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The offensive on Lyman has choked, the offensive on Borova has collapsed,
the offensive on Kupiansk... let's stop here in detail.
For the Russian command, a critical moment has arrived โ strategic reserves
are being activated in the South. It shows that their defenses there are
cracking at the seams and the only way out is to reduce the pressure.
To reduce the pressure, according to the enemy command's plan, is possible by dispersing the
resource of Ukrainian defense forces from the south to the northeast. Otherwise, the
strategic reserve of the occupants, at best, will be enough until mid-September. Therefore, after
losing the initiative to Lyman and Borova, the Russians will persistently push through Kupiansk.
But there is a nuance in this plan of pulling back the resource and reducing pressure. The
same units of limited functionality are still operating in the South, rather than
the main Ukrainian strike groups designed to break through the main line of defense.
The conclusion is self-evident.
Meanwhile, the enemy command has started moving units and subunits from the "newly
formed" formations and associations to the South.
And we are talking, most likely, about the enemy's strategic reserves ... Namely,
the combined arms armies of the Central and Southern Military Districts of Russia,
which the enemy has formed as part of his declared increase in the size of his armed forces.
It becomes clear that the enemy has quite actively started the deployment of the
second operational echelon of troops in the defense zone of its group of troops
"Dnepr" .... Moreover, he has engaged a strategic reserve for this purpose....
Such a decision of Russia's top military command is not accidental or poorly reasoned.
It is, in fact, forced.
After all, it is obvious that strategic reserves are put into action only in two
cases - when they are preparing a large-scale offensive, or when
it has to be done out of "extreme necessity" because somewhere begins to "crack and tear".
It is obvious that the Russian side obviously cannot launch an offensive in the south,
and especially in the Kherson direction, where the enemy is now transferring a
"fresh" motorized rifle division from its strategic reserves....
Therefore, it is clear that this is happening within the framework of strengthening the
defense capabilities of the Dnipro group. But, in this regard, there is a well-reasoned
question - why exactly there and why exactly now? Why this "fresh meat" does not go, for example,
to Tokmak, or to Berdyansk direction, where the Ukrainian offensive is going on?
The answer is simple - because the recent events
in the Crimean-Tauride direction have really "worried" the Russian command.
Here we need to "go into details" a bit...
The fact is that the enemy still can not stop a number of tactical
bridgeheads of the Ukrainian defense forces on the left bank of the Dnipro.
Yes, I was not mistaken... there is not one, but at least 2 of them...
For example, during the previous few days, the enemy tried at least three times to attack some
"hard-to-define" positions of the AFU west of Kozachi Laheri settlement on the occupied bank,
and to no avail. In this regard, I find it hard to believe that the
Russian command is so "stupid" that it can attack someone who is not there...
Obviously, it is precisely to prevent the Ukrainian bridgeheads from "expanding or
connecting" that these reserves are arriving... The expansion of the Ukrainian forces' bridgehead
on the left bank of the Dnipro towards Armyansk is a very "sensitive" nuisance for the enemy....
While writing the scenario, BILD reported that the AFU fighters are entrenched on the left
bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region, to the northern border of Crimea - 83 km.
It's getting more and more interesting...
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