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SPEAKER 1: Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
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SPEAKER 2: We lost both engines!
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SPEAKER 3: Don't be
alarmed, emergency detected.
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00:00:11,745 --> 00:00:12,545
SPEAKER 4: Mayday!
Mayday!
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SPEAKER 5: Brace for impact!
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SPEAKER 6: I think I lost one.
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SPEAKER 7:
Investigations start--
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SPEAKER 8: It's gonna crash!
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NARRATOR: Modern airliners
are among the most complex and
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reliable machines in the world.
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Their safety record is high, and
dangerous incidents are rare.
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00:00:39,873 --> 00:00:42,609
But when they do happen,
aviation authorities
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commit to finding the cause.
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It's rarely easy.
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This is the story of
one such investigation.
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When a 747 suffered a
devastating explosion
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at high altitude, the
crew and passengers
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faced an unprecedented
crisis, and
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one family's grief
helped authorities
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uncover the full truth.
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KEVIN CAMPBELL: Lee kind
of died for nothing.
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You know, you've got to
find out why he died,
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and you've just got to make sure
that it never happens again.
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NARRATOR: Hawaii is a
natural stop for any flight
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across the Pacific.
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On this morning,
a United 747 was
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undergoing routine
inspection for a trip
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to Auckland, New Zealand.
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But as flight 811
prepared for takeoff,
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everyone's guard is up.
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Just a few months earlier, a
terrorist bomb had brought down
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a 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
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LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were in
the aftermath of Lockerbie,
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and I had instructed the crew
to be particularly aware,
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because it was a through
flight from Los Angeles
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going through to New Zealand.
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So in my pre-flight
briefing, I'd
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asked them to make sure that
they checked any baggage that
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looked suspicious or
anything, because we
40
00:02:08,661 --> 00:02:12,499
wanted to be extra cautious.
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00:02:12,499 --> 00:02:15,068
NARRATOR: Flight 811
was heavily loaded.
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00:02:15,068 --> 00:02:19,506
337 passengers packed cargo
holds and a full fuel load.
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The doors closed on time,
and the plane left the gate
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00:02:27,347 --> 00:02:29,582
just before 2:00
in the morning, for
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00:02:29,582 --> 00:02:31,050
a routine eight-hour flight.
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LINDA BAHNA: Well, we were going
to New Zealand on vacation,
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someplace that we had really
thought was interesting,
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and somebody had told
us how beautiful it was.
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So this was kind of
a dream come true.
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BRUCE LAMPERT: I was seated in
what's called the upper deck.
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I hadn't had a
vacation in five years,
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and I took all my MileagePlus
points from United Airlines,
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and I purchased a business-class
ticket to Auckland, New
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Zealand, and Sydney, Australia.
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I was going to finally
make that dream vacation
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I'd always wanted--
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to get to Australia
and lay on a beach
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somewhere, and forget
about airplanes,
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00:03:08,655 --> 00:03:11,558
forget about
accidents, and get this
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00:03:11,558 --> 00:03:12,759
out of my mind for a while.
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NARRATOR: On the
flight deck captain,
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Dave Cronin was hugely
experienced, just
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two months short of retirement.
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Rotate.
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00:03:35,949 --> 00:03:39,552
DAVID CRONIN: I flew almost
35 years with United.
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00:03:39,552 --> 00:03:41,854
I've got over 30,000
hours of flight time
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and just about everything
military as well as civilian.
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My co-pilot, our first
officer, was Al Slader.
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And I'd known Al at that
time for probably 20 years.
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And the second
officer, Mark Thomas--
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00:04:01,641 --> 00:04:04,177
was the first time I
had flown with him,
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00:04:04,177 --> 00:04:08,414
but we got along real well.
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Tell them we can handle
33 if it's available.
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00:04:10,617 --> 00:04:11,584
OK.
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00:04:11,584 --> 00:04:12,986
NARRATOR: The pilots
wanted to climb
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00:04:12,986 --> 00:04:16,723
to 33,000 feet above the Pacific
Ocean to avoid turbulence.
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OK, it looks like
196 put us direct--
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DAVID CRONIN: We did notice
that there were thunderstorms
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100 miles south, right on
course, which was rather
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unusual for that time of night.
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So I left the seatbelt sign on.
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00:04:31,704 --> 00:04:33,306
NARRATOR: Captain
Cronin's decision
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to keep people fastened in their
seats would save many lives.
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LAURA BRENTLINGER: We
were still climbing out,
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00:04:40,413 --> 00:04:42,348
and the seatbelt
sign was still on,
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00:04:42,348 --> 00:04:46,653
and just basically, getting
ready to serve beverages,
87
00:04:46,653 --> 00:04:48,287
and then to tuck everyone
in for the evening,
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00:04:48,287 --> 00:04:50,089
because it was going to
be a long flight down
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00:04:50,089 --> 00:04:51,958
to New Zealand.
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00:04:51,958 --> 00:04:55,061
OK, tell them we're going
to detour over to left.
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00:04:55,061 --> 00:04:56,663
Center, United 811, heavy.
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00:04:56,663 --> 00:04:57,764
We're going to be detouring.
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00:04:57,764 --> 00:04:59,198
Some weather here.
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00:04:59,198 --> 00:05:01,467
It'll be to the left of course.
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00:05:01,467 --> 00:05:04,804
NARRATOR: 100 miles from
Honolulu, as flight 811
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00:05:04,804 --> 00:05:08,508
climbed through 23,000
feet, a huge malfunction
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00:05:08,508 --> 00:05:11,110
was about to occur.
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00:05:11,110 --> 00:05:14,614
There was now a big air pressure
difference between the inside
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00:05:14,614 --> 00:05:17,216
and the outside of the aircraft.
100
00:05:17,216 --> 00:05:20,787
Suddenly, passengers sitting
just above and behind the cargo
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00:05:20,787 --> 00:05:22,655
door heard a noise.
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00:05:22,655 --> 00:05:24,957
LINDA BAHNA: Then, it was
kind of a grinding noise.
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00:05:30,630 --> 00:05:32,331
I heard, like, a thud.
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00:05:36,169 --> 00:05:37,136
The hell?
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00:05:37,136 --> 00:05:39,972
In the next
nanosecond, it was pure,
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00:05:39,972 --> 00:05:42,475
unadulterated pandemonium.
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00:05:42,475 --> 00:05:44,911
[loud noise]
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We lost number three.
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Going down.
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00:05:53,886 --> 00:05:55,488
It looks like we've
lost number three engine,
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and we're descending rapidly.
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00:05:57,123 --> 00:05:57,924
Coming back.
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00:06:01,160 --> 00:06:05,131
The next thing I knew, I
found myself on the stairwell,
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00:06:05,131 --> 00:06:08,401
hanging on to the rungs,
and I immediately knew it
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00:06:08,401 --> 00:06:10,169
was an explosive decompression.
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00:06:12,872 --> 00:06:14,707
NARRATOR: The cargo
door had torn off
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00:06:14,707 --> 00:06:17,777
and ripped a large section
of the plane with it.
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00:06:17,777 --> 00:06:20,279
The pressurized air
inside had blasted
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00:06:20,279 --> 00:06:23,049
out with explosive force.
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00:06:23,049 --> 00:06:24,917
I immediately
thought of Lockerbie.
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00:06:24,917 --> 00:06:28,788
We actually thought it
was a bomb that went off.
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00:06:28,788 --> 00:06:30,890
BRUCE LAMPERT: It
was hell on earth.
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00:06:30,890 --> 00:06:32,658
Everything on the
airplane that wasn't
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00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:38,030
fastened down, tied down,
or secured became airborne.
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00:06:38,030 --> 00:06:39,899
The noise was incredible.
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00:06:39,899 --> 00:06:42,702
[loud noise]
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00:06:42,702 --> 00:06:44,470
BOB BAHNA: Everything
in front of us was gone.
128
00:06:44,470 --> 00:06:48,007
Where we were sitting, we were
about 6 inches from the hole,
129
00:06:48,007 --> 00:06:51,310
so there was nothing in front
of us or to the side of us.
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00:06:51,310 --> 00:06:53,346
The whole side of
the plane was gone.
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00:06:53,346 --> 00:06:55,414
Actually, our feet were
dangling on the hole.
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00:06:55,414 --> 00:06:58,718
And my first thought-- we
weren't going to make it.
133
00:06:58,718 --> 00:07:02,989
You know, I just didn't
think there was any hope.
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00:07:02,989 --> 00:07:05,158
NARRATOR: With the
pressurized air blown out,
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00:07:05,158 --> 00:07:07,627
the lack of oxygen
at 23,000 feet
136
00:07:07,627 --> 00:07:10,997
was now suffocating the
passengers and the crew.
137
00:07:10,997 --> 00:07:13,432
It felt like someone had
kicked me in the stomach
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00:07:13,432 --> 00:07:15,434
and knocked the wind out of me.
139
00:07:15,434 --> 00:07:22,341
And I remember trying to
catch my breath, and couldn't.
