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Today I want to raise the issue of military expediency and military significance of
certain defense areas in the context of the developing Ukrainian offensive.
A classic example of the "political will" to try to hold the situation despite the military
inexpediency was the Russians' defense of Kherson, which lost all its military significance back
in mid-spring last year, when the Russians finally gave up trying to attack Mykolaiv.
However, they held the defense area until November, losing the personnel of their
airborne and mechanized units in unfavorable conditions due to the geography of the area,
and it was extremely stupid. The situation was similar with other settlements.
Obviously, the Ukrainian command's current margin of time to implement a large-scale offensive
expires in early November - due to weather conditions. I emphasize - a large-scale offensive.
The Ukrainian defense forces have about eighty days left before the weather conditions change
significantly, which will negatively affect the capabilities of wheeled vehicles of the Ukrainian
defense forces. Is it a lot for the realization of access to the Sea of Azov? Enough, quite enough.
Despite desperate attempts to prolong their agony,
the occupiers can no longer be saved, at least in the south.
So, what is the main problem for the defending side? It is the accumulation
of general "fatigue" of the defense area followed by a leapfrog breakthrough.
Why? Let's go back in recent history.
The Ukrainians had this with the defense of Popasna last year.
Perfectly built before the full-scale invasion, the defense took the main blow in the form of
countless hordes of Russian troops, held out for about three months, and ceased to exist
with a fairly significant rollback. And this line of defense was qualitatively no
worse than what we see from the Russians. These weren't just continuous lines of fortifications,
but well-constructed platoon and company-level strongpoint systems.
Moreover, visibility allowed for objective control for tens of kilometers to the south and southeast.
The Russians have nothing like this in the south, the geography is not the same.
And what do the Russians have? In the direction of Staromlynivka there are no heights,
the defense line is a few kilometers away, in fact, the fighting is already in the
small village of Zavitne Bazhannia, after which, apparently, the fate of Staromlynivka
will resemble Urozhayne - they will hold on to it until physical extermination.
At the same time, the very line of defense they are holding on to
has been under intensive shelling by the AFU since the end of May.
Let's assume that about three more weeks will pass and the Ukrainian troops will
finally liberate Rabotino. In that case, what options can save Tokmak?
Tokmak, located on the banks of one small river, built in the form of circular defense - the best
place to destroy the remnant of the battalions worn out Russian in the format of simply
beating. The only problem will no longer be the significantly damaged communication lines between
the second and third lines of defense, but the high-rise buildings in Tokmak,
like the elevator clearly visible in the photograph from the Ukrainian drone. However,
again, this is until the first tank strikes from the Ukrainian tanks. And after that, freedom...
Countless fields, no major population centers, accumulated critical losses of the Russian army.
And apparently, at this time, a major offensive will begin from Huliaipole to the Polohy area,
and everything will go into motion. Ukrainian reserves have already started
to enter the battle, since yesterday marders, Challengers, Strykers have been spotted.
Advancing here is difficult, you're too conspicuous, and the enemy can't linger
in Ukrainian fields either. The shore of the Sea of Azov awaits the Ukrainian fighters,
while the Russian fighters are waiting for something completely different.
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