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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:06,373 --> 00:00:08,708 SPEAKER 1: Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 2 00:00:08,708 --> 00:00:10,143 SPEAKER 2: We lost both engines! 3 00:00:10,143 --> 00:00:11,745 SPEAKER 3: Don't be alarmed, emergency detected. 4 00:00:11,745 --> 00:00:12,545 SPEAKER 4: Mayday! Mayday! 5 00:00:12,545 --> 00:00:14,481 SPEAKER 5: Brace for impact! 6 00:00:14,481 --> 00:00:15,982 SPEAKER 6: I think I lost one. 7 00:00:15,982 --> 00:00:18,485 SPEAKER 7: Investigations start-- 8 00:00:18,485 --> 00:00:19,953 SPEAKER 8: It's gonna crash! 9 00:00:30,463 --> 00:00:33,199 NARRATOR: Modern airliners are among the most complex and 10 00:00:33,199 --> 00:00:35,902 reliable machines in the world. 11 00:00:35,902 --> 00:00:39,873 Their safety record is high, and dangerous incidents are rare. 12 00:00:39,873 --> 00:00:42,609 But when they do happen, aviation authorities 13 00:00:42,609 --> 00:00:44,744 commit to finding the cause. 14 00:00:44,744 --> 00:00:46,479 It's rarely easy. 15 00:00:46,479 --> 00:00:50,116 This is the story of one such investigation. 16 00:00:50,116 --> 00:00:53,420 When a 747 suffered a devastating explosion 17 00:00:53,420 --> 00:00:56,289 at high altitude, the crew and passengers 18 00:00:56,289 --> 00:00:59,626 faced an unprecedented crisis, and 19 00:00:59,626 --> 00:01:02,028 one family's grief helped authorities 20 00:01:02,028 --> 00:01:03,229 uncover the full truth. 21 00:01:08,134 --> 00:01:10,036 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Lee kind of died for nothing. 22 00:01:10,036 --> 00:01:12,772 You know, you've got to find out why he died, 23 00:01:12,772 --> 00:01:18,478 and you've just got to make sure that it never happens again. 24 00:01:18,478 --> 00:01:20,780 NARRATOR: Hawaii is a natural stop for any flight 25 00:01:20,780 --> 00:01:21,614 across the Pacific. 26 00:01:24,717 --> 00:01:27,587 On this morning, a United 747 was 27 00:01:27,587 --> 00:01:29,856 undergoing routine inspection for a trip 28 00:01:29,856 --> 00:01:30,924 to Auckland, New Zealand. 29 00:01:35,829 --> 00:01:38,965 But as flight 811 prepared for takeoff, 30 00:01:38,965 --> 00:01:41,835 everyone's guard is up. 31 00:01:41,835 --> 00:01:45,071 Just a few months earlier, a terrorist bomb had brought down 32 00:01:45,071 --> 00:01:47,640 a 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 33 00:01:47,640 --> 00:01:49,843 LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were in the aftermath of Lockerbie, 34 00:01:49,843 --> 00:01:53,046 and I had instructed the crew to be particularly aware, 35 00:01:53,046 --> 00:01:57,050 because it was a through flight from Los Angeles 36 00:01:57,050 --> 00:01:59,085 going through to New Zealand. 37 00:01:59,085 --> 00:02:01,855 So in my pre-flight briefing, I'd 38 00:02:01,855 --> 00:02:05,658 asked them to make sure that they checked any baggage that 39 00:02:05,658 --> 00:02:08,661 looked suspicious or anything, because we 40 00:02:08,661 --> 00:02:12,499 wanted to be extra cautious. 41 00:02:12,499 --> 00:02:15,068 NARRATOR: Flight 811 was heavily loaded. 42 00:02:15,068 --> 00:02:19,506 337 passengers packed cargo holds and a full fuel load. 43 00:02:24,377 --> 00:02:27,347 The doors closed on time, and the plane left the gate 44 00:02:27,347 --> 00:02:29,582 just before 2:00 in the morning, for 45 00:02:29,582 --> 00:02:31,050 a routine eight-hour flight. 46 00:02:34,053 --> 00:02:36,823 LINDA BAHNA: Well, we were going to New Zealand on vacation, 47 00:02:36,823 --> 00:02:40,927 someplace that we had really thought was interesting, 48 00:02:40,927 --> 00:02:42,896 and somebody had told us how beautiful it was. 49 00:02:42,896 --> 00:02:47,567 So this was kind of a dream come true. 50 00:02:47,567 --> 00:02:50,503 BRUCE LAMPERT: I was seated in what's called the upper deck. 51 00:02:50,503 --> 00:02:52,839 I hadn't had a vacation in five years, 52 00:02:52,839 --> 00:02:55,875 and I took all my MileagePlus points from United Airlines, 53 00:02:55,875 --> 00:02:59,412 and I purchased a business-class ticket to Auckland, New 54 00:02:59,412 --> 00:03:01,180 Zealand, and Sydney, Australia. 55 00:03:01,180 --> 00:03:03,249 I was going to finally make that dream vacation 56 00:03:03,249 --> 00:03:04,284 I'd always wanted-- 57 00:03:04,284 --> 00:03:06,452 to get to Australia and lay on a beach 58 00:03:06,452 --> 00:03:08,655 somewhere, and forget about airplanes, 59 00:03:08,655 --> 00:03:11,558 forget about accidents, and get this 60 00:03:11,558 --> 00:03:12,759 out of my mind for a while. 61 00:03:22,368 --> 00:03:23,836 NARRATOR: On the flight deck captain, 62 00:03:23,836 --> 00:03:27,273 Dave Cronin was hugely experienced, just 63 00:03:27,273 --> 00:03:29,208 two months short of retirement. 64 00:03:29,208 --> 00:03:30,009 Rotate. 65 00:03:35,949 --> 00:03:39,552 DAVID CRONIN: I flew almost 35 years with United. 66 00:03:39,552 --> 00:03:41,854 I've got over 30,000 hours of flight time 67 00:03:41,854 --> 00:03:48,328 and just about everything military as well as civilian. 68 00:03:48,328 --> 00:03:52,465 My co-pilot, our first officer, was Al Slader. 69 00:03:52,465 --> 00:03:58,705 And I'd known Al at that time for probably 20 years. 70 00:03:58,705 --> 00:04:01,641 And the second officer, Mark Thomas-- 71 00:04:01,641 --> 00:04:04,177 was the first time I had flown with him, 72 00:04:04,177 --> 00:04:08,414 but we got along real well. 73 00:04:08,414 --> 00:04:10,617 Tell them we can handle 33 if it's available. 74 00:04:10,617 --> 00:04:11,584 OK. 75 00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:12,986 NARRATOR: The pilots wanted to climb 76 00:04:12,986 --> 00:04:16,723 to 33,000 feet above the Pacific Ocean to avoid turbulence. 77 00:04:16,723 --> 00:04:18,858 OK, it looks like 196 put us direct-- 78 00:04:18,858 --> 00:04:21,427 DAVID CRONIN: We did notice that there were thunderstorms 79 00:04:21,427 --> 00:04:25,064 100 miles south, right on course, which was rather 80 00:04:25,064 --> 00:04:27,400 unusual for that time of night. 81 00:04:27,400 --> 00:04:31,704 So I left the seatbelt sign on. 82 00:04:31,704 --> 00:04:33,306 NARRATOR: Captain Cronin's decision 83 00:04:33,306 --> 00:04:38,878 to keep people fastened in their seats would save many lives. 84 00:04:38,878 --> 00:04:40,413 LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were still climbing out, 85 00:04:40,413 --> 00:04:42,348 and the seatbelt sign was still on, 86 00:04:42,348 --> 00:04:46,653 and just basically, getting ready to serve beverages, 87 00:04:46,653 --> 00:04:48,287 and then to tuck everyone in for the evening, 88 00:04:48,287 --> 00:04:50,089 because it was going to be a long flight down 89 00:04:50,089 --> 00:04:51,958 to New Zealand. 90 00:04:51,958 --> 00:04:55,061 OK, tell them we're going to detour over to left. 91 00:04:55,061 --> 00:04:56,663 Center, United 811, heavy. 92 00:04:56,663 --> 00:04:57,764 We're going to be detouring. 93 00:04:57,764 --> 00:04:59,198 Some weather here. 94 00:04:59,198 --> 00:05:01,467 It'll be to the left of course. 95 00:05:01,467 --> 00:05:04,804 NARRATOR: 100 miles from Honolulu, as flight 811 96 00:05:04,804 --> 00:05:08,508 climbed through 23,000 feet, a huge malfunction 97 00:05:08,508 --> 00:05:11,110 was about to occur. 98 00:05:11,110 --> 00:05:14,614 There was now a big air pressure difference between the inside 99 00:05:14,614 --> 00:05:17,216 and the outside of the aircraft. 100 00:05:17,216 --> 00:05:20,787 Suddenly, passengers sitting just above and behind the cargo 101 00:05:20,787 --> 00:05:22,655 door heard a noise. 102 00:05:22,655 --> 00:05:24,957 LINDA BAHNA: Then, it was kind of a grinding noise. 103 00:05:30,630 --> 00:05:32,331 I heard, like, a thud. 104 00:05:36,169 --> 00:05:37,136 The hell? 105 00:05:37,136 --> 00:05:39,972 In the next nanosecond, it was pure, 106 00:05:39,972 --> 00:05:42,475 unadulterated pandemonium. 