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This is what the gradual advance of Ukrainian troops in southern Ukraine looks like now.
The infantry is moving ahead and clearing enemy trenches, while the armored vehicles
are moving behind them along a route that has already been checked for mines.
With such tactics do not expect quick breakthroughs, but the Defense Forces of Ukraine bear minimal
losses.
Only after the breakthrough of the main defense lines will the classic attacks of armored
vehicles together with infantry led by tanks begin.
To understand what this tactic gives, let's look at some numbers in the dynamics of the
Ukrainian offensive and Russian attempts to attack in some directions....
Let's take the Oryx data for the last published 10 days.
Some of the numbers in the reports are old equipment, but most are fresh casualties on
both sides.
A peculiarity of the statistics of the summer campaign is that the Ukrainian defense forces
conduct their actions in the mode of semi-silence.
Therefore - especially with regard to Ukrainian losses - the supporting video and photographic
material is mostly independent or of Russian origin.
Consequently, the casualty figures are likely even worse for Russian forces.
Between July 10 and July 19, Russia lost 248 units, Ukraine lost 73 units.
The ratio of losses for these 10 days is 3.4 to 1.
Losses by type of equipment:
Tanks: 46 to 12.
At that, the last big losses of the AFU were recorded in the report for July 10-11 with
8 tanks.
Since that time the ratio of 33 to 4 in favor of Ukraine has been recorded.
Armoured fighting vehicles and Infantry fighting vehicles: 58 to 18.
The same, the last heavy losses of Ukraine were recorded in the report for July 10-11
with 13 vehicles.
Armored personnel carriers and light armored vehicles: 33 to 29.
Here everything is more - less even.
Both sides are actively using light armored vehicles.
Why Russia loses a lot of such armored vehicles?
On the photo you see the old largest Soviet BMP-1 storage base in Buryatia.
Already more than half of the base is empty, the enemy has lost a lot of modern vehicles
on the Kharkov and Kyiv direction since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.
The only way for Russia to support its troops is with old USSR equipment, but it loses significantly
in this war.
This is one of the reasons for such inflated losses.
Artillery: 28 vs. 8.
Here the numbers are clearly underestimated by OSINT specialists.
Perhaps - in both directions.
Because fixing the results of counter-battery work is quite a complicated thing.
But the trend is also clear.
Trucks: 53 vs. 7.
Ukraine is consistently better at enemy logistics and that's great.
Drones: 12 to 6.
These are mainly operational-tactical level drones and during this time the Ukrainians
lost one Bayraktar.
What else do these numbers tell us?
They show us quite clearly how the gap in the quantity of equipment is narrowing.
Qualitatively, the advantage is already on the side of Ukraine.
Yes, it's not a quick process.
But the rate of Russian losses of the same tanks far outstrips the rate of their restoration
and modernization, even if we take only a very conservative estimate of Oryx.
And so it is for almost all types of equipment.
The Ukrainian offensive began without an actual advantage of 2-3 times as it should have been
and without mopping up the enemy with airpower, which is still lacking.
Such systematic "loss ratios" should lead to one result: the enemy will not be able
to hold the 200-kilometer front line in the South at a certain time.
Mobility and speed of reactions after breaking through the enemy's defense line will be the
key factor after the "exhaustion" and "breakthrough" stages.
And many armies of the world can learn mobility from the Ukrainians.
The gradual softening of Russian defenses in the South continues.
They are already hurting, and it's going to hurt a lot.
So let's keep watching...
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