All language subtitles for Oppenheimer 107.en

— Through another party?
— Yes,

— Could we know who?
— I think that would be a mistake,

I'll tell you for what reason,

Not to take this person to task in any way...

In December 7955,

President Eisenhower had been so alarmed by
charges that Oppenheimer was a Soviet agent

that he had ordered his security clearance
to be revoked

till his case could be properly investigated

So, unknown to Oppenheimer,
formal charges were instituted against him.

Much of the responsibility
for framing these charges

fell upon the Atomic Energy Commission’s
newly—appointed general manager.

(Door closes)

— General NichoLs?
— Yes?

— Harold Green.
— Ah. Come in, Harold.

— How Long have you been with the AEC?
— Three years.

They say you're the smartest young Lawyer
with a commission.

You've handled quite a few security cases,
haven't you?

I guess I have.

— You like the work?
— Very much.

Good... Good.

Cos I got one for ya.

J. Robert Oppenheimer.

He's a big fish.

Think you can handle him?

Yes, sir. Yes, I do.

Good. Now, what I want you to do

is to draw up a draft of charges
against Oppenheimer.

Have a look through his file.
Make your recommendations.

Yes, sir. Er... Which is Oppenheimer's file?

It's all Oppenheimer's file, Harold.

This is a fella who's up to his neck in it.
There's stuff from the 'SOs, early '40s.

A certain amount of material
on the post—war period.

Oppie's attitude towards the H—bomb,
air defence, his conduct as chairman of the GAC.

To my mind,
this is the most interesting material.

However, I have to tell you
that the commissioners of the AEC

have forbidden us to make use
of that post—war material.

Something about
not trying a man for his opinions.

It's fair enough, I suppose.

It's a damn shame, though.

That post—war stuff is awfully interesting.

Well...

How's it going?

I've written in a few sentences
about the post—war.

I told you, Harold. We're not allowed to frame
charges on the basis of the man's opinions.

But it's not his opinions.

The way I've written it, we're not questioning
his opinions on the H—bomb.

It's his voracity we're questioning.

— Voracity?
— Sure. Look at the record.

1945, Oppenheimer says there's a good chance
the H—bomb can be made.

1949, the GAC says the crash program could
produce the hydrogen bomb in five years.

He's chairman of the GAC
and there he is behind the bomb.

But, in the same year, 1949,

you also find him
opposing the development of the bomb

by claiming, among other things,
that "it is not feasible."

So at the same time, Oppenheimer's
saying both yes and no to the H—bomb.

We can't attack his opinions, OK,

but what we can ask is how truthful is he being

about what his opinion is.

It's a test of his voracity,

not his opinions.

They didn't lie, did they, Harold?

General?

You are a smart young lawyer.

Ah. Hi.

— Lewis.
— Sony to drag you down here from Princeton.

— Oppie.
— You just got back from Europe.

— Yeah.
— How was it?

Oh, you know. Declining.

— But the best part was...
— Robert?

It makes me very sad to have to do this

but as chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission,

I have been authorized
to deliver this to you in person.

As you will see, it's official notification
of the charges against you.

Because of those charges,
it had been decided it would be appropriate

to suspend your security clearance.

And because of that suspension,

the AEC is therefore disbarred from any further
use of your seryices as an adviser.

Robert, as I've told you,
this brings me great, deep personal anguish.

I can't believe it.

I just can't.

They can't do this to me!

Strauss was loving every minute of it.

And Nichols!

— They can't do this!
— Well, they have. What are you gonna do?

(Knock on door)

When you called,
I asked Herb Marks to come round.

He did a lot of legal work for the AEC.
He could be useful. Come in, Herb.

Oh, Robert.

— This is terrible. I just want you to know...
— Yeah, yeah.

Read this.

They say I have two choices.

I can resign, no fuss, very discreet.
Or I can request a hearing.

— Open or closed?
— Closed, I would think.

Although Strauss didn't rate the chances of it
staying closed very highly.

Couldn't keep that quiet in Washington.

What do you think, Herb?

I can't believe they had the balls
to put in this stuff about the H—bomb.

— It's opinion.
— Unbelievable, isn't it?

Now, look.
We have all expressed disgust and dismay.

Question is, what does he do now?

Well, he has to ask for a hearing.

If he accepts this,
it's tantamount to an admission of guilt.

I don't know, Herb.
There's a lot of stuff in there.

The Chevalier stuff. All those pre—war
connections.

Christ, that lady. What's her name?

Jean Tatlock.

I know it's only garbage, but who wants one's
garbage spread out for everyone to look at?

— Takes a sick mind to drag Jean into this.
— It's a sick world.

I don't agree with you, Joe.

If he doesn't fight this, he leaves the charges
on the record for everyone else to pick up.

And they will.
Which would you have Robert face?

A closed hearing or a dogfight in the open

with Joe McCarthy,
Senator Jenner or some other caveman?

— OK, but how long do you...
— Joe!

If it's unanswered, he gives sticks of dynamite
to every headline—grabber in Washington.

You have to do it, Robert.

Yes.

(Joe) Are you gonna fight?

I'm going to request a hearing.

if it’s unanswered, he gives sticks of dynamite
to every headline—grabber in Washington.

You have to do it, Robert

Yes. I'm gonna fight

I'm going to request a hearing.

So be it.

Well, thank you very much.
And thank Mr. Hoover for me, will you?

Well, if that's the way he wants it,
we've got to move fast.

I can't be very forward in this.
You'll have to take the strain.

— Right.
— We'll have to appoint a board

and naturally we'll need a lawyer
to present our case.

