All language subtitles for 28-10-2023tftjhfhyeeee

Details about the Avdiivka defense area.

The Russian command is pulling additional
resources to Avdiivka. At the moment,

after the meat grinder of the first
weeks, they were able to compensate

for their losses at the expense of other
bridgeheads. The 2nd Guards Combined Arms

Army of Russia is already in Avdiivka, and
the Russian command has put it into action.

It should be understood that at this stage
Russian troops will not stop storming Avdiivka

and only if a new wave of offensive will
not bring them success, they can put on

pause the Avdiivka adventure, taking into
account the problems in other locations.

In fact, the Russian troops lost as much equipment
at Avdiivka as their military-industrial complex

now produces in a month. That is, the Avdiivka
offensive introduces a severe imbalance in the

very monthly process of compensating for
losses. And this is only in one location.

Without successes in the next few weeks,
they will exhaust the resources they

have been pulling together to compensate for
losses, as a result of the failed offensive,

and will be faced with a dilemma. Either
continue to pound into the Ukrainian defense

at the cost of high losses, weakening other
groups of troops and a number of locations,

or be satisfied with what they have achieved.

Apparently, Russian commanders have chosen
the first option. As I suspected yesterday,

after achieving certain results in the north,
the enemy has also intensified from the south.

It seems that the command of the Russian
armed forces in eastern Ukraine has changed

its approach to organizing and conducting
military operations. Now they are resorting

to a more cyclical method, activating the
northern and southern tactical strike groups

alternately. They have temporarily abandoned
the strategy of a large-scale and continuous

offensive on Avdiivka, as was the case
at the initial stage of the operation.

Several factors may account for this decision:

Insufficient combat capability of Russian units
and formations for a long "powerful and decisive

offensive", as well as an attempt to confuse
the Ukrainian side by forcing it to distribute

its efforts and reserves across the entire
offensive zone, thus reducing the response.

In other words - the enemy command organizes
and conducts offensive actions in the area of

Avdiivka where it can and where it believes that
it can achieve success in the shortest possible

time and with the use of minimal effort.
These are the considerations that should

be taken into account when assessing
the actions of the Russian command.

Although I could be mistaken, it
appears that the Russian armed forces,

in some instances, are learning from their
experiences. Over the past six months,

it has been evident that the Russian
side has reconsidered its approach,

aware of the need to balance the scope of its
strategic objectives with the real possibilities.

But first they necessarily work the old
methods, maximally trying to take the quantity.

In this context, the rapid and
operational change of strategy

and methods in the organization and conduct of
combat operations on the part of the Russian

command in the Avdiivka direction serves as
a vivid example of how they are adapting.

After the enemy failed to quickly break through
the Ukrainian defense with a single powerful blow,

it began to move quickly to elaborate
attacks and assaults in separate areas

and directions, naturally taking
into account its real capabilities.

And while the Russian troops
are increasing their efforts,

the Ukrainian defense forces have also
transferred reserves in the form of two

brigades to Avdiivka, so the hardest days
of the battle for Avdiivka are still ahead.