140
00:07:22,341 --> 00:07:24,544
You're supposed to
wrap those oxygen masks
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00:07:24,544 --> 00:07:27,980
and put them on, except the
oxygen masks in that cabin--
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00:07:27,980 --> 00:07:29,816
they were ripped out of
the ceiling, and they
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00:07:29,816 --> 00:07:31,350
weren't-- they weren't there.
144
00:07:31,350 --> 00:07:34,187
And I remember
thinking to myself,
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00:07:34,187 --> 00:07:36,622
this is what it feels
like to suffocate.
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00:07:36,622 --> 00:07:37,690
United know, 811 heavy.
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00:07:37,690 --> 00:07:40,159
We're doing an
emergency descent.
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00:07:40,159 --> 00:07:42,328
NARRATOR: The pilots could
tell from their instruments
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that the number-three
engine was failing,
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00:07:44,597 --> 00:07:47,400
but they couldn't tell the
full extent of the damage.
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00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,369
Their priority was to get the
plane down to a level where
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00:07:50,369 --> 00:07:52,104
they could breathe normally.
153
00:07:52,104 --> 00:07:53,139
Put your mask on, Dave.
154
00:07:56,609 --> 00:07:58,177
NARRATOR: But the
pilots didn't know
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00:07:58,177 --> 00:08:03,049
that the explosion had destroyed
the entire oxygen supply.
156
00:08:03,049 --> 00:08:04,350
Can't get any oxygen.
157
00:08:04,350 --> 00:08:05,618
We're not getting any oxygen!
158
00:08:05,618 --> 00:08:06,419
Are you getting any?
159
00:08:06,419 --> 00:08:08,287
I can't get any either.
160
00:08:08,287 --> 00:08:10,456
NARRATOR: With the plane
heading steeply down
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00:08:10,456 --> 00:08:12,925
and no word from the
cockpit, the cabin
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00:08:12,925 --> 00:08:14,961
crew were thinking the worst.
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00:08:14,961 --> 00:08:17,597
I remember thinking
that the cockpit, which
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00:08:17,597 --> 00:08:19,899
is up in the upper
deck, had probably
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00:08:19,899 --> 00:08:21,300
blown off the airplane, too.
166
00:08:21,300 --> 00:08:25,838
Because as far up as we could
see, there was nothing there.
167
00:08:25,838 --> 00:08:28,975
Now, we're doing
this nose dive.
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00:08:28,975 --> 00:08:32,011
My next thought was, oh my god,
we're just going straight down.
169
00:08:32,011 --> 00:08:35,114
We're going to
crash into the sea.
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00:08:35,114 --> 00:08:36,782
NARRATOR: With the
airplane ruptured,
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00:08:36,782 --> 00:08:40,019
severe damage to the right
wing and engines, and its crew
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00:08:40,019 --> 00:08:42,989
forcing it down to
an emergency descent,
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the problems on flight
811 had only just begun.
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00:08:52,732 --> 00:08:56,136
Two minutes after suffering
a devastating explosion,
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00:08:56,136 --> 00:09:00,273
flight 811 was still in a
steep emergency descent,
176
00:09:00,273 --> 00:09:04,544
passing rapidly through 15,000
feet to reach breathable air.
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00:09:04,544 --> 00:09:07,347
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811
heavy, say your altitude now.
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00:09:07,347 --> 00:09:08,482
Believe me, 15.
179
00:09:08,482 --> 00:09:11,818
United 811, heavy,
we're out of 15.5.
180
00:09:11,818 --> 00:09:14,087
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
United 811, roger.
181
00:09:14,087 --> 00:09:15,822
I think we blew a
door or something.
182
00:09:15,822 --> 00:09:18,492
Tell the flight attendant to
get prepared for an evacuation.
183
00:09:18,492 --> 00:09:20,193
NARRATOR: The crew
finally began to level
184
00:09:20,193 --> 00:09:22,796
out at a safer altitude.
185
00:09:22,796 --> 00:09:27,267
But they now faced a
barrage of problems.
186
00:09:27,267 --> 00:09:29,469
The most immediate
was the disintegration
187
00:09:29,469 --> 00:09:32,305
of the number-three engine
nearest to the explosion.
188
00:09:34,975 --> 00:09:37,477
We don't have any
fire indications?
189
00:09:37,477 --> 00:09:41,081
I-- I don't have anything.
190
00:09:41,081 --> 00:09:43,316
OK, we lost number three.
191
00:09:43,316 --> 00:09:44,317
Let's shut it down.
192
00:09:44,317 --> 00:09:45,352
There's no N-1.
193
00:09:45,352 --> 00:09:46,786
Yeah, OK.
194
00:09:46,786 --> 00:09:49,289
Ready for number-three
shutdown checklist.
195
00:09:49,289 --> 00:09:53,160
[indistinct radio chatter]
196
00:09:53,160 --> 00:09:57,164
Before you shut down number
three, the generator went off.
197
00:09:57,164 --> 00:09:58,598
Looks all right to try it now.
198
00:10:07,507 --> 00:10:09,442
Well, that stopped
the vibration anyway.
199
00:10:09,442 --> 00:10:10,710
Feel jettison procedure.
200
00:10:10,710 --> 00:10:12,913
Main boost pumps.
201
00:10:12,913 --> 00:10:14,581
Center, United 811.
202
00:10:14,581 --> 00:10:16,149
We need the equipment
standing by.
203
00:10:16,149 --> 00:10:17,317
Company notified, please.
204
00:10:17,317 --> 00:10:19,419
We got a control problem.
205
00:10:19,419 --> 00:10:22,322
Center-wing,
left-right valves, on.
206
00:10:22,322 --> 00:10:23,657
Start dumping the fuel.
207
00:10:23,657 --> 00:10:24,858
I am dumping.
208
00:10:24,858 --> 00:10:27,093
[loud noise]
209
00:10:27,093 --> 00:10:30,830
One stewardess was seriously
injured by falling debris.
210
00:10:30,830 --> 00:10:33,833
As Laura Brentlinger helped
her, the full gravity
211
00:10:33,833 --> 00:10:36,770
of this situation
suddenly became clear.
212
00:10:36,770 --> 00:10:39,206
As I'm holding her in
my arms, I looked up,
213
00:10:39,206 --> 00:10:41,141
and as I looked up,
that was the first time
214
00:10:41,141 --> 00:10:43,910
I saw this tremendous
hole on the side
215
00:10:43,910 --> 00:10:48,415
of the aircraft that was just
a void, and seats were missing.
216
00:10:48,415 --> 00:10:51,117
And I immediately knew that
we had lost passengers.
217
00:10:54,087 --> 00:10:55,855
NARRATOR: Five rows
of seats had been
218
00:10:55,855 --> 00:11:00,126
blown out in the decompression,
killing nine passengers.
219
00:11:00,126 --> 00:11:03,296
On the flight deck, the crew had
turned the stricken plane back
220
00:11:03,296 --> 00:11:06,666
to Honolulu, but with
80 miles still to go,
221
00:11:06,666 --> 00:11:09,236
the crisis now got far worse.
222
00:11:09,236 --> 00:11:11,738
We got a hell of a
control problem here.
223
00:11:11,738 --> 00:11:13,340
I got almost full
rudder on this thing.
224
00:11:13,340 --> 00:11:14,641
Are you dumping
as fast as you can?
225
00:11:14,641 --> 00:11:16,109
I'm dumping everything.
226
00:11:16,109 --> 00:11:18,445
We got a problem with
number-four engine?
227
00:11:18,445 --> 00:11:19,579
Yeah.
228
00:11:19,579 --> 00:11:21,581
NARRATOR: Debris from
the explosion that also
229
00:11:21,581 --> 00:11:23,850
damaged the number-four engine.
230
00:11:23,850 --> 00:11:27,654
If it failed completely, the
implications would be severe.
231
00:11:27,654 --> 00:11:31,591
If you are on two engines
and you weigh 700,000 pounds,
232
00:11:31,591 --> 00:11:33,927
that is a big deal.
233
00:11:33,927 --> 00:11:36,563
Simply because with
that kind of weight,
234
00:11:36,563 --> 00:11:40,033
two engines are not going
to keep you in the air.
235
00:11:40,033 --> 00:11:40,900
You're going to come down.
236
00:11:45,572 --> 00:11:48,341
NARRATOR: Although their
number-four engine was failing,
237
00:11:48,341 --> 00:11:50,610
the pilots pushed it
along with the remaining
238
00:11:50,610 --> 00:11:52,445
engines to full power--
239
00:11:52,445 --> 00:11:55,515
a setting they should not run
up for more than four minutes.
240
00:11:55,515 --> 00:11:58,952
But the nearest land
was 15 minutes away.
241
00:11:58,952 --> 00:12:01,488
I look out the window
on the right-hand side,
242
00:12:01,488 --> 00:12:05,058
and I see flames, big flames.
243
00:12:05,058 --> 00:12:07,327
And I know what flames
in engine means.
244
00:12:07,327 --> 00:12:08,628
It's not good.
