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The Lyman-Kupiansk axis, this section of the front, which is almost 140 kilometers long,
has recently revived, attracting a lot of attention.
This section of the front is not only a combat zone, but also a springboard for a large-scale
Russian psychological operation designed to sow panic in Ukrainians, doubt in allies about
the success of the offensive, and give Russian consumers of information fast food faith in
their army.
It is for this reason that Russian propagandists so ardently call the actions on the Lyman-Kupiansk
axis the beginning, preparation, warming up before some epic offensive, compare Kupiansk
with Bakhmut and dream of a march on Kharkiv.
In reality, their situation in this location, to put it mildly, lacks any particularly epic
prospects.
To begin with, units of two groups of troops, namely, "West" and "Center" are concentrated
on this section of the front.
In total, this is the second largest concentration of enemy forces in the entire combat zone,
after the Zaporizhzhya region.
Also this grouping is the best in terms of the quality of equipment, but it is the best
only because the other groups of troops are even worse.
For example, the "strike fist" on Kupiansk is not so much a breakthrough offensive function,
but more of a defense function.
I particularly like their Armoured fighting vehicles stats - 21% of the authorized strength.
That is, motorized rifle units, which should be in the first echelon to tear up the defense,
are more like marching battalions on maximal.
And now the question is, what is the probability of successful offensive and breakthrough of
enemy defenses by units that have not offensive, but defensive functionality?
No, of course they can attack and even break through the defense.
But they will lose 3-4 times more manpower and mechanized resources than when advancing
with full-fledged functionality.
In turn, advancing at the cost of exsanguination of your resource, suitable for defense, leads
to the fact that you will not be able to hold the defense, but I've already talked about
this earlier.
But that's the point, that the offensive does not bring the Russian troops even an intermediately
tolerable result.
In the second half of June, the offensive on Lyman was launched and what was the result,
what was captured, what was the advance, what were the tactical achievements?
The answer is simple - failure.
The occupants moved in the Borovsk direction by the middle of July.
What outcome did we see?
Capture of three villages wiped off the face of the earth, and then fleeing from them due
to the impossibility of holding them during counterattacks by Ukrainian defense forces.
Kupiansk.
The beginning of the offensive from the end of July-beginning of August.
What did it lead to?
A virtual "capture" of Synkivka that many panic-driven individuals believed in.
As a result, the started large-scale offensive along the Lyman-Kupiansk axis since the second
half of June has not achieved any of its goals, which I can formulate in 3 points:
To show that the Russians could advance.
They did not show and even worse, they wasted their defense resource;
To divert the attention of the AFU General Staff from the south to the east and make
them disperse their forces to reduce the pressure in Zaporizhzhya region - they did not;
To turn Kupiansk into a second Bakhmut and divert the attention of the internal audience
from the failures in the south to the battles around this town - neither did they.
Moreover, the process of transferring part of the units of the "West" and "Center" group
of forces to the south has begun.
In other words, the group, weakened by futile offensive convulsions, becomes even further
weakened as it heads to reinforce the southern foothold.
That this will be the case, I have already said earlier.
Of course, the convulsions along the Lyman-Kupiansk axis of the enemy will continue, but this
phase of imitation of an epic offensive has exhausted itself.
Although sometimes there is a completely unexpected continuation, but for whom?
In the meantime, you can call or write your representatives, members of Congress and any
elected officials in your government and demand increased support for Ukraine.
Thank you to the viewer who reminded me to voice these seemingly simple truths.
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