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Bloomberg estimates that after 16 months of full-scale warfare, Ukraine has more tanks than

Russia, 1,500 Ukrainian tanks versus 1,400 Russian tanks. On the day of the full-scale invasion,

Russia had 3.5 times more tanks. How did Russia manage to shit its tank potential so badly?

According to the documented data the Ukrainian side has lost 558 tanks as of today.

Of these, 352 have been destroyed, 66 damaged, 140 captured.

The Russian side has lost 2,082 tanks,

of which 1,308 were destroyed, 231 damaged, and 545 captured.

That is practically all the lost Ukrainian tanks were compensated at the expense of

the Russian "Lend-Lease" so to speak. But there is a nuance.

At first glance, Ukraine has an advantage in terms of quantity,

but only conditionally, not in practice.

The fact is that quite a few of the Russian tanks are unfit for service.

These tanks require repairs, maintenance, crews and ammunition.

Not all of them have been restored to a combat-ready condition.

The article takes a superficial look at the situation without delving into the issues.

Although, the fact that Ukraine has as many trophy tanks as it has lost is noteworthy.

Also the other day a video appeared of Russian T-54/T-55 tanks being transported

as ancient as "Mammoth's Crap" into the war zone.

And don't tell me about using them as artillery, they actually use them as a combat unit.

Having lost almost all of its original tank resource during the full-scale invasion

of Ukraine, the Russian military industrial complex has never been able to make up for it.

The reason for this is that at the time of the full-scale

invasion of Ukraine there was no serial production of tanks in Russia as such.

T-72 and T-80 tanks have not been produced since 1998, T-90 tanks since 2011.

There was only repair and modernization of the tanks in service and in storage.

This led to degradation of production lines of the same T-72 tanks.

Over 25 years they have been disassembled, sawn up, and broken down.

Today Russian tank building enterprises can be divided into two categories - taking out

of storage and modernization of conditionally modern tanks and taking out of storage and

modernization of outright junk from the "grandfathers rode on it to Berlin" era.

Let's look again at the dynamics of destruction of Russian tanks in the combat zone.

Yes, there have not been records for a long time, but on average it is in the range of 200 combat

vehicles per month. The question is, does the Russian military-industrial complex have the

ability to compensate for such a number of tanks per month with production? The answer is obvious.

If we're talking about T-72/80/90 tanks, no.

That is why more and more T-62/54/55 appear in the combat zone; although quantitatively

they can reach the approximate compensation level, but still they are very far from full

requirement, because their capacity is insufficient for such a replenishment.

There is also one more very important factor - logistics.

Logistics does not always provide timely delivery, according to the needs of the units.

But, most importantly, the presence of tanks is mostly concentrated in the second line.

And this all means that the real stress for the Russian troops is yet to come.

Already now, losses and compensation are putting the tank potential of the Russian occupation

group into minus, but as soon as the processes on the main line of defense are intensified,

compensation will plunge into a deep and irreparable crisis.

Very much looking forward to this moment, are you ?