All language subtitles for 28-01-2024vgcvghcgheeeee

OSINT researchers have long analyzed Russian
resources, where obituaries of Russian military

personnel eliminated in Ukraine have
been published since the beginning of

the full-scale invasion. Dynamics, geography
and designation of the units led them to the

following conclusions regarding the situation of
live force in the occupation troops in Ukraine:

Russia managed to hide its losses quite
well in 2022, when most of the liquidated

occupiers were contract soldiers. However,
live-force losses in the first year of a

full-scale war were generally lower than
in 2023. The Wagner Group began employing

recruited prisoners as early as 2022, but the
operational secrecy of mercenaries, in general,

was higher than that of the Russian armed forces,
so their obituary losses are much worse recorded.

From the beginning of 2023 the losses increase
dramatically. In particular - at the expense of

the 155th Marine Brigade of the Russian Navy,
defeated in an attempt to attack Vuhledar,

as well as among fighters from the
temporarily occupied territories of

Ukraine. Russian commanders during this period
began to more actively mix experienced fighters

with mobilized fighters, regardless of the
compatibility of the units. Subsequently,

units from occupied territories again began
more actively participating in assaults,

leading to a gradual wear down of both categories
– experienced militants and mobilized ones.

As the Ukrainian offensive began, Russian
casualties again increased . Losses were recorded

not only on the main axis of the offensive, but
also on islands on the Dnipro River and near

Bakhmut. It is confirmed that the Russian command
drowned some of its own troops when Kakhovka Dam

was blown up. In the southern direction, the
Russians relied more and more on replenishing

their lost units with mobilized troops. At the
same time, their ability to move new units to this

section of the front was limited. Near Bakhmut,
the occupiers relied even more on undertrained

personnel to supplement the battered units.
Many of these replacements, especially those

recruited among convicts, had only 2-3 weeks
of combat training before being sent to the

front line. This tactic of plugging holes with
new recruits resulted in very high casualties.

The current situation in the Russian armed forces
has deteriorated even further. The current level

of mobilization is just about enough to keep up
the intensity of the fighting and to advance at

an extremely slow pace little by little.
However, to achieve this, it is necessary

to continue replenishing battered units with
poorly trained recruits. At the same time,

some individual units created back in 2022
are still kept in reserve - no casualties

among them have been recorded. In order to
increase the intensity of combat operations,

the Russian command needs to launch a larger
mobilization wave like the one that took place

in the fall of 2022 - but the Russian
leadership still does not dare to do so.

The situation with experienced units in the
enemy's armed forces is very bad - there are

very few of them left, but Russia has
enough manpower in the general mass.