245
00:12:08,628 --> 00:12:10,130
NARRATOR: The
pilots were unaware
246
00:12:10,130 --> 00:12:12,999
that the number-four
engine was now on fire.
247
00:12:12,999 --> 00:12:14,367
You've got 250 knots now.
248
00:12:14,367 --> 00:12:15,168
That's good.
249
00:12:15,168 --> 00:12:16,469
7,000--
250
00:12:16,469 --> 00:12:18,405
Yeah, we're
getting more rumble.
251
00:12:18,405 --> 00:12:19,272
Watch your heading.
252
00:12:19,272 --> 00:12:20,106
Watch your heading.
253
00:12:20,106 --> 00:12:21,241
You want to go direct Honolulu.
254
00:12:21,241 --> 00:12:22,642
OK.
255
00:12:22,642 --> 00:12:24,544
I'm going to go downstairs and
see what the hell is going on.
256
00:12:24,544 --> 00:12:25,745
Yeah.
257
00:12:25,745 --> 00:12:28,381
Go ahead and run down
and see what's happening.
258
00:12:28,381 --> 00:12:30,417
LAURA BRENTLINGER: I
saw the flight engineer
259
00:12:30,417 --> 00:12:33,586
descend down the stairwell.
260
00:12:33,586 --> 00:12:38,258
And when I saw him, my relief
was, oh my god, they're alive.
261
00:12:38,258 --> 00:12:41,261
And there was a huge
sense of relief for me.
262
00:12:41,261 --> 00:12:44,497
He saw the hole, turned
as white as a sheet,
263
00:12:44,497 --> 00:12:47,367
and I screamed to him, dear
god, please get us down.
264
00:12:49,869 --> 00:12:51,404
We've got a fire out there.
265
00:12:51,404 --> 00:12:54,407
Oh, yeah, we got a
fire in number four.
266
00:12:54,407 --> 00:12:55,709
Go through the procedure.
267
00:12:55,709 --> 00:12:57,043
Shut down the engine.
268
00:12:57,043 --> 00:12:58,611
We're not going to be able
to hold this altitude on two.
269
00:13:05,985 --> 00:13:08,254
We got a fire
on the right side.
270
00:13:08,254 --> 00:13:09,589
We're on two engines now.
271
00:13:09,589 --> 00:13:12,025
The whole right side-- it's
just gone from about the one
272
00:13:12,025 --> 00:13:13,993
right back to-- it's just open.
273
00:13:13,993 --> 00:13:15,595
You're just looking outside.
274
00:13:15,595 --> 00:13:16,396
What do you mean?
275
00:13:16,396 --> 00:13:17,330
It looks like a bomb.
276
00:13:17,330 --> 00:13:18,131
Fuselage?
277
00:13:18,131 --> 00:13:18,998
Yeah, the fuselage.
278
00:13:18,998 --> 00:13:20,066
It's just-- it's just open.
279
00:13:24,404 --> 00:13:26,306
OK, it looks like
we got a bomb that
280
00:13:26,306 --> 00:13:28,575
went off on the right side.
281
00:13:28,575 --> 00:13:29,943
The whole right side is gone.
282
00:13:29,943 --> 00:13:33,079
Yeah, from-- from about
the one right back to--
283
00:13:33,079 --> 00:13:35,915
Anybody--?
284
00:13:35,915 --> 00:13:37,050
Some people are probably gone.
285
00:13:37,050 --> 00:13:37,851
I don't know.
286
00:13:41,921 --> 00:13:43,823
I knew that we
had lost people.
287
00:13:43,823 --> 00:13:46,593
I didn't know how many.
288
00:13:46,593 --> 00:13:50,697
In fact, I didn't know until
the next day how many were lost.
289
00:13:50,697 --> 00:13:55,568
But you know, it's
a terrible thing
290
00:13:55,568 --> 00:13:57,003
when you're a captain
of an airplane
291
00:13:57,003 --> 00:13:58,772
and you lose passengers.
292
00:14:05,211 --> 00:14:07,514
NARRATOR: Lee Campbell,
flying home to New Zealand,
293
00:14:07,514 --> 00:14:10,450
was sitting in row 10 just
in front of the cargo door.
294
00:14:14,187 --> 00:14:19,526
I woke up with such a start,
because I'd seen Lee standing
295
00:14:19,526 --> 00:14:23,797
by the bed, just with a
gray jacket over his arm
296
00:14:23,797 --> 00:14:26,266
and a small smile on his face.
297
00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:30,103
Of course, as I woke up,
it faded slowly, uh--
298
00:14:30,103 --> 00:14:33,072
And then, we woke up in the
morning, and we discussed this.
299
00:14:33,072 --> 00:14:35,375
I said, oh, it was
strange in the night,
300
00:14:35,375 --> 00:14:38,845
but it's such a vivid dream.
301
00:14:38,845 --> 00:14:42,015
Lee was standing there.
302
00:14:42,015 --> 00:14:47,287
And then, the radio came on,
and the first item of news
303
00:14:47,287 --> 00:14:51,691
is that there'd been problem
with a United aircraft.
304
00:14:51,691 --> 00:14:54,027
And I said, that was Lee.
305
00:14:54,027 --> 00:14:57,263
It's Lee, and my
blood just ran cold.
306
00:14:57,263 --> 00:14:59,599
I knew he was dead,
from that moment.
307
00:15:05,805 --> 00:15:07,507
Center, do you read?
308
00:15:07,507 --> 00:15:09,576
We evidently had a
bomb or something.
309
00:15:09,576 --> 00:15:11,244
A big section of the right
sidebar of the airplane
310
00:15:11,244 --> 00:15:13,046
is missing.
311
00:15:13,046 --> 00:15:14,581
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
Unite 811, heavy, roger.
312
00:15:14,581 --> 00:15:18,051
I wouldn't go any faster than
I had to, because that hole--
313
00:15:18,051 --> 00:15:19,986
I mean, I wouldn't
get it over 250 knots,
314
00:15:19,986 --> 00:15:20,954
because that's a big--
315
00:15:20,954 --> 00:15:22,989
OK, what's-- what's
our stall speed?
316
00:15:22,989 --> 00:15:24,757
I wouldn't go below 240.
317
00:15:24,757 --> 00:15:26,426
Yeah.
318
00:15:26,426 --> 00:15:28,161
I don't know if we're
going to make this.
319
00:15:28,161 --> 00:15:30,830
We didn't know that we
were going to make it back,
320
00:15:30,830 --> 00:15:33,967
so we were actually preparing
to ditch that airplane
321
00:15:33,967 --> 00:15:37,337
at night in the
Pacific Ocean, which
322
00:15:37,337 --> 00:15:39,939
has never been done before.
323
00:15:39,939 --> 00:15:43,176
NARRATOR: In the cabin, the
crew prepared for the worst.
324
00:15:43,176 --> 00:15:44,544
LAURA BRENTLINGER: My
training kicked in,
325
00:15:44,544 --> 00:15:48,648
and I got up from my
jump seat and started
326
00:15:48,648 --> 00:15:51,284
instructing the crew.
327
00:15:51,284 --> 00:15:52,752
We have to prepare the cabin.
328
00:15:52,752 --> 00:15:55,288
We have to prepare
for a ditching,
329
00:15:55,288 --> 00:15:57,590
which I thought was inevitable.
330
00:16:01,160 --> 00:16:02,896
You're running around
getting life vests on,
331
00:16:02,896 --> 00:16:05,498
and I do remember
thinking, I'm not
332
00:16:05,498 --> 00:16:07,300
sure this is going to matter.
333
00:16:07,300 --> 00:16:11,104
Because when we hit
the water, you know,
334
00:16:11,104 --> 00:16:12,772
I just imagine planes
getting split apart.
335
00:16:16,476 --> 00:16:18,211
I knew that if
we hit the water,
336
00:16:18,211 --> 00:16:19,913
it'd be tantamount to
hitting the ground,
337
00:16:19,913 --> 00:16:22,282
and there would be very
few, if any, survivors.
338
00:16:22,282 --> 00:16:24,350
So my mind went to--
339
00:16:29,355 --> 00:16:32,659
the thing that meant something
to me, and at that point
340
00:16:32,659 --> 00:16:33,760
in my life, it was my son.
341
00:16:36,296 --> 00:16:38,398
NARRATOR: Believing
they were going to die,
342
00:16:38,398 --> 00:16:41,000
one of the passengers
took these photographs.
343
00:16:45,405 --> 00:16:48,875
For 15 minutes, the plane
steadily lost altitude.
344
00:16:48,875 --> 00:16:53,746
Then, at 4,000 feet, there
was a glimmer of hope.
345
00:16:53,746 --> 00:16:58,251
After an imponderable time, I
remember one of the passengers
346
00:16:58,251 --> 00:17:02,322
began to point out one of the
windows on the right side.
347
00:17:02,322 --> 00:17:05,692
And everybody looked, and we
looked to this little window
348
00:17:05,692 --> 00:17:10,163
from wherever we were, and we
could see a point of light,
349
00:17:10,163 --> 00:17:12,432
and another point of
light, and another point.
