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"It's not clear exactly yet, but it's likely to be bad news for the Russian navy," is the
opinion of Anders Nielsen, a military analyst at the Royal Danish Defense College, about
the end of the grain deal.
The grain deal was originally signed for 120 days and then extended several times despite
the Russian leadership threatening to withdraw from it each time.
At the time it was signed, the Russian leadership hoped that by the time the first 120 days
expired, Ukraine would have already lost, so it was seen as a PR exercise for developing
countries dependent on grain supplies, but cannot help Ukraine in the war.
In the end, the "grain deal" significantly benefited Ukraine, while Russia found itself
in a predicament where withdrawal was no longer feasible due to increasing international isolation.
Russia feared being blamed by African nations for causing a food crisis.
Also, the Russian navy is not in a position to run a full-fledged blockade of Ukrainian
ports.
They can shell Ukrainian ports or sink this or that ship with submarine torpedoes, but
a real blockade requires the navy to be present in the area where the ships are traveling
and inspect them.
And Ukraine now has land-based anti-ship missiles and fairly technologically advanced maritime
drones.
In a sense, during the "grain deal" the Russians controlled the Ukrainian navy by not allowing
anything but grain to be smuggled in, and by delaying their inspections, thus creating
a traffic jam of ships.
Many, including Nielsen himself, believed that the Russian leadership would go along
with the grain deal, as withdrawing from it would be even worse for Russia than continuing.
However, on July 17, there was an explosion on the Crimean Bridge, which created serious
delays in Russian logistics (as well as a personal insult to Putin, so he couldn't just
renegotiate the deal).
As a result, the Russians responded with a series of unrealistic demands to reopen the
grain deal, including lifting some of the sanctions, which of course no one would go
for, as they could put forward lifting even more for the next grain deal.
It looks like the Russian leadership was not prepared for the possibility of undermining
the bridge and did not know how to react.
Their response has not been very consistent.
The statement that any ship would be seen as potentially carrying military cargo is
pretty vague.
Then one Kremlin official did clarify that ships would be inspected.
Conducting a naval blockade has clear rules.
It must be announced in advance and then warn passing ships about inspections, you can't
just shoot at them.
The Russians can naturally spit on international laws, but they still need to come in close
to know exactly where the ships are.
This, in turn, will bring the Russian navy into range of Ukrainian missiles and drones.
The Russian Armed Forces will probably continue shelling ports in the near future, in the
hope that this will scare the shipowners enough.
However, in the long run, the Russian leadership faces a number of unpleasant dilemmas.
At the moment everyone is accusing them specifically of using food as a weapon.
If they send a fleet to enforce the blockade - they risk losing ships.
If they don't, they look like losers.
Russian Armed Forces are also forced to spend expensive missiles to destroy grain.
It is possible that the timing of the Crimean Bridge attack was calculated by Ukraine as
a trap for Russia.
The Ukrainian leadership may have decided to raise the stakes by pushing through the
expansion of the "grain deal" to other commodities.
From Ukraine's position, the "grain deal" was a permission for Russia to "blockade at
a discount" where the Russians controlled the passage of ships through inspections.
And from this position, the Ukrainian leadership decided to disrupt this partial blockade by
taking advantage of the weakness of the Russian navy.
What do you think, I look forward to your options in the comments ? Oh yeah, I almost
forgot, thank you all so much for everyone's comments under the video before last, I'll
have a little more free time now.
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