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When I hear statements that the Ukrainian Liberation Forces are
expanding a bridgehead on the left bank of the Kherson region, I experience regular dissonance.
This is due to the fact that the use of the term "bridgehead" for
what is happening on the left bank is, to put it mildly, incorrect.
A bridgehead is a territory where troops are deployed for defense or offensive actions.
In the case of the Left Bank, it should be a bridgehead,
the order of its creation is strictly prescribed when forcing a water barrier.
During the forcing of a water barrier, the forward units occupy the area on the
opposite bank, after which the second echelon forces are introduced and the
process of expansion to the level of operational forces takes place.
In turn, do we observe something similar on the left bank of the Kherson region?
No, then what is happening there?
And what is happening there is also a unique phenomenon for modern wars and conflicts.
The AFU with small groups of Special Operations Forces regularly expand the gray zone, which is
not controlled by either Ukrainian or Russian forces. But with one very important nuance.
The gray zone, which is getting bigger and bigger every time,
is under the fire control of artillery from the right bank, which has an advantage not
only in terms of range and accuracy, but also because of its location at dominant heights.
That is, it is a gray zone under Ukrainian fire control.
That is why it is incorrect to call what is happening on the
left bank of the Kherson region the expansion of the bridgehead.
Having understood what a bridgehead is, I will say a few words "for Kherson region" ... The
enemy units failed to do anything about the presence of the Special Operations Forces of
Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnipro, a little to the west of the village of Kozachi Laheri.
The main positions of the enemy's first line of defense are equipped
along the road leading from Oleshky to Nova Kakhovka along the bank of the Dnipro....
And any approach of the AFU to this line, in any place, causes the Russian command of the
"Dnepr" group of troops to have idiosyncrasies. It "immediately" starts pulling everything that
is "possible and impossible" to this place and immediately "counterattacks".
I think this is too nervous reaction.....
The AFU is operating in this direction exclusively with so-called "small infantry groups", their
presence on the left bank is tactical in nature (and even by such criteria - not very extensive).
And the main benefit from these "sorties" of the AFU, most likely,
consists in trolling the Russian command. So to speak, to keep it "in tone"...
Serious preparations for an operation such as "forcing the Dnipro" AFU clearly do not
demonstrate. For they obviously do not have extra, additional forces to be "active" in
this direction.... To create a nervous situation for Russians is not a problem, but to find 2-3
"additional" full-fledged crews, and then a couple more - to consolidate, or develop an
offensive (and, accordingly, an adequate number of artillery and air defense), much more difficult...
Well, of course, if the Russians, in the end, get "exhausted" running back
and forth along the Dnipro River after each Ukrainian diversionary group .... and "make
a hard but necessary decision" themselves, then no one will object ... But voluntarily
"drowning" their troops in the Dnipro by "forcing it with significant forces" the
general staff of the AFU is also clearly not going to .... At least not yet.
And when the expansion of the bridgehead begins to take place,
it will be impossible not to notice it. At least by the hysterical cries
of Russian propagandists and all sorts of "war correspondents".
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