— Got any ideas?
— What are we looking for? Prestige?

We're looking for results.

I think I may know a fella.

I'm not really clear about this.
Is this going to be some kind of a trial?

Emphatically not. I drew up the regulations
that govern these hearings.

What I was most concerned about was
there should be no element of a trial.

The whole thing should be a calm, Judicious
enquiry after the truth. Nothing more.

— Then we don't need a trial lawyer.
— No, I wouldn't think so.

I think that from first to last

we should emphasize the quality of our case.

You're a distinguished man.

Most distinguished.

You'll have distinguished men prepared to come
and give testimony to your quality and loyalty.

I think our choice of counsel should be governed
by the same criteria. A man of quality.

Do you know Lloyd Garrison?

Name rings a bell.

He's a New York attorney.
He's on the board of the institute.

Sure. On the Urban League?

And he's president of the Civil Liberties Union.

— I know him.
— I don't know if he handles much trial work

— but if this isn't going to be a trial...
— It isn't.

Lloyd Garrison.

A tremendous reputation.

All right, Lloyd. What's the verdict?

Yes.

Now, I can't say too much after reading this,

but clearly there's a great deal
of derogatory items or allegations.

I take it this is not entirely a fairy tale.

Well, sure. I was a member of...
I can't even remember their names now.

Consumers Union?
Cited as a Communist front organization, 1944.

— Sure, I...
— Friends of the Chinese People?

Maybe.

The American Committee
for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom.

Sure. This was all a hundred years ago,
before the war.

I was cleared on this for Los Alamos,
I was cleared on it for the AEC.

— They're scraping the barrel.
— Mm...

My worry is that taken separately
from the rest of your life,

all this adds up to a formidable list
of errors of Judgment.

— Can't let that happen.
— I would like to see a "whole man" approach.

We go to the board and say,
"Yes, there are these..." What shall we...

— Errors of Judgment.
— Youthful indiscretions.

But taken in the full context
of a most distinguished career,

a record of unequalled seryice
to the nation and to the government,

how little a part of the whole story
these blemishes truly are.

How very little.

— That sounds OK.
— Seems to me the right note.

Another problem occurs to me.
These hydrogen bomb matters.

How they permitted themselves
to include them defies belief.

It's incredible. "We don't agree with your
opinions so you're a security risk." Nice thinking.

However, it's here.
And what I would not like to see happening

is that a whole maze of complex scientific detail
should obscure the issues.

I think we wanna keep this thing at all times
on the higher level.

It should be a question of character, motives,
not a lot of fussing with technicalities.

But I always had sound technical reasons
for what I said.

I sense danger here. What do they say?
You can prove anything with technicalities.

Statistics.

And I don't want to give them that chance.

Well, if we do wanna get technical, you'll have
to apply for a high security clearance.

I'd rather not have to.
It's Just a whole area I don't want to get into.

Robert isn't accused of scientific failings
but failings of character.

And these I'm sure we can disprove.

However, we can think that one over.

I don't think there's anything else
we can usefully discuss at this stage.

Any news?

Yeah. Some.

I was over at AEC.
They named the chief counsel for the hearings.

— Roger Robb.
— Who's he? I've never heard of him.

I have.

Washington bar.
He's a damn good trial lawyer.

(Nichols) Mr. Robb.

I wouldn't presume to advise you on your tactics

but I've seen Oppie appear as a witness
before committees and I was impressed.

This guy can charm you right out of your seat.

Well, he can by to charm me.

You know, one thing that...
Well, I won't say it's bothering me.

I don't like to refuse free gifts

but I've been looking over the regulations
governing these hearings.

They seem kinda weighted
against the defendant, don't they?

— How do you mean?
— Well, in trial law,

we have a concept called the blank pad rule.

It means the only matters
on which a defendant can be Judged

are those matters which are actually raised
within the courtroom.

There can't be...
Well, there shouldn't be any prior knowledge.

— Yes.
— Well, here, I see

that I'm gonna be allowed a period
with the board before the hearing opens

to go over the files with them.

To assist them in evaluating the documents.

Oh, I'll assist them, all right. But you can see
where it kicks the blank pad out of the window.

All I know is that it was Joe Volpe
who drew up those regulations.

It was?

Well, that takes care of my conscience.

Still, if I were Oppenheimer's counsel,
I'd raise hell about it.

Who is his counsel, by the way?

Fella named Lloyd Garrison.

Garrison...

— Very distinguished.
— You know him?

Sure. The birdwatcher.

— What?
— I hear he watches birds in his spare time.

Oh. Well, if that's all, Mr. Robb...

Yeah, that's it. Though for a lot of this,
I think I'm gonna need security clearance.

— You got it.
— I imagine defending counsel

will avail themselves of the same facilities.

I really wouldn't know.
Garrison hasn't asked for it.

I honestly believe
we're as ready as we'll ever be.

What are our chances, Lloyd?

— We should be quietly confident.
— We should be scared as hell.

No, no, no. As long as we keep our focus
on the question of character.

Speak the truth and shame the devil.

— I feel pretty relaxed.
— Well, you should.

I've seen you at hearings. No contest.
Personally, I pity Robb tomorrow.

I'm so impressed
by the amount of support we've got.

Everybody we've asked
has been so glad to help.

— It's good of them.
— Except Teller.

Little creep.

I was surprised.
He seemed almost hostile. I wonder why.

That's easy.
He's Jealous of Robert, always has been.

It crossed my mind he might give us trouble.

I don't think so. He's a scientist.
Whatever it is, he'll keep it in the family.

He seemed almost angry with you.

