All language subtitles for 29-09-2023uyftydfrte

Now it is important to realize that
the events in the south are of great

importance and affect the course
and essence of the entire war.

Russia seeks to preserve the land corridor to
Crimea and the Crimean Bridge. At the same time,

Ukraine is trying to sever this logistical link
at its most key link - the land corridor - which

will make maintaining the peninsula
militarily "critically" costly and pointless.

Clearly, the Crimean bridge is highly
vulnerable. And the long-term defense of

Crimea, in conditions of "complete isolation" is
impossible... Especially in the conditions of the

AFU's regular and massive strikes on the port and
military infrastructure of the peninsula itself.

The "defense of Crimea" has strategic
content exclusively until the AFU has

broken through the first and second
positions of the main defense line

of the Russian groups "Zaporozhye" and "Vostok".

As soon as the land corridor becomes
"impassable," and this may happen even

without the AFU's access to the coast of the
Sea of Azov, and the Crimean bridge will be

in the range of the AFU's long-range
precision weapons, the issue of the

"defense of Crimea" will become "especially
piquant" for strategists in the Kremlin.

As far as I understand, these are exactly the

strategic goals that Ukraine
has set for the 2023 campaign.

To date, Ukraine has achieved certain results.

In the operational-tactical direction Tokmak
- Melitopol, the AFU managed to overcome the

first position of the enemy's main defense
line. In addition, the AFU has acquired the

ability to deliver sufficiently massive
and concentrated strikes on the enemy's

military infrastructure in Crimea, as well as to
influence the functioning of the Crimean bridge.

All of this is, of course, far from the ultimate
strategic goals, but some progress is evident.

Another question is what are the
further prospects for the AFU to

achieve its goal by the end of the 2023 campaign?

Three main factors can be emphasized :

Overcoming the echeloned and prepared
enemy defenses on the way to the Sea of

Azov will require a huge amount of
effort and resources from the AFU.

Effective strikes on the military infrastructure
in Crimea must be regular and massive.

After the "rupture" of the land corridor,

the Crimean bridge will only partially
satisfy the enemy's logistical needs.

Also, we should not forget about the population

of the peninsula and occupied parts
of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions,

which the enemy will also have to provide
exactly through the "Crimean Bridge".

Therefore, any influence of the AFU on the size of
its carrying capacity is critical for the enemy.

To increase the influence it
is necessary either to go to

the coast of the Sea of Azov or
the allies must sharply increase

the volume of supplies of long-range
precision weapons and not only them.

Also, the Ukrainian side must neutralize
or severely limit the enemy in the air

and at sea in this strategic direction.
The impact on the military infrastructure

in Crimea will also depend on the supply of
high-precision and long-range means of defeat.

What could be the negative scenario ? It
is possible that the goals for the 2023

campaign will have to be reconsidered,
and the Ukrainian side may have to limit

itself to narrowing the land corridor to the
south, rather than cutting it completely.

Our appeals to our representatives in
Congress or to Members of the European

Parliament can expedite their sound
decisions. Don't forget about this.