All language subtitles for Fiasco S01E04 The Trip to Tehran 1080p AMZN WEB-DL DDP5 1 H 264-FLUX (1)_track4_[eng]

[narrator]
Previously on "Fiasco"...

when a new hostage crisis
takes hold in Lebanon,

Ronald Reagan is determined
to avoid the same mistakes

made by his predecessor,
Jimmy Carter.

But as the crisis deepens,
Reagan becomes consumed

with bringing
his countrymen home.

Then National Security
Advisor Robert McFarlane

presents a risky proposal
to sell weapons to Iran

in exchange for
the release of hostages.

Reagan eagerly signs off.

[dramatic music plays]

So far, we have been
following the strands

of the Iran-Contra
saga separately,

tracing each one
from conception to execution,

as they wove, one by one,

through the mind
of Oliver North

and the universe of room 392.

-[man 1] The contras.
- [man 2] Kidnapped in Beirut.

[man 3] Ayatollah Khomeini.

[narrator]
But this is the moment

when the strands come together

to form the surreal plot

we have come to know
as the Iran-Contra scandal.

[man] Iran was exporting
its revolution

to wage war
against Western interests

and conservative
Arab interests.

[man 2] Father Jenco
from Illinois

is the fifth American
to disappear

from the streets of West
Beirut in the last ten months.

[man 3] We had hostages that
had been taken, in Lebanon.

Our responsibility is to try to
get those hostages back home.

[man 4]
CIA officers have directed

and funded the war
against Nicaragua.

CIA employees executing
the more damaging attacks.

But Congress passed
an amendment

which said you can't spend any
money to support the Contras.

They were gonna die on a limb.

Hell of a mess.

[narrator]
How did Ronald Reagan's

ambitions in Central America

become fused with his priorities
in the Middle East?

How did the money,
the personnel, the logistics,

and the policy
all get tangled together?

[man 1] There was
a major screwup.

I mean, you can
just imagine today,

if the White House was caught
selling arms to Iran,

- there would be outrage.
- [phone rings]

But then, to take the money
from a Middle East operation

and give it to a group
that's involved

in a civil war,
it becomes diabolical.

From the beginning,
there was one person

who could have predicted
that Reagan would fall prey

to an out-of-control
hostage crisis.

It was his
national security advisor,

Robert "Bud" McFarlane.

He saw the risk clearly

during his first week in office
back in 1983...

The count of American dead
in today's terrorist attack

on the U.S. Marine compound
in Beirut stands at 135.

...as the situation in Lebanon
went from dangerous to deadly.

I didn't know what hit us.

You hear about 1,000 people,
it seemed like, screaming,

"Help me. God help me."

[man] Reagan was
just shattered by it.

At the earliest opportunity,

he wanted
to go to Camp Lejeune

and be consoling and whatever
he could do, and he did.

If this country is to remain
a force for good in the world,

we'll face times like these,
times of sadness and loss.

Your fellow citizens
know and appreciate

that Marines and their families
are carrying a heavy burden.

[somber music plays]

[man] I watched him,

and I became
quite emotional too.

He was both embittered

and sorrowful
for the survivors

and the parents
who were there.

[somber rock music plays]

[narrator] It was clear
that Reagan

cared deeply about
his fellow countrymen abroad.

But for Bud McFarlane,

the President's grief
provoked a troubling thought.

♪

[man]
That investment personally

of the time and effort
to go and be there.

You couldn't deny
this is vivid evidence

of how an enemy
would see a vulnerability.

[narrator] And it was
in this vulnerability

that Iran, once again,
saw an opportunity.

They could capitalize on it
by coaxing Reagan

into risking everything

for the rescue
of seven hostages.

I am Leon Neyfakh.

This is "Fiasco:

the Story of Iran-Contra."

When Reagan came into office,
I was at the State Department,

and he wanted me
to be his interlocutor

between the heads of state
throughout the Middle East.

[dramatic music plays]

His secretary of state,
he asked me,

"What do you think is
the most important issue

that we must study hard?"
And I said,

"Well, the wild card in
the mix here is really Iran."

[all chanting]

[McFarlane] We've had
a revolutionary figure emerge

as the leader of Iran.

[all chanting]

♪

[McFarlane]
At the geopolitical center

of the energy world
on the planet,

this is a terribly
important country,

and it is bound to be a target
for the Soviet Union.

Iran was, in many ways,
thought by Americans,

including those in
the Reagan administration,

to be a new kind of face
of anti-American evil.

The American Embassy in Tehran
ceased operations

in November 1979

when it was taken over
by militants,

and it has never opened since.

[Neyfakh] Inescapably,
this story always comes back

to that year of revolution:
1979.

[man] In early 1979,
the Shah gave up,

and he left the country.

He never came back
to Iran again,

and everything connected

with his regime
soon completely collapsed.

The Iranian people
are united, and they believe,

and all of them are behind
Khomeini's leadership.

