All language subtitles for 27-08-2023exyertuy

The Lyman-Kupiansk axis, this section of the
front, which is almost 140 kilometers long,

has recently revived, attracting a lot of
attention.

This section of the front is not only a combat
zone, but also a springboard for a large-scale

Russian psychological operation designed to
sow panic in Ukrainians, doubt in allies about

the success of the offensive, and give Russian
consumers of information fast food faith in

their army.

It is for this reason that Russian propagandists
so ardently call the actions on the Lyman-Kupiansk

axis the beginning, preparation, warming up
before some epic offensive, compare Kupiansk

with Bakhmut and dream of a march on Kharkiv.

In reality, their situation in this location,
to put it mildly, lacks any particularly epic

prospects.

To begin with, units of two groups of troops,
namely, "West" and "Center" are concentrated

on this section of the front.

In total, this is the second largest concentration
of enemy forces in the entire combat zone,

after the Zaporizhzhya region.

Also this grouping is the best in terms of
the quality of equipment, but it is the best

only because the other groups of troops are
even worse.

For example, the "strike fist" on Kupiansk
is not so much a breakthrough offensive function,

but more of a defense function.

I particularly like their Armoured fighting
vehicles stats - 21% of the authorized strength.

That is, motorized rifle units, which should
be in the first echelon to tear up the defense,

are more like marching battalions on maximal.

And now the question is, what is the probability
of successful offensive and breakthrough of

enemy defenses by units that have not offensive,
but defensive functionality?

No, of course they can attack and even break
through the defense.

But they will lose 3-4 times more manpower
and mechanized resources than when advancing

with full-fledged functionality.

In turn, advancing at the cost of exsanguination
of your resource, suitable for defense, leads

to the fact that you will not be able to hold
the defense, but I've already talked about

this earlier.

But that's the point, that the offensive does
not bring the Russian troops even an intermediately

tolerable result.

In the second half of June, the offensive
on Lyman was launched and what was the result,

what was captured, what was the advance, what
were the tactical achievements?

The answer is simple - failure.

The occupants moved in the Borovsk direction
by the middle of July.

What outcome did we see?

Capture of three villages wiped off the face
of the earth, and then fleeing from them due

to the impossibility of holding them during
counterattacks by Ukrainian defense forces.

Kupiansk.

The beginning of the offensive from the end
of July-beginning of August.

What did it lead to?

A virtual "capture" of Synkivka that many
panic-driven individuals believed in.

As a result, the started large-scale offensive
along the Lyman-Kupiansk axis since the second

half of June has not achieved any of its goals,
which I can formulate in 3 points:

To show that the Russians could advance.

They did not show and even worse, they wasted
their defense resource;

To divert the attention of the AFU General
Staff from the south to the east and make

them disperse their forces to reduce the pressure
in Zaporizhzhya region - they did not;

To turn Kupiansk into a second Bakhmut and
divert the attention of the internal audience

from the failures in the south to the battles
around this town - neither did they.

Moreover, the process of transferring part
of the units of the "West" and "Center" group

of forces to the south has begun.

In other words, the group, weakened by futile
offensive convulsions, becomes even further

weakened as it heads to reinforce the southern
foothold.

That this will be the case, I have already
said earlier.

Of course, the convulsions along the Lyman-Kupiansk
axis of the enemy will continue, but this

phase of imitation of an epic offensive has
exhausted itself.

Although sometimes there is a completely unexpected
continuation, but for whom?

In the meantime, you can call or write your
representatives, members of Congress and any

elected officials in your government and demand
increased support for Ukraine.

Thank you to the viewer who reminded me to
voice these seemingly simple truths.