Edward takes some understanding sometimes.

You're very forgiving, Robert.

Tu comprends?

You pardonnez so goddamn much.
Those bastards are trying to nail you.

— Oh, now...
— Oh, no, Just kidding. Obviously.

I think we all need a good night's rest.

I need another drink.

(Narrator) The hearing
in the matter of] Robert Oppenheimer

opened on April the 72th, 7954.

The board consisted of Gordon Gray
as chairman,

the industrialist 7'homas Morgan,

and a scientist, Dr. Ward II Evans
of Northwestern University.

Unknown to Oppenheimer,
their counsel Roger Robb

had in his possession
tapes of wartime interviews

between Oppenheimer
and the Manhattan Project security officers.

— We've been waiting nearly half an hour.
— I do apologize.

I can't say exactly where he might be.

— I'm sure we'll have news very shortly.
— Well, I hope so.

Mr. Robb, I apologize for this delay.

Quite all right with us, Mr. Chairman.

— What the...
— She fell downstairs last night.

— Have they started?
— They're waiting.

Mr. Chairman, members of the board.

I would like to say at the onset
that we appreciate very much

the willingness of men of your standing
and responsibility

to undertake this exacting and onerous Job
in the interests of the countly

We cannot but be conscious
that for the past week,

members of the board have been examining
a file containing items about Dr. Oppenheimer

to which we have had,
and we now have, no access at all.

I'm sure it goes without saying

that we are confident that the minds
of the members of the board

will be open to receive the testimony
that we shall submit.

I think you have no need to have concern
on that score, Mr. Garrison.

Gentlemen, you have in your possession
copies of a letter written by Dr. Oppenheimer

and addressed to General Nichols,
letter dated March 4th, 1954.

In this letter,
written in the form of an autobiography,

he has sought to give an account

of the activities that have given rise
to the derogatory items in his record

that have led to this hearing.

One of the things that struck me
as I went through this account

was the quite evident fact that throughout,
his energies were strongly devoted

almost entirely to his scientific undertakings.

In this whole post—war period, I do not think
that there is a single association of his

that can possibly be questioned as derogatony,

or indeed anything other
than a rich record of devotion to his science

and seryice to the government.

In the post—war period, everything in it
is in truth utterly inconsistent

with the notion that this man could have been
anything but a devoted supporter

of the American system that we love.

I think that's all I have to say
of a preliminary character, Mr. Chairman.

Now Mr. Robb?

Dr. Oppenheimer, did you prepare your letter
of March 4th, 1954 to General Nichols,

— this autobiography?
— Yes.

— And you've read it very carefully, I assume?
— Yes.

Are all the statements in this letter the truth
the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Yes, Mr. Robb.

Dr. Oppenheimer,

there's never been any question in your mind

that a man as closely associated
with the Communist movement

has no business on a secret war proJect?

— That is right.
— Then let me ask you a blunt question.

Didn't you know, certainly by 1943,

that the Communist Party was an instrument
or vehicle of espionage in this countly?

— I was not clear about that.
— Didn't you suspect it?

— No.
— Wasn't your fear of espionage

one of the reasons
why you felt membership in the Party

was inconsistent
with work on a secret war proJect?

Yes.

— Your answer is that it was.
— Yes.

What about a former member of the Party?

Is he an appropriate person
to work on a secret war proJect?

That would depend on the totality and character
of the disengagement

and what kind of a man he was,
whether he was an honest man.

Let us take your brother Frank as an example.
Tell us the kind of test you applied in his case.

In the case of a brother, you don't apply tests.
At least I didn't.

— Well, now...
— I knew my brother.

I never regarded him as dangerous.

I see. In other words, you felt that your brother
was an exception to what you Just stated here.

No. I felt that
though there was a danger of espionage,

that this was not a general danger.

How would you have tested to see
if someone was dangerous back in 1943?

— Only the knowledge of a man's character.
— Just what you knew of him?

I don't regard myself as a man to settle these
questions. I am stating opinions.

That's Just what I'm getting at, Doctor.

On page 22 of this letter,

you refer to what for convenience
I will call the Eltenton—Chevalier incident.

Would you please tell the board as accurately
as you can what happened on that occasion?

This is one of those things I've had so many
occasions to think about

that I'm not gonna recall actual words,
I'm gonna recall the nature of the conversation.

Wherever possible,
I would prefer that you'd use the actual words.

— I'm not going to do that.
— Go on, Doctor.

One day, in the winter of 1942/'43,

Haakon Chevalier came to our house for drinks.

When I went into the pantly, he followed me.

Um... He said, "I saw George Eltenton recently."

Eltenton said he had means of communicating
technical information to Soviet scientists.

He didn't describe the means.

I thought I said, "But that's treason,"
but I'm not sure.

Anyway, I said something.
"This is a terrible thing."

Chevalier expressed complete agreement.
That was the end of it.

— You used the word "treason"?
— I don't know.

— Did you think it was treasonous?
— I thought it was terrible.

Did you think it was treasonous?

To take information from the US
and ship it abroad illegally? Sure.

In other words, you felt that the course
of conduct suggested to you by Eltenton

was an attempt at espionage, didn't you?

— Sure.
— Did Chevalier in that conversation to you

mention anything about the use of microfilm
as a means of transmitting information?

— No.
— You're sure of that?

— Yes.
— Did he tell you or indicate in any way

that he'd spoken to anyone but you
about this matter?

— No.
— You're sure of this?

Yes.

When did you first mention your conversation
with Chevalier to a security officer?

On a visit to Berkeley. I don't remember
what security officer it was.