Khomeini and his forces
really gain the upper hand

and begin establishing
the institutions

that we see today,
40 years later,

in the Islamic Republic
of Iran.

He was the one who understood
and made real

how to combine
Islam and politics.

[Neyfakh] Around the time
the U.S. hostages taken

during the Carter administration
returned home,

Ayatollah Khomeini
consolidated his power over Iran

and hardened his stance
towards the United States.

[man] This was the first group
of Americans

to leave the country

since the U.S. embassy said
it could no longer guarantee

the safety
of U.S. citizens in Iran.

Pan American Airlines
brought a plane in

to take its people out

and opened the flight
to a few other companies

and about 20 newsmen

who decided it was time
to get out.

[Neyfakh] So how did we get

from being literally
shut out of Iran

by our archenemy,
Ayatollah Khomeini,

to selling his government
deadly weapons

just six years later?

To understand that,
we need to look next door

to the region's
other reigning despot.

[applause]

[man] He likes
to be called Saddam,

but some Arabs
have other names for him.

The Butcher of Baghdad is one.

[Neyfakh] Remember him?
Saddam Hussein.

A character from a completely
different American fiasco.

Well, he plays
a role here too.

[man 1] Saddam Hussein
al-Tikriti,

president in name
for the past 14 months,

but Iraq's strongman
for the past decade,

variously attired
in Arab headdress

or in the uniform
of a field marshal

although he was never
a soldier.

But his favorite image:

the cuddly father figure.

[Neyfakh] Before he was
a menace to Kuwait,

Saddam waged one of
the longest and bloodiest wars

in modern
Middle Eastern history.

It was against his neighbor,

the radical Muslim cleric

solidifying his power in Iran
and posing a new challenge

to Saddam's aggressively
secular dictatorship.

[woman] Saddam Hussein
was a Sunni leader

who was running a majority
Shiite country,

and he kept
the Shiite community in check.

And Khomeini had a theocracy.

[all chanting]

He had visions
of having a government

based on religious power,

maybe emulated in other parts
of the Arab world.

They were exact opposites.

[all chanting]

The Arab Gulf countries
were extremely nervous

about the kind of regime
that emerged in Iran.

And there's
this traditional rivalry

between Sunnis and Shia,

and they felt threatened.

What Saddam feared was that

the ethnicity of the Shia

and their loyalty
to the Shia Imams

would trump their faith
in the government of Iraq,

which was primarily Sunni

and which did very little
to help the Shia majority.

So the ability of Khomeini

to threaten Saddam
was quite profound.

[Neyfakh] In 1980,

in the wake of Iran's
chaotic revolution,

Saddam Hussein
saw an opportunity.

[man] Saddam and his aides
want to establish Iraq,

not Iran,
as the major power in the area

and elevate Saddam
as the leader of all Arabs.

[Neyfakh] And so Saddam did
what dictators often do.

He attacked.

Basking in
their nationalist identity,

Iranians flocked
to the frontlines

to defend their country.

[man] The men and boys who
have responded wear headbands

that say simply,
"Yes to Khomeini."

It means they have promised
their lives to the revolution.

[Neyfakh] Women willingly
offered up

their husbands and sons
and even themselves.

But manpower was not enough.

This was modern warfare,

and weapons and technology

were going
to determine the victor.

[man] Iranian resistance
crumbled in the early days

to the advancing Iraqis.

The first major territorial
gain came last Wednesday

when Iraq claimed the capture
of the town of Qasr-e Shirin

in the north.

Now the Islamic revolution
has been replaced

by the ruthless Arab socialism
of President Saddam Hussein.

We are just coming here
to force them to recognize that

and to be reasonable enough
to see that they cannot do

and they cannot have it
their way all the time.

To most Americans,

the basic lesson
of the Iranian hostage crisis

was that
the Iranian Islamic Regime

of Ayatollah Khomeini

was dangerous and irrational,

impossible to deal with,
inscrutable.

And so when Iraq invaded Iran,

the United States
leaned on the side of Iraq.

[Neyfakh] In fact,
America went further

than just siding with Iraq.

It struck up
a tentative partnership

with Saddam Hussein,

and by 1983,

America was supplying Iraq
with arms.

Saddam was enjoying
the support of the West,

of the United States.

He was buying weaponry
from them,

and he could do no wrong.

It was a convenient alliance.

[Neyfakh] The alliance
was founded on one thing.

[Boustany] Iraq was sitting
on a lot of oil.

They had reserves.

[man] So vast are their
reserves, that Iraqis say

that the last two barrels
of oil

in the world will be theirs.

The U.S. didn't have
alternatives at the time

to Saudi oil or Arab oil.

And oil prices were a matter
of national interest

and very important
to the economy of the U.S.

Iran felt that its back
was against the wall.

The Iraqi Air Force
was superior.

They didn't have
the right kind of missiles

to defend themselves.

