All language subtitles for 31-08-2023rtdxrtuje

Yesterday on the basis of OSINT it was
discovered that the AFU bypassed the

enemy positions southeast of Novoprokopivka.
Today a number of military officers publicly

confirmed fighting in this area just
before the main enemy defense line.

What does this information give us?

It is obvious that despite the fierce
concentration of enemy troops in a small area,

the enemy cannot stop the offensive. This advance
directly into the enemy's main line of defense

occurs at a maintained pace. I emphasize again
- this is already happening in front of the main

defense line, on which (according to doctrines)
the pace of the AFU should fall and wither,

so that the enemy can make a powerful
counterattack on the Ukrainian side.

Because the enemy clung to the "Security
Zone," he lost significant reserves not

in the most important places. The main thing
is that there he spent the most "cadre part",

which by logic should have been waiting for its
"star time" behind the main line of defense.

Therefore, now the enemy "does not withdraw
behind the main line of defense", but it is

"displaced" and recycled by the defense forces
of Ukraine. This is a significant difference,

as the former is the result of
planned tactics and strategy,

while the latter is due to a lack of
resources and is an uncontrolled process.

And the main thing is the proper place of the
advance. The enemy's main line of defense is

built competently by heights, but beyond
Novoprokopivka and up to the Dnipro River

there is an interesting "topographical" situation:
the main line passes through appreciable heights,

but the reserve positions and the
second line of defense due to the

peculiarities of the relief go already in
the lowlands. The enemy understands this,

and surely this can justify his actions
to "cling" to the Security Zone.

As a matter of fact, if you are confidently
entrenched on the main line of defense (for

which battles are already going on) - you
get a tangible advantage in heights on

the reserve positions and the second (last
continuous) line of defense of the enemy.

There is an opinion that positions "along the
main line" may be "slightly easier". This is

what some analysts explain a certain "chaos"
and haste in the enemy's actions regarding the

transfer of reserves and constant attempts
to counterattack on occasion and without.

I would also like to touch upon the topic of the
night mass drone strike on Russian territory,

and specifically one of the episodes
- the strike on the airfield in Pskov,

during which 4 to 6 IL-76 aircraft
were damaged and disabled. This is

a heavy military transport aircraft, of
which Russia had about 100 in service.

From the Ukrainian border to Pskov in a
straight line is 700 kilometers. That is,

the question arises, how could
several UAVs overcome such a distance

undetected and without being shot down by
"unparalleled in the world" air defense?

Another point, what route did they fly ?

About 400 kilometers is near the border
with Belarus. Then it is the Pskov region,

bordering Latvia and Estonia
- NATO member countries.

So, what does it mean that Russia has
no air defense along the border with

Belarus and in the area bordering with
scary and aggressive NATO countries?

What can we do when one third of all
active air defense was destroyed by

Ukrainians, one third is in Ukraine to cover
the occupation troops, and the remaining one

third has to be concentrated to protect at least
Moscow and the Crimean bridge. At the same time,

this air defense is becoming
steadily less and less every day.

In such conditions of acute shortage, even
the insidious and aggressive NATO is not

so scary for the Russian command and it
is exposing the advanced location. It

is a pity that no one will take
advantage of the situation and,

unlike Russia, will not violate
the borders of a sovereign state.

I imagine that, with such trends,

will be with Russian air defense at the
end of 2023. Russia, are you asleep?