All language subtitles for 15-12-2023fgfddfgeeee

Ukrainian Defense Forces offensive
in 2023: success or failure?

Most think in certain, understandable categories,

without going beyond their boundaries. Few
consider the result of the summer offensive

from a slightly different perspective
than simply liberating territories.

The main category of such thinking
is the measurement of Ukraine's

achievements in liberated square
kilometers, villages and towns.

In reality, the assessment
of achievements may include

other components, such as heights,
strongholds, transportation hubs,

and various milestones. And there is another
very important category - enemy casualties.

From June through November 2023, the enemy
lost nearly 122,000 personnel, 1,760 tanks,

2,894 Armoured fighting vehicles,
4,457 barrel artillery, 337 MLRS,

269 air defense systems, 4,160
vehicles and 679 special vehicles.

During this period, Russian forces suffered the

heaviest casualties since the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Those who view the success of the offensive solely

in square kilometers usually fail to
draw parallels with what would have

awaited Ukraine had the Ukrainians not
launched the operation in the summer.

If the AFU had not attacked, the Russian forces
would have had the opportunity to accumulate

resources, restore the combat effectiveness
of units, fully staff them and form new ones.

As of today, the Russian grouping in Ukraine
is up to 450,000 personnel. Without the active

offensive campaign of the AFU, this figure
would now be more than 550 thousand, which

would make it much easier for the Russian
command not only to defend but also to

attack. Russia's military-industrial complex
has been working for the last six months to

constantly compensate for losses, and has not
allowed the enemy to accumulate equipment.

Moreover, the Ukrainian offensive forced the
Russians to use up their artillery ammunition

reserves, depleting them completely.
It was during the summer of 2023 that

Iranian munitions were first identified in
the enemy's arsenal. By the end of summer,

Russia intensified the acquisition of ammunition
from North Korea, indicating a critical situation

for the adversary with proportional
supplies of ammunition to the combat zone

The summer offensive was a forced measure. If
it had not been launched by Ukrainian troops,

Russian troops would have been able to
accumulate strike capabilities so that

they could conduct offensive operations
simultaneously in several directions.

In turn, the AFU not only tied down
enemy forces in the Zaporizhzhya region,

but also created temporary logistical
confusion and the effect of Russian units

constantly roaming from one group of troops to
another to reinforce one or another bridgehead.

It is true that these actions did not result in
the large-scale liberation of the territories

that many had hoped, but it was they that
allowed the serious damage and depletion of

the enemy, forcing it to significantly limit its
offensive ambitions and in general reducing the

effectiveness of any offensive in any direction
that Russian troops are trying to conduct.

So I categorically disagree with the
statement that the summer offensive

was a complete failure. Yes, it uncovered
a number of problems and forced a change

in the general tactics of combat
operations. But at the same time,

this campaign performed another function
perfectly - the exhaustion of the enemy,

and this tendency was maintained in winter as
well. In general, the concept of exhausting the

enemy may become the main concept in the new phase
of warfare from which we are moving into 2024.