And a lot of young
Iranian soldiers

died in the war.

Millions died.
Many were taken prisoner.

[Neyfakh] By the summer
of 1985, the bloody war

between Iran and Iraq
had been raging for five years.

[man] The Iranians seem to
have no intention at all

of agreeing to a ceasefire,
let alone peace negotiations.

The war will drag on,
continuing instability

at the very heart
of the oil world.

[woman] And many are wondering

how long Iran
can stay in this fight

without American
military assistance.

[Neyfakh] To make matters
more complicated,

the White House feared
that the Soviet Union

was jockeying for influence
in Iran

or even planning to invade.

[McFarlane] Iran, I thought,
really was threatened.

They were a target.

The Cold War was raging
during this time,

so it was crucial
that we do whatever we could

to prevent an expansion

of Soviet influence
in the Middle East.

[Neyfakh] It was against
the backdrop

of the Iran-Iraq war

that in the summer of 1985,
an Iranian arms dealer

by the name
of Manucher Ghorbanifar

was introduced
to Bud McFarlane.

Ghorbanifar claimed that
there were moderate elements

within Khomeini's cabinet

who wanted to engage
with the U.S.

[Teicher]
McFarlane was very concerned

that America
not miss an opportunity

to restore
some semblance of normalcy

to our relationship with Iran.

Or at least stop
the radicalization

and begin a process

that would move them
more towards a centrist policy

and a restoration
of the balance of power

and the Middle East order.

[Neyfakh]
That was the long-term play.

In the short term,

Ghorbanifar was also
promising to help Reagan

out of his hostage crisis.

[chanting]

[Neyfakh] Extremist Shiite
militants in Lebanon,

who referred to themselves
as Hezbollah,

had kidnapped
seven Americans in Beirut.

As far as the White House
was concerned,

Hezbollah answered
to Ayatollah Khomeini.

There is sufficient evidence
that radical Shia terrorists

are responsive
to Iranian guidance

for us to hold
Tehran responsible.

[man] In the last three years,

Khomeini's
fundamentalist message

has found many supporters

among the Shiites
of the Lebanon.

Downtrodden for generations,
many now believe

in an Islamic revolution
against foreign influence.

[Teicher] Iranian leadership
were using the Pasdaran

to train people
to become martyrs.

We saw Shia unrest
in Saudi Arabia.

We saw Shia unrest in Yemen.

Wherever there were
Shiite communities,

they were typically
the impoverished communities,

and they were looking
to Iran for help.

[Neyfakh]
Hezbollah had learned

from the Iranian
hostage crisis

how to put pressure
on the United States.

[man] ...for in this city,

a live hostage
is worth a lot of money.

[Neyfakh] Ghorbanifar said
that he could persuade

the Iranian government
to pressure Hezbollah

into releasing
the seven American hostages

being held in Lebanon.

It was this promise
that would lead Bud McFarlane

to make a fateful decision.

[phone ringing]

He instructed Oliver North

to strike a deal
with Ghorbanifar,

whereby Iran would broker
the release of the hostages.

And in return,

the Ayatollah would get the
one thing he really needed.

[all chanting]

[Boustany]
The Iranians needed weapons,

and they knew that

Saddam's supremacy
in the skies

and with missiles
and all kinds of weaponry

was because the West

was supplying
these weapons to them.

[Neyfakh]
There was one problem.

The White House
had placed an embargo

on the sale of weapons
to Iran.

[McManus] There were
plenty of laws broken

in the arms sales to Iran,

but if a President
and his advisors decide that

"we're going to find a lawyer
to write an interpretation

that says that
we're within the law,"

they may or may not get away
with it

in the long run,

but they clearly
have the power to do it

in the short run.

[Neyfakh]
To keep the deal secret,

the Israeli government agreed
to act as a middleman.

It went like this.

The U.S. would sell
the missiles to Israel,

and Israel would
then ship them to Iran.

The plan was designed
to avoid a direct sale

to a country
that the Reagan administration

had designated
a state sponsor of terrorism.

[McFarlane] The president had

made the decision
unequivocally.

He was profoundly focused

on securing the release
of the hostages in Lebanon.

I reminded him again that,
"Look, this may not work."

And he said, "Well, Bud,
we don't know until we try."

[Neyfakh] On August 20, 1985,

a plane carrying
96 American TOW missiles

left Israel for Iran.

[McFarlane] Right away,

after the President
made the decision,

I began to hear
a different story.

[Neyfakh] In a last-minute
bait and switch,

Ghorbanifar
was saying that Iran

wanted an additional
400 missiles.

Even worse,
he said that only one hostage

instead of all seven
would be freed in exchange.

McFarlane was furious.

[McFarlane]
You're being screwed here.

That was my reaction to it.

And I said, "Look, this is
really unimpressive

"on their part
and foolish on ours

if we can't get this
straightened out."

