All language subtitles for Space Shuttle Columbia The Final Flight S01E04 1080p WEBRip x264-BAE_track3_[eng]

♪

-For the second time
in nasa's history,

A space shuttle has been lost
along with its entire crew.

Once again,
we are asking ourselves,

How could this have happened?

-Do you have any idea
how big that

Piece of foam was
that came off?

-We'd heard some reports
that during launch

There had been some concerns
that some debris

Hit the wing.

Is that true and is that
any cause of concern

And that could have caused
today's problems?

-It is true.

It was judged that, erm ,

That event did not represent
a safety concern.

-This happened under my watch,

But I didn't have the answers.

In every public forum
I'm gonna have to be in,

How am I gonna explain
this to anybody?

At this time,
we have no indication

That the mishap
was caused by anything

Or anyone on the ground.

-Nasa
never wants to look stupid.

Nasa wants to be the agency
with the answers.

-My thoughts are on
what we missed,

What I missed

To allow this to happen.

-But if you overlook something,

It will come to bite you one day
or another.

♪

♪

-I was playing tennis
in mclean, virginia.

I received a phone call saying

That I would be flown
immediately

To barksdale air force base.

After challenger,

Nasa had a contingency plan
in case

There was a shuttle accident.

I never really imagined
that it would happen.

With columbia, we had people
who had experience

With accident investigation
from the military,

Navy, and air force on the team.

-I came to the investigation
as a helicopter pilot

Who knew something about doing
accident investigations.

I did not come
to the investigation

As a space shuttle expert.

I literally knew nothing about

How the shuttle
was put together.

We needed nasa's help
because by definition,

Everybody who came in
as an external part

Of the investigation team
is not a space shuttle expert.

There was years
of shuttle program knowledge

That we needed to learn
very quickly.

-There's that issue
of the falling foam

During the launch
of space shuttle columbia.

-Very early on nasa told us

That they knew about a foam --
a debris event.

But we didn't even know
enough about the shuttle

To understand that
there was foam on the tanks.

The press wants to know
what happened

And it's like,

"yep, so do we."

-It's a mammoth job for those
taking part in a mammoth task.

-Covering many hundreds
of square miles.

-It's the largest
recovery effort

That has ever been attempted
in this country.

-As an investigator,

I wanted as ironclad a case

As we could possibly have
for the sequence

Of events leading
to the cause of the crash

Of space shuttle columbia.

But if we were going to do that,

We needed to collect
all the debris

And reconstruct the shuttle.

-1,200 sites
have been identified.

-All those pieces of columbia
will be brought

To the kennedy space center,

Where it will be reassembled

In a manner of speaking.

-Really thousands
of pieces of debris

Are now pieces to a puzzle.

♪

-Under a crisp texas sky,

Thousands of mourners
are gathering,

Including that man,
neil armstrong ,

As nasa gathers to say
farewell to seven of its own.

-Knowing that I wasn't
gonna see my dad again

And losing that many people

That you love and that
you're close to all at once.

It was just so heavy.

The world just became
a scary place.

-Just felt like
I was so, like...

Raw, just so...Exposed.

-To have your dad die
in a public way,

And you have press
focused in on you.

I knew I didn't
want to be there.

-Just like a feeling of, like,

How are we supposed to act?

-The grief is heavy.

Our nation shares
in your sorrow.

And in your pride.

-This isn't my own
personal loss.

You kind of realise that this --
this is a public story,

A national grieving.

Everybody felt like
they lost something of theirs.

-In your grief,
you are responding

As your friends
would have wished,

With focus, professionalism,
and unbroken faith

In the mission of this agency.

The people of nasa
are being tested once again.

-I could see outside the window
all the crowd.

I had my suit and tie on.

And I said to myself,
"I'm gonna go outside,"

And then I couldn't.

I just shut the door,

Locked it,
and I just sobbed at my desk.

The president's talking outside,
and I was just sobbing,

And sobbing, and sobbing.

Inside johnson space center,

The internal conflict
was building.

-On the first day
that we went in,

There were people
who received us very well,

There were people who were
not happy that we were here.

-I was one of the first people

To be interviewed
and interrogated.

I felt ok, I felt like,
"this is a good thing,

This has to happen.
I hope they're thorough."