107 00:05:42,475 --> 00:05:44,911 [loud noise] 108 00:05:51,284 --> 00:05:52,719 We lost number three. 109 00:05:52,719 --> 00:05:53,886 Going down. 110 00:05:53,886 --> 00:05:55,488 It looks like we've lost number three engine, 111 00:05:55,488 --> 00:05:57,123 and we're descending rapidly. 112 00:05:57,123 --> 00:05:57,924 Coming back. 113 00:06:01,160 --> 00:06:05,131 The next thing I knew, I found myself on the stairwell, 114 00:06:05,131 --> 00:06:08,401 hanging on to the rungs, and I immediately knew it 115 00:06:08,401 --> 00:06:10,169 was an explosive decompression. 116 00:06:12,872 --> 00:06:14,707 NARRATOR: The cargo door had torn off 117 00:06:14,707 --> 00:06:17,777 and ripped a large section of the plane with it. 118 00:06:17,777 --> 00:06:20,279 The pressurized air inside had blasted 119 00:06:20,279 --> 00:06:23,049 out with explosive force. 120 00:06:23,049 --> 00:06:24,917 I immediately thought of Lockerbie. 121 00:06:24,917 --> 00:06:28,788 We actually thought it was a bomb that went off. 122 00:06:28,788 --> 00:06:30,890 BRUCE LAMPERT: It was hell on earth. 123 00:06:30,890 --> 00:06:32,658 Everything on the airplane that wasn't 124 00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:38,030 fastened down, tied down, or secured became airborne. 125 00:06:38,030 --> 00:06:39,899 The noise was incredible. 126 00:06:39,899 --> 00:06:42,702 [loud noise] 127 00:06:42,702 --> 00:06:44,470 BOB BAHNA: Everything in front of us was gone. 128 00:06:44,470 --> 00:06:48,007 Where we were sitting, we were about 6 inches from the hole, 129 00:06:48,007 --> 00:06:51,310 so there was nothing in front of us or to the side of us. 130 00:06:51,310 --> 00:06:53,346 The whole side of the plane was gone. 131 00:06:53,346 --> 00:06:55,414 Actually, our feet were dangling on the hole. 132 00:06:55,414 --> 00:06:58,718 And my first thought-- we weren't going to make it. 133 00:06:58,718 --> 00:07:02,989 You know, I just didn't think there was any hope. 134 00:07:02,989 --> 00:07:05,158 NARRATOR: With the pressurized air blown out, 135 00:07:05,158 --> 00:07:07,627 the lack of oxygen at 23,000 feet 136 00:07:07,627 --> 00:07:10,997 was now suffocating the passengers and the crew. 137 00:07:10,997 --> 00:07:13,432 It felt like someone had kicked me in the stomach 138 00:07:13,432 --> 00:07:15,434 and knocked the wind out of me. 139 00:07:15,434 --> 00:07:22,341 And I remember trying to catch my breath, and couldn't. 140 00:07:22,341 --> 00:07:24,544 You're supposed to wrap those oxygen masks 141 00:07:24,544 --> 00:07:27,980 and put them on, except the oxygen masks in that cabin-- 142 00:07:27,980 --> 00:07:29,816 they were ripped out of the ceiling, and they 143 00:07:29,816 --> 00:07:31,350 weren't-- they weren't there. 144 00:07:31,350 --> 00:07:34,187 And I remember thinking to myself, 145 00:07:34,187 --> 00:07:36,622 this is what it feels like to suffocate. 146 00:07:36,622 --> 00:07:37,690 United know, 811 heavy. 147 00:07:37,690 --> 00:07:40,159 We're doing an emergency descent. 148 00:07:40,159 --> 00:07:42,328 NARRATOR: The pilots could tell from their instruments 149 00:07:42,328 --> 00:07:44,597 that the number-three engine was failing, 150 00:07:44,597 --> 00:07:47,400 but they couldn't tell the full extent of the damage. 151 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,369 Their priority was to get the plane down to a level where 152 00:07:50,369 --> 00:07:52,104 they could breathe normally. 153 00:07:52,104 --> 00:07:53,139 Put your mask on, Dave. 154 00:07:56,609 --> 00:07:58,177 NARRATOR: But the pilots didn't know 155 00:07:58,177 --> 00:08:03,049 that the explosion had destroyed the entire oxygen supply. 156 00:08:03,049 --> 00:08:04,350 Can't get any oxygen. 157 00:08:04,350 --> 00:08:05,618 We're not getting any oxygen! 158 00:08:05,618 --> 00:08:06,419 Are you getting any? 159 00:08:06,419 --> 00:08:08,287 I can't get any either. 160 00:08:08,287 --> 00:08:10,456 NARRATOR: With the plane heading steeply down 161 00:08:10,456 --> 00:08:12,925 and no word from the cockpit, the cabin 162 00:08:12,925 --> 00:08:14,961 crew were thinking the worst. 163 00:08:14,961 --> 00:08:17,597 I remember thinking that the cockpit, which 164 00:08:17,597 --> 00:08:19,899 is up in the upper deck, had probably 165 00:08:19,899 --> 00:08:21,300 blown off the airplane, too. 166 00:08:21,300 --> 00:08:25,838 Because as far up as we could see, there was nothing there. 167 00:08:25,838 --> 00:08:28,975 Now, we're doing this nose dive. 168 00:08:28,975 --> 00:08:32,011 My next thought was, oh my god, we're just going straight down. 169 00:08:32,011 --> 00:08:35,114 We're going to crash into the sea. 170 00:08:35,114 --> 00:08:36,782 NARRATOR: With the airplane ruptured, 171 00:08:36,782 --> 00:08:40,019 severe damage to the right wing and engines, and its crew 172 00:08:40,019 --> 00:08:42,989 forcing it down to an emergency descent, 173 00:08:42,989 --> 00:08:45,791 the problems on flight 811 had only just begun. 174 00:08:52,732 --> 00:08:56,136 Two minutes after suffering a devastating explosion, 175 00:08:56,136 --> 00:09:00,273 flight 811 was still in a steep emergency descent, 176 00:09:00,273 --> 00:09:04,544 passing rapidly through 15,000 feet to reach breathable air. 177 00:09:04,544 --> 00:09:07,347 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811 heavy, say your altitude now. 178 00:09:07,347 --> 00:09:08,482 Believe me, 15. 179 00:09:08,482 --> 00:09:11,818 United 811, heavy, we're out of 15.5. 180 00:09:11,818 --> 00:09:14,087 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, roger. 181 00:09:14,087 --> 00:09:15,822 I think we blew a door or something. 182 00:09:15,822 --> 00:09:18,492 Tell the flight attendant to get prepared for an evacuation. 183 00:09:18,492 --> 00:09:20,193 NARRATOR: The crew finally began to level 184 00:09:20,193 --> 00:09:22,796 out at a safer altitude. 185 00:09:22,796 --> 00:09:27,267 But they now faced a barrage of problems. 186 00:09:27,267 --> 00:09:29,469 The most immediate was the disintegration 187 00:09:29,469 --> 00:09:32,305 of the number-three engine nearest to the explosion. 188 00:09:34,975 --> 00:09:37,477 We don't have any fire indications? 189 00:09:37,477 --> 00:09:41,081 I-- I don't have anything. 190 00:09:41,081 --> 00:09:43,316 OK, we lost number three. 191 00:09:43,316 --> 00:09:44,317 Let's shut it down. 192 00:09:44,317 --> 00:09:45,352 There's no N-1. 193 00:09:45,352 --> 00:09:46,786 Yeah, OK. 194 00:09:46,786 --> 00:09:49,289 Ready for number-three shutdown checklist. 195 00:09:49,289 --> 00:09:53,160 [indistinct radio chatter] 196 00:09:53,160 --> 00:09:57,164 Before you shut down number three, the generator went off. 197 00:09:57,164 --> 00:09:58,598 Looks all right to try it now. 198 00:10:07,507 --> 00:10:09,442 Well, that stopped the vibration anyway. 199 00:10:09,442 --> 00:10:10,710 Feel jettison procedure. 200 00:10:10,710 --> 00:10:12,913 Main boost pumps. 201 00:10:12,913 --> 00:10:14,581 Center, United 811. 202 00:10:14,581 --> 00:10:16,149 We need the equipment standing by. 203 00:10:16,149 --> 00:10:17,317 Company notified, please. 204 00:10:17,317 --> 00:10:19,419 We got a control problem. 205 00:10:19,419 --> 00:10:22,322 Center-wing, left-right valves, on. 206 00:10:22,322 --> 00:10:23,657 Start dumping the fuel. 207 00:10:23,657 --> 00:10:24,858 I am dumping. 208 00:10:24,858 --> 00:10:27,093 [loud noise] 209 00:10:27,093 --> 00:10:30,830 One stewardess was seriously injured by falling debris. 210 00:10:30,830 --> 00:10:33,833 As Laura Brentlinger helped her, the full gravity 211 00:10:33,833 --> 00:10:36,770 of this situation suddenly became clear. 212 00:10:36,770 --> 00:10:39,206 As I'm holding her in my arms, I looked up, 213 00:10:39,206 --> 00:10:41,141 and as I looked up, that was the first time 214 00:10:41,141 --> 00:10:43,910 I saw this tremendous hole on the side 215 00:10:43,910 --> 00:10:48,415 of the aircraft that was just a void, and seats were missing. 