All language subtitles for 08-11-2023ghjvjhkheee

In the Southern operational zone, on the left
bank of Kherson, events are unfolding that are

clearly not in favor of the adversary. At the very
least, in the vicinity of the village of Krynky,

the adversary has not only failed to narrow down
the Ukrainian Armed Forces' tactical foothold

over the past week but has also been unable to
prevent its gradual expansion on the flanks.

The Russian command has concentrated units
from the 18th combined-arms army and the

40th army corps in this direction. However, it
is evident that the adversary's command will

face certain difficulties, primarily concerning
the allocation of their forces and resources.

The Ukrainian command has the ability to choose at
its own discretion where and when to act "across

the Dnipro" on a sufficiently wide front, so
the enemy has to, constantly expecting such

actions from the AFU, distribute the forces
of its grouping of troops more or less evenly

throughout the entire length of its sector
of responsibility along the Dnipro River.

This results in limiting the enemy's ability
to react quickly and promptly to such actions

of the AFU, simply because it is impossible to be
"everywhere and at once" strong and sufficiently

"operative", especially when the Ukrainians
act one time in several areas and directions.

The adversary can address this constraint through
two means: reinforcing their grouping with

additional forces and resources or designating a
portion of their existing forces and resources as

a so-called mobile reserve, specifically
intended to respond to such situations.

But the enemy has certain difficulties
in this direction as well. The fact is

that almost everything that could
be used to substantially strengthen

this direction is already deployed
here, and it is clearly lacking.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that for
significant reinforcement of their group

with forces from the Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk
directions, which are holding the so-called

"land corridor," the adversary's command will
likely be unable to withdraw anything right now

because the pressure from the Ukrainian
Armed Forces in this zone is evidently

ongoing. And the "Defense of Crimea" is
still only in a state of "formation".

Acquiring anything substantial
from other directions during the

offensive in Avdiivka and intense
battles in the Bakhmut region,

as well as on the Kupiansk and Lyman
directions, is also probably unfeasible.

Hence, it is quite intriguing to see how the newly
appointed commander of the "Dnieper" group will

attempt to address this challenge, primarily
using the forces already under his command.

How it will actually be, I think we will see
in the near future, because the delay of the

Russian command on this issue, obviously, may
end for him, to put it mildly, "ambiguously".

It is not necessary to have high hopes
in advance, but there has already been

confirmation that the first BTR-4E has been
transferred to the left bank. But forcing

the river is quite a complex task, where the
biggest difficulty is the issue of logistics.

Meanwhile, yesterday another absolute
daily record was set for the use by the

occupying forces of corrective aerial
bombs in the combat zone - 103 bombs.

In total, 433 bombs have already been used by
Russian aviation in the first week of November.

And to date, there is still no effective
instrument of counteraction. All those

tools that can counteract - Ukraine either does
not exist, will appear over time, or critically

insufficient, while Russia is increasing the
intensity of attacks with corrected air bombs.