-I think the folks
that were probably

Less interested in our help

Were more
at the management level in nasa.

In some cases,
we're asking for data,

And then they'd be like,
"I can't give you

That information right now,
you're gonna have to

Go up through a very formal

Nasa chain of command
to be approved."

-I call it the managers' club.

It's a type of a culture

Where there are rules of
behaviour and ways of talking.

You don't jump
the chain of command.

Don't -- and that's insulting
to go up to

Someone higher and ask directly.

You're supposed to coordinate
all your questions.

-Are you going to risk
your career in nasa

By standing up and arguing
with the chain of command?

-You don't talk bluntly
or pose questions like that

To a nasa manager.

-Because that can be
very career limiting

And you find yourself shuffled
off into a windowless room,

Just going through paperwork.

-I want the system -- I want the
nasa manager culture confronted.

♪

-Good afternoon,
everybody, and welcome

To the johnson space center

For today's briefing.

Again, joining me is

Shuttle program manager
ron dittemore.

-Today I brought with me
a piece of foam,

And I think we've made
some foam available to you

So that you can
get an understanding

Of the composition
of this material.

It's very lightweight,
which is logical.

You would want it
to be lightweight

Because the more weight
you put on the tank,

The less upmass
you could launch into an orbit.

So, it's difficult
for us to believe as engineers,

As management and as a team,

That this particular piece
of foam debris shedding

From the tank represented
a safety of flight issue.

-I caught some segment
that ron got into

In which he said
in a declarative voice...

-Right now, it just
does not make sense to us

That a piece of debris

Would be the root cause

For the loss of columbia
and its crew.

There's got to be
another reason.

-Well, how can he say that?

Where is he getting that from?

What a big denial.

-To be certain it was foam
is nonsense, right?

But to be certain it wasn't
foam is equally nonsense.

Right? And that's what
they were saying.

"it's not foam."
well, how do you know?

-I know from

The accident investigation
team's perspective,

No one was gonna go public

And say,
"we know what didn't happen."

-You get that shot right there?

That's a nasa official.

He's holding a piece of foam,

Which he is now saying

Could not have
had enough impact

'cause it's too light
to have damaged those tiles

That we've been talking about.

-I knew ron.
I had respect for ron.

Ron was linda ham's boss

And a good manager.

But what's always
the first step in grief?

Denial.

-I called ron and I said,

"ron, let me just
remind you, ok?

We had a clear understanding

That we are not
gonna eliminate anything

Until the data has come in

To definitively eliminate it."

-To bring that out

And dismiss it,
you know, pre-emptively,

I think speaks volumes.

At the very least
they had to acknowledge it.

But it was acknowledging
their own mistakes

And that's hard to do.

♪

-Each week there was
a new trailer load

Of debris showed up,

Came right in this hangar
through those doors,

And it would be catalogued
and then put out on the floor.

I want to know what
the debris is telling us,

I want to know what
the aerodynamics are telling us,

And I want to know
what the sensors are telling us.

You follow the debris,
what's it telling you?

♪

And if you follow the logic,

You begin to see pieces
that are telling you a story.

As we were progressing through
the left-wing reconstruction,

You can see these burned tiles,

This reinforced carbon-carbon,

Looks like it's been burned

In a way that's very different
than everything else.

All of that data pointed to
a problem at rcc panel 8.

Something very different

Happened in this location
on the orbiter.

And so, let's go see if
we can understand what that was.

-Ok, so, as the vehicle
is entering the atmosphere,

These black tiles
are protecting the structure,

The aluminium of the vehicle,
in high-heat areas.

And the grey is
the wing leading edge

Reinforced carbon-carbon,
rcc panels.

Those protect the vehicle from
the highest level of heat,

Those 3,000 degree temperatures,

So that you don't get
metal melting.

But we had never had any
experience in breaking a panel.

-What was starting to join up
was you've got video analysis

That says the strike
on the orbiter

Created a hole in the wing.

And you can see that
there had been

Some sort of penetration

Against the rcc panel.

Hot gas had entered in,

The shuttle had lost
aerodynamic control and crashed.

But I think the challenge
for a lot of folks at nasa

Was believing
that foam had done that.