[Neyfakh] Now ready to pull
the plug on the whole deal,

McFarlane went back
to the president.

[McFarlane] It was very clear
that that priority,

the safety of Americans,

is what drove him
in decision-making.

He was an optimist

without thinking seriously
about the downside risks here.

[Neyfakh] And so,
on September 15th,

a second plane
carrying 408 American missiles

arrived in Iran.

McFarlane had
the terrible task of choosing

which one hostage
would walk free.

While President Reagan
was clearly touched

and wanted to bring about
freedom for the hostages,

the one who he really cared
about was Bill Buckley.

[McFarlane] Clearly that's
the one I favored,

just out
of professional anguish.

[Mayer] Of all the hostages,

none hurt more than Buckley.

He was our own man.

He was someone
who was doing public service

for the CIA
in a very dangerous post.

People were very worried about
what was being done to him.

The CIA reportedly spent
a small fortune to try

and find William Buckley.
After he was kidnapped,

Iranian gunmen
took him to Tehran.

He reportedly was tortured
there till he gave up secrets

and then sent back
to his Lebanese captors

and forced
to write a confession.

[Neyfakh] Earlier that year,

Hezbollah had released
a video of William Buckley.

The video proved
that Buckley was still alive,

but only just.

The situation was dire,

both in terms of Buckley's
obviously ailing health

and the classified information

he could be giving up
under torture.

But despite McFarland's pleas
to release him first,

he was told that Buckley
was too sick to travel.

McFarlane would have
to pick someone else.

[McFarlane] North said,

"Well, there's this pastor."

[Neyfakh]
The pastor was Benjamin Weir.

Do you think the government
has been doing

all it can to gain his release?

I think a special effort
needs to be made now.

[Neyfakh] For months now,

his wife had been publicly
calling on the U.S.

to resolve the hostage crisis.

Her husband
had been in captivity

for almost 500 days,

far longer than
the Iranian students

had held
the U.S. embassy hostage.

If Buckley couldn't be freed,

then Weir was
an obvious second choice.

[somber music plays]

Just hours after
the second shipment

of American weapons
landed in Tehran,

Weir was freed.

♪

His release would mark
the first successful

arms-for-hostages transaction

in what would come to be known
as the Iran-Contra scandal.

[Weir] So somewhat
unexpectedly we were told

that my dad had been released.

We weren't really
expecting that news.

We'd had no premonition
that that was going to happen

in any way.

All of a sudden,
there was a knock on the door,

and there was my dad.

Quite a shock.

[trumpet music plays]

I'm pleased to inform you,
if you haven't heard,

that Reverend Benjamin Weir,

who was held hostage
for 18 months in Lebanon,

- has now been released.
- [cheers and applause]

[woman] Today's news brought
renewed hope for the families

of the six Americans
still held hostage.

The heaviness of one's heart
is lightened some.

I want to have
a positive attitude,

and be optimistic,
and think that this is

the first step in the release
towards all of the people.

[Neyfakh] No one knew
that Weir had been released

in an arms-for-hostages deal,
not even Weir himself.

[man] Because the
six other hostages

have not yet been freed,

we do not intend
to disclose any details

on how the Reverend Weir
was freed.

However, I can assure you
that no deal was made

and that our position

on no concessions
to terrorists has not changed.

[dramatic music plays]

[Teicher]
I asked Colonel North,

who was the only one who would
know about this sort of thing,

and he just gave me
his special grin

and the twinkle in his eye.

Which was his way of saying,
"Yes, something's going on."

We went to Washington, D.C.,

and at the church's offices
on Capitol Hill,

my father held
a press conference.

For the first time,

he spoke to the press
about what had happened.

I hardly need to say
that I'm glad to be here.

Not least, but first of all,

I give credit and praise

to our Heavenly Father

for his tender,
sustaining power

throughout this ordeal,

for my release

and for the hope that,
by his grace,

freedom will come soon

to those who are still captive.

- Hi. How are you?
- Well, thank you.

[Neyfakh] Weir's release

was a significant
public victory for Reagan.

Behind the scenes, the
administration was struggling

to secure the release
of the remaining hostages.

We are continuing to hope

and continuing
to do everything we can.

[woman] The families say
you're not doing enough.

Well, unfortunately,
we can't tell even the families

all the things
that we are doing.

[Neyfakh] Fear for
the hostages' lives

weighed heavily on Reagan
and on the country.

They cohabitated
with rodents and cockroaches.

They were moved
from place to place.

They were wrapped
like mummies with rags

stuffed into their mouths
tied to radiators.

Many of them were beaten.

I mean, these men
really suffered.

[Neyfakh]
What was not yet known

was that William Buckley,

the CIA station chief,
had been dead for months.

[Mayer] And of course,
it turned out later,

long before anybody
in the U.S. knew it,

he was horribly tortured
and murdered.

[man] The Post says
that Buckley later died

from a lack
of medical attention.

His body was never found.

