All language subtitles for 18-10-2023cfgxdfeeee

About the Russian army's shell famine in Ukraine
and how it is turning into a shell crisis.

In the fourth quarter of 2023, for the first
time, the number of rounds fired by Ukrainian

artillery exceeded the number of rounds fired
by the artillery of the occupying forces.

This was an expected result due to the decreasing
firepower of the Russian army due to the depletion

of ammunition depots.

While at the very beginning of the invasion
of Ukraine, in February and March, the Russian

artillery could afford even 80 thousand rounds
per day, as of the beginning of October 2023

the figure has fallen below 10 thousand rounds
for the first time.

This situation forces Russia to distribute
its firepower very rigidly, limiting most

of the front.

And when someone claims that there is no shell
famine, that right now there is hell under

Avdiivka, there is nothing surprising about
it.

Under Avdiivka hell, and for hundreds of kilometers
of the front there are solitary, or batch

shelling.

This decrease is due not only to the reduction
in stocks in warehouses and storage centres,

but also to a number of other factors.

The Russian military-industrial complex is
able to provide troops, on average, for 4.5

thousand shots per day.

It was not possible to increase critical production
in Russia, which is confirmed by the lack

of technical and technological capabilities.

It is for this reason that the Russians are
trying to find additional sources of ammunition,

in particular Iran and North Korea.

But, as is known, Iran has been transferring
shells to Russia for a long time.

Nevertheless, this has not been able to critically
affect the situation in the war zone and the

number of rounds fired by the occupiers has
continued to decline.

Similarly, North Korea will not be able to
critically change the situation in the combat

zone with its supplies.

Only ad hoc, short-term and on certain parts
of the front.

At the same time, Ukraine's partners are just
increasing production of ammunition.

If the war drags on, the Russian army will
find itself in a situation where it will not

be able to fire more rounds per day than its
own production capacity allows it to do.

This is one example of the fact that a protracted
war is not in Russia's interests in the first

place.

Russia also has a serious shortage of artillery,
as the amount of artillery being destroyed

exceeds the capacity of the Russian defense
industry to make up for those losses.

Beginning in May 2023, the gap between losses
and the ability to compensate has become significant.

In turn, the reduction in the number of artillery
also reduces the enemy's firepower, and the

use of older artillery reduces its effectiveness
in terms of range and accuracy.

The problem of barrels is no less important,
since in the absence of mass, serial production

of barrels for artillery in Russia, the only
solution is either to reduce the number of

rounds fired to a safe level or total "cannibalism"
of barrels.

Of course, Russia can try to get some artillery
from Iran and North Korea, in addition to

shells, but just as with shells, this will
help only locally, but will not solve the

problem.

As a result, the Russian troops are no longerjust
suffering from shell starvation, but rather

have a shell crisis, unlike the Ukrainian
defense forces.

Of course, in the coming days, we may even
see peak spikes in shelling from the Russian

side.

But this will no longer be a systematic shelling
of ammunition, but convulsions of Russian

capabilities.