They would say foam can't
break reinforced carbon-carbon.

There were a lot of people
that said there's something else

That explains this.

-We decided to ask nasa about
the history of foam strikes,

Which had never been done.

-I was asked by
the accident investigation team

To help find that type
of information.

I went through a database,

There's a historical database of
all the space shuttle missions,

From the very first shuttle
mission up until that day.

I called the investigators

And I said, "you're
not gonna believe this.

Take a look at this."

♪

-I was shocked to find

That there were
over a half a dozen occurrences

Of foam strikes recorded.

So, we turned that in
into the investigation board.

-1983 was the first
bipod ramp foam loss.

1990, 1992,

'92 again, 1994.

As well as those bigger pieces,

We saw small pieces of foam

Fall away all the time.

What we call "popcorning".

When popcorn pops,
it pops up and comes out

And so that's what we call it,
popcorning.

They weren't very big
so you're not talking about

Much damage to the tiles.

And so,
it had become the norm at nasa.

This mantra --
"it's only foam,

It's only foam.

Hey, we see foam loss
all the time.

And it never did any damage
to the vehicle.

We don't have to worry
about it,

It's only foam."

Two missions before columbia
it happened on sts-112 atlantis.

A significant strike hit
the skirt

Of the solid rocket booster
and actually put a dent in it.

-Prior till the launch
of columbia,

And a couple of the meetings,

The topic of foam
coming off 112 came up.

There's probably, erm...

15 to 20 people around the table

And then there's a lot of other
people at nasa in the room.

We talked about starting to look
into this a little bit more

Because we've seen
it come off on, you know,

More than one flight now.

We should understand
if there's a way to prevent it.

-Late October of 2002,
after sts-112 atlantis,

I went to a meeting
about that flight.

I had put together a report
about the foam loss

And the damage
to the solid rocket booster.

And I presented the case
that said,

"that amount of foam,

That mass,

In one chunk coming
off shuttle atlantis --

This was the vehicle
telling us something is wrong,

Here's your warning."

At risk of being insubordinate,

I said to the heads
of the shuttle program

Sitting around the centre table,

I was adamant at that meeting,

"either fix the problem

Or don't fly an external tank
on the next launch,

Which is impossible."

From that meeting,

I never heard any discussion of

"let's get
a better understanding of this

Before we schedule
the next launch."

-In other words, again,
they were thinking

It was more of
a turnaround issue.

And so, it wasn't preventing
shuttle flights

From going forward.

-The pressure on the management
team to stay on schedule

And the concept of,
"it's just foam"

Is leading the charge
through all of this.

-So, it wasn't like they weren't
talking about issues at all,

But there certainly was a big
focus on the -- on the schedule.

-Here's an e-mail,
it's Tuesday January 21st,

This was sent six days
into the columbia mission.

This is
a private exchange between

Linda ham and ron dittemore,

Two of the top managers
in the program.

"the rationale for flight
for the sts-112 loss of foam

Was lousy.

The rationale states,
'we haven't changed anything,

We haven't experienced
any safety

Of flight damage
in 112 flights.'"

The concluding sentence --

"the rationale was
lousy then and it still is..."

What I take that
to mean is that

Linda ham is raising a concern,

But they appear to rely on
the fact that previous flights

Which had suffered
this foam loss,

Had returned safely.

In other words,
"we've gotten away with this".

This is a failure to learn
from past similar events,

Simply because those flights

Did not have
catastrophic consequences.

The classic -- the classic
normalisation of deviance.

-You have to make sure

That every incident
is thoroughly investigated

And properly assessed.

And that wasn't done
for the 112 foam loss.

-People were saying they were
willing to accept the risk.

What they didn't understand is

How much risk they
were accepting.

After the 112 loss,
people were starting to say,

"maybe we're accepting
too much risk."

-We should have never
launched columbia

Until we fixed that problem.

-Yeah, I was concerned,
you know?

We were moving in
the right direction,

We just didn't get there
in time.

♪

-Good afternoon, everybody,
and welcome to

The johnson space center
for today's briefing.

♪

-Lisa starke with abc news.

When you realized
that you had this debris

That had struck the shuttle
and you started your analysis,

What was the discussion
about trying to take a look

Either through satellites
or these large telescopes

That the military has
and why was the decision made

Not to try that?

