All language subtitles for 06-12-2023ghcvghcgheeee

The victory in the war against Russia can be
considered only the complete liberation of the

territories of Ukraine. But is the process of
releasing the territories a proof of victory,

and their loss, on the contrary?
It sounds paradoxical, but no,

and now we are entering just such a
paradoxical, at first glance, phase.

The new phase of the war is not so much
about liberating new territories as about

inflicting maximum damage on the enemy,
depleting his resource - with maximum

preservation of our own forces and means.
That is, a war of attrition is beginning.

As of today, Russians are critically
constrained in their ability to accumulate

the technical and mechanized component,
and their military-industrial complex

operates only to compensate for losses,
gradually slipping into the negative.

The new phase of war and new
victories is to destroy the

enemy in quantities that would not
allow them to recover, get stronger,

and carry out operations not only of an
offensive but also of a defense nature.

In his article for The Economist,
the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU,

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, explained in the clearest
possible language why the summer offensive

did not achieve the expected successes. It was
addressed first and foremost to the partners,

from whom we would like to see more action
than we have seen for almost two years now.

But still, we cannot say that the summer offensive
was not successful. It was during this period

that we witnessed a number of records for the
destruction of armored vehicles, artillery,

air defense, vehicles, etc. Russian troops
lost almost 150,000 personnel in manpower!

All summer and throughout the fall, the
Russian group remained constrained in the

Zaporizhzhya region and constantly demanded new
resources to contain the Ukrainian offensive.

Now we can observe how the enemy
cannot block and neutralize the

expansion of the AFU bridgehead on
the left bank of the Kherson region.

That is, there is a result from the summer
campaign, the only thing is that it was planned

as an offensive campaign with the liberation of
territories, and not as a campaign of exhausting

and depleting the enemy. And, unfortunately,
this factor had its negative impact.

The 2022 scenario no longer works, and this
changes absolutely everything in terms of the

approach to planning subsequent operations and
reassessment of the situation at all levels.

This does not mean that in the short term the AFU

will not be able to attack and
will only exhaust the enemy, no.

Yes, while the AFU will have only defense
bridgeheads and some positions and locations

they will be forced to leave - and
this should also be taken adequately,

without panic and depression. But there
are bridgeheads where the presence of the

Ukrainian side may well expand, which
is gradually emerging in the future.

The new phase of the war is not a
phase of principles and stubbornness,

it is a phase of rationalism and endurance.
Weakening and exhaustion of the enemy to the

stage when there will be enough forces to
deliver a crushing blow, and more than one.

If you like, the concept of action in
the short term is not the liberation of

as many square kilometers as possible,
but the elimination of as many invaders

as possible and, more importantly,
the destruction of their equipment

with maximum preservation of their
own lives and mechanized component.