[Neyfakh] The question now
was what to do next?

Reagan wanted McFarlane
to negotiate the release

of the remaining hostages,

but McFarlane no longer
trusted Ghorbanifar to serve

as a reliable intermediary
between the U.S. and Iran.

[McFarlane] Unless you have
absolute conviction

in the integrity

of the people
you're dealing with,

a barter for hostages
is just an open door

to encouraging
more hostages being taken.

From the Iranian
point of view,

if it works,
let's do it again.

And so I was suspicious.

And I was candid
with Reagan about that.

[Neyfakh]
As it turned out,

McFarlane was right
to be skeptical.

Ghorbanifar was, in fact,

something of a triple agent,
if you like.

In his career, he had worked
for the regime of the Shah.

He had worked for
United States intelligence.

He had worked
for Israeli intelligence.

And by the time we got
to know him in the 1980s,

he was working for the Iranian
revolutionary regime.

He was a classic
international wheeler-dealer

who didn't care
what side you were on.

All he wanted to do
was make a deal.

[McFarlane] The more
I learned about Ghorbanifar,

it was very clear that
he was neither a principal,

a decision-maker,

nor a person
of particular influence

with the Iranian armed forces.

Nothing that he said really
established his bona fides

apart from having a history

of being involved
in arms trade.

[Neyfakh]
During this same period,

McFarlane turned his attention
away from Iran

and towards America's other
global foe: the Soviet Union.

[marching band music plays]

McFarlane was planning
the first ever meeting

between Reagan
and his Soviet counterpart,

Mikhail Gorbachev.

As the summit neared,

McFarlane handed full control
of negotiations

with Ghorbanifar off
to Oliver North.

He was North's problem now.

[McFarlane] I had
a challenging six months

planning the Soviet summit

to tee up
both sides' understanding

of what was to be
the outcome in Geneva.

[Neyfakh] The topic of
these diplomatic negotiations,

ironically,
was weapons reduction.

We go to Geneva
with the sober realization

that nuclear weapons pose the
greatest threat in human history

to the survival
of the human race,

that the arms race
must be stopped.

[chatter]

[Neyfakh] McFarlane spent
months tutoring Reagan

on the details of arms control.

Ronald Reagan
was never a detail man.

Not on foreign policy.

Not on domestic policy.

His aides would tell stories
about his eyes glazing over.

It was revealed that

before his meetings
with foreign leaders,

instead of a big binder
of printed material of the kind

that the CIA
would have customarily

given to a president
before a summit,

the CIA had prepared a movie
about Mikhail Gorbachev,

a mini documentary,

so that he could absorb
the information that way.

And the President
was delighted.

[man]
The November summit arrives,

and the world
is watching closely

to see if the tensions

will remain as icy
as the Geneva weather.

[Neyfakh]
On November 19, 1985,

Reagan and Gorbachev
met in Switzerland.

[applause]

General Secretary Gorbachev
and I

have held
comprehensive discussions

covering all elements
of our relationship.

I'm convinced that we are
heading in the right direction.

[applause]

[Neyfakh] Both men agreed

to consider reducing
their stockpiles

of nuclear weapons,

but Reagan refused
to compromise on his dream

of building a missile
defense system in space.

Ultimately, no deal was signed.

Meanwhile, McFarlane was losing
control of Oliver North

who was continuing to give in
to Ghorbanifar's demands

for more and more weapons.

[McFarlane] The Iranians
wanted sophisticated

air-to-air missiles

before anyone else
would be released.

Well, it was out
of the question.

This was a particularly
sophisticated system

that we weren't even selling
to all of our allies,

let alone to
an alien country like Iran.

This really was a marker

of the good faith
being very much in doubt.

[Neyfakh] Nevertheless,
with no oversight,

Oliver North persisted.

Iran was asking
for 150 HAWK missiles

as well as 200
Sidewinder missiles

and 30 to 50 Phoenix missiles.

But this time, it was America
that changed the terms.

A plane carrying
just 18 Hawk missiles

touched down in Iran.

In addition to the drastically
reduced number of weapons,

they weren't even the I-Hawks

capable of
shooting down planes

at high altitudes
the Iranians had ordered.

On top of that,
about half the missiles

carried Israeli's
Star of David markings,

which enraged the Iranians.

No hostages were released.

A week later, deflated
from the Geneva summit

and from what
looked increasingly

like dead-end negotiations
with Iran,

McFarlane had had enough.

[McFarlane] I was exhausted.

Their request for a much more
sophisticated weapons system,

their lack of production
of releasing a hostage

led me to formally ask for
a meeting with the president.

I was reaching a point where,
more for family reasons,

I wanted to retire.

His ability to weigh
both sides of an issue

and to provide key advice
has been invaluable.

[McFarlane] And we had a long
and rather emotional,

mutual sorrow to the point

of his being distraught
at my leaving,

and he wanted me
to reconsider.