-We certainly had
that discussion.

We believe that
taking a picture ,

Looking for tile damage,

It does not show us
the depth of tile

That may have been
shaved off.

We cannot make
a determination conclusively

Whether that represents
a concern or not.

- Well, linda, reading
through the transcripts,

In hindsight were you
sufficiently open to the idea

That this was
a really serious problem?

-You're asking 20/20 hindsight
or what --

What my thought was then?

-Well, it sounds like
you were just kind of

Seeking reassurance
that everything was ok,

As opposed to digging in
and saying,

'how do we know this? '

-I didn't have a preconceived
notion on the damage

Or the possible consequences,
and I needed to wait for them

To complete their work.

-The best experts
at our disposal concluded

That it was a minor problem,
not a significant problem.

-And when you
added all that up,

There was no need
to take pictures

To document any evidence

Because we believed
it to be superficial

And it to be a turnaround issue

And not a safety issue.

And so we --
we didn't take any pictures.

-Had we known
that there was

A catastrophic situation
on orbit,

We certainly would
have done everything we could.

-Absolutely.

-I...

I'm not aware of anybody else
during the mission

Asking for a photo request
and when.

I only learned later

That there really were

People outside of our team

That were trying
to do something about it.

-I had no idea
what was happening

Because there was
no communication.

I'm not in the loop,
I'm not in the know,

Nobody's talking to each other,

So nobody knows what's going on.

-The problem
that we had in nasa culturally

At the time was people would not
speak up with their concerns.

It was the most anti-dissenting
opinion place that I know of.

People were scared silly
to speak up.

-Nasa is a series of fiefdoms,

And there isn't necessarily
a lot of exchange of knowledge

Across those silos,
you know, frankly,

The system is not designed
for good communication.

But that's not an excuse,

Because this foam problem was
a not a new problem.

It was ignored right up
until an opportunity

To intervene presented itself,

And then that opportunity
to get a spy satellite

To take a look was dismissed.

To sort of stick to your guns
of convincing yourself

That it's ok...

...It just made matters worse.

-I-I could --
I could only deal with the data

That was presented to me.

The whole situation was a case
of people doing their jobs

As they understood them.

But I think everybody
was operating with good faith.

There was no, er...

I wouldn't say malfeasance,
but negligence.

There may have been --

I don't even think
there was negligence,

I just think
that the actions we took

Were inadequate
for the problem we were facing.

-I think there was a mindset
and sort of a hope

That we've seen
foam strikes before

And it's never caused
a safety of flight issue.

So, we're assuming
that's the case here,

But not a sure thing.

It seemed like
by staying ignorant

Of the degree of damage,

The mission management team

Perhaps didn't want to know
about the worst-case scenario.

-At this point,
from our work in the hangar,

I think we have
enough information

To say we found the physical
cause of the shuttle crash.

But there were still
people at nasa

Who didn't believe that foam

Could break
reinforced carbon-carbon.

-We're here at
southwest research institute

In san antonio, texas,
to conduct a test

To show whether foam
could create a hole big enough

To destroy the vehicle.

-Everything came down to
whether or not

The foam shot was gonna break
an rcc panel.

But if our investigative
analysis is wrong, then what?

-Five, four, three, two, one.

-Whoa!

[ indistinct chatter ]

♪

-Ok. Foam will break
reinforced carbon-carbon.

-I mean, there was no doubt
at that point, right?

Case closed.

There's no denying it.

You know, there was there was
foam falling from day one.

They should have had
that test on day two.

-This was a known failure.

But I think the failure
to imagine being wrong,

The failure to imagine
the consequences of failure

Were catastrophic.

And I think it's
this whole notion of the failure

To imagine failure.

-Nasa's trying to move forward

After Tuesday's
blistering report,

Blaming it for
failing to prevent

The shuttle columbia tragedy.

-Nasa stands
accused of complacency

Of a flawed safety culture

Of major management failures.

Technical failures,
but also about a human failure.

-Nasa had conflicting goals
of cost,

Schedule, and safety.

It's our view that
clearly there is still evidence

Of a silent safety program
with echoes of challenger.

