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Zulu
A 100,000-strong Russian offensive on the Lyman-Kupiansk axis....
Last week, Russian occupation troops launched an active offensive in the Luhansk region,
with goal #1 - to reach the administrative borders of the region, goal #2 - to reach
the left bank of the Oskol River, and about goal #3 a little later.
The Russian command planned to launch a counteroffensive on February 24, 2023,
but it was then they choked and did not start.
Many factors played to their detriment and the activation of one of the most
combat-ready and staffed groups was postponed for later. And that later was the end of June.
But the activation was not planned. The occupants were prompted to do so by
intensive offensive actions of the Ukrainian defense forces since mid-May in the area of
Bakhmut, as well as since early June in the Zaporizhzhya and partially Donetsk regions.
That is, the plan to fulfill objective #1 and objective #2 became conditioned by the need
to fulfill objective #3 - diversion of the command of the Ukrainian defense forces and
dispersal of their resources to reinforce another section of the front. That is, the
initial objective of the entire Russian offensive along the Lyman-Kupiansk axis is... imitation.
They imitate an epic offensive, realizing the minimal chance of success, with only
one goal - to divert the attention and resource of Ukrainians from Zaporizhzhya and Donetsk regions.
According to the idea of Putin's command, the pressure of defense
forces in these directions should decrease, but there is a nuance.
After the Russian troops regrouped, the Ukrainian side also wasted no time and set up defenses on
the vacated positions. In fact, the Russians are now forced to advance along the same
supply line as the Ukrainians in the Zaporizhzhya region, but from open positions to closed ones.
Another very important point is resource. The figures of 100 thousand personnel and 900
tanks are constantly heard in the information space. Many impressionable people faint when
they hear such figures and with a white flag in one hand and a torch in the other run to
retransmit the slogan "counter-offensive failed, we need negotiations", but....
What's 100,000 occupiers? It's 125 Battalion tactical groups.
What is the offensive front on the Lyman-Kupiansk axis? 172 kilometers.
What's the BTG's offensive functionality? In January-February 2023 in the direction of
Ugledar there were 3 to 4 BTG per 1 km of front. Remember what the result was, those meat waves of
the enemy? Russian forces lost the basic offensive functionality of their BTGs as early as 2022.
So, offensively, even 4 BTGs per 1 km of front is no guarantee of a successful offensive for
the Russian side. And in this case, 125 BTGs on 172 km of front, everything is clear.
Further, what is 900 tanks? More precisely, how many,
according to the standard configuration of tanks should be in the 125 BTG? 1375 tanks.
That is, a shortage of 475 main battle tanks, which undermines the functionality of the BTG.
Further, all this mass is not simultaneously in the first line, they are placed on echelons.
That is, the resource to break through the defense of the defense
forces on the axis is even less than necessary.
And these are all dry figures, which are confirmed in practice.
Not even a week of active actions in the enemy's offensive, as this
offensive fell into stagnation, and in some places even rolled
back because of the lack of resources to hold the positions taken earlier.
That's why we need to include critical thinking, we don't need to reflex on big
numbers, 100 thousand personnel, 900 tanks, thousands of Russian drones,
tactical nuclear weapons, explosives on the roof of the fifth power unit, and so on.
If it does not turn on, then listen to those who will explain everything in a sensible
and balanced way, without panic and calls to buy potassium iodide in bulk. I have spoken.
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