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"Not Canon Fodder" or "Are Ukraine's Defense Forces Advancing Slowly?"
First of all, I will address the civilians who want meat and action, who complain in
their comfortable apartments about Ukraine's allegedly slow counter-offensive.
They overlook the main difference between the Ukrainian army and the Russian army.
While Russian commanders use soldiers as cannon fodder, Ukrainian officers value soldiers'
lives, and for them there is no "meat assault" option.
Ukrainians will not throw their own into minefields.
They will not rush into a poorly prepared battle just so that the next military expert
can praise their diligence.
Instead, Ukrainian forces are bombarding the Russian rear with British and French long-range
rockets, destroying ammunition depots and supply centers.
The effect of the depletion of Russian forces may not yet be as noticeable, but it is important.
Even a slow but sustained pressure campaign, backed by the massive efforts now under way,
could create gaps in Russian lines that Ukrainian forces could exploit first locally and then
for deeper penetration.
But much depends on Western supplies of equipment and military hardware.
Ukraine needs demining equipment, more artillery, more drones.
It finally needs aviation.
Separately, I would like to appeal to the criticism of various experts, both European
and American, who are also not satisfied with the pace of the counter-offensive.
Ukraine has gotten far less demining equipment than it needs.
It tried American-style action to break through the Russian defenses, but 10 days later it
had to adopt a different approach - more cautious and consistent, matching its capabilities
and challenges on the battlefield.
And that, by historical standards, is a quick adaptation.
By comparison, it took the U.S. Army four years to develop an operational approach to
counterintelligence in Iraq to eliminate the remnants of al-Qaeda and Baath.
It is a common misconception for large armies to think that their way is the best or only
way.
As a result of this assumption, the U.S. tried to build small mirror armies in its model,
Vietnam and Afghanistan.
And they failed because they were not tailored to the specifics of the environment or did
not have the resources necessary for such a build.
The Ukrainians know far more about how to fight the Russians than anyone in the West,
and they are in combat conditions that no Western army has faced since World War II.
If American colonels or generals were in Ukraine and had direct contact with their Ukrainian
counterparts, they could get realistic assessments of the course of combat operations and understand
Ukrainian tactical and operational needs.
This would give Ukraine the assurance of support that videoconferencing does not provide, and
would also bring some calm to the discussions in Washington.
A physical presence in Ukraine with a high-level military mission, accompanied by visits from
the head of U.S. command in Europe, would be indispensable to assess what needs to be
done to help Ukraine regain its territory and win the war.
Stop whining - help win, that's what needs to be done.
Then Ukraine will be able to maintain pressure until Russian forces on the front line crack.
And Ukrainians will be able to take advantage of this.
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