I said,
"I really can't do that.

I'm sorry to let you down."

At the end, he very clearly,
reluctantly said, "All right."

[Neyfakh]
McFarlane's parting wisdom

was that all negotiations

with Iranian arms dealers
should cease.

[McFarlane] The president
was pursed lips all the way,

as was his way
of showing his wish

to go in the opposite direction

that he thought
it worth continuing.

But at the end,
he said, "All right,"

and he directed me
to go to London.

[Neyfakh] On December 7th,
McFarlane flew to London

for what would be his final
international mission

as national security advisor.

Ghorbanifar and Oliver North
were there waiting for him.

[McFarlane] I said,

"My government
simply is not interested

"in pursuing what we think

is evidence of bad faith here
on the Iranian side.

There would be no arms
transfers at all."

[Neyfakh]
Ghorbanifar was livid.

[McFarlane] He stormed around.

Said, "You're foolish, you're
crazy, you're misguided.

This is the opportunity
of a lifetime."

I said, "Ollie, it's over.
Let's get out of here."

And we left.

I have a statement
I wish to read to you.

It's with deep regret
and reluctance

that I have accepted
the resignation of Bud McFarlane

as my assistant
for National Security Affairs.

While Bud's departure
is a cause

of deep regret for me,

I'm pleased to announce

that I have appointed
Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter

to be the new assistant
to the president

for National Security Affairs.

[Neyfakh] As McFarlane
cleared out his office,

he feared that Reagan
would turn his attention

back to Iran.

[McFarlane] I knew that
his preoccupation

with the safety
of the hostages

would lead him to start
this process up again.

I nonetheless tabled
my resignation and left,

and I shouldn't have done it.

The only person that could
have stopped it was me.

And I didn't do it.

[Neyfakh]
McFarlane was right.

Negotiations
between Oliver North

and Manucher Ghorbanifar
resumed.

To North, the only downside

of further arms-for-hostages
transactions

was a few weapons being sent
to Iran with no results.

On the other hand,
if the deals stopped,

the hostages
could come to severe harm.

[man] In January of 1986,

after I had become
a national security advisor

in December,
I convened an NSPG meeting

with the director
of central intelligence,

Bill Casey.

And Bill Casey picked retired
Air Force General Dick Secord

to be the contractor
to manage the logistics

of getting the weapons
from the U.S. to Iran.

[Neyfakh] Richard Secord
was still buying weapons

and building an air fleet

with American money
for the Contras in Nicaragua.

In his new role,
he would also be in charge

of funneling
U.S. weapons to Iran.

So they decided
that I ought to take over

that whole operation,
which was growing and growing.

Well, that was the last thing
we needed.

But suddenly,
we find ourselves involved

in the Iran part of this mess.

[Neyfakh] On January 22nd,
North flew to London again

to turn up the heat
on Ghorbanifar.

If negotiations were
going to continue,

the hostages needed
to be released and soon.

This meeting would later
become publicly known as...

The bathroom story.

[Neyfakh] And that story
goes something like this...

[McManus] North
and Ghorbanifar

and others were in London
in a hotel room.

The negotiations
were getting nowhere,

and according to North,

Ghorbanifar asked him
to step into the bathroom...

and said, "There has to be
"a way to make this deal work.

I can just write you
a check for $1 million."

North recognized that he was,
in effect,

being offered a bribe.

And North, in his accounting,
bristled and said,

"No, I can't do
anything like that."

At which point
Ghorbanifar said,

"Well, what if I sent the money
"to an account for the Contras?

Would that help?"

At which point,
according to North,

he said, "Now, that's
an interesting idea."

And thus was
the diversion begun.

[Neyfakh] And so,
as the story goes,

it was in a London bathroom

that North's two big missions
became one.

And the twin-engine scandal,

now known as Iran-Contra,
was born.

It became apparent
to Ollie North

that he had just found a way to
solve two problems, he thought.

One was getting the hostages
out of Iran,

and the other was getting money
to the Contras in Nicaragua.

I, at the time, thought that it
was a really neat idea

to use Khomeini's money

to support the indigenous forces
in Nicaragua

where we were trying

to roll back
the Communist Marxist state.

The Iranian program
was controversial.

I've often told people
I specialize in controversies,

but I thought
it made a lot of sense.

In the later retelling
of Ollie North,

the idea of diverting money

from Iranian arms sales
to the Contras

actually came from Ghorbanifar,
the Iranian arms merchant.

The problem with that story,
as charming as it is,

is that it is
almost certainly untrue.

[Neyfakh] In fact, by
the time North and Ghorbanifar

had their dubious
bathroom conversation,

Secord had already diverted
more than $850,000

from Iranian arms sales
to Nicaragua,

a transaction Secord
would jokingly refer

to as a Contra-bution.

We only had
a small amount of money,

and we were eating it up
very rapidly.

Air operations
are very expensive.

And procuring these weapons
was very expensive.