216 00:10:48,415 --> 00:10:51,117 And I immediately knew that we had lost passengers. 217 00:10:54,087 --> 00:10:55,855 NARRATOR: Five rows of seats had been 218 00:10:55,855 --> 00:11:00,126 blown out in the decompression, killing nine passengers. 219 00:11:00,126 --> 00:11:03,296 On the flight deck, the crew had turned the stricken plane back 220 00:11:03,296 --> 00:11:06,666 to Honolulu, but with 80 miles still to go, 221 00:11:06,666 --> 00:11:09,236 the crisis now got far worse. 222 00:11:09,236 --> 00:11:11,738 We got a hell of a control problem here. 223 00:11:11,738 --> 00:11:13,340 I got almost full rudder on this thing. 224 00:11:13,340 --> 00:11:14,641 Are you dumping as fast as you can? 225 00:11:14,641 --> 00:11:16,109 I'm dumping everything. 226 00:11:16,109 --> 00:11:18,445 We got a problem with number-four engine? 227 00:11:18,445 --> 00:11:19,579 Yeah. 228 00:11:19,579 --> 00:11:21,581 NARRATOR: Debris from the explosion that also 229 00:11:21,581 --> 00:11:23,850 damaged the number-four engine. 230 00:11:23,850 --> 00:11:27,654 If it failed completely, the implications would be severe. 231 00:11:27,654 --> 00:11:31,591 If you are on two engines and you weigh 700,000 pounds, 232 00:11:31,591 --> 00:11:33,927 that is a big deal. 233 00:11:33,927 --> 00:11:36,563 Simply because with that kind of weight, 234 00:11:36,563 --> 00:11:40,033 two engines are not going to keep you in the air. 235 00:11:40,033 --> 00:11:40,900 You're going to come down. 236 00:11:45,572 --> 00:11:48,341 NARRATOR: Although their number-four engine was failing, 237 00:11:48,341 --> 00:11:50,610 the pilots pushed it along with the remaining 238 00:11:50,610 --> 00:11:52,445 engines to full power-- 239 00:11:52,445 --> 00:11:55,515 a setting they should not run up for more than four minutes. 240 00:11:55,515 --> 00:11:58,952 But the nearest land was 15 minutes away. 241 00:11:58,952 --> 00:12:01,488 I look out the window on the right-hand side, 242 00:12:01,488 --> 00:12:05,058 and I see flames, big flames. 243 00:12:05,058 --> 00:12:07,327 And I know what flames in engine means. 244 00:12:07,327 --> 00:12:08,628 It's not good. 245 00:12:08,628 --> 00:12:10,130 NARRATOR: The pilots were unaware 246 00:12:10,130 --> 00:12:12,999 that the number-four engine was now on fire. 247 00:12:12,999 --> 00:12:14,367 You've got 250 knots now. 248 00:12:14,367 --> 00:12:15,168 That's good. 249 00:12:15,168 --> 00:12:16,469 7,000-- 250 00:12:16,469 --> 00:12:18,405 Yeah, we're getting more rumble. 251 00:12:18,405 --> 00:12:19,272 Watch your heading. 252 00:12:19,272 --> 00:12:20,106 Watch your heading. 253 00:12:20,106 --> 00:12:21,241 You want to go direct Honolulu. 254 00:12:21,241 --> 00:12:22,642 OK. 255 00:12:22,642 --> 00:12:24,544 I'm going to go downstairs and see what the hell is going on. 256 00:12:24,544 --> 00:12:25,745 Yeah. 257 00:12:25,745 --> 00:12:28,381 Go ahead and run down and see what's happening. 258 00:12:28,381 --> 00:12:30,417 LAURA BRENTLINGER: I saw the flight engineer 259 00:12:30,417 --> 00:12:33,586 descend down the stairwell. 260 00:12:33,586 --> 00:12:38,258 And when I saw him, my relief was, oh my god, they're alive. 261 00:12:38,258 --> 00:12:41,261 And there was a huge sense of relief for me. 262 00:12:41,261 --> 00:12:44,497 He saw the hole, turned as white as a sheet, 263 00:12:44,497 --> 00:12:47,367 and I screamed to him, dear god, please get us down. 264 00:12:49,869 --> 00:12:51,404 We've got a fire out there. 265 00:12:51,404 --> 00:12:54,407 Oh, yeah, we got a fire in number four. 266 00:12:54,407 --> 00:12:55,709 Go through the procedure. 267 00:12:55,709 --> 00:12:57,043 Shut down the engine. 268 00:12:57,043 --> 00:12:58,611 We're not going to be able to hold this altitude on two. 269 00:13:05,985 --> 00:13:08,254 We got a fire on the right side. 270 00:13:08,254 --> 00:13:09,589 We're on two engines now. 271 00:13:09,589 --> 00:13:12,025 The whole right side-- it's just gone from about the one 272 00:13:12,025 --> 00:13:13,993 right back to-- it's just open. 273 00:13:13,993 --> 00:13:15,595 You're just looking outside. 274 00:13:15,595 --> 00:13:16,396 What do you mean? 275 00:13:16,396 --> 00:13:17,330 It looks like a bomb. 276 00:13:17,330 --> 00:13:18,131 Fuselage? 277 00:13:18,131 --> 00:13:18,998 Yeah, the fuselage. 278 00:13:18,998 --> 00:13:20,066 It's just-- it's just open. 279 00:13:24,404 --> 00:13:26,306 OK, it looks like we got a bomb that 280 00:13:26,306 --> 00:13:28,575 went off on the right side. 281 00:13:28,575 --> 00:13:29,943 The whole right side is gone. 282 00:13:29,943 --> 00:13:33,079 Yeah, from-- from about the one right back to-- 283 00:13:33,079 --> 00:13:35,915 Anybody--? 284 00:13:35,915 --> 00:13:37,050 Some people are probably gone. 285 00:13:37,050 --> 00:13:37,851 I don't know. 286 00:13:41,921 --> 00:13:43,823 I knew that we had lost people. 287 00:13:43,823 --> 00:13:46,593 I didn't know how many. 288 00:13:46,593 --> 00:13:50,697 In fact, I didn't know until the next day how many were lost. 289 00:13:50,697 --> 00:13:55,568 But you know, it's a terrible thing 290 00:13:55,568 --> 00:13:57,003 when you're a captain of an airplane 291 00:13:57,003 --> 00:13:58,772 and you lose passengers. 292 00:14:05,211 --> 00:14:07,514 NARRATOR: Lee Campbell, flying home to New Zealand, 293 00:14:07,514 --> 00:14:10,450 was sitting in row 10 just in front of the cargo door. 294 00:14:14,187 --> 00:14:19,526 I woke up with such a start, because I'd seen Lee standing 295 00:14:19,526 --> 00:14:23,797 by the bed, just with a gray jacket over his arm 296 00:14:23,797 --> 00:14:26,266 and a small smile on his face. 297 00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:30,103 Of course, as I woke up, it faded slowly, uh-- 298 00:14:30,103 --> 00:14:33,072 And then, we woke up in the morning, and we discussed this. 299 00:14:33,072 --> 00:14:35,375 I said, oh, it was strange in the night, 300 00:14:35,375 --> 00:14:38,845 but it's such a vivid dream. 301 00:14:38,845 --> 00:14:42,015 Lee was standing there. 302 00:14:42,015 --> 00:14:47,287 And then, the radio came on, and the first item of news 303 00:14:47,287 --> 00:14:51,691 is that there'd been problem with a United aircraft. 304 00:14:51,691 --> 00:14:54,027 And I said, that was Lee. 305 00:14:54,027 --> 00:14:57,263 It's Lee, and my blood just ran cold. 306 00:14:57,263 --> 00:14:59,599 I knew he was dead, from that moment. 307 00:15:05,805 --> 00:15:07,507 Center, do you read? 308 00:15:07,507 --> 00:15:09,576 We evidently had a bomb or something. 309 00:15:09,576 --> 00:15:11,244 A big section of the right sidebar of the airplane 310 00:15:11,244 --> 00:15:13,046 is missing. 311 00:15:13,046 --> 00:15:14,581 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): Unite 811, heavy, roger. 312 00:15:14,581 --> 00:15:18,051 I wouldn't go any faster than I had to, because that hole-- 313 00:15:18,051 --> 00:15:19,986 I mean, I wouldn't get it over 250 knots, 314 00:15:19,986 --> 00:15:20,954 because that's a big-- 315 00:15:20,954 --> 00:15:22,989 OK, what's-- what's our stall speed? 316 00:15:22,989 --> 00:15:24,757 I wouldn't go below 240. 317 00:15:24,757 --> 00:15:26,426 Yeah. 318 00:15:26,426 --> 00:15:28,161 I don't know if we're going to make this. 319 00:15:28,161 --> 00:15:30,830 We didn't know that we were going to make it back, 320 00:15:30,830 --> 00:15:33,967 so we were actually preparing to ditch that airplane 321 00:15:33,967 --> 00:15:37,337 at night in the Pacific Ocean, which 322 00:15:37,337 --> 00:15:39,939 has never been done before. 323 00:15:39,939 --> 00:15:43,176 NARRATOR: In the cabin, the crew prepared for the worst. 324 00:15:43,176 --> 00:15:44,544 LAURA BRENTLINGER: My training kicked in, 325 00:15:44,544 --> 00:15:48,648 and I got up from my jump seat and started 326 00:15:48,648 --> 00:15:51,284 instructing the crew. 327 00:15:51,284 --> 00:15:52,752 We have to prepare the cabin. 