350
00:17:12,432 --> 00:17:15,001
Pretty soon, you could
make out of coastline.
351
00:17:15,001 --> 00:17:17,136
OK, I've got lights over here.
352
00:17:17,136 --> 00:17:18,738
OK.
353
00:17:18,738 --> 00:17:19,606
OK.
354
00:17:19,606 --> 00:17:20,940
We're at 4.
355
00:17:20,940 --> 00:17:23,042
We're 21 miles out.
356
00:17:23,042 --> 00:17:23,843
We're in good shape.
357
00:17:26,479 --> 00:17:29,816
NARRATOR: At Honolulu Airport,
an emergency was declared.
358
00:17:29,816 --> 00:17:31,851
All other aircraft
were diverted,
359
00:17:31,851 --> 00:17:34,621
and the rescue services
prepared for the crash landing
360
00:17:34,621 --> 00:17:35,855
of a fully loaded airliner.
361
00:17:41,861 --> 00:17:43,162
Hey, you want to
give me some speeds?
362
00:17:43,162 --> 00:17:45,164
Yeah.
363
00:17:45,164 --> 00:17:49,636
150 is going to be
your two engine.
364
00:17:49,636 --> 00:17:50,937
Use a 160.
365
00:17:50,937 --> 00:17:51,738
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United
811, I need souls on board,
366
00:17:51,738 --> 00:17:52,739
if you have it.
367
00:17:52,739 --> 00:17:54,340
OK, souls on board.
368
00:17:54,340 --> 00:17:56,042
160 is the minimum.
369
00:17:56,042 --> 00:17:57,910
Stand by, United 811, heavy.
370
00:17:57,910 --> 00:17:59,746
I don't know how
many is on board.
371
00:17:59,746 --> 00:18:04,217
200 and-- I don't have the
paperwork in front of me here.
372
00:18:04,217 --> 00:18:06,586
Uh, we're too busy right now.
373
00:18:06,586 --> 00:18:08,254
200 and something.
374
00:18:08,254 --> 00:18:09,689
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): OK.
375
00:18:09,689 --> 00:18:11,991
NARRATOR: Six minutes
from the airport, the crew
376
00:18:11,991 --> 00:18:15,228
now had to slow the
overweight plane for landing.
377
00:18:15,228 --> 00:18:16,863
But the effect of
this was unknown.
378
00:18:20,700 --> 00:18:22,735
What's going to happen
when I start coming out
379
00:18:22,735 --> 00:18:26,873
with flaps and landing gear?
380
00:18:26,873 --> 00:18:30,276
We're either going to land
on the airport in the water
381
00:18:30,276 --> 00:18:33,846
or downtown Honolulu.
382
00:18:33,846 --> 00:18:35,882
OK, inboards
are coming to ten.
383
00:18:35,882 --> 00:18:38,985
How do the controls feel?
384
00:18:38,985 --> 00:18:39,852
All right, so far.
385
00:18:42,655 --> 00:18:44,157
NARRATOR: But the
flaps were damaged
386
00:18:44,157 --> 00:18:46,159
and could not fully extend.
387
00:18:46,159 --> 00:18:49,729
This meant that flight 811 would
have to land dangerously fast.
388
00:18:53,800 --> 00:18:55,068
SPEAKER (ON RADIO):
United 811, heavy.
389
00:18:55,068 --> 00:18:56,869
Do you have the
airport in sight?
390
00:18:56,869 --> 00:18:58,504
It's over here to
the right, Captain.
391
00:18:58,504 --> 00:18:59,739
OK.
392
00:18:59,739 --> 00:19:01,074
OK, we have the airport.
393
00:19:01,074 --> 00:19:03,710
United 811, heavy.
394
00:19:03,710 --> 00:19:06,946
SPEAKER (ON RADIO): 811 is
clear to land, eight left.
395
00:19:06,946 --> 00:19:08,081
Equipment standing by.
396
00:19:08,081 --> 00:19:12,118
Wind at 05012.
397
00:19:12,118 --> 00:19:13,686
Clear to land.
398
00:19:13,686 --> 00:19:17,457
Eight left, United 811, heavy.
399
00:19:17,457 --> 00:19:20,960
NARRATOR: As the unstable
747 lined up for landing,
400
00:19:20,960 --> 00:19:24,030
the pilots knew they would
only have one attempt.
401
00:19:24,030 --> 00:19:26,099
But even if they got
it on the runway,
402
00:19:26,099 --> 00:19:28,167
the nagging question remained.
403
00:19:28,167 --> 00:19:31,671
Would the stress of impact
cause the damaged and overweight
404
00:19:31,671 --> 00:19:33,539
aircraft to disintegrate?
405
00:19:38,611 --> 00:19:41,447
Severely damaged, with
an unstable airframe,
406
00:19:41,447 --> 00:19:44,617
losing altitude, and
on only two engines,
407
00:19:44,617 --> 00:19:48,421
flight 811 began its final
approach to Honolulu airport.
408
00:19:52,258 --> 00:19:54,026
Two-engine approach.
409
00:19:54,026 --> 00:19:55,027
Two-engine approach.
410
00:19:57,530 --> 00:19:59,766
We still had no idea how
far off the ground we were,
411
00:19:59,766 --> 00:20:01,534
if we were going to make
it to Honolulu or not.
412
00:20:01,534 --> 00:20:03,936
But that seemed like
an appropriate time,
413
00:20:03,936 --> 00:20:05,872
if we're somewhere around
land, that we're probably going
414
00:20:05,872 --> 00:20:09,575
to try and land somewhere
to get the passengers
415
00:20:09,575 --> 00:20:10,877
in their brace positions.
416
00:20:10,877 --> 00:20:12,779
So that's when we
started yelling for them
417
00:20:12,779 --> 00:20:14,514
to get down to brace positions.
418
00:20:14,514 --> 00:20:20,953
Every molecule in my
body combined to express,
419
00:20:20,953 --> 00:20:25,224
get this damn airplane
on the ground.
420
00:20:25,224 --> 00:20:27,360
How are we doing
on the hydraulics?
421
00:20:27,360 --> 00:20:30,229
Hydraulics are good.
422
00:20:30,229 --> 00:20:32,598
We got brakes?
423
00:20:32,598 --> 00:20:34,667
Normal hydraulics.
424
00:20:34,667 --> 00:20:36,068
So we got brakes.
425
00:20:36,068 --> 00:20:41,340
But, uh-- you're only going to
have reversing on one and one.
426
00:20:41,340 --> 00:20:43,709
Though I thought maybe there
was a chance that we were going
427
00:20:43,709 --> 00:20:46,145
to actually be able
to attempt to land,
428
00:20:46,145 --> 00:20:47,680
the thought came to my mind.
429
00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:49,015
What happens now?
430
00:20:49,015 --> 00:20:52,485
Do we-- on impact,
do we explode?
431
00:20:52,485 --> 00:20:56,355
Do we fall out this huge hole?
432
00:20:56,355 --> 00:20:58,825
NARRATOR: Despite dumping
fuel, the aircraft was
433
00:20:58,825 --> 00:21:00,359
still critically overweight.
434
00:21:00,359 --> 00:21:01,661
192.
435
00:21:01,661 --> 00:21:03,663
NARRATOR: But without full
flaps to keep it in the air,
436
00:21:03,663 --> 00:21:05,298
it had to approach fast.
437
00:21:05,298 --> 00:21:06,699
1,000 down.
438
00:21:06,699 --> 00:21:09,202
NARRATOR: The danger was that
the undercarriage would shear
439
00:21:09,202 --> 00:21:11,671
off and the plane break up.
440
00:21:11,671 --> 00:21:12,905
A dot and a half high.
441
00:21:17,009 --> 00:21:22,815
190.
442
00:21:22,815 --> 00:21:27,753
185.
443
00:21:27,753 --> 00:21:28,554
A little slow.
444
00:21:28,554 --> 00:21:30,256
A little slow, Dave.
445
00:21:30,256 --> 00:21:31,157
It's below what we want.
446
00:21:38,364 --> 00:21:39,498
Coming up on the glide slope.
447
00:21:42,134 --> 00:21:43,936
OK.
448
00:21:43,936 --> 00:21:44,937
Let's try the gear.
449
00:21:47,673 --> 00:21:49,642
NARRATOR: No one
knew if the explosion
450
00:21:49,642 --> 00:21:51,310
damaged the landing gear.
451
00:21:51,310 --> 00:21:53,279
I remember Laura saying
to me that she didn't
452
00:21:53,279 --> 00:21:54,981
hear the landing gear go down.
453
00:21:54,981 --> 00:21:55,815
And it was loud.
454
00:21:55,815 --> 00:21:57,116
You know, it was still loud.
455
00:21:57,116 --> 00:21:59,318
And I didn't hear the
landing gear go down.
456
00:21:59,318 --> 00:22:00,720
So that's another thought--
457
00:22:00,720 --> 00:22:02,321
maybe they can't get
the landing gear down.
458
00:22:02,321 --> 00:22:06,025
Maybe it's not down.