Well, if the record shows that it was to
Lieutenant Johnson on August 25th, 1943,

— you would accept that?
— Yes.

And the next day you were interyiewed
by Colonel Pash, were you not?

Yes.

Did you tell Pash
the whole truth about this matter?

— No.
— You lied to him?

Yes.

What did you tell Colonel Pash
that was not true?

That Eltenton had approached three people on
the Manhattan ProJect through an intermedialy.

Did you discuss with or disclose to Pash
the identity of Chevalier?

No.

Let us then refer to Chevalier as X.

All right.

Did you tell Pash that X had approached
three people on this proJect?

I'm not clear whether there were three X's
or whether X had approached three people.

Didn't you say X had approached three people?

Probably.

Why did you do that, Doctor?

Because I was an idiot.

Is that your only explanation?

— I was reluctant to mention Chevalier.
— Yes.

No doubt somewhat reluctant to mention myself.

Why would you tell them
Chevalier had gone to three people?

— Didn't that make it worse for Chevalier?
— I didn't mention him.

No, no, but X. If X had gone to three people,
that would have shown.

— He was deeply involved.
— Yes.

I'm gonna have trouble
making myself understandable.

The story I told Pash was not a true stony.

There were not three or more people involved
on the proJect.

There was one person involved. That was me.

Whether I embroidered the story
to underline the seriousness of it

or to hide the simple facts, namely that
Chevalier had only talked to me about it,

I don't know.

Did Pash ask you for the name of X?

— I imagine he did.
— Don't you know that he did?

I... Sure.

Didn't you know that your refusal to give him
the identity of X impeded the investigation?

Actually, the only thing
that needed investigating was Eltenton.

— What did Pash want to investigate?
— I imagine the three others on the proJect.

You knew Colonel Pash would move heaven
and earth to find these three, didn't you?

— Yes.
— And that he'd want to know the identity of X?

— Yes.
— And yet you wouldn't give it to him.

How long had you known this man Chevalier
in 1943?

— For a number of years.
— How had you known him?

— As a quite close friend.
— Did you know him as a fellow traveler?

— Yes.
— Had you any reason to suspect

he was a member of the Communist Party?

— No.
— You knew he was quite a Red, didn't you?

— I would say quite pink.
— Not red?

— I won't quibble.
— When did you see him last?

— On my last trip to Europe.
— That was in December 1953?

— Yes.
— Six months ago?

Yes.

Let us return
to your interyiew with Colonel Pash.

I would like to read certain portions of the
transcript of the interyiew and ask you...

Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the existence of the rule

under which we cannot ask for access to the file.

But I wonder if it would not be proper,
if counsel is going to read from a transcript,

for us to be furnished with a copy of it?

This would be orthodox in a court of law.
I don't pretend this is a court of law, but...

Mr. Chairman,
I know of no rule in any court of law

that you must furnish counsel with a copy
of a transcript you're reading at the time.

This is presently marked "Secret",

so I could not possibly make it available
to Mr. Garrison at this time.

But it is being read into the record.

That's right.

(Clears throat) Frankly,
I don't know the answer to this, Mr. Garrison.

We will consider the request.

Now, Mr. Robb?

Your letter to General Nichols.
On page four, you mention Jean Tatlock.

— Yes.
— Who you saw for the last time in June 1943?

— Yes.
— Why did you have to see her?

She had expressed a strong desire to see me.

She was undergoing psychiatric treatment.

She was extremely unhappy.

Did you find out why she had to see you?

Because she was still in love with me.

— Where did you see her?
— At her home.

— Was she a Communist at that time?
— We didn't even talk about it.

Do you have reason to believe
she wasn't still a Communist in 1943?

— No.
— You spent the night with her, didn't you?

— Yes.
— You were working on a secret war proJect.

— Yes.
— Was that consistent with good security?

— It was, as a matter of fact...
— Spending the night with a Communist...

I don't believe she was a Communist.

— Oh, you don't?
— I've had secrets in my head for a long time.

It doesn't matter who I associate with.
I don't talk about those secrets.

Passing the time of day with a Communist, I...

I don't think it is wise.

But I don't see that it's necessarily dangerous if
the man is discreet and knows what he's up to.

I should like to move now
to the matter of the thermonuclear.

Doctor. Did you, subsequent to President
Truman's decision in January 1950

to proceed with the thermonuclear program,

ever express any opposition to the development
of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds?

I would think that I could very well have said
that it was a dreadful weapon.

Why do you think
you could "very well" have said that?

Because I have always thought
it was a dreadful weapon.

Even when from a technical point of view,
it was a sweet, lovely and beautifulJob,

I still felt it was a dreadful weapon.

— And have said so?
— Yes.

Well, Doctor, at Los Alamos and running at least
through the first year at the GAC,

you were encouraging investigation
into the thermonuclear.

— Yes.
— When did your moral qualms get so strong

that you opposed the actual production
of the thermonuclear bomb?

When it was suggested that the United States
produce these things at all costs.

What did moral qualms have to do with that?

— What did moral qualms have to do with that?
— Yes, sir.

We freely used the atomic bomb.

Yes. In fact, Doctor, you assisted in selecting
the target for the drop of the bomb on Japan?

— Yes.
— How many were killed or inJured by that?

— 70,000.
— Did you have moral qualms about that?

Terrible ones.

Would you have supported
dropping the thermonuclear?

— It would have made no sense.
— Why not?

The target was too small.

The target was too small.

Supposing there was a target in Japan big
enough for the thermonuclear weapon.

— Would you have opposed dropping it?
— I believe I would.

At Los Alamos, you would have made
the weapon, wouldn't you?

