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In three months of the offensive, the Russian occupiers have set a record for losses.
The Russian offensive, which began in November 2023, may exhaust its potential by spring. At
the same time, the Russians have not achieved and are unlikely to achieve any important
results. But what losses have the occupiers suffered during the period of this offensive?
To assess the period of the offensive, let's take the full cycle from November
2023 to January 2024, that is, 3 months of combat operations.
The enemy losses from November 2023 to January 2024 were:
Personnel - 84,740; Tanks - 1,099; Armored fighting vehicles - 1,939; Barrel artillery
- 1,978; MLRS - 130; Vehicles - 2,643; Special vehicles - 443; Air defense - 100; Aviation - 11;
All 3 months were record-breaking in terms of personnel losses with the
absolute record in December - 29,970 personnel.
This is all due not only to the fact of the offensive itself,
but also to two very important circumstances. The first is the weather conditions.
Conducting an offensive in winter is always associated with an actual increase in losses,
and it was during this unfavorable period that the intensification of enemy offensive actions began.
The second, no less important circumstance is the lack of full staffing of units in terms of
equipment. In the offensive it is a very important indicator, allowing to save the
lives of the assaulting units, as well as providing fire support is critical in the
course of action on the battle line. Despite the fact that the Russians have significantly more
equipment than the Ukrainian Defense Forces, they do not have enough for the total number of units.
Also, the record increase in personnel losses is simultaneously due to the Russian
command's disregard for human lives and the growing shortage of equipment in the troops.
For two months in a row, the record for destroyed vehicles was set at 931 and 937,
respectively. These figures were also due to the growing shortage of armored fighting
vehicles in the Russian military and the increasing use of civilian vehicles instead.
Similarly with special vehicles, which were destroyed for two consecutive months on record.
In December, the second-highest number of lost tanks was recorded - 419,
and in November, the second highest number of Multiple rocket launchers losses was 66.
Since the start of the Russian occupation forces' fall-winter offensive campaign,
not a single critical settlement, city, transportation hub, etc.,
has been captured. Three months of intense combat operations were accompanied by high
and record losses for the Russian troops. During the three months in Ukraine, a number of Russian
occupiers comparable to the total number of some armies of the world were destroyed.
In addition, during the winter period, when it is desirable to go on the defensive and accumulate
forces, the Russians have only accelerated the process of depletion of their troops,
and in the spring they will come out not with accumulated potential,
but on the contrary - with the need to compensate for losses. This necessity
will also include mandatory mobilization after the so-called Russian presidential elections,
which will also affect the intensity of combat operations in the summer of 2024.
In fact, the offensive was supposed to "prove" to the electorate the success of
the so-called "special military operation" with the subsequent capture of Avdiivka,
Lyman and Kupiansk, but as they say, not this time.
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