328 00:15:52,752 --> 00:15:55,288 We have to prepare for a ditching, 329 00:15:55,288 --> 00:15:57,590 which I thought was inevitable. 330 00:16:01,160 --> 00:16:02,896 You're running around getting life vests on, 331 00:16:02,896 --> 00:16:05,498 and I do remember thinking, I'm not 332 00:16:05,498 --> 00:16:07,300 sure this is going to matter. 333 00:16:07,300 --> 00:16:11,104 Because when we hit the water, you know, 334 00:16:11,104 --> 00:16:12,772 I just imagine planes getting split apart. 335 00:16:16,476 --> 00:16:18,211 I knew that if we hit the water, 336 00:16:18,211 --> 00:16:19,913 it'd be tantamount to hitting the ground, 337 00:16:19,913 --> 00:16:22,282 and there would be very few, if any, survivors. 338 00:16:22,282 --> 00:16:24,350 So my mind went to-- 339 00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:32,659 the thing that meant something to me, and at that point 340 00:16:32,659 --> 00:16:33,760 in my life, it was my son. 341 00:16:36,296 --> 00:16:38,398 NARRATOR: Believing they were going to die, 342 00:16:38,398 --> 00:16:41,000 one of the passengers took these photographs. 343 00:16:45,405 --> 00:16:48,875 For 15 minutes, the plane steadily lost altitude. 344 00:16:48,875 --> 00:16:53,746 Then, at 4,000 feet, there was a glimmer of hope. 345 00:16:53,746 --> 00:16:58,251 After an imponderable time, I remember one of the passengers 346 00:16:58,251 --> 00:17:02,322 began to point out one of the windows on the right side. 347 00:17:02,322 --> 00:17:05,692 And everybody looked, and we looked to this little window 348 00:17:05,692 --> 00:17:10,163 from wherever we were, and we could see a point of light, 349 00:17:10,163 --> 00:17:12,432 and another point of light, and another point. 350 00:17:12,432 --> 00:17:15,001 Pretty soon, you could make out of coastline. 351 00:17:15,001 --> 00:17:17,136 OK, I've got lights over here. 352 00:17:17,136 --> 00:17:18,738 OK. 353 00:17:18,738 --> 00:17:19,606 OK. 354 00:17:19,606 --> 00:17:20,940 We're at 4. 355 00:17:20,940 --> 00:17:23,042 We're 21 miles out. 356 00:17:23,042 --> 00:17:23,843 We're in good shape. 357 00:17:26,479 --> 00:17:29,816 NARRATOR: At Honolulu Airport, an emergency was declared. 358 00:17:29,816 --> 00:17:31,851 All other aircraft were diverted, 359 00:17:31,851 --> 00:17:34,621 and the rescue services prepared for the crash landing 360 00:17:34,621 --> 00:17:35,855 of a fully loaded airliner. 361 00:17:41,861 --> 00:17:43,162 Hey, you want to give me some speeds? 362 00:17:43,162 --> 00:17:45,164 Yeah. 363 00:17:45,164 --> 00:17:49,636 150 is going to be your two engine. 364 00:17:49,636 --> 00:17:50,937 Use a 160. 365 00:17:50,937 --> 00:17:51,738 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, I need souls on board, 366 00:17:51,738 --> 00:17:52,739 if you have it. 367 00:17:52,739 --> 00:17:54,340 OK, souls on board. 368 00:17:54,340 --> 00:17:56,042 160 is the minimum. 369 00:17:56,042 --> 00:17:57,910 Stand by, United 811, heavy. 370 00:17:57,910 --> 00:17:59,746 I don't know how many is on board. 371 00:17:59,746 --> 00:18:04,217 200 and-- I don't have the paperwork in front of me here. 372 00:18:04,217 --> 00:18:06,586 Uh, we're too busy right now. 373 00:18:06,586 --> 00:18:08,254 200 and something. 374 00:18:08,254 --> 00:18:09,689 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): OK. 375 00:18:09,689 --> 00:18:11,991 NARRATOR: Six minutes from the airport, the crew 376 00:18:11,991 --> 00:18:15,228 now had to slow the overweight plane for landing. 377 00:18:15,228 --> 00:18:16,863 But the effect of this was unknown. 378 00:18:20,700 --> 00:18:22,735 What's going to happen when I start coming out 379 00:18:22,735 --> 00:18:26,873 with flaps and landing gear? 380 00:18:26,873 --> 00:18:30,276 We're either going to land on the airport in the water 381 00:18:30,276 --> 00:18:33,846 or downtown Honolulu. 382 00:18:33,846 --> 00:18:35,882 OK, inboards are coming to ten. 383 00:18:35,882 --> 00:18:38,985 How do the controls feel? 384 00:18:38,985 --> 00:18:39,852 All right, so far. 385 00:18:42,655 --> 00:18:44,157 NARRATOR: But the flaps were damaged 386 00:18:44,157 --> 00:18:46,159 and could not fully extend. 387 00:18:46,159 --> 00:18:49,729 This meant that flight 811 would have to land dangerously fast. 388 00:18:53,800 --> 00:18:55,068 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, heavy. 389 00:18:55,068 --> 00:18:56,869 Do you have the airport in sight? 390 00:18:56,869 --> 00:18:58,504 It's over here to the right, Captain. 391 00:18:58,504 --> 00:18:59,739 OK. 392 00:18:59,739 --> 00:19:01,074 OK, we have the airport. 393 00:19:01,074 --> 00:19:03,710 United 811, heavy. 394 00:19:03,710 --> 00:19:06,946 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): 811 is clear to land, eight left. 395 00:19:06,946 --> 00:19:08,081 Equipment standing by. 396 00:19:08,081 --> 00:19:12,118 Wind at 05012. 397 00:19:12,118 --> 00:19:13,686 Clear to land. 398 00:19:13,686 --> 00:19:17,457 Eight left, United 811, heavy. 399 00:19:17,457 --> 00:19:20,960 NARRATOR: As the unstable 747 lined up for landing, 400 00:19:20,960 --> 00:19:24,030 the pilots knew they would only have one attempt. 401 00:19:24,030 --> 00:19:26,099 But even if they got it on the runway, 402 00:19:26,099 --> 00:19:28,167 the nagging question remained. 403 00:19:28,167 --> 00:19:31,671 Would the stress of impact cause the damaged and overweight 404 00:19:31,671 --> 00:19:33,539 aircraft to disintegrate? 405 00:19:38,611 --> 00:19:41,447 Severely damaged, with an unstable airframe, 406 00:19:41,447 --> 00:19:44,617 losing altitude, and on only two engines, 407 00:19:44,617 --> 00:19:48,421 flight 811 began its final approach to Honolulu airport. 408 00:19:52,258 --> 00:19:54,026 Two-engine approach. 409 00:19:54,026 --> 00:19:55,027 Two-engine approach. 410 00:19:57,530 --> 00:19:59,766 We still had no idea how far off the ground we were, 411 00:19:59,766 --> 00:20:01,534 if we were going to make it to Honolulu or not. 412 00:20:01,534 --> 00:20:03,936 But that seemed like an appropriate time, 413 00:20:03,936 --> 00:20:05,872 if we're somewhere around land, that we're probably going 414 00:20:05,872 --> 00:20:09,575 to try and land somewhere to get the passengers 415 00:20:09,575 --> 00:20:10,877 in their brace positions. 416 00:20:10,877 --> 00:20:12,779 So that's when we started yelling for them 417 00:20:12,779 --> 00:20:14,514 to get down to brace positions. 418 00:20:14,514 --> 00:20:20,953 Every molecule in my body combined to express, 419 00:20:20,953 --> 00:20:25,224 get this damn airplane on the ground. 420 00:20:25,224 --> 00:20:27,360 How are we doing on the hydraulics? 421 00:20:27,360 --> 00:20:30,229 Hydraulics are good. 422 00:20:30,229 --> 00:20:32,598 We got brakes? 423 00:20:32,598 --> 00:20:34,667 Normal hydraulics. 424 00:20:34,667 --> 00:20:36,068 So we got brakes. 425 00:20:36,068 --> 00:20:41,340 But, uh-- you're only going to have reversing on one and one. 426 00:20:41,340 --> 00:20:43,709 Though I thought maybe there was a chance that we were going 427 00:20:43,709 --> 00:20:46,145 to actually be able to attempt to land, 428 00:20:46,145 --> 00:20:47,680 the thought came to my mind. 429 00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:49,015 What happens now? 430 00:20:49,015 --> 00:20:52,485 Do we-- on impact, do we explode? 431 00:20:52,485 --> 00:20:56,355 Do we fall out this huge hole? 432 00:20:56,355 --> 00:20:58,825 NARRATOR: Despite dumping fuel, the aircraft was 433 00:20:58,825 --> 00:21:00,359 still critically overweight. 434 00:21:00,359 --> 00:21:01,661 192. 435 00:21:01,661 --> 00:21:03,663 NARRATOR: But without full flaps to keep it in the air, 436 00:21:03,663 --> 00:21:05,298 it had to approach fast. 437 00:21:05,298 --> 00:21:06,699 1,000 down. 438 00:21:06,699 --> 00:21:09,202 NARRATOR: The danger was that the undercarriage would shear 439 00:21:09,202 --> 00:21:11,671 off and the plane break up. 440 00:21:11,671 --> 00:21:12,905 A dot and a half high. 441 00:21:17,009 --> 00:21:22,815 190. 