— I couldn't.
— No, no. I didn't ask you that, Doctor.

If you could have discovered it,
you would have, wouldn't you?

— Oh, yeah. Certainly.
— You were working toward that end.

Yes.

I need to say
that running a laboratory is one thing,

— advising the government is another.
— Evidently.

Doctor, I have a note here that you testified
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

that there was a surprising unanimity

at the general advisory committee meeting
on October 29th, 1949,

that the United States
should not take the initiative at that time

— in an all—out thermonuclear program.
— Yes.

How many people run that committee?

— Nine. One man was in Sweden.
— Oh. Who was that?

— Dr. Glenn Seaborg.
— So you didn't know how he felt about it.

He was in Sweden.
There was no communication with him.

I beg your pardon.

He was in Sweden.
There was no communication with him.

I see.

I'm going to show you a letter,
Dr. Oppenheimer,

taken from your files at Princeton

sent by you to the Atomic Energy Commission,

addressed to you, and signed by Glenn Seaborg.

I'm going to say before I see this
that I have no recollection of it.

I would be certain of one thing.
If the letter reached me before a meeting,

I would have read it to the committee.

— The letter was dated October 14th, 1949.
— So it almost certainly reached me.

Unless it came by wagon train,
it reached you, didn't it?

Right.

I will read relevant sections
of this letter from Dr. Seaborg.

"Although I deplore the prospect of our country
putting a tremendous effort into this..."

He was talking about the thermonuclear,
wasn't he?

Obviously.

"..I must confess that I've been unable to come
to the conclusion that we should not.

"My present feeling
would perhaps be best summarized

"by saying that I would have to hear
some good arguments

"before I could take on sufficient courage

"to recommend not going toward
such a program."

Isn't it clear to you now that Dr. Seaborg
did express himself prior to the meeting?

It is. Not in unequivocal terms.

Why did you tell the Atomic Energy Commission

that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed himself
on this subJect?

I would have to see the transcript.
I don't remember the question or answer.

If you did make that statement,
it was not true, was it?

Doctor, did you hear my question?

I heard it, but I have heard that kind of question
too often.

I'm sure of that, Doctor,
but would you answer it nevertheless?

Isn't he entitled to see testimony referred to
instead of answering hypothetical questions?

(Robb) It is not hypothetical.

Doctor, if you told
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

that Dr. Seaborg had not expressed himself
prior to the meeting on October 29th, 1949,

that was not true, was it?

— It would depend entirely on...
— Yes or no?

I will not say yes or no.
I would like to make a general protest.

I am told that I have said certain things.

— Doctor, the question...
— I don't recall. If I said them...

— Doctor, a simple...
— I will not say yes or no!

(Robb) That's all I have at the moment,
Mr. Chairman.

We will recess at this point.

Mr. Robb, my congratulations. That was brilliant.

I've never seen Oppie in such a fix.

You were right. He did back down.
Aren't you pleased?

I didn't entirely enJoy it.

I quite admire the guy.

— Joe.
— I heard about it.

It was unbelievable. Unbelievable!

That tricky bastard.
The truth doctor. "Yes or no!"

I can't believe any experienced Jurist
would fall for that masquerade.

None of them is experienced.

Robert has told one...untruth in his life.

The way Robb handled that Chevalier garbage,
it sounded like he'd told a million.

I deeply regret I did not challenge him on that.

How are you, Robert?

— How was it?
— Idiotic.

And he's reading out this stuff, these transcripts.

We don't have any idea what's in his file.
It's easy as hell to trip Robert up.

Demand access. Tell 'em if they won't
give you access, you'll walk out.

This is no enquily It's a trial. You didn't agree
to take part in a trial. Access, or you'll walk.

— That is not my advice.
— Oh, hell.

And it must be Robert's decision.

— How about it?
— I can't.

Robert, they're shafting you.

I know that. I can't walk out now.
It'd be a confession of guilt.

And now it's public.

— I read it.
— How did they get hold of it?

The Times has been after us for weeks.

Scottie Ruston called yesterday morning,
said he couldn't sit on it any more.

I thought it was better
they have the whole stony.

— I bet the board didn't like that.
— I guess they didn't.

Robert, I still think you should quit.

Mr. Volpe, I am ready as always to be replaced.

But while I am still Robert's chief counsel,
my advice is to proceed.

— I still think we have a reasonable chance.
— On what grounds?

On the quality of our case.

This trickery of Robb's is based on nothing
but tittle—tattle, third—rate informants,

FBI scourings.

When the board sees the caliber of the men
prepared to stand by Robert,

I can't believe they'll be unimpressed.

(Garrison) Mr. McCloy.
Would you state your present position?

I am presently chairman of the board
of the Chase National Bank.

Would you also state positions you held
in the defence establishment in the war?

I was Assistant Secretary of War until 1945.

After that,
I seryed on various defence committees.

I was on the President's committee
with Mr. Acheson and General Groves

with special reference to atomic weapons.

During those years,
you had many contacts with Dr. Oppenheimer.

— Oh, yes.
— Based on your acquaintance,

would you give the board your opinion
as to his loyalty,

and as to his security risk
or want of security risk.

In as much as I had any acquaintance
with Dr. Oppenheimer,

I would say that I have no doubt
as to his loyalty.

I have absolutely no doubt
as to his value to the United States.

And I would say that in my opinion,

Dr. Oppenheimer does not represent any threat
to the security of the United States.

(Garrison) Thank you.

(Gray) Mr. Robb?

Is the Chase National Bank
the largest in the countly, Mr. McCloy?

