Original subtitles

In the Southern operational zone, on the left bank of Kherson, events are unfolding that are

clearly not in favor of the adversary. At the very least, in the vicinity of the village of Krynky,

the adversary has not only failed to narrow down the Ukrainian Armed Forces' tactical foothold

over the past week but has also been unable to prevent its gradual expansion on the flanks.

The Russian command has concentrated units from the 18th combined-arms army and the

40th army corps in this direction. However, it is evident that the adversary's command will

face certain difficulties, primarily concerning the allocation of their forces and resources.

The Ukrainian command has the ability to choose at its own discretion where and when to act "across

the Dnipro" on a sufficiently wide front, so the enemy has to, constantly expecting such

actions from the AFU, distribute the forces of its grouping of troops more or less evenly

throughout the entire length of its sector of responsibility along the Dnipro River.

This results in limiting the enemy's ability to react quickly and promptly to such actions

of the AFU, simply because it is impossible to be "everywhere and at once" strong and sufficiently

"operative", especially when the Ukrainians act one time in several areas and directions.

The adversary can address this constraint through two means: reinforcing their grouping with

additional forces and resources or designating a portion of their existing forces and resources as

a so-called mobile reserve, specifically intended to respond to such situations.

But the enemy has certain difficulties in this direction as well. The fact is

that almost everything that could be used to substantially strengthen

this direction is already deployed here, and it is clearly lacking.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that for significant reinforcement of their group

with forces from the Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk directions, which are holding the so-called

"land corridor," the adversary's command will likely be unable to withdraw anything right now

because the pressure from the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this zone is evidently

ongoing. And the "Defense of Crimea" is still only in a state of "formation".

Acquiring anything substantial from other directions during the

offensive in Avdiivka and intense battles in the Bakhmut region,

as well as on the Kupiansk and Lyman directions, is also probably unfeasible.

Hence, it is quite intriguing to see how the newly appointed commander of the "Dnieper" group will

attempt to address this challenge, primarily using the forces already under his command.

How it will actually be, I think we will see in the near future, because the delay of the

Russian command on this issue, obviously, may end for him, to put it mildly, "ambiguously".

It is not necessary to have high hopes in advance, but there has already been

confirmation that the first BTR-4E has been transferred to the left bank. But forcing

the river is quite a complex task, where the biggest difficulty is the issue of logistics.

Meanwhile, yesterday another absolute daily record was set for the use by the

occupying forces of corrective aerial bombs in the combat zone - 103 bombs.

In total, 433 bombs have already been used by Russian aviation in the first week of November.

And to date, there is still no effective instrument of counteraction. All those

tools that can counteract - Ukraine either does not exist, will appear over time, or critically

insufficient, while Russia is increasing the intensity of attacks with corrected air bombs.