442 00:21:22,815 --> 00:21:27,753 185. 443 00:21:27,753 --> 00:21:28,554 A little slow. 444 00:21:28,554 --> 00:21:30,256 A little slow, Dave. 445 00:21:30,256 --> 00:21:31,157 It's below what we want. 446 00:21:38,364 --> 00:21:39,498 Coming up on the glide slope. 447 00:21:42,134 --> 00:21:43,936 OK. 448 00:21:43,936 --> 00:21:44,937 Let's try the gear. 449 00:21:47,673 --> 00:21:49,642 NARRATOR: No one knew if the explosion 450 00:21:49,642 --> 00:21:51,310 damaged the landing gear. 451 00:21:51,310 --> 00:21:53,279 I remember Laura saying to me that she didn't 452 00:21:53,279 --> 00:21:54,981 hear the landing gear go down. 453 00:21:54,981 --> 00:21:55,815 And it was loud. 454 00:21:55,815 --> 00:21:57,116 You know, it was still loud. 455 00:21:57,116 --> 00:21:59,318 And I didn't hear the landing gear go down. 456 00:21:59,318 --> 00:22:00,720 So that's another thought-- 457 00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:02,321 maybe they can't get the landing gear down. 458 00:22:02,321 --> 00:22:06,025 Maybe it's not down. 459 00:22:06,025 --> 00:22:08,527 You got the gear down. 460 00:22:08,527 --> 00:22:10,263 We're clear to land, and everything's taken 461 00:22:10,263 --> 00:22:11,564 care of, as far as we know. 462 00:22:22,275 --> 00:22:27,480 195. 463 00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:28,281 Half a dot high. 464 00:22:31,984 --> 00:22:33,252 Looking-- looking good. 465 00:22:35,955 --> 00:22:41,027 192. 466 00:22:41,027 --> 00:22:42,061 195. 467 00:22:42,061 --> 00:22:42,929 Coming off in the power. 468 00:22:46,332 --> 00:22:47,133 100 feet. 469 00:22:53,372 --> 00:22:54,173 50 feet. 470 00:22:59,745 --> 00:23:00,613 Center thhe trim. 471 00:23:00,613 --> 00:23:01,414 Center the trim. 472 00:23:05,117 --> 00:23:07,720 30. 473 00:23:07,720 --> 00:23:08,521 10. 474 00:23:12,959 --> 00:23:15,094 Zero. 475 00:23:15,094 --> 00:23:15,895 We're on. 476 00:23:20,866 --> 00:23:23,469 Gear's holding. 477 00:23:23,469 --> 00:23:24,503 LEONARD JENKINS: We landed. 478 00:23:24,503 --> 00:23:25,771 It felt fast. 479 00:23:25,771 --> 00:23:27,773 And that was my next concern-- is that we weren't going 480 00:23:27,773 --> 00:23:29,208 to stop at the end of the runway, 481 00:23:29,208 --> 00:23:30,509 that we were just going to keep going. 482 00:23:41,854 --> 00:23:45,358 And all of a sudden, we were slowing down, slowing down. 483 00:23:45,358 --> 00:23:48,160 And I said, oh my god, we've landed. 484 00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,162 We're on the ground. 485 00:23:50,162 --> 00:23:52,932 And the people started applauding. 486 00:24:02,942 --> 00:24:06,245 DAVID CRONIN: Probably the best landing I've ever made. 487 00:24:06,245 --> 00:24:09,315 When we finally stopped on the runway, 488 00:24:09,315 --> 00:24:13,486 we deployed all 10 chutes, and the flight attendants 489 00:24:13,486 --> 00:24:17,223 evacuated all the passengers. 490 00:24:17,223 --> 00:24:19,291 LEONARD JENKINS: It's amazing how fast everyone went. 491 00:24:19,291 --> 00:24:23,729 My understanding is, like, less than 45 seconds, 330 people 492 00:24:23,729 --> 00:24:26,365 were off the airplane. 493 00:24:26,365 --> 00:24:28,267 BRUCE LAMPERT: We were probably 20 feet off the ground, 494 00:24:28,267 --> 00:24:30,403 and I would have stepped out of the airplane without a slide. 495 00:24:30,403 --> 00:24:32,338 I wanted to get off so bad. 496 00:24:32,338 --> 00:24:33,839 Fortunately, there was a slide. 497 00:24:33,839 --> 00:24:36,709 I stepped into the abyss, fell into the slide, 498 00:24:36,709 --> 00:24:38,844 flew down to the bottom of the thing, 499 00:24:38,844 --> 00:24:43,582 and then you hit, feet running. 500 00:24:43,582 --> 00:24:45,918 LAURA BRENTLINGER: The slide kind of kicked me up and flew 501 00:24:45,918 --> 00:24:49,088 me up into the air, and my thought was, oh my god, 502 00:24:49,088 --> 00:24:50,556 I'm going to survive this whole thing, 503 00:24:50,556 --> 00:24:53,392 and I'm going to get wiped out here on the evacuation. 504 00:24:53,392 --> 00:24:55,661 Because it just really threw me. 505 00:24:55,661 --> 00:24:57,897 And I landed and scraped up my legs 506 00:24:57,897 --> 00:25:00,833 pretty badly, and landed on my feet. 507 00:25:00,833 --> 00:25:04,403 And it wasn't until that moment that I had the sense of, 508 00:25:04,403 --> 00:25:06,539 I'm here, I'm OK, I'm on the ground. 509 00:25:10,076 --> 00:25:13,779 DAVID CRONIN: When we got all our switches off, 510 00:25:13,779 --> 00:25:15,681 I ran through the airplane, made sure there 511 00:25:15,681 --> 00:25:18,317 wasn't no one else on the airplane, came up to the door-- 512 00:25:18,317 --> 00:25:19,185 one left-- 513 00:25:19,185 --> 00:25:20,953 and went down the slide. 514 00:25:20,953 --> 00:25:22,421 And I came around the front, and I 515 00:25:22,421 --> 00:25:24,390 saw that humongous hole in the side, 516 00:25:24,390 --> 00:25:25,691 and I just couldn't believe it. 517 00:25:33,065 --> 00:25:34,533 By the grace of god, we made it. 518 00:25:34,533 --> 00:25:36,936 And it was an awesome experience. 519 00:25:36,936 --> 00:25:40,206 I would never want to go through that again. 520 00:25:40,206 --> 00:25:41,474 LINDA BAHNA: It was crazy. 521 00:25:41,474 --> 00:25:42,475 It was wild. 522 00:25:42,475 --> 00:25:51,851 It was scary, all at the same time, 523 00:25:51,851 --> 00:25:54,353 I just thought that that was the end, that we were going to die. 524 00:25:54,353 --> 00:25:57,123 I mean, that was my first thought-- 525 00:25:57,123 --> 00:25:58,524 that this is the end. 526 00:26:03,562 --> 00:26:05,397 NARRATOR: But for the families of the nine people 527 00:26:05,397 --> 00:26:08,934 who were killed, the ordeal was just beginning. 528 00:26:08,934 --> 00:26:13,639 Kevin and Susan Campbell's son, Lee, had been flying home. 529 00:26:13,639 --> 00:26:16,142 KEVIN CAMPBELL: About 3:00 in the afternoon, 530 00:26:16,142 --> 00:26:20,546 I think they said that there was no New Zealanders involved. 531 00:26:20,546 --> 00:26:24,450 But we just knew that it was Lee. 532 00:26:24,450 --> 00:26:27,353 And then, about, I suppose, 1/4 of an hour later, 533 00:26:27,353 --> 00:26:30,156 we got a phone call from Chicago. 534 00:26:30,156 --> 00:26:32,291 And they just said that they regret 535 00:26:32,291 --> 00:26:36,362 to inform us that our son was missing, presumed dead. 536 00:26:36,362 --> 00:26:39,899 And I guess about another hour after that, 537 00:26:39,899 --> 00:26:41,834 a policeman arrived at the door. 538 00:26:41,834 --> 00:26:43,669 And he took one look at us, and he says, 539 00:26:43,669 --> 00:26:46,605 I can see that you've had the news. 540 00:26:46,605 --> 00:26:48,674 So it was just-- 541 00:26:48,674 --> 00:26:52,711 just an awful, awful day. 542 00:26:52,711 --> 00:26:56,949 And it certainly didn't get much better for a long, long time. 543 00:27:03,622 --> 00:27:06,158 NARRATOR: Although Lee's body had not been recovered, 544 00:27:06,158 --> 00:27:08,794 the Campbells flew straight to the wrecked aircraft 545 00:27:08,794 --> 00:27:10,262 in Honolulu. 546 00:27:10,262 --> 00:27:13,132 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Your initial feeling is that you want to be 547 00:27:13,132 --> 00:27:19,538 as close to the spot where your relative died, 548 00:27:19,538 --> 00:27:20,940 and that was the aircraft. 549 00:27:20,940 --> 00:27:27,146 So we had to immediately go and see the aircraft. 550 00:27:27,146 --> 00:27:29,248 SUSAN CAMPBELL: The damage inside was horrific. 551 00:27:29,248 --> 00:27:31,550 Just a total mess. 552 00:27:31,550 --> 00:27:33,819 And the hole in the side of the aircraft 553 00:27:33,819 --> 00:27:36,922 was much bigger than I had thought it would be, 554 00:27:36,922 --> 00:27:41,827 even though we had seen television newsreel reports. 