No, it's... (Clears throat)
Pardon me. It's the third largest.

— Do you have a great many branches?
— Yes, we have.

As far as you know,

do you have any employee of your bank

who has been
for any considerable period of time

on terms of rather friendly or intimate
association with thieves or safe—crackers?

— Well, I don't know of any.
— Suppose you had a branch manager.

One day a friend of his came to him and said,

"I have some friends who are thinking
about coming to your bank to rob it.

"And I'd like to talk to you about
maybe leaving the vault open some nights

"so that they could do it."

And your branch manager
reJected this suggestion.

— Would you expect him to report the incident?
— Yes, I would.

Suppose he waited six or eight months
to report it.

Would you be rather concerned
as to why he hadn't done so before?

Yes.

Suppose when he did report it, he said,

"This is a close friend of mine
and I know he's innocent

"and therefore
I'm not going to tell you who he was."

Would you be concerned about that?

Well, I'd certainly urge him to tell me,
for the security of the bank.

Now, supposing a few years later,
this branch manager came to you

and he said, "Mr. McCloy, I told you a scheme
that my friend and his friends had all set up,

"with tear gas and getaway cars.

"But it was a lot of bunk. It Just wasn't true."

Would you be a bit puzzled as to why
he told you such a false story about his friend?

Yes, of course I would.

That's all.

(Garrison) General Groves. You appointed Dr.
Oppenheimer to be the director at Los Alamos.

— Yes, sir.
— How would you rate his achievement?

I think he did a magnificent Job
while he was under my control.

Would you select him again?

I see of no reason why not,

assuming all the conditions are the same.

Based on your total acquaintance
and experience with him,

would you say that in your opinion he would
ever consciously commit a disloyal act?

I would be amazed if he did.

That is all I have to ask.

(Gray) Mr. Robb?

General, in the light of your experience
in security matters

and in the light of your knowledge of Dr.
Oppenheimer's file, would you clear him today?

I think before answering that,
I'd like to give my interpretation

of what the atomic energy act requires.

I, uh... I have it here somewhere.

On page 98 I think you'll find it, General.

Yes.

Thank you.

"The commission shall have determined

"that permitting such person
to have access to restricted data

"will not endanger
the common defence or security."

My interpretation of "endanger"

is that there is a reasonable presumption
that there might be a danger.

It is not a case of proving
that a man is a danger.

It's a case of thinking
that he might be a danger.

I would not clear Dr. Oppenheimer today
if I were a member of the commission

based on this interpretation.

(Gray) Yes, Mr. Garrison.
(Garrison) General Groves.

You have given us your interpretation
of the atomic energy act.

Is it your opinion that the common defence
and security of the US would be endangered?

— Mr. Lansdale?
— Mr. Robb.

My colleague has Just told me something
which I find disturbing.

I gather you told him if you were asked
to clear Oppenheimer today, you'd say yes.

— That is correct.
— When we spoke a few weeks ago,

you said you would not clear him today.

— You've been talking to Garrison.
— I'd prefer not to discuss this.

All right, Mr. Lansdale.
Now, you're a lawyer and I'm a lawyer.

You're going to be asked in that room if you'd
clear him on the basis of present loyalty criteria.

And I promise you.
If you testify under oath in the affirmative,

— I swear to God I will impeach you.
— You can do what you want.

Right.

Mr. Lansdale. During the war, you were the top
security officer in the atomic bomb proJect.

— Yes, sir.
— You had many interyiews with Oppenheimer

touching on the Chevalier incident.

— And other matters.
— Yes. What Judgment did you form

as to his political convictions at that time?

That he was not a Communist.

— You were satisfied that he was a loyal citizen.
— Yes.

If you had the decision whether to clear
Dr. Oppenheimer or not today,

would you do so?

I will answer that yes, based on the criteria
and standards that we used then.

Those criteria were loyalty and discretion.

I am making no attempt
to interpret the present law.

That is all I have at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

(Gray) Mr. Robb?

As I understand it, Mr. Lansdale,

you're not offering any opinion as to whether
or not you would clear Dr. Oppenheimer

on the basis of presently—existing standards.

That's a standard that's strange to me.

I believed then
that Dr. Oppenheimer was loyal and discreet.

I have not changed my mind.

Mr. Lansdale.

Do you have the feeling that you want to defend
Dr. Oppenheimer here?

I feel strongly that Dr. Oppenheimer is loyal.

I am extremely disturbed
by the hysteria of the times,

of which this seems to be a manifestation.

You think that this enquiry
is a manifestation of hysteria?

— I think...
— Yes or no?

I will not answer that yes or no.

I don't think that
this is a manifestation of hysteria.

I think the fact that associations to 1940
are regarded with the same seriousness

that similar associations would be regarded
today is a manifestation of hysteria.

That's all.

Nice. You stood up to him,
he didn't like it one bit.

— It was good of him.
— Very useful.

I Just wish he'd said he'd clear you today
under present law.

You can't have everything.

Groves was a hell of a disappointment.
Were you expecting that?

— Sure. He's regular Army.
— Mm. Cover your ass.

He was the guy who appointed me in '43.
He had to get out from under that.

Hello, Councilor.

— General Nichols?
— Yes?

Is there any word on my security clearance?

These things take time.

I understand Mr. Robb was granted clearance
within eight days.

I put in my request three weeks ago.

We're doing the best we can.

Dr. Bethe. On the basis of your association
with him over many years,

at Los Alamos and after,

would you express an opinion about
Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty to the United States?

I am happy to do this.

I have absolute faith
in Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty.

I have absolutely no question

that he has seryed this country
very long and very well.

