All language subtitles for 25-08-2023xersxertfe

When I hear statements that the
Ukrainian Liberation Forces are

expanding a bridgehead on the left bank of the
Kherson region, I experience regular dissonance.

This is due to the fact that the
use of the term "bridgehead" for

what is happening on the left bank
is, to put it mildly, incorrect.

A bridgehead is a territory where troops are
deployed for defense or offensive actions.

In the case of the Left Bank,
it should be a bridgehead,

the order of its creation is strictly
prescribed when forcing a water barrier.

During the forcing of a water barrier,
the forward units occupy the area on the

opposite bank, after which the second
echelon forces are introduced and the

process of expansion to the level
of operational forces takes place.

In turn, do we observe something similar
on the left bank of the Kherson region?

No, then what is happening there?

And what is happening there is also a unique
phenomenon for modern wars and conflicts.

The AFU with small groups of Special Operations
Forces regularly expand the gray zone, which is

not controlled by either Ukrainian or Russian
forces. But with one very important nuance.

The gray zone, which is getting
bigger and bigger every time,

is under the fire control of artillery from
the right bank, which has an advantage not

only in terms of range and accuracy, but also
because of its location at dominant heights.

That is, it is a gray zone
under Ukrainian fire control.

That is why it is incorrect to
call what is happening on the

left bank of the Kherson region
the expansion of the bridgehead.

Having understood what a bridgehead is, I will
say a few words "for Kherson region" ... The

enemy units failed to do anything about the
presence of the Special Operations Forces of

Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnipro, a little
to the west of the village of Kozachi Laheri.

The main positions of the enemy's
first line of defense are equipped

along the road leading from Oleshky to Nova
Kakhovka along the bank of the Dnipro....

And any approach of the AFU to this line, in
any place, causes the Russian command of the

"Dnepr" group of troops to have idiosyncrasies.
It "immediately" starts pulling everything that

is "possible and impossible" to this
place and immediately "counterattacks".

I think this is too nervous reaction.....

The AFU is operating in this direction exclusively
with so-called "small infantry groups", their

presence on the left bank is tactical in nature
(and even by such criteria - not very extensive).

And the main benefit from these
"sorties" of the AFU, most likely,

consists in trolling the Russian command.
So to speak, to keep it "in tone"...

Serious preparations for an operation such
as "forcing the Dnipro" AFU clearly do not

demonstrate. For they obviously do not have
extra, additional forces to be "active" in

this direction.... To create a nervous situation
for Russians is not a problem, but to find 2-3

"additional" full-fledged crews, and then a
couple more - to consolidate, or develop an

offensive (and, accordingly, an adequate number of
artillery and air defense), much more difficult...

Well, of course, if the Russians, in
the end, get "exhausted" running back

and forth along the Dnipro River after each
Ukrainian diversionary group .... and "make

a hard but necessary decision" themselves,
then no one will object ... But voluntarily

"drowning" their troops in the Dnipro by
"forcing it with significant forces" the

general staff of the AFU is also clearly
not going to .... At least not yet.

And when the expansion of the
bridgehead begins to take place,

it will be impossible not to notice
it. At least by the hysterical cries

of Russian propagandists and all
sorts of "war correspondents".