All language subtitles for 24-09-2023-ctrycrtye

Some time ago, when considering
the fortifications and defense

lines being built in temporarily occupied
Crimea, I decided to consider them in the

context of available means of defeat at the
Ukrainian Liberation Forces of the depth of

effective fire impact on the occupants
in Crimea, in case of their defense.

As a result, I got such a layer cake with a
40-kilometer zone of use of barrel artillery,

80-kilometer zone of MLRS, as well as 120
and 150-kilometer zones at the prospect of

supplying the means of defeat of appropriate
range. I should note in advance that the zones

of defeat were specified taking into account the
mandatory safety buffer for the means of defeat.

At the same time, such a layer cake will be viable
only in the case of realization of the scenario

under which Snake Island was liberated,
but adapted for the territory of Crimea.

The scenario of complete isolation of the
Crimean peninsula from the outside world

and methodical and systematic
annihilation of the occupants.

The main task of the Ukrainian side to start the

active phase of this scenario is to reach
the administrative border of the peninsula.

After that, the formation of shock and fire
potential will begin to fulfill the tasks

of destroying all military facilities and
military infrastructure on the peninsula.

In fact, the AFU could provide 4 zones of
defeat, taking into account the available

and prospective means of defeat, and these
zones would be quite enough to force the

Russian troops to shrink as much as possible
in the southern location of the peninsula,

denuding, well, or at least weakening
the north and center of the peninsula.

In turn, an important point was to
regain full control over the Sea of

Azov and cause damage incomparable to the
functioning of the only logistical artery

connecting the Russian mainland and
the peninsula - the Crimean Bridge.

Preservation of ferry communication is
possible only for civilian purposes,

but in case of its use for providing
the peninsula with the forces and

means of Russian troops, such ferries
should be destroyed at sea or in ports,

because during transportation of troops,
they can and will hide behind civilians.

Thus, the enemy contingent on the peninsula
will be isolated and will suffer daily losses,

the restoration of which will be impossible.
That is, there will be a daily disadvantage,

which will lead after some time to a complete loss
of combat effectiveness of enemy units in Crimea.

But, what has changed recently? Recently,
the peninsula has begun to fly in means from

which there is no hiding. They can hardly be
intercepted by Russian air defense means and

even the southern strip of the peninsula
is not safe for the occupants even now.

Such opportunities significantly unload the
AFU ability to create the most effective zone

of defeat in temporarily occupied Crimea. And
no matter how many personnel the occupants have

concentrated on the peninsula, after fleeing from
the mainland south, this number will not matter.

After all, in Crimea this mass
will be in even worse conditions

than on the right bank of the
Kherson region before fleeing.

This is only one of the scenarios that I
see most clearly, but at the same time,

on the table in the General Staff of the
AFU, there are several such scenarios,

and some of them are much more unexpected
than this template sketch of a larger-scale

operation than was on Snake Island or
the right bank of the Kherson region.