I have faith in him quite generally.

That's all.

(Gray) Mr. Robb.

Doctor, how many scientific divisions were there
are Los Alamos?

It changed in the course of time. I think seven
but it may have been eight or nine.

Which division was Klaus Fuchs in?

— He was in my division.
— Thank you.

That's all.

Dr. Fermi, you were a member
of the General Advisory Committee

— for a period of four years till December 1950.
— Yes.

You participated in its deliberations

concerning the advice to the AEC on the
thermonuclear program in the fall of 1949.

I did.

Would you tell the board briefly
about the deliberations?

Positions taken, the reasons for them.

I can testify to my own feelings.

I was concerned that to go ahead
with the crash thermonuclear program

might weaken the development
of conventional atomic weapons.

Do you remember, Dr. Fermi, whether or not
there was an opportunity at this meeting

for the freest and fullest discussions?

Yes, I think so.

In his role as chairman of the GAC,

what opportunity did Dr. Oppenheimer afford the
other members to express fully their views?

— A perfect opportunity.
— That's all.

(Gray) Mr. Robb?

I believe he is a man of upstanding character,
that he is a loyal individual.

I do not believe
that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk.

(Gray) Mr. Robb asked you earlier whether
you had spoken with Chairman Strauss.

I talked to Strauss. I never hid from him

my opinion that this whole proceeding
was most unfortunate.

And there he was, a consultant. If you don't
want to consult him, you don't have to, period.

Why you have to go through
this kind of a thing...

There's a real positive record here.

We have an atom bomb
and a whole armory of nuclear weapons.

What more do you want? Mermaids?

This is Just a tremendous achievement.

That the end of this road
should be this kind of a hearing,

that can't help but be humiliating.

I thought it was a pretty bad show.
I still think so.

(Gray) Thank you, Dr. Rabi.
We will recess for a short while.

— That was so good.
— I don't know if I made much sense in there.

I got drunk last night
I was so disgusted with this.

You were fine. Robert appreciates it very much.

Are you sure?
He looked like he was in some kind of a trance.

Well, he's a little withdrawn.

Well, he looked like er...like a martyr.

Is that what he's doing? It is, isn't it?

I know Oppie. It's that goddamn actor in him.

I bet he's really enJoying himself.

He's going through a terrible experience,
Dr. Rabi.

I know it. I feelfor him.

But tell him to keep fighting.

— Tell him not to be such a schmuck.
— OK.

— Hello, Doctor. I'm early.
— We're on schedule. You'll be on in 15 minutes.

I don't want to probe your testimony
ahead of time, Doctor.

Will I have to say it in front of the board
and Dr. Oppenheimer?

Of course, of course. There's one thing you
might like to glance at while you're waiting.

What is this?

It's a resume of the FBI files on Oppenheimer.

15 minutes, Doctor.

Dr. Teller, may I ask you please,

are you appearing as a witness here today
because you want to be here?

I appear because I've been asked to
and because I consider it my duty.

I would have preferred not to appear.

— Did you work during the war at Los Alamos?
— I did.

— What was the nature of your work there?
— Theoretical work connected with the bomb.

During the war, did you have any discussions
about the thermonuclear?

— Very frequent discussions.
— What was Dr. Oppenheimer's opinion?

I clearly remember
that towards the end of the war,

he encouraged me to go ahead
with the thermonuclear investigation.

I also know that very shortly
after the dropping of the bomb on Japan

that this plan was changed.

And, to the best of my belief, it was changed
because of the opinion of Dr. Oppenheimer

that this was not the time
to pursue the program further.

Doctor, as an expert on this question,

suppose you'd gone to work
on the thermonuclear in 1945 or 1946,

I mean, really gone to work on it.

Do you have any opinion
when you might have achieved the weapon?

It is my belief that if at the end of the war

some people like Dr. Oppenheimer
would have lent moral support,

not even their own work, Just moral support,

I think we could have kept as many people in
Los Alamos to work on the thermonuclear

as we later recruited in 1949...

under very difficult conditions.

I believe that if we had gone to work in 1945,

we could have achieved a thermonuclear bomb
Just about four years earlier than we did.

Now, Doctor. In Janualy, 1950,

the President decided that we should go ahead
with the thermonuclear program.

— Do you recall that?
— Yeah, I do.

— Was the program accelerated?
— It was.

Did you have discussions with Dr. Oppenheimer
as to whether he would assist you?

I had two discussions with him.

One was shortly before the President's decision.

At that time, I called Dr. Oppenheimer
and asked him if it was a go—ahead decision,

would he please really help us with this thing?

And Dr. Oppenheimer's answer
was in the negative.

A few months later, I called him up
and asked him not for direct help

but for help in recruiting people.

Oppenheimer said then,
"You know in this matter I'm neutral.

"I should be glad, however,
to recommend some very good people."

And he mentioned a few.

I wrote to all of these people,
tried to persuade them to come to Los Alamos.

None of them came.

Where were these people located?

The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

Doctor, to simplify the issues here,

is it your intention to suggest that Dr.
Oppenheimer is disloyal to the United States?

I have always assumed and I now assume
that he is loyal to the United States.

Do you believe or do you not believe
that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk?

In a great number of cases,
I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act in a way

which for me
was exceedingly hard to understand.

I thoroughly disagreed with him
on numerous issues.

And his actions, frankly,
appeared to me confused and complicated.

To this extent, I would like to see
the vital interests of this country enhanced

which I understand better,
and therefore trust more.

In this very limited sense,

I would like to express a feeling
that I would personally feel more secure

if public matters would rest in other hands.

