All language subtitles for 30-12-2023-rtdrtdtreee

For Russia, Crimea has always been problematic
in defense and supply issues, and this was

especially evident during the full-scale invasion
of Ukraine.

But for the Russian leadership, the seized
peninsula was an element of reputation.

A demonstration that Moscow could afford to
seize what it considered its own.

Things changed dramatically in 2022, when
Crimea became the main logistical hub for

the invasion of mainland Ukraine and a base
for Russian occupation troops.

Great expectations were placed on it, but
the outcome was disappointment and a strategic

deadlock.

The Black Sea Fleet was supposed to play no
less important a role in the occupation of

mainland Ukraine than the ground forces and
aviation component.

But gradually the fleet lost its dominance
in the Black Sea, suffered losses, was driven

away from Ukrainian waters, and at one point
began to burn in a spectacular and sparkling

fashion.

As a result, for almost two years the Black
Sea Fleet not only failed to show any effectiveness,

but at the end of 2023 it was expelled from
the peninsula, and any call of its ships to

the port may end with their total destruction....

One of the real reasons for the occupation
of Crimea in 2014 was Russia's desire to dominate

the Black Sea, and it was willing to make
any losses to maintain that dominance.

However, it was ephemeral and dissipated as
soon as Russia entered into full-scale confrontation

with a country that essentially had no fleet.

Now Russia has no navy, only a flotilla.

For Russia, it was a priority after the occupation
of Crimea to link it with the mainland territory

by a bridge.

This logistics was to simplify primarily military
transport.

As a result of the strikes on the bridge,
logistics through Crimea proved unreliable,

and in the second half of 2023 there were
attempts by the occupiers to start construction

of a railroad on the Ukrainian mainland, which
only confirmed the enemy's lack of confidence

in the future of the Kerch Bridge.

To strengthen the security of airfields and
other facilities on the peninsula, the Russian

occupation forces began to concentrate more
and more air defense equipment.

Today, the peninsula has an echeloned air
defense system, which is the second densest

after Moscow.

But this sometimes even simplifies the tasks
for the Ukrainian Defense Forces to destroy

the occupants' expensive air defense systems.

In 2024, the story of the Black Sea Flotilla's
escape from Crimea to Novorossiysk may repeat

itself for aviation, which Russian troops
will be forced to withdraw to Russian territory

in order to protect from total destruction.

For the Russian occupiers, Crimea was supposed
to be a bulwark and support in their occupation

of all of southern Ukraine, but it has turned
into a burden that causes more problems and

losses than profit.

At some point, holding Crimea will become
even more problematic for the enemy than,

for example, the right bank of the Kherson
region.

The only difficulty is that for the Russian
command, Crimea is a matter of reputation

and principle.

Even when it protrudes as a bleeding bone
from the throat of the occupation regime,

it will not be spat out, continuing to endure
the pain.

Perhaps this is what will ultimately break
the regime.