All language subtitles for 04-10-2023fhxchfgee

What forces the Russians have
gathered to defend "Crimea"

and the unenviable fate of the Bakhmut defenders.

We talk a lot about the Zaporizhzhya region,
sometimes about the left-bank Kherson region,

assess the possibilities of offensive and
defensive enemy groups in these directions,

make forecasts. But little attention is
paid to the temporarily occupied Crimea.

But what Russian forces are currently
providing for the defense of Crimea?

The "Crimea" grouping of troops or the "Crimean
defense" grouping of troops is responsible for

this task. And as of today, it is just over 11,000
personnel. Yes, I didn't misspell it, 11,000.

But what is most interesting is how much equipment

this weakest of all groups of troops
has in service. And now attention:

Tanks - about 30;
Armoured fighting vehicles - less than 60;

Artillery - about 90 barrels;
MLRS - 4 units!

If we use the index Battalion tactical group
in relation to them, the picture looks even

more gloomy! After all, these 14 BTGs in
Crimea have only 30 tanks instead of 154;

60 Armoured fighting vehicles instead of
462; 90 artillery barrels instead of 168.....

That's a monstrous understaffing.

Of course, Crimea is a defensive
springboard, which will be saturated

with the forces and means of those who will
escape from the mainland south of Ukraine.

That is, these 11 thousand in the process
of fleeing Russian troops from the mainland

south will dramatically increase by 100
thousand or more, but there is a nuance...

Usually, where it's thin, it cracks loudest. But
in the case of Crimea, everything will crack.

But back to Bakhmut. While Kleshchiivka,
Andriivka and Kurdiumivka were parts of

the occupants' support line in the south-western
sector of Bakhmut, the railroad was a conventional

defense line, the crossing of which would
create a lot of problems for the Russians.

After all, on its left side is a direct
route to the southern logistical artery 0513.

After a series of unsuccessful counterattacks
on Kleshchiivka and Andriivka, the enemy's

resources have been drained and for the
most part they are now sitting on the

left side of the "railroad" in the forest
belts waiting for the inevitable - mop-up.

But to cross the "railroad"
is not such an easy task.

There are several convenient crossings,
especially in the vicinity of Andriivka,

due to the presence of crossings and optimal
routes towards Odradivka. But for now they are

shot through by the enemy, especially from the
nearby forest belts. The solution is a matter of

time and the amount of cluster munitions, then the
inevitable will happen - mopping up the survivors.

But the main thing is that one way or another,
but this crossing will take place and the

advance to highway 0513, which is already
under fire control of the AFU, will begin.

But when physical control over it is
established, we can talk about success

in the southwestern sector and the beginning
of advancement in the southeastern sector.

The AFU will put a stop to the Russian
defense capabilities as a whole south of

Bakhmut and the possibility of taking
under fire control eastern logistics.

To reinforce the southern direction, the
Russians have only one option - transferring

resources from the north. However, if
they start moving units from the north,

the potential in this direction will
be reduced, with negative consequences.

But how can the Russian command operate the
resource, after the AFU will establish fire

control over all logistics in
this area? Rhetorical question.