-They knew about the foam,

They could take pictures,
and people chose not to.

Felt almost like
they had betrayed him.

-Why?

Why?

The only reason

Was because of the way

They made decisions
within that culture.

-I felt angry.
I mean, I just

Was extremely disappointed.

-Pure grief and sadness
turned into anger and disgust.

It kind of became
this inner struggle in me of,

"how can I hate this thing
that my dad loved so much?"

♪

-Well, it goes without saying
that we were all trying

To do the right thing
all along.

We were basing our decisions

On the best information
that we had at the time.

Nobody wanted to do
any harm to anyone.

-If a bunch of things
went really right

And they identified
very early on

And got images early on

And everything went about
perfectly,

Just maybe

There could have been
a rescue mission.

But it's questionable whether
you could get the other orbiter,

Which would have been
atlantis in this case,

Processed and out to the pad
in time

Without putting that crew
at serious risk.

We would have had to pull
together this huge effort

In the eleventh hour
to figure out how to fly

One shuttle next to the other

To conduct an operation

That you'd never trained
or prepared for.

It was not
in the art of the possible

Given what we knew.

-The one tool
we could have tried to look at

Was changing the way
entry is done,

Trying to change
how it enters the atmosphere.

You can change the angle
of attack coming in

So you can lessen the heat
in certain areas

By moving to the other side
and then come back again.

-We can do all the "woulda,
shoulda" all day long here.

That's easy.

When you actually have to make
the decisions real time,

You're doing some
really complicated stuff.

That's a lot harder.

-I think that rick
would have wanted to have known

Something was very wrong
with the vehicle,

So he could have the opportunity
to repair something

Or fix something.

But at the same time,
there was also a trust

That nasa would look out
for their best interest.

-In terms of a hypothetical --

And I think other people
in senior levels

That probably felt
the same way --

If we knew that
the crew wasn't gonna survive,

Why would we tell them?

Why wouldn't we let them
just carry out their mission

And feel like they were
successful you know?

-The thing I can't get past is,
if we had of known

That entry was going to
cause loss of the vehicle

And loss of the crew,
there are things we can do

As human beings.

And that is for the families,

The chance to be
able to say goodbye.

That wasn't afforded to anyone.

And that's always haunted me.

Sorry.

♪

-Yes, there were individuals
who made very poor decisions.

You need to embrace
dissenting opinions,

And if somebody says,

"hey, let's get better data

To make a decision,"

Why is getting
better data a-a problem?

But, I mean,
I was in mission control.

I was a nasa employee.
I knew about the foam strike.

When there's blame
that's laid out,

I am right up there
saying I knew.

And I -- and I wish I could've
done something differently.

But I-I can't undo that.

And it -- you can just make
it better for those that follow.

-I feel ashamed.

So, who's guilty?

I'm not just gonna say

The program managers are.

We're all guilty.

If you don't speak up
for your own system

And you're the victims
of this environment,

We're guilty, too.

-During the mission,
I could have easily done a story

Saying, "this thing happened.

While nasa is saying
it's nothing,

Some engineers believe
there may be some concern."

What if I had done that?

I was the one who could have --

Should have
and could have

Owned that story in a way

That potentially
even might have changed

The course of events.

I definitely failed at my job.

Just like they failed at theirs.

And so, I'm part of the problem.

[ applause ]
-ladies and gentlemen,

The president
of the united states.

- In 2010, the space shuttle,

After nearly 30 years of duty,

Will be retired from service.

-The minute columbia
evaporated over texas,

The shuttle program
was ready to be retired.

That's when I felt like,
"wow, was all this in vain?

No more shuttle program.
They died.

What did he --
what did they accomplish?"

There was not a lot positive
at that point in time.

-The legacy of columbia
must carry on.

The shuttle's chief purpose
over the next several years

Will be to help finish assembly

Of the international
space station.

-This could easily
have just stopped cold,

But we made a decision to
continue this exploration quest

That they just gave
their lives for.

-2, 1. Booster ignition...

And lift off
of the space shuttle discovery

Returning to the space station

Paving the way
for future missions beyond.

-I was very quickly assigned
to the second return

To flight mission sts-121.

