All language subtitles for 008 Reconnaissance with CentralOps (OBJ 2.1)

af Afrikaans
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bn Bengali
bs Bosnian
bg Bulgarian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian
cs Czech
da Danish
nl Dutch
en English
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
el Greek
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
km Khmer
ko Korean
ku Kurdish (Kurmanji)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Lao
la Latin
lv Latvian
lt Lithuanian
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
ne Nepali
no Norwegian
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt Portuguese
pa Punjabi
ro Romanian
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
st Sesotho
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhala
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
te Telugu
th Thai
tr Turkish
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese Download
cy Welsh
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
or Odia (Oriya)
rw Kinyarwanda
tk Turkmen
tt Tatar
ug Uyghur
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,210 --> 00:00:02,850 -: CentralOps.net and sites like it are a wonderful resource 2 00:00:02,850 --> 00:00:03,683 for the hacker, 3 00:00:03,683 --> 00:00:05,160 as it helps to provide some anonymity 4 00:00:05,160 --> 00:00:06,510 during our assessments. 5 00:00:06,510 --> 00:00:08,640 CentralOps allows us to create a Domain Dossier 6 00:00:08,640 --> 00:00:10,440 or Email Dossier on our victims. 7 00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:12,180 Gathering openly available information, 8 00:00:12,180 --> 00:00:13,800 such as the owner of the domain names, 9 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:14,970 the technical contacts, 10 00:00:14,970 --> 00:00:15,900 technical details, 11 00:00:15,900 --> 00:00:17,430 and the network ranges involved. 12 00:00:17,430 --> 00:00:19,830 This is key information that's required for us to gather 13 00:00:19,830 --> 00:00:21,660 as we attempt to understand the victim network 14 00:00:21,660 --> 00:00:23,550 and plan our attacks. 15 00:00:23,550 --> 00:00:26,280 We can use CentralOps from any computer with a web browser 16 00:00:26,280 --> 00:00:28,020 and since we already have our Kali machine connected 17 00:00:28,020 --> 00:00:30,180 to the internet, that's what we're gonna use. 18 00:00:30,180 --> 00:00:33,423 So from our Kali machine, we're gonna open up Firefox. 19 00:00:38,220 --> 00:00:40,443 From here, we're gonna go to CentralOps.net. 20 00:00:45,510 --> 00:00:47,160 So once we get to CentralOps.net, 21 00:00:47,160 --> 00:00:49,010 we're gonna go to the Domain Dossier. 22 00:00:50,910 --> 00:00:53,670 So now we need to pick a domain to look up or an IP address. 23 00:00:53,670 --> 00:00:55,743 For our example, I'm gonna use AVG. 24 00:00:57,330 --> 00:00:59,880 So AVG is an antivirus company located 25 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:00,810 in the Netherlands. 26 00:01:00,810 --> 00:01:02,160 So we're gonna look them up 27 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:03,870 and we're gonna choose all five options. 28 00:01:03,870 --> 00:01:06,270 We want the traceroute, the service scan, the DNS records 29 00:01:06,270 --> 00:01:08,283 the Whois of both network and domain. 30 00:01:09,600 --> 00:01:10,473 And then hit go. 31 00:01:12,570 --> 00:01:14,910 So the first thing we're gonna see, 32 00:01:14,910 --> 00:01:16,500 is our Address lookup 33 00:01:16,500 --> 00:01:19,650 and this is just gonna do a basic check of the name 34 00:01:19,650 --> 00:01:20,580 to the IP address. 35 00:01:20,580 --> 00:01:23,970 In this case, AVG will resolve to two different IP addresses 36 00:01:23,970 --> 00:01:25,570 as displayed here on the screen. 37 00:01:26,460 --> 00:01:28,800 After that we're gonna see the domain Whois record. 