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Let's talk about enemy reserves and prospects.
The occupiers have probably learned the rule badly since last year - if you pull reserves
from one area, you weaken another.
And we are not even talking about tactical reserves.
Now they have a dilemma - where to move them?
Sometimes they lack the strength and resources for a full-fledged execution of tasks in Kupiansk
and Lyman, then they want to fully capture Marinka, then to encircle Avdiivka.
Or to hold positions in Bakhmut and Staromlynivka, or in other locations.
But there will come a moment when they will be forced to get into not operational, but
strategic reserves.
And in principle, there is not much left there.
After all, their main reserves are still tactical.
There are still a certain number of operational ones, which cover the 3rd line and what is
behind it.
From these reserves, the enemy is already slowly employing units.
It should be understood that the deeper the Ukrainians go into the enemy's orders, the
fewer minefields there are.
This means that even to delay the advance of the Ukrainian defense forces, the Russians
will have to suffer fantastic losses.
In other words, to disperse and deplete reserves.
And when one side enters an operational space that is not covered by reserves, it ends sadly
for the other side.
But the enemy is still very strong and has a sufficient margin of safety.
The stakes are now at their highest, and the price of error is also at its maximum.
In such conditions we see such rates of advancement, which we have now.
But it will not be like this all the time, that very moment will come at some point.
But it will not end the war, it is still for a long time, the war will not stop even after
reaching the borders of 1991.
And this is important to realize!
Everything, literally everything, will depend on the success of this year.
But this is about detailed planning, balanced decisions and prompt response, not about when
the Ukrainians will march on Moscow or seize any Russian territories.
This will not happen in principle, it is important to transfer fire to the enemy's territory
and wage war there, but it will be done by Russians, for example Freedom of Russia Legion.
And from the Ukrainian side they will have someone to cover them.
I am sure that the Ukrainian command has such competencies, which has been proven many times.
But conducting large-scale all-arms operations, which have not happened for almost 80 years
all over the world - this thing is extremely difficult.
On the fingers of one hand you can count on the fingers of one hand those people who will
be able to organize and implement it.
There are such people in Ukraine, and this is good.
Now we would have to wait for modern aviation and remove the taboo on the use of Western
weapons on the territory of Russia.
The conclusions are very simple, in fact, and I have already said it more than once.
We all need patience and understanding that the war will not end tomorrow, and the most
important thing is that the war is not somewhere "out there", only in Ukraine.
It is close to all of us, but it is hard to imagine and I understand that.
Well said Dr. Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute in his piece criticizing
the decision-making process at the level of Western governments:
"The war in Ukraine has highlighted significant shortcomings in the machinery of government
in NATO capitals, and it is vital that these are corrected to ensure that the Alliance
is prepared for future threats.
The most glaring flaw is the failure of Ukraine's partners to appreciate the time lag between
decisions and their desired effect.
The delay between knowing what was needed and deciding whether to provide assistance
was very costly.
Russian incompetence in conducting offensive operations in January 2023 saved Ukraine's
allies from all the consequences of their indecision.
The Ukrainian offensive may yet succeed.
But its cost has risen sharply because of Western lethargy."
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