-Steve lindsey joined
on the flight deck

By pilot mark kelly,
headed for six months

On the international
space station.

-You know, certainly one
of the legacies of columbia

And the entire
space shuttle program

Is we learned
how to more safely fly

The shuttle to honour
its commitment

As part of the
international space station.

-For that mission
we did space walks

To practise repairing
tile outside,

To repair the leading edge
of the wing,

The reinforced carbon-carbon.

We developed techniques

To make sure
that we had the ability

To repair the space shuttle

If we find another hole
in the wing or the tile.

♪

-Atlantis, welcome to
the international space station

For the last time.

-The shuttle had at long last
served its purpose,

In building the space station.

But, as time went on,
it was evident

It was time to move onto
something else.

And frankly something
with a fundamental redesign.

-Having fired the imagination
of a generation,

Its place in history secured,

The space shuttle pulls
into port for the last time --

It's voyage at an end.

-The idea of the us
not having its own capability

To fly to space again
was looming.

And I think
if you took that away,

We would feel as if
we'd lost something meaningful

And really central
to our national identity.

The question for nasa was --

What happens next?

♪

-And here we go.

5. Core stage engine start...

3, 2, 1...

Boosters and ignition.

And lift off of artemis 1.

We rise together back
to the moon and beyond.

♪

-By going back to the moon
and eventually onto mars,

We can honour our fallen
crew members from columbia

And their families.

-Artemis is a new rocket
and a new space craft

To send humans to the moon.

As the mission management
team chair for artemis 1,

I took lessons learned

From the columbia accident
investigation report

And used that
to guide the structure

Of the mission management team

To ensure we could hear
dissenting opinions

And other information
was being communicated

In spite of potential management
or communication challenges.

It's tragic we had to go through

The columbia accident
to get here.

So, I always remind myself
of what's at stake

If we don't retain
those lessons.

-As always,
nasa's arrow is pointed up

Towards the stars
as it should be.

It's about the united states ,

And our partners,
remaining the leaders

In aerospace technology
and exploration.

Here in
the united states senate,

I've got a little say
on some of these programs,

And I'm trying to make sure
that nasa has the resources

It needs to fly people
in space as safely as possible.

American astronauts flying
on american rockets

From american soil
into space once again.

It's a very exciting time
for our space program.

Sending people into space
is dangerous.

More dangerous than most things.

It's one of the riskiest things
that people have ever done.

-To be able to experience
this incredible career

Of being an astronaut
was something

That we always called
a calculated risk.

Rick died doing something that
he was very passionate about.

In the end, I had to very
purposely make a decision

That this was not gonna
be something

That was gonna define me
for the rest of my life.

I didn't want to go down
that path of "it's your fault

Or your fault,
or I'm angry about this

And I can't let go of it."

None of that was a path

I wanted to go on at all.

I want to be a great mom

And I want to be productive

And not just be stuck
in that one spot.

And god has been very merciful
to help me with that

Just to be able to keep
moving forward.

-I was angry that my mom
chose to take that risk...

...Instead of staying with me.

And I know it's probably
a great benefit

To the scientific community...

...And maybe a small risk
of failure,

But it's still kind of painful.

-Daddy, I'm here!

-Hi!

-Oh, my gosh.

It's crazy over here, right?

-[ giggles ]

-You need your sunglasses?

Try 'em on.

This is laurel,
and she's my daughter.

She has a lot of
my mom's spirit.

The same enthusiasm
and positivity.

♪

I imagine...

It would be harder
if she wasn't such a great kid.

So, I got pretty lucky there.

♪

-Nasa has released
video footage

Taken inside the cockpit

Of the space shuttle columbia.

It was recorded
in the final moments

Before the shuttle broke up.

The last part of the tape
was burnt up in the accident.

-It's years since the accident,

And I've kind of
reframed the way

That I look at nasa
as a whole.

I forgive them.

And that my family
forgives them.

I think I still feel
a little bit ambivalent

About the future
of space exploration.

Part of me kind of
wants to keep my distance.

But I realise my dad died
doing what he loved.

And there's still kind of
that little bit in me

That if I got the chance
to go to space,

I think I can't pass up
the opportunity

To see what he saw.

It would just be so moving

To kind of put myself
in his shoes.

♪

♪