38 00:01:28,800 --> 00:01:32,010 Now with a large company like AVG or Yahoo or Google 39 00:01:32,010 --> 00:01:32,843 or somebody like that, 40 00:01:32,843 --> 00:01:34,800 you're not gonna get as much detailed information 41 00:01:34,800 --> 00:01:36,720 as you would if you had a small business. 42 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:37,890 So in this case we can look 43 00:01:37,890 --> 00:01:40,230 at who they registered their domain through? 44 00:01:40,230 --> 00:01:43,353 Which in this case was Mark Monitor Incorporated. 45 00:01:44,310 --> 00:01:45,630 So we can, we can see that 46 00:01:45,630 --> 00:01:47,670 and that might play into the spear phishing campaign 47 00:01:47,670 --> 00:01:50,270 but it's probably not real helpful for us right now. 48 00:01:51,240 --> 00:01:53,663 We're gonna go ahead and scroll down even further. 49 00:01:54,870 --> 00:01:56,700 The next thing we're gonna come to, 50 00:01:56,700 --> 00:01:58,500 is the detailed Whois record, 51 00:01:58,500 --> 00:02:01,200 and in here we're gonna see the registration information. 52 00:02:01,200 --> 00:02:03,510 We're gonna see who the person is registered to. 53 00:02:03,510 --> 00:02:05,550 In our case, since it's a large company 54 00:02:05,550 --> 00:02:07,590 they just put in Domain Administrator. 55 00:02:07,590 --> 00:02:09,960 If it's a small business, you'll usually see the owner 56 00:02:09,960 --> 00:02:10,830 of the business's name 57 00:02:10,830 --> 00:02:12,660 or their technical support people. 58 00:02:12,660 --> 00:02:13,770 You also will get information, 59 00:02:13,770 --> 00:02:15,270 such as where they are. 60 00:02:15,270 --> 00:02:17,790 In this case they are located in Amsterdam, 61 00:02:17,790 --> 00:02:19,860 with the street name listed there. 62 00:02:19,860 --> 00:02:21,210 You also get phone numbers. 63 00:02:21,210 --> 00:02:24,300 This can be useful as part of a pre-texting campaign as well 64 00:02:24,300 --> 00:02:26,220 and you'll get an email address. 65 00:02:26,220 --> 00:02:27,660 In the case of a large company like this, 66 00:02:27,660 --> 00:02:29,550 they probably are not monitoring this address 67 00:02:29,550 --> 00:02:32,160 but it's domainadministration@avg.com. 68 00:02:32,160 --> 00:02:33,870 If we had somebody's username in there, 69 00:02:33,870 --> 00:02:36,720 for instance Jason.Dion@avg.com, 70 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:38,250 that could tell us the naming structure 71 00:02:38,250 --> 00:02:39,540 for email addresses that could be useful 72 00:02:39,540 --> 00:02:41,010 in a spear phishing campaign, 73 00:02:41,010 --> 00:02:42,630 or a good point of contact to use 74 00:02:42,630 --> 00:02:44,190 as part of a spear phishing campaign, 75 00:02:44,190 --> 00:02:46,590 such as the technical registration point of contact. 76 00:02:46,590 --> 00:02:48,750 If we have that information, we can use that 77 00:02:48,750 --> 00:02:50,283 as a way into the network. 78 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:52,500 We're gonna continue scrolling down, 79 00:02:52,500 --> 00:02:53,800 see what else we can find. 80 00:02:56,610 --> 00:02:58,560 Again, Domain Administrator, 81 00:02:58,560 --> 00:02:59,820 Domain Administrator, 82 00:02:59,820 --> 00:03:00,900 not the most helpful thing 83 00:03:00,900 --> 00:03:03,660 because again, this is a large company. 84 00:03:03,660 --> 00:03:05,520 One of the things I noticed that's kind of interesting 85 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:06,750 is their name servers. 86 00:03:06,750 --> 00:03:09,150 If you notice they're using akam.net. 87 00:03:09,150 --> 00:03:11,580 Akam is actually a large network service provider. 88 00:03:11,580 --> 00:03:13,650 They actually can help prevent denial of service attacks 89 00:03:13,650 --> 00:03:14,490 from occurring. 