All language subtitles for 24-11-2023gghvhjeee

War in Ukraine in 2024 and options
for the development of events.

Based on the experience of the events of 2022
and 2023, we can make a number of predictions

about how events will develop in 2024 and
even subsequent years, because the end of

the war next year is not expected, even
under the most favorable circumstances.

The year 2024 may become the year of
liberation of the South of the country,

the preconditions for such a development of
events we can observe today in the war zone.

The formation of a bridgehead on
the left bank will continue in 2024,

which may lead to a priority cutting
of important logistics. This will force

the Russian troops to withdraw to more
favorable positions deep into the region.

The Russians will not be able to hold the wedge
in Zaporizhzhya region for long and the AFU will

break through it in the direction of Tokmak,
which in combination with the development of

events on the left bank will force the
enemy to withdraw closer to Melitopol.

In turn, the enemy will continue to try
to expand its zone of control in Donetsk

region. The Avdiivka direction
will drain their resources,

preventing them from developing
offensives in old and new directions.

A possible next wave of mobilization will allow
the enemy to solve the issue of human resources,

while the problem of the technical component will
not be solved. Russia will continue to deplete

its domestic resources and depend on supplies of
certain nomenclature from Iran and North Korea.

The result of the fighting
in Ukraine in 2024 may be a

classic positional war in the East and
a series of achievements in the South,

allowing to expand bridgeheads and
limit the logistics of the occupiers.

The sequence of liberation of the territories
of Ukraine may look like - Kherson region and

Zaporizhzhya region. Between the process of
their liberation there may be operations with

regard to Crimea, but it is premature
to talk about its liberation in 2024.

Donetsk and Lugansk regions will
be the most difficult stage of

liberation of Ukrainian territories.
And all this points to the fact that

the war will not be fleeting,
much less will it end in 2024.

In analysis, there should always be
a focus on situational variability

rather than constants. For example, in our
analysis, we can consider or exclude the

destruction of a vital logistical artery
like the Crimean Bridge. Now the Crimean

Bridge is functioning incompletely, but it is
functioning. But if the support on it ceases,

then the situation in the whole south of mainland
Ukraine changes dramatically, because the system

of providing troops sharply degrades and
the liberation processes will accelerate.

If we consider the course of hostilities in 2022,

the Russian troops retreated in a situation
where holding the bridgehead was disastrous for

them. They fled during the counteroffensive
of the AFU on the northern bridgehead. The

stalemate of the Russians on the right
bank forced them to flee to the left.

But in 2023 the doctrine of "not a step back"
was adopted and this translated into colossal

losses of enemy manpower. The direct dependence
of the Russian troops' retention of territories

on the number of these troops can play a deadly
joke with them, because quantity is not quality.

By the end of 2023 the number of Russian troops
in Ukraine has increased 2.5 times and exceeds

400 thousand. But despite this growth, the
Russian army has not demonstrated even a

tenth of the achievements of the beginning
of the invasion. This quantitative factor

allows the enemy to hold territories, but under
its weight they will collapse at some point.

But it won't be in 2024. In 2024, unfortunately,

the Russians will still
have the strength to resist.