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About the production of thousands of Russian drones... Not so long ago,

Russian propaganda released a report from its Lancet barrage munitions production facility with

the false narrative that its production capacity is tens of thousands of Lancets per month.

Russian top propagandists gave incredible production figures of

45,000 Lancets per month, and a number of Russian media even claimed 200,000.

Although the report was a psychological operation, panic-mongers in many countries fell for this lie.

Now, as the information space begins to actively discuss the story about

the Shahed-136 kamikaze drone factory, there are reports that this factory will be able

to produce thousands of kamikaze drones per month. But there is a nuance here as well.

First of all, Russia does not have the technical and technological capability

to produce thousands of drones of any type per month in a fully closed cycle.

For example, back in October 2021, Putin said that the Russian Defense Ministry has

2,000 various drones in service. He said it proudly, as if it was a mega-achievement.

That is, during the time without hyper-sanctions and active hostilities, the level of a full-scale

war, in a relatively working economy, only 2 thousand different drones were assembled.

Not 20 thousand or 10 thousand, but 2 thousand over several years of production

by different companies and different types in a country that was preparing for invasion.

Second, even in Iran, as of the fall of 2022

an average of 50 Shahed-136 drones were being produced. By early 2023,

it was able to approach a production rate of up to 100 Shahed-136s per month.

This is production in a country where everything for this process is set up and fine-tuned.

Thirdly. From words to numbers, if we talk about the Lancet, their every strike is videotaped and

shown on all propaganda platforms with foaming at the mouth and euphoria. But how many such

videos are published per month? 40 thousand, maybe 20 thousand or 2 thousand, at least 200?

Less than 100 videos of Lancet strikes are published in open sources in a month.

Now let's approach the question empirically.

In May 2023, 655 Russian various drones were shot down, 377 of which are Shahed-136.

That is, 278 of them are different types of drones of Russian and non-Russian manufacture.

In June, 414 drones were shot down, of which 166 are Shahed-136,

that is - 248 of them are different types of Russian and not only production.

In July, 448 drones were shot down, 193 of them Shahed-136,

that is - 255 of them are different types of Russian and not only of Russian production.

What conclusions can be drawn from this?

As we can see, from month to month, the average number of non-Shahed-136s shot down,

as well as Orlan, Lancet and others, is practically unchanged. These are

reconnaissance drones, these are drones with drop containers, these are barrage munitions,

and the sum total of all of them every month is about the same amount.

Therefore, when someone starts another conversation about the fact that Russia

can produce tens of thousands of drones and that soon Ukraine will be attacked daily

by hundreds of Shahed-136 and Lancet... Well, you know what to do in that case.

Sometimes an panic-mongers is worse than a monkey with a grenade.