90 00:03:14,490 --> 00:03:15,840 So if that was gonna be our strategy 91 00:03:15,840 --> 00:03:16,860 to take down this network, 92 00:03:16,860 --> 00:03:18,690 it may not work as well. 93 00:03:18,690 --> 00:03:19,620 If they're a small business, 94 00:03:19,620 --> 00:03:20,820 they're probably not using akam 95 00:03:20,820 --> 00:03:21,720 and that may be a way 96 00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:23,340 that you can take down their network. 97 00:03:23,340 --> 00:03:25,800 But again, a denial of service is never used 98 00:03:25,800 --> 00:03:26,633 in ethical hacking. 99 00:03:26,633 --> 00:03:28,260 There's really no reason for it, 100 00:03:28,260 --> 00:03:30,900 but it's something we can consider using our research here. 101 00:03:30,900 --> 00:03:32,520 We're gonna go down to the Network record. 102 00:03:32,520 --> 00:03:34,380 Now the Network Whois, 103 00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:35,640 is a little bit different. 104 00:03:35,640 --> 00:03:37,470 You'll notice here it actually gives us a range, 105 00:03:37,470 --> 00:03:41,190 93. 184. 217. 0 106 00:03:41,190 --> 00:03:42,840 up through 0.31, 107 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:45,960 is actually being owned and operated by AVG. 108 00:03:45,960 --> 00:03:48,180 That means they have 31 IP addresses 109 00:03:48,180 --> 00:03:50,220 30 of which are ratable on the internet. 110 00:03:50,220 --> 00:03:52,410 That is 30 possible targets, 111 00:03:52,410 --> 00:03:53,970 whether they're routers, firewalls, 112 00:03:53,970 --> 00:03:55,560 or actual servers tied to the internet 113 00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:56,910 that we could be looking at, 114 00:03:56,910 --> 00:03:59,210 if that is within the scope of our assessment. 115 00:04:00,630 --> 00:04:02,730 As we go down a little bit further, 116 00:04:02,730 --> 00:04:04,260 you can notice who actually registered 117 00:04:04,260 --> 00:04:07,710 for these IP addresses, Derrick Sawyer. 118 00:04:07,710 --> 00:04:09,720 So again, that can be a name that we can use 119 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:11,580 as part of a pre-texting campaign, 120 00:04:11,580 --> 00:04:12,750 it may be a name that we use 121 00:04:12,750 --> 00:04:15,060 as part of an email phishing campaign. 122 00:04:15,060 --> 00:04:17,130 Lots of different uses when we find good names 123 00:04:17,130 --> 00:04:19,740 and good email addresses for people. 124 00:04:19,740 --> 00:04:22,040 We're gonna go down into our DNS records next. 125 00:04:26,190 --> 00:04:29,400 So in our DNS records, you'll see the DNS records 126 00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:31,710 for avg.com. 127 00:04:31,710 --> 00:04:33,960 There's two address records as we saw earlier. 128 00:04:33,960 --> 00:04:37,230 We see 93.184.217.9 129 00:04:37,230 --> 00:04:40,380 and then we see 93.184.211.28. 130 00:04:40,380 --> 00:04:41,310 These are two different servers 131 00:04:41,310 --> 00:04:43,743 that are answering up for the name avg.com. 132 00:04:44,640 --> 00:04:45,630 This is probably being done 133 00:04:45,630 --> 00:04:47,670 because AVG is such a large company. 134 00:04:47,670 --> 00:04:49,050 One server couldn't handle the loads. 135 00:04:49,050 --> 00:04:52,140 So they have two servers that are acting as content switches 136 00:04:52,140 --> 00:04:54,510 to provide that service to their customers. 137 00:04:54,510 --> 00:04:56,220 And then again, we see a akam.net 138 00:04:56,220 --> 00:04:57,630 as the name servers answering up. 139 00:04:57,630 --> 00:04:59,850 So again, it's gonna be load sharing 140 00:04:59,850 --> 00:05:01,830 and helping to handle a large amount 141 00:05:01,830 --> 00:05:04,410 of load that would come against those servers. 142 00:05:04,410 --> 00:05:06,143 Next we're gonna look at Traceroute. 143 00:05:11,070 --> 00:05:14,130 So it starts out from the servers at CentralOps 144 00:05:14,130 --> 00:05:15,960 and goes out across the internet 145 00:05:15,960 --> 00:05:18,000 until it finds where it's going. 