuade Sinn Fein.

It is a remarkable achievement
in one lifetime.

He was teaching in St Columb's,

involved with Credit Union.

Inside was a man who had something

big to do,

so he had to go elsewhere.

And he did that in America, he did
that in the European Parliament.

There is a greatness about his
political life, and what he did,

and what he helped to change.

I would put him in the same breath

as Parnell, Daniel O'Connell.

In the world we're living in today,

where there are so many forces
trying to take down

that elemental human
and humane view,

John Hume and the results
achieved in Northern Ireland

stand as a stunning rebuke

to the people who choose violence.

GAELIC MUSIC