459
00:22:06,025 --> 00:22:08,527
You got the gear down.
460
00:22:08,527 --> 00:22:10,263
We're clear to land,
and everything's taken
461
00:22:10,263 --> 00:22:11,564
care of, as far as we know.
462
00:22:22,275 --> 00:22:27,480
195.
463
00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:28,281
Half a dot high.
464
00:22:31,984 --> 00:22:33,252
Looking-- looking good.
465
00:22:35,955 --> 00:22:41,027
192.
466
00:22:41,027 --> 00:22:42,061
195.
467
00:22:42,061 --> 00:22:42,929
Coming off in the power.
468
00:22:46,332 --> 00:22:47,133
100 feet.
469
00:22:53,372 --> 00:22:54,173
50 feet.
470
00:22:59,745 --> 00:23:00,613
Center thhe trim.
471
00:23:00,613 --> 00:23:01,414
Center the trim.
472
00:23:05,117 --> 00:23:07,720
30.
473
00:23:07,720 --> 00:23:08,521
10.
474
00:23:12,959 --> 00:23:15,094
Zero.
475
00:23:15,094 --> 00:23:15,895
We're on.
476
00:23:20,866 --> 00:23:23,469
Gear's holding.
477
00:23:23,469 --> 00:23:24,503
LEONARD JENKINS: We landed.
478
00:23:24,503 --> 00:23:25,771
It felt fast.
479
00:23:25,771 --> 00:23:27,773
And that was my next concern--
is that we weren't going
480
00:23:27,773 --> 00:23:29,208
to stop at the
end of the runway,
481
00:23:29,208 --> 00:23:30,509
that we were just
going to keep going.
482
00:23:41,854 --> 00:23:45,358
And all of a sudden, we were
slowing down, slowing down.
483
00:23:45,358 --> 00:23:48,160
And I said, oh my
god, we've landed.
484
00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,162
We're on the ground.
485
00:23:50,162 --> 00:23:52,932
And the people
started applauding.
486
00:24:02,942 --> 00:24:06,245
DAVID CRONIN: Probably the
best landing I've ever made.
487
00:24:06,245 --> 00:24:09,315
When we finally
stopped on the runway,
488
00:24:09,315 --> 00:24:13,486
we deployed all 10 chutes,
and the flight attendants
489
00:24:13,486 --> 00:24:17,223
evacuated all the passengers.
490
00:24:17,223 --> 00:24:19,291
LEONARD JENKINS: It's amazing
how fast everyone went.
491
00:24:19,291 --> 00:24:23,729
My understanding is, like, less
than 45 seconds, 330 people
492
00:24:23,729 --> 00:24:26,365
were off the airplane.
493
00:24:26,365 --> 00:24:28,267
BRUCE LAMPERT: We were probably
20 feet off the ground,
494
00:24:28,267 --> 00:24:30,403
and I would have stepped out of
the airplane without a slide.
495
00:24:30,403 --> 00:24:32,338
I wanted to get off so bad.
496
00:24:32,338 --> 00:24:33,839
Fortunately, there was a slide.
497
00:24:33,839 --> 00:24:36,709
I stepped into the abyss,
fell into the slide,
498
00:24:36,709 --> 00:24:38,844
flew down to the
bottom of the thing,
499
00:24:38,844 --> 00:24:43,582
and then you hit, feet running.
500
00:24:43,582 --> 00:24:45,918
LAURA BRENTLINGER: The slide
kind of kicked me up and flew
501
00:24:45,918 --> 00:24:49,088
me up into the air, and
my thought was, oh my god,
502
00:24:49,088 --> 00:24:50,556
I'm going to survive
this whole thing,
503
00:24:50,556 --> 00:24:53,392
and I'm going to get wiped
out here on the evacuation.
504
00:24:53,392 --> 00:24:55,661
Because it just really threw me.
505
00:24:55,661 --> 00:24:57,897
And I landed and
scraped up my legs
506
00:24:57,897 --> 00:25:00,833
pretty badly, and
landed on my feet.
507
00:25:00,833 --> 00:25:04,403
And it wasn't until that
moment that I had the sense of,
508
00:25:04,403 --> 00:25:06,539
I'm here, I'm OK,
I'm on the ground.
509
00:25:10,076 --> 00:25:13,779
DAVID CRONIN: When we
got all our switches off,
510
00:25:13,779 --> 00:25:15,681
I ran through the
airplane, made sure there
511
00:25:15,681 --> 00:25:18,317
wasn't no one else on the
airplane, came up to the door--
512
00:25:18,317 --> 00:25:19,185
one left--
513
00:25:19,185 --> 00:25:20,953
and went down the slide.
514
00:25:20,953 --> 00:25:22,421
And I came around
the front, and I
515
00:25:22,421 --> 00:25:24,390
saw that humongous
hole in the side,
516
00:25:24,390 --> 00:25:25,691
and I just couldn't believe it.
517
00:25:33,065 --> 00:25:34,533
By the grace of god, we made it.
518
00:25:34,533 --> 00:25:36,936
And it was an
awesome experience.
519
00:25:36,936 --> 00:25:40,206
I would never want to
go through that again.
520
00:25:40,206 --> 00:25:41,474
LINDA BAHNA: It was crazy.
521
00:25:41,474 --> 00:25:42,475
It was wild.
522
00:25:42,475 --> 00:25:51,851
It was scary, all
at the same time,
523
00:25:51,851 --> 00:25:54,353
I just thought that that was the
end, that we were going to die.
524
00:25:54,353 --> 00:25:57,123
I mean, that was
my first thought--
525
00:25:57,123 --> 00:25:58,524
that this is the end.
526
00:26:03,562 --> 00:26:05,397
NARRATOR: But for the
families of the nine people
527
00:26:05,397 --> 00:26:08,934
who were killed, the
ordeal was just beginning.
528
00:26:08,934 --> 00:26:13,639
Kevin and Susan Campbell's
son, Lee, had been flying home.
529
00:26:13,639 --> 00:26:16,142
KEVIN CAMPBELL: About
3:00 in the afternoon,
530
00:26:16,142 --> 00:26:20,546
I think they said that there
was no New Zealanders involved.
531
00:26:20,546 --> 00:26:24,450
But we just knew
that it was Lee.
532
00:26:24,450 --> 00:26:27,353
And then, about, I suppose,
1/4 of an hour later,
533
00:26:27,353 --> 00:26:30,156
we got a phone
call from Chicago.
534
00:26:30,156 --> 00:26:32,291
And they just said
that they regret
535
00:26:32,291 --> 00:26:36,362
to inform us that our son
was missing, presumed dead.
536
00:26:36,362 --> 00:26:39,899
And I guess about
another hour after that,
537
00:26:39,899 --> 00:26:41,834
a policeman arrived at the door.
538
00:26:41,834 --> 00:26:43,669
And he took one look
at us, and he says,
539
00:26:43,669 --> 00:26:46,605
I can see that
you've had the news.
540
00:26:46,605 --> 00:26:48,674
So it was just--
541
00:26:48,674 --> 00:26:52,711
just an awful, awful day.
542
00:26:52,711 --> 00:26:56,949
And it certainly didn't get much
better for a long, long time.
543
00:27:03,622 --> 00:27:06,158
NARRATOR: Although Lee's
body had not been recovered,
544
00:27:06,158 --> 00:27:08,794
the Campbells flew straight
to the wrecked aircraft
545
00:27:08,794 --> 00:27:10,262
in Honolulu.
546
00:27:10,262 --> 00:27:13,132
KEVIN CAMPBELL: Your initial
feeling is that you want to be
547
00:27:13,132 --> 00:27:19,538
as close to the spot
where your relative died,
548
00:27:19,538 --> 00:27:20,940
and that was the aircraft.
549
00:27:20,940 --> 00:27:27,146
So we had to immediately
go and see the aircraft.
550
00:27:27,146 --> 00:27:29,248
SUSAN CAMPBELL: The damage
inside was horrific.
551
00:27:29,248 --> 00:27:31,550
Just a total mess.
552
00:27:31,550 --> 00:27:33,819
And the hole in the
side of the aircraft
553
00:27:33,819 --> 00:27:36,922
was much bigger than I
had thought it would be,
554
00:27:36,922 --> 00:27:41,827
even though we had seen
television newsreel reports.
555
00:27:41,827 --> 00:27:43,963
And it was so sad to
get in and actually
556
00:27:43,963 --> 00:27:46,632
see where Lee's seat had been.
557
00:27:46,632 --> 00:27:49,034
The legs of the seat
were still there.
558
00:27:49,034 --> 00:27:52,871
There was a good bit of fuselage
beside him, and still a window.
559
00:27:56,242 --> 00:27:57,443
NARRATOR: But the
Campbells' desire
560
00:27:57,443 --> 00:28:00,246
to find the cause of
Lee's death inevitably
561
00:28:00,246 --> 00:28:03,983
brought them face-to-face
with dreadful details.
562
00:28:03,983 --> 00:28:07,853
They took us to the medical
examiner's office as well.
563
00:28:07,853 --> 00:28:12,157
Because they had found body
parts and that sort of thing.
