All language subtitles for 24-12-2023-fchcfgfceee

Some conclusions on the assessment of
the situation in the Avdiivka area.

On the Donetsk direction, the enemy command
continues its attempts to "successfully

complete" the operation to encircle the
Avdiivka Defense District of the AFU.

However, they have some difficulties in
maintaining the dynamics and intensity of attacks

simultaneously on several areas and directions,
which play a key role in continuing the offensive.

After all, this requires the availability of a
sufficient amount of forces and means capable

of carrying out such actions for an extended
period. Fresh formations are needed - shelves,

brigades, in extreme cases, battalions
and companies. And it is precisely here,

precisely now, and for a sufficiently long time.

The Russian command has planned to move
its forces from the Bakhmut direction

to the Avdiivka direction, to the area of
the village of Marinka, and has introduced

units of the "Volunteer Assault Corps" into
the battle in the Avdiivka industrial zone.

Also on Avdiivka direction the enemy has in
reserve at least 3 motorized rifle regiments,

7 rifle and motorized rifle reserve battalions,
as well as up to 3 volunteer battalions.

Therefore, the question arises - why
move two "brigade level" formations

from one active direction at
once, because from the formal

point of view there are enough forces
and means concentrated near Avdiivka?

Or Avdiivka is more important
for the adversary than Bakhmut,

or for accomplishing the assigned task
in the Avdiivka area, the enemy needed

additional forces and means to "maintain
the pace of the offensive." Therefore,

the Russian command decided to redistribute
them in favor of some, at the expense of others.

I think one doesn’t rule out the other.

But the desire to attack simultaneously
in many directions can play a "cruel joke"

on the enemy. No one has ever canceled the
principle of concentration in the art of war.

Of course, it is quite possible to attack
on a wide front, with significant forces,

and at first glance, it looks
very "attractive" and effective.

But this becomes a very important and painful
problem when it does not bring results,

or brings little results. In
such a scenario, your strike

forces may continue to incur significant
losses without yielding any 'dividends'.

In this case, the enemy is forced either to
reduce the scope of his offensive (gradually

narrowing it along the front), or to
reduce the intensity of his attacks,

as well as the size of his forces and means.

At Avdiivka we are now witnessing an attempt
by the Russian command to maintain the planned

scope of its offensive. Including by
moving additional combat-capable units

to this direction, even at the expense
of other active sites and directions.

But I think they will soon face another "hard
necessity" - they will have to increase the

"operational pauses" between attacks, as well
as the time needed for additional manning.

Eventually, the enemy will have to
abandon the strategy of "immediately

and everywhere" and switch to alternating
attacks in specific areas and directions.

At the moment, the Russian commanders
believe that they still have enough forces

and means to conduct the offensive
with the desired pace and scope.

However, the first signs of a changing
situation are already being observed...