And buying
and operating a ship,

that was pretty expensive.

You know, and we needed
additional funds,

and this came along.
We said, "Eh, how about this?

It's a good way.
We'll tap into that," and did.

[Neyfakh] Now under
Richard Secord's direction,

Operation Recovery
was launched.

It was a complex order
of operations

that was designed specifically
to uphold one thing: secrecy.

And it went like this.

Ghorbanifar
would deposit funds

into a Swiss bank account
controlled by Secord.

Secord would then transfer
a portion of that money

to the CIA,

which would purchase
the missiles from the U.S. Army.

Secord would then
charter a plane

to ferry the missiles
from the U.S. to Israel.

Finally, an Israeli charter
would carry the weapons

on their last leg to Iran.

A shipment of 500 TOW missiles
arrived in Iran

on February 18th.

But once again,
no hostages were released.

Just under two weeks later,

an additional 500 TOW missiles
were delivered to Iran.

Again, no hostages were freed.

North had now overseen
five shipments

of lethal weapons to Iran,

and it had been months
since the first

and only hostage
had been freed.

But in the meantime,
as much as $20 million

had piled up in Secord's
Swiss bank account.

The war in Nicaragua

was now just
as dependent on Iran

as the fate of the hostages
in Beirut.

It was time for a face-to-face
meeting with the enemy.

[McManus] McFarlane's visit
to Tehran in May

was the point
at which all of his illusions

about the possibilities
of a deal with Iran

crashed into
a brick wall of reality.

[Neyfakh]
In the spring of 1986,

Reagan called Bud McFarlane
out of retirement

to spearhead
a top secret mission.

[McFarlane]
And I agreed to go

when I was asked
by the president to go to Iran.

[Neyfakh] He would be
traveling with a small team.

My name is George Cave,
and I was in the CIA,

and I focused
on the Middle East.

[Neyfakh] Howard Teicher

and Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North.

Ghorbanifar claimed
that he had arranged

for McFarlane and his team
to meet with men

in Khomeini's inner circle.

[Poindexter] We hadn't had any
diplomatic approach to Iran

up to that point.

And so it was momentous
to decide to send a mission.

[Neyfakh] America hadn't sent
a White House delegation to Iran

since the hostage crisis
six years earlier.

Our hope was that
we would actually sit down

with Speaker Rafsanjani,
Mousavi, the prime minister.

[Neyfakh] This had
always been McFarlane's goal--

to determine,
once and for all,

if a relationship between Iran
and the U.S. could be brokered.

He saw this as
an important moment

to make a difference

in the course
of American history

in the Middle East.

[Neyfakh] This could be
McFarlane's Kissinger moment.

As for Reagan,

he was being promised what
he had wanted all along,

the immediate release

of all remaining
American hostages in Lebanon.

Everyone did not think
this was a good idea.

This was a high-stakes gamble.

The trip was supported
by the CIA,

and it was opposed
by the State Department

and the Defense Department.

[Neyfakh] The operation
was completely covert.

Not even Congress
knew about it,

and just a handful of Iranians
were aware

that an American delegation,

along with several tons
of weapons parts,

were boarding a plane
bound for Tehran.

[Secord] We borrowed
an airplane from Israel.

We went over every bit
of that airplane,

and anything
that would indicate

it was Israeli,
Stars of David or whatever,

we got rid of it.

And we take off
in this unmarked, white 707.

We had Irish passports,
and we had an Irish story,

because we were going
as an Irish trade delegation.

My Irish name was Tim McGann,
from Dingle.

[Neyfakh] Determined
to make a good impression

on the Iranians,

North decided
to sweeten the deal.

Of course,
the funny story on the plane

was Ollie
pulling out this cake.

And I said, "What is this?"

[McManus] It was a regular
old chocolate cake

with a great, big brass key

pressed into the frosting,
on top.

[Cave] The key represents
the opening of relations

between the two countries.

[Teicher] And indeed, there
is a tradition among Persians

when families or individuals
try to make up,

after some kind of fight,

they share pastries
and cookies and cakes.

So it was
an appropriate gift to bring

as a light-hearted

but, nonetheless,
symbolic gesture on our part.

[McManus] Unfortunately,
when they arrived in Iran

and wanted to present this key
to senior Iranian leaders,

they never got a chance,

because the young guards

providing security for them
at their hotel suite

found the cake
and ate it first.

That's a pretty good metaphor
for the whole trip.

[Neyfakh] Reagan had also
given the men a signed Bible

to take with them.
It was a gesture to indicate

that they were representing
the president

and that Reagan, too,
was a man of God.

Well, I was very concerned
that there be a plan

to rescue us
if we were held hostage.

So I specifically

and repeatedly
asked Oliver North,

"What is the plan
for extricating us

"in the event that we can't
just drive to the airport

and get on our airplane?"

And Ollie assured me that
everything was taken care of.