564
00:28:12,157 --> 00:28:16,528
So they didn't actually
show us the body parts,
565
00:28:16,528 --> 00:28:18,097
but they showed us bits
and pieces that they
566
00:28:18,097 --> 00:28:20,032
had recovered from the engines.
567
00:28:20,032 --> 00:28:23,902
And we got the medical
examiner's report
568
00:28:23,902 --> 00:28:26,472
on what they had recovered.
569
00:28:26,472 --> 00:28:29,608
So you know, we really would
have preferred that it was Lee
570
00:28:29,608 --> 00:28:31,143
that went through the
engine, because it would
571
00:28:31,143 --> 00:28:33,212
have been an immediate death.
572
00:28:33,212 --> 00:28:35,848
Because it was a four-minute
fall down to the ocean,
573
00:28:35,848 --> 00:28:37,883
and we know that the
people could have been
574
00:28:37,883 --> 00:28:39,952
alive as they were falling.
575
00:28:39,952 --> 00:28:43,822
And when you think about
that, that's just horrific.
576
00:28:43,822 --> 00:28:46,425
NARRATOR: As it became clear
that their son's body would
577
00:28:46,425 --> 00:28:48,694
never be found,
the Campbells' need
578
00:28:48,694 --> 00:28:51,263
to find the cause of the
accident that killed him
579
00:28:51,263 --> 00:28:54,400
grew stronger.
580
00:28:54,400 --> 00:28:56,335
Lee kind of died for nothing.
581
00:28:56,335 --> 00:28:59,071
You know, you've got to
find out why he died,
582
00:28:59,071 --> 00:29:02,441
and you've just got to make sure
that it never happens again.
583
00:29:09,482 --> 00:29:12,151
NARRATOR: Susan and Kevin
Campbell traveled to America
584
00:29:12,151 --> 00:29:14,320
to begin researching
possible causes
585
00:29:14,320 --> 00:29:17,123
of the disaster on flight 811.
586
00:29:17,123 --> 00:29:19,592
With the cargo door at
the bottom of the ocean,
587
00:29:19,592 --> 00:29:23,829
no one had any hard evidence.
588
00:29:23,829 --> 00:29:26,565
MAN: The engines
number 3 and 4--
589
00:29:26,565 --> 00:29:29,468
NARRATOR: Two months after
the accident on flight 811,
590
00:29:29,468 --> 00:29:32,071
the NTSB held
preliminary hearings,
591
00:29:32,071 --> 00:29:33,973
and the Campbells were there.
592
00:29:33,973 --> 00:29:36,041
But they soon grew frustrated.
593
00:29:36,041 --> 00:29:39,545
The NTSB would not complete
its report for months.
594
00:29:39,545 --> 00:29:42,381
The Campbells
wanted answers now.
595
00:29:42,381 --> 00:29:44,150
--the probable
cause of this accident
596
00:29:44,150 --> 00:29:45,351
was the sudden opening--
597
00:29:45,351 --> 00:29:47,953
We certainly weren't going
to leave it to the NTSB
598
00:29:47,953 --> 00:29:48,988
to come up with the findings.
599
00:29:48,988 --> 00:29:51,123
We were going to follow through.
600
00:29:51,123 --> 00:29:52,491
And when the
hearings ended, they
601
00:29:52,491 --> 00:29:54,059
had said that we
could take whatever
602
00:29:54,059 --> 00:29:55,728
we wanted off the press table.
603
00:29:55,728 --> 00:29:59,098
And Susan walked up to the
top table and yelled out,
604
00:29:59,098 --> 00:30:01,801
there's a really
good set up here.
605
00:30:01,801 --> 00:30:06,505
So I grabbed a box and loaded
in all of the documents
606
00:30:06,505 --> 00:30:08,240
that we could find up there.
607
00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:10,743
Kevin's the most
honest of people I know.
608
00:30:10,743 --> 00:30:12,778
But here he was,
taking something
609
00:30:12,778 --> 00:30:16,749
that we hadn't specifically
been told we could take.
610
00:30:16,749 --> 00:30:18,284
KEVIN CAMPBELL: And we're
heading out the door
611
00:30:18,284 --> 00:30:21,220
just as the NTSB were arriving
back in with the trolley
612
00:30:21,220 --> 00:30:23,222
to pick up all their documents.
613
00:30:23,222 --> 00:30:25,558
So we were out the door
and into a taxi and gone.
614
00:30:31,063 --> 00:30:33,933
SUSAN CAMPBELL: So we quickly
realized we'd got a really good
615
00:30:33,933 --> 00:30:36,302
set of papers, with a
lot of things that hadn't
616
00:30:36,302 --> 00:30:38,671
been released to the public.
617
00:30:38,671 --> 00:30:40,940
We were able to really
start our investigation
618
00:30:40,940 --> 00:30:42,341
in earnest at that stage.
619
00:30:49,782 --> 00:30:51,784
NARRATOR: With the
NTSB investigation
620
00:30:51,784 --> 00:30:56,188
ongoing, suddenly, the
Campbells had an insider's view.
621
00:30:56,188 --> 00:30:59,959
Documents revealed that other
cargo doors opened inward,
622
00:30:59,959 --> 00:31:01,994
so the plane's internal
pressure helped
623
00:31:01,994 --> 00:31:04,563
jam the door into its frame.
624
00:31:04,563 --> 00:31:08,300
But the cargo door on
the 747 opened outward,
625
00:31:08,300 --> 00:31:11,170
allowing for more cargo
space, but requiring
626
00:31:11,170 --> 00:31:15,341
a more robust locking system
to handle the pressure.
627
00:31:15,341 --> 00:31:18,043
What they do is they build
in multiple redundancies
628
00:31:18,043 --> 00:31:19,645
to make sure the
door is properly
629
00:31:19,645 --> 00:31:22,848
latched and does not open.
630
00:31:22,848 --> 00:31:27,620
And you build an end to a point
that it's extremely improbable
631
00:31:27,620 --> 00:31:29,054
that the door would ever open.
632
00:31:32,992 --> 00:31:37,530
NARRATOR: So what went
wrong with flight 811?
633
00:31:37,530 --> 00:31:40,399
Kevin Campbell thought the
problem lay in the design
634
00:31:40,399 --> 00:31:41,800
of the locking mechanism.
635
00:31:44,370 --> 00:31:47,439
To lock the cargo
door on the 747,
636
00:31:47,439 --> 00:31:50,409
electric motors rotate
C-shaped latches
637
00:31:50,409 --> 00:31:52,478
around pins in the door frame.
638
00:31:52,478 --> 00:31:55,347
A handle then moves
arms known as locking
639
00:31:55,347 --> 00:31:58,484
sectors over the
top of the C latches
640
00:31:58,484 --> 00:32:00,219
to prevent them from reopening.
641
00:32:07,026 --> 00:32:09,361
Campbell, an
engineer by training,
642
00:32:09,361 --> 00:32:12,531
built a model to approximate
the Boeing design.
643
00:32:12,531 --> 00:32:14,133
KEVIN CAMPBELL: Initially,
the locking sectors
644
00:32:14,133 --> 00:32:15,634
were made in aluminum.
645
00:32:15,634 --> 00:32:18,203
And in 1975, Boeing
realized that they weren't
646
00:32:18,203 --> 00:32:21,640
strong enough, and they
actually doubled up the aluminum
647
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:23,542
to make it double thickness.
648
00:32:23,542 --> 00:32:26,378
But it still wasn't
strong enough.
649
00:32:26,378 --> 00:32:27,880
And a lot of the
airlines didn't even
650
00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,015
put the doublers on anyway.
651
00:32:30,015 --> 00:32:32,117
NARRATOR: He thought the
weakness of the aluminum
652
00:32:32,117 --> 00:32:35,955
increased the risk of the
door accidentally opening.
653
00:32:35,955 --> 00:32:38,624
With the aluminum
locking sectors,
654
00:32:38,624 --> 00:32:42,261
if the C-locks
tried to back-wind,
655
00:32:42,261 --> 00:32:45,531
open electrically, it
would just push the locking
656
00:32:45,531 --> 00:32:48,167
sector out of the way.
657
00:32:48,167 --> 00:32:50,903
It just simply wasn't up to the
job that it was designed for.
658
00:32:53,572 --> 00:32:55,274
NARRATOR: If
Campbell was correct,
659
00:32:55,274 --> 00:32:58,577
this could happen again, and
more lives were at stake.
660
00:33:01,513 --> 00:33:04,683
They redoubled their efforts to
conduct their own investigation
661
00:33:04,683 --> 00:33:09,688
into the flight that killed
their son and eight others.
662
00:33:09,688 --> 00:33:12,625
SUSAN CAMPBELL: We bought a
car and set off in the United
663
00:33:12,625 --> 00:33:16,128
States to see as many
people who were involved
664
00:33:16,128 --> 00:33:18,731
with the accident as possible.