555 00:27:41,827 --> 00:27:43,963 And it was so sad to get in and actually 556 00:27:43,963 --> 00:27:46,632 see where Lee's seat had been. 557 00:27:46,632 --> 00:27:49,034 The legs of the seat were still there. 558 00:27:49,034 --> 00:27:52,871 There was a good bit of fuselage beside him, and still a window. 559 00:27:56,242 --> 00:27:57,443 NARRATOR: But the Campbells' desire 560 00:27:57,443 --> 00:28:00,246 to find the cause of Lee's death inevitably 561 00:28:00,246 --> 00:28:03,983 brought them face-to-face with dreadful details. 562 00:28:03,983 --> 00:28:07,853 They took us to the medical examiner's office as well. 563 00:28:07,853 --> 00:28:12,157 Because they had found body parts and that sort of thing. 564 00:28:12,157 --> 00:28:16,528 So they didn't actually show us the body parts, 565 00:28:16,528 --> 00:28:18,097 but they showed us bits and pieces that they 566 00:28:18,097 --> 00:28:20,032 had recovered from the engines. 567 00:28:20,032 --> 00:28:23,902 And we got the medical examiner's report 568 00:28:23,902 --> 00:28:26,472 on what they had recovered. 569 00:28:26,472 --> 00:28:29,608 So you know, we really would have preferred that it was Lee 570 00:28:29,608 --> 00:28:31,143 that went through the engine, because it would 571 00:28:31,143 --> 00:28:33,212 have been an immediate death. 572 00:28:33,212 --> 00:28:35,848 Because it was a four-minute fall down to the ocean, 573 00:28:35,848 --> 00:28:37,883 and we know that the people could have been 574 00:28:37,883 --> 00:28:39,952 alive as they were falling. 575 00:28:39,952 --> 00:28:43,822 And when you think about that, that's just horrific. 576 00:28:43,822 --> 00:28:46,425 NARRATOR: As it became clear that their son's body would 577 00:28:46,425 --> 00:28:48,694 never be found, the Campbells' need 578 00:28:48,694 --> 00:28:51,263 to find the cause of the accident that killed him 579 00:28:51,263 --> 00:28:54,400 grew stronger. 580 00:28:54,400 --> 00:28:56,335 Lee kind of died for nothing. 581 00:28:56,335 --> 00:28:59,071 You know, you've got to find out why he died, 582 00:28:59,071 --> 00:29:02,441 and you've just got to make sure that it never happens again. 583 00:29:09,482 --> 00:29:12,151 NARRATOR: Susan and Kevin Campbell traveled to America 584 00:29:12,151 --> 00:29:14,320 to begin researching possible causes 585 00:29:14,320 --> 00:29:17,123 of the disaster on flight 811. 586 00:29:17,123 --> 00:29:19,592 With the cargo door at the bottom of the ocean, 587 00:29:19,592 --> 00:29:23,829 no one had any hard evidence. 588 00:29:23,829 --> 00:29:26,565 MAN: The engines number 3 and 4-- 589 00:29:26,565 --> 00:29:29,468 NARRATOR: Two months after the accident on flight 811, 590 00:29:29,468 --> 00:29:32,071 the NTSB held preliminary hearings, 591 00:29:32,071 --> 00:29:33,973 and the Campbells were there. 592 00:29:33,973 --> 00:29:36,041 But they soon grew frustrated. 593 00:29:36,041 --> 00:29:39,545 The NTSB would not complete its report for months. 594 00:29:39,545 --> 00:29:42,381 The Campbells wanted answers now. 595 00:29:42,381 --> 00:29:44,150 --the probable cause of this accident 596 00:29:44,150 --> 00:29:45,351 was the sudden opening-- 597 00:29:45,351 --> 00:29:47,953 We certainly weren't going to leave it to the NTSB 598 00:29:47,953 --> 00:29:48,988 to come up with the findings. 599 00:29:48,988 --> 00:29:51,123 We were going to follow through. 600 00:29:51,123 --> 00:29:52,491 And when the hearings ended, they 601 00:29:52,491 --> 00:29:54,059 had said that we could take whatever 602 00:29:54,059 --> 00:29:55,728 we wanted off the press table. 603 00:29:55,728 --> 00:29:59,098 And Susan walked up to the top table and yelled out, 604 00:29:59,098 --> 00:30:01,801 there's a really good set up here. 605 00:30:01,801 --> 00:30:06,505 So I grabbed a box and loaded in all of the documents 606 00:30:06,505 --> 00:30:08,240 that we could find up there. 607 00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:10,743 Kevin's the most honest of people I know. 608 00:30:10,743 --> 00:30:12,778 But here he was, taking something 609 00:30:12,778 --> 00:30:16,749 that we hadn't specifically been told we could take. 610 00:30:16,749 --> 00:30:18,284 KEVIN CAMPBELL: And we're heading out the door 611 00:30:18,284 --> 00:30:21,220 just as the NTSB were arriving back in with the trolley 612 00:30:21,220 --> 00:30:23,222 to pick up all their documents. 613 00:30:23,222 --> 00:30:25,558 So we were out the door and into a taxi and gone. 614 00:30:31,063 --> 00:30:33,933 SUSAN CAMPBELL: So we quickly realized we'd got a really good 615 00:30:33,933 --> 00:30:36,302 set of papers, with a lot of things that hadn't 616 00:30:36,302 --> 00:30:38,671 been released to the public. 617 00:30:38,671 --> 00:30:40,940 We were able to really start our investigation 618 00:30:40,940 --> 00:30:42,341 in earnest at that stage. 619 00:30:49,782 --> 00:30:51,784 NARRATOR: With the NTSB investigation 620 00:30:51,784 --> 00:30:56,188 ongoing, suddenly, the Campbells had an insider's view. 621 00:30:56,188 --> 00:30:59,959 Documents revealed that other cargo doors opened inward, 622 00:30:59,959 --> 00:31:01,994 so the plane's internal pressure helped 623 00:31:01,994 --> 00:31:04,563 jam the door into its frame. 624 00:31:04,563 --> 00:31:08,300 But the cargo door on the 747 opened outward, 625 00:31:08,300 --> 00:31:11,170 allowing for more cargo space, but requiring 626 00:31:11,170 --> 00:31:15,341 a more robust locking system to handle the pressure. 627 00:31:15,341 --> 00:31:18,043 What they do is they build in multiple redundancies 628 00:31:18,043 --> 00:31:19,645 to make sure the door is properly 629 00:31:19,645 --> 00:31:22,848 latched and does not open. 630 00:31:22,848 --> 00:31:27,620 And you build an end to a point that it's extremely improbable 631 00:31:27,620 --> 00:31:29,054 that the door would ever open. 632 00:31:32,992 --> 00:31:37,530 NARRATOR: So what went wrong with flight 811? 633 00:31:37,530 --> 00:31:40,399 Kevin Campbell thought the problem lay in the design 634 00:31:40,399 --> 00:31:41,800 of the locking mechanism. 635 00:31:44,370 --> 00:31:47,439 To lock the cargo door on the 747, 636 00:31:47,439 --> 00:31:50,409 electric motors rotate C-shaped latches 637 00:31:50,409 --> 00:31:52,478 around pins in the door frame. 638 00:31:52,478 --> 00:31:55,347 A handle then moves arms known as locking 639 00:31:55,347 --> 00:31:58,484 sectors over the top of the C latches 640 00:31:58,484 --> 00:32:00,219 to prevent them from reopening. 641 00:32:07,026 --> 00:32:09,361 Campbell, an engineer by training, 642 00:32:09,361 --> 00:32:12,531 built a model to approximate the Boeing design. 643 00:32:12,531 --> 00:32:14,133 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Initially, the locking sectors 644 00:32:14,133 --> 00:32:15,634 were made in aluminum. 645 00:32:15,634 --> 00:32:18,203 And in 1975, Boeing realized that they weren't 646 00:32:18,203 --> 00:32:21,640 strong enough, and they actually doubled up the aluminum 647 00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:23,542 to make it double thickness. 648 00:32:23,542 --> 00:32:26,378 But it still wasn't strong enough. 649 00:32:26,378 --> 00:32:27,880 And a lot of the airlines didn't even 650 00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,015 put the doublers on anyway. 651 00:32:30,015 --> 00:32:32,117 NARRATOR: He thought the weakness of the aluminum 652 00:32:32,117 --> 00:32:35,955 increased the risk of the door accidentally opening. 653 00:32:35,955 --> 00:32:38,624 With the aluminum locking sectors, 654 00:32:38,624 --> 00:32:42,261 if the C-locks tried to back-wind, 655 00:32:42,261 --> 00:32:45,531 open electrically, it would just push the locking 656 00:32:45,531 --> 00:32:48,167 sector out of the way. 657 00:32:48,167 --> 00:32:50,903 It just simply wasn't up to the job that it was designed for. 658 00:32:53,572 --> 00:32:55,274 NARRATOR: If Campbell was correct, 659 00:32:55,274 --> 00:32:58,577 this could happen again, and more lives were at stake. 