[Neyfakh] What North meant
but told no one

was that William Casey,
using a classic CIA tactic,

had handed him cyanide pills

in the event that the mission
went horribly wrong.

And before the American
delegation had even landed,

it almost did

when Iranian control ops

picked up the jet's approach
and radioed the pilot.

[Cave] They said, you know,

"Either tell us
what's going on,

or I'm gonna shoot you down."
And so we explained,

and I gave them
the name of the man

in the prime minister's office
who they should contact.

And they apparently did,

because we were not threatened
after that.

[Neyfakh] But that was only
the beginning of their troubles.

[Teicher] From the moment
we arrived,

the atmosphere was bizarre.

They had apparently changed
their clocks,

and we didn't know it.

And they were expecting us
at a different time.

And we were set off
into some, uh,

I'd say,
second-class VIP lounge.

And we stayed there
for about an hour-plus

until Ghorbanifar
showed up apologizing.

[Neyfakh] The logistics screw-up
was disconcerting,

but it was a small price to pay

if the rest of
the mission went well.

[Teicher] We said, "Well,
have the hostages been freed?"

That was what we were told
when we arrived.

And there was no news,

and so the main thing
they were supposed to do

on arrival wasn't happening.

[Neyfakh] This
was starting to feel

like a futile exercise,
at best,

and a trap, at worst.

And then we piled into
these old Oldsmobiles,

and we're driven
from the airport

to the former Tehran Hilton,

now known as
the Imperial Hotel.

There we were ensconced
on the top-floor penthouse,

cut off from everyone.

[Neyfakh] And thus began

a strange and frustrating
three days.

[Teicher] There was really
no food in this hotel.

They'd come out
with this big menu.

100 items on the menu.
And you would say,

"Wow, this sounds great.
I'll have this."

"We don't have it."

Turned out they had
nothing on the menu.

They had a pancake.

[Neyfakh] The American envoy
had shown up during Ramadan,

the month when devout Muslims

fast from sunrise
till sundown.

[Teicher] So Ghorbanifar
had, I believe,

his mother prepare
a feast for us,

which we did enjoy.
But, you know,

that was about the only thing
that he delivered that he said

he was gonna deliver that was
what he said it would be.

[Neyfakh] Holed up in
the less-than-luxurious

confines of the Tehran Hilton,

they began negotiating.

McFarlane expected
to be talking

to the most senior leaders.

He was there as a personal
emissary of the United States.

He found himself talking to
arms dealers and underlings

whose real connection to power
wasn't clear at all.

[Neyfakh] Worse still,
it was becoming clear

that the Iranians hadn't
even contacted Hezbollah

to discuss the hostage
release in Lebanon.

We were having substantive
dialogue about our goals

and our interests,

and, you know,

where we thought
we could possibly cooperate.

And what could be
an opening to improvement?

And then we would suddenly,
you know, say,

"But we're not gonna
talk anymore

unless you release
the hostages."

And then the Iranians
would say,

"Well, we can't even
try to influence them

until you deliver
all the spare parts."

Because indeed,
because of our mistrust

and their past failure
to deliver,

we didn't bring
all of the parts with us

that they wanted.
Only some of them.

So it was a very
frustrating experience

where McFarlane
was increasingly fed up

and just ready to leave.

[Cave] McFarlane would insist

they've gotta
release hostages.

That was our instructions
when we came here--

to make sure that
the hostages get released

before you make
any commitments.

And...

we never got that.

[Teicher] It was plain

that we had been misled
by Ghorbanifar.

He had misled both parties

in an effort
to create a situation

where a deal would happen.

And once we knew
that Ghorbanifar had lied to us

and lied to the Iranians,

I knew
this was a really bad idea.

[McFarlane]
I aborted the mission

before it was 48 hours old

when there was
a breach of commitment

that they had made
to deliver hostages.

[Neyfakh] On the morning
of their third day in Tehran,

things went from bad to worse.

News that Americans were
in town on a secret mission

had leaked to the public.

[Cave] A couple of mullahs
found out about it,

started spreading the word,

and that's when
the mobs were formed.

[Neyfakh] A failed mission

suddenly became
a life-threatening one.

They said,
"Get everyone down here.

"We gotta get you out of here,

"because this mob's coming up
the main highway.

It's blocked."

So we went over the backroads
of Northern Tehran,

to get out of the way
of these guys

that were coming to get us.

And we just got on the plane
and left.

I think we were all
kind of glad to get out alive.

[laughs]

The plane ride home
was very quiet.

It was very quiet.

I recall saying to Bud that,
while we failed,

you know, we did
the right thing to try.

And he said, "Maybe."

[Neyfakh]
The American delegation

had escaped with their lives,

but the fate of the hostages
still hung in the balance.

And just six months later,

details
of the Iran-Contra operation

would leak out into the open.

The consequences
for the Reagan Administration

would be monumental.

[solemn music plays]

♪