146 00:05:18,000 --> 00:05:20,340 In this case, once we get to the *** 147 00:05:20,340 --> 00:05:22,260 in line 10 through 13, 148 00:05:22,260 --> 00:05:24,150 that's usually where it hits firewalls 149 00:05:24,150 --> 00:05:26,160 and some companies will not respond to pings 150 00:05:26,160 --> 00:05:27,300 or Traceroutes. 151 00:05:27,300 --> 00:05:28,133 And the reason why 152 00:05:28,133 --> 00:05:29,940 is they don't want you mapping their network. 153 00:05:29,940 --> 00:05:31,950 So we know they have at least some firewalls 154 00:05:31,950 --> 00:05:33,570 and some border security there. 155 00:05:33,570 --> 00:05:34,830 Again, we already figured that out 156 00:05:34,830 --> 00:05:37,560 because of the akam.net being the ones answering up 157 00:05:37,560 --> 00:05:38,670 for their domain name. 158 00:05:38,670 --> 00:05:40,830 So we know that they're pretty secure. 159 00:05:40,830 --> 00:05:42,720 Now we'll move on to the Service scan. 160 00:05:42,720 --> 00:05:45,300 And here in the service scan you'll see that FTP Timed out, 161 00:05:45,300 --> 00:05:47,010 SMTP Timed out, 162 00:05:47,010 --> 00:05:49,380 web browsing port 80 is open. 163 00:05:49,380 --> 00:05:50,700 POP servers, IMAP server 164 00:05:50,700 --> 00:05:52,530 and HTTPS, all have timed out 165 00:05:52,530 --> 00:05:53,580 and this is pretty typical 166 00:05:53,580 --> 00:05:56,040 when using a large company like AVG. 167 00:05:56,040 --> 00:05:57,540 So let's do another Domain Dossier. 168 00:05:57,540 --> 00:05:59,690 This time we're gonna use a small business. 169 00:06:01,260 --> 00:06:04,270 from Domain Dossier, I'm gonna go to titancipher.com 170 00:06:07,950 --> 00:06:08,907 and I'm gonna use Service Scan 171 00:06:08,907 --> 00:06:11,493 and Traceroute, and then hit Go. 172 00:06:12,780 --> 00:06:14,940 Now titancipher.com is a domain that I own. 173 00:06:14,940 --> 00:06:16,890 It's hosted on a small server, 174 00:06:16,890 --> 00:06:18,960 it's used on a WordPress platform, 175 00:06:18,960 --> 00:06:20,640 which is actually hosted by Blue Host. 176 00:06:20,640 --> 00:06:23,280 And as we go through, you're gonna see that. 177 00:06:23,280 --> 00:06:24,450 It's gonna look a lot different 178 00:06:24,450 --> 00:06:26,550 than the AVG answers we got last time. 179 00:06:26,550 --> 00:06:30,570 So in this case, we have a single IP address 180 00:06:30,570 --> 00:06:32,330 which is answering up for TitanCipher. 181 00:06:32,330 --> 00:06:34,200 If we go into the domain records, you'll see 182 00:06:34,200 --> 00:06:36,750 that it's bluehost.com that tells me who they're using 183 00:06:36,750 --> 00:06:38,550 and the fact that they're using Bluehost tells you 184 00:06:38,550 --> 00:06:40,860 they're probably using WordPress as their platform 185 00:06:40,860 --> 00:06:42,360 because Bluehost is known for that. 186 00:06:42,360 --> 00:06:44,790 So if you could find vulnerabilities in WordPress 187 00:06:44,790 --> 00:06:47,490 you can then use those against that particular domain. 188 00:06:48,450 --> 00:06:49,440 Next we're gonna scroll down 189 00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:50,580 and you'll see more information 190 00:06:50,580 --> 00:06:52,080 about the actual person who owns it, 191 00:06:52,080 --> 00:06:53,520 their name their address, 192 00:06:53,520 --> 00:06:55,650 their phone numbers, their email addresses, 193 00:06:55,650 --> 00:06:57,500 all information that could be useful. 194 00:06:58,470 --> 00:06:59,910 Again, for a spear fishing campaign 195 00:06:59,910 --> 00:07:01,587 or something of that nature. 196 00:07:01,587 --> 00:07:02,820 Network Whois... 197 00:07:02,820 --> 00:07:04,170 so Network Whois again, 198 00:07:04,170 --> 00:07:06,180 that's gonna show us who owns the IP addresses. 199 00:07:06,180 --> 00:07:07,470 In this case, it's actually owned 200 00:07:07,470 --> 00:07:09,450 by Unified Layer Networks. 