660 00:33:01,513 --> 00:33:04,683 They redoubled their efforts to conduct their own investigation 661 00:33:04,683 --> 00:33:09,688 into the flight that killed their son and eight others. 662 00:33:09,688 --> 00:33:12,625 SUSAN CAMPBELL: We bought a car and set off in the United 663 00:33:12,625 --> 00:33:16,128 States to see as many people who were involved 664 00:33:16,128 --> 00:33:18,731 with the accident as possible. 665 00:33:18,731 --> 00:33:24,303 We started at Seattle, down to Denver, across to Chicago, 666 00:33:24,303 --> 00:33:30,943 through to Washington, DC, down to Kentucky, on to Miami, 667 00:33:30,943 --> 00:33:36,315 and back across to San Diego, back up through San Francisco, 668 00:33:36,315 --> 00:33:38,484 back to Seattle. 669 00:33:38,484 --> 00:33:39,918 And that was just one trip. 670 00:33:42,721 --> 00:33:44,123 NARRATOR: The Campbells soon discovered 671 00:33:44,123 --> 00:33:47,126 a similar incident to flight 811 when cargo 672 00:33:47,126 --> 00:33:49,094 doors had failed mid-flight. 673 00:33:52,197 --> 00:33:56,068 In 1987, two years before flight 811, 674 00:33:56,068 --> 00:33:59,038 a Pan Am 747 had been climbing out 675 00:33:59,038 --> 00:34:03,609 of Heathrow when it had failed to pressurize at 20,000 feet. 676 00:34:03,609 --> 00:34:06,912 The pilots had to turn back. 677 00:34:06,912 --> 00:34:09,314 When it got back to Heathrow, they found that the door was 678 00:34:09,314 --> 00:34:11,350 hanging open an inch and a half at the bottom, 679 00:34:11,350 --> 00:34:14,887 and all of the locks were open. 680 00:34:14,887 --> 00:34:16,522 When it got to the maintenance base, 681 00:34:16,522 --> 00:34:20,125 they found that all of the locking sectors 682 00:34:20,125 --> 00:34:23,128 were either bent or broken. 683 00:34:23,128 --> 00:34:24,563 NARRATOR: Boeing blamed the failure 684 00:34:24,563 --> 00:34:27,099 on mishandling of the door by the ground crew-- 685 00:34:27,099 --> 00:34:28,600 a common problem. 686 00:34:28,600 --> 00:34:32,404 But Campbell thought it didn't explain this problem. 687 00:34:32,404 --> 00:34:34,473 The door had been closed manually. 688 00:34:34,473 --> 00:34:36,675 And what they said happened was that the guy 689 00:34:36,675 --> 00:34:39,011 wound the C-locks closed-- 690 00:34:39,011 --> 00:34:41,547 98 turns of a speed wrench. 691 00:34:41,547 --> 00:34:46,719 He closed the outer handle, and then wound it open again. 692 00:34:46,719 --> 00:34:49,621 And to be in the position that they were found in when 693 00:34:49,621 --> 00:34:50,989 the aircraft got back, he would have 694 00:34:50,989 --> 00:34:53,859 had to wind them open 98 turns, and that's 695 00:34:53,859 --> 00:34:56,061 just absolutely ridiculous. 696 00:34:56,061 --> 00:34:57,863 NARRATOR: Were the doors really getting 697 00:34:57,863 --> 00:35:00,933 mishandled by ground crew, weakening the latches? 698 00:35:00,933 --> 00:35:04,203 Or was there a problem baked into the system? 699 00:35:04,203 --> 00:35:07,940 Campbell suspected an electrical fault. 700 00:35:07,940 --> 00:35:11,243 It had a fault in the S2 master latch lock switch 701 00:35:11,243 --> 00:35:14,413 that should have turned off the power to the door 702 00:35:14,413 --> 00:35:15,814 when the outer handle was closed. 703 00:35:19,518 --> 00:35:21,620 NARRATOR: When the outer handle was closed, 704 00:35:21,620 --> 00:35:24,123 the S2 master lock switch was meant 705 00:35:24,123 --> 00:35:27,659 to disconnect the power supply and stop the C-latch motors 706 00:35:27,659 --> 00:35:28,727 from turning. 707 00:35:28,727 --> 00:35:31,029 So could this have failed, allowing 708 00:35:31,029 --> 00:35:33,432 the motors to open the door? 709 00:35:33,432 --> 00:35:36,568 Boeing asked the airlines to do a simple test. 710 00:35:36,568 --> 00:35:39,238 Close the outer handle, then press 711 00:35:39,238 --> 00:35:41,106 the switch to open the door. 712 00:35:41,106 --> 00:35:44,376 It should remain closed, but in some cases, 713 00:35:44,376 --> 00:35:46,145 the door tried to open. 714 00:35:46,145 --> 00:35:49,081 KEVIN CAMPBELL: When they hit the switch, it actually worked. 715 00:35:49,081 --> 00:35:51,383 Boeing thought, this is not going to work, 716 00:35:51,383 --> 00:35:52,484 but it actually worked. 717 00:35:52,484 --> 00:35:54,653 There was power to the door locks, 718 00:35:54,653 --> 00:35:58,290 with the outer handle closed. 719 00:35:58,290 --> 00:36:00,259 And the lock started to move, and it 720 00:36:00,259 --> 00:36:03,962 started to force the locking sectors out of the way. 721 00:36:03,962 --> 00:36:06,932 And a few days later, the airlines 722 00:36:06,932 --> 00:36:09,835 started ringing in and saying it was damaging their planes. 723 00:36:09,835 --> 00:36:12,337 So Boeing stopped the test, but it 724 00:36:12,337 --> 00:36:15,841 meant that on those aircraft, the S2 switch had failed, which 725 00:36:15,841 --> 00:36:18,544 is a silent failure, and all of those aircraft 726 00:36:18,544 --> 00:36:22,581 were likely to have the same problem as 811. 727 00:36:22,581 --> 00:36:24,516 They were just waiting for a short circuit 728 00:36:24,516 --> 00:36:26,251 to open the doors. 729 00:36:26,251 --> 00:36:28,253 NARRATOR: The Campbells now became convinced 730 00:36:28,253 --> 00:36:32,491 that the accident on flight 811 began with a failure of the S2 731 00:36:32,491 --> 00:36:33,659 switch. 732 00:36:33,659 --> 00:36:36,862 Power remained on to the C-latch motors. 733 00:36:36,862 --> 00:36:39,264 All it might take would be a short circuit 734 00:36:39,264 --> 00:36:43,902 in an aging plane's wiring to start the motors up. 735 00:36:43,902 --> 00:36:46,471 The aluminum locking sectors would be through waiting 736 00:36:46,471 --> 00:36:49,308 to stop the latches turning, and the cargo door 737 00:36:49,308 --> 00:36:50,342 could burst open. 738 00:36:55,114 --> 00:36:57,283 The National Transportation Safety Board 739 00:36:57,283 --> 00:36:59,953 determines that the probable cause of this accident 740 00:36:59,953 --> 00:37:01,221 was the sudden-- 741 00:37:01,221 --> 00:37:03,856 NARRATOR: After waiting a year for the NTSB report, 742 00:37:03,856 --> 00:37:05,925 Kevin and Susan Campbell expected 743 00:37:05,925 --> 00:37:08,061 it to match their theory of what had led 744 00:37:08,061 --> 00:37:10,430 to the accident on flight 811. 745 00:37:10,430 --> 00:37:12,699 I'd assumed that we would have a report come out that this was 746 00:37:12,699 --> 00:37:15,101 an electrical malfunction, and were 747 00:37:15,101 --> 00:37:17,670 staggered when they came out and said that the door had 748 00:37:17,670 --> 00:37:18,871 been mishandled. 749 00:37:18,871 --> 00:37:21,441 The report focused entirely on the fact 750 00:37:21,441 --> 00:37:24,410 that the door lock must have been mishandled 751 00:37:24,410 --> 00:37:27,480 by the ramp attendant. 752 00:37:27,480 --> 00:37:29,349 That was disappointing. 753 00:37:29,349 --> 00:37:33,653 And we felt that they must have been at a different hearing 754 00:37:33,653 --> 00:37:36,289 from the one we were at. 755 00:37:36,289 --> 00:37:40,627 NARRATOR: So how had the NTSB come to their conclusion? 756 00:37:40,627 --> 00:37:42,895 There was other evidence that we had found 757 00:37:42,895 --> 00:37:46,733 during our investigation of improper procedures 758 00:37:46,733 --> 00:37:49,902 by the United mechanics and ramp people. 759 00:37:49,902 --> 00:37:52,605 So we were convinced that there was-- 760 00:37:52,605 --> 00:37:55,642 we could use the word, "abuse," being done on the doors. 761 00:37:55,642 --> 00:37:58,144 The doors were sort of abused and weren't 762 00:37:58,144 --> 00:37:59,746 maintained very well. 763 00:37:59,746 --> 00:38:04,684 We concluded that the probable cause was mechanical. 764 00:38:04,684 --> 00:38:07,520 NARRATOR: The Campbells thought the NTSB report was simply 765 00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:11,124 incomplete and incorrect. 