All language subtitles for 09-08-2023xrexryoi

"Not Canon Fodder" or "Are Ukraine's Defense
Forces Advancing Slowly?"

First of all, I will address the civilians
who want meat and action, who complain in

their comfortable apartments about Ukraine's
allegedly slow counter-offensive.

They overlook the main difference between
the Ukrainian army and the Russian army.

While Russian commanders use soldiers as cannon
fodder, Ukrainian officers value soldiers'

lives, and for them there is no "meat assault"
option.

Ukrainians will not throw their own into minefields.

They will not rush into a poorly prepared
battle just so that the next military expert

can praise their diligence.

Instead, Ukrainian forces are bombarding the
Russian rear with British and French long-range

rockets, destroying ammunition depots and
supply centers.

The effect of the depletion of Russian forces
may not yet be as noticeable, but it is important.

Even a slow but sustained pressure campaign,
backed by the massive efforts now under way,

could create gaps in Russian lines that Ukrainian
forces could exploit first locally and then

for deeper penetration.

But much depends on Western supplies of equipment
and military hardware.

Ukraine needs demining equipment, more artillery,
more drones.

It finally needs aviation.

Separately, I would like to appeal to the
criticism of various experts, both European

and American, who are also not satisfied with
the pace of the counter-offensive.

Ukraine has gotten far less demining equipment
than it needs.

It tried American-style action to break through
the Russian defenses, but 10 days later it

had to adopt a different approach - more cautious
and consistent, matching its capabilities

and challenges on the battlefield.

And that, by historical standards, is a quick
adaptation.

By comparison, it took the U.S. Army four
years to develop an operational approach to

counterintelligence in Iraq to eliminate the
remnants of al-Qaeda and Baath.

It is a common misconception for large armies
to think that their way is the best or only

way.

As a result of this assumption, the U.S. tried
to build small mirror armies in its model,

Vietnam and Afghanistan.

And they failed because they were not tailored
to the specifics of the environment or did

not have the resources necessary for such
a build.

The Ukrainians know far more about how to
fight the Russians than anyone in the West,

and they are in combat conditions that no
Western army has faced since World War II.

If American colonels or generals were in Ukraine
and had direct contact with their Ukrainian

counterparts, they could get realistic assessments
of the course of combat operations and understand

Ukrainian tactical and operational needs.

This would give Ukraine the assurance of support
that videoconferencing does not provide, and

would also bring some calm to the discussions
in Washington.

A physical presence in Ukraine with a high-level
military mission, accompanied by visits from

the head of U.S. command in Europe, would
be indispensable to assess what needs to be

done to help Ukraine regain its territory
and win the war.

Stop whining - help win, that's what needs
to be done.

Then Ukraine will be able to maintain pressure
until Russian forces on the front line crack.

And Ukrainians will be able to take advantage
of this.