201 00:07:09,450 --> 00:07:10,950 They own a large block, 202 00:07:10,950 --> 00:07:12,870 then they've given part of that block to Blue host, 203 00:07:12,870 --> 00:07:16,080 who then gave a single IP to titancipher.com. 204 00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:18,840 So if you notice here, they have a class A address. 205 00:07:18,840 --> 00:07:22,680 So the /16, they're gonna have over 64,000 IPs. 206 00:07:22,680 --> 00:07:23,970 You don't wanna just go in there blindly 207 00:07:23,970 --> 00:07:25,530 and scan 64,000 IPs, 208 00:07:25,530 --> 00:07:28,320 if you're targeting one titancipher.com, 209 00:07:28,320 --> 00:07:29,370 it wouldn't make any sense. 210 00:07:29,370 --> 00:07:31,620 So this is gonna help you identify who owns the network 211 00:07:31,620 --> 00:07:33,330 and what parts of the network there are. 212 00:07:33,330 --> 00:07:34,950 I'm gonna scroll down a little further 213 00:07:38,580 --> 00:07:40,680 and we're gonna find the DNS records. 214 00:07:40,680 --> 00:07:42,540 Now the DNS records here are gonna show us 215 00:07:42,540 --> 00:07:44,513 that there's a name server answering up Bluehost.com. 216 00:07:45,527 --> 00:07:46,360 TitanCipher is being answered up 217 00:07:46,360 --> 00:07:48,180 by Bluehost who is their provider. 218 00:07:48,180 --> 00:07:51,360 They do have a mail server, mail.titancipher.com. 219 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:52,860 They do have an name server, 220 00:07:52,860 --> 00:07:54,990 second name server on Bluehost. 221 00:07:54,990 --> 00:07:57,873 We also see their A records, which is their IP address. 222 00:08:05,790 --> 00:08:07,620 Next, we can look at the Traceroute. 223 00:08:07,620 --> 00:08:09,600 This Traceroute you see looks a lot different 224 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:11,610 than the Traceroute we saw with AVG. 225 00:08:11,610 --> 00:08:13,530 In this case, everybody is answered up. 226 00:08:13,530 --> 00:08:14,910 We get both the IP addresses 227 00:08:14,910 --> 00:08:16,710 and the fully qualified domain names, 228 00:08:16,710 --> 00:08:18,180 so we know every single piece 229 00:08:18,180 --> 00:08:19,680 between CentralOps 230 00:08:19,680 --> 00:08:21,810 and that particular server that's answering up. 231 00:08:21,810 --> 00:08:25,680 Now notice the last server that answers up that 193, 232 00:08:25,680 --> 00:08:27,330 something quite interesting here. 233 00:08:27,330 --> 00:08:30,420 When it resolved, it didn't resolve to titancipher.com. 234 00:08:30,420 --> 00:08:32,010 Can you guess why? 235 00:08:32,010 --> 00:08:33,659 Well, the reason why is that this has showed us 236 00:08:33,659 --> 00:08:35,070 that it's a shared server. 237 00:08:35,070 --> 00:08:38,070 It's not owned exclusively by TitanCipher. 238 00:08:38,070 --> 00:08:40,799 In fact, it's owned by Unified Layer who owns Blue Host. 239 00:08:40,799 --> 00:08:43,860 So there may be 20, 30, 40, 50 different websites 240 00:08:43,860 --> 00:08:45,120 on this particular server. 241 00:08:45,120 --> 00:08:47,310 TitanCipher is just one of them. 242 00:08:47,310 --> 00:08:48,330 Now that's important to know 243 00:08:48,330 --> 00:08:50,700 because if you try to hack titancipher.com, 244 00:08:50,700 --> 00:08:52,620 you may not be hitting titancipher.com 245 00:08:52,620 --> 00:08:55,020 you may be hitting some of these other servers in there 246 00:08:55,020 --> 00:08:57,420 and if you do that, you'd now be breaking the law 247 00:08:57,420 --> 00:08:58,890 because you were only hired for an assessment 248 00:08:58,890 --> 00:09:00,330 by this one company. 249 00:09:00,330 --> 00:09:02,040 So you have to be very careful when you start looking 250 00:09:02,040 --> 00:09:03,060 at where they're hosted. 251 00:09:03,060 --> 00:09:04,740 This is really important information when we look 252 00:09:04,740 --> 00:09:05,883 at the Domain Dossier. 