766 00:38:11,124 --> 00:38:15,595 What they said happened was, the door was closed. 767 00:38:15,595 --> 00:38:18,398 The locks didn't fully close. 768 00:38:18,398 --> 00:38:23,636 The doors partially closed, just hanging on the pins. 769 00:38:23,636 --> 00:38:25,038 And then, they closed the outer handle, 770 00:38:25,038 --> 00:38:27,940 but that just simply can't happen. 771 00:38:27,940 --> 00:38:31,010 Because that part of the locking sector is still intact. 772 00:38:31,010 --> 00:38:34,147 It just simply can't happen. 773 00:38:34,147 --> 00:38:37,216 You can't close the outer handle, unless these are 774 00:38:37,216 --> 00:38:40,119 in the fully locked position. 775 00:38:40,119 --> 00:38:43,056 It's the only way that the outer handle will close. 776 00:38:43,056 --> 00:38:45,925 And just closing this manually, you 777 00:38:45,925 --> 00:38:49,529 can't exert enough force to actually damage this part 778 00:38:49,529 --> 00:38:50,897 of the locking sector. 779 00:38:50,897 --> 00:38:53,099 All it does is just backs up against there. 780 00:38:53,099 --> 00:38:55,068 If the locks aren't fully closed, 781 00:38:55,068 --> 00:38:58,004 it just simply backs up against them and goes no further. 782 00:39:06,813 --> 00:39:09,816 NARRATOR: The Campbells didn't accept the NTSB findings 783 00:39:09,816 --> 00:39:10,616 and kept digging. 784 00:39:19,492 --> 00:39:22,362 After the Pan Am incident in 1987, 785 00:39:22,362 --> 00:39:25,064 it turned out that Boeing had issued a directive 786 00:39:25,064 --> 00:39:28,167 to the airlines on how to correct the weak aluminum 787 00:39:28,167 --> 00:39:30,870 locking sectors. 788 00:39:30,870 --> 00:39:33,172 RON SCHLEEDE: The directive that came out 789 00:39:33,172 --> 00:39:36,209 was to replace the aluminum sectors with steel 790 00:39:36,209 --> 00:39:38,077 sectors that could not be bent. 791 00:39:38,077 --> 00:39:41,481 And there were additionally some interim requirements 792 00:39:41,481 --> 00:39:44,884 for inspections to be performed until what 793 00:39:44,884 --> 00:39:47,553 they call terminating action-- the steel 794 00:39:47,553 --> 00:39:48,788 sectors were installed. 795 00:39:52,525 --> 00:39:54,394 NARRATOR: The Federal Aviation Administration 796 00:39:54,394 --> 00:39:57,397 required these improvements but gave the airlines 797 00:39:57,397 --> 00:39:58,898 18 months to comply. 798 00:40:05,805 --> 00:40:08,474 Within a year, Lee Campbell and eight others 799 00:40:08,474 --> 00:40:17,683 would die on flight 811. 800 00:40:17,683 --> 00:40:20,286 After the deaths, the FAA instantly 801 00:40:20,286 --> 00:40:23,623 shortened the deadline for fixing the cargo door 802 00:40:23,623 --> 00:40:26,459 from 18 months to just 30 days. 803 00:40:31,297 --> 00:40:35,234 Still thinking the NTSB got it wrong, 804 00:40:35,234 --> 00:40:38,204 the Campbells took their case to the press 805 00:40:38,204 --> 00:40:40,540 and were invited to United Airlines. 806 00:40:40,540 --> 00:40:41,941 KEVIN CAMPBELL: One of them actually 807 00:40:41,941 --> 00:40:47,046 broke down, because they'd never had to meet next of kin before. 808 00:40:47,046 --> 00:40:51,217 And Eddie ended up with the vice president of United 809 00:40:51,217 --> 00:40:54,520 taking us around the maintenance facility. 810 00:40:54,520 --> 00:40:56,722 And he had people running off in all directions 811 00:40:56,722 --> 00:41:00,293 just to get the information that we wanted, questions answered. 812 00:41:00,293 --> 00:41:03,062 We could go anywhere that we wanted. 813 00:41:03,062 --> 00:41:06,432 And we just-- everything was laid on for us, 814 00:41:06,432 --> 00:41:08,534 because at that stage, they realized 815 00:41:08,534 --> 00:41:12,505 that we really did know what we were talking about. 816 00:41:12,505 --> 00:41:16,709 NARRATOR: Other families of the victims added pressure. 817 00:41:16,709 --> 00:41:20,112 The vital piece of evidence, flight 811's cargo door, 818 00:41:20,112 --> 00:41:24,484 still laid 2 miles down in the Pacific Ocean. 819 00:41:24,484 --> 00:41:27,019 With headlines driving up public interest, 820 00:41:27,019 --> 00:41:32,658 the NTSB commissioned the US Navy to search for it. 821 00:41:32,658 --> 00:41:36,095 100 miles south of Honolulu, a deep submersible 822 00:41:36,095 --> 00:41:37,597 began to trawl the seabed. 823 00:41:40,299 --> 00:41:41,934 KEVIN CAMPBELL: We went to Honolulu 824 00:41:41,934 --> 00:41:45,538 and waited there while they had their attempts. 825 00:41:45,538 --> 00:41:47,673 And they finally recovered the door 826 00:41:47,673 --> 00:41:50,643 from 14,000 feet of water, which was the deepest 827 00:41:50,643 --> 00:41:53,579 recovery ever at that time. 828 00:41:53,579 --> 00:41:55,581 And we were phoned within an hour 829 00:41:55,581 --> 00:41:58,351 of it coming out of the water. 830 00:41:58,351 --> 00:42:00,887 NARRATOR: The recovered door came under intense scrutiny. 831 00:42:05,324 --> 00:42:09,896 Then, in June 1991, another incident appeared to confirm 832 00:42:09,896 --> 00:42:11,264 the Campbells' theory. 833 00:42:11,264 --> 00:42:15,034 A four-year-old United 747 was sitting on the apron in New 834 00:42:15,034 --> 00:42:18,070 York when the C-latch motor started up 835 00:42:18,070 --> 00:42:20,339 and the door opened itself. 836 00:42:20,339 --> 00:42:24,043 After recovery of the door was that in fact, 837 00:42:24,043 --> 00:42:26,145 the actual pieces had-- 838 00:42:26,145 --> 00:42:28,247 NARRATOR: Finally, the NTSB publicly 839 00:42:28,247 --> 00:42:30,349 issued a revised report that concurred 840 00:42:30,349 --> 00:42:32,151 with the Campbells' version. 841 00:42:32,151 --> 00:42:36,255 There was an inadvertent failure of either the switch 842 00:42:36,255 --> 00:42:39,792 or the wiring that caused an uncommanded opening 843 00:42:39,792 --> 00:42:41,460 of the door. 844 00:42:41,460 --> 00:42:43,462 KEVIN CAMPBELL: It's nice that other people know that you're 845 00:42:43,462 --> 00:42:46,933 right and had been all along, and that the support that they 846 00:42:46,933 --> 00:42:50,736 had given you was vindicated. 847 00:42:50,736 --> 00:42:52,271 NARRATOR: The Campbells spent thousands 848 00:42:52,271 --> 00:42:55,875 of dollars of their own money on their campaign. 849 00:42:55,875 --> 00:42:58,811 They were never interested in a financial settlement for Lee's 850 00:42:58,811 --> 00:43:01,280 death, but they did persuade United 851 00:43:01,280 --> 00:43:03,349 and Boeing to set up a university 852 00:43:03,349 --> 00:43:06,319 scholarship in his name. 853 00:43:06,319 --> 00:43:07,620 SUSAN CAMPBELL: I couldn't have lived 854 00:43:07,620 --> 00:43:11,657 with myself if we had done no investigating ourselves. 855 00:43:11,657 --> 00:43:14,794 It was just something we both felt we needed to do. 856 00:43:14,794 --> 00:43:16,228 We didn't even discuss it. 857 00:43:16,228 --> 00:43:18,898 We just knew that's what we would do. 858 00:43:18,898 --> 00:43:19,699 Yeah. 859 00:43:25,738 --> 00:43:28,674 NARRATOR: For some of the survivors of flight 811, 860 00:43:28,674 --> 00:43:31,143 the cost has been heavy. 861 00:43:31,143 --> 00:43:33,179 Each crew member handled it differently. 862 00:43:33,179 --> 00:43:37,149 I know there are still two crew members that have never 863 00:43:37,149 --> 00:43:40,252 set foot on an aircraft again. 864 00:43:40,252 --> 00:43:42,355 It was very difficult for me. 865 00:43:42,355 --> 00:43:47,159 I was diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder. 866 00:43:47,159 --> 00:43:49,128 You can't reason. 867 00:43:49,128 --> 00:43:50,329 You can't think. 868 00:43:50,329 --> 00:43:54,867 Making the slightest decision is very difficult. 869 00:43:54,867 --> 00:43:56,802 You're just at a total loss. 870 00:43:56,802 --> 00:43:59,805 So it was very difficult to cope with. 67854

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