Dr. Teller.

I would like to ask you this question.

Do you feel it would endanger
the common defence and security

to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?

I believe the character of Dr. Oppenheimer

is such that
he would never willingly or knowingly

do anything to endanger
the safety of this countly

To the extent
your question is directed towards intent,

I would say I do not see any reason
to deny clearance.

If it is a question of wisdom and Judgment,

as demonstrated by actions since 1945,

then I would say one would be wiser
not to grant clearance.

Thank you very much, Dr. Teller.
We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow.

I'm sorly

After what you've Just said,
I don't know what you mean.

(Narrator) On May the 6th, 7954,
after hearing 79 days of testimony

in the matter of]. Robert Oppenheimer,

the board retired to consider its verdict

Have a drink, Herb.

No, thanks. I'd like to finish this.

What is it?

Well, Lloyd thinks we should submit analysis
of the testimony to the board.

Give 'em another nudge in the right direction.

Let's stop kidding ourselves.

— You think it's hopeless?
— After Teller?

Oh, he didn't say much.

He said enough.

The rest were nothing.

Nobodies like Griggs,
a couple of Air Force apes.

But Teller...

Teller is a great man.

Almost.

He's big enough for the board to hide behind
if they want to.

It's unforgivable.

— My fault.
— Yours?

I should have...stroked his vanity.

I couldn't do it.

Too many balls in the air.

Too many balls.

Too much bullshit.

I'll have that drink.

I am so tired.

You know, when this is over,

why don't you take a holiday?

I'd like to go off by myself for six months.

Well, why don't you?

— Kitty would understand.
— Think so?

Well, she should.

You disapprove of her, don't you?

Well, I wouldn't say that.

You know, she's sick.

I don't Just mean the drinking,
I mean really sick.

Intestinal.

She has a lot of pain.

That's why she drinks.

Part of the reason.

I know this couple in Georgetown.

They have separate apartments.

Very close, but...

They have dinner together almost every night
and then they go home.

Separately.

What do you make of that?

— Sounds like a mature arrangement.
— Think so?

For Christ's sakes, Robert.
You've only got one life.

It's not so bad.

Are you sure?

I've gotta go up.

Robert, I...

If you'd like to talk about this...

Thanks, Herb.

— Good morning, Mr. Marks.
— Oh, hi.

— Is Robert up?
— No.

I hear you've been encouraging him
to leave me.

Did you think he wouldn't tell me?

— I Just thought that...
— He would never leave me.

He's too scared.

One of his women killed herself.
You know who I mean.

He's too damn scared I'll do it.
And I keep him good and scared too.

I've got him and I'm gonna keep him.
I couldn't go through a day without him.

— Do you think that's horrible?
— People shouldn't live off other people.

Did it ever cross your bird brain
he can't get through a day without me?

— There's no need to be insulting.
— There's no need to stick your stupid nose in.

In my house.

What do you know about us?

I don't know anything.

No.

Now, are you gonna want eggs?

Just coffee.

On May the 27th, 7954,

the board of enguiry delivered its verdict

By a two—to—one majority, it declared that

”it would need be consistent
with the security interests of the United States

”to reinstate
Dr. Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance. ”

The lone dissenter
was the scientist Ward Evans.

He had some difficulty formulating his opinion.

He was helped in doing this
by AEC counsel Roger Robb.

On the 29th of june, 7954,

the commissioners of the AEC confirmed
the board of enguiry’s recommendation.

Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance
would not be reinstated

Well, it ain't Siberia.

Look. There are people these days
who have lost everything.

Guys who have to work in South America,
guys who can't get a Job anywhere.

— Exiled to Princeton. Is that so bad?
— Now, look...

Oh, I'm sorry for Oppie. Of course I am.

I'm Just trying to cheer myself up.

(Radio plays swing music)

Oh, you made it.

— Joe.
— Robert.

— Rabi, how's Columbia?
— Still owns New York.

— How are you feeling, Robert?
— How am I feeling?

— A lot of people wanna be remembered to you.
— Good, good.

They're saying it's a tragedy, what happened.

— It was no tragedy. A farce, maybe.
— They're still following your lead.

When Teller was at Los Alamos,
everybody did what you did.

— Nobody would shake his hand.
— I shook his hand.

I shook it.

Farce.

Farce.

This is the meaning of my life,
to divide the scientific community.

When I was a young man,
I wanted to have a significant life.

Now they're saying it's a tragedy.

But I think it's been a farce all along.

— Oppie...
— A bitter farce.

Have you seen Kitty yet?

Let's go see her.

No need.

Rabi.

— Joe.
— Kitty.

So, how do you like our holy blessed martyr?

I think it's his finest part.

I'm sending a telegram to Stratford, England.

Watch out, Larly Competition.

There's drinks inside.

And I persuaded my son
to turn down his Jungle music.

You go ahead.

This martyr's moving slower and slower.

I should trade him in.

Oh, come on. I was only kidding.

Go to hell, Kitty.

Well, Join me, Robert.

Oh, come on.
We're not gonna Just lie down and die.

In the years that followed the hearings,

Oppenheimer was honored and applauded
in many foreign countries.

In his own country, his security clearance,
the mark of his government’s trust in him,

was never reinstated

But his good name was partially restored

when President johnson awarded him
the Fermi Medal for Science in 7965

the year after it had been won by Edward Teller

Oppenheimer died from cancer in 7962

Kitty died in 7972

7'heir daughter 7'oni committed suicide in 7972

Their son Peter now lives with his family
in New Mexico, not far from los Alamos,

where he works
as a builder and restorer of homes.