665
00:33:18,731 --> 00:33:24,303
We started at Seattle, down
to Denver, across to Chicago,
666
00:33:24,303 --> 00:33:30,943
through to Washington, DC,
down to Kentucky, on to Miami,
667
00:33:30,943 --> 00:33:36,315
and back across to San Diego,
back up through San Francisco,
668
00:33:36,315 --> 00:33:38,484
back to Seattle.
669
00:33:38,484 --> 00:33:39,918
And that was just one trip.
670
00:33:42,721 --> 00:33:44,123
NARRATOR: The Campbells
soon discovered
671
00:33:44,123 --> 00:33:47,126
a similar incident to
flight 811 when cargo
672
00:33:47,126 --> 00:33:49,094
doors had failed mid-flight.
673
00:33:52,197 --> 00:33:56,068
In 1987, two years
before flight 811,
674
00:33:56,068 --> 00:33:59,038
a Pan Am 747 had
been climbing out
675
00:33:59,038 --> 00:34:03,609
of Heathrow when it had failed
to pressurize at 20,000 feet.
676
00:34:03,609 --> 00:34:06,912
The pilots had to turn back.
677
00:34:06,912 --> 00:34:09,314
When it got back to Heathrow,
they found that the door was
678
00:34:09,314 --> 00:34:11,350
hanging open an inch and
a half at the bottom,
679
00:34:11,350 --> 00:34:14,887
and all of the locks were open.
680
00:34:14,887 --> 00:34:16,522
When it got to the
maintenance base,
681
00:34:16,522 --> 00:34:20,125
they found that all
of the locking sectors
682
00:34:20,125 --> 00:34:23,128
were either bent or broken.
683
00:34:23,128 --> 00:34:24,563
NARRATOR: Boeing
blamed the failure
684
00:34:24,563 --> 00:34:27,099
on mishandling of the
door by the ground crew--
685
00:34:27,099 --> 00:34:28,600
a common problem.
686
00:34:28,600 --> 00:34:32,404
But Campbell thought it
didn't explain this problem.
687
00:34:32,404 --> 00:34:34,473
The door had been
closed manually.
688
00:34:34,473 --> 00:34:36,675
And what they said
happened was that the guy
689
00:34:36,675 --> 00:34:39,011
wound the C-locks closed--
690
00:34:39,011 --> 00:34:41,547
98 turns of a speed wrench.
691
00:34:41,547 --> 00:34:46,719
He closed the outer handle,
and then wound it open again.
692
00:34:46,719 --> 00:34:49,621
And to be in the position
that they were found in when
693
00:34:49,621 --> 00:34:50,989
the aircraft got
back, he would have
694
00:34:50,989 --> 00:34:53,859
had to wind them open
98 turns, and that's
695
00:34:53,859 --> 00:34:56,061
just absolutely ridiculous.
696
00:34:56,061 --> 00:34:57,863
NARRATOR: Were the
doors really getting
697
00:34:57,863 --> 00:35:00,933
mishandled by ground crew,
weakening the latches?
698
00:35:00,933 --> 00:35:04,203
Or was there a problem
baked into the system?
699
00:35:04,203 --> 00:35:07,940
Campbell suspected
an electrical fault.
700
00:35:07,940 --> 00:35:11,243
It had a fault in the S2
master latch lock switch
701
00:35:11,243 --> 00:35:14,413
that should have turned
off the power to the door
702
00:35:14,413 --> 00:35:15,814
when the outer
handle was closed.
703
00:35:19,518 --> 00:35:21,620
NARRATOR: When the
outer handle was closed,
704
00:35:21,620 --> 00:35:24,123
the S2 master lock
switch was meant
705
00:35:24,123 --> 00:35:27,659
to disconnect the power supply
and stop the C-latch motors
706
00:35:27,659 --> 00:35:28,727
from turning.
707
00:35:28,727 --> 00:35:31,029
So could this have
failed, allowing
708
00:35:31,029 --> 00:35:33,432
the motors to open the door?
709
00:35:33,432 --> 00:35:36,568
Boeing asked the airlines
to do a simple test.
710
00:35:36,568 --> 00:35:39,238
Close the outer
handle, then press
711
00:35:39,238 --> 00:35:41,106
the switch to open the door.
712
00:35:41,106 --> 00:35:44,376
It should remain closed,
but in some cases,
713
00:35:44,376 --> 00:35:46,145
the door tried to open.
714
00:35:46,145 --> 00:35:49,081
KEVIN CAMPBELL: When they hit
the switch, it actually worked.
715
00:35:49,081 --> 00:35:51,383
Boeing thought, this
is not going to work,
716
00:35:51,383 --> 00:35:52,484
but it actually worked.
717
00:35:52,484 --> 00:35:54,653
There was power
to the door locks,
718
00:35:54,653 --> 00:35:58,290
with the outer handle closed.
719
00:35:58,290 --> 00:36:00,259
And the lock started
to move, and it
720
00:36:00,259 --> 00:36:03,962
started to force the locking
sectors out of the way.
721
00:36:03,962 --> 00:36:06,932
And a few days
later, the airlines
722
00:36:06,932 --> 00:36:09,835
started ringing in and saying
it was damaging their planes.
723
00:36:09,835 --> 00:36:12,337
So Boeing stopped
the test, but it
724
00:36:12,337 --> 00:36:15,841
meant that on those aircraft,
the S2 switch had failed, which
725
00:36:15,841 --> 00:36:18,544
is a silent failure, and
all of those aircraft
726
00:36:18,544 --> 00:36:22,581
were likely to have the
same problem as 811.
727
00:36:22,581 --> 00:36:24,516
They were just waiting
for a short circuit
728
00:36:24,516 --> 00:36:26,251
to open the doors.
729
00:36:26,251 --> 00:36:28,253
NARRATOR: The Campbells
now became convinced
730
00:36:28,253 --> 00:36:32,491
that the accident on flight 811
began with a failure of the S2
731
00:36:32,491 --> 00:36:33,659
switch.
732
00:36:33,659 --> 00:36:36,862
Power remained on to
the C-latch motors.
733
00:36:36,862 --> 00:36:39,264
All it might take would
be a short circuit
734
00:36:39,264 --> 00:36:43,902
in an aging plane's wiring
to start the motors up.
735
00:36:43,902 --> 00:36:46,471
The aluminum locking sectors
would be through waiting
736
00:36:46,471 --> 00:36:49,308
to stop the latches
turning, and the cargo door
737
00:36:49,308 --> 00:36:50,342
could burst open.
738
00:36:55,114 --> 00:36:57,283
The National
Transportation Safety Board
739
00:36:57,283 --> 00:36:59,953
determines that the probable
cause of this accident
740
00:36:59,953 --> 00:37:01,221
was the sudden--
741
00:37:01,221 --> 00:37:03,856
NARRATOR: After waiting a
year for the NTSB report,
742
00:37:03,856 --> 00:37:05,925
Kevin and Susan
Campbell expected
743
00:37:05,925 --> 00:37:08,061
it to match their
theory of what had led
744
00:37:08,061 --> 00:37:10,430
to the accident on flight 811.
745
00:37:10,430 --> 00:37:12,699
I'd assumed that we would have
a report come out that this was
746
00:37:12,699 --> 00:37:15,101
an electrical
malfunction, and were
747
00:37:15,101 --> 00:37:17,670
staggered when they came out
and said that the door had
748
00:37:17,670 --> 00:37:18,871
been mishandled.
749
00:37:18,871 --> 00:37:21,441
The report focused
entirely on the fact
750
00:37:21,441 --> 00:37:24,410
that the door lock must
have been mishandled
751
00:37:24,410 --> 00:37:27,480
by the ramp attendant.
752
00:37:27,480 --> 00:37:29,349
That was disappointing.
753
00:37:29,349 --> 00:37:33,653
And we felt that they must have
been at a different hearing
754
00:37:33,653 --> 00:37:36,289
from the one we were at.
755
00:37:36,289 --> 00:37:40,627
NARRATOR: So how had the NTSB
come to their conclusion?
756
00:37:40,627 --> 00:37:42,895
There was other
evidence that we had found
757
00:37:42,895 --> 00:37:46,733
during our investigation
of improper procedures
758
00:37:46,733 --> 00:37:49,902
by the United mechanics
and ramp people.
759
00:37:49,902 --> 00:37:52,605
So we were convinced
that there was--
760
00:37:52,605 --> 00:37:55,642
we could use the word, "abuse,"
being done on the doors.
761
00:37:55,642 --> 00:37:58,144
The doors were sort
of abused and weren't
762
00:37:58,144 --> 00:37:59,746
maintained very well.
763
00:37:59,746 --> 00:38:04,684
We concluded that the
probable cause was mechanical.
764
00:38:04,684 --> 00:38:07,520
NARRATOR: The Campbells thought
the NTSB report was simply
765
00:38:07,520 --> 00:38:11,124
incomplete and incorrect.
766
00:38:11,124 --> 00:38:15,595
What they said happened
was, the door was closed.
767
00:38:15,595 --> 00:38:18,398
The locks didn't fully close.
768
00:38:18,398 --> 00:38:23,636
The doors partially closed,
just hanging on the pins.