253 00:09:06,840 --> 00:09:09,083 Next we're gonna go down to our Service scan. 254 00:09:12,446 --> 00:09:14,700 In the Service scan, you'll see that they're using FTP. 255 00:09:14,700 --> 00:09:16,260 That's a known vulnerability for us 256 00:09:16,260 --> 00:09:17,790 and it even tells us what type of FTP. 257 00:09:17,790 --> 00:09:20,280 In this case, Pure-FTPd server. 258 00:09:20,280 --> 00:09:22,320 That's an important piece of information that we could use 259 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:24,090 if we were gonna hack this company. 260 00:09:24,090 --> 00:09:27,900 SMTP Timeout, therefore, it's not answering up for SMTP. 261 00:09:27,900 --> 00:09:28,733 That's good to know. 262 00:09:28,733 --> 00:09:30,780 Don't throw any SMTP attacks. 263 00:09:30,780 --> 00:09:32,730 They're...they are running a web server, 264 00:09:32,730 --> 00:09:35,880 they're running Nginx/1.10.2. 265 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:36,930 We now know the version number 266 00:09:36,930 --> 00:09:38,310 and the software they're using. 267 00:09:38,310 --> 00:09:40,350 That's useful to find vulnerabilities. 268 00:09:40,350 --> 00:09:41,340 Again, all we're doing here 269 00:09:41,340 --> 00:09:42,960 is information gathering, at this point. 270 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:44,400 POP3 server does answer up, 271 00:09:44,400 --> 00:09:46,560 so there is something listening there. 272 00:09:46,560 --> 00:09:49,260 IMAP-143, another mail server. 273 00:09:49,260 --> 00:09:50,820 It's answering up as well. 274 00:09:50,820 --> 00:09:52,620 Things that we need to take note of. 275 00:09:55,890 --> 00:09:57,090 If we get into their secure site, 276 00:09:57,090 --> 00:10:00,870 we see Port 443 secure HTTP server, 277 00:10:00,870 --> 00:10:02,220 so a secure https. 278 00:10:02,220 --> 00:10:04,380 We can see their SSL certificate here. 279 00:10:04,380 --> 00:10:07,170 They're using a shaw256RSA token 280 00:10:07,170 --> 00:10:09,570 as as their server validation. 281 00:10:09,570 --> 00:10:12,270 That is information that can be useful. 282 00:10:12,270 --> 00:10:14,970 BlueHost.com is the ones who gave them that information. 283 00:10:14,970 --> 00:10:16,020 So we might be able to use that 284 00:10:16,020 --> 00:10:18,390 as part of a spear phishing campaign again. 285 00:10:18,390 --> 00:10:20,520 You can see the fact that we have Apache running 286 00:10:20,520 --> 00:10:21,390 as the server. 287 00:10:21,390 --> 00:10:22,500 You see that, they're at the bottom. 288 00:10:22,500 --> 00:10:24,990 HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 289 00:10:24,990 --> 00:10:26,400 Server Apache. 290 00:10:26,400 --> 00:10:28,800 Again, more information that we wanna take note of. 291 00:10:28,800 --> 00:10:31,050 They also have a PHP session ID. 292 00:10:31,050 --> 00:10:32,880 That's something else that we could take note of. 293 00:10:32,880 --> 00:10:36,030 We see jasondin.com/wp. 294 00:10:36,030 --> 00:10:37,650 WP usually stands for WordPress, 295 00:10:37,650 --> 00:10:39,780 so that could be vulnerabilities we could take care of. 296 00:10:39,780 --> 00:10:41,460 So these are all different things that we can look at, 297 00:10:41,460 --> 00:10:43,830 as we move forward in our exploitation later on. 298 00:10:43,830 --> 00:10:45,030 The next thing we're gonna look at 299 00:10:45,030 --> 00:10:46,770 is our Email Dossier 300 00:10:46,770 --> 00:10:48,220 and we'll just click on that, 301 00:10:49,770 --> 00:10:51,030 and then we're gonna give an email address 302 00:10:51,030 --> 00:10:52,170 that we want to test out. 303 00:10:52,170 --> 00:10:54,780 If we had email.test@hotmail.com for instance, 304 00:10:54,780 --> 00:10:56,880 let's see if that's a valid email address. 305 00:10:57,810 --> 00:10:58,920 Click go. 306 00:10:58,920 --> 00:11:01,050 We find out that it is a bad email address 307 00:11:01,050 --> 00:11:03,540 because it was rejected by the server. 