All language subtitles for 23-12-2023fhxdfxfeeee

I would like to talk about the
most powerful groups of enemy

troops in the south-western theater
of military operations. At the moment,

these are the "South" and "Dnieper" groups,
but today it is about the "South" group.

Its operational zone includes the
two most "relevant" at the moment

operational directions - Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

It consists of almost 157 thousand
personnel, 758 tanks, 2371 armored

fighting vehicles of all types, 2359 artillery
systems of caliber from 100-mm and 487 MLRS.

At the moment, the "South" group is
the main direction of the command of

the United Russian Army on
the territory of Ukraine.

It is now implementing in two
directions at once its command's

plan to conduct two operational-tactical
offensive operations simultaneously.

But how much longer will the command aggressively
throw personnel into attack and assault operations

in non-stop mode, with such a high level of losses
and at the same time - insignificant "victories"?

And it wouldn't have been such an acute problem
for the enemy if they had been advancing in narrow

directions and areas. Or this offensive would
lead to some deep breakthroughs and penetrations,

because they obviously have "enough"
live "raw materials" for this offensive.

But they are trying to attack on the widest
possible front and just mechanically increase

the number and pace of "grinding up"
their own troops. At the same time,

they also fail to break through
to the operational-tactical depth.

Attempts of the "first wave" to break through
the Ukrainian defense "in depth" by significant

assault groups, with the support and participation
of armored vehicles only increased their losses.

Therefore, very quickly they switched to "small
infantry groups" attacks, but in "non-stop" mode.

Yes, this allows the enemy to gradually and
systematically "displace" the Ukrainian troops.

But at the same time it significantly reduces
the probability and size of a hypothetical

breakthrough and sharply increases the time
for the enemy troops to complete the task,

because "small infantry groups" purely
physically cannot break through further

than the forward strongholds
and gain a foothold there.

They can displace individual units or even
a platoon from the frontline positions,

but they cannot pose a significant
threat to the entire Ukrainian

Armed Forces defense system in a
particular direction or sector.

Attempts to combine one method with
another have so far failed to give the

enemy the desired result. As soon as he tries
to concentrate forces in one or another area,

the volume of losses immediately begins
to grow avalanche-like. Because this

concentration is immediately noticed by the
Ukrainian command and reacts accordingly.

We have to go back to systematic
displacement by assault groups.

Therefore, at the moment, the key factors
affecting the course and results of the

offensive in the near future will be the quantity
and quality of trained and prepared personnel,

the level of their equipment and weapons, as
well as their moral and psychological qualities,

the work of artillery and the level of
effectiveness of military intelligence.

It is these capabilities of the parties
that will determine in the near future

the final results of the offensive
convulsions of the "South" group.

Of course, they will also depend on other
factors, but whether the enemy will be

able to "successfully complete" the operation in
the Avdiivka area and whether they will be able

to force the AFU to withdraw from Bakhmut
will largely depend on the above factors.