769
00:38:23,636 --> 00:38:25,038
And then, they closed
the outer handle,
770
00:38:25,038 --> 00:38:27,940
but that just
simply can't happen.
771
00:38:27,940 --> 00:38:31,010
Because that part of the
locking sector is still intact.
772
00:38:31,010 --> 00:38:34,147
It just simply can't happen.
773
00:38:34,147 --> 00:38:37,216
You can't close the outer
handle, unless these are
774
00:38:37,216 --> 00:38:40,119
in the fully locked position.
775
00:38:40,119 --> 00:38:43,056
It's the only way that the
outer handle will close.
776
00:38:43,056 --> 00:38:45,925
And just closing
this manually, you
777
00:38:45,925 --> 00:38:49,529
can't exert enough force to
actually damage this part
778
00:38:49,529 --> 00:38:50,897
of the locking sector.
779
00:38:50,897 --> 00:38:53,099
All it does is just
backs up against there.
780
00:38:53,099 --> 00:38:55,068
If the locks aren't
fully closed,
781
00:38:55,068 --> 00:38:58,004
it just simply backs up against
them and goes no further.
782
00:39:06,813 --> 00:39:09,816
NARRATOR: The Campbells didn't
accept the NTSB findings
783
00:39:09,816 --> 00:39:10,616
and kept digging.
784
00:39:19,492 --> 00:39:22,362
After the Pan Am
incident in 1987,
785
00:39:22,362 --> 00:39:25,064
it turned out that Boeing
had issued a directive
786
00:39:25,064 --> 00:39:28,167
to the airlines on how to
correct the weak aluminum
787
00:39:28,167 --> 00:39:30,870
locking sectors.
788
00:39:30,870 --> 00:39:33,172
RON SCHLEEDE: The
directive that came out
789
00:39:33,172 --> 00:39:36,209
was to replace the
aluminum sectors with steel
790
00:39:36,209 --> 00:39:38,077
sectors that could not be bent.
791
00:39:38,077 --> 00:39:41,481
And there were additionally
some interim requirements
792
00:39:41,481 --> 00:39:44,884
for inspections to be
performed until what
793
00:39:44,884 --> 00:39:47,553
they call terminating
action-- the steel
794
00:39:47,553 --> 00:39:48,788
sectors were installed.
795
00:39:52,525 --> 00:39:54,394
NARRATOR: The Federal
Aviation Administration
796
00:39:54,394 --> 00:39:57,397
required these improvements
but gave the airlines
797
00:39:57,397 --> 00:39:58,898
18 months to comply.
798
00:40:05,805 --> 00:40:08,474
Within a year, Lee
Campbell and eight others
799
00:40:08,474 --> 00:40:17,683
would die on flight 811.
800
00:40:17,683 --> 00:40:20,286
After the deaths,
the FAA instantly
801
00:40:20,286 --> 00:40:23,623
shortened the deadline
for fixing the cargo door
802
00:40:23,623 --> 00:40:26,459
from 18 months to just 30 days.
803
00:40:31,297 --> 00:40:35,234
Still thinking the
NTSB got it wrong,
804
00:40:35,234 --> 00:40:38,204
the Campbells took
their case to the press
805
00:40:38,204 --> 00:40:40,540
and were invited
to United Airlines.
806
00:40:40,540 --> 00:40:41,941
KEVIN CAMPBELL: One
of them actually
807
00:40:41,941 --> 00:40:47,046
broke down, because they'd never
had to meet next of kin before.
808
00:40:47,046 --> 00:40:51,217
And Eddie ended up with the
vice president of United
809
00:40:51,217 --> 00:40:54,520
taking us around the
maintenance facility.
810
00:40:54,520 --> 00:40:56,722
And he had people running
off in all directions
811
00:40:56,722 --> 00:41:00,293
just to get the information that
we wanted, questions answered.
812
00:41:00,293 --> 00:41:03,062
We could go anywhere
that we wanted.
813
00:41:03,062 --> 00:41:06,432
And we just-- everything
was laid on for us,
814
00:41:06,432 --> 00:41:08,534
because at that
stage, they realized
815
00:41:08,534 --> 00:41:12,505
that we really did know
what we were talking about.
816
00:41:12,505 --> 00:41:16,709
NARRATOR: Other families of
the victims added pressure.
817
00:41:16,709 --> 00:41:20,112
The vital piece of evidence,
flight 811's cargo door,
818
00:41:20,112 --> 00:41:24,484
still laid 2 miles down
in the Pacific Ocean.
819
00:41:24,484 --> 00:41:27,019
With headlines driving
up public interest,
820
00:41:27,019 --> 00:41:32,658
the NTSB commissioned the
US Navy to search for it.
821
00:41:32,658 --> 00:41:36,095
100 miles south of
Honolulu, a deep submersible
822
00:41:36,095 --> 00:41:37,597
began to trawl the seabed.
823
00:41:40,299 --> 00:41:41,934
KEVIN CAMPBELL: We
went to Honolulu
824
00:41:41,934 --> 00:41:45,538
and waited there while
they had their attempts.
825
00:41:45,538 --> 00:41:47,673
And they finally
recovered the door
826
00:41:47,673 --> 00:41:50,643
from 14,000 feet of water,
which was the deepest
827
00:41:50,643 --> 00:41:53,579
recovery ever at that time.
828
00:41:53,579 --> 00:41:55,581
And we were phoned
within an hour
829
00:41:55,581 --> 00:41:58,351
of it coming out of the water.
830
00:41:58,351 --> 00:42:00,887
NARRATOR: The recovered door
came under intense scrutiny.
831
00:42:05,324 --> 00:42:09,896
Then, in June 1991, another
incident appeared to confirm
832
00:42:09,896 --> 00:42:11,264
the Campbells' theory.
833
00:42:11,264 --> 00:42:15,034
A four-year-old United 747 was
sitting on the apron in New
834
00:42:15,034 --> 00:42:18,070
York when the C-latch
motor started up
835
00:42:18,070 --> 00:42:20,339
and the door opened itself.
836
00:42:20,339 --> 00:42:24,043
After recovery of the
door was that in fact,
837
00:42:24,043 --> 00:42:26,145
the actual pieces had--
838
00:42:26,145 --> 00:42:28,247
NARRATOR: Finally,
the NTSB publicly
839
00:42:28,247 --> 00:42:30,349
issued a revised
report that concurred
840
00:42:30,349 --> 00:42:32,151
with the Campbells' version.
841
00:42:32,151 --> 00:42:36,255
There was an inadvertent
failure of either the switch
842
00:42:36,255 --> 00:42:39,792
or the wiring that caused
an uncommanded opening
843
00:42:39,792 --> 00:42:41,460
of the door.
844
00:42:41,460 --> 00:42:43,462
KEVIN CAMPBELL: It's nice that
other people know that you're
845
00:42:43,462 --> 00:42:46,933
right and had been all along,
and that the support that they
846
00:42:46,933 --> 00:42:50,736
had given you was vindicated.
847
00:42:50,736 --> 00:42:52,271
NARRATOR: The Campbells
spent thousands
848
00:42:52,271 --> 00:42:55,875
of dollars of their own
money on their campaign.
849
00:42:55,875 --> 00:42:58,811
They were never interested in a
financial settlement for Lee's
850
00:42:58,811 --> 00:43:01,280
death, but they
did persuade United
851
00:43:01,280 --> 00:43:03,349
and Boeing to set
up a university
852
00:43:03,349 --> 00:43:06,319
scholarship in his name.
853
00:43:06,319 --> 00:43:07,620
SUSAN CAMPBELL: I
couldn't have lived
854
00:43:07,620 --> 00:43:11,657
with myself if we had done
no investigating ourselves.
855
00:43:11,657 --> 00:43:14,794
It was just something we
both felt we needed to do.
856
00:43:14,794 --> 00:43:16,228
We didn't even discuss it.
857
00:43:16,228 --> 00:43:18,898
We just knew that's
what we would do.
858
00:43:18,898 --> 00:43:19,699
Yeah.
859
00:43:25,738 --> 00:43:28,674
NARRATOR: For some of the
survivors of flight 811,
860
00:43:28,674 --> 00:43:31,143
the cost has been heavy.
861
00:43:31,143 --> 00:43:33,179
Each crew member
handled it differently.
862
00:43:33,179 --> 00:43:37,149
I know there are still two
crew members that have never
863
00:43:37,149 --> 00:43:40,252
set foot on an aircraft again.
864
00:43:40,252 --> 00:43:42,355
It was very difficult for me.
865
00:43:42,355 --> 00:43:47,159
I was diagnosed with severe
post-traumatic stress disorder.
866
00:43:47,159 --> 00:43:49,128
You can't reason.
867
00:43:49,128 --> 00:43:50,329
You can't think.
868
00:43:50,329 --> 00:43:54,867
Making the slightest
decision is very difficult.
869
00:43:54,867 --> 00:43:56,802
You're just at a total loss.
870
00:43:56,802 --> 00:43:59,805
So it was very
difficult to cope with.
67854
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