308 00:11:03,540 --> 00:11:05,220 Now instead, if I use an email address 309 00:11:05,220 --> 00:11:06,970 that I think is valid for instance: 310 00:11:10,140 --> 00:11:12,240 titancipher@gmail.com, 311 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:13,830 hit go. 312 00:11:13,830 --> 00:11:16,323 We'll see that this passed the validation test. 313 00:11:18,450 --> 00:11:19,283 As we scroll down, 314 00:11:19,283 --> 00:11:21,960 we'll see that it actually found the MX records for Google 315 00:11:21,960 --> 00:11:23,360 for that particular address. 316 00:11:25,230 --> 00:11:27,570 And when it tried to make a connection over SMTP to Google 317 00:11:27,570 --> 00:11:30,330 to say, does this email ad address exist? 318 00:11:30,330 --> 00:11:31,620 We can see that it did come back 319 00:11:31,620 --> 00:11:33,350 and say that it was successful... 320 00:11:34,560 --> 00:11:36,540 right here showing us 321 00:11:36,540 --> 00:11:39,570 that, that was a good valid email address. 322 00:11:39,570 --> 00:11:40,670 Let's try another one. 323 00:11:42,930 --> 00:11:45,020 What if we had one like... 324 00:11:48,720 --> 00:11:51,210 titancipher23@gmail.com? 325 00:11:51,210 --> 00:11:53,310 Let's see if that's a valid email address. 326 00:11:54,300 --> 00:11:55,680 We hit go. 327 00:11:55,680 --> 00:11:57,960 Bad address, does not exist. 328 00:11:57,960 --> 00:11:59,940 So if we tried to start sending spear phishing emails 329 00:11:59,940 --> 00:12:02,250 towards titancipher23@gmail.com, 330 00:12:02,250 --> 00:12:03,510 they would just get rejected. 331 00:12:03,510 --> 00:12:06,120 But titancipher@gmail.com does exist. 332 00:12:06,120 --> 00:12:07,770 It would be a valid address to use. 333 00:12:07,770 --> 00:12:09,030 Where this becomes helpful 334 00:12:09,030 --> 00:12:11,190 is when we start looking up information on the company. 335 00:12:11,190 --> 00:12:13,560 For instance, if we go back to AVG, 336 00:12:13,560 --> 00:12:17,730 if we think their naming scheme was first name.last name 337 00:12:17,730 --> 00:12:18,563 and we found a name 338 00:12:18,563 --> 00:12:21,390 of someone who we think is an employee, John Smith, 339 00:12:21,390 --> 00:12:25,350 we can try in here, john.smith@avg.com 340 00:12:25,350 --> 00:12:26,880 and see if it comes back as a valid 341 00:12:26,880 --> 00:12:28,080 or invalid address. 342 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:30,240 This will help us know what is good addresses 343 00:12:30,240 --> 00:12:31,470 and what are bad addresses. 344 00:12:31,470 --> 00:12:33,270 If you start sending a lot of emails 345 00:12:33,270 --> 00:12:35,490 to a server with bad email addresses, 346 00:12:35,490 --> 00:12:37,860 that server will start realizing that there's a spam coming 347 00:12:37,860 --> 00:12:40,740 from your address and they'll block you down. 348 00:12:40,740 --> 00:12:42,630 You always wanna be targeted in your approach. 349 00:12:42,630 --> 00:12:44,460 You don't wanna just shotgun things. 350 00:12:44,460 --> 00:12:46,560 You wanna be precise like a sniper. 351 00:12:46,560 --> 00:12:48,270 This is just one of the tools that you can use 352 00:12:48,270 --> 00:12:49,530 during a reconnaissance phase. 353 00:12:49,530 --> 00:12:50,550 There's literally hundreds 354 00:12:50,550 --> 00:12:52,110 of different tools available out there, 355 00:12:52,110 --> 00:12:52,943 but this is just one 356 00:12:52,943 --> 00:12:54,360 that I particularly happen to like. 357 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:56,070 I recommend that you try out various tools 358 00:12:56,070 --> 00:12:58,440 to figure out which one works for you and your style. 359 00:12:58,440 --> 00:13:00,090 This lesson was to show you the process 360 00:13:00,090 --> 00:13:01,290 that an attacker goes through 361 00:13:01,290 --> 00:13:03,240 in collecting some of the basic information they need 362 00:13:03,240 --> 00:13:04,940 in order to develop their attacks. 26171

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.